基于损失厌恶的企业和供应链订货定价决策与激励研究
摘要
传统供应链管理研究主要基于损失中性假设基础上,也就是决策者对损失不存在任何偏好。然而,现实生活中,企业与顾客都有可能存在损失厌恶,并且,由于损失厌恶导致供应链成员之间的关系发生了变化,相互之间博弈行为发生重大调整,供应链协调与激励策略有很大不同。所以,损失厌恶对企业决策行为和供应链契约的影响引起了学术界的广泛关注。本文运用前景理论中的损失厌恶模型刻画决策者的损失厌恶特征,运用定量分析与定性分析相结合的方法,研究了企业和供应链的订货定价策略与激励问题,并通过算例分析进行验证。论文的主要研究内容及研究成果如下：
1)基于损失厌恶背景研究企业的订货定价决策与激励问题。首先,对损失厌恶零售商与损失中性零售商的订货决策进行比较研究。发现两者订货存在相同之处与不同之处,不同之处在于：损失厌恶零售商的订货量随着零售价格和采购价格的增大可能增大,也可能减小；而损失中性零售商的订货量随着零售价格的增大而增大,随着采购价格的增大而减小。这表明损失厌恶对零售商的订货决策产生重要影响。其次,以损失厌恶顾客为背景,研究损失中性零售商订货定价决策与激励问题,研究表明：顾客损失厌恶导致零售商减少订货和降低价格,给零售商绩效带来不利影响；补偿契约能够增加零售商绩效,同时,当补偿额在一定范围内时,也能够增加顾客效用,实现企业和顾客双赢；顾客损失厌恶程度越大,补偿契约弱化顾客损失厌恶对零售商与顾客的不利影响越明显。最后,延伸至损失厌恶零售商面对损失厌恶顾客情形,发现在无补偿契约情形下,顾客损失厌恶给顾客绩效带来不利影响,但是,在有补偿契约情形下,顾客损失厌恶可能给顾客绩效带来有利影响；当补偿额在一个更小的范围内,也能够实现企业和顾客双赢。
2)基于损失厌恶背景研究供应链的订货定价决策与激励问题。首先,研究损失厌恶零售商与损失中性制造商的订货定价决策与激励问题,结果表明：零售商损失厌恶导致制造商降低价格、零售商减少订货,并给制造商和零售商的绩效带来不利影响；同时,回购契约促使制造商提高价格,零售商增加订货,当回购价格小于一定范围内时,制造商和零售商的绩效得到改善,回购契约能够发挥激励作用；并且零售商损失厌恶程度越大,回购契约弱化损失厌恶对零售商的不利影响越明显。然后,研究损失厌恶零售商与损失厌恶制造商的订货定价决策与激励问题,发现当回购价格在一个更小的范围内时,回购契约才可能发挥激励作用；并且零售商损失厌恶程度越大,回购契约弱化零售商损失厌恶对零售商的不利影响逐渐减弱。
3)基于损失厌恶信息不对称研究企业和供应链的订货定价决策与激励问题。首先,以顾客的损失厌恶信息不对称为背景,研究损失中性零售商订货定价决策与激励问题。结果表明：与信息对称相比较,零售商低估顾客的损失厌恶程度导致零售商提高价格和增加订货,但是顾客效用和需求量减小,无论零售商低估或者高估顾客的损失厌恶程度,零售商的利润都将减小；当零售商低估顾客的损失厌恶程度时,补偿契约能够发挥激励作用,但是,当零售商高估顾客的损失厌恶程度大于一定范围时,补偿契约导致顾客效用下降,此时,补偿契约不能发挥激励作用；且在补偿契约情形下,补偿金额越大,损失厌恶信息对零售商和顾客的绩效影响越小。然后,以零售商的损失厌恶信息不对称为背景,研究损失厌恶零售商与损失中性制造商订货定价决策与激励问题。研究表明：与信息对称相比较,制造商低估零售商的损失厌恶程度导致制造商提高价格、零售商减少订货、零售商效用和供应链效用下降,无论制造商低估或者高估零售商的损失厌恶程度都会导致制造商利润下降；当回购价格在一定范围内时,回购契约提高了制造商、零售商和供应链的绩效,因此,回购契约能够发挥激励作用；在回购契约情形下,制造商高估零售商损失厌恶程度能够提高零售商和制造商的绩效,且回购价格越大,损失厌恶信息对零售商绩效的影响越大。
4)基于攀比心态损益参照点研究企业和供应链的订货定价决策与激励问题。首先,考虑损失厌恶顾客具有攀比心态,研究损失中性零售商订货定价决策与激励问题。结果表明：攀比心态导致零售商降低价格、减少订货量,零售商和顾客绩效下降；补偿契约能够提高价格、增加订货量；当补偿额在一定范围内时,补偿契约能够发挥激励作用,但是,当补偿额大于一定范围时,补偿契约导致顾客效用下降,此时,补偿契约不能够发挥激励作用。然后,考虑损失厌恶零售商具有攀比心态,研究零售商与损失中性制造商订货定价决策与激励问题。研究表明：攀比心态导致制造商降低价格、零售商减少订货、制造商、零售商和供应链绩效下降；当回购价格小于一定范围内时,回购契约能够提高价格、增加订货量、制造商、零售商和供应链绩效得到改善,此时,回购契约能够发挥激励作用。
论文的创新点主要表现在以下四个方面：
1)将损失厌恶和损失中性企业的订货决策进行比较。不仅从理论上证明了损失中性企业的订货量随着零售价格的增大而增大,随着采购价格的增大而减小；损失厌恶企业的订货量随着零售价格和采购价格的增大而可能增大,也可能减小；而且还通过算例仿真验证了该结论的正确性。
2)以损失厌恶顾客作为新的研究视角,分析顾客损失厌恶对企业决策行为的影响,以及企业制定的补偿契约对企业和顾客的激励问题。发现顾客损失厌恶导致企业减少订货和降低价格,并给零售商绩效带来不利影响；但是,如果补偿额在一定范围内,补偿契约能够发挥激励作用。
3)以损失厌恶信息非对称为背景,分析损失厌恶信息对企业决策行为的影响,以及契约对企业和供应链的激励问题。研究表明：当顾客损失厌恶信息非对称时,企业低估顾客的损失厌恶程度导致企业提高价格、增加订货、以及顾客效用下降,无论企业低估或者高估顾客的损失厌恶程度都会导致企业利润下降；补偿契约在企业低估顾客的损失厌恶程度情形下能够发挥激励作用。当零售商损失厌恶信息非对称时,制造商低估零售商的损失厌恶程度导致制造商提高价格、零售商减少订货、零售商效用和供应链效用下降,无论制造商低估或者高估零售商的损失厌恶程度都会导致制造商利润下降；同时,当回购价格在一定范围内时,回购契约能够发挥激励作用。
4)将攀比心态引入损失厌恶参照点,研究人们的攀比心态对企业决策行为的影响,以及契约对企业和供应链的激励问题。结果表明：当损失厌恶顾客具有攀比心态时,攀比心态导致企业降低价格、减少订货,企业和顾客绩效下降；如果补偿额在一定范围内,补偿契约能够发挥激励作用。当损失厌恶零售商具有攀比心态时,攀比心态导致制造商降低价格、零售商减少订货、制造商、零售商和供应链绩效下降；同时,当回购价格小于一定范围内时,回购契约能够发挥激励作用。
Traditional research on management of supply chain is mainly based on loss-neutral, that is, the decision-maker has not any preferences to loss. However, in reality, enterprise and customer may be have loss-averse attitude, moreover, the relationships of supply chain members and game behaviors are changed by loss-aversion, coordination and incentive strategies of supply chain are quite different. so, influence on decision-making of enterprise and contracts of supply chain by loss-aversion have been cared by academic field. in this paper, the loss-averse model is established to depict loss-averse characteristics of decision-maker based on prospect theory, using methods of quantitative and qualitative analysis, study ordering and pricing strategies of enterprise and incentive issue of supply chain, verified by the analysis of numerical example. The main research contents and results are as follows:
1) Study ordering and pricing decisions of enterprise and incentive problem based on loss aversion. first of all, compare the order decisions of loss-averse retailer with loss-neutral retailer. find the common and difference between them, the difference is that loss-averse retailer's order quantity increases or decreases with retail price, purchase price increasing; and loss-neutral retailer's order quantity increases with retail price increasing, and decreases with purchase price increasing, which indicates that loss aversion has important effect on order decision-making. second, loss-averse customer is considered, study loss-neutral retailer's ordering and pricing decisions and incentive problem, results show that customer's loss aversion reduces order and price of retailer, detrimental to retailer's performance; compensation contract can increase retailer's performance, meanwhile, when the compensation amounts constrict to a certain range, compensation contract can increase customer's utility, win-win between retailer with customer may be realized; customer's loss aversion is greater, compensation contract has more obvious to weaken adverse impact on customer and retailer by loss aversion. finally, the situation of loss-averse retailer facing loss-averse customer is considered, results show that customer's loss aversion brings adverse effect to customer's performance with non-compensation contract, but bring beneficial effect to customer's performance with compensation contract; win-win is also realized when compensation amount is in the smaller range.
2) Study ordering, pricing decisions and incentive problem of supply chain based on loss aversion. first of all, ordering, pricing decisions and incentive problem between loss-averse retailer with loss-neutral manufacturer is considered, results show that retailer's loss aversion makes manufacturer reduce price, retailer reduce order, and brings detrimental effect to performances of manufacturer and retailer; meanwhile, buyback contract makes manufacturer raise price, retailer increase order, when buyback price is less than certain range, performances of manufacturer and retailer are improved, buyback contract can play incentive effect; loss-averse degree is greater, buyback contract has more obvious to weaken adverse effect on retailer by loss aversion. then, ordering, pricing decisions and incentive problem between loss-averse retailer with loss-averse manufacturer is considered, results show that buyback contract can play incentive effect when buyback price is less than smaller range, retailer's loss-averse degree is greater, buyback contract decreases to weaken adverse impact on retailer by loss aversion.
3) Research ordering, pricing decisions of enterprise and incentive problem of supply chain under the background of asymmetric loss-averse information. first, asymmetric loss-averse information of customer is considered, study ordering, pricing decisions and incentive problem of loss-neutral retailer. results show that compared with the symmetric information, if retailer underestimates loss-averse degree of customer, which leads retailer to raise price and increase order, but decreases demand and customer's utility, whether retailer underestimates or overestimates customer's loss-averse degree, retailer's profit would be reduced; when retailer underestimates loss-averse degree of customer, compensation contract can play incentive effect, but, when retailer overestimates customer's loss aversion to the greater extent, compensation contract decreases customer's utility, at this time, compensation contract cannot play incentive effect; and in compensation contract situation, compensation amount is the greater, loss-averse information has little influence on performances of retailer and customer. Then, asymmetric loss-averse information of retailer is considered, study ordering, pricing decisions and incentive problem between loss-averse retailer with loss-neutral manufacturer. results show that compared with symmetric information, manufacturer raises price, retailer reduces order, utilities of retailer and supply chain are decreased when manufacturer underestimates retailer's loss-aversion, whether manufacturer underestimates or overestimates loss-averse degree of retailer, which leads manufacturer's profit to decline; when buyback price is less than certain range, performances of manufacturer, retailer and supply chain are improved by buyback contract, therefore, buyback contract can play incentive effect; in the buyback contract situation, performances of retailer and manufacturer can be improved when manufacturer overestimates retailer's loss-aversion, and buyback price is the greater, loss-averse information has more influence on retailer's performance.
4) Take comparative mentality into reference point of loss-aversion, study ordering, pricing decisions of enterprise and incentive problem of supply chain. first, take comparative mentality into loss-averse customer, research ordering, pricing decisions and incentive problem of loss-neutral retailer. results show that retailer decreases price, reduces order, performances of retailer and customer are decreased by comparative mentality; compensation contract can raise price and order; compensation contract can play incentive effect when compensation amount is in certain range, but customer's utility is decreased when compensation amounts extend certain range, at this time, compensation contract cannot play incentive effect. then, comparative mentality is considered into loss-averse retailer, research ordering, pricing decisions and incentive problem between retailer with loss-neutral manufacturer. results show that manufacturer reduces price, retailer reduces order, performances of manufacturer, retailer and supply chain are decreased by comparative mentality; when buyback price is less than certain range, buyback contract can raise price, increase order, improve performances of manufacturer, retailer and supply chain, so, buyback contract can play incentive effect.
In this dissertation, some innovations are made in the following four aspects:
1) Compare the order policies between loss-averse retailer with loss-neutral retailer. theoretically prove that loss-neutral retailer's order increases with retail price increasing, decreases with purchase price increasing; but, loss-averse retailer's order may be increase or decrease with retail price and purchase price increasing, and verify the correctness of conclusions by simulation.
2) Loss-averse customer is considered as new perspective, study influence on decision-making behavior of enterprise by customer's loss-aversion, and incentive problem of enterprise and customer by compensation contract. find that customer's loss-aversion leads enterprise to reduce order and price, brings detrimental effect to retailer's performance; however, compensation contract can play incentive effect if compensation amount is in certain range.
3) Asymmetric information of loss-aversion is considered, research effect on decision-making of enterprise by loss-averse information, and incentive problem of enterprise and supply chain by contract. results show that when asymmetric loss-averse information of customer is considered, if enterprise underestimates customer's loss-aversion, which leads enterprise to raise price and order, decreases customer's utility, whether enterprise underestimates or overestimates customer's loss-aversion, which would make enterprise's profit decrease; compensation contract can play incentive effect when enterprise underestimates customer's loss-aversion, when retailer's loss-aversion information is asymmetric, manufacturer raises price, retailer reduces order, utilities of retailer and supply chain are decreased when manufacturer underestimates retailer's loss-aversion, whether manufacturer underestimates or overestimates retailer's loss-aversion, which would decrease manufacturer's profit; meanwhile, when buyback price is less than certain range, buyback contract can play incentive effect.
4) Take comparative mentality into reference point of loss-aversion, study influence on decision-making behavior of enterprise by comparative mentality, and incentive issue of enterprise and supply chain by contract. results show that when comparative mentality is considered into loss-averse customer, comparative mentality leads enterprise to reduce price and order, performances of enterprise and customer are decreased; if compensation amount is in certain range, compensation contract can play incentive effect. when comparative mentality is considered into loss-averse retailer, comparative mentality leads manufacturer to reduce price, brings retailer to decrease order, performances of manufacturer, retailer and supply chain are decreased; meanwhile, when buyback price is less than certain range, buyback contract can play incentive effect.
1)基于损失厌恶背景研究企业的订货定价决策与激励问题。首先,对损失厌恶零售商与损失中性零售商的订货决策进行比较研究。发现两者订货存在相同之处与不同之处,不同之处在于：损失厌恶零售商的订货量随着零售价格和采购价格的增大可能增大,也可能减小；而损失中性零售商的订货量随着零售价格的增大而增大,随着采购价格的增大而减小。这表明损失厌恶对零售商的订货决策产生重要影响。其次,以损失厌恶顾客为背景,研究损失中性零售商订货定价决策与激励问题,研究表明：顾客损失厌恶导致零售商减少订货和降低价格,给零售商绩效带来不利影响；补偿契约能够增加零售商绩效,同时,当补偿额在一定范围内时,也能够增加顾客效用,实现企业和顾客双赢；顾客损失厌恶程度越大,补偿契约弱化顾客损失厌恶对零售商与顾客的不利影响越明显。最后,延伸至损失厌恶零售商面对损失厌恶顾客情形,发现在无补偿契约情形下,顾客损失厌恶给顾客绩效带来不利影响,但是,在有补偿契约情形下,顾客损失厌恶可能给顾客绩效带来有利影响；当补偿额在一个更小的范围内,也能够实现企业和顾客双赢。
2)基于损失厌恶背景研究供应链的订货定价决策与激励问题。首先,研究损失厌恶零售商与损失中性制造商的订货定价决策与激励问题,结果表明：零售商损失厌恶导致制造商降低价格、零售商减少订货,并给制造商和零售商的绩效带来不利影响；同时,回购契约促使制造商提高价格,零售商增加订货,当回购价格小于一定范围内时,制造商和零售商的绩效得到改善,回购契约能够发挥激励作用；并且零售商损失厌恶程度越大,回购契约弱化损失厌恶对零售商的不利影响越明显。然后,研究损失厌恶零售商与损失厌恶制造商的订货定价决策与激励问题,发现当回购价格在一个更小的范围内时,回购契约才可能发挥激励作用；并且零售商损失厌恶程度越大,回购契约弱化零售商损失厌恶对零售商的不利影响逐渐减弱。
3)基于损失厌恶信息不对称研究企业和供应链的订货定价决策与激励问题。首先,以顾客的损失厌恶信息不对称为背景,研究损失中性零售商订货定价决策与激励问题。结果表明：与信息对称相比较,零售商低估顾客的损失厌恶程度导致零售商提高价格和增加订货,但是顾客效用和需求量减小,无论零售商低估或者高估顾客的损失厌恶程度,零售商的利润都将减小；当零售商低估顾客的损失厌恶程度时,补偿契约能够发挥激励作用,但是,当零售商高估顾客的损失厌恶程度大于一定范围时,补偿契约导致顾客效用下降,此时,补偿契约不能发挥激励作用；且在补偿契约情形下,补偿金额越大,损失厌恶信息对零售商和顾客的绩效影响越小。然后,以零售商的损失厌恶信息不对称为背景,研究损失厌恶零售商与损失中性制造商订货定价决策与激励问题。研究表明：与信息对称相比较,制造商低估零售商的损失厌恶程度导致制造商提高价格、零售商减少订货、零售商效用和供应链效用下降,无论制造商低估或者高估零售商的损失厌恶程度都会导致制造商利润下降；当回购价格在一定范围内时,回购契约提高了制造商、零售商和供应链的绩效,因此,回购契约能够发挥激励作用；在回购契约情形下,制造商高估零售商损失厌恶程度能够提高零售商和制造商的绩效,且回购价格越大,损失厌恶信息对零售商绩效的影响越大。
4)基于攀比心态损益参照点研究企业和供应链的订货定价决策与激励问题。首先,考虑损失厌恶顾客具有攀比心态,研究损失中性零售商订货定价决策与激励问题。结果表明：攀比心态导致零售商降低价格、减少订货量,零售商和顾客绩效下降；补偿契约能够提高价格、增加订货量；当补偿额在一定范围内时,补偿契约能够发挥激励作用,但是,当补偿额大于一定范围时,补偿契约导致顾客效用下降,此时,补偿契约不能够发挥激励作用。然后,考虑损失厌恶零售商具有攀比心态,研究零售商与损失中性制造商订货定价决策与激励问题。研究表明：攀比心态导致制造商降低价格、零售商减少订货、制造商、零售商和供应链绩效下降；当回购价格小于一定范围内时,回购契约能够提高价格、增加订货量、制造商、零售商和供应链绩效得到改善,此时,回购契约能够发挥激励作用。
论文的创新点主要表现在以下四个方面：
1)将损失厌恶和损失中性企业的订货决策进行比较。不仅从理论上证明了损失中性企业的订货量随着零售价格的增大而增大,随着采购价格的增大而减小；损失厌恶企业的订货量随着零售价格和采购价格的增大而可能增大,也可能减小；而且还通过算例仿真验证了该结论的正确性。
2)以损失厌恶顾客作为新的研究视角,分析顾客损失厌恶对企业决策行为的影响,以及企业制定的补偿契约对企业和顾客的激励问题。发现顾客损失厌恶导致企业减少订货和降低价格,并给零售商绩效带来不利影响；但是,如果补偿额在一定范围内,补偿契约能够发挥激励作用。
3)以损失厌恶信息非对称为背景,分析损失厌恶信息对企业决策行为的影响,以及契约对企业和供应链的激励问题。研究表明：当顾客损失厌恶信息非对称时,企业低估顾客的损失厌恶程度导致企业提高价格、增加订货、以及顾客效用下降,无论企业低估或者高估顾客的损失厌恶程度都会导致企业利润下降；补偿契约在企业低估顾客的损失厌恶程度情形下能够发挥激励作用。当零售商损失厌恶信息非对称时,制造商低估零售商的损失厌恶程度导致制造商提高价格、零售商减少订货、零售商效用和供应链效用下降,无论制造商低估或者高估零售商的损失厌恶程度都会导致制造商利润下降；同时,当回购价格在一定范围内时,回购契约能够发挥激励作用。
4)将攀比心态引入损失厌恶参照点,研究人们的攀比心态对企业决策行为的影响,以及契约对企业和供应链的激励问题。结果表明：当损失厌恶顾客具有攀比心态时,攀比心态导致企业降低价格、减少订货,企业和顾客绩效下降；如果补偿额在一定范围内,补偿契约能够发挥激励作用。当损失厌恶零售商具有攀比心态时,攀比心态导致制造商降低价格、零售商减少订货、制造商、零售商和供应链绩效下降；同时,当回购价格小于一定范围内时,回购契约能够发挥激励作用。
Traditional research on management of supply chain is mainly based on loss-neutral, that is, the decision-maker has not any preferences to loss. However, in reality, enterprise and customer may be have loss-averse attitude, moreover, the relationships of supply chain members and game behaviors are changed by loss-aversion, coordination and incentive strategies of supply chain are quite different. so, influence on decision-making of enterprise and contracts of supply chain by loss-aversion have been cared by academic field. in this paper, the loss-averse model is established to depict loss-averse characteristics of decision-maker based on prospect theory, using methods of quantitative and qualitative analysis, study ordering and pricing strategies of enterprise and incentive issue of supply chain, verified by the analysis of numerical example. The main research contents and results are as follows:
1) Study ordering and pricing decisions of enterprise and incentive problem based on loss aversion. first of all, compare the order decisions of loss-averse retailer with loss-neutral retailer. find the common and difference between them, the difference is that loss-averse retailer's order quantity increases or decreases with retail price, purchase price increasing; and loss-neutral retailer's order quantity increases with retail price increasing, and decreases with purchase price increasing, which indicates that loss aversion has important effect on order decision-making. second, loss-averse customer is considered, study loss-neutral retailer's ordering and pricing decisions and incentive problem, results show that customer's loss aversion reduces order and price of retailer, detrimental to retailer's performance; compensation contract can increase retailer's performance, meanwhile, when the compensation amounts constrict to a certain range, compensation contract can increase customer's utility, win-win between retailer with customer may be realized; customer's loss aversion is greater, compensation contract has more obvious to weaken adverse impact on customer and retailer by loss aversion. finally, the situation of loss-averse retailer facing loss-averse customer is considered, results show that customer's loss aversion brings adverse effect to customer's performance with non-compensation contract, but bring beneficial effect to customer's performance with compensation contract; win-win is also realized when compensation amount is in the smaller range.
2) Study ordering, pricing decisions and incentive problem of supply chain based on loss aversion. first of all, ordering, pricing decisions and incentive problem between loss-averse retailer with loss-neutral manufacturer is considered, results show that retailer's loss aversion makes manufacturer reduce price, retailer reduce order, and brings detrimental effect to performances of manufacturer and retailer; meanwhile, buyback contract makes manufacturer raise price, retailer increase order, when buyback price is less than certain range, performances of manufacturer and retailer are improved, buyback contract can play incentive effect; loss-averse degree is greater, buyback contract has more obvious to weaken adverse effect on retailer by loss aversion. then, ordering, pricing decisions and incentive problem between loss-averse retailer with loss-averse manufacturer is considered, results show that buyback contract can play incentive effect when buyback price is less than smaller range, retailer's loss-averse degree is greater, buyback contract decreases to weaken adverse impact on retailer by loss aversion.
3) Research ordering, pricing decisions of enterprise and incentive problem of supply chain under the background of asymmetric loss-averse information. first, asymmetric loss-averse information of customer is considered, study ordering, pricing decisions and incentive problem of loss-neutral retailer. results show that compared with the symmetric information, if retailer underestimates loss-averse degree of customer, which leads retailer to raise price and increase order, but decreases demand and customer's utility, whether retailer underestimates or overestimates customer's loss-averse degree, retailer's profit would be reduced; when retailer underestimates loss-averse degree of customer, compensation contract can play incentive effect, but, when retailer overestimates customer's loss aversion to the greater extent, compensation contract decreases customer's utility, at this time, compensation contract cannot play incentive effect; and in compensation contract situation, compensation amount is the greater, loss-averse information has little influence on performances of retailer and customer. Then, asymmetric loss-averse information of retailer is considered, study ordering, pricing decisions and incentive problem between loss-averse retailer with loss-neutral manufacturer. results show that compared with symmetric information, manufacturer raises price, retailer reduces order, utilities of retailer and supply chain are decreased when manufacturer underestimates retailer's loss-aversion, whether manufacturer underestimates or overestimates loss-averse degree of retailer, which leads manufacturer's profit to decline; when buyback price is less than certain range, performances of manufacturer, retailer and supply chain are improved by buyback contract, therefore, buyback contract can play incentive effect; in the buyback contract situation, performances of retailer and manufacturer can be improved when manufacturer overestimates retailer's loss-aversion, and buyback price is the greater, loss-averse information has more influence on retailer's performance.
4) Take comparative mentality into reference point of loss-aversion, study ordering, pricing decisions of enterprise and incentive problem of supply chain. first, take comparative mentality into loss-averse customer, research ordering, pricing decisions and incentive problem of loss-neutral retailer. results show that retailer decreases price, reduces order, performances of retailer and customer are decreased by comparative mentality; compensation contract can raise price and order; compensation contract can play incentive effect when compensation amount is in certain range, but customer's utility is decreased when compensation amounts extend certain range, at this time, compensation contract cannot play incentive effect. then, comparative mentality is considered into loss-averse retailer, research ordering, pricing decisions and incentive problem between retailer with loss-neutral manufacturer. results show that manufacturer reduces price, retailer reduces order, performances of manufacturer, retailer and supply chain are decreased by comparative mentality; when buyback price is less than certain range, buyback contract can raise price, increase order, improve performances of manufacturer, retailer and supply chain, so, buyback contract can play incentive effect.
In this dissertation, some innovations are made in the following four aspects:
1) Compare the order policies between loss-averse retailer with loss-neutral retailer. theoretically prove that loss-neutral retailer's order increases with retail price increasing, decreases with purchase price increasing; but, loss-averse retailer's order may be increase or decrease with retail price and purchase price increasing, and verify the correctness of conclusions by simulation.
2) Loss-averse customer is considered as new perspective, study influence on decision-making behavior of enterprise by customer's loss-aversion, and incentive problem of enterprise and customer by compensation contract. find that customer's loss-aversion leads enterprise to reduce order and price, brings detrimental effect to retailer's performance; however, compensation contract can play incentive effect if compensation amount is in certain range.
3) Asymmetric information of loss-aversion is considered, research effect on decision-making of enterprise by loss-averse information, and incentive problem of enterprise and supply chain by contract. results show that when asymmetric loss-averse information of customer is considered, if enterprise underestimates customer's loss-aversion, which leads enterprise to raise price and order, decreases customer's utility, whether enterprise underestimates or overestimates customer's loss-aversion, which would make enterprise's profit decrease; compensation contract can play incentive effect when enterprise underestimates customer's loss-aversion, when retailer's loss-aversion information is asymmetric, manufacturer raises price, retailer reduces order, utilities of retailer and supply chain are decreased when manufacturer underestimates retailer's loss-aversion, whether manufacturer underestimates or overestimates retailer's loss-aversion, which would decrease manufacturer's profit; meanwhile, when buyback price is less than certain range, buyback contract can play incentive effect.
4) Take comparative mentality into reference point of loss-aversion, study influence on decision-making behavior of enterprise by comparative mentality, and incentive issue of enterprise and supply chain by contract. results show that when comparative mentality is considered into loss-averse customer, comparative mentality leads enterprise to reduce price and order, performances of enterprise and customer are decreased; if compensation amount is in certain range, compensation contract can play incentive effect. when comparative mentality is considered into loss-averse retailer, comparative mentality leads manufacturer to reduce price, brings retailer to decrease order, performances of manufacturer, retailer and supply chain are decreased; meanwhile, when buyback price is less than certain range, buyback contract can play incentive effect.
引文
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