考虑交易者行为的双渠道供应链定价策略研究
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摘要
随着全球经济的增长和Internet技术的普及,电子商务在全球范围内正以前所未有的速度迅猛发展。电子商务不仅改变了人们的消费型态和购物模式,还扩展了企业的分销渠道。面对日益多变的市场需求环境,已很少有企业仅依靠采取单一的渠道策略制胜,电子渠道与传统渠道的组合运营模式即双渠道分销已成为企业必不可少的选择。双渠道供应链已得到广泛认同并正展现出其巨大的潜力,呈现出较为广阔的发展空间。因此,对双渠道供应链的企业运作策略进行研究,给企业提供深入理解双渠道本质和实施双渠道战略的指导性方法,具有重要的理论和现实意义。
论文考虑供应链交易者行为,从制造商和零售商合作及竞争行为、制造商和零售商信息分享行为、消费者策略行为以及消费者退货行为几个不同角度对双渠道的决策问题进行了研究,具体内容如下：
(1)在一对一的双渠道供应链环境下,对制造商和零售商的合作及竞争行为进行了研究,分别在不同行为下比较了一致定价和差异定价两种价格模式,分析了具有不同风险态度的制造商和零售商的最优决策,并给出了不同价格模式下制造商和零售商采取合作行为的边界条件,探讨了合作行为下的利润分配机制,指出采取差异定价时,直销渠道价格和零售渠道价格、两渠道的期望需求不受零售商和制造商是否合作的影响,只受到供应链双方风险规避度的影响,若制造商和零售商采取合作行为,零售商将获取较低批发价格；当两渠道采取一致定价时,消费者可以从风险中性的供应链成员的竞争行为中获取更多的社会福利；在一定条件下,制造商和零售商愿意采取合作行为,从而有效缓解渠道冲突。
(2)针对制造商和零售商的信息分享行为,构建了双渠道供应链制造商和零售商的两阶段博弈模型,其中供应链需求来源于各渠道的真实价格,分别探讨了集中供应链、分散供应链无信息分享、分散供应链信息分享三种情况下的最优决策。研究表明,制造商和零售商收益受其预测精度影响；由于供应链成员进行制造商Stackelberg博弈,不管制造商是否愿意主动分享信息,其预测信息都会被动分享。零售商对需求信息的预测总是基于信息分享的基础上,具有后动优势。零售商的信息分享行为取决于其信息价值,根据其信息价值,给出了零售商愿意分享其预测信息的边界条件。
(3)以消费者策略行为为出发点,把市场中的消费者分为短视性和策略性两种,分别在传统供应链和双渠道供应链的背景下分析两阶段动态定价策略,探讨策略行为对双渠道供应链各成员价格和期望收益的影响,并和市场消费者同为短视性或策略性的极端情况进行比较,研究指出：和传统供应链一样,双渠道供应链成员双方的价格策略也受到消费者类型和消费者群体的构成影响；但在一定条件下,策略性消费者的存在有利于双渠道下制造商和零售商利润的增加,这和传统供应链的研究结果不同。
(4)在零售渠道和直销渠道同时存在消费者退货行为的条件下,分别在单一零售渠道、单一直销渠道、双渠道下建立了博弈模型,分析了合作退货和返还制造商两种不同退货策略下定价决策的均衡及其成立条件,识别了消费者退货行为对供应链价格制定、渠道需求及成员利润的影响,并进一步通过数值计算进行了验证,发现当存在消费者退货时,双渠道供应链优于单一渠道情况；双渠道环境下,合作退货可获得较高的零售渠道销量,但较少的直销渠道销量；当直销渠道的消费者退货率大于零售渠道的消费者退货率时,相对于合作退货方式,返还制造商退货策略下产品零售价格较高,而直销渠道价格较低；合作退货下的供应链总体利润最大,即当存在消费者退货时,要想提高供应链的整体利润,供应链成员应紧密合作,制定合理的策略来共同处理消费者退货问题。
With the global economic growth and the popularity of the Internet technology, E-commerce is growing with unprecedented speed on a global scale. E-commerce has not only changed people's consumption patterns and shopping patterns, but also expanded the distribution channels. In the face of ever-changing market demand environment, few companies can only rely on a single channel to outmaneuver. A combination of the electronic channel and traditional channel, i.e. dual-channel distribution, has become an essential choice for enterprises. The dual-channel supply chain has been widely recognized and is showing its great potential and a broad space for development. Therefore, to provide in-depth understanding and implementation of dual-channel for enterprises, research on the dual-channel supply chain business operation strategies has important theoretical and practical significance.
This dissertation takes the behavior of traders into consideration and studies decision problem of dual-channel supply chain from several different perspectives, including cooperative and competitive behavior, information sharing behavior, customer strategy behavior and customer returns behavior. Specifically, the content can be abstracted as follows:
(1)Under one-to-one dual-channel supply chain environment, the cooperation and competition behavior of manufacturer and retailer are studied. Two mathematical models of consistent pricing and inconsistent pricing in different behavior are compared. After deriving the optimal decision of manufacturer and retailer with different risk attitudes, this dissertation presents the boundary conditions of manufacturer and retailer to adopt cooperative behavior under different pricing model. The profit distribution mechanism in cooperation behavior is analyzed. We find that in inconsistent pricing scheme, the optimal direct channel price, retail channel price and the expected demand of two channels are not influenced by cooperate and competition behaviors of retailer and manufacturer, but influenced by risk aversion of two parties. If the manufacturer and retailer adopt a cooperative behavior, retailer will get lower wholesale price. Consumers can get more social welfare from the competitive behavior of the risk-neutral members in consistent pricing scheme. Manufacturer and retailer are willing to adopt a cooperative behavior under certain conditions to mitigate channel conflict effectively.
(2)With respect to information-sharing behavior of manufacturer and retailer, a two-stage game model of the dual-channel supply chain is established, in which the demand is derived from the real price of each channel. The optimal pricing strategies of three cases--the centralized case, decentralized with and without information sharing cases were compared. The results show that the income of manufacturer and retailer are subject to the prediction accuracy. Due to the manufacturer Stackelberg game played between manufacturer and retailer, whether the manufacturer is willing to share information or not, the forecast information will be shared passively. With second-mover advantage, the retailer will always determine his forecast demand information based on information sharing. The information-sharing behavior of retailer depends on his information value. The boundary conditions are presented when the retailer is willing to share his information according to his information value.
(3)Taking the consumer strategy behavior into consideration, we divide the consumer market into two kinds:myopic and strategic. Two-stage pricing strategies are analyzed in the context of traditional supply chain and dual-channel supply chain. The impact of customer strategic behavior on price and expected profit are discussed. By compassion of the case with customer of the same type, we show that pricing strategy in dual channel is affected by consumer types and consumer groups, which is the same with traditional supply chain. But under certain conditions, manufacturer and retailer will better off in the presence of strategic consumers, which is different from the situation in traditional supply chain.
(4)When customer return behavior exists both in retail channel and direct channel, the game models in single retail channel, single direct channel and dual channel are constructed respectively. The price equilibriums and conditions in two different return policies (cooperative return and returning goods to manufacturer) were analyzed. The influence of customer return behavior on supply chain pricing, channel demand and profits are assessed and further verified by numerical calculation. Results show that when consumer returns exists, dual-channel supply chain do better than a single channel; in dual channel environment, cooperative return policy get a higher retail sales but less direct sales. When consumer return rate in direct channel is greater than the rate in retail channel, the retail channel price is higher and direct channel price is lower in manufacturer return policy compared with the case in cooperative return policy. Supply chain get more profit in cooperative return policy, namely, in order to increase the overall profits of the supply chain, supply chain members must work closely to develop a reasonable strategy to deal with the consumer return problem.
论文考虑供应链交易者行为,从制造商和零售商合作及竞争行为、制造商和零售商信息分享行为、消费者策略行为以及消费者退货行为几个不同角度对双渠道的决策问题进行了研究,具体内容如下：
(1)在一对一的双渠道供应链环境下,对制造商和零售商的合作及竞争行为进行了研究,分别在不同行为下比较了一致定价和差异定价两种价格模式,分析了具有不同风险态度的制造商和零售商的最优决策,并给出了不同价格模式下制造商和零售商采取合作行为的边界条件,探讨了合作行为下的利润分配机制,指出采取差异定价时,直销渠道价格和零售渠道价格、两渠道的期望需求不受零售商和制造商是否合作的影响,只受到供应链双方风险规避度的影响,若制造商和零售商采取合作行为,零售商将获取较低批发价格；当两渠道采取一致定价时,消费者可以从风险中性的供应链成员的竞争行为中获取更多的社会福利；在一定条件下,制造商和零售商愿意采取合作行为,从而有效缓解渠道冲突。
(2)针对制造商和零售商的信息分享行为,构建了双渠道供应链制造商和零售商的两阶段博弈模型,其中供应链需求来源于各渠道的真实价格,分别探讨了集中供应链、分散供应链无信息分享、分散供应链信息分享三种情况下的最优决策。研究表明,制造商和零售商收益受其预测精度影响；由于供应链成员进行制造商Stackelberg博弈,不管制造商是否愿意主动分享信息,其预测信息都会被动分享。零售商对需求信息的预测总是基于信息分享的基础上,具有后动优势。零售商的信息分享行为取决于其信息价值,根据其信息价值,给出了零售商愿意分享其预测信息的边界条件。
(3)以消费者策略行为为出发点,把市场中的消费者分为短视性和策略性两种,分别在传统供应链和双渠道供应链的背景下分析两阶段动态定价策略,探讨策略行为对双渠道供应链各成员价格和期望收益的影响,并和市场消费者同为短视性或策略性的极端情况进行比较,研究指出：和传统供应链一样,双渠道供应链成员双方的价格策略也受到消费者类型和消费者群体的构成影响；但在一定条件下,策略性消费者的存在有利于双渠道下制造商和零售商利润的增加,这和传统供应链的研究结果不同。
(4)在零售渠道和直销渠道同时存在消费者退货行为的条件下,分别在单一零售渠道、单一直销渠道、双渠道下建立了博弈模型,分析了合作退货和返还制造商两种不同退货策略下定价决策的均衡及其成立条件,识别了消费者退货行为对供应链价格制定、渠道需求及成员利润的影响,并进一步通过数值计算进行了验证,发现当存在消费者退货时,双渠道供应链优于单一渠道情况；双渠道环境下,合作退货可获得较高的零售渠道销量,但较少的直销渠道销量；当直销渠道的消费者退货率大于零售渠道的消费者退货率时,相对于合作退货方式,返还制造商退货策略下产品零售价格较高,而直销渠道价格较低；合作退货下的供应链总体利润最大,即当存在消费者退货时,要想提高供应链的整体利润,供应链成员应紧密合作,制定合理的策略来共同处理消费者退货问题。
With the global economic growth and the popularity of the Internet technology, E-commerce is growing with unprecedented speed on a global scale. E-commerce has not only changed people's consumption patterns and shopping patterns, but also expanded the distribution channels. In the face of ever-changing market demand environment, few companies can only rely on a single channel to outmaneuver. A combination of the electronic channel and traditional channel, i.e. dual-channel distribution, has become an essential choice for enterprises. The dual-channel supply chain has been widely recognized and is showing its great potential and a broad space for development. Therefore, to provide in-depth understanding and implementation of dual-channel for enterprises, research on the dual-channel supply chain business operation strategies has important theoretical and practical significance.
This dissertation takes the behavior of traders into consideration and studies decision problem of dual-channel supply chain from several different perspectives, including cooperative and competitive behavior, information sharing behavior, customer strategy behavior and customer returns behavior. Specifically, the content can be abstracted as follows:
(1)Under one-to-one dual-channel supply chain environment, the cooperation and competition behavior of manufacturer and retailer are studied. Two mathematical models of consistent pricing and inconsistent pricing in different behavior are compared. After deriving the optimal decision of manufacturer and retailer with different risk attitudes, this dissertation presents the boundary conditions of manufacturer and retailer to adopt cooperative behavior under different pricing model. The profit distribution mechanism in cooperation behavior is analyzed. We find that in inconsistent pricing scheme, the optimal direct channel price, retail channel price and the expected demand of two channels are not influenced by cooperate and competition behaviors of retailer and manufacturer, but influenced by risk aversion of two parties. If the manufacturer and retailer adopt a cooperative behavior, retailer will get lower wholesale price. Consumers can get more social welfare from the competitive behavior of the risk-neutral members in consistent pricing scheme. Manufacturer and retailer are willing to adopt a cooperative behavior under certain conditions to mitigate channel conflict effectively.
(2)With respect to information-sharing behavior of manufacturer and retailer, a two-stage game model of the dual-channel supply chain is established, in which the demand is derived from the real price of each channel. The optimal pricing strategies of three cases--the centralized case, decentralized with and without information sharing cases were compared. The results show that the income of manufacturer and retailer are subject to the prediction accuracy. Due to the manufacturer Stackelberg game played between manufacturer and retailer, whether the manufacturer is willing to share information or not, the forecast information will be shared passively. With second-mover advantage, the retailer will always determine his forecast demand information based on information sharing. The information-sharing behavior of retailer depends on his information value. The boundary conditions are presented when the retailer is willing to share his information according to his information value.
(3)Taking the consumer strategy behavior into consideration, we divide the consumer market into two kinds:myopic and strategic. Two-stage pricing strategies are analyzed in the context of traditional supply chain and dual-channel supply chain. The impact of customer strategic behavior on price and expected profit are discussed. By compassion of the case with customer of the same type, we show that pricing strategy in dual channel is affected by consumer types and consumer groups, which is the same with traditional supply chain. But under certain conditions, manufacturer and retailer will better off in the presence of strategic consumers, which is different from the situation in traditional supply chain.
(4)When customer return behavior exists both in retail channel and direct channel, the game models in single retail channel, single direct channel and dual channel are constructed respectively. The price equilibriums and conditions in two different return policies (cooperative return and returning goods to manufacturer) were analyzed. The influence of customer return behavior on supply chain pricing, channel demand and profits are assessed and further verified by numerical calculation. Results show that when consumer returns exists, dual-channel supply chain do better than a single channel; in dual channel environment, cooperative return policy get a higher retail sales but less direct sales. When consumer return rate in direct channel is greater than the rate in retail channel, the retail channel price is higher and direct channel price is lower in manufacturer return policy compared with the case in cooperative return policy. Supply chain get more profit in cooperative return policy, namely, in order to increase the overall profits of the supply chain, supply chain members must work closely to develop a reasonable strategy to deal with the consumer return problem.
引文
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