对价方式、溢价率与中长期业绩
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摘要
我国控制权转移活动是随着国有经济“国退民进、抓大放小”的改革和资本市场的建设而蓬勃兴起的。虽然控制权转移之类的并购活动吸引了众多学者,但是对于交易价格这个并购活动的核心内容来说却研究不多。本文着眼于对价方式的角度,剖析其对盈余管理的影响,并力图较为正确地评价对价方式对市场绩效是否存在改进作用。
本文的研究发现不同对价方式的盈余管理动机存在差异,有偿转让控制权的对价方式更易推动上市公司通过操控应计利润调低净资产,提高溢价率,以符合政策要求。动机的差异导致两种对价方式下上市公司的盈余管理程度并不相同。实证结果表明,在整体上无偿类样本相对于同行业公司没有明显的盈余管理,而有偿类样本则有明显通过线上项目调控应计利润的痕迹,即使控制了“洗大澡”等因素,对价方式对操控性应计利润的影响还是十分明显。
利用每股净资产和每股价格回归得到的系数,本文估算出名义溢价率和实际溢价率等数据,不仅证实了前述盈余管理的动机,而且发现调整盈余管理后的实际溢价率与市场溢价率接近。
本文还根据对价方式影响市场绩效两种途径将对价方式对市场绩效的影响分为前期影响和后期影响。如此明确划分对价方式的前期、后期影响,是为了防止企业将控制权转移前的业绩挪到控制权转移后,制造出业绩提高的假象。
实证结果表明对价方式的前期影响并不显著,对价方式的后期影响在控制权转移后的18个月内的确存在,说明有偿转让方式可以提高企业的中短期市场绩效,但中长期来看,对价方式的作用并不明显。
本文的贡献主要包括:注重对价方式样本选择的可比性;将盈余管理问题引入我国控制权转移的研究中;较为深入研究对价方式及市场绩效并估算出实际溢价率;利用较为准确的行业资料估算操控性应计利润,并采用更为严谨的自举法来检验市场绩效。
Control right transfer(CRT) has depeloped with the reform of the state economy and construction of the capital market. Althought these M&A activities have attractedmany researchers, few studies pay attention to the core issue------price. Therefore,this paper emphasizes on pricing mode, analysing its impact on earnings management and market performance.
The paper discovers that pricing mode has impact on the motivation of earnings management. CRTs with paperment often motivate listed companies to adjust DA, so as to make companies' equity seem low and premium rate seem high. This adjustment is made to meet the regulations concerning pricing for transfering stated-owned stock. Different motivations lead different amount of DA adjusted by listed companies. Empirical results show that overrall, CRTs without payment have no significant DA while CRTs with payment have significant DA even other factors such as "big bath" have controlled.
Utilizing the coefficients of the regression between equity per share and price per share, the paper estimates nominal premium rate and real premium rate. This procedure not only proves the existence of motivation to manage earnings, but also discovers real premium rate is quite the same as premium rate with little DA in the market.
Considering the different way that the pricing mode of CRTs has impact on market performance, the paper divides the influence of pricing mode into prophase part and anaphase part. This division is made for distinguishing fake account that defers recognizing perfomance before CRTs until CRTs are finished.
Empirical tests show no significance for prophase influence of the pricing mode. Meanwile, significant anaphase infuence of the pricing mode does exist during the 18 months after CRTs. That is, CRTs with payment can improve short- and medium-term market performance. However, pricing mode shows little significant influence on market performance.
The paper contributes in following aspects: paying attention to the comparability when choosing data; considering earnings management in the research on CRTs; conducting a thorough research on pricing mode and its influence on market performance; estimating real premium rate; calculating DA with accurate industrial data; using the precise method of bootstrapping to test market performance.
本文的研究发现不同对价方式的盈余管理动机存在差异,有偿转让控制权的对价方式更易推动上市公司通过操控应计利润调低净资产,提高溢价率,以符合政策要求。动机的差异导致两种对价方式下上市公司的盈余管理程度并不相同。实证结果表明,在整体上无偿类样本相对于同行业公司没有明显的盈余管理,而有偿类样本则有明显通过线上项目调控应计利润的痕迹,即使控制了“洗大澡”等因素,对价方式对操控性应计利润的影响还是十分明显。
利用每股净资产和每股价格回归得到的系数,本文估算出名义溢价率和实际溢价率等数据,不仅证实了前述盈余管理的动机,而且发现调整盈余管理后的实际溢价率与市场溢价率接近。
本文还根据对价方式影响市场绩效两种途径将对价方式对市场绩效的影响分为前期影响和后期影响。如此明确划分对价方式的前期、后期影响,是为了防止企业将控制权转移前的业绩挪到控制权转移后,制造出业绩提高的假象。
实证结果表明对价方式的前期影响并不显著,对价方式的后期影响在控制权转移后的18个月内的确存在,说明有偿转让方式可以提高企业的中短期市场绩效,但中长期来看,对价方式的作用并不明显。
本文的贡献主要包括:注重对价方式样本选择的可比性;将盈余管理问题引入我国控制权转移的研究中;较为深入研究对价方式及市场绩效并估算出实际溢价率;利用较为准确的行业资料估算操控性应计利润,并采用更为严谨的自举法来检验市场绩效。
Control right transfer(CRT) has depeloped with the reform of the state economy and construction of the capital market. Althought these M&A activities have attractedmany researchers, few studies pay attention to the core issue------price. Therefore,this paper emphasizes on pricing mode, analysing its impact on earnings management and market performance.
The paper discovers that pricing mode has impact on the motivation of earnings management. CRTs with paperment often motivate listed companies to adjust DA, so as to make companies' equity seem low and premium rate seem high. This adjustment is made to meet the regulations concerning pricing for transfering stated-owned stock. Different motivations lead different amount of DA adjusted by listed companies. Empirical results show that overrall, CRTs without payment have no significant DA while CRTs with payment have significant DA even other factors such as "big bath" have controlled.
Utilizing the coefficients of the regression between equity per share and price per share, the paper estimates nominal premium rate and real premium rate. This procedure not only proves the existence of motivation to manage earnings, but also discovers real premium rate is quite the same as premium rate with little DA in the market.
Considering the different way that the pricing mode of CRTs has impact on market performance, the paper divides the influence of pricing mode into prophase part and anaphase part. This division is made for distinguishing fake account that defers recognizing perfomance before CRTs until CRTs are finished.
Empirical tests show no significance for prophase influence of the pricing mode. Meanwile, significant anaphase infuence of the pricing mode does exist during the 18 months after CRTs. That is, CRTs with payment can improve short- and medium-term market performance. However, pricing mode shows little significant influence on market performance.
The paper contributes in following aspects: paying attention to the comparability when choosing data; considering earnings management in the research on CRTs; conducting a thorough research on pricing mode and its influence on market performance; estimating real premium rate; calculating DA with accurate industrial data; using the precise method of bootstrapping to test market performance.
引文
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[1]并购相关法规主要搜索于http://www.law-lib.com、http://www.qseek.net/law网站。
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