丹尼特的自然主义心智理论研究
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摘要
丹尼尔·克莱门特·丹尼特是近四十年来心灵哲学和认知科学领域最具影响力的哲学家之一。作为自然主义者,其理论既因独创性而受到诸多认知科学家们的关注和赞赏,又因标新立异、离经叛道而饱受各方责难。丹尼特关于心灵和认知问题的研究是否以及如何能构成一个主旨明确的哲学体系,这是其学术思想最具争议性的地方。本文通过对丹尼特关于意向性、意识和自由意志三种心智现象的一系列论述进行分析,证明了他的研究工作实际上是围绕协调人的外显形象和科学形象这个中心而展开的。丹尼特看似松散、关联性不大的意向理论、意识理论和自由意志相容论最终构建了一个宏大的自然主义心智理论体系。
全文共分为五个部分。导言介绍了丹尼特的学术背景,阐明了本论文选题的目的、意义,并梳理了国内外关于丹尼特理论的研究进展和存在的问题,最后指出了论文内容的重点、难点与创新点,及论文研究中存在的不足之处。
第一章“意向性的自然化”从三个方面对丹尼特的意向理论进行了阐述。第一节主要讨论丹尼特的三种解释策略——物理立场、设计立场和意向立场。丹尼特认为每种立场都有其适用的范围,它们的解释效率和精确度各不相同。对于行为相当复杂的高级系统,我们将不得不采用意向立场,将其看作是能够根据各种意向状态进行行动的意向系统。意向系统理论虽然在解释和预测系统行为方面很高效,但容易使人对其形成“工具主义”定位,即认为意向立场理论只是有用的工具,并不承诺任何意向性的实在性。本章的第二节即论述了丹尼特的“温和实在论”立场及他对“工具主义”质疑的回应。在丹尼特看来,无论意向模式还是意向状态都是实在的,只不过它们是另一个层次的实在性,只有通过意向立场,我们才能辨别它们的存在。最后,论文探讨了意向性的进化史,指出人的意向性是由大脑各部分的意向性构成的,纯粹的机械组织在意向立场下也可以展现出意向性。
第二章“意识的自然化”对丹尼特的意识理论进行了全面剖析。丹尼特强调欲对意识现象进行自然化解释,首先必须改变研究意识的笛卡尔式进路,因此本文在本章首节中详细分析了笛卡尔意识理论的各种特征,以及丹尼特对这些特征的批判；第二节涉及丹尼特意识研究的第三人称方法——异现象学方法和其意识理论——多重草稿模型,解释了丹尼特对意识现象如何产生的基本观点——多重草稿的竞争与部分草稿的获胜；在第三节中,论文考察了丹尼特的意识进化论,将丹尼特的意识看作是特定基因型选择、表型可塑性选择与文化基因选择三个连续阶段的产物,并指出丹尼特所理解的意识实际上就是运行在大脑硬件上的虚拟机。
第三章“自由意志的自然化”旨在详细阐释丹尼特的自由意志相容论观点,及其对自由意志如何在自然界产生的解释。本章第一节主要介绍丹尼特对不相容论观点的驳斥,表明实际上丹尼特希望通过将与自由意志密切相关的自我控制、理性与可避免性概念归入意向立场来解决自由意志与决定论的相容性问题；第二节阐述了自由意志的进化论。丹尼特将自由意志看作是人类在能够承担责任的前提下所获得的选择权。因此人类要想获得自由意志首先必须进行承担责任的训练,而愿意承担责任来自于我们对成为合作者群体中的一员的渴望。自由意志正是在合作与利他行为出现、人们愿意为成为合作者而进行自我设计的基础上产生的。
第四章“对丹尼特心智理论的评价”从两方面对丹尼特的心智自然化工作进行了分析定位。首先从宏观方面来说,丹尼特的心智理论是逻辑行为主义与功能主义的混合体,既吸收了二者的理论精华又对它们进行了改进；从微观方面来说,丹尼特的理论具有以下几个特征：自然主义、反本质主义与非还原论。
最后的结语部分对论文的四个主要观点进行了回顾,点评了丹尼特的自然主义工程及心智理论对心智哲学和认知科学发展所作出的贡献,同时指出论文中没有涉及到的有关丹尼特的其它问题,明确提出今后对丹尼特思想进行研究的主要努力方向和需要解决的主要问题。
Daniel Clement Dennett is one of the most influential philosophers of philosophy of mind and the cognitive science of the past forty years. As a naturalist, his theory is attractive and admirable to many cognitive scientists for its originality, while being blamed for deviation and unorthodox. Whether Dennett's research on mind and cognitive issues constitutes a philosophical system with a definite purport is the most controversial issue about his academic ideas. By analyzing Dennett's discourse about three mental phenomenon of intentionality, consciousness and free will, this dissertation certifies that all of his research is actually around the very center of reconciling the scientific and manifest image of human beings. Therefore, it is a grand system of naturalist theory of mind that Dennett's intentional theory, consciousness theory and free will compatibilism have actually established.
There are five parts in this dissertation. The introduction focuses on the significance of the topic while introducing Dennett's academic background and his naturalist position. We can also make clear the domestic and foreign research status on Dennett's project and our emphasis, difficulties, innovations and even the insufficiency of this paper from this part.
Chapter one named "naturalizing intentionality" states Dennett's intentional theory from three aspects. Firstly, it concerns his three explaining strategy—physical stance, design stance and intentional stance. Dennett thinks that each stance has its scope of application for its explaining efficiency and accuracy. For those complicated systems, we have to adopt intentional stance to treat them as intentional ones which act on their intentional status. Although the intentional system theory is efficient in interpreting and predicting behaviors of systems, it is more probable to view it as an "instrumental theory". That is to say, intentional theory is just one of useful tools which commit no reality of intentionality. Dennett's responses to the "instrumentalism" and his "mild realism" are two main contents of the second part of this chapter. According to Dennett, either the intentional pattern or the intentional states is real. They are realities of another level which we might discriminate just from the intentional stance. The last part discusses the evolution of intentionality while pointing out that the intentionality of human beings is come from the intentionality of all the part of human brains. Mechanical devices can also demonstrate intentionality in the intentional stance.
Chapter two,"naturalizing consciousness", analyzes Dennett's consciousness theory entirely. Dennett argues that if we want to explain consciousness naturally, we must change the research tradition from Descartes. The first part concentrates on the characteristics of Descartes' consciousness theory and Dennett's critiques to it. Then we turn to Dennett's third-person method of consciousness studies which is called "heterophenomenology" and his "multiple drafts model" of conscious phenomenon which consider consciousness as the result of competition of lots of drafts. Lastly, with inspections of the evolutionary history of consciousness, we views consciouness as a production of a three-phase process which is consist of selection for specific genotypes, selection for phenotypic plasticity and selection for memes. To Dennett, consciousness is a kind of virtual machine running on the brain hardware.
Chapter three named "naturalizing free will" is about Dennett's compatibilism and his explanation of the emergence of free will. We first investigate his refutations to incompatibilist standpoint in order to show that, indeed, he hopes to solve the problem of the compatibility of free will and determinism by attribiting the concepts of self-control, rationality and evitability, which have intimate connection with human free will, to the intentional stance. Then, we focus on the evolutionary understanding of free will. Dennett sees our free will as chances to choose under the condition of being capable to take responsibility. Therefore, if someone desires to be free he has to accept some kind of practice to learn how to be responsible first. Our aspiration to be responsible is from our desires to be a number of the group of cooperators. So, free will is resulted from the emergence of cooperation and altruism with human's self-design to be a cooperator.
The fourth chapter is an assessment to Dennett's theory of mind, which estimates his academic thingkings from two aspects:on the one hand, Dennett's theory of mind, which is a hybrid of behaviorism and functionalism, intakes their theoretical quintessence with making some innovation; on the other hand, Dennett's theory also has several specific characteristics such as naturalism, anti-essentialism and non-reductionism.
The conclusion reviews four main ideas of this dissertation and meanwhile, comments the contributions Dennett's naturalist project and theory of mind make to the development of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. With putting forward some issues not discussed here, we propose exactly what we should concentrate on and solve in the future.
全文共分为五个部分。导言介绍了丹尼特的学术背景,阐明了本论文选题的目的、意义,并梳理了国内外关于丹尼特理论的研究进展和存在的问题,最后指出了论文内容的重点、难点与创新点,及论文研究中存在的不足之处。
第一章“意向性的自然化”从三个方面对丹尼特的意向理论进行了阐述。第一节主要讨论丹尼特的三种解释策略——物理立场、设计立场和意向立场。丹尼特认为每种立场都有其适用的范围,它们的解释效率和精确度各不相同。对于行为相当复杂的高级系统,我们将不得不采用意向立场,将其看作是能够根据各种意向状态进行行动的意向系统。意向系统理论虽然在解释和预测系统行为方面很高效,但容易使人对其形成“工具主义”定位,即认为意向立场理论只是有用的工具,并不承诺任何意向性的实在性。本章的第二节即论述了丹尼特的“温和实在论”立场及他对“工具主义”质疑的回应。在丹尼特看来,无论意向模式还是意向状态都是实在的,只不过它们是另一个层次的实在性,只有通过意向立场,我们才能辨别它们的存在。最后,论文探讨了意向性的进化史,指出人的意向性是由大脑各部分的意向性构成的,纯粹的机械组织在意向立场下也可以展现出意向性。
第二章“意识的自然化”对丹尼特的意识理论进行了全面剖析。丹尼特强调欲对意识现象进行自然化解释,首先必须改变研究意识的笛卡尔式进路,因此本文在本章首节中详细分析了笛卡尔意识理论的各种特征,以及丹尼特对这些特征的批判；第二节涉及丹尼特意识研究的第三人称方法——异现象学方法和其意识理论——多重草稿模型,解释了丹尼特对意识现象如何产生的基本观点——多重草稿的竞争与部分草稿的获胜；在第三节中,论文考察了丹尼特的意识进化论,将丹尼特的意识看作是特定基因型选择、表型可塑性选择与文化基因选择三个连续阶段的产物,并指出丹尼特所理解的意识实际上就是运行在大脑硬件上的虚拟机。
第三章“自由意志的自然化”旨在详细阐释丹尼特的自由意志相容论观点,及其对自由意志如何在自然界产生的解释。本章第一节主要介绍丹尼特对不相容论观点的驳斥,表明实际上丹尼特希望通过将与自由意志密切相关的自我控制、理性与可避免性概念归入意向立场来解决自由意志与决定论的相容性问题；第二节阐述了自由意志的进化论。丹尼特将自由意志看作是人类在能够承担责任的前提下所获得的选择权。因此人类要想获得自由意志首先必须进行承担责任的训练,而愿意承担责任来自于我们对成为合作者群体中的一员的渴望。自由意志正是在合作与利他行为出现、人们愿意为成为合作者而进行自我设计的基础上产生的。
第四章“对丹尼特心智理论的评价”从两方面对丹尼特的心智自然化工作进行了分析定位。首先从宏观方面来说,丹尼特的心智理论是逻辑行为主义与功能主义的混合体,既吸收了二者的理论精华又对它们进行了改进；从微观方面来说,丹尼特的理论具有以下几个特征：自然主义、反本质主义与非还原论。
最后的结语部分对论文的四个主要观点进行了回顾,点评了丹尼特的自然主义工程及心智理论对心智哲学和认知科学发展所作出的贡献,同时指出论文中没有涉及到的有关丹尼特的其它问题,明确提出今后对丹尼特思想进行研究的主要努力方向和需要解决的主要问题。
Daniel Clement Dennett is one of the most influential philosophers of philosophy of mind and the cognitive science of the past forty years. As a naturalist, his theory is attractive and admirable to many cognitive scientists for its originality, while being blamed for deviation and unorthodox. Whether Dennett's research on mind and cognitive issues constitutes a philosophical system with a definite purport is the most controversial issue about his academic ideas. By analyzing Dennett's discourse about three mental phenomenon of intentionality, consciousness and free will, this dissertation certifies that all of his research is actually around the very center of reconciling the scientific and manifest image of human beings. Therefore, it is a grand system of naturalist theory of mind that Dennett's intentional theory, consciousness theory and free will compatibilism have actually established.
There are five parts in this dissertation. The introduction focuses on the significance of the topic while introducing Dennett's academic background and his naturalist position. We can also make clear the domestic and foreign research status on Dennett's project and our emphasis, difficulties, innovations and even the insufficiency of this paper from this part.
Chapter one named "naturalizing intentionality" states Dennett's intentional theory from three aspects. Firstly, it concerns his three explaining strategy—physical stance, design stance and intentional stance. Dennett thinks that each stance has its scope of application for its explaining efficiency and accuracy. For those complicated systems, we have to adopt intentional stance to treat them as intentional ones which act on their intentional status. Although the intentional system theory is efficient in interpreting and predicting behaviors of systems, it is more probable to view it as an "instrumental theory". That is to say, intentional theory is just one of useful tools which commit no reality of intentionality. Dennett's responses to the "instrumentalism" and his "mild realism" are two main contents of the second part of this chapter. According to Dennett, either the intentional pattern or the intentional states is real. They are realities of another level which we might discriminate just from the intentional stance. The last part discusses the evolution of intentionality while pointing out that the intentionality of human beings is come from the intentionality of all the part of human brains. Mechanical devices can also demonstrate intentionality in the intentional stance.
Chapter two,"naturalizing consciousness", analyzes Dennett's consciousness theory entirely. Dennett argues that if we want to explain consciousness naturally, we must change the research tradition from Descartes. The first part concentrates on the characteristics of Descartes' consciousness theory and Dennett's critiques to it. Then we turn to Dennett's third-person method of consciousness studies which is called "heterophenomenology" and his "multiple drafts model" of conscious phenomenon which consider consciousness as the result of competition of lots of drafts. Lastly, with inspections of the evolutionary history of consciousness, we views consciouness as a production of a three-phase process which is consist of selection for specific genotypes, selection for phenotypic plasticity and selection for memes. To Dennett, consciousness is a kind of virtual machine running on the brain hardware.
Chapter three named "naturalizing free will" is about Dennett's compatibilism and his explanation of the emergence of free will. We first investigate his refutations to incompatibilist standpoint in order to show that, indeed, he hopes to solve the problem of the compatibility of free will and determinism by attribiting the concepts of self-control, rationality and evitability, which have intimate connection with human free will, to the intentional stance. Then, we focus on the evolutionary understanding of free will. Dennett sees our free will as chances to choose under the condition of being capable to take responsibility. Therefore, if someone desires to be free he has to accept some kind of practice to learn how to be responsible first. Our aspiration to be responsible is from our desires to be a number of the group of cooperators. So, free will is resulted from the emergence of cooperation and altruism with human's self-design to be a cooperator.
The fourth chapter is an assessment to Dennett's theory of mind, which estimates his academic thingkings from two aspects:on the one hand, Dennett's theory of mind, which is a hybrid of behaviorism and functionalism, intakes their theoretical quintessence with making some innovation; on the other hand, Dennett's theory also has several specific characteristics such as naturalism, anti-essentialism and non-reductionism.
The conclusion reviews four main ideas of this dissertation and meanwhile, comments the contributions Dennett's naturalist project and theory of mind make to the development of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. With putting forward some issues not discussed here, we propose exactly what we should concentrate on and solve in the future.
引文
② David L. Thompson(2009). Daniel Dennett. New York, NY:Continuum International Publishing Group:3
③ Daniel C. Dennett(1987). The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:15
① Daniel C. Dennett(1987). The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:48
② 约翰·塞尔.心灵的再发现.王巍译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2005：54
① Daniel C. Dennett(1987). The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:17
① Daniel C. Dennett(1978).Brainstorms:Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:17
① Daniel C. Dennett(1987). The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:15
① Matthew Elton(2003). Daniel Dennett:Reconciling Science and our Self-Conception. Cambridge:Polity:46
① Daniel C. Dennett(1998). Brainchildren:Essays on Designing Minds. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:101
① Daniel C. Dennett(1998). Brainchildren:Essays on Designing Minds. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:103
② 丹尼尔·丹尼特,我的哲学研究综述.欧阳康主编.当代英美著名哲学家学术自述.北京：人民出版社,2005：105-106
① Daniel C. Dennett(1987). The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:20
① Daniel C. Dennett(1998). Brainchildren:Essays on Designing Minds. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:360
② David L. Thompson(2009). Daniel Dennett. New York, NY:Continuum International Publishing Group:92
① Daniel C. Dennett(1987). The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:15
① A. Brook, D. Ross eds.(2000). Daniel Dennett. New York, NY:Cambridge University Press:19
② D.Ross, A. Brook, D. Thompson eds.(2000). Dennett's Philosophy:A Comprehensive Assessment. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press:20
① A. Brook, D. Ross eds.(2000). Daniel Dennett. New York, NY:Cambridge University Press:21
① Tadeusz Zawidzki(2007). Dennett. Oxford:Oneworld Publications:145
② 丹尼尔·丹尼特.心灵种种：对意识的探索.罗军译.上海：上海科学技术出版社,2010：49
① Daniel C. Dennett(1971). Intentional Systems. The Journal of Philosophy,68(4):93-94
② 约翰·塞尔.心灵的再发现.王巍译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2005：81
③ Matthew Elton(2003). Daniel Dennett:Reconciling Science and our Self-Conception. Cambridge:Polity:45
① 2006年,英国《自然》杂志发表研究报告称,在澳大利亚西部发现一处形状怪异的十堆,系由三十四亿年前
② 丹尼尔·丹尼特.心灵种种：对意识的探索.罗军译.上海：上海科学技术出版社,2010：55
① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.我的哲学研究综述.欧阳康主编.当代英美著名哲学家学术自述.北京：人民出版社,2005：108
② Daniel C. Dennett(1978). Brainstorm:Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:12
① Matthew Elton(2003). Daniel Dennett:Reconciling Science and our Self-Conception. Cambridge:Polity:41
① Daniel C. Dennett(1978). Brainstorm:Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:122
② Tadeusz Zawidzki(2007). Dennett. Oxford:Oneworld Publications:42
① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.我的哲学研究综述.欧阳康主编.当代英美著名哲学家学术自述.北京：人民出版社,2005：109
① Gerard O'Brien and Jonathan Opie (1999). A Defense of Cartesian Materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59, No.4:939
② 丹尼尔·丹尼特.意识的解释.苏德超、李涤非、陈虎平译.北京：北京理工大学出版社,2008：122
① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.意识的解释.苏德超、李涤非、陈虎平译.北京：北京理工大学出版社,2008：385
① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.意识的解释.苏德超、李涤非、陈虎平译.北京：北京理工大学出版社,2008：139
① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.意识的解释.苏德超、李涤非、陈虎平译.北京：北京理工大学出版社,2008：143
① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.意识的解释.苏德超、李涤非、陈虎平译.北京：北京理工大学出版社,2008：127
① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.意识的解释.苏德超、李涤非、陈虎平译.北京：北京理工大学出版社,2008：490
① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.意识的解释.苏德超、李涤非、陈虎平译.北京：北京理工大学出版社,2008：479
② Joan McCarthy(2007). Dennett and Ricoeur on the Narrative Self. New York, NY:Prometheus Books:49
① Gerard O'Brien and Jonathan Opie (1999). A Defense of Cartesian Materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59, No.4:940
② Matthew Elton(2003). Daniel Dennett:Reconciling Science and our Self-Conception. Cambridge:Polity:xiii
③ Daniel C. Dennett(1993). The Message is there is no Medium. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53:920
① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.意识的解释.苏德超、李涤非、陈虎平译.北京：北京理工大学出版社,2008：75
① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.意识的解释.苏德超、李涤非、陈虎平译.北京：北京理工大学出版社,2008：77
① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.意识的解释.苏德超、李涤非、陈虎平译.北京：北京理工大学出版社,2008：155
① Daniel C.Dennett(1998).Brainchildren:Essays on Designing Minds.Cambridge,MA:MIT Press:131
② Daniel C.Dennett(2005).Sweet Dreams.Cambridge,MA:MIT Press:170
① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.意识的解释.苏德超、李涤非、陈虎平译.北京：北京理工大学出版社,2008：197
① Tadeusz Zawidzki(2007). Dennett. Oxford:Oneworld Publications:85
② Richard Dawkins(1976). The Selfish Gene. Oxford:Oxford University Press:206
① Richard Dawkins(1976). The Selfish Gene. Oxford:Oxford University Press:206
② 丹尼尔·丹尼特.意识的解释.苏德超、李涤非、陈虎平译.北京：北京理工大学出版社,2008：230
① Daniel C. Dennett(1995). Darwin s Dangerous Idea:Evolution and the Meaning of Life. New York:Simon and Schuster:365
① Daniel C. Dennett(1984). Elbow Room:The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:52
② Daniel C. Dennett(1984). Elbow Room:The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:72
① David L.Thompson(2009).Daniel Dennett.New York,NY:Continuum International Publishing Group:111
② Daniel C.Dennett(1987).The Intentional Stance.Cambridge,MA:MIT Press:15
① Daniel C. Dennett(2003). Freedom Evolves. New York, NY:Viking Penguin:56
① Craig Ross(2011). Dennett on Free will. Int Ontology Metaphysics 12:140
② Tadeusz Zawidzki(2007). Dennett. Oxford:Oneworld Publications:103
Daniel C. Dennett(1998). Brainchildren:Essays on Designing Minds. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:103
Craig Ross(2011). Dennett on Free will. Int ontology Metaphysics 12:147
① Daniel C. Dennett(2003). Freedom Evolves. New York, NY:Viking Penguin:292
① Daniel C. Dennett(2003). Freedom Evolves. New York, NY:Viking Penguin:149
① Daniel C. Dennett(2003). Freedom Evolves. New York, NY:Viking Penguin:200
Daniel C. Dennett(2003). Freedom Evolves. New York, NY:Viking Penguin:203
① Tadeusz Zawidzki(2007). Dennett. Oxford:Oneworld Publications:121
① Matthew Elton(2003). Daniel Dennett:Reconciling Science and our Self-Conception. Cambridge:Polity:19
① Tadeusz Zawidzki(2007). Dennett. Oxford:Oneworld Publications:25
② 约翰·海尔.当代心灵哲学导论.高新民,殷筱,徐弢译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2005：61
③ 完美伪装者论证的要点是一个人可以表现出具有某种心理状态时应有的行为,但实际上却并不具有该心理状态：超级斯巴达人论证的要点是一个人可以在具有某种心理状态的情况下不表现出任何通常与该状态相关联的那些行为。以“痛”的心理状态为例,完美伪装者可以在不痛的情况下作出痛的行为,而超级斯巴达人则可以在痛的情况下不表现出任何与痛相关的行为。
④ 吉尔伯特·赖尔.心的概念.徐大建译.北京：商务印书馆,2009：10
① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.我的哲学研究综述.欧阳康主编.当代英美著名哲学家学术自述.北京：人民出版社,2005：119
① Matthew Elton(2003). Daniel Dennett:Reconciling Science and our Self-Conception. Cambridge:Polity:13
① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.我的哲学研究综述.欧阳康主编.当代英美著名哲学家学术自述.北京：人民出版社,2005：105
① David L. Thompson(2009). Daniel Dennett. New York, NY:Continuum International Publishing Group:41
② 丹尼尔·丹尼特.我的哲学研究综述.欧阳康主编.当代英美著名哲学家学术自述.北京：人民出版社,2005：108
① Bo Dahlbom(1993). Mind is Artificial. Bo Dahlbom. ed. Dennett and his Critics:Demystifying Mind. Oxford: Blackwell:163
① 蒯因.语词和对象.陈启伟等译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2005：230
① Bo Dahlbom(1993). Dennett and his Critics:Demystifying Mind. Oxford:Blackwell:4
① 丹尼特在《心灵种种：对意识的探索》一书中提出了心灵的四个种类,即达尔文式心灵(Darwinian mind)、波普尔式心灵(Popperian mind）、斯金纳式心灵(Skinnerian mind)和格利高里式心灵(Gregorian)。具体内容见该书第四章。
① Jerry Fodor(1987). Psychosemantics. Cambridge, MA:The MIT Press:97
② Tadeusz Zawidzki(2007). Dennett. Oxford:Oneworld Publications:158
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① Daniel C. Dennett(1987). The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:17
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① Daniel C. Dennett(1987). The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:15
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① Daniel C. Dennett(1998). Brainchildren:Essays on Designing Minds. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:101
① Daniel C. Dennett(1998). Brainchildren:Essays on Designing Minds. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:103
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① Daniel C. Dennett(1987). The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:20
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① Tadeusz Zawidzki(2007). Dennett. Oxford:Oneworld Publications:145
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① Daniel C. Dennett(1971). Intentional Systems. The Journal of Philosophy,68(4):93-94
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③ Matthew Elton(2003). Daniel Dennett:Reconciling Science and our Self-Conception. Cambridge:Polity:45
① 2006年,英国《自然》杂志发表研究报告称,在澳大利亚西部发现一处形状怪异的十堆,系由三十四亿年前
② 丹尼尔·丹尼特.心灵种种：对意识的探索.罗军译.上海：上海科学技术出版社,2010：55
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② Daniel C. Dennett(1978). Brainstorm:Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:12
① Matthew Elton(2003). Daniel Dennett:Reconciling Science and our Self-Conception. Cambridge:Polity:41
① Daniel C. Dennett(1978). Brainstorm:Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:122
② Tadeusz Zawidzki(2007). Dennett. Oxford:Oneworld Publications:42
① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.我的哲学研究综述.欧阳康主编.当代英美著名哲学家学术自述.北京：人民出版社,2005：109
① Gerard O'Brien and Jonathan Opie (1999). A Defense of Cartesian Materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59, No.4:939
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① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.意识的解释.苏德超、李涤非、陈虎平译.北京：北京理工大学出版社,2008：385
① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.意识的解释.苏德超、李涤非、陈虎平译.北京：北京理工大学出版社,2008：139
① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.意识的解释.苏德超、李涤非、陈虎平译.北京：北京理工大学出版社,2008：143
① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.意识的解释.苏德超、李涤非、陈虎平译.北京：北京理工大学出版社,2008：127
① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.意识的解释.苏德超、李涤非、陈虎平译.北京：北京理工大学出版社,2008：490
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② Joan McCarthy(2007). Dennett and Ricoeur on the Narrative Self. New York, NY:Prometheus Books:49
① Gerard O'Brien and Jonathan Opie (1999). A Defense of Cartesian Materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59, No.4:940
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③ Daniel C. Dennett(1993). The Message is there is no Medium. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53:920
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① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.意识的解释.苏德超、李涤非、陈虎平译.北京：北京理工大学出版社,2008：77
① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.意识的解释.苏德超、李涤非、陈虎平译.北京：北京理工大学出版社,2008：155
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② Daniel C.Dennett(2005).Sweet Dreams.Cambridge,MA:MIT Press:170
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① Richard Dawkins(1976). The Selfish Gene. Oxford:Oxford University Press:206
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① Daniel C. Dennett(1995). Darwin s Dangerous Idea:Evolution and the Meaning of Life. New York:Simon and Schuster:365
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② Daniel C. Dennett(1984). Elbow Room:The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:72
① David L.Thompson(2009).Daniel Dennett.New York,NY:Continuum International Publishing Group:111
② Daniel C.Dennett(1987).The Intentional Stance.Cambridge,MA:MIT Press:15
① Daniel C. Dennett(2003). Freedom Evolves. New York, NY:Viking Penguin:56
① Craig Ross(2011). Dennett on Free will. Int Ontology Metaphysics 12:140
② Tadeusz Zawidzki(2007). Dennett. Oxford:Oneworld Publications:103
Daniel C. Dennett(1998). Brainchildren:Essays on Designing Minds. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:103
Craig Ross(2011). Dennett on Free will. Int ontology Metaphysics 12:147
① Daniel C. Dennett(2003). Freedom Evolves. New York, NY:Viking Penguin:292
① Daniel C. Dennett(2003). Freedom Evolves. New York, NY:Viking Penguin:149
① Daniel C. Dennett(2003). Freedom Evolves. New York, NY:Viking Penguin:200
Daniel C. Dennett(2003). Freedom Evolves. New York, NY:Viking Penguin:203
① Tadeusz Zawidzki(2007). Dennett. Oxford:Oneworld Publications:121
① Matthew Elton(2003). Daniel Dennett:Reconciling Science and our Self-Conception. Cambridge:Polity:19
① Tadeusz Zawidzki(2007). Dennett. Oxford:Oneworld Publications:25
② 约翰·海尔.当代心灵哲学导论.高新民,殷筱,徐弢译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2005：61
③ 完美伪装者论证的要点是一个人可以表现出具有某种心理状态时应有的行为,但实际上却并不具有该心理状态：超级斯巴达人论证的要点是一个人可以在具有某种心理状态的情况下不表现出任何通常与该状态相关联的那些行为。以“痛”的心理状态为例,完美伪装者可以在不痛的情况下作出痛的行为,而超级斯巴达人则可以在痛的情况下不表现出任何与痛相关的行为。
④ 吉尔伯特·赖尔.心的概念.徐大建译.北京：商务印书馆,2009：10
① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.我的哲学研究综述.欧阳康主编.当代英美著名哲学家学术自述.北京：人民出版社,2005：119
① Matthew Elton(2003). Daniel Dennett:Reconciling Science and our Self-Conception. Cambridge:Polity:13
① 丹尼尔·丹尼特.我的哲学研究综述.欧阳康主编.当代英美著名哲学家学术自述.北京：人民出版社,2005：105
① David L. Thompson(2009). Daniel Dennett. New York, NY:Continuum International Publishing Group:41
② 丹尼尔·丹尼特.我的哲学研究综述.欧阳康主编.当代英美著名哲学家学术自述.北京：人民出版社,2005：108
① Bo Dahlbom(1993). Mind is Artificial. Bo Dahlbom. ed. Dennett and his Critics:Demystifying Mind. Oxford: Blackwell:163
① 蒯因.语词和对象.陈启伟等译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2005：230
① Bo Dahlbom(1993). Dennett and his Critics:Demystifying Mind. Oxford:Blackwell:4
① 丹尼特在《心灵种种：对意识的探索》一书中提出了心灵的四个种类,即达尔文式心灵(Darwinian mind)、波普尔式心灵(Popperian mind）、斯金纳式心灵(Skinnerian mind)和格利高里式心灵(Gregorian)。具体内容见该书第四章。
① Jerry Fodor(1987). Psychosemantics. Cambridge, MA:The MIT Press:97
② Tadeusz Zawidzki(2007). Dennett. Oxford:Oneworld Publications:158
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