农产品交易关系治理机制
|
摘要
20世纪80年代以来,伴随着以家庭联产承包责任制为核心的农业生产体制改革的推进,党中央、国务院启动了以市场化改革为中心的农村流通体制改革,打破了国合商业在农村流通中的垄断地位,逐步推动农村商品流通的市场化。经过20多年的改革与发展,一个以市场调节为基础,国家宏观调控下的多形式、多渠道的农村流通体系已初步建立。伴随着两项改革的推进,农户成为了农业生产和农产品流通的基本组织单元。然而,随着这两项改革的深化,一些新的矛盾也逐渐突显出来,其中尤以“小农户”与“大市场”之间的矛盾最为突出。当前正在推行的农业产业化的使命正在于在家庭承包制的前提下解决“小农户”如何进入“大市场”的问题。基于上述认识,学者们对农业产业化进程中能够带动农户进入市场的经济组织形式及其与农户的联系机制进行了大量研究,取得了丰富的研究成果。在现有的研究中,学者们主要依赖新制度经济学,尤其是交易成本经济学展开研究,大多将注意力集中在农产品交易关系中契约的类型与性质、针对契约不完备产生的违约与机会主义行为的治理机制等方面。这种研究方法过于单一的现象不仅会产生很多的重复性研究,同时也不利于深化对相关问题的认识与理解。如以经济学为理论基础的研究中,由于学者们过于关注各种交易关系中的契约形式及其隐含的各种经济学命题,交易关系中的另一个重要层面——交易双方交易关系的建立、发展、维护与终止过程,以及在此过程中双方的互动行为——都没有得到充分的关注。根据经济社会学嵌入理论的观点,经济行为是嵌入在社会关系中的,因而忽视了经济交易行为所嵌入其中的社会互动背景对交易行为的解释是不完全的。以新制度经济学作为基本的理论工具对农产品流通进行研究使得上述交易关系的社会维度无法进入分析视野,这无论是对理论的发展,还是对实践的指导都是一个重要的缺陷。与此同时,现有的关于农产品交易关系治理机制的研究也基本上以新制度经济学为分析工具,围绕着威廉姆森的交易治理理论模型展开,交易关系中的社会与文化要素没有得到应有关注。基于此,本文在现有研究的基础上,重点从关系营销与营销渠道治理理论的角度对农产品交易关系进行研究,重点关注现有研究的两个薄弱环节：农产品交易关系的建立、发展、维护与结束的过程,以及农产品交易关系的治理机制。论文希望通过关注交易关系社会文化背景的理论视角的研究,对农产品交易关系中的若干社会行为要素及其对交易关系稳定性的影响展开深入研究。
论文研究发现可以概括为以下几个方面：
第一,农产品交易关系包括经济与社会行为两大维度。本文将市场营销学中的营销渠道政治经济比较分析框架引入农产品流通渠道,并建立了农产品流通渠道政治经济分析框架模型。根据政治经济分析框架的观点,本文将农产品交易关系作为分析单位,进而将农产品流通渠道的研究领域分成了经济与社会行为两大维度。基于这个分析框架,本文对农产品流通领域的研究文献进行了大体的定位,研究发现现有绝大多数研究都是集中于农产品交易关系的经济维度,即致力于探讨农产品交易的形式、契约的性质与类型及交易关系中的决策机制。相对于农产品经济维度研究文献的极大丰富,对农产品交易关系社会行为维度的研究则非常缺乏,而关于经济与社会行为维度之间相互影响、相互作用的研究就更为稀少。据此,本文认为应该加强对农产品交易关系的社会行为维度的研究,尤其需要关注各种社会行为要素对交易绩效的影响。基于营销学的理论基础,本文认为可以借鉴关系营销理论和营销渠道行为理论深入展开对农产品交易关系行为维度的研究。但在借鉴营销学理论对农产品交易关系进行研究的过程中,需要注意由于研究背景和研究对象转换所带来的理论适用性问题。
第二,社会行为要素对农产品交易关系的生命周期过程有重要影响。基于本文提出的农产品流通渠道政治经济分析框架,并带着对农产品交易关系行为维度进行探索研究的目标,本文首先考察了在农产品交易关系建立、发展、维护与结束过程中社会行为要素的影响。两个案例研究印证了政治经济分析框架的观点,在农产品交易关系生命周期过程中,除了诸如市场价格机制、竞争机制等传统经济学所关注的因素以外,诸如公平、冲突、满意、权力应用、信任与承诺等社会行为要素对农产品交易关系的生命周期过程产生了重要影响。但这种影响会由于交易关系类型的不同而存在一些差别,如在市场型交易关系中,价格在交易关系发展的早期阶段起着几乎唯一的决定作用,而在交易关系向高级阶段不断发展的过程中,诸如公平、满意、信任等行为要素所起的作用就会越来越大。而在订单农业中的契约型交易关系中,由于交易关系在建立最初就具有一定的长期导向,因此价格机制所起的作用就不如在市场型交易关系中那么突出,相反,冲突的解决、权力的应用、满意水平、信任与承诺等社会行为要素在整个交易关系的发展过程中都扮演着极为重要的作用。本文这两个案例研究的发现进一步强化了本文理论研究中的观点,即深入研究农产品交易关系中的社会行为要素可以更为全面、深刻地理解农产品交易关系的运行机制。
第三,嵌于农村社会文化中的人际关系行为规范是一种重要的农产品交易治理机制。如我们在文中多次提到的那样,现有关于农产品交易关系治理机制的研究主要以新制度经济学为理论工具,并且多数研究都是建立在威廉姆森所建立的经典理论框架的基础上,而对于交易关系中的社会行为要素缺乏足够的关注。基于这一理论缺陷,本文将营销学中的营销渠道治理理论和关系营销理论引入到农产品交易关系的治理研究中,并着重关注了经济学分析范式没有充分重视的社会行为要素。本文的跨案例研究表明,在不同的农产品交易关系中,均存在一种为交易关系提供了内在的稳定机制,并且有效抑制了交易双方的投机行为、提升了交易绩效的治理机制,这种治理机制就是根植于中国农村乡土社会文化中的人际关系行为规范。这一研究结果一方面印证了营销渠道治理理论中关于关系治理机制的重要作用,另一方面,也丰富并在某种程度上拓展了关系治理的研究。这是由于我们所发现的这种基于农村社会文化的人际关系行为规范的治理机制并不完全等同于营销渠道治理理论文献中的关系治理,前者更能体现中国本土文化的特点,这种人与人之间的行为规范嵌入在中国的乡土文化中,而不像西方学者所称的关系治理中行为规范是建立在双方企业不断互动的基础上。从这个角度来看,继续深化对中国本土的这种“关系治理”机制的研究也将有利于推动营销渠道治理理论的发展。
第四,政府应在提升农产品交易绩效的工作中准确定位角色与参与程度。在农业产业化过程中,政府,尤其是基层政府应该在提升农产品交易绩效的过程中扮演什么样的角色、履行什么样的职责一直也是学界非常关心的问题。从理论研究和实践来看,基层政府的角色正在趋向理性化、合理化,从最初直接介入农产品的交易关系,逐步向以提供公共产品和间接协助为主转变。本文研究发现也表明,政府合理地界定其参与农产品交易关系的角色对提升交易绩效、促进农户增收具有重要意义。一方面,中国农村的现实特点决定了基层政府无法、也不能游离于农产品流通过程之外,不仅诸如市场信息、交通等基础设施这样的公共产品有赖于政府提供,并且企业与农户之间交易关系的建立也需要政府提供很多协助。另一方面,政府在介入农产品流通过程时,又必须明确地界定自己的角色与职责,以公共产品提供者的身份间接介入农产品交易关系,而非出于逐利的动机或者对农产品流通活动予以管控的动机介入是一种较为合适的方式。当然,深入、细致地探讨政府在农产品流通过程中的职责并不是本文研究的重点,但这却是一个非常值得继续深入研究的重大理论与现实问题。
Since 1980s, as promoting the reform of agricultural production system with household contract resposibility system as its core, Central Party Committee and State Council have launched the reform of rural distribution system centered on marketization, breakting up the monoply of state-owned commerce in rural distribution, and promoting marketization of distribution of rural commodities step by step. After over 20 years'development and reform, based on market regulation, the multi-form and multi-channel rural distribution system under national control has initially established. With promoting two forms, farmers have become the basic organization unit of agricultural prodution and agricultural products distribution. However, with these two reforms deepening, some new contradicions appear gradually, among which the contradiction between "small rural households" and "large market" is especially serious. The task of implementing agricultural industrialization is to solve how the "small rural households" enter into the "large market" under the condition of household contract system. Based on the above, scholars have studied considerably on the forms of economic organization which could bring the farmers into makets and their connections mechanism with fanmers in the progress of agricultural industrialization, and achieved fruitful results. In the extant researches, based mainly on New Institutional Economics, especially Transaction Cost Economics, scholars focus on the types and nature of contract in the transaction relationship of agricultural products and governance mechanism of breaking contracts and opportunistic behaviors caused by incomplete contract. Such single method not just lead to replicated researches, but is not conducive to know and understand relevant issues deeply. For instance, among the researches based on economics, since scholars pay much attention to contract types of various transtion relationship and their implicit propositions of economics, the other important level of transaction relationship——the process of establishing, developing, maintaining and terminating the transaction relationship, and the interaction behaviors of the parties during these processes——is not paid sufficient attention. According to Embeddedness of Economic Sociology, economic actions are embedded in social relationships. Thus, transaction behaviors can not be explained fully if the background of social interaction in which economic transaction behaviors are embedded is ignored. Based on New Institutional Economics, researches on agricultural products distribution are blind to the social dimensions of transtion relationships, which is main defect of development of theory and guidance of practice. Meanwhile, also based on New Institutional Economics, the extant researches on governance mechanism of transaction relationships of agricultural products are centered on Williamson's model of transaction governance, and the social and cultural factors in transation relationships are ignored. Based on this, this paper will study the agricultural transaction relationship mainly from the perspective of relationship marketing and governance of marketing channel, and focus on two parts ignored:the process of establishing, developing, maintaining and terminating the transaction relationship, and the interaction behaviors of the parties during these processes. By focusing on social cultural background of transaction relationships, this paper will study deeply some factors of social behaviors and their impact on stablity of transaction relationships.
The findings could be summarized as follows:
First, the transaction relationships include economic dimension and social dimension. This paper introduces the political economies comparative analytical framework of marketing channel to distribution channel of agricultural products, and establishes a political economies analytical framework of distribution channel of agricultural products. According to analytical framework of political economies, this paper regards transaction relationships of agricultural products as analytical unit, and then divides the field of distribution of agricultural products into economics dimension and social dimension. Based on this analytical framework, through studying the literatures on distribution of agricultural products, this paper finds most researches focus on economic dimension of transaction relationships of agricultural products, which mainly discuss the types of agricultural products transaction, nature and types of contract and decision mechanism in transaction relationships. Compared with literatures mainly on economic dimension of agricultural products, literatures lack social dimension of agricultural products, especially interaction between economic dimension and social dimension. According to this, the researches on social behaviors of transaction relationships of agricultural products should be strengthened, and the attention to the impact of various factors of social behaviors on transaction performance should be paid in particular. Based on Marketing, behavioral dimension of transaction relationships of agricultural products could be studied deeply by borrowing theory about relationship marketing and marketing channel behavior. But during such process, the problem of theoretical generality caused by transforming background and object of research should be paid attention.
Second, factors of social behavior have significant impact on life cycle of transaction relationships of agricultural products. Based on political economies analytical framework of agricultural products distribution, to explore the behavioral dimension of transaction relationships of agricultural products, the impact of factors of social behavior on the process of establishing, developing, maintaining and terminating the transaction relationships of agricultural products are studied firstly. Two cases studies confirm the political economies analytical framework. In the life cycle of transaction relationships of agricultural products, traditional economies focus on price, competition, etc. In addition to that, factors of social behavior, such as equity, conflict, satisfaction, use of power, trust and promise, also have significant impact on the life cycle of transaction relationships of agricultural products. But such impact is different due to the types of transaction relationships. In market transaction relationships, price is the only determinants in the beginning stages of transaction relationships, while as the transaction relationships developing, factors such as equity, satisfaction, trust play more and more important role. In the contract transaction relationships of made-to-order agriculture, since transaction relationships are long-term oriented initially, price plays less important role than in market transaction relationships. On the contrary, factors such as solving conflict, use of power, level of satisfaction, trust and promise play extremely important role in the developing process of transaction relationships. Findings of the two case studies confirm the view of the theoretical research in this paper. The running mechanism of the transaction relationships of agricultural products could be understood comprehensively by studying the dimensions of social behavior.
Third, the behavioral norms of interpersonal relationships embedded in rural social culture are an important transaction governance mechanism of agriculture. As mentioned, the extant researches on governance mechanism of transaction relationships of agricultural products mainly regard New Institutional Economics as theoretical tool, and most of them are based on Williamson's classic theoretical framework. However, factors of social behavior in transaction relationships are ignored. Based on this theoretical gap, this paper introduces marketing channel governance and relationship marketing to transaction relationship governance of agricultural products, and focus on the factors of social behavior Economics analytical paradigm ignores. Findings of cross-case study show that, in different transaction relationships of agricultural products, there is a transaction relationship which provides internal stability mechanism, inhibits opportunistic behaviors, and promotes the governance mechanism of transaction performance. Such governance mechanism is rooted in the behavioral norms of interpersonal relationships in China rural social culture. This result, on the one hand, confirms the important role of governance mechanism in marketing channel governance theory; on the other hand, this result enriches and extends to some extent the researches on relationship governance, because the governance mechanism of behavioral norms of interpersonal relationships in rural social culture could not be totally equal to relationship governance in literatures on marketing channel governance theory. The former reflects the Chinese local culture better, in which the interpersonal behavioral norms are embedded, rather than behavioral norms of relationship governance are established on the interactions of firms, as western scholars argue. From this point of view, researches on "relationship governance" mechanism in Chinese culture should be deepened, which is also helpful to promote the governance theory of marketing channel.
Fourth, government should position its role exactly and the level of participation in the work of promoting transaction performance of agricultural products. In agriculural industrialization, the role and responsibility of government, especially local government in promoting transaction performance of agricultural products are always hot issues scholars are concerned about. Theoretically and practically, the roles of local government are tending to be rational and reasonable, and transform from intervening directly in transaction relationships of agricultural products to providing public goods and assiting indirectly. Findings show that, government defines its role reasonably in participating in transaction relationships of agricultural products, which is significant to promote transaction performance and increase farmers'income. On the one hand, the local governmeng can not be free with the distribution of agricultural products, which is determined by the reality in Chinese country. Government not just provides public goods, such as market information, transportation, but help establish the transaction relationships between firms and farmers. On the other hands, when intervening in the distribution of agricultural products, government must define its roles and resposibilities clearly. It is appropriate to be provider of publice goods to intervene in transaction relationships of agricultural products, rather than pursue profits or control the distribution of agricultural products. It is beyond the main body of this paper to discuss deeply and detailedly the roles and resposibilities government plays in the distribution of agricultural products. However, it is an important theoretical and practical issue that is worthwhile to study deeply.
论文研究发现可以概括为以下几个方面：
第一,农产品交易关系包括经济与社会行为两大维度。本文将市场营销学中的营销渠道政治经济比较分析框架引入农产品流通渠道,并建立了农产品流通渠道政治经济分析框架模型。根据政治经济分析框架的观点,本文将农产品交易关系作为分析单位,进而将农产品流通渠道的研究领域分成了经济与社会行为两大维度。基于这个分析框架,本文对农产品流通领域的研究文献进行了大体的定位,研究发现现有绝大多数研究都是集中于农产品交易关系的经济维度,即致力于探讨农产品交易的形式、契约的性质与类型及交易关系中的决策机制。相对于农产品经济维度研究文献的极大丰富,对农产品交易关系社会行为维度的研究则非常缺乏,而关于经济与社会行为维度之间相互影响、相互作用的研究就更为稀少。据此,本文认为应该加强对农产品交易关系的社会行为维度的研究,尤其需要关注各种社会行为要素对交易绩效的影响。基于营销学的理论基础,本文认为可以借鉴关系营销理论和营销渠道行为理论深入展开对农产品交易关系行为维度的研究。但在借鉴营销学理论对农产品交易关系进行研究的过程中,需要注意由于研究背景和研究对象转换所带来的理论适用性问题。
第二,社会行为要素对农产品交易关系的生命周期过程有重要影响。基于本文提出的农产品流通渠道政治经济分析框架,并带着对农产品交易关系行为维度进行探索研究的目标,本文首先考察了在农产品交易关系建立、发展、维护与结束过程中社会行为要素的影响。两个案例研究印证了政治经济分析框架的观点,在农产品交易关系生命周期过程中,除了诸如市场价格机制、竞争机制等传统经济学所关注的因素以外,诸如公平、冲突、满意、权力应用、信任与承诺等社会行为要素对农产品交易关系的生命周期过程产生了重要影响。但这种影响会由于交易关系类型的不同而存在一些差别,如在市场型交易关系中,价格在交易关系发展的早期阶段起着几乎唯一的决定作用,而在交易关系向高级阶段不断发展的过程中,诸如公平、满意、信任等行为要素所起的作用就会越来越大。而在订单农业中的契约型交易关系中,由于交易关系在建立最初就具有一定的长期导向,因此价格机制所起的作用就不如在市场型交易关系中那么突出,相反,冲突的解决、权力的应用、满意水平、信任与承诺等社会行为要素在整个交易关系的发展过程中都扮演着极为重要的作用。本文这两个案例研究的发现进一步强化了本文理论研究中的观点,即深入研究农产品交易关系中的社会行为要素可以更为全面、深刻地理解农产品交易关系的运行机制。
第三,嵌于农村社会文化中的人际关系行为规范是一种重要的农产品交易治理机制。如我们在文中多次提到的那样,现有关于农产品交易关系治理机制的研究主要以新制度经济学为理论工具,并且多数研究都是建立在威廉姆森所建立的经典理论框架的基础上,而对于交易关系中的社会行为要素缺乏足够的关注。基于这一理论缺陷,本文将营销学中的营销渠道治理理论和关系营销理论引入到农产品交易关系的治理研究中,并着重关注了经济学分析范式没有充分重视的社会行为要素。本文的跨案例研究表明,在不同的农产品交易关系中,均存在一种为交易关系提供了内在的稳定机制,并且有效抑制了交易双方的投机行为、提升了交易绩效的治理机制,这种治理机制就是根植于中国农村乡土社会文化中的人际关系行为规范。这一研究结果一方面印证了营销渠道治理理论中关于关系治理机制的重要作用,另一方面,也丰富并在某种程度上拓展了关系治理的研究。这是由于我们所发现的这种基于农村社会文化的人际关系行为规范的治理机制并不完全等同于营销渠道治理理论文献中的关系治理,前者更能体现中国本土文化的特点,这种人与人之间的行为规范嵌入在中国的乡土文化中,而不像西方学者所称的关系治理中行为规范是建立在双方企业不断互动的基础上。从这个角度来看,继续深化对中国本土的这种“关系治理”机制的研究也将有利于推动营销渠道治理理论的发展。
第四,政府应在提升农产品交易绩效的工作中准确定位角色与参与程度。在农业产业化过程中,政府,尤其是基层政府应该在提升农产品交易绩效的过程中扮演什么样的角色、履行什么样的职责一直也是学界非常关心的问题。从理论研究和实践来看,基层政府的角色正在趋向理性化、合理化,从最初直接介入农产品的交易关系,逐步向以提供公共产品和间接协助为主转变。本文研究发现也表明,政府合理地界定其参与农产品交易关系的角色对提升交易绩效、促进农户增收具有重要意义。一方面,中国农村的现实特点决定了基层政府无法、也不能游离于农产品流通过程之外,不仅诸如市场信息、交通等基础设施这样的公共产品有赖于政府提供,并且企业与农户之间交易关系的建立也需要政府提供很多协助。另一方面,政府在介入农产品流通过程时,又必须明确地界定自己的角色与职责,以公共产品提供者的身份间接介入农产品交易关系,而非出于逐利的动机或者对农产品流通活动予以管控的动机介入是一种较为合适的方式。当然,深入、细致地探讨政府在农产品流通过程中的职责并不是本文研究的重点,但这却是一个非常值得继续深入研究的重大理论与现实问题。
Since 1980s, as promoting the reform of agricultural production system with household contract resposibility system as its core, Central Party Committee and State Council have launched the reform of rural distribution system centered on marketization, breakting up the monoply of state-owned commerce in rural distribution, and promoting marketization of distribution of rural commodities step by step. After over 20 years'development and reform, based on market regulation, the multi-form and multi-channel rural distribution system under national control has initially established. With promoting two forms, farmers have become the basic organization unit of agricultural prodution and agricultural products distribution. However, with these two reforms deepening, some new contradicions appear gradually, among which the contradiction between "small rural households" and "large market" is especially serious. The task of implementing agricultural industrialization is to solve how the "small rural households" enter into the "large market" under the condition of household contract system. Based on the above, scholars have studied considerably on the forms of economic organization which could bring the farmers into makets and their connections mechanism with fanmers in the progress of agricultural industrialization, and achieved fruitful results. In the extant researches, based mainly on New Institutional Economics, especially Transaction Cost Economics, scholars focus on the types and nature of contract in the transaction relationship of agricultural products and governance mechanism of breaking contracts and opportunistic behaviors caused by incomplete contract. Such single method not just lead to replicated researches, but is not conducive to know and understand relevant issues deeply. For instance, among the researches based on economics, since scholars pay much attention to contract types of various transtion relationship and their implicit propositions of economics, the other important level of transaction relationship——the process of establishing, developing, maintaining and terminating the transaction relationship, and the interaction behaviors of the parties during these processes——is not paid sufficient attention. According to Embeddedness of Economic Sociology, economic actions are embedded in social relationships. Thus, transaction behaviors can not be explained fully if the background of social interaction in which economic transaction behaviors are embedded is ignored. Based on New Institutional Economics, researches on agricultural products distribution are blind to the social dimensions of transtion relationships, which is main defect of development of theory and guidance of practice. Meanwhile, also based on New Institutional Economics, the extant researches on governance mechanism of transaction relationships of agricultural products are centered on Williamson's model of transaction governance, and the social and cultural factors in transation relationships are ignored. Based on this, this paper will study the agricultural transaction relationship mainly from the perspective of relationship marketing and governance of marketing channel, and focus on two parts ignored:the process of establishing, developing, maintaining and terminating the transaction relationship, and the interaction behaviors of the parties during these processes. By focusing on social cultural background of transaction relationships, this paper will study deeply some factors of social behaviors and their impact on stablity of transaction relationships.
The findings could be summarized as follows:
First, the transaction relationships include economic dimension and social dimension. This paper introduces the political economies comparative analytical framework of marketing channel to distribution channel of agricultural products, and establishes a political economies analytical framework of distribution channel of agricultural products. According to analytical framework of political economies, this paper regards transaction relationships of agricultural products as analytical unit, and then divides the field of distribution of agricultural products into economics dimension and social dimension. Based on this analytical framework, through studying the literatures on distribution of agricultural products, this paper finds most researches focus on economic dimension of transaction relationships of agricultural products, which mainly discuss the types of agricultural products transaction, nature and types of contract and decision mechanism in transaction relationships. Compared with literatures mainly on economic dimension of agricultural products, literatures lack social dimension of agricultural products, especially interaction between economic dimension and social dimension. According to this, the researches on social behaviors of transaction relationships of agricultural products should be strengthened, and the attention to the impact of various factors of social behaviors on transaction performance should be paid in particular. Based on Marketing, behavioral dimension of transaction relationships of agricultural products could be studied deeply by borrowing theory about relationship marketing and marketing channel behavior. But during such process, the problem of theoretical generality caused by transforming background and object of research should be paid attention.
Second, factors of social behavior have significant impact on life cycle of transaction relationships of agricultural products. Based on political economies analytical framework of agricultural products distribution, to explore the behavioral dimension of transaction relationships of agricultural products, the impact of factors of social behavior on the process of establishing, developing, maintaining and terminating the transaction relationships of agricultural products are studied firstly. Two cases studies confirm the political economies analytical framework. In the life cycle of transaction relationships of agricultural products, traditional economies focus on price, competition, etc. In addition to that, factors of social behavior, such as equity, conflict, satisfaction, use of power, trust and promise, also have significant impact on the life cycle of transaction relationships of agricultural products. But such impact is different due to the types of transaction relationships. In market transaction relationships, price is the only determinants in the beginning stages of transaction relationships, while as the transaction relationships developing, factors such as equity, satisfaction, trust play more and more important role. In the contract transaction relationships of made-to-order agriculture, since transaction relationships are long-term oriented initially, price plays less important role than in market transaction relationships. On the contrary, factors such as solving conflict, use of power, level of satisfaction, trust and promise play extremely important role in the developing process of transaction relationships. Findings of the two case studies confirm the view of the theoretical research in this paper. The running mechanism of the transaction relationships of agricultural products could be understood comprehensively by studying the dimensions of social behavior.
Third, the behavioral norms of interpersonal relationships embedded in rural social culture are an important transaction governance mechanism of agriculture. As mentioned, the extant researches on governance mechanism of transaction relationships of agricultural products mainly regard New Institutional Economics as theoretical tool, and most of them are based on Williamson's classic theoretical framework. However, factors of social behavior in transaction relationships are ignored. Based on this theoretical gap, this paper introduces marketing channel governance and relationship marketing to transaction relationship governance of agricultural products, and focus on the factors of social behavior Economics analytical paradigm ignores. Findings of cross-case study show that, in different transaction relationships of agricultural products, there is a transaction relationship which provides internal stability mechanism, inhibits opportunistic behaviors, and promotes the governance mechanism of transaction performance. Such governance mechanism is rooted in the behavioral norms of interpersonal relationships in China rural social culture. This result, on the one hand, confirms the important role of governance mechanism in marketing channel governance theory; on the other hand, this result enriches and extends to some extent the researches on relationship governance, because the governance mechanism of behavioral norms of interpersonal relationships in rural social culture could not be totally equal to relationship governance in literatures on marketing channel governance theory. The former reflects the Chinese local culture better, in which the interpersonal behavioral norms are embedded, rather than behavioral norms of relationship governance are established on the interactions of firms, as western scholars argue. From this point of view, researches on "relationship governance" mechanism in Chinese culture should be deepened, which is also helpful to promote the governance theory of marketing channel.
Fourth, government should position its role exactly and the level of participation in the work of promoting transaction performance of agricultural products. In agriculural industrialization, the role and responsibility of government, especially local government in promoting transaction performance of agricultural products are always hot issues scholars are concerned about. Theoretically and practically, the roles of local government are tending to be rational and reasonable, and transform from intervening directly in transaction relationships of agricultural products to providing public goods and assiting indirectly. Findings show that, government defines its role reasonably in participating in transaction relationships of agricultural products, which is significant to promote transaction performance and increase farmers'income. On the one hand, the local governmeng can not be free with the distribution of agricultural products, which is determined by the reality in Chinese country. Government not just provides public goods, such as market information, transportation, but help establish the transaction relationships between firms and farmers. On the other hands, when intervening in the distribution of agricultural products, government must define its roles and resposibilities clearly. It is appropriate to be provider of publice goods to intervene in transaction relationships of agricultural products, rather than pursue profits or control the distribution of agricultural products. It is beyond the main body of this paper to discuss deeply and detailedly the roles and resposibilities government plays in the distribution of agricultural products. However, it is an important theoretical and practical issue that is worthwhile to study deeply.
引文
[1]安妮·T·科兰、埃林·安德森、路易斯·W-斯特恩、阿德尔·埃尔-安萨里.营销渠道[M].第7版.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2008.
[2]奥利弗·E·威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度[M].北京：商务印书馆,2002.
[3]卜长莉.社会资本与社会和谐[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2005.
[4]查金祥、黎东升.当前农产品网络营销的系统架构研究[J].农业经济问题,2006,(3)：72-74.
[5]邓宏图、米献炜.约束条件下合约选择和合约延续性条件分析——内蒙古塞飞亚集团有限公司和农户持续签约的经济解释[J].管理世界,2002(12)：120-127,151.
[6]董晓霞、黄季焜、Scott Rozelle、王红林.北京超市发展及其周边地区农户果蔬生产和销售的特征分析[J].中国农村经济,2006,(11)：9-16.
[7]杜吟棠.“公司+农户”模式初探——兼论其合理性与局限性[J].北京：中国农村观察,2002,(1)：30-38.
[8]杜吟棠.农业产业化经营和农民组织创新对农民收入的影响[J].中国农村观察,2005,(3)：9-18.
[9]郭成、孙东升.新时期粮食物流业的现状、问题及发展方向[J].中国农村经济,2006,(2)：18-26.
[10]郭冬乐、宋则、王诚庆.印度农产品流通体制考察[J].财贸经济,1997,(7)：37-43.
[11]郭红东.我国农户参与订单农业行为的影响因素分析[J].中国农村经济,2005,(3)：24-32.
[12]郭红东.龙头企业与农户订单安排与履约：理论和来自浙江企业的实证分析[J].农业经济问题,2006(2)：36-42,79.
[13]郭红东、蒋文华.“行业协会+公司+合作社+专业农户”订单模式的实践与启示[J].中国农村经济,2007,(4)：48-52.
[14]郭锦墉、尹琴、廖小官.农产品营销中影响农户合作伙伴选择的因素分析——基于江西省农户的实证[J].农业经济问题,2007,(1)：86-93.
[15]郭晓鸣、廖祖君、孙彬.订单农业运行机制的经济学分析[J].农业经济问题,2006,(11)：15-18.
[16]郭毅、詹志俊、侯丽敏、周莲峰、肖丽.渠道治理与研究深化——渠道管理研 究及其创新途径[J].管理学报,2005,(1)：105-114.
[17]国务院研究室农村司课题组.关于订单农业发展的形式、作用及建议[J].农业经济问题,2001,(3)：43-46.
[18]侯守礼、王威、顾海英.不完备契约及其演进：政府、信任和制度——以奶业契约为例[J].中国农村观察,2004,(6)：46-54.
[19]黄维梁.论农产品差异化营销的意义及其策略探讨[J].中国农村经济,2000,(8)：40-42,49.
[20]黄征学.农业产业化实现路径之探讨——来自塞飞亚集团公司的经验[J].中国农村观察,2004,(3)：12-20.
[21]黄志宏.“鸿源米业”：值得推广的“公司+协会+基地+农户”模式[J].中国农村经济,2006,(6)：24-31.
[22]黄祖辉、王祖锁.从不完全合约看农业产业化经营的组织方式[J].农业经济问题,2002,(3)：28-31.
[23]计国君、张巧虹.汽车供应链中的分销渠道治理[J].山西财经大学学报,2007,(2)：50-56.
[24]姜翰、杨鑫、金占明.战略模式选择对企业关系治理行为影响的实证研究-从关系强度角度出发[J].管理世界,2008,(3)：115-124.
[25]蒋青云、陈家瑶、郑勇强.产业生命周期与渠道治理形式的选择[C].中国市场学会2006年年会暨第四次全国会员代表大会论文集。
[26]李炳坤.农产品流通体制改革与市场制度建设[J].中国农村经济,1999,(6)：11-18.
[27]李大胜、王广深、张光辉.广东农产品流通的改革与发展[J].农业经济问题,2002,(3)：56-61.
[28]李怀祖.管理研究方法论[M].第二版.西安：西安交通大学出版社,2004.
[29]李彤彤.完善农副产品流通组织体制,开拓农村消费市场[J].管理世界,2000,(2)：173-178.
[30]李晓锦.从交易特性看农产品物流体系的规制及其专业化发展[C].中国市场学会2006年年会暨第四次全国会员代表大会论文集.
[31]刘翠萍.深化我国农产品流通体制改革的思索[J].中国流通经济,2004,(6)：21-24.
[32]刘东英.农产品现代物流研究框架的试构建[J].中国农村经济,2005,(7)：64-70.
[33]刘东英、梁佳.中国的生鲜蔬菜物流链：观察与解释[J].中国农村经济,2007,(8)：47-55.
[34]刘凤芹.不完全合约与履约障碍——以订单农业为例[J].经济研究,2003,(4)：22-30.
[35]龙方、任木荣.农业产业化产业组织模式及其形成的动力机制分析[J].农业经济问题,2007,(4)：34-38.
[36]罗必良、王玉蓉、王京安.农产品流通组织制度的效率决定：一个分析框架[J].农业经济问题,2000,(8)：26-31.
[37]罗伯特·K·殷.案例研究：设计与方法[M].重庆：重庆大学出版社,2004.
[38]闵耀良、邓红卫.美国蔬菜、水果市场流通状况考察[J].中国农村经济,2000,(4)：69-74.
[39]石磊.农产品流通体制改革的目标模式选择[J].农业经济问题,1999,(5)：40-44.
[40]史建民.提高农业订单履约率的法学分析[J].农业经济问题,2001,(12)：48-52.
[41]唐柏飞.丹麦的粮食流通与合作社及其启示[J].宏观经济研究,2003,(5)：61-63.
[42]田敏、安建设、张闯.农产品流通渠道冲突对农户收入的影响——基于河南省焦作市红壳鸡蛋流通渠道的分析[J].广东商学院学报,2010,(2)：17-23.
[43]田敏、张闯.订单农业中交易关系的治理机制与风险防范：基于辽宁盛德集团的案例研究[J].财贸研究,2010,(4)：53-61.
[44]王遐见.粮食流通与现代物流[J].农业经济问题,2004,(5)：21-24,79.
[45]王志刚、马建蕾.农产品批发市场购销商客户关系形成机制研究[J].南开经济研究,2007,(2)：120-127.
[46]王爱群、夏英.合同关系与农业垂直一体化应用比较研究[J].农业经济问题,2006,(7)：38-41.
[47]王醒男.日本农协演变经纬的政治经济学分析[J].中国农村观察,2006,(1)：66-73.
[48]温思美、杨顺江.论农业产业化进程中的农产品流通体制改革[J].农业经济问题,2000,(10)：45-48.
[49]夏春玉等.流通概论[M].大连：东北财经大学出版社,2006.
[50]夏春玉、张闯、董春艳、梁守砚.“订单农业”中交易关系的建立、发展与维护——以经纪人主导的蔬菜流通渠道为例[J].财贸研究,2009, (4)：25-34.
[51]夏春玉、张闯、梁守砚.城乡互动的双向流通系统：互动机制与建立路径[J].财贸经济,2009,(10)：106-112.
[52]姚今观、纪良纲.中国农产品流通体制与价格制度[M].北京：中国物价出版社,1995.
[53]尹云松、高玉喜、糜仲春.公司与农户间商品契约的类型及其稳定性考察——对5 家农业产业化龙头企业的个案分析[J].中国农村经济,2003,(8)：63-67.
[54]应瑞瑶、孙艳华.江苏省肉鸡行业垂直协作形式的调查分析——从肉鸡养殖户的角度[J].农业经济问题,2007,(7)
[55]张闯.渠道权力的过度倾斜与权力失效——基于农产品营销渠道的研究[J].财经论丛,2006,(5)：96-101.
[56]张闯.社会网络视角下的渠道权力结构与策略研究[M].大连：东北财经大学出版社,2008.
[57]张闯、汤宇、梁守砚.市场型交易关系的建立与发展及其运行机制——基于辽宁普兰店市蔬菜流通渠道的案例研究[J].财经问题研究,2010,(3)：31-38.
[58]张闯、夏春玉.农产品流通渠道：权力结构与组织体系构建[J].农业经济问题,2005,(7)：28-34.
[59]张闯、夏春玉.深化农村流通体制改革：系统性框架及若干关键点[J].财贸研究,2008,(1)：32-39.
[60]张闯、徐健、夏春玉.契约型农产品渠道中农户人际关系网络结构对企业权力应用及其结果的影响[J].营销科学学报,2010,6(1),85-108.
[61]张闯、周洋、田敏.订单农业中的交易成本与关系稳定性：中间商的作用——以安徽某镇养鸡业流通渠道为例[J].学习与实践,2010,(1)：30-37.
[62]郑礼明、谢峰、肖荣美.我国粮食产销合作社的构建[J].财经科学,2000, (4)105-108.
[63]赵德余、顾海英、黄瑢.粮食订单的缔约难题及其合约改进[J].中国农村观察,2005,(4)：2-13.
[64]赵泉民、李怡.关系网络与中国乡村社会的合作经济——基于社会资本视角[J].农业经济问题,2007,(8)：40-46.
[65]赵晓飞、李崇光.“农户—龙头企业”的农产品渠道关系稳定性：理论分析与实证检验[J].农业技术经济,2007,(5)：15-24.
[66]周立群、曹利群.农村“分包制”组织形态分析[J].天津社会科学,2000,(4)：58-63.
[67]周立群、曹利群.农村经济组织形态的演变与创新[J].经济研究,2001,(1)：69-75,83.
[68]周立群、邓宏图.为什么选择了‘准一体化’的基地合约——来自塞飞亚公司与农户签约的证据[J].中国农村观察,2004,(3)
[69]周曙东、戴迎春.供应链框架下生猪养殖户垂直协作形式选择分析[J].中国农村经 济,2005,(6)：30-36.
[70]祝宏辉、王秀清.新疆番茄产业中农户参与订单农业的影响因素分析[J].中国农村经济,2007,(7)：67-75.
[71]庄贵军.营销渠道控制：理论与模型[J].管理学报,2004,(1)：82-88.
[72]庄贵军、李珂、崔晓明.关系营销导向与跨组织人际关系对企业关系型渠道治理的影响[J].管理世界,2008,(7)：77-90.
[73]庄贵军、席酉民.中国营销渠道中私人关系对渠道权力使用的影响[J].管理科学学报,2004,(6)：52-62.
[74]庄贵军、席酉民、周筱莲.权力、冲突与合作：中国营销渠道中私人关系的影响作用[J].管理科学,2007,(4)：38-47.
[75]Achrol, Ravi S, Torger Reve and Louis W. Stern,1983, "The Environment of Marketing Channel Dyads:A Framework for Comparative Analysis", Journal of Marketing,47(Fall), PP 55-67.
[76]Anderson, James C. and James A. Narus,1990, "A Model of Distributor Firm and Manufacturer Firm Working Partnerships", Journal of Marketing,54(January), PP42-58.
[77]Antia, Kersi D. and Gary L. Frazier,2001, "The Severity of Contract Enforcement in Interfirm Channel Relationships", Journal of Marketing, vol.65, PP67-81.
[78]Arndt, Johan,1983, "The Political Economy Paradigm:Foundation for Theory Building in Marketing", Journal of Marketing,47(Fall), PP44-54.
[79]Beson, J. Kenneth,1975, "The Interorganizational Network as a Political Economy", Administrative Science Quarterly,20(June), PP229-249.
[80]Brown, James R., Chekitan S. Dev and Dong-Jin Lee,2000, "Managing Marketing Channel Opportunism:The Efficacy of Alternative Governance Mechanisms", Journal of Marketing,64, PP51-65.
[81]Cannon, Joseph P., Ravi S. Achrol and Gregory T. Gundlach,2000, "Contracts, Norms, and Plural Form Governance", Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,28, PP180-194.
[82]Claro Danny pimentel, Claro Priscila B. Oliveira,2010, "Collaborative Buyer-Supplier Relationships and Downstream Information in Marketing Channels", Industrial Marketing Management,39(2), PP221-228.
[83]Crosno, Jody L. and Robert Dahlstrom,2008, "A Meta-analysis Review of Opportunism in Exchange Relationships", Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,36, PP191-201.
[84]Dahlstrom, Robert and Arne Nygaard,1999, "An Empirical Investigation of Ex Post Transaction Costs in Franchised Distribution Channels", Journal of Marketing Research,34(May), PP160-170.
[85]Dwyer, F. Rober, Paul H. Schurr and Sejo Oh,1987, "Developing Buyer-Seller Relationships", Journal of Marketing,51, PP11-27.
[86]E1-Ansary, Adel I. and Louis W. Stern,1972, "Power Measurement in the Distribution Channel", Journal of Marketing Research,9(February), PP47-52.
[87]Emerson, Richard M.,1962, "Power-Dependence Relations", American Sociological Review,27, PP31-41.
[88]Eisenhardt, Kathleen M.,1989, "Building Theories from Case Study Research", Academy of Management Review,14(4), PP532-550.
[89]Ferguson, Ronald J., Michele Paulin and Jasmin Bergeron,2005, "Contractual Governance, Relational Governance, and the Performance of Interfirm Service Exchanges:The Influence of Boundary-Spanner Closeness", Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,33, PP217-234.
[90]Gaski, John F.,1984, "The Theory of Power and Conflict in Channels of Distribution", Journal of Marketing,48(Summer), PP9-29.
[91]Granovetter, Mark,1985, "Economic Action and Social Structure:The Problem of Embeddedness", American Journal of Sociology,91, PP481-510.
[92]Gundlach, Gregory T. and Patrick E. Murphy,1993, "Ethical and Legal Foundations of Relational Marketing Exchanges", Journal of Marketing,57, PP35-46.
[93]Hallen, Lars, Jan Johanson and Nazeem Seyed-Mohamed,1991, "Interfirm Adaptation in Business Relationships", Journal of Marketing,55, PP29-37.
[94]Heide, Jan B. and George John,1992, "Do Norms Matter in Marketing Relationships?", Journal of Marketing,56, PP32-44.
[95]Heide, Jan B.and Miner, Anne S.,1992, "The Shadow of the Future:Effects of Anticipated Interaction and Frequency of Contact on Buyer-Seller Cooperation", Academy of Management Journal,35 (2), PP265-291.
[96]Heide, Jan B.,1994, "Interorganizational Governance in Marketing Channels", Journal of Marketing,58, PP71-85.
[97]Hwang, K. K.,1987, "Face and Favor:The Chinese Power Game", American Journal of Sociology,92, PP944-974.
[98]Jap Sandy D. and Anderson Erin,2003, "Safeguarding Interorganizational Performance and Continuity under Ex post Opportunism" Marketing Science.49 (2), PP1684-1701.
[99]Joshi, Ashwin W. and Stephen J. Arnold,1998, "How Relational Norms Affect Compliance in Industrial Buying", Journal of Business Research,41, PP 105-114.
[100]Kaufmann, Patrick J. and Louis W. Stern,1988, "Relational Exchange Norms, Perceptions of Unfairness, and Retained Hostility in Commercial Litigation", Journal of Conflict Resolution,32, PP534-552.
[101]Lambe, C. Jay, Robert E. Spekman and Shelby D. Hunt,2000, "Interimistic Relational Exchange:Conceptualization and Prepositional Development", Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,28, PP212-225.
[102]Liu Yi, Luo Yadong and Liu Ting,2009, "Governing Buyer-Supplier Relationships through Transactional and Relational Mechanisms:Evidence from China." Journal of operations management,27 (4), PP294-309.
[103]Lusch, Robert F. and James Brown,1996, "Interdependency, Contracting, and Relational Behavior in Marketing Channels", Journal of Marketing,60, PP19-38.
[104]Macneil, Ian R.,1978, "Contracts:Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law", Northwestern University Law Review,72, PP854-902.
[105]Macneil, Ian R.,1980, The New Social Contract, An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations. New Haven, CT:Yale University Press.
[106]Macneil, Ian R.,2000, "Relational Contract Theory:Challenges and Queries", Northwestern University Law Review,94, PP877-907.
[107]Morgan, Robert M. and Shelby D. Hunt,1994, "The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship Marketing", Journal of Marketing,58(July), PP20-38.
[108]Nevin, John R.,1995, "Relationship Marketing and Distribution Channels:Exploring Fundamental Issues", Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,23, PP327-334.
[109]Noordewier, Thomas G., George John and John Nevin,1990, "Performance Outcomes of Purchasing Arrangement in Industrial Buyer-Vendor Relationships", Journal of Marketing,54(4), PP80-93.
[110]Rindfleisch, Aric and Jan B. Heide,1997, "Transaction Cost Analysis:Past, Present, and Future Applications", Journal of Marketing,61,PP30-54.
[111]Rosenbloom, Bert,1973, "Conflict and Channel Efficiency:Some Conceptual Models for the Decision Maker", The Journal of Marketing,7(3),PP26-30.
[112]Ryu Sungmin, Kabadayi Sertan and Chung Christina,2007, "The Relationship between Unilateral and Bilateral Control Mechanisms:The Contextual Effect of Long-Term Orientation" Journal of business research.60(7), PP681-689.
[113]Stern, Louis W.,1988, "Reflections on Channels Research", Journal of Retailing, 64(1), PP1-4.
[114]Stern, Louis W. and Jay W. Brown,1969, "Distribution Channels:A Social Systems Approach", in Louis W. Stern (Ed.), Distribution Channels:Behavioral Dimensions. Boston:Houghton Mifflin.
[115]Stern, Louis W. and Torger Reve,1980, "Distribution Channels as Political Economics: A Framework for Comparative Analysis", Journal of Marketing,44, PP52-64.
[116]Wamsley, G., M. Zald,1973, "The Political Economy of Public Organizations", Public Administration Review,33(January-February), PP62-73.
[117]Webster, F. E. Jr.,1992, "The Changing Role of Marketing in the Corporation", Journal of Marketing,29, PP 1-17.
[118]Weitz Barton A.and Jap Sandy D.,1995, "Relationship Marketing and Distribution Channels", Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,23(4), PP305-320.
[119]Williamson, Oliver E.,1975, Markets and Hierarchies. New York:The Free Press.
[120]Williamson, Oliver E.,1996, The Mechanisms of Governance. New York:The Free Press.
[121]Zald, M.,1970, "Political Economy:A Framework for Comparative Analysis", in M. Zald(ed.), Power in Organizations, Nashville:Vanderbilt University Press,221-261.
[2]奥利弗·E·威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度[M].北京：商务印书馆,2002.
[3]卜长莉.社会资本与社会和谐[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2005.
[4]查金祥、黎东升.当前农产品网络营销的系统架构研究[J].农业经济问题,2006,(3)：72-74.
[5]邓宏图、米献炜.约束条件下合约选择和合约延续性条件分析——内蒙古塞飞亚集团有限公司和农户持续签约的经济解释[J].管理世界,2002(12)：120-127,151.
[6]董晓霞、黄季焜、Scott Rozelle、王红林.北京超市发展及其周边地区农户果蔬生产和销售的特征分析[J].中国农村经济,2006,(11)：9-16.
[7]杜吟棠.“公司+农户”模式初探——兼论其合理性与局限性[J].北京：中国农村观察,2002,(1)：30-38.
[8]杜吟棠.农业产业化经营和农民组织创新对农民收入的影响[J].中国农村观察,2005,(3)：9-18.
[9]郭成、孙东升.新时期粮食物流业的现状、问题及发展方向[J].中国农村经济,2006,(2)：18-26.
[10]郭冬乐、宋则、王诚庆.印度农产品流通体制考察[J].财贸经济,1997,(7)：37-43.
[11]郭红东.我国农户参与订单农业行为的影响因素分析[J].中国农村经济,2005,(3)：24-32.
[12]郭红东.龙头企业与农户订单安排与履约：理论和来自浙江企业的实证分析[J].农业经济问题,2006(2)：36-42,79.
[13]郭红东、蒋文华.“行业协会+公司+合作社+专业农户”订单模式的实践与启示[J].中国农村经济,2007,(4)：48-52.
[14]郭锦墉、尹琴、廖小官.农产品营销中影响农户合作伙伴选择的因素分析——基于江西省农户的实证[J].农业经济问题,2007,(1)：86-93.
[15]郭晓鸣、廖祖君、孙彬.订单农业运行机制的经济学分析[J].农业经济问题,2006,(11)：15-18.
[16]郭毅、詹志俊、侯丽敏、周莲峰、肖丽.渠道治理与研究深化——渠道管理研 究及其创新途径[J].管理学报,2005,(1)：105-114.
[17]国务院研究室农村司课题组.关于订单农业发展的形式、作用及建议[J].农业经济问题,2001,(3)：43-46.
[18]侯守礼、王威、顾海英.不完备契约及其演进：政府、信任和制度——以奶业契约为例[J].中国农村观察,2004,(6)：46-54.
[19]黄维梁.论农产品差异化营销的意义及其策略探讨[J].中国农村经济,2000,(8)：40-42,49.
[20]黄征学.农业产业化实现路径之探讨——来自塞飞亚集团公司的经验[J].中国农村观察,2004,(3)：12-20.
[21]黄志宏.“鸿源米业”：值得推广的“公司+协会+基地+农户”模式[J].中国农村经济,2006,(6)：24-31.
[22]黄祖辉、王祖锁.从不完全合约看农业产业化经营的组织方式[J].农业经济问题,2002,(3)：28-31.
[23]计国君、张巧虹.汽车供应链中的分销渠道治理[J].山西财经大学学报,2007,(2)：50-56.
[24]姜翰、杨鑫、金占明.战略模式选择对企业关系治理行为影响的实证研究-从关系强度角度出发[J].管理世界,2008,(3)：115-124.
[25]蒋青云、陈家瑶、郑勇强.产业生命周期与渠道治理形式的选择[C].中国市场学会2006年年会暨第四次全国会员代表大会论文集。
[26]李炳坤.农产品流通体制改革与市场制度建设[J].中国农村经济,1999,(6)：11-18.
[27]李大胜、王广深、张光辉.广东农产品流通的改革与发展[J].农业经济问题,2002,(3)：56-61.
[28]李怀祖.管理研究方法论[M].第二版.西安：西安交通大学出版社,2004.
[29]李彤彤.完善农副产品流通组织体制,开拓农村消费市场[J].管理世界,2000,(2)：173-178.
[30]李晓锦.从交易特性看农产品物流体系的规制及其专业化发展[C].中国市场学会2006年年会暨第四次全国会员代表大会论文集.
[31]刘翠萍.深化我国农产品流通体制改革的思索[J].中国流通经济,2004,(6)：21-24.
[32]刘东英.农产品现代物流研究框架的试构建[J].中国农村经济,2005,(7)：64-70.
[33]刘东英、梁佳.中国的生鲜蔬菜物流链：观察与解释[J].中国农村经济,2007,(8)：47-55.
[34]刘凤芹.不完全合约与履约障碍——以订单农业为例[J].经济研究,2003,(4)：22-30.
[35]龙方、任木荣.农业产业化产业组织模式及其形成的动力机制分析[J].农业经济问题,2007,(4)：34-38.
[36]罗必良、王玉蓉、王京安.农产品流通组织制度的效率决定：一个分析框架[J].农业经济问题,2000,(8)：26-31.
[37]罗伯特·K·殷.案例研究：设计与方法[M].重庆：重庆大学出版社,2004.
[38]闵耀良、邓红卫.美国蔬菜、水果市场流通状况考察[J].中国农村经济,2000,(4)：69-74.
[39]石磊.农产品流通体制改革的目标模式选择[J].农业经济问题,1999,(5)：40-44.
[40]史建民.提高农业订单履约率的法学分析[J].农业经济问题,2001,(12)：48-52.
[41]唐柏飞.丹麦的粮食流通与合作社及其启示[J].宏观经济研究,2003,(5)：61-63.
[42]田敏、安建设、张闯.农产品流通渠道冲突对农户收入的影响——基于河南省焦作市红壳鸡蛋流通渠道的分析[J].广东商学院学报,2010,(2)：17-23.
[43]田敏、张闯.订单农业中交易关系的治理机制与风险防范：基于辽宁盛德集团的案例研究[J].财贸研究,2010,(4)：53-61.
[44]王遐见.粮食流通与现代物流[J].农业经济问题,2004,(5)：21-24,79.
[45]王志刚、马建蕾.农产品批发市场购销商客户关系形成机制研究[J].南开经济研究,2007,(2)：120-127.
[46]王爱群、夏英.合同关系与农业垂直一体化应用比较研究[J].农业经济问题,2006,(7)：38-41.
[47]王醒男.日本农协演变经纬的政治经济学分析[J].中国农村观察,2006,(1)：66-73.
[48]温思美、杨顺江.论农业产业化进程中的农产品流通体制改革[J].农业经济问题,2000,(10)：45-48.
[49]夏春玉等.流通概论[M].大连：东北财经大学出版社,2006.
[50]夏春玉、张闯、董春艳、梁守砚.“订单农业”中交易关系的建立、发展与维护——以经纪人主导的蔬菜流通渠道为例[J].财贸研究,2009, (4)：25-34.
[51]夏春玉、张闯、梁守砚.城乡互动的双向流通系统：互动机制与建立路径[J].财贸经济,2009,(10)：106-112.
[52]姚今观、纪良纲.中国农产品流通体制与价格制度[M].北京：中国物价出版社,1995.
[53]尹云松、高玉喜、糜仲春.公司与农户间商品契约的类型及其稳定性考察——对5 家农业产业化龙头企业的个案分析[J].中国农村经济,2003,(8)：63-67.
[54]应瑞瑶、孙艳华.江苏省肉鸡行业垂直协作形式的调查分析——从肉鸡养殖户的角度[J].农业经济问题,2007,(7)
[55]张闯.渠道权力的过度倾斜与权力失效——基于农产品营销渠道的研究[J].财经论丛,2006,(5)：96-101.
[56]张闯.社会网络视角下的渠道权力结构与策略研究[M].大连：东北财经大学出版社,2008.
[57]张闯、汤宇、梁守砚.市场型交易关系的建立与发展及其运行机制——基于辽宁普兰店市蔬菜流通渠道的案例研究[J].财经问题研究,2010,(3)：31-38.
[58]张闯、夏春玉.农产品流通渠道：权力结构与组织体系构建[J].农业经济问题,2005,(7)：28-34.
[59]张闯、夏春玉.深化农村流通体制改革：系统性框架及若干关键点[J].财贸研究,2008,(1)：32-39.
[60]张闯、徐健、夏春玉.契约型农产品渠道中农户人际关系网络结构对企业权力应用及其结果的影响[J].营销科学学报,2010,6(1),85-108.
[61]张闯、周洋、田敏.订单农业中的交易成本与关系稳定性：中间商的作用——以安徽某镇养鸡业流通渠道为例[J].学习与实践,2010,(1)：30-37.
[62]郑礼明、谢峰、肖荣美.我国粮食产销合作社的构建[J].财经科学,2000, (4)105-108.
[63]赵德余、顾海英、黄瑢.粮食订单的缔约难题及其合约改进[J].中国农村观察,2005,(4)：2-13.
[64]赵泉民、李怡.关系网络与中国乡村社会的合作经济——基于社会资本视角[J].农业经济问题,2007,(8)：40-46.
[65]赵晓飞、李崇光.“农户—龙头企业”的农产品渠道关系稳定性：理论分析与实证检验[J].农业技术经济,2007,(5)：15-24.
[66]周立群、曹利群.农村“分包制”组织形态分析[J].天津社会科学,2000,(4)：58-63.
[67]周立群、曹利群.农村经济组织形态的演变与创新[J].经济研究,2001,(1)：69-75,83.
[68]周立群、邓宏图.为什么选择了‘准一体化’的基地合约——来自塞飞亚公司与农户签约的证据[J].中国农村观察,2004,(3)
[69]周曙东、戴迎春.供应链框架下生猪养殖户垂直协作形式选择分析[J].中国农村经 济,2005,(6)：30-36.
[70]祝宏辉、王秀清.新疆番茄产业中农户参与订单农业的影响因素分析[J].中国农村经济,2007,(7)：67-75.
[71]庄贵军.营销渠道控制：理论与模型[J].管理学报,2004,(1)：82-88.
[72]庄贵军、李珂、崔晓明.关系营销导向与跨组织人际关系对企业关系型渠道治理的影响[J].管理世界,2008,(7)：77-90.
[73]庄贵军、席酉民.中国营销渠道中私人关系对渠道权力使用的影响[J].管理科学学报,2004,(6)：52-62.
[74]庄贵军、席酉民、周筱莲.权力、冲突与合作：中国营销渠道中私人关系的影响作用[J].管理科学,2007,(4)：38-47.
[75]Achrol, Ravi S, Torger Reve and Louis W. Stern,1983, "The Environment of Marketing Channel Dyads:A Framework for Comparative Analysis", Journal of Marketing,47(Fall), PP 55-67.
[76]Anderson, James C. and James A. Narus,1990, "A Model of Distributor Firm and Manufacturer Firm Working Partnerships", Journal of Marketing,54(January), PP42-58.
[77]Antia, Kersi D. and Gary L. Frazier,2001, "The Severity of Contract Enforcement in Interfirm Channel Relationships", Journal of Marketing, vol.65, PP67-81.
[78]Arndt, Johan,1983, "The Political Economy Paradigm:Foundation for Theory Building in Marketing", Journal of Marketing,47(Fall), PP44-54.
[79]Beson, J. Kenneth,1975, "The Interorganizational Network as a Political Economy", Administrative Science Quarterly,20(June), PP229-249.
[80]Brown, James R., Chekitan S. Dev and Dong-Jin Lee,2000, "Managing Marketing Channel Opportunism:The Efficacy of Alternative Governance Mechanisms", Journal of Marketing,64, PP51-65.
[81]Cannon, Joseph P., Ravi S. Achrol and Gregory T. Gundlach,2000, "Contracts, Norms, and Plural Form Governance", Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,28, PP180-194.
[82]Claro Danny pimentel, Claro Priscila B. Oliveira,2010, "Collaborative Buyer-Supplier Relationships and Downstream Information in Marketing Channels", Industrial Marketing Management,39(2), PP221-228.
[83]Crosno, Jody L. and Robert Dahlstrom,2008, "A Meta-analysis Review of Opportunism in Exchange Relationships", Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,36, PP191-201.
[84]Dahlstrom, Robert and Arne Nygaard,1999, "An Empirical Investigation of Ex Post Transaction Costs in Franchised Distribution Channels", Journal of Marketing Research,34(May), PP160-170.
[85]Dwyer, F. Rober, Paul H. Schurr and Sejo Oh,1987, "Developing Buyer-Seller Relationships", Journal of Marketing,51, PP11-27.
[86]E1-Ansary, Adel I. and Louis W. Stern,1972, "Power Measurement in the Distribution Channel", Journal of Marketing Research,9(February), PP47-52.
[87]Emerson, Richard M.,1962, "Power-Dependence Relations", American Sociological Review,27, PP31-41.
[88]Eisenhardt, Kathleen M.,1989, "Building Theories from Case Study Research", Academy of Management Review,14(4), PP532-550.
[89]Ferguson, Ronald J., Michele Paulin and Jasmin Bergeron,2005, "Contractual Governance, Relational Governance, and the Performance of Interfirm Service Exchanges:The Influence of Boundary-Spanner Closeness", Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,33, PP217-234.
[90]Gaski, John F.,1984, "The Theory of Power and Conflict in Channels of Distribution", Journal of Marketing,48(Summer), PP9-29.
[91]Granovetter, Mark,1985, "Economic Action and Social Structure:The Problem of Embeddedness", American Journal of Sociology,91, PP481-510.
[92]Gundlach, Gregory T. and Patrick E. Murphy,1993, "Ethical and Legal Foundations of Relational Marketing Exchanges", Journal of Marketing,57, PP35-46.
[93]Hallen, Lars, Jan Johanson and Nazeem Seyed-Mohamed,1991, "Interfirm Adaptation in Business Relationships", Journal of Marketing,55, PP29-37.
[94]Heide, Jan B. and George John,1992, "Do Norms Matter in Marketing Relationships?", Journal of Marketing,56, PP32-44.
[95]Heide, Jan B.and Miner, Anne S.,1992, "The Shadow of the Future:Effects of Anticipated Interaction and Frequency of Contact on Buyer-Seller Cooperation", Academy of Management Journal,35 (2), PP265-291.
[96]Heide, Jan B.,1994, "Interorganizational Governance in Marketing Channels", Journal of Marketing,58, PP71-85.
[97]Hwang, K. K.,1987, "Face and Favor:The Chinese Power Game", American Journal of Sociology,92, PP944-974.
[98]Jap Sandy D. and Anderson Erin,2003, "Safeguarding Interorganizational Performance and Continuity under Ex post Opportunism" Marketing Science.49 (2), PP1684-1701.
[99]Joshi, Ashwin W. and Stephen J. Arnold,1998, "How Relational Norms Affect Compliance in Industrial Buying", Journal of Business Research,41, PP 105-114.
[100]Kaufmann, Patrick J. and Louis W. Stern,1988, "Relational Exchange Norms, Perceptions of Unfairness, and Retained Hostility in Commercial Litigation", Journal of Conflict Resolution,32, PP534-552.
[101]Lambe, C. Jay, Robert E. Spekman and Shelby D. Hunt,2000, "Interimistic Relational Exchange:Conceptualization and Prepositional Development", Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,28, PP212-225.
[102]Liu Yi, Luo Yadong and Liu Ting,2009, "Governing Buyer-Supplier Relationships through Transactional and Relational Mechanisms:Evidence from China." Journal of operations management,27 (4), PP294-309.
[103]Lusch, Robert F. and James Brown,1996, "Interdependency, Contracting, and Relational Behavior in Marketing Channels", Journal of Marketing,60, PP19-38.
[104]Macneil, Ian R.,1978, "Contracts:Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law", Northwestern University Law Review,72, PP854-902.
[105]Macneil, Ian R.,1980, The New Social Contract, An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations. New Haven, CT:Yale University Press.
[106]Macneil, Ian R.,2000, "Relational Contract Theory:Challenges and Queries", Northwestern University Law Review,94, PP877-907.
[107]Morgan, Robert M. and Shelby D. Hunt,1994, "The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship Marketing", Journal of Marketing,58(July), PP20-38.
[108]Nevin, John R.,1995, "Relationship Marketing and Distribution Channels:Exploring Fundamental Issues", Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,23, PP327-334.
[109]Noordewier, Thomas G., George John and John Nevin,1990, "Performance Outcomes of Purchasing Arrangement in Industrial Buyer-Vendor Relationships", Journal of Marketing,54(4), PP80-93.
[110]Rindfleisch, Aric and Jan B. Heide,1997, "Transaction Cost Analysis:Past, Present, and Future Applications", Journal of Marketing,61,PP30-54.
[111]Rosenbloom, Bert,1973, "Conflict and Channel Efficiency:Some Conceptual Models for the Decision Maker", The Journal of Marketing,7(3),PP26-30.
[112]Ryu Sungmin, Kabadayi Sertan and Chung Christina,2007, "The Relationship between Unilateral and Bilateral Control Mechanisms:The Contextual Effect of Long-Term Orientation" Journal of business research.60(7), PP681-689.
[113]Stern, Louis W.,1988, "Reflections on Channels Research", Journal of Retailing, 64(1), PP1-4.
[114]Stern, Louis W. and Jay W. Brown,1969, "Distribution Channels:A Social Systems Approach", in Louis W. Stern (Ed.), Distribution Channels:Behavioral Dimensions. Boston:Houghton Mifflin.
[115]Stern, Louis W. and Torger Reve,1980, "Distribution Channels as Political Economics: A Framework for Comparative Analysis", Journal of Marketing,44, PP52-64.
[116]Wamsley, G., M. Zald,1973, "The Political Economy of Public Organizations", Public Administration Review,33(January-February), PP62-73.
[117]Webster, F. E. Jr.,1992, "The Changing Role of Marketing in the Corporation", Journal of Marketing,29, PP 1-17.
[118]Weitz Barton A.and Jap Sandy D.,1995, "Relationship Marketing and Distribution Channels", Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,23(4), PP305-320.
[119]Williamson, Oliver E.,1975, Markets and Hierarchies. New York:The Free Press.
[120]Williamson, Oliver E.,1996, The Mechanisms of Governance. New York:The Free Press.
[121]Zald, M.,1970, "Political Economy:A Framework for Comparative Analysis", in M. Zald(ed.), Power in Organizations, Nashville:Vanderbilt University Press,221-261.