技术标准及其后进入者策略研究
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摘要
由于高通公司的成功经验,以及中国企业在技术标准上受制于人的DVD案例,从中国政府到企业无不梦想拥有知识产权的技术标准。中国企业非常渴望拥有标准,不断尝试在各种产品上提出自己的技术标准。
在日常生活中,我们接触到的很多技术标准,尤其是国家质量技术监督局和行业协会制定的技术标准以及我们耳熟能详的ISO9000质量认证标准,都是作为公共品出现,由政府来制定并进行强制或者推荐使用,并不以盈利为目的。制定这些标准的目的都是为了各企业能够生产出标准化的产品,来达到规模经济效益。
为什么高通公司的CDMA技术标准和以飞利浦为首的6C联盟能够对技术标准进行收费?作为后进入者,大唐所制定的TD—SCDMA标准面临着什么样的困难,需要付出什么样的努力才能使大唐的技术标准获得成功?大唐模式是否是技术标准的后进入者的唯一模式?这些都是本文作者始终思考的问题,也是引起本研究开展的动机。
经过分析,我们认为技术标准和知识产权的结合,尤其是基本专利的结合,导致只要符合该技术标准的任何产品都需要对基本专利进行付费。基本专利成为其他厂商进入技术标准的壁垒,明确本文所讨论的技术标准是融合了基本专利的技术标准。
在基本专利的微观层面,讨论了一流的企业为什么做标准。单个专利的价值难以实现,绝大多数的专利是没有价值的。而专利和技术标准的结合,出现了基本专利。一流的企业通过制定技术标准,将自己的专利融入到技术标准形成基本专利或者通过交叉许可他人的专利,通过对基本专利的占有实现对被许可企业的收费。一流的企业通过制定技术标准,实现对基本专利的控制,将市场之间的竞争改变为市场内的竞争。技术标准持有人不仅通过技术标准许可获益,而且通过产量竞争或者芯片等核心产品的生产来影响产业的结构和绩效。
由于技术标准具有网络外部性,具有自然垄断特性,但技术标准的竞争存在国家、经济利益,在一个产业内经常是多个技术标准共存。我们通过构建技术标准的钻石模型,以生产要素来解释企业是否具备制定技术标准的能力;以需求条件来解释技术标准如何能够获得市场的认可,并取得一定的用户基数;以企业的战略和竞争对手来分析技术标准企业在竞争中所采取的战略,如:企业联盟、技术标准开放等;以相关产业和支持产业的表现来分析技术标准所涉及的各产业是否有竞争力,是否能使技术标准尽快得到完善;政府在技术标准中应有的角色,以及机会对技术标准制定的影响。我们认为对于技术标准来说,各要素之间同样是相互影响,缺一不可。
通过分析各国的移动通信案例来实证技术标准的钻石模型。我们认为钻石模型的各要素都非常重要,只不过在特定的条件下、不同的案例中显的有所区别。以高通公司为例,机会角色同样重要,如果高通公司的CDMA专利不是3G技术所必须使用的基本专利的话,爱立信等企业制定的3G标准就不会向高通公司倾斜,高通公司作为移动通信标准的后进入者难以成为标准之王。
我们国家有大量的企业介入标准制定,但多是后进入者,因此研究后进入者如何参与技术标准的竞争有着非常重要的意义。我们认为技术标准竞争存在技术标准之间的竞争和技术标准内的竞争,大唐模式是后进入者参与技术标准之间竞争的一个案例,我们结合钻石模型和大唐技术标准的案例进行分析,认为没有政府的支持,大唐模式难以成功,因此我们认为政府支持成为大唐案例中钻石模型的关键要素,我们提出政府应该采取的具体措施。但我们认为大唐的技术标准是个特例,我们国家的企业制定的技术标准不可能都让政府来支持,更多的要依赖企业自身的能力,参与技术标准内的竞争,也就是基本专利的竞争,由跟随一部分原创一原创,来逐渐提高基本专利的比重,最终实现技术标准的主导,依靠市场力量和政府应有的支持来获得技术标准的赶超,我们认为华为和中兴的模式更具有普适性。
As the successful experience of QualComm Company, and the DVD case of which the Chinese enterprises are limited by the technical standard, both Chinese governm -ent and enterprises are dreaming of the independent IPR (intellectual property rights) of technical standard. Chinese enterprises are looking forward to the standard, and trying to put the own technical standard on all kinds of products.
There are lots of technical standards in our daily life, specially the standard made by China State Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision、the Association of Indus -try and IS09000. All of them are compulsive or commended as the public goods, and are not profitable.
Why the CDMA technical standard of Qualcomm and the 6C union leaded by Philips can charge license fee on technical standard? What's kind of the problems the Datang's TD-SCDMA standard faced? How make great efforts on Datang's technical standard? Is Datang the only pattern of which can be used by new entrant. These are all the questions about which the writer is thinking over, and the incentive of the researching.
After analysis, we think that the combination of the technical standard and IPR, especially essential patent, is the reason of charging license fee on each products of which used the technical standard. The essential patent has been the barrier to get into the technical standard for other producers.
On the micro -level of the essential patent, we discuss why top company can make the standard. We know that it is hardly to realize the value for an individual patent, and most of the patens are valueless. But the combination of the patent and technical standard brings to the essential patent. The essential patent is a necessary aspect if you want to produce under the technical standard. According to make the technical standard, Top company combine the patent with the technical standard to be a essential patent or cross-licensing. Then top company realized the charging fees by holding the essential patent. Hence the competition between the markets is becomes to inner the market. The holder of the technical standard gets the benefit not only from the license of standard, but also from the quantity competition or producing the core-products, say chipset.
Technical standard is a kind of the natural monopoly as its network externality. But there are several technical standards in one industry as there would be benefits conflicts among countries. According to build up Diamond Model, we can explain if the enterprise has the ability of making the technical standard by factor conditions; explain how to be admitted by market by demand conditions and obtain a number of users; analyszing the stratagem of technical standard company, e.g. enterprise union, opening technical standard and so on; By the related and supporting industries, we can analyze if there exists interrelate between the industries and support the the ability of competition; What role should the government play; and how the opportunity influnce the technical standard . We believe that the factors are affected by each other and indispensable for the technical standards.
We can approve the method of Diamond Model according to analysis several countries cases of mobile communication. We believe that each factor of Diamond Model is very important, but can be different in sepcial conditions and cases. As the sample of Qualcomm, it is same important for factor of opportunities. If the Patent of CDMA is not the essential patent for 3G technique, the 3G standard made by company like Ericsson couldn't lean to Qualcomm, thus Qualcomm won't be the King of the standard.
There are enterprises now in making technical standards in China, but most of them are new entrant, it is significative in researching how the new entrant participate in the standard competition. We think that there are competition between the technical standards and, inner the standards. Patten of Datang company is a case of that. We analysis the case together with the Diamond Model, and we believe that Datang couldn't be successful without supporting of the government. Hence we think the supporting from government is a key factor in case of Datang's Diamond Model, and we raise the detail method which government can be adopted. But we think Datang's technical standard is a special case, and government can not support all technical standards made by Chinese enterprises. It depends much more on the ability of the enterprise itself, to participate in the competition of inner standards, which to say the competition of essential patent. It is a process from following the standard to partial created to totally created the standard, so that the rate of essential patent is increased gradually, finally to be the leader of the technical standard. Enterprises depend on the market and supporting from government to exceed the technical standard. We introduce the pattern of Huawei and ZTE is a common pattern.
在日常生活中,我们接触到的很多技术标准,尤其是国家质量技术监督局和行业协会制定的技术标准以及我们耳熟能详的ISO9000质量认证标准,都是作为公共品出现,由政府来制定并进行强制或者推荐使用,并不以盈利为目的。制定这些标准的目的都是为了各企业能够生产出标准化的产品,来达到规模经济效益。
为什么高通公司的CDMA技术标准和以飞利浦为首的6C联盟能够对技术标准进行收费?作为后进入者,大唐所制定的TD—SCDMA标准面临着什么样的困难,需要付出什么样的努力才能使大唐的技术标准获得成功?大唐模式是否是技术标准的后进入者的唯一模式?这些都是本文作者始终思考的问题,也是引起本研究开展的动机。
经过分析,我们认为技术标准和知识产权的结合,尤其是基本专利的结合,导致只要符合该技术标准的任何产品都需要对基本专利进行付费。基本专利成为其他厂商进入技术标准的壁垒,明确本文所讨论的技术标准是融合了基本专利的技术标准。
在基本专利的微观层面,讨论了一流的企业为什么做标准。单个专利的价值难以实现,绝大多数的专利是没有价值的。而专利和技术标准的结合,出现了基本专利。一流的企业通过制定技术标准,将自己的专利融入到技术标准形成基本专利或者通过交叉许可他人的专利,通过对基本专利的占有实现对被许可企业的收费。一流的企业通过制定技术标准,实现对基本专利的控制,将市场之间的竞争改变为市场内的竞争。技术标准持有人不仅通过技术标准许可获益,而且通过产量竞争或者芯片等核心产品的生产来影响产业的结构和绩效。
由于技术标准具有网络外部性,具有自然垄断特性,但技术标准的竞争存在国家、经济利益,在一个产业内经常是多个技术标准共存。我们通过构建技术标准的钻石模型,以生产要素来解释企业是否具备制定技术标准的能力;以需求条件来解释技术标准如何能够获得市场的认可,并取得一定的用户基数;以企业的战略和竞争对手来分析技术标准企业在竞争中所采取的战略,如:企业联盟、技术标准开放等;以相关产业和支持产业的表现来分析技术标准所涉及的各产业是否有竞争力,是否能使技术标准尽快得到完善;政府在技术标准中应有的角色,以及机会对技术标准制定的影响。我们认为对于技术标准来说,各要素之间同样是相互影响,缺一不可。
通过分析各国的移动通信案例来实证技术标准的钻石模型。我们认为钻石模型的各要素都非常重要,只不过在特定的条件下、不同的案例中显的有所区别。以高通公司为例,机会角色同样重要,如果高通公司的CDMA专利不是3G技术所必须使用的基本专利的话,爱立信等企业制定的3G标准就不会向高通公司倾斜,高通公司作为移动通信标准的后进入者难以成为标准之王。
我们国家有大量的企业介入标准制定,但多是后进入者,因此研究后进入者如何参与技术标准的竞争有着非常重要的意义。我们认为技术标准竞争存在技术标准之间的竞争和技术标准内的竞争,大唐模式是后进入者参与技术标准之间竞争的一个案例,我们结合钻石模型和大唐技术标准的案例进行分析,认为没有政府的支持,大唐模式难以成功,因此我们认为政府支持成为大唐案例中钻石模型的关键要素,我们提出政府应该采取的具体措施。但我们认为大唐的技术标准是个特例,我们国家的企业制定的技术标准不可能都让政府来支持,更多的要依赖企业自身的能力,参与技术标准内的竞争,也就是基本专利的竞争,由跟随一部分原创一原创,来逐渐提高基本专利的比重,最终实现技术标准的主导,依靠市场力量和政府应有的支持来获得技术标准的赶超,我们认为华为和中兴的模式更具有普适性。
As the successful experience of QualComm Company, and the DVD case of which the Chinese enterprises are limited by the technical standard, both Chinese governm -ent and enterprises are dreaming of the independent IPR (intellectual property rights) of technical standard. Chinese enterprises are looking forward to the standard, and trying to put the own technical standard on all kinds of products.
There are lots of technical standards in our daily life, specially the standard made by China State Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision、the Association of Indus -try and IS09000. All of them are compulsive or commended as the public goods, and are not profitable.
Why the CDMA technical standard of Qualcomm and the 6C union leaded by Philips can charge license fee on technical standard? What's kind of the problems the Datang's TD-SCDMA standard faced? How make great efforts on Datang's technical standard? Is Datang the only pattern of which can be used by new entrant. These are all the questions about which the writer is thinking over, and the incentive of the researching.
After analysis, we think that the combination of the technical standard and IPR, especially essential patent, is the reason of charging license fee on each products of which used the technical standard. The essential patent has been the barrier to get into the technical standard for other producers.
On the micro -level of the essential patent, we discuss why top company can make the standard. We know that it is hardly to realize the value for an individual patent, and most of the patens are valueless. But the combination of the patent and technical standard brings to the essential patent. The essential patent is a necessary aspect if you want to produce under the technical standard. According to make the technical standard, Top company combine the patent with the technical standard to be a essential patent or cross-licensing. Then top company realized the charging fees by holding the essential patent. Hence the competition between the markets is becomes to inner the market. The holder of the technical standard gets the benefit not only from the license of standard, but also from the quantity competition or producing the core-products, say chipset.
Technical standard is a kind of the natural monopoly as its network externality. But there are several technical standards in one industry as there would be benefits conflicts among countries. According to build up Diamond Model, we can explain if the enterprise has the ability of making the technical standard by factor conditions; explain how to be admitted by market by demand conditions and obtain a number of users; analyszing the stratagem of technical standard company, e.g. enterprise union, opening technical standard and so on; By the related and supporting industries, we can analyze if there exists interrelate between the industries and support the the ability of competition; What role should the government play; and how the opportunity influnce the technical standard . We believe that the factors are affected by each other and indispensable for the technical standards.
We can approve the method of Diamond Model according to analysis several countries cases of mobile communication. We believe that each factor of Diamond Model is very important, but can be different in sepcial conditions and cases. As the sample of Qualcomm, it is same important for factor of opportunities. If the Patent of CDMA is not the essential patent for 3G technique, the 3G standard made by company like Ericsson couldn't lean to Qualcomm, thus Qualcomm won't be the King of the standard.
There are enterprises now in making technical standards in China, but most of them are new entrant, it is significative in researching how the new entrant participate in the standard competition. We think that there are competition between the technical standards and, inner the standards. Patten of Datang company is a case of that. We analysis the case together with the Diamond Model, and we believe that Datang couldn't be successful without supporting of the government. Hence we think the supporting from government is a key factor in case of Datang's Diamond Model, and we raise the detail method which government can be adopted. But we think Datang's technical standard is a special case, and government can not support all technical standards made by Chinese enterprises. It depends much more on the ability of the enterprise itself, to participate in the competition of inner standards, which to say the competition of essential patent. It is a process from following the standard to partial created to totally created the standard, so that the rate of essential patent is increased gradually, finally to be the leader of the technical standard. Enterprises depend on the market and supporting from government to exceed the technical standard. We introduce the pattern of Huawei and ZTE is a common pattern.
引文
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89 Utterback,JM and L.Kim,"Invasion of a Stable Business by Radical Innovation." In.The Management of Productivity and Technology in Manufacturing,Paul Kleindorfer,ed.New York:Plenum Press,1986,pp.129-130.
90 FJ Olleros,"Emerging industries and the burnout of pioneers," J.Prod.Innov.Manage.,vol.1,pp.5-18.1986.
91 曹淑敏,《无线移动通信的发展趋势》http://www.zte.com.cn/06publication/magazine2.jsp
92 一种无线通信技术,比3G能提供更高的带宽
93 两个第三代移动通信最主要的标准化组织
108 马俊,《网络型产业技术标准的机制与政策》,信息技术与标准化,2003.12
1. R.Bekkers,GDuysters and B.Verspagen(2000), 《intellectual property rights,strategic technology agreements and market structure.the case of GSM》
2. Noam, E. (1992). Telecommunications in Europe. Oxford University Press.
3. Granstrand, O. (1999). The economics and management of intellectual property: Towards intellectual capitalism. Cheltenham, UK: Edgar Elgar
4. Bekkers, R.N.A. & Liotard, I. (1999). 'The tense relation between mobile telecommunications standards and IPR ', European Intellectual Property Review (1999) Issue 3, 110-126.
5. Parchomovsky&Wagner , 《 patent portfolios 》 , http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi? article=1055& context=upenn /wps, 2004
6. Joel I.klein 美国司法部文件, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1123.htm
7. K.Arrow(1962),Economic welfare and the allocation of resourse for invention.the rate and direction of inventive activity .Princeton University Press.
8. M.Rostoker (1984) .A Survey Of Corporate Licensing. IDEA,24,59-92.
9. N.T.Gallini (1984) .Deterrence by market-sharing: a strategic incentive for licensing. American Economic Review,74,931-941.
10. M.Katz and C. Shapiro ( 1985 ) .On the licensing of innovations. Rand Journal of Economics,101,567-589.
11. M.Katz and C. Shapiro (1986) .How to license intangible property. The quarterly journal of economics, VOL.101,NO3
12. M.I.Kamien and Y.Tauman (1986), Fees vs royalties and the private value of a patent. The quarterly journal of economics, VOL.101,471-491
13. K.Rockeet ( 1990), Choosing the competition and patent licensing.Rand Journal of Economics 21,160-171.
14. Farrell, Joseph, and Carl Shapiro,(1992) "Standard Setting in High Definition Television," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics. 1992,1-93.
15. Besen, Stan,(1992) "AM versus FM: The Battle of the Bands," Industrial and Corporate Change, 1992. 1, 375-96.
16. Katz Michael and Carl Shapiro (1986) /Technology adoption in the Presence of network externalities. Journal of political economy .Vol.94
17. Katz Michael and Carl Shapiro ( 1985 ) , Network externalities ,Competition and Compatibility , American Economic Review,Vol.75(3)
18. S.Muto (1993). On licensing policies in Bertrand competition .Games and economics behavior,5,257-267.
19. M.Eswaran (1994) .Licensees as entry barriers. Canadian Journal of Economics,27,673-688.
20. M. Eswaran (1994) .Cross-Licensing of Competing Patents as a facilitating Device. Canadian Journal of Economics,27,689-708.
21. X.Henry Wang (1998). Fee vs royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model. Economics 60,55-62.
22. San-Seung Yi (1998), Whom to license patented technology. Managerial and Decision Economics,19,189-195.
23. X.Henry Wang and Bill.Z Yang (1999 ), on licensing under Bertrand competiton.
24. M.I.Kamien and Y.Tauman (2002), patent licensing:the isdide story. The Manchester school,70-715.
25. A.I.Saracho (2002), patent licensing under strategic delegation. Journal of Economics & Management strategy, 11,225-251.
26. Pinar Karaca-Mandic, Network Effects in Technology Adoption: The Case of DVD Players, University of California at Berkeley, JOB MARKET PAPER, 2004.1
27. X.Henry Wang and Bill.Z Yang (2003), A note of technology transfer by a monopoly.
28. N.Economides (1996) The Economics of Networks," International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14, pp 673-699.
29. J.M.Gallaugher,and Y.M.Wang ( 2002 ) , Understanding Network Effects in Software Markets:Evidence from Web Server Pricing," MIS Quarterly (26:4), pp 303-327.
30. RJ.Kauffman, J.McAndrews, and Y.M.Wang (2000) , Opening The 'Black Box' of Network Externalities in Network Adoption," Information Systems Research (11:1), pp 61-82.
31. Besen, Stanley and Joseph Farrell (1991), The role of the ITU in standardization. Telecommunications Policy, Aug 1991, pp.311-321.
32. L.M.B.Cabral (2003), Choosing technology standards:government policy to firm strategy.
33. Aggarwal & Walden, monopoly power in standards is a myth,Standard Making: A Critical Research Frontier for Information Systems MISQ Special Issue Workshop
34. Qingwei Meng&Delin Yang,An analysis of the Funcition of Enterprise Allies and Government in the High-Tech Industry Standard War: A Case Study of the Competition between WIFI &WAPI.
35. Mark Lemley (2001) , Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1495, 1507
36. R.Schmalensee (1982), Commodity Bundling by a Single-Product Monopolist," Journal of Law and Economics,XXV,pp.67-71
37.Utterback,JM and L.Kim,"Invasion of a Stable Business by Radical Innovation." In.The Management of Productivity and Technology in Manufacturing,Paul Kleindorfer,ed.New York:Plenum Press,1986,pp.129-130.
38.19.FJ Olleros,"Emerging industries and the burnout of pioneers," J.Prod.Innov.Manage.,vol.1,pp.5-18,1986.
39.Carpenter,G.S.and K.Nakamoto.1989.Consumer Preference Formation and Pioneering Advantage.Journal of Marketing,Vol.26,pp.285
40.PlatformWCDMA announce patent licensing programme for 3G WCDMA,http://www.3gnewsroom.com/3g_news/mar_04/news_4353.shtml,2004年3月24日
41.《Qualcomm wields its patent power》,www.qpsx.com/download/QualcommWields.pdf
42.郁义鸿、高汝熹,《管理经济学》,东方出版中心
43.《高汝熹文集》,上海社会科学出版社
44.高汝熹、鲁国锋,《关于发展上海设计产业的研究分析》,上海经济,2002(3/4)
45.高汝熹、王新文,《上海发展知识产业的战略选择》,研究与发展,1999(3)
46.陈殷,《中国移动通信市场竞争 及规制研究--后进入者视角》,2005,复旦大学博士论文
47.李金勇,《上海生产性服务业发展研究》,2005,复旦大学博士论文
48.吴敏辉,《R&D产业化研究》,2005,复旦大学博士论文
49.郭斌,《产业标准竞争及其在产业政策中的现实意义》,《中国工业经济》,2000(1)
50.曾楚宏、林丹明,《信息经济时代:标准为王》,软科学,2002年(4)
51.葛亚力,《技术标准战略的构建策略研究》,中国工业经济,2003年6月
52.李再杨、杨少华,《技术标准化联盟的成功案例》,《中国工业经济》,2003年7月
53.迈克尔.波特,《国家竞争优势》,华夏出版社
54.多纳德.海、德理克.莫瑞斯,《产业经济学与组织》,经济科学出版社
55.杨公朴、夏大慰,《产业经济学教程》,上海财经大学出版社
56.泰勒尔,《产业组织理论》,中国人民大学出版社
57.王万山,《高新技术行业标准:政府决定还是市场决定》,《中国科技论坛》,2004年第4期
58.Carl Shapiro Hal Varian,《信息规则:网络经济的策略指导》,中国人民大学出版社。
59.张平、马骁,《标准化与知识产权战略》,知识产权出版社。
60.施卓敏,《论寡头企业的先动优势与后动优势》,http://www.marketingcn.org /Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=299
61.曹淑敏,《无线移动通信的发展趋势》http://www.zte.com.cn/06publication/magazine2.jsp
62.沈嘉,《OFDM欲引领新一代无线技术》,http://www.edu.cn/20051111/31601 23.shtm
63.《技术标准与知识产权战略研究的重要性》,马骁,http://www.chinaeclaw.com /readArticle.asp?id=2620
64.《北京大学课题组中国自主电信标准报告》,http://tech.sina.com.cn/t/2005-09-29/0004731647.shtml
65.《项立刚:北大中国自主电信标准报告令人失望》,http://tech.sina.com.cn/t/2005-09-29/1252732298.shtml
66.赵莹,《浅析标准知识产权战略》,http://www.szip.org
67.王生辉和张京红(2004),《网络化产业中的技术标准竞争策略》,《科学管理研究》,第22卷第2期
68.夏先良,《私有协议与标准化的知识产权政策》,中国工业经济,2004年第1期
69.王国才,朱道立《网络经济下劣势企业标准赶超策略研究》,科学学与科学技术管理,2004.9
70.《ISO拒绝WAPI成国际标准802.11i获批》,http://network.pc365.com.cn/news24901.html
71.吴学安,《“DVD收费”之讼胜算几何》,http://ibdaily.mofcom.gov.cn/%60Template /gqxxnews Template.asp?newsid=79171
72.高通称3G芯片销量增长5年内欲拿下50%份额,http://tech.sina.com.cn/t/2006-02-14/1352840714.shtml
73.翁轶从和陈洪民,《基于网络外部性的技术标准控制策略与企业兼并》,系统工程理论方法应用,第10卷第3期,2001
74.互联网实验室,《新全球主义中国高科技标准战略研究报告》,2004年7月
75.《爱立信与世界电信125年》,http://www.ericsson.com/cn/ericsson/ericsson /century/125.shtml
76.《评论:如何评价与借鉴日本发展2G的“教训”》,刘春辉,http://www.people.com.cn /GB/15369/30630/30635/2209653.html
77.《西门子与NEC成为世界最大的3G设备供应商》,http://tech.sina.com.cn/t/2005-07-19/0912666595.shtml
78.《高通完成收购WiMAX竞争商研发能力得到提升》,http://www.enet.com.cn/article /2006/0120/A20060120495552.shtml
79.马俊,《网络型产业技术标准的机制与政策》,信息技术与标准化,2003.12
80.施卓敏,《论寡头企业的先动优势与后动优势》,http://www.marketingcn.org/Article Show.asp?ArticleID=299
81.曹淑敏,《无线移动通信的发展趋势》http://www.zte.com.cn/06publication/magazine2.jsp
82.《邬贺铨院士称TD不会拖累运营商 政府适当买单》,http://tech.sina.com.cn /t/2006-03-08/0018860408.shtml
83.《TD产业经济年会秘密召开 中国移动上马TD?》,http://info.tele.hc360.com/2006/02/22083662471.shtml
84.《TD-SCDMA现状及前景》,http://www.tdscdma-alliance.org/view.asp?id=293
85.《2005年度深圳市专利统计排名出炉,华为居榜首》,http://www.huawei.com/cn/news /view.do?id=968&cid=57
86.《中国有可能形成优于世界的最富有的资源是全民基础教育》,http://www.huawei.com/cn/publications/view.do?id=596&cid=201&pid=87
87.《AVS知识产权政策:平衡专利私有权和标准公益性》,AVS通讯,2004年10月22日
88.陈志刚,《科技部全面剖析WAPI失败原因及中国标准战略》,http://www.people.com.cn /GB/it/1068/2685466.html
89.吕品,《企业技术标准之争的博弈分析》,《国际经贸探索》,第19卷第4期,2003.8
90.帅旭和陈宏民,《网络外部性与市场竞争:中国移动通信产业竞争的网络经济学分析》,世界经济,2003年第4期
91.高通公司、中兴通讯、华为等公司的网站
15 M.Rostoker(1984).A Survey Of Corporate Licensing.IDEA,24,59-92.
16 《专利权转让与许可使用》,http://www.hbipo.gov.cn/qsyzlgz-12.htm
17 N.T.Gallini(1984).Deterrence by market-sharing:a strategic incentive for licensing.American Economic Review,74,931-941.
18 M.Katz and C.Shapiro(1986).How to license intangible property.The quarterly journal of economics VOL.101,NO3
19 K.Rockeet(1990),Choosing the competition and patent licensing.Rand Journal of Economics 21,160-171.
20 M.Eswaran(1994).Licensees as entry barriers.Canadian Journal of Economics,27,673-688.
21 M.I.Kamien and Y.Tauman(1986),Fees vs royalties and the private value of a patent.
22 S.Muto(1993),On licensing policies in Bertrand competition.Games and economics behavior,5,257-267.
23 X.Henry Wang(1998),Fee vs royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model.
24 San-Seung Yi(1998),Whom to license patented technology.Managerial and Decision Economics,19,189-195.
25 M.I.Kamien and Y.Tauman(2002),patent licensing:the isdide story.The Manchester school,70-715.
26 X.Henry Wang and Bill.Z Yang(1999),on licensing under Bertrand competiton.
27 A.I.Saracho(2002),patent licensing under strategic delegation.Journal of Economics & Management strategy,11,225-251.
28 Chalres W.L.Hill(1992),Strategies for exploiting technological innovations:when and when not to license
29 X.Henry Wang and Bill.Z Yang(2003),A note of technology transfer by a monopoly.
30 Nalin&Lihui(2004),Strategic investmen in techonology standards
31 Katz Michael and Carl Shapiro(1985),Network externalities,Competition and Compatibility,American Economic Review,Vol.75(3)
Katz Michael and Carl Shapiro(1986),Technology adoption in the Presence of network externalities.Journal of political economy.Vol.94
32 Economides,N."The Economics of Networks," International Journal of Industrial Organization(14:2) 1996,pp 673-699.
33 Gallaugher,J.M.,and Wang,Y.-M."Understanding Network Effects in Software Markets:Evidence from Web Server Pricing," MIS Quarterly(26:4),December 2002,pp 303-327.
34 Kauffman,R.J.,McAndrews,J.,and Wang,Y.M."Opening The 'Black Box' of Network Externalities in Network Adoption," Information Systems Research(11:1),March 2000,pp 61-82.
35 Besen,Stan,(1992) "AM versus FM:The Battle of the Bands," Industrial and Corporate Change,1992.1,375-96.
36 Farrell,Joseph,and Carl Shapiro,(1992) "Standard Setting in High Definition Television," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity:Microeconomics.1992,1-93.
37 王生辉和张京红(2004),《网络化产业中的技术标准竞争策略》,《科学管理研究》,第22卷第2期
38 Aggarwal & Walden,《monopoly power in standards is a mith》。
39 吕品,《企业技术标准之争的博弈分析》,《国际经贸探索》,第19卷第4期,2003.8
40 Besen,Stanley and Joseph Farrell(1991),The role of the ITU in standardization.Telecommunications Policy,Aug 1991,pp.311-321.
41 夏先良,私有协议与标准化的知识产权政策,中国工业经济,2004年第1期
42 L.M.B.Cabral(2003),Choosing technology standards:government policy to firm strategy.
43 王万山,《高新技术行业标准:政府决定还是市场决定》,中国科技论坛,2004年7月
44 李再杨、杨少华,《技术标准化联盟的成功案例》,《中国工业经济》,2003年7月
45 曾楚宏、林丹明,《信息经济时代:标准为王》,软科学,2002年第4期
46 帅旭和陈宏民,《网络外部性与市场竞争:中国移动通信产业竞争的网络经济学分析》,世界经济,2003年第4期
47 Qingwei Meng&Delin Yang,《An analysis of the Funcition of Enterprise Allies and Government in the High-Tech Industry Standard War:A Case Study of the Competition between WIFI &WAPI.》
48 葛亚力,《技术标准战略的构建策略研究》,中国工业经济,2003年6月
49 王国才和朱道立,《网络经济下劣势企业标准赶超策略研究》,科学学与科学技术管理,2004.9
50 马俊,《网络型产业技术标准的机制与政策》,信息技术与标准化,2003.12
51 《ISO拒绝WAPI成国际标准802.11i获批》,http://network.pc365.com.cn/news24901.html
52 根据《依星悲歌》,http://www.c114.net/hottopic/ZZHtml_2001/H200166000852-1.shtml和《66颗依星是死?是活?》http://www.c114.net/hottopic/ZZHtml_2001/H200166000854-1.shtml等资料整理
59 《信息规则:网络经济的策略指导》,Carl Shapiro Hal Varian,2000年,中国人民大学出版社。
60 高通称3G芯片销量增长5年内欲拿下50%份额,http://tech.sina.com.cn/t/2006-02-14/1352840714.shtml
75 李再杨、杨少华,《技术标准化联盟的成功案例》,《中国工业经济》,2003年7月
83 马俊,《网络型产业技术标准的机制与政策》,信息技术与标准化,2003.12
84 施卓敏,论寡头企业的先动优势与后动优势,http://www.marketingcn.org/Anicle_show.asp?ArticleID=299
85 Schmalensee,R.1982."Commodity Bundling by a Single-Product Monopolist," Journal of Law and Economics,XXV,pp.67-71
86 Carpenter,G.S.and K.Nakamoto.1989.Consumer Preference Formation and Pioneering Advantage.Journal of Marketing,Vol.26,pp.285
87 陈殷,2005,中国移动通信市场竞争 及规制研究--后进入者视角,博士论文
88 施卓敏,论寡头企业的先动优势与后动优势,http://www.marketingcn.org/Article_show.asp?ArticleID=299
89 Utterback,JM and L.Kim,"Invasion of a Stable Business by Radical Innovation." In.The Management of Productivity and Technology in Manufacturing,Paul Kleindorfer,ed.New York:Plenum Press,1986,pp.129-130.
90 FJ Olleros,"Emerging industries and the burnout of pioneers," J.Prod.Innov.Manage.,vol.1,pp.5-18.1986.
91 曹淑敏,《无线移动通信的发展趋势》http://www.zte.com.cn/06publication/magazine2.jsp
92 一种无线通信技术,比3G能提供更高的带宽
93 两个第三代移动通信最主要的标准化组织
108 马俊,《网络型产业技术标准的机制与政策》,信息技术与标准化,2003.12
1. R.Bekkers,GDuysters and B.Verspagen(2000), 《intellectual property rights,strategic technology agreements and market structure.the case of GSM》
2. Noam, E. (1992). Telecommunications in Europe. Oxford University Press.
3. Granstrand, O. (1999). The economics and management of intellectual property: Towards intellectual capitalism. Cheltenham, UK: Edgar Elgar
4. Bekkers, R.N.A. & Liotard, I. (1999). 'The tense relation between mobile telecommunications standards and IPR ', European Intellectual Property Review (1999) Issue 3, 110-126.
5. Parchomovsky&Wagner , 《 patent portfolios 》 , http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi? article=1055& context=upenn /wps, 2004
6. Joel I.klein 美国司法部文件, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1123.htm
7. K.Arrow(1962),Economic welfare and the allocation of resourse for invention.the rate and direction of inventive activity .Princeton University Press.
8. M.Rostoker (1984) .A Survey Of Corporate Licensing. IDEA,24,59-92.
9. N.T.Gallini (1984) .Deterrence by market-sharing: a strategic incentive for licensing. American Economic Review,74,931-941.
10. M.Katz and C. Shapiro ( 1985 ) .On the licensing of innovations. Rand Journal of Economics,101,567-589.
11. M.Katz and C. Shapiro (1986) .How to license intangible property. The quarterly journal of economics, VOL.101,NO3
12. M.I.Kamien and Y.Tauman (1986), Fees vs royalties and the private value of a patent. The quarterly journal of economics, VOL.101,471-491
13. K.Rockeet ( 1990), Choosing the competition and patent licensing.Rand Journal of Economics 21,160-171.
14. Farrell, Joseph, and Carl Shapiro,(1992) "Standard Setting in High Definition Television," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics. 1992,1-93.
15. Besen, Stan,(1992) "AM versus FM: The Battle of the Bands," Industrial and Corporate Change, 1992. 1, 375-96.
16. Katz Michael and Carl Shapiro (1986) /Technology adoption in the Presence of network externalities. Journal of political economy .Vol.94
17. Katz Michael and Carl Shapiro ( 1985 ) , Network externalities ,Competition and Compatibility , American Economic Review,Vol.75(3)
18. S.Muto (1993). On licensing policies in Bertrand competition .Games and economics behavior,5,257-267.
19. M.Eswaran (1994) .Licensees as entry barriers. Canadian Journal of Economics,27,673-688.
20. M. Eswaran (1994) .Cross-Licensing of Competing Patents as a facilitating Device. Canadian Journal of Economics,27,689-708.
21. X.Henry Wang (1998). Fee vs royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model. Economics 60,55-62.
22. San-Seung Yi (1998), Whom to license patented technology. Managerial and Decision Economics,19,189-195.
23. X.Henry Wang and Bill.Z Yang (1999 ), on licensing under Bertrand competiton.
24. M.I.Kamien and Y.Tauman (2002), patent licensing:the isdide story. The Manchester school,70-715.
25. A.I.Saracho (2002), patent licensing under strategic delegation. Journal of Economics & Management strategy, 11,225-251.
26. Pinar Karaca-Mandic, Network Effects in Technology Adoption: The Case of DVD Players, University of California at Berkeley, JOB MARKET PAPER, 2004.1
27. X.Henry Wang and Bill.Z Yang (2003), A note of technology transfer by a monopoly.
28. N.Economides (1996) The Economics of Networks," International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14, pp 673-699.
29. J.M.Gallaugher,and Y.M.Wang ( 2002 ) , Understanding Network Effects in Software Markets:Evidence from Web Server Pricing," MIS Quarterly (26:4), pp 303-327.
30. RJ.Kauffman, J.McAndrews, and Y.M.Wang (2000) , Opening The 'Black Box' of Network Externalities in Network Adoption," Information Systems Research (11:1), pp 61-82.
31. Besen, Stanley and Joseph Farrell (1991), The role of the ITU in standardization. Telecommunications Policy, Aug 1991, pp.311-321.
32. L.M.B.Cabral (2003), Choosing technology standards:government policy to firm strategy.
33. Aggarwal & Walden, monopoly power in standards is a myth,Standard Making: A Critical Research Frontier for Information Systems MISQ Special Issue Workshop
34. Qingwei Meng&Delin Yang,An analysis of the Funcition of Enterprise Allies and Government in the High-Tech Industry Standard War: A Case Study of the Competition between WIFI &WAPI.
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