经理股票期权制度激励机制研究
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摘要
股票期权制度是基于股票期权合约的创新，作为一种薪酬制度被广泛应用于激励企业经理人。由于股票期权将经理人的报酬与公司的远期股票价格联系和捆绑在一起，从而能有效地规避企业经营者的短期行为，并在一定程度上解决了两权分离后企业产生的委托代理问题，是一种报酬和风险相匹配的长期激励制度。
股票期权制度在实际应用中取得了巨大成功，但也产生了一些问题并引发了广泛的争议，特别是在最近几年，一些知名的大公司采用了股票期权制度，但却发生了系列经理人违背股东利益的巨大道德风险行为。对股票期权制度的激励机制进行研究，揭示其激励的机理并分析产生激励效果的所需条件，对理论研究以及实际运用有着重要意义。
论文运用博弈论、信息经济学以及经济学原理进行建模，对股票期权制度激励机制的三个重要方面进行了研究。
首先论文对通过信息揭示对导入股票期权制度后经理人市场筛选的效率进行研究，结论证明，股票期权制度的采用，能够有效地规避了低能力的经理人冒充高能力的经理人，使得股东从经理人市场上更有可能招聘到高能力的经理人，而且大大降低了股东的筛选成本。
然后论文对股票期权制度的激励机理及对企业长期发展的影响进行了研究，结论表明，股票期权制度将经理人期望收益同公司的近期、远期绩效同时联系在一起，使得经理人在位期间有积极性注重企业的长期发展，在理论上实现了股东和经营者之间的激励相容，在一定程度上解决了现代公司所面临的委托代理问题。同时也比较性研究了传统薪酬制度，指出固定工资制是最差的薪酬制度，没有任何激励作用；年薪制忽视了企业的长期发展绩效，也不能使股东效用最大化。
最后论文在对经理人在职道德风险行为进行分解的基础上，对股东采用股票期权制度后，产生激励效果的条件进行了研究，得到了委托人的最优激励监督合同，同时产生四个重要结论。
论文最后部分还比较分析了国内外股票期权的实施情况，并讨论了中国目前实施股票期权制度所遇到障碍因素：公司治理结构、股票市场效率、中介机构及财务会计法规等。
Stock option system, based on the innovation of stock option contract, has been used extensively as a kind of salary system to encourage the business managers. Due to the salary of manager is bound to the future stock price of the company, and accordingly, the short-term behavior of the manager can be avoided, and to certain degree, the principal-agent problem appeared after separating ownership from right of control can be solved. So to speak, stock option is a long-term incentive system based on the match of return and risk. .
Stock option system has obtained great success at actual application, but also aroused some problems and caused extensive dispute. In recent years, some well-known companies have adopted the stock option system, however, a series of behaviors that managers take great moral hazard to disobey the shareholder's benefits have happened. For both theoretic research and practical application, it is important to study and analyze the incentive mechanism of stock option system and to discover the requirements to produce incentive effect.
This dissertation studied the three important aspects of the incentive mechanism of stock option system through building mathematic model based on game theory, information economics and economics principle.
First, the dissertation studied the efficiency of sorting managers after adopting stock option system. It shows that the adoption of stock option system can availably evade the low-ability managers from pretending to be of high-ability, and make the shareholder to have more possibility to choose manager of high ability, so to reduce the cost.
Then this dissertation studied the incentive mechanism and its influences to the enterprise's development in long-term. It shows that the expecting return of managers can be connected with the short-term and long-term performance so to make managers to focus on the enterprise's development in long-term. Therefore, the incentive compatibility between shareholder and manager can be realized theoretically and to certain degree, the principal-agent problem can be solved. Meanwhile, it compared the traditional salary system and pointed out that fixed salary system is the least effective, while the annual salary ignores the long-term performance of the enterprise and can not
maximize the shareholders' utility.
Finally this dissertation studied the requirements to produce incentive effect after adopting the stock option system on foundation of the specializing moral hazard of managers and achieved the optimal incentive and supervised contract and other four elemental conclusions.
In the last part, it comparatively analyzed the application of shock option in domestic and foreign countries, and discussed the obstacles that stock option system encountered in China: corporate governance, the efficiency of stock market, agency institution, finance and accountancy laws etc.
股票期权制度在实际应用中取得了巨大成功，但也产生了一些问题并引发了广泛的争议，特别是在最近几年，一些知名的大公司采用了股票期权制度，但却发生了系列经理人违背股东利益的巨大道德风险行为。对股票期权制度的激励机制进行研究，揭示其激励的机理并分析产生激励效果的所需条件，对理论研究以及实际运用有着重要意义。
论文运用博弈论、信息经济学以及经济学原理进行建模，对股票期权制度激励机制的三个重要方面进行了研究。
首先论文对通过信息揭示对导入股票期权制度后经理人市场筛选的效率进行研究，结论证明，股票期权制度的采用，能够有效地规避了低能力的经理人冒充高能力的经理人，使得股东从经理人市场上更有可能招聘到高能力的经理人，而且大大降低了股东的筛选成本。
然后论文对股票期权制度的激励机理及对企业长期发展的影响进行了研究，结论表明，股票期权制度将经理人期望收益同公司的近期、远期绩效同时联系在一起，使得经理人在位期间有积极性注重企业的长期发展，在理论上实现了股东和经营者之间的激励相容，在一定程度上解决了现代公司所面临的委托代理问题。同时也比较性研究了传统薪酬制度，指出固定工资制是最差的薪酬制度，没有任何激励作用；年薪制忽视了企业的长期发展绩效，也不能使股东效用最大化。
最后论文在对经理人在职道德风险行为进行分解的基础上，对股东采用股票期权制度后，产生激励效果的条件进行了研究，得到了委托人的最优激励监督合同，同时产生四个重要结论。
论文最后部分还比较分析了国内外股票期权的实施情况，并讨论了中国目前实施股票期权制度所遇到障碍因素：公司治理结构、股票市场效率、中介机构及财务会计法规等。
Stock option system, based on the innovation of stock option contract, has been used extensively as a kind of salary system to encourage the business managers. Due to the salary of manager is bound to the future stock price of the company, and accordingly, the short-term behavior of the manager can be avoided, and to certain degree, the principal-agent problem appeared after separating ownership from right of control can be solved. So to speak, stock option is a long-term incentive system based on the match of return and risk. .
Stock option system has obtained great success at actual application, but also aroused some problems and caused extensive dispute. In recent years, some well-known companies have adopted the stock option system, however, a series of behaviors that managers take great moral hazard to disobey the shareholder's benefits have happened. For both theoretic research and practical application, it is important to study and analyze the incentive mechanism of stock option system and to discover the requirements to produce incentive effect.
This dissertation studied the three important aspects of the incentive mechanism of stock option system through building mathematic model based on game theory, information economics and economics principle.
First, the dissertation studied the efficiency of sorting managers after adopting stock option system. It shows that the adoption of stock option system can availably evade the low-ability managers from pretending to be of high-ability, and make the shareholder to have more possibility to choose manager of high ability, so to reduce the cost.
Then this dissertation studied the incentive mechanism and its influences to the enterprise's development in long-term. It shows that the expecting return of managers can be connected with the short-term and long-term performance so to make managers to focus on the enterprise's development in long-term. Therefore, the incentive compatibility between shareholder and manager can be realized theoretically and to certain degree, the principal-agent problem can be solved. Meanwhile, it compared the traditional salary system and pointed out that fixed salary system is the least effective, while the annual salary ignores the long-term performance of the enterprise and can not
maximize the shareholders' utility.
Finally this dissertation studied the requirements to produce incentive effect after adopting the stock option system on foundation of the specializing moral hazard of managers and achieved the optimal incentive and supervised contract and other four elemental conclusions.
In the last part, it comparatively analyzed the application of shock option in domestic and foreign countries, and discussed the obstacles that stock option system encountered in China: corporate governance, the efficiency of stock market, agency institution, finance and accountancy laws etc.
引文
[1] 黄钟苏、高晓博. 经理激励与股票期权.第一版.北京：中国工商联合出版社. 2001
[2] Marinne Bertrand and sendhil Mollainathan. Agents with and without principals. The American Economic Review,2000,2:203-208
[3] 黄 斌 聂祖荣．激励股票期权的理论与实践．中国股票网
[4] 李春琦，石磊. 国外企业激励理论述评.工业企业管理.2001,9
[5] 袁国良.上市公司管理层激励因素来自何方.上海证券报.1999.11.11
[6] 梁能等．公司治理结构：中国的实践与美国的经验．第一版．北京：中国人民大学出版社，2000
[7] 张维迎．企业理论与中国企业改革．第一版．北京：北京大学出版社．1999
[8] 魏杰、赵俊超.关于人力资本作为企业制度要素的考虑.清华大学中国经济研究中心研究动态，2001/2/24
[9] 周其仁.市场里的企业：一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约.经济研究.1996，6
[10] 刘志新、贾福清.证券市场有效性理论与实证.第一版.北京：航空工业出版社.2001，1-22
[11] George Baker. The use of performance measures in incentive contracting. The American Economic Review,2000,2:415-420
[12] 拉丰、马赫蒂摩著.陈志俊等译.激励理论－委托代理模型.第一版.北京：中国人民大学出版社.2002
[13] 龚玉池. 经理股票期权的产权基础. 大连理工大学学报（社会科学版）.2000.12
[14] 颜爱民、陈易健、朱诚良. 企业激励机制有效性分析. 中南工业大学学报(社科版). 2001.1
[15] 陈晓红、毛萍. 论国有企业经营者报酬激励机制. 中南工业大学学报(社科版). 2001.1
[16] 叶克林. 企业家期权报酬制度的经验、理论与政策选择. 工业企业管理. 2001.5
[17] 曹丰. 西方经理人员激励效果分析. 外国经济与管理. 2000.8
[18] 郑兴山、唐元虎. 产权制度和企业绩效. 经济体制改革. 2001.1
[19] Brain J. Hall and Kevin J. Murphy. Optimal exercise prices for executive stock options. The American Economic Review, 2000, 2,209-214
[20] Marinne Bertrand and sendhil Mollainathan. Agents with and without principals. The American Economic Review,2000,2,203-208
[21] Edward P. Lazer. Performance Pay and Productivity.The Ameracan Economic Review, 2000,12,1346-1361
[22] 刘爱东、谭艳. 国有企业实行经理股票期权的问题与对策. 中南工业大学学报(社科版). 2001,1
[23] 赵伟功.论期权激励模式的局限性.武汉交通管理干部学院学报,2000,4
[24] 孙鹏. 中国经理人股票期权计划应缓行. 经济理论与经济管理. 2001.3
[25] 郑先炳. 美加银行业股票期权计划的实施及启示.世界经济.2001,9
[26] 兰邦华、何歆.美国非传统股票期权实践与理论的新发展.经济管理,2001,14
[27] 金雪军、马敏.美国指数化股票期权即对我国的借鉴.投资与证券,2001,5
[28] 陈佳贵、杜莹芬. 国有企业经营者的激励与约束--理论、实证与政策[M]. P51-67.经济管理出版社. 2001.2
[29] 孔宁宁 .对股票期权及其会计处理的系统认识.中国会计网校.2003.4.8
[30] 胡俞越. 经理层革命-股票期权制度与经理层融资收购.第一版.北京：中国财政经济出版社. 2000
[31] Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny. A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance.1997,737-783
[32] Adolf A, Berle and Gardiner Means. The Modern Corporation and Property. Transaction Publishers, 1932( reprinted 1991)
[33] 程承坪、魏明侠. 人力资本剩余索取权及政策取向. 经济与管理研究.2000.5
[34] 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.第一版.上海:上海三联书店,1996
[35] Martin, Stepher & David Parker. The Impact of Privavalization -Ownership and Corporate in the UK. Rountledge, 1997
[36] Tittenbrun, Jack. Private Versus Public Enterprise. London: Janus Publishing company,1996
[37] 石婷婷. 人力资本产权及激励制度创新. 体制改革. 2001.1
[38] 黄群慧. 企业经营者年薪制比较. 经济管理. 2001.5
[39] 纪根培. 经营者年薪制计算方法质疑. 工业企业管理. 2001.4
[40] 郭元晞. 论经营者年薪制. 经济研究. 1995.11
[41] 张文贤. 管理人入股--人力资本定价.立信会计出版社. 2001.4
[42] 约翰.赫尔.期权、期货和衍生证券.华夏出版社.1997.3
[43] 杨秀苔、刘星等.证券投资原理. 重庆大学出版社. 1992.4
[44] 文宗瑜、唐俊.公司股份期权与员工持股计划.第一版.北京：中国金融出版社.2000
[45] 张昕海、于东科.股权激励.第一版.北京：机械工业出版社.2000
[46] 拉丰.激励理论.第一版.北京：北京大学出版社.2001
[47] 白巍，郑勇强，余成勇. 股票期权激励效果的博弈分析.经济管理.2001,18
[48] George W. Fenn and Nellie Liang. Corporate payout policy and managerial stock incentives. Journal of Financial Economics. 2001, 60(1)
[49] Mary Ellen Carter and Luann J. Lynch. An examination of executive stock option re-pricing. Journal of Financial Economics,2001 61(2)
[50] John E. core and Wayne R. Guay . Stock option plans for non-executive employees. Journal of Financial Economics. 2001, 61(2)
[51] Xianming Zhou. Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance: comment. Journal of Financial Economics. 2001,62(3 )
[52] Conyon and K.J. Murphy . The price and the Pauper? CEO pay in the United Kinom. Economic Journal .2000,110(467)
[53] William P.Rogerson. The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems. Econometrica, 1985, 53(6)
[2] Marinne Bertrand and sendhil Mollainathan. Agents with and without principals. The American Economic Review,2000,2:203-208
[3] 黄 斌 聂祖荣．激励股票期权的理论与实践．中国股票网
[4] 李春琦，石磊. 国外企业激励理论述评.工业企业管理.2001,9
[5] 袁国良.上市公司管理层激励因素来自何方.上海证券报.1999.11.11
[6] 梁能等．公司治理结构：中国的实践与美国的经验．第一版．北京：中国人民大学出版社，2000
[7] 张维迎．企业理论与中国企业改革．第一版．北京：北京大学出版社．1999
[8] 魏杰、赵俊超.关于人力资本作为企业制度要素的考虑.清华大学中国经济研究中心研究动态，2001/2/24
[9] 周其仁.市场里的企业：一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约.经济研究.1996，6
[10] 刘志新、贾福清.证券市场有效性理论与实证.第一版.北京：航空工业出版社.2001，1-22
[11] George Baker. The use of performance measures in incentive contracting. The American Economic Review,2000,2:415-420
[12] 拉丰、马赫蒂摩著.陈志俊等译.激励理论－委托代理模型.第一版.北京：中国人民大学出版社.2002
[13] 龚玉池. 经理股票期权的产权基础. 大连理工大学学报（社会科学版）.2000.12
[14] 颜爱民、陈易健、朱诚良. 企业激励机制有效性分析. 中南工业大学学报(社科版). 2001.1
[15] 陈晓红、毛萍. 论国有企业经营者报酬激励机制. 中南工业大学学报(社科版). 2001.1
[16] 叶克林. 企业家期权报酬制度的经验、理论与政策选择. 工业企业管理. 2001.5
[17] 曹丰. 西方经理人员激励效果分析. 外国经济与管理. 2000.8
[18] 郑兴山、唐元虎. 产权制度和企业绩效. 经济体制改革. 2001.1
[19] Brain J. Hall and Kevin J. Murphy. Optimal exercise prices for executive stock options. The American Economic Review, 2000, 2,209-214
[20] Marinne Bertrand and sendhil Mollainathan. Agents with and without principals. The American Economic Review,2000,2,203-208
[21] Edward P. Lazer. Performance Pay and Productivity.The Ameracan Economic Review, 2000,12,1346-1361
[22] 刘爱东、谭艳. 国有企业实行经理股票期权的问题与对策. 中南工业大学学报(社科版). 2001,1
[23] 赵伟功.论期权激励模式的局限性.武汉交通管理干部学院学报,2000,4
[24] 孙鹏. 中国经理人股票期权计划应缓行. 经济理论与经济管理. 2001.3
[25] 郑先炳. 美加银行业股票期权计划的实施及启示.世界经济.2001,9
[26] 兰邦华、何歆.美国非传统股票期权实践与理论的新发展.经济管理,2001,14
[27] 金雪军、马敏.美国指数化股票期权即对我国的借鉴.投资与证券,2001,5
[28] 陈佳贵、杜莹芬. 国有企业经营者的激励与约束--理论、实证与政策[M]. P51-67.经济管理出版社. 2001.2
[29] 孔宁宁 .对股票期权及其会计处理的系统认识.中国会计网校.2003.4.8
[30] 胡俞越. 经理层革命-股票期权制度与经理层融资收购.第一版.北京：中国财政经济出版社. 2000
[31] Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny. A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance.1997,737-783
[32] Adolf A, Berle and Gardiner Means. The Modern Corporation and Property. Transaction Publishers, 1932( reprinted 1991)
[33] 程承坪、魏明侠. 人力资本剩余索取权及政策取向. 经济与管理研究.2000.5
[34] 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.第一版.上海:上海三联书店,1996
[35] Martin, Stepher & David Parker. The Impact of Privavalization -Ownership and Corporate in the UK. Rountledge, 1997
[36] Tittenbrun, Jack. Private Versus Public Enterprise. London: Janus Publishing company,1996
[37] 石婷婷. 人力资本产权及激励制度创新. 体制改革. 2001.1
[38] 黄群慧. 企业经营者年薪制比较. 经济管理. 2001.5
[39] 纪根培. 经营者年薪制计算方法质疑. 工业企业管理. 2001.4
[40] 郭元晞. 论经营者年薪制. 经济研究. 1995.11
[41] 张文贤. 管理人入股--人力资本定价.立信会计出版社. 2001.4
[42] 约翰.赫尔.期权、期货和衍生证券.华夏出版社.1997.3
[43] 杨秀苔、刘星等.证券投资原理. 重庆大学出版社. 1992.4
[44] 文宗瑜、唐俊.公司股份期权与员工持股计划.第一版.北京：中国金融出版社.2000
[45] 张昕海、于东科.股权激励.第一版.北京：机械工业出版社.2000
[46] 拉丰.激励理论.第一版.北京：北京大学出版社.2001
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