不对称信息下供应商发展和切换问题研究
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摘要
供应链协调可以使供应链获得整体效益最大,但是由不同利益实体组成的供应链成员在信息共享中会隐藏自己的私人信息以维护收益,因此不对称信息在供应链协调和契约制订中广泛存在.本文研究供应商占主导地位的制造商加工销售问题、供应商投资发展问题和供应商切换问题,同时对具有时滞的三级供应链切换系统的稳定性进行了分析.主要内容如下：
基于委托代理理论分析不对称信息下供应商占主导地位的制造商再加工销售合同设计问题.供应商以一定的价格向制造商供货,制造商对产品再次加工并对外销售,供应商需要确定销售价格和制造商支付的转移支付以最大化所得收益.建立了供应商期望收益最大化的委托代理模型,通过分析模型的目标函数、激励相容约束和参与约束,得到了最优的销售价格和所获转移支付与供应商再加工成本的函数关系.结果表明随着制造商再制造成本的递增,供应商的销售价格增加,而制造商所付的转移支付递减.最后通过数值算例验证模型的可行性.
分析了不对称信息下供应商投资发展问题.供应商通过投资来提高质量、降低成本,其投资量可以看作私人信息.供应商汇报一个投资量,购买企业根据供应商汇报的投资量来确定购货量和转移支付.购买企业通过调节购货量和转移支付确保供应商汇报真实投资量,建立了不对称信息下供应商投资发展的模型,通过分析得到了企业的最优采购策略,并通过数值算例验证了供应商投资发展模型和相关契约的可行性.
分析了不对称信息下购买企业占主导的供应商切换问题.通过分析参与约束和激励相容约束,建立最小化购买企业采购成本的供应商切换模型,给出了最优的切换策略.
建立了竞争影响的不对称信息下供应商切换的委托代理模型,其中购买企业对新加入供应商成本的主观评判可以看作一个模糊变量.通过分析激励相容约束、参与约束和竞争影响,得到了供应商切换模型的确定等价类,给出了竞争情形下的最优供应商切换策略.同时将对称信息和不对称信息的切换策略进行了对比.最后通过数值算例验证了模型和切换策略的有效性.
分析了具有时滞的由制造商、分销商和批发商组成的供应链系统,当制造商的产能固定、分销商和供应商根据本身库存确定针对需求的供应量时,该供应链系统变成了一个线性切换系统.考虑送货量不能为负,制造商库存充足则不生产等实际情况,通过仿真分析时滞和生产商产能影响下的供应链切换系统的稳定性.
The supply chain coordination can make the total supply chain get themaximum profit, but the supply chain is composed of enterprises with difer-ent benefits, and the enterprises will hide their information in the informationsharing process of the total supply chain to obtain their own profits, so the asym-metric information exists widely in the process of coordination and the contractformulation of supply chain. Based on the theory of principal-agent, the pricingcontract of the dominant supplier to the manufacture, the investment develop-ment of supplier and the supplier switching are researched, and the stability ofthe three-level supply chain switch system with delay is analyzed. It is composedof the following five aspects.
A contract for the dominant supplier with asymmetric information is de-signed and analyzed. The supplier sells his products to a manufacturer whoreprocesses and sell to the market, the manufacturer pays to the dominant sup-plier the sale price and transfer payment. A principal-agent model is establishedto maximize the profit of the supplier, and the sale price and the transfer paymentto the dominant supplier can be obtained through the analysis of the objectivefunction, the incentive compatibility constraint and the participation constraint.The sale price of the dominant supplier is increasing with the increase of thereprocessed cost of the manufacturer, while the transfer payment to the domi-nant supplier is decreasing. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustratethe efectiveness of the proposed model.
The investment development of supplier with asymmetric information isstudied. The supplier can improve quality and decrease cost through his owninvestment, the investment quantity can be considered as his private information,and the enterprise can determine the purchasing quantity and transfer paymentthrough the supplier’s reported investment quantity. As the incentive compati-bility constraint and the participation constraint, the enterprize and make surethe supplier report his true investment quantity. The purchasing quantity and the transfer payment function can be obtained through the analysis of the con-straints. Finally a numerical example is given to illustrate the efectiveness of
the supplier investment model and the contract.The supplier switching problem with asymmetric information is given, andthe supplier switching model is set up to minimize the buying firm’s total pro-curement cost which includes the transfer payment to the incumbent supplier,the payment to the entrant supplier and the switching cost. With the theoretical
analysis of the proposed model, the supplier switching strategy can be obtained.The principal-agent problem for supplier switching with taking into accountthe asymmetric information and the competition efect is studied, where thebuying firm’s assessment to the entrant supplier’s cost is described as a fuzzyvariable. Through the analysis of the participation constraint, the incentivecompatibility constraint and the objective function, the equivalent model of thefuzzy principal-agent problem for supplier switching is proposed, and the optimalsupplier switching strategy is obtained. Additionally, the supplier switching de-cision under symmetric information is also studied. Finally, an example is givento illustrate the efectiveness of the proposed model and the supplier switching
strategy.A three-level supply chain switch system with time delay is proposed. Whenthe production capacity is fixed, the distributor and the retailer supply accord-ing to the inventory quantity level, the three-level supply chain system can beconverted into a linear switch system. As the supply quantity of each level islarger than zero, the manufacturer does not produce if the inventory is adequate,the distributor and retailer do not make an order if the inventory quantity islarger than the safe inventory quantity, the stability of the three-level supplychain switch system is analyzed through simulation.
基于委托代理理论分析不对称信息下供应商占主导地位的制造商再加工销售合同设计问题.供应商以一定的价格向制造商供货,制造商对产品再次加工并对外销售,供应商需要确定销售价格和制造商支付的转移支付以最大化所得收益.建立了供应商期望收益最大化的委托代理模型,通过分析模型的目标函数、激励相容约束和参与约束,得到了最优的销售价格和所获转移支付与供应商再加工成本的函数关系.结果表明随着制造商再制造成本的递增,供应商的销售价格增加,而制造商所付的转移支付递减.最后通过数值算例验证模型的可行性.
分析了不对称信息下供应商投资发展问题.供应商通过投资来提高质量、降低成本,其投资量可以看作私人信息.供应商汇报一个投资量,购买企业根据供应商汇报的投资量来确定购货量和转移支付.购买企业通过调节购货量和转移支付确保供应商汇报真实投资量,建立了不对称信息下供应商投资发展的模型,通过分析得到了企业的最优采购策略,并通过数值算例验证了供应商投资发展模型和相关契约的可行性.
分析了不对称信息下购买企业占主导的供应商切换问题.通过分析参与约束和激励相容约束,建立最小化购买企业采购成本的供应商切换模型,给出了最优的切换策略.
建立了竞争影响的不对称信息下供应商切换的委托代理模型,其中购买企业对新加入供应商成本的主观评判可以看作一个模糊变量.通过分析激励相容约束、参与约束和竞争影响,得到了供应商切换模型的确定等价类,给出了竞争情形下的最优供应商切换策略.同时将对称信息和不对称信息的切换策略进行了对比.最后通过数值算例验证了模型和切换策略的有效性.
分析了具有时滞的由制造商、分销商和批发商组成的供应链系统,当制造商的产能固定、分销商和供应商根据本身库存确定针对需求的供应量时,该供应链系统变成了一个线性切换系统.考虑送货量不能为负,制造商库存充足则不生产等实际情况,通过仿真分析时滞和生产商产能影响下的供应链切换系统的稳定性.
The supply chain coordination can make the total supply chain get themaximum profit, but the supply chain is composed of enterprises with difer-ent benefits, and the enterprises will hide their information in the informationsharing process of the total supply chain to obtain their own profits, so the asym-metric information exists widely in the process of coordination and the contractformulation of supply chain. Based on the theory of principal-agent, the pricingcontract of the dominant supplier to the manufacture, the investment develop-ment of supplier and the supplier switching are researched, and the stability ofthe three-level supply chain switch system with delay is analyzed. It is composedof the following five aspects.
A contract for the dominant supplier with asymmetric information is de-signed and analyzed. The supplier sells his products to a manufacturer whoreprocesses and sell to the market, the manufacturer pays to the dominant sup-plier the sale price and transfer payment. A principal-agent model is establishedto maximize the profit of the supplier, and the sale price and the transfer paymentto the dominant supplier can be obtained through the analysis of the objectivefunction, the incentive compatibility constraint and the participation constraint.The sale price of the dominant supplier is increasing with the increase of thereprocessed cost of the manufacturer, while the transfer payment to the domi-nant supplier is decreasing. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustratethe efectiveness of the proposed model.
The investment development of supplier with asymmetric information isstudied. The supplier can improve quality and decrease cost through his owninvestment, the investment quantity can be considered as his private information,and the enterprise can determine the purchasing quantity and transfer paymentthrough the supplier’s reported investment quantity. As the incentive compati-bility constraint and the participation constraint, the enterprize and make surethe supplier report his true investment quantity. The purchasing quantity and the transfer payment function can be obtained through the analysis of the con-straints. Finally a numerical example is given to illustrate the efectiveness of
the supplier investment model and the contract.The supplier switching problem with asymmetric information is given, andthe supplier switching model is set up to minimize the buying firm’s total pro-curement cost which includes the transfer payment to the incumbent supplier,the payment to the entrant supplier and the switching cost. With the theoretical
analysis of the proposed model, the supplier switching strategy can be obtained.The principal-agent problem for supplier switching with taking into accountthe asymmetric information and the competition efect is studied, where thebuying firm’s assessment to the entrant supplier’s cost is described as a fuzzyvariable. Through the analysis of the participation constraint, the incentivecompatibility constraint and the objective function, the equivalent model of thefuzzy principal-agent problem for supplier switching is proposed, and the optimalsupplier switching strategy is obtained. Additionally, the supplier switching de-cision under symmetric information is also studied. Finally, an example is givento illustrate the efectiveness of the proposed model and the supplier switching
strategy.A three-level supply chain switch system with time delay is proposed. Whenthe production capacity is fixed, the distributor and the retailer supply accord-ing to the inventory quantity level, the three-level supply chain system can beconverted into a linear switch system. As the supply quantity of each level islarger than zero, the manufacturer does not produce if the inventory is adequate,the distributor and retailer do not make an order if the inventory quantity islarger than the safe inventory quantity, the stability of the three-level supplychain switch system is analyzed through simulation.
引文
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