基于企业绩效的中国上市公司非高管员工薪酬激励体制实证研究
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摘要
企业经营权和所有权的分离,导致委托-代理问题的出现。解决委托-代理问题,必须建立一套有效的激励-约束机制,使代理人为委托人的利益服务。随着股权分置改革的推进和资本市场的完善,员工持股问题越来越受到各上市公司重视,同时作为薪酬激励手段之一有更加完善的体制。因此,本文鉴于员工持股这一参数判断上市公司是否进行了股权激励手段,以此进行实证研究。
本文选取了2008年或2009年上市公司非高管层薪酬与公司财务绩效指标等数据,通过对指标选取及概念的界定基础上,先对数据进行统计分析之后,立足于我国上市公司非高管层薪酬与相关因素的关联性上,对我国进行股权激励的上市公司绩效与上市公司非高管层薪酬之间的相关性进行分析检验,望能得到上市公司有效的薪酬激励机制与非高管薪酬激励的相互激励性因素。通过对我国上市公司非高管层薪酬进行统计分析发现,薪酬水平呈现上升趋势,却因行业内及行业间公司规模、薪酬制度等规定不统一,因而绝对水平不高.经统计检验发现,企业绩效与非高管薪酬有一定的正相关关系,但是相对应的检验相关程度有待进一步提高,对检验数据进行分析可知,公司绩效与公司非高管层年度薪酬存在显著正相关关系,说明选取的样本公司进行了股权激励后产生了一定的效果,但是激励需要短期激励与长期激励相结合,因而,公司绩效的提高并不能对于公司非高管薪酬的提高有显著的说明性.针对样本是否采用股权激励手段,方式不一,也有很多方式,本文以员工是否持股为标准判断,虽然员工持股比例较低,但是对于员工持股的短期效应较明显,长期效应还需建立起有效的股权激励机制。
The separation of enterprise's management and ownership, led to the agency problem. In order to solve the agency problem,we need to have a set of incentiveand restraint mechanisms,making agents to maximize the welfare of the clients. With the carrying on of the shareholder structure reform and the promotion of the capital market, more and more employees of listed companies holding their company's shares,and As a means of incentive pay to have a more complete system.
Therefor,This view of the employee-owned company of this parameter to determine whether the equity market incentives, as empirical research.
This paper examined Senior executives of listed companies pay and non-financial performance indicators and other data, through the selection and definition of the concept index, based on the data before statistical analysis on the listed firms over 2008-2009, Listed Companies in China based on the remuneration of senior management of the associated factors, Incentive stock options to our country performance of listed companies and listed companies pay non-senior management to analyze the correlation between the test, Listed companies hope to get an effective pay incentives and mutual non-executive compensation incentive incentive factor. Listed Companies in China by senior management salaries for statistical analysis found that pay levels on the rise, because of the companies within the industry size and industry, salary system and other regulations are not unified, and therefore the absolute level is not high. The statistical test showed that non-executive pay and corporate performance has some positive correlation, but the degree of correlation corresponding to the test should be improved further, On test data analysis, the company senior management performance and company annual remuneration of non-significant positive correlation, indicating that the sample selected after the company had equity incentive produced a certain effect, but need short-term incentives and long-term incentive incentives combined Thus, the improvement of corporate performance, and not for the company's non-executive compensation increased significantly explanatory. Whether to adopt the equity incentive for the sample means in different ways, there are many ways, this paper as a standard to judge whether the staff shareholding, while employee ownership is relatively low, but for the short-term effect of employee stock ownership more obvious need to establish long-term effects An effective equity incentives.
本文选取了2008年或2009年上市公司非高管层薪酬与公司财务绩效指标等数据,通过对指标选取及概念的界定基础上,先对数据进行统计分析之后,立足于我国上市公司非高管层薪酬与相关因素的关联性上,对我国进行股权激励的上市公司绩效与上市公司非高管层薪酬之间的相关性进行分析检验,望能得到上市公司有效的薪酬激励机制与非高管薪酬激励的相互激励性因素。通过对我国上市公司非高管层薪酬进行统计分析发现,薪酬水平呈现上升趋势,却因行业内及行业间公司规模、薪酬制度等规定不统一,因而绝对水平不高.经统计检验发现,企业绩效与非高管薪酬有一定的正相关关系,但是相对应的检验相关程度有待进一步提高,对检验数据进行分析可知,公司绩效与公司非高管层年度薪酬存在显著正相关关系,说明选取的样本公司进行了股权激励后产生了一定的效果,但是激励需要短期激励与长期激励相结合,因而,公司绩效的提高并不能对于公司非高管薪酬的提高有显著的说明性.针对样本是否采用股权激励手段,方式不一,也有很多方式,本文以员工是否持股为标准判断,虽然员工持股比例较低,但是对于员工持股的短期效应较明显,长期效应还需建立起有效的股权激励机制。
The separation of enterprise's management and ownership, led to the agency problem. In order to solve the agency problem,we need to have a set of incentiveand restraint mechanisms,making agents to maximize the welfare of the clients. With the carrying on of the shareholder structure reform and the promotion of the capital market, more and more employees of listed companies holding their company's shares,and As a means of incentive pay to have a more complete system.
Therefor,This view of the employee-owned company of this parameter to determine whether the equity market incentives, as empirical research.
This paper examined Senior executives of listed companies pay and non-financial performance indicators and other data, through the selection and definition of the concept index, based on the data before statistical analysis on the listed firms over 2008-2009, Listed Companies in China based on the remuneration of senior management of the associated factors, Incentive stock options to our country performance of listed companies and listed companies pay non-senior management to analyze the correlation between the test, Listed companies hope to get an effective pay incentives and mutual non-executive compensation incentive incentive factor. Listed Companies in China by senior management salaries for statistical analysis found that pay levels on the rise, because of the companies within the industry size and industry, salary system and other regulations are not unified, and therefore the absolute level is not high. The statistical test showed that non-executive pay and corporate performance has some positive correlation, but the degree of correlation corresponding to the test should be improved further, On test data analysis, the company senior management performance and company annual remuneration of non-significant positive correlation, indicating that the sample selected after the company had equity incentive produced a certain effect, but need short-term incentives and long-term incentive incentives combined Thus, the improvement of corporate performance, and not for the company's non-executive compensation increased significantly explanatory. Whether to adopt the equity incentive for the sample means in different ways, there are many ways, this paper as a standard to judge whether the staff shareholding, while employee ownership is relatively low, but for the short-term effect of employee stock ownership more obvious need to establish long-term effects An effective equity incentives.
引文
[1]Jensen,M&Meckling,W. Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,AgencyCosts,and Ownership Structure,Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.3,1976:305-360.
[2]Robert C.Hanson,Moon H.Song.Managerial ownership,board structure,andthe division of gains in divestitures,Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.6,Issue1,2000,55-70
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[7]Elaine GMauldin.Systematic difference in employee stock ownership plan contributions:some evidence[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,1999(18).
[8]周建波.孙菊生.经营者股权激励的治理效应研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2003,(5)：74-93
[9]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效—项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000,(1)：24-30.
[10]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000,(3)：32-38.
[11]于东智.董事会、公司治理与绩效——对中国上市公司的经验分析[J].中国社会科学,2003(3)：29-41
[12]许承明,濮卫东.内部人持股与上市公司绩效研究[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2003(11)：123-126
[13]颜爱民,陈易健等.企业激励有效性分析[J].中南工业大学学报(社会科学版),2001
[14]管静.EvA：我国企业业绩评价指标的合理选择[J].商业现代化,2007(10)
[15]南开大学公司治理研究中心公司治理评价课题组,李维安.中国上市公司治理指数与公司绩效的实证分析——基于中国1149家上市公司的研究.管理世界,2006,3：104-113
[16]佘虹志.我国上市公司高管激励机制的实证研究[D].湖南大学.2006年10月.
[17]宋彦胜.国有企业薪酬激励机制的研究[D].北京交通大学.2004年11月.
[18]陆娜.企业薪酬激励机制研究和设计[D].西安建筑科技大学.2003年6月.
[19]张俊瑞,赵进文,张建等.高级管理层薪酬与上市公司经营绩效相关性的实证分析[J].会计研究,2003,9
[20]高明华.高管薪酬凸显激励缺陷[J].证券市场周刊,2007(4)
[21]杨瑞龙.经理报酬、企业绩效与股权结构的实证研究[J].江苏行政学院学报,2002,1
[22]曾繁英,金式容.经理人业绩评价与激励报酬研究[J].企业经济(江西),2004(1)
[23]毛华初.欧美企业管理薪酬对我国企业的启示[J].集团经济研究,2005(1)
[24]高娟.上市公司高层管理人员薪酬与企业业绩关系的实证研究[J].财会月刊(理论),2006(4)
[25]程国平.经营者激励——理论、方案与机制[M].经济管理出版社,2002.21
[26]李斌,闫丽荣.委托人与代理人在公司治理中的行为博弈[J],财经问题研究,2005(7)
[27]大卫·格拉斯曼.EVA革命—以价值为核心的企业战略与财务、薪酬管理体系[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2002
[28]彭璧玉.经理薪酬的影响因素分析[J].现代管理科学,2004,10
[29]王长城,姚裕群.薪酬制度与管理[M].北京：高等教育出版社,2004.
[30]康十勇,林玳玳.工资理论与管理实务[M].北京：中国经济出版社,2001.
[31]韩漪萍,萧毅.薪酬与激励的新探讨[J].科技创业,2006.5
[32]曹振杰,彭东瑞.我国企业采用宽带薪酬的冲突及其对策[J].内蒙古财经学院学报,2007.1
[33]吴定玉.宽带薪酬管理模式探析[J].北京工业大学学报(社会科学版),2004.1
[34]刘斌,刘星.CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J].会计研究,2003.3
[35]李琦.上市公司高级经理人薪酬影响因素分析[J].经济科学,2003.6
[36]王超.宽带薪酬实施中应注意的问题[J].经济师,2004.3
[37]李新建.企业薪酬管理[M].天津：南开大学出版社,2003
[38]俞鸿琳.国有上市公司管理者股权激励效应的实证检验[J].经济学,2006,(1)
[39]陈勇,廖冠民,王霆.我国上市公司股权激励效应的实证分析[J].管理世界,2005,(2)
[40]苏卫东,李树爱.上市公司高管持股与经营者腐败.南方金融,2006,358(6)：50-51
[41]王战强.上市公司高管人员持股状况研究及政策建议[J].证券市场导报,1998,(9)：42-48
[42]中国上市公司股权结构与公司绩效(2009)
[43]中国上市公司高管层股权激励实施效果研究
[44]袁国良,王怀芳,刘明.上市公司股权激励的实证分析及其相关问题[A].刘树成,沈沛主编.中国资本市场前沿理论研究文集[C].成都：社会科学文献出版社.2000
[2]Robert C.Hanson,Moon H.Song.Managerial ownership,board structure,andthe division of gains in divestitures,Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.6,Issue1,2000,55-70
[3]Jensen M, Murphy K. Performance pay and top-management incentives[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1990:225-264.
[4]Richard I.Henderson.Compensation Management in a Knowledge-Based World,9th Edition[M].New Jersey:Pearson Education,Inc,2003.
[5]David.P.Lepak,Scott.A.Snell,The Human Resource Architecture:Toward a Theoryof Human Capital Allocation and Development[M].Academy of Management Review,1999.
[6]DeehpandSloanR.ManagemerialineentiveandthehorizonProblem.joumalofaceountlngand economies,1991,14(1):51-89
[7]Elaine GMauldin.Systematic difference in employee stock ownership plan contributions:some evidence[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,1999(18).
[8]周建波.孙菊生.经营者股权激励的治理效应研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2003,(5)：74-93
[9]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效—项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000,(1)：24-30.
[10]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000,(3)：32-38.
[11]于东智.董事会、公司治理与绩效——对中国上市公司的经验分析[J].中国社会科学,2003(3)：29-41
[12]许承明,濮卫东.内部人持股与上市公司绩效研究[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2003(11)：123-126
[13]颜爱民,陈易健等.企业激励有效性分析[J].中南工业大学学报(社会科学版),2001
[14]管静.EvA：我国企业业绩评价指标的合理选择[J].商业现代化,2007(10)
[15]南开大学公司治理研究中心公司治理评价课题组,李维安.中国上市公司治理指数与公司绩效的实证分析——基于中国1149家上市公司的研究.管理世界,2006,3：104-113
[16]佘虹志.我国上市公司高管激励机制的实证研究[D].湖南大学.2006年10月.
[17]宋彦胜.国有企业薪酬激励机制的研究[D].北京交通大学.2004年11月.
[18]陆娜.企业薪酬激励机制研究和设计[D].西安建筑科技大学.2003年6月.
[19]张俊瑞,赵进文,张建等.高级管理层薪酬与上市公司经营绩效相关性的实证分析[J].会计研究,2003,9
[20]高明华.高管薪酬凸显激励缺陷[J].证券市场周刊,2007(4)
[21]杨瑞龙.经理报酬、企业绩效与股权结构的实证研究[J].江苏行政学院学报,2002,1
[22]曾繁英,金式容.经理人业绩评价与激励报酬研究[J].企业经济(江西),2004(1)
[23]毛华初.欧美企业管理薪酬对我国企业的启示[J].集团经济研究,2005(1)
[24]高娟.上市公司高层管理人员薪酬与企业业绩关系的实证研究[J].财会月刊(理论),2006(4)
[25]程国平.经营者激励——理论、方案与机制[M].经济管理出版社,2002.21
[26]李斌,闫丽荣.委托人与代理人在公司治理中的行为博弈[J],财经问题研究,2005(7)
[27]大卫·格拉斯曼.EVA革命—以价值为核心的企业战略与财务、薪酬管理体系[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2002
[28]彭璧玉.经理薪酬的影响因素分析[J].现代管理科学,2004,10
[29]王长城,姚裕群.薪酬制度与管理[M].北京：高等教育出版社,2004.
[30]康十勇,林玳玳.工资理论与管理实务[M].北京：中国经济出版社,2001.
[31]韩漪萍,萧毅.薪酬与激励的新探讨[J].科技创业,2006.5
[32]曹振杰,彭东瑞.我国企业采用宽带薪酬的冲突及其对策[J].内蒙古财经学院学报,2007.1
[33]吴定玉.宽带薪酬管理模式探析[J].北京工业大学学报(社会科学版),2004.1
[34]刘斌,刘星.CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J].会计研究,2003.3
[35]李琦.上市公司高级经理人薪酬影响因素分析[J].经济科学,2003.6
[36]王超.宽带薪酬实施中应注意的问题[J].经济师,2004.3
[37]李新建.企业薪酬管理[M].天津：南开大学出版社,2003
[38]俞鸿琳.国有上市公司管理者股权激励效应的实证检验[J].经济学,2006,(1)
[39]陈勇,廖冠民,王霆.我国上市公司股权激励效应的实证分析[J].管理世界,2005,(2)
[40]苏卫东,李树爱.上市公司高管持股与经营者腐败.南方金融,2006,358(6)：50-51
[41]王战强.上市公司高管人员持股状况研究及政策建议[J].证券市场导报,1998,(9)：42-48
[42]中国上市公司股权结构与公司绩效(2009)
[43]中国上市公司高管层股权激励实施效果研究
[44]袁国良,王怀芳,刘明.上市公司股权激励的实证分析及其相关问题[A].刘树成,沈沛主编.中国资本市场前沿理论研究文集[C].成都：社会科学文献出版社.2000