中国管理层收购市场及其环境研究
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摘要
自20世纪70年代美国上市公司私有化和杠杆收购相结合而产生了特殊的管理层收购方式以来,管理层收购已经走过了30余年的发展历程。由于它在激励内部人积极性、降低代理成本、改善企业经营状况方面具有积极作用,因而目前它已经成为一个全球性的经济现象,从早期的边缘性收购方式成为当今西方国家主流的收购方式之一,为这些国家改善企业经营管理,提高资源配置效率,促进社会生产力的发展,增加全民福利发挥了重要作用。
我国目前还有三十七万多亿的国有资产,这些国有资产无论是从经济效益与效率,还是从社会效益来看,都仍然不如民营企业。大量的国有企业的存在,造成了整个经济的体制性无效率。因此将绝大多数国有企业改造成为一般竞争性企业应是我国市场化导向的经济体制改革的长期目标和战略任务。目前所倡导的国有企业股份制改革虽然取得了一定的成果,但仍然存在很多问题,经济绩效并没有显著改善。根源在于国有企业的改革不彻底,国家继续在股份公司中占有大股份,对企业的生产和经营进行干预和控制。因此从长期来看,非关系国计民生的国有企业的最终改革方向应是国家退出大股东地位,尤其是处在竞争领域的国有企业。而管理层收购,无论是从西方的理论和实证研究来看,都是国有企业深化改革的较好方式。
本文收集整理了1997-2008年10余年来我国上市公司管理层收购的全部案例,并在这些案例的基础上,对我国上市公司管理层收购的财富效应进行了实证研究。相比于同类研究,本文通过增加样本容量、扩大样本期间、拓宽业绩指标的覆盖面等途径,采用因子分析法与方差检验法,对我国上市公司管理层收购的财富效应进行了全面的分析,包括股权出让方的财富效应,流通股股东的短期和长期财富效应等。本文的实证研究结果表明,已有上市公司的管理层收购,每股收购价格并不显著低于每股净资产。因而如果说国有企业在管理层收购过程中存在国有资产流失,那么流失并不发生在定价过程中,而是发生在价款支付过程中以及地方政府为了防止失业而给予管理层收购价格折扣方面,该结论显著不同于以往国有资产定价过低导致国有资产流失的流行结论。本文的实证研究还表明,我国已有上市公司的管理层收购没有产生财富效应。根本原因在于我国管理层收购的市场环境不成熟,使得管理层收购财富效应的两个重要来源：降低代理成本和产生节税效应都不能发挥作用。但鉴于管理层收购在明晰国有企业产权、深化国有企业改革,推动我国经济结构调整等方面的重要作用,我国应努力加强管理层收购的市场环境建设,目前因噎废食的做法是错误的。
自2005年全面停止大型国有及国有控股企业和上市公司的管理层收购后,经过6年的发展,我国管理层收购的市场环境日趋成熟,影响管理层收购效益发挥的因素日渐消除,尤其是在管理层收购的法律规范和并购融资制度建设方面取得许多重大突破,因而我国应逐步放开国有大型企业和上市公司国有股权禁止向管理层转让的暂行规定,尤其是处于竞争领域的,非关系国计民生行业的国有企业,让各类主体在国有股权转让中平等竞买,使管理层收购这种西方主流的收购方式在我国国有企业的深化改革中发挥积极作用,为我国经济的可持续发展作出贡献。
Since the emerging of MBO which is a special type of acquisition combining the privatization of listed companies and leverged buyouts in 1970s, it has been developed for more than 30 years. At present it has become the leading acquisition method in western countries for it has many positive effects, such as instigating the managers, reducing the agent cost, improving the enterprise operation and so on. MBO has played an important role in improving these countries'enterprise management, enhancing the efficiency of resource allocation, developing the social production and increasing the people's welfare.
Untill now our country still has more than 37 trillion state-owned assets, the economic effect and efficiency of these assets are relatively lower than those of private enterprises' assets. It leads to systemic economic inefficiency for so many SOEs exist. So it will be a long object and strategic task for our country market reform to make most of SOEs become common competitive enterprises. Although the existing stockholding system reform has made some achievements, there are still a lot of problems existed, especially the economic performance of SOEs has not been improved obviously. The basic reason is that the reform is not complete and the country still has the largest stock in listed companies, intervenes and controls the companies'operation. On long terms, the final direction for SOEs'reform should be privatization—the country withdraws from the majority shareholder status, especially for the SOEs in competitive Industry which is not important for the national economy and people's livelihood. MBO is a good method for SOEs'deep reform regardess of theoretical or empirical analysis in western countries.
This paper collects all MBO cases on Chinese listed companies from 1997 to 2008. Based on these cases, the paper makes empirical research on MBO's wealth effects. Compared with other researches, this paper enlarges sample size, expands the time period, broadens the measearing indexes for performance, uses the principal factor analysis and variance test. This paper makes a complete analysis on MBO's wealth effect, including wealth effects for stock grantor, the short and long wealth effects for circulation share holders. The paper shows that the purchasing price for a stock is not significantly lower than net assets per share. So if loss of state assets exists in MBO, the loss doesn't occur in the process of pricing, but in the process of payment and in the price rebate that the local government allows to the manager in order to prevent workers' unemployment. This conclusion is remarkably different from the former viewpoint that the low price causes the loss of state assets. This paper also shows that the existing MBOs for listed companies in china don't have wealth effects, the cause lies in the fact that the market environment for MBO is not mature. So the two main sources including reducing the agent cost and saving tax for MBO wealth effects do not play their roles. But MBO has important roles on clarifying state-owned property rights, deepening the reform to state-owned enterprises and adjusting the economical structure, we should strengthen to build up the market environment for MBO, and the practice to stop the MBOs in large-scaled SOEs and listed companies is completely wrong if we refuse to do what one should for fear of running a risk.
After the cease to large-scaled state-owned enterprise's MBO and listed companies' MBO from 2005,6 years have passed, the market environment for MBO is becoming more and more mature, and the factors which influence MBO wealth effects are eliminating day by day, especially we have made significant breakthroughs in legal norm and financing system for MBO, so we should release the rigid restrictions on MBOs to large scaled SOEs and listed companies gradually, especially the SOEs, make this mainstream acquisition method play a positive role in SOEs'deep reform and do a service for our country economy's sustainable development.
我国目前还有三十七万多亿的国有资产,这些国有资产无论是从经济效益与效率,还是从社会效益来看,都仍然不如民营企业。大量的国有企业的存在,造成了整个经济的体制性无效率。因此将绝大多数国有企业改造成为一般竞争性企业应是我国市场化导向的经济体制改革的长期目标和战略任务。目前所倡导的国有企业股份制改革虽然取得了一定的成果,但仍然存在很多问题,经济绩效并没有显著改善。根源在于国有企业的改革不彻底,国家继续在股份公司中占有大股份,对企业的生产和经营进行干预和控制。因此从长期来看,非关系国计民生的国有企业的最终改革方向应是国家退出大股东地位,尤其是处在竞争领域的国有企业。而管理层收购,无论是从西方的理论和实证研究来看,都是国有企业深化改革的较好方式。
本文收集整理了1997-2008年10余年来我国上市公司管理层收购的全部案例,并在这些案例的基础上,对我国上市公司管理层收购的财富效应进行了实证研究。相比于同类研究,本文通过增加样本容量、扩大样本期间、拓宽业绩指标的覆盖面等途径,采用因子分析法与方差检验法,对我国上市公司管理层收购的财富效应进行了全面的分析,包括股权出让方的财富效应,流通股股东的短期和长期财富效应等。本文的实证研究结果表明,已有上市公司的管理层收购,每股收购价格并不显著低于每股净资产。因而如果说国有企业在管理层收购过程中存在国有资产流失,那么流失并不发生在定价过程中,而是发生在价款支付过程中以及地方政府为了防止失业而给予管理层收购价格折扣方面,该结论显著不同于以往国有资产定价过低导致国有资产流失的流行结论。本文的实证研究还表明,我国已有上市公司的管理层收购没有产生财富效应。根本原因在于我国管理层收购的市场环境不成熟,使得管理层收购财富效应的两个重要来源：降低代理成本和产生节税效应都不能发挥作用。但鉴于管理层收购在明晰国有企业产权、深化国有企业改革,推动我国经济结构调整等方面的重要作用,我国应努力加强管理层收购的市场环境建设,目前因噎废食的做法是错误的。
自2005年全面停止大型国有及国有控股企业和上市公司的管理层收购后,经过6年的发展,我国管理层收购的市场环境日趋成熟,影响管理层收购效益发挥的因素日渐消除,尤其是在管理层收购的法律规范和并购融资制度建设方面取得许多重大突破,因而我国应逐步放开国有大型企业和上市公司国有股权禁止向管理层转让的暂行规定,尤其是处于竞争领域的,非关系国计民生行业的国有企业,让各类主体在国有股权转让中平等竞买,使管理层收购这种西方主流的收购方式在我国国有企业的深化改革中发挥积极作用,为我国经济的可持续发展作出贡献。
Since the emerging of MBO which is a special type of acquisition combining the privatization of listed companies and leverged buyouts in 1970s, it has been developed for more than 30 years. At present it has become the leading acquisition method in western countries for it has many positive effects, such as instigating the managers, reducing the agent cost, improving the enterprise operation and so on. MBO has played an important role in improving these countries'enterprise management, enhancing the efficiency of resource allocation, developing the social production and increasing the people's welfare.
Untill now our country still has more than 37 trillion state-owned assets, the economic effect and efficiency of these assets are relatively lower than those of private enterprises' assets. It leads to systemic economic inefficiency for so many SOEs exist. So it will be a long object and strategic task for our country market reform to make most of SOEs become common competitive enterprises. Although the existing stockholding system reform has made some achievements, there are still a lot of problems existed, especially the economic performance of SOEs has not been improved obviously. The basic reason is that the reform is not complete and the country still has the largest stock in listed companies, intervenes and controls the companies'operation. On long terms, the final direction for SOEs'reform should be privatization—the country withdraws from the majority shareholder status, especially for the SOEs in competitive Industry which is not important for the national economy and people's livelihood. MBO is a good method for SOEs'deep reform regardess of theoretical or empirical analysis in western countries.
This paper collects all MBO cases on Chinese listed companies from 1997 to 2008. Based on these cases, the paper makes empirical research on MBO's wealth effects. Compared with other researches, this paper enlarges sample size, expands the time period, broadens the measearing indexes for performance, uses the principal factor analysis and variance test. This paper makes a complete analysis on MBO's wealth effect, including wealth effects for stock grantor, the short and long wealth effects for circulation share holders. The paper shows that the purchasing price for a stock is not significantly lower than net assets per share. So if loss of state assets exists in MBO, the loss doesn't occur in the process of pricing, but in the process of payment and in the price rebate that the local government allows to the manager in order to prevent workers' unemployment. This conclusion is remarkably different from the former viewpoint that the low price causes the loss of state assets. This paper also shows that the existing MBOs for listed companies in china don't have wealth effects, the cause lies in the fact that the market environment for MBO is not mature. So the two main sources including reducing the agent cost and saving tax for MBO wealth effects do not play their roles. But MBO has important roles on clarifying state-owned property rights, deepening the reform to state-owned enterprises and adjusting the economical structure, we should strengthen to build up the market environment for MBO, and the practice to stop the MBOs in large-scaled SOEs and listed companies is completely wrong if we refuse to do what one should for fear of running a risk.
After the cease to large-scaled state-owned enterprise's MBO and listed companies' MBO from 2005,6 years have passed, the market environment for MBO is becoming more and more mature, and the factors which influence MBO wealth effects are eliminating day by day, especially we have made significant breakthroughs in legal norm and financing system for MBO, so we should release the rigid restrictions on MBOs to large scaled SOEs and listed companies gradually, especially the SOEs, make this mainstream acquisition method play a positive role in SOEs'deep reform and do a service for our country economy's sustainable development.
引文
14 Tim C.Opler, "Operating performance in Leveraged Buyouts:Evidence from 1985-1989", Readings in Mergers and Acquisitions, pp.76-86.
15 Smart and Waldfogel, OP. Cit.; Smith, op. cit.;Kaplan, op. cit.; Bull, op.cit.
16 Smith, op.cit.
17周叔莲.20年中国国有企业改革经验的理论分析[J].中国社会科学院研究生院学报,2000年第3期.
30根据《股权风云-中国上市公司管理层收购案例全集(1997-2008)》计算而得。
34刘志云。《企业国有产权向管理层转让暂行规定》评析,中国并购法报告,2006
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