公司治理、多元化战略与财务绩效的关系
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摘要
近年来理论界及实业界均十分关注公司治理的质量,将其作为最重要的决策因素。C. Collins&Jerry I. Porras (1994)通过对18个具有百年历史优秀公司与其对手公司的对比,揭示了公司基业长青的秘诀,其中最为重要的一条就是:那些伟大的公司一定都有一个独立和有效的公司治理机制。中国上市公司协会执行副会长李小雪(2012)指出,在经济全球化的趋势下,公司治理日益受到世界各国的重视,良好的公司治理是促进公司规范运作,建立市场信心,吸引长期投资的重要手段,也是增强市场透明度,保护投资者利益,推动资本市场持续稳定健康发展的重要基础。
     2008年的金融危机给各行各业带来了不同程度的危害,于是Markowitz的分散投资理论又再度被提起,不少公司开始将他们的触角伸向不同的资产、业务和地域,从而加强自己在危机中的减震能力。在实践中,中小企业因为资金实力有限、品牌知名度低、技术开发能力相对薄弱、市场网络不完善等原因使人们凭直觉认为其不应搞多元化经营。但调查显示,20.7%的中小企业以多元化战略为第一战略,而43%的中小企业将多元化战略作为第二战略,众多中小企业是通过采用多元化战略发展成为大公司的(孟执芳和陈志军,2005)。
     公司治理作为协调公司参与各方权责利的制度安排,在实现权力制衡的同时,更强调决策的科学性(李维安,2001)。对于作为公司重要战略决策之一的多元化战略来说,公司治理特征的不同必然影响公司决策层在多元化战略决策的选择,从而影响到公司多元化战略对公司财务绩效的作用效果。因此,上市公司只有对其治理结构与机制进行及时的调整与完善,建立有效的监督控制机制,处理好多元化经营实施后所引发的内部矛盾与冲突,才能保证多元化战略实施的成功,实现财务绩效的提升。
     创业板公司成长性较高,经营机制灵活,多元化和创新性特征突出,但同时经营不确定性较大,面临的风险更为复杂。所以完善公司治理,顺利实施多元化,对于上市不久的创业板公司更具理论和现实意义。多元化战略作为公司战略的重要组成部分,其决策是否科学以及能否成功实施从而得到绩效提升主要取决于公司治理水平。我国创业板上市公司治理与多元化战略有何种关系?多元化战略会给财务绩效带来何种影响?多元化在公司治理与财务绩效间起到何种作用?正是本文所将要解决的主要问题。
     文章在对委托代理理论、利益相关者理论、公司创业理论以及公司成长理论回顾的基础上,从公司治理、多元化战略和财务绩效三个角度对我国创业板上市公司的概况进行分析,之后梳理了国内外学者关于公司治理、多元化战略和财务绩效作用关系的理论文献,构建了公司治理、多元化战略和财务绩效关系综合模型,并运用现有创业板上市公司数据对模型进行了实证检验,得出了相应的实证结果。对这些实证结果进行系统的分析,本研究主要得出以下结论:
     1、从公司治理出发,研究了股权结构、董事会治理、高管层激励与利益相关者治理对财务绩效的作用机理,结果表明:总的说来,创业板上市公司的公司治理各维度对财务绩效具有显著的影响。具体的影响有:股权集中度与财务绩效呈负相关关系,已流通股比例与财务绩效负相关,董事会规模与财务绩效负相关,董事会职能结构与财务绩效呈“U”型相关关系,高管层持股与财务绩效负相关,高管薪酬与财务绩效正相关,利益相关者治理与财务绩效呈“倒U”型相关关系。但是,独立董事比例与财务绩效之间的关系并不显著。
     2、沿着上述思路,研究了公司治理各维度,即股权结构、董事会治理、高管层激励与利益相关者治理对多元化战略的作用机理。结果表明,创业板上市公司的公司治理与多元化战略具有显著的相关关系。具体的影响有:股权集中度与多元化战略负相关,已流通股比例与多元化战略负相关,独立董事比例与多元化战略负相关,董事职能结构与多元化战略负相关,高管层持股与多元化战略负相关,高管薪酬与多元化战略呈负相关关系,利益相关者治理与多元化战略呈正相关关系。但是,董事会规模与多元化战略呈负相关关系的假设未通过检验。
     3、针对我国创业板市场的实际状况,检验了创业板上市公司的多元化战略给其财务绩效带来的影响。结果表明,多元化战略与财务绩效呈正相关关系,即现阶段创业板上市公司多元化战略具有溢价效应。究其原因,有可能是因为多元化经营能够帮助创业板上市公司抵御外部经营风险、减轻竞争压力并且达成资源共享,同时还可以利用内部资本市场完成公司内资源的有效配置,打破外部资本市场融资限制的瓶颈,从而创造出新价值,实现1+1>2的多元化溢价效果。
     4、利用中介检验的方法,探索了多元化战略的中介作用。实证研究结果表明:多元化战略在不同的公司治理维度中所起的作用是相异的。具体来说:多元化战略在已流通股比例—财务绩效、高管层持股—财务绩效、高管薪酬—财务绩效之间的中介作用成立,即已流通股比例、高管层持股与高管薪酬对公司财务绩效除了具有直接影响外,还会通过多元化战略间接地产生影响。而多元化战略对于其他公司治理维度所起的中介作用没有通过检验。
     本文的创新点主要有以下几个方面:
     第一,创新性地构建了公司治理、多元化战略与财务绩效关系的综合模型,并从理论及实证视角对模型进行分析和验证。多数学者只研究公司治理对财务绩效的作用或多元化战略对财务绩效的作用,很少将三者结合起来进行综合研究。公司治理直接影响战略选择,越过战略直接研究公司治理与财务绩效的关系,也能得出二者之间具有影响的结论。但是,这样的研究容易使人产生误解,认为公司治理的改变,一定会带来财务绩效的变化,从而将焦点单纯放在对公司治理的单一调整上,忽略了其它也很重要的因素对财务绩效的影响。此外,学者们大多停留在股权结构、董事会治理等维度单方面对公司绩效的影响等研究上,很少综合考察公司治理多个维度对财务绩效的作用。本文全面考虑公司治理各个维度的综合作用,理清了公司治理、多元化战略与财务绩效的关系,在当前创业板上市公司快速成长的关键时期是非常必要的,同时也极大的丰富了理论方面的研究。
     第二,本研究对部分研究变量的维度划分更加全面。将公司治理划分为四个维度,即股权结构、董事会治理、高管层激励和利益相关者治理,并对其进行量化、统计、分析。基于委托代理理论和利益相关者理论,结合创业板上市公司发展现状,对利益相关者治理进行了界定,将其划分为债权人治理、员工治理、机构投资者治理、政府治理等多方面,并对其进行量化处理,将利益相关者治理这一维度加入研究模型,参与本文的实证分析,并研究其与其他变量间的关系,具有一定的创新性。此外,在董事会治理维度划分方面,本文结合创业板上市公司实际状况,加入了当前研究的热点——董事会职能结构这一维度,并全面参与本文综合研究,使得董事会治理变量的作用更加全面,研究更加符合实际状况和理论要求,得出更加客观真实的结论,具有一定的创新性,进一步充实了公司治理理论。
     第三,探究了多元化战略在公司治理与财务绩效的中介作用。之前学者的研究不是研究公司治理某一维度与企业财务绩效的关系,就是研究多元化战略与企业财务绩效的关系,很少有人探讨多元化战略在公司治理与财务绩效之间的影响。本文创新性的从中介作用的角度出发,探讨了多元化战略在公司治理各维度与企业财务绩效之间所起的作用,进一步丰富了理论研究。因此,这就为公司治理政策的改进和调整带来了一定的引导与努力方向。由于企业的多元化战略是公司治理部分维度影响企业绩效的一个部分中介变量,而对这一中介变量的确认是事前或者事中能够实现的,因此企业可以通过对战略实施能力的监控来评价部分公司治理维度的效果。这对我国企业在目前经济制度转型时期及时调整自身的公司治理以提高企业对环境快速变化的反应能力尤其重要。
In recent years, the theoretical circle and the business community are very concernedabout the quality of corporate governance as the most important decision-making factors. C.Collins&Jerry I. Porras (1994) reveal the Everlasting secret of enterprise through thecomparison of the18century-old outstanding enterprises with its rival company. The mostimportant one is that a great company must have an independent and effective corporategovernance mechanism. Li Xiaoxue (2012), the executive vice president of Chinese ListedCompanies Association, pointed out that corporate governance attracted world attentionincreasingly in the trend of economic globalization. A good corporate governance is animportant mean to promote the standardized operation of the company, to build marketconfidence, to attract long-term investment. And it is also an important foundation toenhance the transparency of the market, to protect the interests of investors, and to promotecapital markets for steady and healthy development.
     The financial crisis in2008is harming to the various trades and industries with varyingdegrees. So the diversified investment theory of Markowitz is instituted again. Manycompanies began to stretch their tentacles to different assets, business and geography, so asto enhance damping capacity in a crisis. In practice, because of the limited capital, low brandawareness, weak technology development capability, imperfect market network, lowdiversification management level, people had a hunch that the small and medium enterprises(SMEs) should not engage in diversification. However, the survey shows that diversificationstrategy is the first strategy of20.7percent of SMEs, while is the second strategy of43percent of SMEs. A number of SMEs become large enterprises by adopting diversificationstrategy(Zhifang Meng&Zhijun Chen,2005).
     Corporate governance is more emphasis on scientific decision-making, while thebalance of powers, as the institutional arrangements to coordinate the powers andresponsibilities of parties involved in the company (Weian Li,2001). Corporate governancecharacteristics will inevitably affect the decision-making in the choice of diversificationstrategy decisions to one of the important strategic decision, the diversification strategy, thusaffecting the effect of the company's diversification strategy on corporate financialperformance. Thus, only the listed companies adjust and improve its governance structureand mechanism timely, establish an effective supervision and control mechanism, handleinternal contradictions and conflicts triggered by the implementation of diversification well,can ensure the success of the implementation of the diversification strategy and the improvedof financial performance.
     Listed companies on GEM are of high growth, flexible operating mechanism,prominent diversify and innovative features. But they operate with uncertainty and the risk ismore complex. Therefore, the perfect corporate governance and smooth implementation ofdiversify are of more theoretical and realistic significance to listed companies on GEM. Thescientific decision-making and successful implementation of diversification strategy, as animportant part of the company's strategy, depends primarily on the level of corporategovernance. So it may improve the performance. What is the relationship between corporategovernance and diversification strategy of listed companies on GEM? How candiversification strategy impact financial performance? What role of diversification strategyto play in corporate governance and financial performance? These are the main issues to besolved in this paper.
     At first, we review on the principal-agent theory, stakeholder theory, corporateentrepreneurship theory and enterprise growth theory. Then, analyze the profile of listedcompanies on GEM from the three perspectives of corporate governance, diversificationstrategy and financial performance. After that, comb the theoretical literature about theinteraction among corporate governance, diversification strategy and financial performanceof domestic and foreign scholars. And then, construct the relationship model amongcorporate governance, diversification strategy and financial performance. At last, empiricaltest on the model with the data of existing GEM listed company and obtained thecorresponding empirical results. Analysis of these empirical results of this studysystematically, the conclusions are as follows:
     1. Study on the mechanism of ownership structure, board governance, managerialincentives, stakeholder governance on the financial performance. In general, the results showthat the various dimensions of the corporate governance of companies listed on GEM havesignificant influence on financial performance. Ownership concentration and financialperformance was negatively correlated. Proportion of tradable shares and financialperformance negatively correlated. Board size and financial performance negativelycorrelated. The relationship between the function of the Board structure and financialperformance was ‘U-shaped’. Shares held by senior executives and financial performancenegatively correlated. Executive remuneration and financial performance are positivelycorrelated. Stakeholder governance and financial performance was ‘inverted U-shaped’correlation. However, the relationship between the proportion of independent directors andfinancial performance is not significant.
     2. Study on the mechanism of ownership structure, board governance, managerialincentives, stakeholder governance on the diversification strategy. In general, the resultsshow that the various dimensions of the corporate governance of companies listed on GEMhave significant influence on diversification strategy. Ownership concentration anddiversification strategy was negatively correlated. Proportion of tradable shares and diversification strategy negatively correlated. Proportion of independent directors anddiversification strategy negatively correlated. The function of the Board structure anddiversification strategy negatively correlated. Shares held by senior executives anddiversification strategy negatively correlated. Executive remuneration and diversificationstrategy negatively correlated. Stakeholder governance and diversification strategy arepositively correlated. However, the relationship between the board size and diversificationstrategy is not significant.
     3. Examines the the impact of the diversification strategy of the companies listed onGEM to its financial performance based on the actual situation of GEM in China. The resultsshow that diversification strategy and financial performance are positively correlated.Diversification strategy of companies listed on GEM has the premium effect at this stage.The reason may be that diversification can help companies listed on GEM resist externaloperational risks, reduce the competitive pressures and achieve the sharing of resources. Andcompanies listed on GEM also can take advantage of the completion of the efficientallocation of resources in the internal capital market within the enterprise, breaking thebottleneck of external capital market financing restrictions. So the companies can create newvalue and achieve the diversify premium effect of ‘1plus1is greater than2’.
     4. Adopt the intermediary inspection method to explore the intermediary role of thediversification strategy. The empirical results show that the role of diversification strategy inthe different corporate governance dimension is different. Diversification strategy plays anintermediary role in the proportion of tradable shares-financial performance. Diversificationstrategy plays an intermediary role in the shares held by senior executives-financialperformance. Diversification strategy plays an intermediary role in the executiveremuneration-financial performance. The proportion of tradable shares, shares held bysenior executives and executive remuneration have a direct impact on corporate financialperformance, but also have an indirectly impact on corporate financial performance throughthe diversification strategy. The intermediary role of diversification strategy plays in othercorporate governance dimensions did not pass the test.
     The innovations of this paper are mainly the following:
     First, innovatively building integrated relationship model of corporate governance,diversification strategy and financial performance, and analyze and validate the the modelfrom a theoretical and empirical perspective. Prior scholars either study the relationshipbetween few dimensions of corporate governance to corporate financial performance, or therelationship between diversification strategy and corporate financial performance. Fewpeople do the comprehensive study of the combined effects of the three. This paper sorts outthe relationship among corporate governance, diversification strategy and financialperformance. It is very necessary to the companies listed on GEM of rapid growth in thecritical period. And it’s also enriched the theoretical aspects of the research greatly.
     Second, the dimensions of the corporate governance division are more comprehensivein this study. Prior scholars divided the corporate governance into three dimensions ofownership structure, board governance, managerial incentives, based on the meaning ofcorporate governance, which has a certain sidedness. We define stakeholder governancecombined with the development status of the companies listed on GEM, based on theprincipal-agent theory and stakeholder theory in this study. Stakeholder governance isdivided into institutional investors, staff, governance and creditor and was quantified. Add itto the research model and involved in statistical analysis. And study its relationship withother variables.
     Third, add a research focus-the function of the board structure dimension to boardgovernance. Most prior scholars study board governance only from the board size, theproportion of independent directors and the unity of chairman and general manager. Theyignore the important role of the function of the board background. In this paper, we add thefunction of the board structure dimension into board governance combined with the actualsituation of the companies listed on GEM. So the role of board governance variable is morecomprehensive. The study is more consistent with the theoretical and practical requirements.The conclusions are more objective and true. Further enrich the theory of corporategovernance.
     Fourth, this study is the first to explore the intermediary role of the diversificationstrategy in corporate governance and financial performance. In recent years, many scholarsexplore the mechanism of the role of corporate governance on enterprise performancethrough empirical research. But so far they have not get consistent conclusions. So that thethe relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance is known as a‘black box’ for study (Collins and Clark,2003). This paper discusses the role ofdiversification strategy between corporate governance and corporate financial performancefrom the perspective of the intermediary role of diversification strategy innovatively andprovides further theoretical support to open the ‘black box’.
     Fifth, the selection of research object focuses on companies listed on GEM to study onthe regularity of development and growth of companies listed on GEM. There areconsiderable differences between the corporate governance in developed and developingcountries, so the empirical test on the data of companies listed on GEM in China is important.In this paper, we are the first to do the systematic and in-depth study of companies listed onGEM and sum up the relevant regularity of the GEM listed companies. It has certainsignificance to the formulation of government policy, the development of GEM market, thegrowth of companies listed on GEM and decision-making of investor.
     Sixth, enrich the understanding of the effects of diversification strategy of SMEs.Traditional concepts tend to think that the diversification strategy are the patent of largeenterprises, SMEs should not adopt diversification strategy. Diversification of SMEs will bring a reduction of the corporate performance. The results of this study shows that thediversification strategy of companies listed on GEM can enhance the company's financialperformance in this stage. Whether the SMEs should carry out diversification strategy or notis not absolute. Corporate governance should take full account of the internal and externalenvironment changes, combined with their own development needs, and to seek the beststrategies suitable to grow their own to improve the financial performance of enterprises.
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