劳动制度变迁的收入分配效应研究
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摘要
收入分配一直是经济学领域重点关注的问题之一。在决定收入分配及收入不平等因素中,制度是重要影响因素之一。制度作为非市场因素,不仅影响收入决定机制,而且通过影响报酬率系数而最终影响收入分配的结果。关于工资收入的劳动立法作为一项正式的劳动制度,对劳动市场的均衡及工资收入决定同样有重要的影响。因此,我国新劳动法作为一项正式的劳动制度,其颁布理论上也将对劳动者的工资决定机制和劳动市场均衡产生影响,具有收入再分配的功能。而这也正是新劳动法所期望达到的目标之一。好的制度是稀缺的,一项好的政策或制度的实施,是否达到预期目标,以及能在多大程度上达到,需要经验上加以检验。尽管新劳动法的实施很短,能得到的数据仅仅为两个时段的数据,但以此研究新劳动法的收入分配效应,仍然能得出有益的结论。鉴于此,在新劳动法实施一年多之际,分析和评估其收入分配效应,具有重要的理论意义与政策意义。本文贡献在于,尝试用调查的微观数据,全方位、系统地评价新劳动法作为一项正式的制度变迁的收入分配效应,增加已有的收入分配理论的学术积累,并为新的政策制定和实施提供借鉴。
国外关于工资立法对收入分配的文献很多,但国外的文献是建立在劳动市场相对完善和规范基础上的分析。而我国尚处于经济转型时期,劳动市场还不健全,再加上劳动市场依旧处于买方市场,劳动者维权意识薄弱,这些都决定了同样的一项工资立法或者制度的实施,用西方的实践得到的理论恐怕仍然不能解释我国劳动力市场的收入分配实践。鉴于此,只能在借鉴西方理论基础上,建立我国自身的劳动立法与收入分配的对应关系的理论,才能更好地指导相关政策的实践。而目前国内的相关研究虽然注意到工资立法作为正式的劳动制度对工资收入的影响,但关于劳动制度对工资收入分配的影响的定量研究还非常少。而现有的研究中,要么假设劳动制度是外生的,要么假定所有企业均遵守劳动制度的前提下,分析工资收入分配。在这些假定下,即使控制人力资本变量和其他特征变量,可能仍然无法解释工资收入差异的全部。而本文的分析不仅把劳动制度内生化,并且还假定企业在新劳动法实施中“机会主义”是有差异的。这样,由于“机会主义”的差异,企业遵守新劳动法的程度是不同的,因此可以预期,在新的劳动制度下,“机会主义”轻微的企业的劳动者能够获得新劳动动法规定的经济利益较多,而“机会主义”严重的企业的劳动者有可能仍然无法享受到新劳动法实施带来的好处。由于不同所有制部门、行业和区域的企业执行新劳动法程度有差异,因此最终的部门、行业和区域的收入分配效应也是不同的。
此外,预期新劳动法会提高劳动要素的价格。劳动要素价格的提高,势必引起要素之间的替代,从而引起要素在不同行业和区域流动。而要素的流动会进一步影响不同行业和不同区域的要素市场和要素价格。最终会影响行业和区域的工资决定机制和工资差异。新劳动法并不能彻底消除部门市场分割,但通过影响非国有部门,最终也会影响到部门收入分配。总之,可以预期,新劳动法对总体、不同部门、不同行业和不同区域均可能产生收入分配效应。这里,进一步把预期的收入分配效应分为两大类,即新劳动法的绝对收入分配效应和相对收入分配效应,并加以检验。
在绝对收入分配效应中,重点从工资收入分布、工资收入决定机制和收入差异三个方面予以实证分析。其一,工资收入分布变迁。经验结果表明,新劳动法实施后,劳动者的收入分布整体向右移动,说明受新劳动法的影响,劳动者工资收入总体上有普遍提高。其二,工资收入决定机制。修正的明瑟方程OLS估计和邹至庄检验可知,新劳动法实施前后的明瑟方程有显著结构上的差异。并且,方程的估计系数显示,新劳动法改变了各要素的回报率,从而整体上对工资决定有显著、正的影响。由分位数模型的估计结果可以看出,新劳动法对工资分布的不同区间均产生正的、显著的分配效应,但不同区间的报酬率是有差异的。总的来看,处于分位数较低位置的劳动者相对较高位置的劳动者,新劳动法产生的收入分配效应更大。而不同所有制部门、不同行业和不同区域的工资方程估计结果显示,新劳动法对各部门、行业和各区域均有正的分配效应,但程度有所差异。总的来看,对非国有部门的分配效应要大于国有部门,对劳动密集型行业的分配效应要大于资本密集型和技术密集型行业,对中部地区的影响大于东、西部的影响。最后,收入差异分解。分解结果显示,新劳动法实施后,部门工资差异有较大程度的下降。而以技术密集型行业作为参照基准,对行业工资收入差异进行动态的JMP分解。由分结果可知,劳动制度变迁前后这段时间内,劳动对技术工资差异下降了,资本对技术的工资差异则号升了。以东部地区作为参照基准,对区域工资收入差异进行动态的JMP分解。由分结果可知,劳动制度变迁前后这段时间内,中部对东部工资差异下降了,西部对东部的工资差异则上升了。而且,分解结果还显示,无法解释的系数差异均可以解释以上差异的下降。而无法解释的系数差异中,新劳动法的实施,则在其中起了很大的作用。
劳动制度变迁不仅影响劳动者绝对收入水平,还影响其相对收入水平,而相对收入水平就是指收入流动性。实证过程从两个方面进行：收入流动性测度与收入流动决定因素的估计。其一,收入流动性测度。实证结果表明,不同劳动者群体的收入流动是有差异的。从人口特征来说,女性、低学历、青年、已婚和本地户口要比对应群体的流动性高。从企业特征来说,不同所有制、不同规模、不同区域和不同要素密集度的企业的劳动者收入流动性也是有差异的。非国有企业、中小型、西部区域和劳动密集型行业比对应的其他群体收入流动性更高。而在收入流动性结构中发现,在人口特征分组中,女性、低学历、中年、已婚和异地户口的人群表现出比其对应群体更高向上流动的势头。其中,女性、低学历和中年群体呈现向上流动和向下流动的“双高现象”,值得引起特别的关注。而在企业特征分组中,非国有企业、中小型、东部地区和劳动要素密集型企业表现出比其对应分组更高向上流动的势头。其二,收入流动决定因素估计。不同分组的群体收入流动的决定是有差异的。但总体而言,区域差异和在各分位组的相对位置显著影响收入流动。大致说来,东部各收入组比中西部对应的各收入组有更大的机会向更高收入组流动,而向下流动的可能性要低于中西部地区；而在各分位组上方位置有更多机会流到较高组,各族下方位置的群体则流到较低收入组的概率要大。
收入流动会影响收入分配的不平等状况,因此本文最后通过收入不平等指数的计算和分解,解析收入分配的最终效应。由各种衡量收入不平等的指数及其变动情况看,实施新劳动法后,总体的劳动个体收入的收入分配趋向公平。不同部门、不同行业和不同区域的不平等状况变动趋势和总体是一致的。不平等指数基尼系数和方差分解结果表明,尽管不同分类组的收入不平等程度受新劳动法影响,均有一定程度的变动。但由于影响因素以及这些因素的影响方向、影响程度是有差异的,最终导致基尼系数和方差下降的程度和下降的路径存在差异。
Income distribution is always one of the important issues in economics. In concerned factors which affect income distribution and income inequality, institution is seemed as one of important factors. As a non-market factor, institution, not only affects income decision mechanism, but also by influencing the coefficient of return rate ultimately affect the results of income distribution. Labor Law on wage income, as a formal labor institution, also has significant impacts on labor market equilibrium and wage income decision. So, our country's New Labor Law, theoretically will also have impact on labor market equilibrium and wage income decision, and has the function of income redistribution. This is one of the goals that New Labor Law expects to achieve. A good institution is scarce, the implementation of a good policy or institution, whether to achieve the expected objectives and the extent to which can be achieved, need to be tested empirically. Despite the time after implementation of the New Labor Law is short, we can only get two periods of data, however during the research of its income distribution effects, we can still draw useful conclusions. In view of this, When New Labor Law has been implemented for more than a year, Analyzing and evaluating its income distribution effect, has important theoretical significance and policy significance. The contribution of this paper is to try to comprehensively and systematically evaluate income distribution effects of New Labor Law as a formal institutional change with micro-data, with which we can increase the accumulation of academic theory on income distribution, and provide references for new policy's establishment and implementation.
With regard to wage legislation effects on income distribution, there are many foreign literatures, but the analysis of foreign literature is based on the labor market which is relatively perfect and standardized. While China is still in the economy transformation period, labor market is still not perfect, coupled with labor market still being buyer market, and the awareness of workers'rights protection is weak, these all come to a decision that the same wage legislation or the implementation of institution, the theory from the Western practice still can not explain the income distribution practice from labor market in China. In view of this, only we can do is that on the basis of Western theories, establish our own theory about the corresponding relationship between China's own labor legislation and income distribution in order to better guide policies in practice. The current domestic research, while seem the labor wage legislation as a formal system has impact on wage income, but there is still very little quantitative research on it. The current researchs analyze the wage income distribution with the assumption that the labor system is exogenous, or assumption that all firms comply with the labor institutions. Under these assumptions, even if after control human capital variable and other characteristics variables, we are still unable to explain all the differentials in wage income. This paper will look on labor institutions as endogenous, and also assumes that the "opportunism" of firm's implementaing New Labor Law is different. Because "opportunism" is different, the degree of firms' compliance with New labor Law is then different, so it can be expected, under New Labor Law, the labors in minor "opportunism" firms will get more benefit, while others in serious "opportunism" firms maybe still be unable to enjoy the benefits of implementation of New Labor Law. Due to different ownership sectors, industries and regions, the degrees of firms'implementing New Labor Law are different, so the final income distribution effects of different sectors, industries and regions are not same.
In addition, we expect New Labor Law will raise the price of labor factor. As labor factor price increases, it maybe causes substitution between factors, which will further cause factors mobile through different industries and regions. The mobility of factors will further affect the factor markets and factor prices of different industries and different regions, which will ultimately affect the wage determination mechanism and the wage differentials of inter-industry and inter-region. New Labor Law can not completely eliminate markets's segmentation, but by influencing the non-state sector, it will eventually affect inter-sector wage income differentials. In short, we can expect New Labor Law will generate income distributional effects to general labor factors, different sectors, different industries and different regions. Here, the effect of income distribution is further expected to be divided into two categories, namely, New Labor Law's absolute income distribution effects and relative income distribution effects, which will be tested using suvry data.
In absolute income distribution effects, we mainly give empirical analysis of wage distribution, wage decision-making mechanism and income differentials. Firstly, wage income distribution. Survy data shows that after the implementation of New Labor Law, the overall income distribution of laborers move to the right which shows that duo to the impact of the New Labor Law, laborers'wages on the whole rose greatly. Secondly, wage income decision-making mechanism. From modified Mincer Equation OLS estimate and Chow test, we can find before and after the implementation of the New Labor Law, Mincer equation has significant structural differentials. Moreover, the estimated coefficients of equation show New Labor Law s the rate of return of factors, and thus overall has significant positive impact on wage decision. By quantile regression model estimation, we can find, New Labor Law has positive and significant distributional effects on wage distribution in different quantile interval, but the rate of return of different quantile interval is not same. In general, compared to the laborer who was in higher position, there is a greater income distribution effect generated by New Labor Law for lowers. The estimation results of the wage equation in the different ownership sectors, different industries and different regions show that New Labor Law in various sectors, industries and all regions has a positive distributional effect, but the degree is different. Overall, the distributional effect of the non-state sector is greater than the state sector, the distributional effect of labor-intensive industries is greater than the capital-intensive and technology-intensive industries and the impact of the central region is greater than the eastern and western's. Finally, decompose wage income differentials. Decomposition results show that after the implementation of New Labor Law, sector wage differentials have a greater downward degree. With the technology-intensive industry as a reference benchmark, we carry on dynamic JMP decomposition to the industry wage differentials. From the results, in the period before and after the labor institutional transition, wage differentials decreased to technology, capital wage differentials increased to technology. With the eastern region as a reference benchmark, we carry on dynamic JMP decomposition to the regional wage differentials. From the results, in the period before and after labor institutional transition, the central wage differentials declined to eastern, westen wage differentials increased to easten. Moreover, the results of decomposition also show that the unexplained coefficients can explain the above differentials. As for unexplained coefficient differentials, New Labor Law plays a great role in it.
Labor institutional change, not only affects the absolute income level of laborers, but also affects their relative income position, the latter means income mobility. The positive process is from two aspects:the measurement of income mobility and the determinants of income mobility. Firstly, income mobility measurement. The empirical results show that income nobilities of different laborers groups are different. From the demographic characteristics, the female, low education, middle-aged, married and local population has higher mobility compared to the corresponding groups. From the firm features, the mobility of laborers'wage income in the firms of different ownerships, different sizes, different regions and different intensity of the factors is also different. Non-state firms, small or middle size, western regions, and labor-intensive industries than the other corresponding groups have higher earnings mobility. In the structure of income mobility, we find that in the groups of demographic characteristics, women, low education, middle-aged, married and off-site population showed a higher upward probability of mobility than their counterparts. Among them, women, low education and middle-aged groups, show "double high" phenomenon of both upward mobility and downward mobility which deserves special attention. While in the group of firms'features, the non-state-owned enterprises, small or middle size, and the eastern regions and labor-intensive firms than the corresponding groups showed a higher upward probablity of mobility. Secondly, the estimates of income mobility determinants. Determinants of income mobilities from different groups are different. Overall, however, regional differences and the relative position in each subgroup have a significant impact on earnings mobility. Generally speaking, all income groups of eastern than the corresponding income groups of Midwest have greater opportunities of mobility to a higher-income group, while the possibility of downward mobility is lower than the central and western regions; while for the groups in the top position of the subgroup, there are more opportunities to flow to the higher group, the probability of all groups below the location to flow to the lower-income groups should be large.
Income mobility will affect the inequality of income distribution, therefore this paper finally analyses the ultimate effect of the income distribution by calculating and decomposing the income inequality indices. From various measures of income inequality index and its change, it is seen that after the implementation of New Labor Law, the total wage income of the individual moves towards a fairer income distribution. The trends of inequality condition of different sections, different industries and different regions are consistent with the whole. The Gini coefficient of inequality indices and variance decomposition results show that, due to New Labor Law, income inequality degrees of different income groups have a certain degree of s, but influential factors, the direction of the impact of these factors as well as the extent of impact are different, and eventually lead to differentials in Gini coefficient, the extent of variance decline and the path of decline.
国外关于工资立法对收入分配的文献很多,但国外的文献是建立在劳动市场相对完善和规范基础上的分析。而我国尚处于经济转型时期,劳动市场还不健全,再加上劳动市场依旧处于买方市场,劳动者维权意识薄弱,这些都决定了同样的一项工资立法或者制度的实施,用西方的实践得到的理论恐怕仍然不能解释我国劳动力市场的收入分配实践。鉴于此,只能在借鉴西方理论基础上,建立我国自身的劳动立法与收入分配的对应关系的理论,才能更好地指导相关政策的实践。而目前国内的相关研究虽然注意到工资立法作为正式的劳动制度对工资收入的影响,但关于劳动制度对工资收入分配的影响的定量研究还非常少。而现有的研究中,要么假设劳动制度是外生的,要么假定所有企业均遵守劳动制度的前提下,分析工资收入分配。在这些假定下,即使控制人力资本变量和其他特征变量,可能仍然无法解释工资收入差异的全部。而本文的分析不仅把劳动制度内生化,并且还假定企业在新劳动法实施中“机会主义”是有差异的。这样,由于“机会主义”的差异,企业遵守新劳动法的程度是不同的,因此可以预期,在新的劳动制度下,“机会主义”轻微的企业的劳动者能够获得新劳动动法规定的经济利益较多,而“机会主义”严重的企业的劳动者有可能仍然无法享受到新劳动法实施带来的好处。由于不同所有制部门、行业和区域的企业执行新劳动法程度有差异,因此最终的部门、行业和区域的收入分配效应也是不同的。
此外,预期新劳动法会提高劳动要素的价格。劳动要素价格的提高,势必引起要素之间的替代,从而引起要素在不同行业和区域流动。而要素的流动会进一步影响不同行业和不同区域的要素市场和要素价格。最终会影响行业和区域的工资决定机制和工资差异。新劳动法并不能彻底消除部门市场分割,但通过影响非国有部门,最终也会影响到部门收入分配。总之,可以预期,新劳动法对总体、不同部门、不同行业和不同区域均可能产生收入分配效应。这里,进一步把预期的收入分配效应分为两大类,即新劳动法的绝对收入分配效应和相对收入分配效应,并加以检验。
在绝对收入分配效应中,重点从工资收入分布、工资收入决定机制和收入差异三个方面予以实证分析。其一,工资收入分布变迁。经验结果表明,新劳动法实施后,劳动者的收入分布整体向右移动,说明受新劳动法的影响,劳动者工资收入总体上有普遍提高。其二,工资收入决定机制。修正的明瑟方程OLS估计和邹至庄检验可知,新劳动法实施前后的明瑟方程有显著结构上的差异。并且,方程的估计系数显示,新劳动法改变了各要素的回报率,从而整体上对工资决定有显著、正的影响。由分位数模型的估计结果可以看出,新劳动法对工资分布的不同区间均产生正的、显著的分配效应,但不同区间的报酬率是有差异的。总的来看,处于分位数较低位置的劳动者相对较高位置的劳动者,新劳动法产生的收入分配效应更大。而不同所有制部门、不同行业和不同区域的工资方程估计结果显示,新劳动法对各部门、行业和各区域均有正的分配效应,但程度有所差异。总的来看,对非国有部门的分配效应要大于国有部门,对劳动密集型行业的分配效应要大于资本密集型和技术密集型行业,对中部地区的影响大于东、西部的影响。最后,收入差异分解。分解结果显示,新劳动法实施后,部门工资差异有较大程度的下降。而以技术密集型行业作为参照基准,对行业工资收入差异进行动态的JMP分解。由分结果可知,劳动制度变迁前后这段时间内,劳动对技术工资差异下降了,资本对技术的工资差异则号升了。以东部地区作为参照基准,对区域工资收入差异进行动态的JMP分解。由分结果可知,劳动制度变迁前后这段时间内,中部对东部工资差异下降了,西部对东部的工资差异则上升了。而且,分解结果还显示,无法解释的系数差异均可以解释以上差异的下降。而无法解释的系数差异中,新劳动法的实施,则在其中起了很大的作用。
劳动制度变迁不仅影响劳动者绝对收入水平,还影响其相对收入水平,而相对收入水平就是指收入流动性。实证过程从两个方面进行：收入流动性测度与收入流动决定因素的估计。其一,收入流动性测度。实证结果表明,不同劳动者群体的收入流动是有差异的。从人口特征来说,女性、低学历、青年、已婚和本地户口要比对应群体的流动性高。从企业特征来说,不同所有制、不同规模、不同区域和不同要素密集度的企业的劳动者收入流动性也是有差异的。非国有企业、中小型、西部区域和劳动密集型行业比对应的其他群体收入流动性更高。而在收入流动性结构中发现,在人口特征分组中,女性、低学历、中年、已婚和异地户口的人群表现出比其对应群体更高向上流动的势头。其中,女性、低学历和中年群体呈现向上流动和向下流动的“双高现象”,值得引起特别的关注。而在企业特征分组中,非国有企业、中小型、东部地区和劳动要素密集型企业表现出比其对应分组更高向上流动的势头。其二,收入流动决定因素估计。不同分组的群体收入流动的决定是有差异的。但总体而言,区域差异和在各分位组的相对位置显著影响收入流动。大致说来,东部各收入组比中西部对应的各收入组有更大的机会向更高收入组流动,而向下流动的可能性要低于中西部地区；而在各分位组上方位置有更多机会流到较高组,各族下方位置的群体则流到较低收入组的概率要大。
收入流动会影响收入分配的不平等状况,因此本文最后通过收入不平等指数的计算和分解,解析收入分配的最终效应。由各种衡量收入不平等的指数及其变动情况看,实施新劳动法后,总体的劳动个体收入的收入分配趋向公平。不同部门、不同行业和不同区域的不平等状况变动趋势和总体是一致的。不平等指数基尼系数和方差分解结果表明,尽管不同分类组的收入不平等程度受新劳动法影响,均有一定程度的变动。但由于影响因素以及这些因素的影响方向、影响程度是有差异的,最终导致基尼系数和方差下降的程度和下降的路径存在差异。
Income distribution is always one of the important issues in economics. In concerned factors which affect income distribution and income inequality, institution is seemed as one of important factors. As a non-market factor, institution, not only affects income decision mechanism, but also by influencing the coefficient of return rate ultimately affect the results of income distribution. Labor Law on wage income, as a formal labor institution, also has significant impacts on labor market equilibrium and wage income decision. So, our country's New Labor Law, theoretically will also have impact on labor market equilibrium and wage income decision, and has the function of income redistribution. This is one of the goals that New Labor Law expects to achieve. A good institution is scarce, the implementation of a good policy or institution, whether to achieve the expected objectives and the extent to which can be achieved, need to be tested empirically. Despite the time after implementation of the New Labor Law is short, we can only get two periods of data, however during the research of its income distribution effects, we can still draw useful conclusions. In view of this, When New Labor Law has been implemented for more than a year, Analyzing and evaluating its income distribution effect, has important theoretical significance and policy significance. The contribution of this paper is to try to comprehensively and systematically evaluate income distribution effects of New Labor Law as a formal institutional change with micro-data, with which we can increase the accumulation of academic theory on income distribution, and provide references for new policy's establishment and implementation.
With regard to wage legislation effects on income distribution, there are many foreign literatures, but the analysis of foreign literature is based on the labor market which is relatively perfect and standardized. While China is still in the economy transformation period, labor market is still not perfect, coupled with labor market still being buyer market, and the awareness of workers'rights protection is weak, these all come to a decision that the same wage legislation or the implementation of institution, the theory from the Western practice still can not explain the income distribution practice from labor market in China. In view of this, only we can do is that on the basis of Western theories, establish our own theory about the corresponding relationship between China's own labor legislation and income distribution in order to better guide policies in practice. The current domestic research, while seem the labor wage legislation as a formal system has impact on wage income, but there is still very little quantitative research on it. The current researchs analyze the wage income distribution with the assumption that the labor system is exogenous, or assumption that all firms comply with the labor institutions. Under these assumptions, even if after control human capital variable and other characteristics variables, we are still unable to explain all the differentials in wage income. This paper will look on labor institutions as endogenous, and also assumes that the "opportunism" of firm's implementaing New Labor Law is different. Because "opportunism" is different, the degree of firms' compliance with New labor Law is then different, so it can be expected, under New Labor Law, the labors in minor "opportunism" firms will get more benefit, while others in serious "opportunism" firms maybe still be unable to enjoy the benefits of implementation of New Labor Law. Due to different ownership sectors, industries and regions, the degrees of firms'implementing New Labor Law are different, so the final income distribution effects of different sectors, industries and regions are not same.
In addition, we expect New Labor Law will raise the price of labor factor. As labor factor price increases, it maybe causes substitution between factors, which will further cause factors mobile through different industries and regions. The mobility of factors will further affect the factor markets and factor prices of different industries and different regions, which will ultimately affect the wage determination mechanism and the wage differentials of inter-industry and inter-region. New Labor Law can not completely eliminate markets's segmentation, but by influencing the non-state sector, it will eventually affect inter-sector wage income differentials. In short, we can expect New Labor Law will generate income distributional effects to general labor factors, different sectors, different industries and different regions. Here, the effect of income distribution is further expected to be divided into two categories, namely, New Labor Law's absolute income distribution effects and relative income distribution effects, which will be tested using suvry data.
In absolute income distribution effects, we mainly give empirical analysis of wage distribution, wage decision-making mechanism and income differentials. Firstly, wage income distribution. Survy data shows that after the implementation of New Labor Law, the overall income distribution of laborers move to the right which shows that duo to the impact of the New Labor Law, laborers'wages on the whole rose greatly. Secondly, wage income decision-making mechanism. From modified Mincer Equation OLS estimate and Chow test, we can find before and after the implementation of the New Labor Law, Mincer equation has significant structural differentials. Moreover, the estimated coefficients of equation show New Labor Law s the rate of return of factors, and thus overall has significant positive impact on wage decision. By quantile regression model estimation, we can find, New Labor Law has positive and significant distributional effects on wage distribution in different quantile interval, but the rate of return of different quantile interval is not same. In general, compared to the laborer who was in higher position, there is a greater income distribution effect generated by New Labor Law for lowers. The estimation results of the wage equation in the different ownership sectors, different industries and different regions show that New Labor Law in various sectors, industries and all regions has a positive distributional effect, but the degree is different. Overall, the distributional effect of the non-state sector is greater than the state sector, the distributional effect of labor-intensive industries is greater than the capital-intensive and technology-intensive industries and the impact of the central region is greater than the eastern and western's. Finally, decompose wage income differentials. Decomposition results show that after the implementation of New Labor Law, sector wage differentials have a greater downward degree. With the technology-intensive industry as a reference benchmark, we carry on dynamic JMP decomposition to the industry wage differentials. From the results, in the period before and after the labor institutional transition, wage differentials decreased to technology, capital wage differentials increased to technology. With the eastern region as a reference benchmark, we carry on dynamic JMP decomposition to the regional wage differentials. From the results, in the period before and after labor institutional transition, the central wage differentials declined to eastern, westen wage differentials increased to easten. Moreover, the results of decomposition also show that the unexplained coefficients can explain the above differentials. As for unexplained coefficient differentials, New Labor Law plays a great role in it.
Labor institutional change, not only affects the absolute income level of laborers, but also affects their relative income position, the latter means income mobility. The positive process is from two aspects:the measurement of income mobility and the determinants of income mobility. Firstly, income mobility measurement. The empirical results show that income nobilities of different laborers groups are different. From the demographic characteristics, the female, low education, middle-aged, married and local population has higher mobility compared to the corresponding groups. From the firm features, the mobility of laborers'wage income in the firms of different ownerships, different sizes, different regions and different intensity of the factors is also different. Non-state firms, small or middle size, western regions, and labor-intensive industries than the other corresponding groups have higher earnings mobility. In the structure of income mobility, we find that in the groups of demographic characteristics, women, low education, middle-aged, married and off-site population showed a higher upward probability of mobility than their counterparts. Among them, women, low education and middle-aged groups, show "double high" phenomenon of both upward mobility and downward mobility which deserves special attention. While in the group of firms'features, the non-state-owned enterprises, small or middle size, and the eastern regions and labor-intensive firms than the corresponding groups showed a higher upward probablity of mobility. Secondly, the estimates of income mobility determinants. Determinants of income mobilities from different groups are different. Overall, however, regional differences and the relative position in each subgroup have a significant impact on earnings mobility. Generally speaking, all income groups of eastern than the corresponding income groups of Midwest have greater opportunities of mobility to a higher-income group, while the possibility of downward mobility is lower than the central and western regions; while for the groups in the top position of the subgroup, there are more opportunities to flow to the higher group, the probability of all groups below the location to flow to the lower-income groups should be large.
Income mobility will affect the inequality of income distribution, therefore this paper finally analyses the ultimate effect of the income distribution by calculating and decomposing the income inequality indices. From various measures of income inequality index and its change, it is seen that after the implementation of New Labor Law, the total wage income of the individual moves towards a fairer income distribution. The trends of inequality condition of different sections, different industries and different regions are consistent with the whole. The Gini coefficient of inequality indices and variance decomposition results show that, due to New Labor Law, income inequality degrees of different income groups have a certain degree of s, but influential factors, the direction of the impact of these factors as well as the extent of impact are different, and eventually lead to differentials in Gini coefficient, the extent of variance decline and the path of decline.
引文
①阿瑟·刘易斯：《发展计划》,北京经济学院出版社,1988年,第78页。
⑥目前研究可以归为内部因素的有效率差异(Katz,1986; Kruger&Summers,1988:Gera and Grenier,1994等)、租金分享(Freeman and Medoff,1981、 1984; Grey,1993等)、技术创新(Gatica&Mizala& Romaguera, 1995:Borjas and Ramey,2000等)
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[25]Goldfarb, Roberts and Anthony M. J. Yezer (1976), Evaluating Alternative Wage Theories of Intercity and interregional Wage Differentials, Journal of Regional Science,16,345-363.
(26]Creedy, J. and RE. Hart,1979, Age and the distribution of earnings, Economic Journal 89, 280-293
[27]Grey A. (1993), Interindustry Wage Differentials in Manufacturing:Rents and Industrial Structure, Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol.26,525-535.
[28]Harry C. Eastman,1954, the American Economic Review, Vol.44, No.3,369-376
[29]Heckman, J. (1974), Shadow prices, market wages and labor supply, Econometric a,42(4), 679-694.
[30]Heckman, J. (1979), Sample Selection Bias as A Specification Error, Econometrica,47,153-162.
[31]J.M. Cousineau and R. Lacroix (1983), Structural Effect and Regional Market Effect in Inter-Regional Wage Differentials:The Case of Toronto and Montreal, the Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol.16, No.4,655-668
[32]Joao Pereira, Aurora Galego(2007), Regional Wage Differentials:Static and Dynamic Approaches, CEFAGE-UE Working Paper, July.
[33]J. Osburn (2000), Interindustry wage differentials:patterns and possible sources, Monthly Labor Review,123,34-46.
[34]Juhn, Chinhui, Kevin M. Murphy, Brooks Pierce (1993), Wage Inequality and the Rise in Returns to Skill, Journal of Political Economy,101(3),410-442.
[35]Juhn C, Murphy K. and Pierce B. (1991), Accounting for the slowdown in the black-white wage convergence, in Kosters M. (Ed) Workers and their wages,107-43, AEI Press.
[36]Khor, Niny and John Pencavel,2006,1 ncome Mobi li t y of Individuals in China and The Uni ted States, Economics of Transition,14 (3)
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[42]Machado, J. And J. Mata,-2005, Counterfactual Decomposition of s in Wage Distributions Using Quantile Regression, Journal of Applied Economics,20,445-465.
[43]Machin, Stephen J. (1997):.The Decline of Labour Market Institutions and the Rise in Wage Inequality in Britain, European Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, vol.41,647-58.
[44]Matthews, R.C.O.,1986, the economics of institutions and the sources of economic-growth, Economic Journal,96 (December),903-918.
[45]McCall, J.J. (1973), Income Mobility, Racial Discrimination and Economic Growth. D.C. Heath, Lexington.
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[48]Ming Lu, Shiqing Jiang(2008), Labor Market Reform, Income inequality and Economic Growth in China, China&World Economy, Vol.16, No.6,63-80.
[49]Neuman, S. and R. Oaxaca,2003, Estimating Labor Market Discrimination with Selectivity-Corrected Wage Equations:Methodological Considerations and An Illustration from Israel", working paper.
[50]North, Douglas (1990):Institution, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press.
[51]Oaxaca, R.L. (1973), Male-female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets, International Economic Review,14,693-709.
[52]Oaxaca, R.L., Ransom, M.R. (1994), on discrimination and the decomposition of wage differentials, Journal of Econometrics 61,5-21.
[53]P.A. Edin and J. Zetterberg,1992, Interindustry wage differentials:Evidence from Sweden and a comparison with the United States. American Economic review,82,1341-1349.
[54]Pregibon D (1980), Goodness of Link tests for Generalized Linear Models, Applied Statistics, Vol.29,12-24.
[55]Richard B. Freeman,1996, the Minimum Wage as a Redistributive Tool, The Economic Journal, Vol.106, No.436 (May,1996), pp.639-649
[56]Roger, Koenker (2005), Quantile Regression., Cambridge University Press.
[57]Roback, Jennifer (1982), Wages, Rents, and the Quality of Life,the Journal of Political Economy, Vol.90, Issue 6,1257-1278.
[58]Robert J. Newman (1982), Dynamic Patterns in Regional Wage Differentials, Southern Economic Journal, Vol.49, No.1, pp.246-254
[59]Sara Lemos (2008), Minimum wage effects in a developing country, Labour Economics 16, 224-237
[60]Shorrocks, A.F. (1976), Income mobility and the Markov assumption, Economic Journal,86, 566-577.
[61]Sergio Firpo, Nicole M. Fortin, Thomas Lemieux (2007), Unconditional quantile Regressions, workingpaper
[62]Sergio Firpo, Nicole M. Fortin, Thomas Lemieux (2007), Decomposing Wage Distributions using Recentered Influence Function Regressions, workingpaper.
[63]Slichter (1950),Notes on the Structure of Wages, Review of Economics and Statistics, 32(Feb),80-91.
[64]Smith, Sharon P.,1977, Government Wage Differentials, Journal of Urban Economics,4,248-271.
[65]Stephen C. Farber and Robert J. Newman (1989), Regional Wage Differentials and the Spatial Convergence of Worker Characteristic Prices, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.71, No. 2,224-231.
[66]Stephen Machin (1997), the decline of labour market institutions and the rise in wage inequality in Britain, European Economic Review,41,647-657.
[67]Surendra Gera& Gilles Grenier (1994), Interindustry Wage Differentials and Efficiency Wages: Some Canadian Evidence, Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, 27(1),81-100.
{68] Up Lim, Sung Chul Cho (2009), the decomposition of regional wage differentials in Korea, Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
[69]Ugo Panizza& Christine Zhen-Wei Qiang (2005), Public-private wage differential and gender gap in Latin America:Spoiled bureaucrats and exploited women? The Journal of Socio-Economics, 34,810-833.
[70]van der Gaag,Jacques and Wim Vijverberg,1988,A Switching Regression Model for Wage Determinants in the Public and Private Sectors of a Developing Country,The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.70, No.2,244-252
[71]Wagstaff A, Van Doorslaer E, Paci P. (1991). On the measurement of horizontal inequity in the delivery of healthcare. Journal of Health Economics,10(2),169-205.
[72]Wagstaff A, Van Doorslaer E (1994), Measuring inequalities in health in the presence of multiple-category morbidity indicators. Health Econ,3(4),281-289.
[73]Zhang, Junsen, Yaohui Zhao, Albert Park, and Xiaoqing Song (2005),Economic Returns to Schooling in Urban China,1988 to 2001,Journal of Comparative Economics,33(4),730-752.
⑥目前研究可以归为内部因素的有效率差异(Katz,1986; Kruger&Summers,1988:Gera and Grenier,1994等)、租金分享(Freeman and Medoff,1981、 1984; Grey,1993等)、技术创新(Gatica&Mizala& Romaguera, 1995:Borjas and Ramey,2000等)
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