农地流转中农户、村委会、政府行为研究
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摘要
农村土地流转是统筹城乡用地需求、满足城市化、工业化发展的必要条件,是实现农民由土地实物保障向价值保障的转换,加强农民利益保护和农村社会稳定的时代前提。我国的农地流转,虽己进入法律规范阶段,但实践中仍存在着不少问题。现实中的农地流转并不是一种纯粹的市场行为,而是蕴含在特殊的国家、集体和农民关系之中的。在人地关系相对紧张的状态下,作为农村土地所有者的“集体”——村委会和作为农村土地最终支配者的“国家”——政府,都具有将农户承包土地通过一定的途径收归“集体”或“国家”的手段。在这种国家、集体和农户关系下,农户难以真正支配农地流转的过程,也难以真正从农地流转中获得充分的收益。如何在确保农户权益的前提下将农户、村委会和政府之间的博弈关系和利益诉求有效的整合,是农地流转中值得回答的深层次问题。
迄今为止,有关农地流转的研究主要集中在农地流转现状及影响因素、农地流转制度和法律、农地流转的市场机制等方面。从农地流转行为研究看,大多学者研究对象主要聚焦于农户农地流转行为。通过系统的文献回顾发现,很少有研究将农户、村委会和政府结合在一起来探讨农地流转,尤其是对三者在农地流转中相互关系的分析更少。本文拟通过对襄阳市农地流转现状实证调查,探讨农地流转中农户、村委会和政府行为机理的选择,并从理论层面上解析三者在农地流转中的博弈关系。在此基础上,提出将农户、村委会和政府在农地流转中的行为有效地结合起来,建立共同的利益驱动机制,最大限度保护农民的土地权利地位,实现农地流转有效运行。
论文首先构建了关于农地流转利益相关主体行为研究的理论分析框架,从而为下文深入、系统的理论提炼及实证分析提供了必要的分析视角、范围和逻辑结构。接着,系统分析了我国农地流转发展的特征与现状。当前,我国的农地流转主要呈现出五大特征：一是规模扩大、趋势加快但整体规模偏低；二是农地流转区域间差异显著；三是流转形式多样化；四是新型农业经营主体流转比重不断增加；五是大宗农地流转期限延长,但农户间转包期限依然较短；六是农地流转市场初步建立。随后,论文还进一步提出当前的农地流转还存在着流转行为规范化程度不高、仲裁机构不健全、流转农地非粮化倾向明显、土地流转市场化程度较低等问题。
基于对农地流转现状与发展特征的深入考察,结合构建的一般理论分析框架,本文开始着重研究农地流转中农户、村委会和政府的行为。论文选取襄阳市的樊城区、老河口市、谷城县3个调查样本地,通过对13村312户农户的问卷调查和访谈、座谈等,获取了论文所需要的第一手资料和数据。论文从农户、村委会、政府三个方面对各自在农地流转中的行为进行分析,进而探讨农地流转三者之间的博弈关系。在农户层面,运用Logistic回归方程,从农户个体特征、家庭状况、外部体制环境等3类因素17个因子对农户农地流转行为进行回归分析。在村委会层面,就村委会在农地流转中的职能和作用、村委会在农地流转中的行为选择、存在的问题及制约因素、被调查地村委会农地流转的现状进行了分析和总结,并辅以案例进行实证研究。在政府层面,从政府介入农地流转的必要性、政府在农地流转中的行为选择及实证案例等方面进行了论证。在此基础上,分别探讨了农户、村委会和政府在农地流转中的行为目标,并就三者之间的关系进行博弈分析。
调查与研究结果表明：
第一,农户参与农地流转的行为从根本上说是一种有限理性的行为。在不同的要素资源禀赋下,农户的农地流转行为是不同的,它主要受家庭收入水平与来源、农地面积、农地承包期和户主年龄、职业等因素的影响。农户的行为总是在风险和利润之间博弈,寻求风险最小化条件下的利润最大化。
第二,在目前我国农户分散、规模较小,农地流转市场不健全,流转渠道不通畅等现实情况下,农地流转的运行需要村委会的介入和参与,为农业发展提供助力。然而,我国村委会的发展缺少相对公平、有序的发展空间。现行村委会面临准行政职能过度强化、经济职能不明确、干部社会动员能力不足、自治能力不足等问题。如何建立适宜村委会发展的外部环境,使其在农地流转经济活动中发挥应有的作用是值得我们深入思考的问题。
第三,政府行为的优化是实现农地流转快速有序进行的必然途径。现实农地流转中,基于成本收益的“理性选择”可能导致政府行为偏离公共利益的目标,产生政府失灵。因此,从制度源头上改变地方政府的效用函数和激励机制,合理界定政府行为边界,寻求市场机制与政府调控的最佳结合点,使地方政府干预纠正市场的同时,避免和克服政府失灵,从“经济人”回归到公共利益代表者,从而实现公平与效率的统一。
第四,农地流转的实施涉及到中央政府、地方政府、村委会、农户等主要利益主体。在市场经济环境中,作为理性经济人的利益主体会根据不同的利益诉求进行比较并作出行为选择。在农地流转中,中央政府希望通过农地流转的实施,以较小的财政付出获取生态目标的实现；地方政府,希望中央能减免农业税收,加大中央财政转移支付,并提高补助标准；村委会追求的是自身社会利益和经济利益的最大化；农户追求的是收益的最大化和后续生计的可持续化。因此,实现农地流转的关键是正确认识农户、村委会和政府之间的利益博弈关系和利益诉求,并从和谐博弈关系的角度进行行为的调适,以达到不同利益者比较一致并充分信任的农地流转目标和发展战略。
第五,针对目前我国农地流转中存在的问题与不足,依据调查研究数据以及实证分析结果,提出完善农地流转可行的、适于操作的政策建议：厘定角色,建立共同利益驱动机制；重塑职责,培育流转利益主体新型关系；确立地位,实现农民土地权利的制度保障。
论文研究可能存在如下几点创新：一是从国内外有关农地流转行为的研究看,众多学者主要聚焦于农户农地流转行为状况及影响因素,很少有学者去研究整个农地流转过程中涉及的相关利益主体的行为和诉求。本文从微观层面上探讨农地流转中农户、村委会和政府的行为选择和利益诉求,揭示各利益主体行为选择的内在动因,探讨在各自约束条件下选择相应的行为实现自身利益的最大化的机理,在研究视角上有一定的拓展和创新。二是将数理统计方法和博弈分析方法结合起来,对农地流转的利益主体进行定量和定性的分析。论文以实证的方式探究各利益主体在流转中的行为选择,并运用博弈论分析方法探讨农地流转中各利益主体之间的关系,寻求利益的均衡点。在方法上,这可能有一定的创新。
As the necessary conditions of the land demand of overall urban-rural plan and the development of urbanization and industrialization, the farmland circulation is the premise for farmers to transform the land security into value security and ensuring the farmers' interests and social stability in rural area. The land circulation system in our country has entered into legal norm stage, but it also has some problems in practice. The real land circulation is not only a kind of pure market behavior, but also be embedded into the special relationship among country, collective and farmers. In the state of strained relations between people and land, the "collective", as the owner of rural land, has the right to put the farmers'contracted land to their own use just as village committee and country. The farmers can not really dominate the process of farmland circulation and gain sufficient interests under such kind of relationship among country, collective and famers. This is a deep-seated problem for farmland circulation to combine interest demand of farmers with village committee and country under the premise of ensuring the rights and interests of farmers.
Up to now, the researches associated with farmland circulation mainly focused on the current situation and influence factors of land circulation, their rules and laws and market mechanism. According to the literature review, it is found that very few scholars have engaged in the studying the farmland circulation based on the combination of farmers, village committee and country. This dissertation will make an empirical investigation of status quo of farmland circulation in Xiangyang city to explore the mechanism of behavior in farmers, village committee and country as well as to analyze their gambling relationship. Simultaneously, it also put forward that it will be useful to effectively combine the behavior of farmers with village committee and country and establish common interests driving mechanism to protect the right of farmers arid realize the effective implementing of farmland circulation.
This dissertation first built the theoretical framework of behavior analysis of interest-related parts in the process of land circulation in order to provide necessary logical structure for the following theoretical extraction and empirical analysis. It also analyzed the current situation of farmland circulation in our country and concluded five features: firstly, it has large-scale and accelerated development speed but the overall size was still in a low level; secondly, the differences between circulation areas were significant; thirdly, there were diversified forms of land circulation; fourthly, the proportion of new agriculture business entity has increased; fifthly, the period of large-scale farmland circulation has extended but the period of subcontracting among farmers was short; sixthly, the market of farmland circulation has taken shape initially. Then, this dissertation has further discussed some problems existed in the process of land circulation, such as the low degree of formalization of circulation behavior, imperfect arbitral institution, prominent non-food tendency in farmland circulation and low degree of marketization.
On the basis of the in-depth investigation of current situation and development characters of farmland circulation, this dissertation focus on the behaviors among farmers, village committee and government combined with ordinary theoretical analysis framework. It surveyed312households in Fancheng district, LaoHekou city and Gucheng County and obtained useful information and data. This dissertation explored the mechanism of behavior in farmers, village committee and country and analyzed their gambling relationship. In term of farmers, it used Logistic regression equation to analyze the farmland circulation from the aspects of personal features, family status and external institutional environment. In term of village committee, it analyzed and concluded the function of village committee in the process of farmland circulation, their behavior choices, problems and restriction factors and current situation. In term of government, this dissertation demonstrated the necessity of government's participation in farmland circulation and their behavior choices. This dissertation discussed the behavior features of farmers, village committee and government in farmland circulation and their differences as well as to analyze their gambling relationships.
The research result shows that:
Firstly, the behavior for farmers engaged in the farmland circulation is basically a kind of restricted rational behavior. Under different background, the farmers'behaviors are disparate which will be influenced by family income and source, farmland area, contract period of farmland, the age of householder and careers. Their behaviors always seek to maximize the benefits in the condition of risk minimization.
Secondly, under the situation of dispersive householders, imperfect farmland circulation market and blocking working capital flow channel, the operation of farmland circulation needs the engagement and participation of village committee to provide help for agriculture development. However, our country's village committee is lack of relative fair and well-organized development space. There are many problems the village committee faced, such as intensive administrative function, ambiguous economic functions, incapable cadre and self-government capacity. So how to establish a healthy external environment for the development of village committee to play a part in the process of farmland circulation will become a serious question.
Thirdly, the optimization of government behavior is an inevitably method for realizing farmland circulation. In the real situation, the "rational choice" based on cost-benefit may lead the government behavior to miss the target of public interest and cause government failure. Hence, it will be useful to change the utility function and incentive mechanism of local government from source system and rationally define the border of government behavior. This way could help local government to avoid failure and become the representative of public interest.
Fourthly, the implementation of farmland circulation involved central and local government, village committee and householders. In market economy, the interest body, as rational investor, will make a comparison among different interest appeals and make a behavior choice. In the process of farmland circulation, the central government wants to obtain the realization of ecological objectives with small financial expenditure by the implementation of farmland circulation. While the local government hopes that the central government could reduce the agricultural taxes and improve the standard of subsidy. And the village committee seeks the maximize profit of social and economy interest as well as the farmers pursue the maximize profit and its sustainable development. So, the key factor of farmland circulation is to have a correct understanding of the gambling relationship among farmers, village committee and government and to make an adjustment in order to realize the target of farmland circulation and development strategy.
Fifthly, according to the problems and insufficient existing in our country's farmland circulation, this dissertation put forward some feasible and operable suggestions for perfecting the farmland circulation, which is to build common interest driven system, cultivate new relations of interest bodies and ensure farmers'rights.
There are several innovation points in this dissertation:Firstly, many scholars mainly focused on the behavior situation and influence factors of farmland circulation while seldom people want to study the behavior and appeal of relative interest bodies. This dissertation based on micro-level to explore each interest bodies'behavior choices and has its own innovations in study perspective. Secondly, this dissertation combined the mathematical statistics method and gambling analysis method to analyze the interest bodies in farmland circulation. It also discussed the behavior choices of each body and used gambling theory to study their relationships. It has an innovation point in research method.
迄今为止,有关农地流转的研究主要集中在农地流转现状及影响因素、农地流转制度和法律、农地流转的市场机制等方面。从农地流转行为研究看,大多学者研究对象主要聚焦于农户农地流转行为。通过系统的文献回顾发现,很少有研究将农户、村委会和政府结合在一起来探讨农地流转,尤其是对三者在农地流转中相互关系的分析更少。本文拟通过对襄阳市农地流转现状实证调查,探讨农地流转中农户、村委会和政府行为机理的选择,并从理论层面上解析三者在农地流转中的博弈关系。在此基础上,提出将农户、村委会和政府在农地流转中的行为有效地结合起来,建立共同的利益驱动机制,最大限度保护农民的土地权利地位,实现农地流转有效运行。
论文首先构建了关于农地流转利益相关主体行为研究的理论分析框架,从而为下文深入、系统的理论提炼及实证分析提供了必要的分析视角、范围和逻辑结构。接着,系统分析了我国农地流转发展的特征与现状。当前,我国的农地流转主要呈现出五大特征：一是规模扩大、趋势加快但整体规模偏低；二是农地流转区域间差异显著；三是流转形式多样化；四是新型农业经营主体流转比重不断增加；五是大宗农地流转期限延长,但农户间转包期限依然较短；六是农地流转市场初步建立。随后,论文还进一步提出当前的农地流转还存在着流转行为规范化程度不高、仲裁机构不健全、流转农地非粮化倾向明显、土地流转市场化程度较低等问题。
基于对农地流转现状与发展特征的深入考察,结合构建的一般理论分析框架,本文开始着重研究农地流转中农户、村委会和政府的行为。论文选取襄阳市的樊城区、老河口市、谷城县3个调查样本地,通过对13村312户农户的问卷调查和访谈、座谈等,获取了论文所需要的第一手资料和数据。论文从农户、村委会、政府三个方面对各自在农地流转中的行为进行分析,进而探讨农地流转三者之间的博弈关系。在农户层面,运用Logistic回归方程,从农户个体特征、家庭状况、外部体制环境等3类因素17个因子对农户农地流转行为进行回归分析。在村委会层面,就村委会在农地流转中的职能和作用、村委会在农地流转中的行为选择、存在的问题及制约因素、被调查地村委会农地流转的现状进行了分析和总结,并辅以案例进行实证研究。在政府层面,从政府介入农地流转的必要性、政府在农地流转中的行为选择及实证案例等方面进行了论证。在此基础上,分别探讨了农户、村委会和政府在农地流转中的行为目标,并就三者之间的关系进行博弈分析。
调查与研究结果表明：
第一,农户参与农地流转的行为从根本上说是一种有限理性的行为。在不同的要素资源禀赋下,农户的农地流转行为是不同的,它主要受家庭收入水平与来源、农地面积、农地承包期和户主年龄、职业等因素的影响。农户的行为总是在风险和利润之间博弈,寻求风险最小化条件下的利润最大化。
第二,在目前我国农户分散、规模较小,农地流转市场不健全,流转渠道不通畅等现实情况下,农地流转的运行需要村委会的介入和参与,为农业发展提供助力。然而,我国村委会的发展缺少相对公平、有序的发展空间。现行村委会面临准行政职能过度强化、经济职能不明确、干部社会动员能力不足、自治能力不足等问题。如何建立适宜村委会发展的外部环境,使其在农地流转经济活动中发挥应有的作用是值得我们深入思考的问题。
第三,政府行为的优化是实现农地流转快速有序进行的必然途径。现实农地流转中,基于成本收益的“理性选择”可能导致政府行为偏离公共利益的目标,产生政府失灵。因此,从制度源头上改变地方政府的效用函数和激励机制,合理界定政府行为边界,寻求市场机制与政府调控的最佳结合点,使地方政府干预纠正市场的同时,避免和克服政府失灵,从“经济人”回归到公共利益代表者,从而实现公平与效率的统一。
第四,农地流转的实施涉及到中央政府、地方政府、村委会、农户等主要利益主体。在市场经济环境中,作为理性经济人的利益主体会根据不同的利益诉求进行比较并作出行为选择。在农地流转中,中央政府希望通过农地流转的实施,以较小的财政付出获取生态目标的实现；地方政府,希望中央能减免农业税收,加大中央财政转移支付,并提高补助标准；村委会追求的是自身社会利益和经济利益的最大化；农户追求的是收益的最大化和后续生计的可持续化。因此,实现农地流转的关键是正确认识农户、村委会和政府之间的利益博弈关系和利益诉求,并从和谐博弈关系的角度进行行为的调适,以达到不同利益者比较一致并充分信任的农地流转目标和发展战略。
第五,针对目前我国农地流转中存在的问题与不足,依据调查研究数据以及实证分析结果,提出完善农地流转可行的、适于操作的政策建议：厘定角色,建立共同利益驱动机制；重塑职责,培育流转利益主体新型关系；确立地位,实现农民土地权利的制度保障。
论文研究可能存在如下几点创新：一是从国内外有关农地流转行为的研究看,众多学者主要聚焦于农户农地流转行为状况及影响因素,很少有学者去研究整个农地流转过程中涉及的相关利益主体的行为和诉求。本文从微观层面上探讨农地流转中农户、村委会和政府的行为选择和利益诉求,揭示各利益主体行为选择的内在动因,探讨在各自约束条件下选择相应的行为实现自身利益的最大化的机理,在研究视角上有一定的拓展和创新。二是将数理统计方法和博弈分析方法结合起来,对农地流转的利益主体进行定量和定性的分析。论文以实证的方式探究各利益主体在流转中的行为选择,并运用博弈论分析方法探讨农地流转中各利益主体之间的关系,寻求利益的均衡点。在方法上,这可能有一定的创新。
As the necessary conditions of the land demand of overall urban-rural plan and the development of urbanization and industrialization, the farmland circulation is the premise for farmers to transform the land security into value security and ensuring the farmers' interests and social stability in rural area. The land circulation system in our country has entered into legal norm stage, but it also has some problems in practice. The real land circulation is not only a kind of pure market behavior, but also be embedded into the special relationship among country, collective and farmers. In the state of strained relations between people and land, the "collective", as the owner of rural land, has the right to put the farmers'contracted land to their own use just as village committee and country. The farmers can not really dominate the process of farmland circulation and gain sufficient interests under such kind of relationship among country, collective and famers. This is a deep-seated problem for farmland circulation to combine interest demand of farmers with village committee and country under the premise of ensuring the rights and interests of farmers.
Up to now, the researches associated with farmland circulation mainly focused on the current situation and influence factors of land circulation, their rules and laws and market mechanism. According to the literature review, it is found that very few scholars have engaged in the studying the farmland circulation based on the combination of farmers, village committee and country. This dissertation will make an empirical investigation of status quo of farmland circulation in Xiangyang city to explore the mechanism of behavior in farmers, village committee and country as well as to analyze their gambling relationship. Simultaneously, it also put forward that it will be useful to effectively combine the behavior of farmers with village committee and country and establish common interests driving mechanism to protect the right of farmers arid realize the effective implementing of farmland circulation.
This dissertation first built the theoretical framework of behavior analysis of interest-related parts in the process of land circulation in order to provide necessary logical structure for the following theoretical extraction and empirical analysis. It also analyzed the current situation of farmland circulation in our country and concluded five features: firstly, it has large-scale and accelerated development speed but the overall size was still in a low level; secondly, the differences between circulation areas were significant; thirdly, there were diversified forms of land circulation; fourthly, the proportion of new agriculture business entity has increased; fifthly, the period of large-scale farmland circulation has extended but the period of subcontracting among farmers was short; sixthly, the market of farmland circulation has taken shape initially. Then, this dissertation has further discussed some problems existed in the process of land circulation, such as the low degree of formalization of circulation behavior, imperfect arbitral institution, prominent non-food tendency in farmland circulation and low degree of marketization.
On the basis of the in-depth investigation of current situation and development characters of farmland circulation, this dissertation focus on the behaviors among farmers, village committee and government combined with ordinary theoretical analysis framework. It surveyed312households in Fancheng district, LaoHekou city and Gucheng County and obtained useful information and data. This dissertation explored the mechanism of behavior in farmers, village committee and country and analyzed their gambling relationship. In term of farmers, it used Logistic regression equation to analyze the farmland circulation from the aspects of personal features, family status and external institutional environment. In term of village committee, it analyzed and concluded the function of village committee in the process of farmland circulation, their behavior choices, problems and restriction factors and current situation. In term of government, this dissertation demonstrated the necessity of government's participation in farmland circulation and their behavior choices. This dissertation discussed the behavior features of farmers, village committee and government in farmland circulation and their differences as well as to analyze their gambling relationships.
The research result shows that:
Firstly, the behavior for farmers engaged in the farmland circulation is basically a kind of restricted rational behavior. Under different background, the farmers'behaviors are disparate which will be influenced by family income and source, farmland area, contract period of farmland, the age of householder and careers. Their behaviors always seek to maximize the benefits in the condition of risk minimization.
Secondly, under the situation of dispersive householders, imperfect farmland circulation market and blocking working capital flow channel, the operation of farmland circulation needs the engagement and participation of village committee to provide help for agriculture development. However, our country's village committee is lack of relative fair and well-organized development space. There are many problems the village committee faced, such as intensive administrative function, ambiguous economic functions, incapable cadre and self-government capacity. So how to establish a healthy external environment for the development of village committee to play a part in the process of farmland circulation will become a serious question.
Thirdly, the optimization of government behavior is an inevitably method for realizing farmland circulation. In the real situation, the "rational choice" based on cost-benefit may lead the government behavior to miss the target of public interest and cause government failure. Hence, it will be useful to change the utility function and incentive mechanism of local government from source system and rationally define the border of government behavior. This way could help local government to avoid failure and become the representative of public interest.
Fourthly, the implementation of farmland circulation involved central and local government, village committee and householders. In market economy, the interest body, as rational investor, will make a comparison among different interest appeals and make a behavior choice. In the process of farmland circulation, the central government wants to obtain the realization of ecological objectives with small financial expenditure by the implementation of farmland circulation. While the local government hopes that the central government could reduce the agricultural taxes and improve the standard of subsidy. And the village committee seeks the maximize profit of social and economy interest as well as the farmers pursue the maximize profit and its sustainable development. So, the key factor of farmland circulation is to have a correct understanding of the gambling relationship among farmers, village committee and government and to make an adjustment in order to realize the target of farmland circulation and development strategy.
Fifthly, according to the problems and insufficient existing in our country's farmland circulation, this dissertation put forward some feasible and operable suggestions for perfecting the farmland circulation, which is to build common interest driven system, cultivate new relations of interest bodies and ensure farmers'rights.
There are several innovation points in this dissertation:Firstly, many scholars mainly focused on the behavior situation and influence factors of farmland circulation while seldom people want to study the behavior and appeal of relative interest bodies. This dissertation based on micro-level to explore each interest bodies'behavior choices and has its own innovations in study perspective. Secondly, this dissertation combined the mathematical statistics method and gambling analysis method to analyze the interest bodies in farmland circulation. It also discussed the behavior choices of each body and used gambling theory to study their relationships. It has an innovation point in research method.
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