中国A股上市公司IPO募资投向变更动因与后果研究
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摘要
股票市场的基本功能之一是对金融资源进行配置,它以发行虚拟证券的形式将资金从社会公众手中聚集到需要资金的企业,为企业提供直接融资的便利；此时,股票市场配置金融资源的功能完成了第一步,接下来则需要由企业将它们通过股票市场筹集到的资金进行使用,以增加企业的内在价值。上市公司通过公开发行股票的方式筹集到的资金如何使用对于一国经济的各个层面都有重要意义：就微观层面而言,它决定着上市公司自身发展的内在动力,是投资者利益得以保障的基础；就中观层面而言,它决定着股票市场的资源配置功能是否得以实现,围绕募集资金使用展开的各种活动是所有股票市场行为的中心环节；就宏观层面而言,它甚至关系到国民经济的快速健康发展。然而中国上市公司公开发行股票募集资金的使用出现了一种特殊的现象,即上市公司大面积频繁改变募集资金的投向。这是顺应市场变化的商业决策,还是股票市场功能扭曲下的恶意融资?是上市公司经营业绩提升的动力,还是公司绩效下滑的先兆?要清晰地回答这些问题十分困难。群发性的募资变更行为是中国上市公司行为规律发生作用的一个具体表现,在资本市场不断发展与完善的背景之下,为这一行为规律探索一条可以因循的逻辑线索具有相当的理论与现实意义。
在现有的国外文献中,对募集资金使用问题的研究主要集中于过度投资、投资不足和随意使用自由现金流、公司的低效率投资行为、以及新股发行后长期业绩不良等问题,专门研究募资投向变更问题的相关成果几乎未见；而国内对于这一问题的研究,主要涉及募资投向变更的动因和募资投向变更的后果的研究。其中对募资变更动因的探讨是这一研究相对集中的领域,相关研究文献从不同的视角切入,或用规范分析方法或用实证研究方法论证了引发上市公司募资投向变更行为的原因,概括起来有两种截然不同的观点：一种观点认为募资投向变更行为对公司及市场产生了严重的负面影响,应对其进行严格监管；另一种观点则认为变更募资投向是上市公司在经营过程中应对市场环境变化及宏观政策调整的一种自然反应,有其自身的合理性,不应盲目否定。
对上市公司变更募集资金投向产生的影响的研究主要集中于两个方面：一是市场对募资投向变更行为的反应,一是募资投向变更对公司业绩的影响。对募资投向变更后的市场反应的研究文献均采用了事件研究法,但研究结果却出现了两种相反的观点,其分歧主要表现在两个层面：第一,市场对于上市公司变更募资投向的行为是否作出了反应,这是判断市场有效性的重要依据之一；第二,市场对于上市公司募资变更行为作出了积极反应还是消极反应,这是判断投资者对改变募集资金投向这种行为的态度是否理性的重要依据。对于募资投向变更对公司业绩的影响,现有文献涉及规范研究和实证研究两种方法。在相关的实证研究中,已有文献绝大多数采取会计研究法以财务指标作为被解释变量。研究结论也有两种相反的观点：一种认为变更募资投向使公司业绩下降,另一种则认为变更募资投向提高了公司业绩。
关于上市公司募资投向变更的现有研究成果涉及到这一行为的动因及其产生的影响,内容可谓全面,但尚未形成有机的整体,且存在一些不足,主要表现为：第一,对于上市公司募资投向变更问题的探索静态而孤立。现有文献中的规范研究简单地将各种募资变更行为同质化,以“变更”和“不变更”作为判断上市公司优劣的标准；实证研究则通常只考察1-3年的数据或者典型个案,分析结果的解释力有限。第二,对于上市公司募资投向变更问题的探索缺乏清晰的逻辑线索。现有文献没有深入地探究上市公司、控股股东、公众投资者以及监管部门这些市场行为主体在改变募资投向这一行为产生及发展过程中各自的作用以及内在的关联,缺乏对募资变更行为生成机制的系统分析。有鉴于此,本文试图在研究上市公司募资投向变更行为方面,提供一份完整的募资变更资料和一条贯穿首尾的逻辑线索。
本文以1990年～2009年在中国股票市场进行IPO且发生过募资投向变更行为的上市公司为研究对象,全景式地展示了自中国股市建立以来上市公司募资投向变更的情况,对引发上市公司募资投向变更的制度及非制度诱因进行了理论上的阐释,并对募资投向变更行为的动因,及其对市场及公司绩效的作用后果进行了实证检验。根据本文对募资投向变更行为的定义以及设定的相关数据采集标准,从第一例募资投向变更行为发生的1993年至考察期末的2009年,中国股票市场上累计有538家上市公司变更过IPO募资投向,这成为本文进行实证研究的基础样本。在此基础之上本文的实证研究内容主要包括：(1)公司治理总体水平以及内外部公司治理机制与募资投向变更行为是否存在相关关系；(2)管理者的股权融资偏好以及投资者的资产选择偏好与募资投向变更行为是否存在相关关系；(3)股票市场对上市公司改变IPO募资投向的行为做出了怎样的反应；(4)上市公司改变IPO募资投向对公司的绩效产生了怎样的影响。
经过理论分析和实证检验,本文得到了以下几组研究成果：
1.关于募资投向变更行为的制度及非制度诱因,本文给出如下解释：
就制度性因素而言,中国现行的股票发审制度,具有很强的政府主导特性,这种政府主导的对股票的供给从总量到结构都呈现出一种“供不应求”的状态,加之制度具有的项目主导特性,这使得拟发行股票的企业在争夺发行资格的竞争中,以项目作为唯一的核心指导企业的决策行为,从而形成募资变更行为事前强化的激励机制。上市公司在变更IPO募资投向行为发生之后,来自公司外部监管层面的处罚惩戒机制失效,来自公司内部中小股东层面的诉讼赔偿机制缺失,表现出制度约束弱化的特征。这种变更行为事后弱化的约束机制,加上以供给主导特性、项目主导特性和供给非有效性的形式表现出来的事前强化的激励机制,形成了中国上市公司大面积变更IPO募资投向行为的制度根源。
就非制度因素而言,一方面,中国金融市场上的低股权融资成本使企业的管理者具有了股权融资的外在激励,股权融资近乎为零的自由现金流约束又产生了内在激励,使其具有较强的股权融资偏好；企业本身对资金的渴求与管理者对股权融资的偏好遇上制度性的强激励与弱约束,便催生了上市公司的募资投向变更行为。另一方面,投资者对上市公司选择的投资项目具有相当的偏好,具体表现为由信息不对称导致的单一资产偏好以及由宏观经济政策导向引发的投资选择偏好,上市公司为确保发行成功以及发行时获得较高的定价,会在发行前选择项目时有意识地迎合投资者的偏好,而在发行成功募集资金到位后,又变更这些项目。作为市场参与主体的管理者与投资者的偏好导致了上市公司变更募资投向行为的非制度性激励机制的强化,而以所有权性质结构中的“委托人-代理人缺位”问题和股权分配结构中的“大股东控制”问题为特征的上市公司内部治理机制缺陷,和以公司控制权市场及经理人市场约束失效为特征的公司外部治理机制缺陷则是上市公司募资投向变更行为非制度性约束机制弱化的具体表现。非制度性激励机制的强化与非制度性约束机制的弱化同样成为上市公司变更募集资金投向的重要诱因。
2.关于募资投向变更的动因及后果,本文通过实证研究得到以下结论：
通过二项回归分析和多元线性回归分析发现,公司治理水平越高,上市公司变更募资投向的可能性越小,募资变更的概率与公司治理水平负相关；公司治理水平越高,募资变更的程度越低,募资变更程度与公司治理水平负相关。作为公司治理机制组成部分的所有权性质结构、股权分配结构、独立董事占比、B股H股发行状况、以及公司控制权转移状况等均与上市公司募资投向变更的概率和程度呈显著的相关关系。
通过因子分析,本文将影响上市公司募资投向变更的非制度因素归结为资本成本因子、负债水平因子、自由现金流因子和多元化经营因子,而多元线性回归分析的结果表明上市公司募资投向变更的概率和程度与资本成本因子、负债水平因子和多元化经营因子都有显著的相关关系。
通过事件研究法对上市公司变更募资投向行为的市场反应进行实证检验,本文发现：上市公司变更募集资金投向的行为在短期内并没有引起市场的剧烈反应,说明市场对于募资投向变更这一行为并没有给予过多的关注。但上市公司的募资投向变更行为却使投资者在短期内获得了超额收益,也就是说市场并没有将募资变更行为当作一种“失信行为”而通过股票价格予以惩罚,反而将其当作具有某种“价值”的信息予以追捧,这在一定程度上成为上市公司随意变更募资投向的助推剂。
通过因子分析方法将上市公司的系列财务指标转换成为反映公司经营绩效的综合得分,以此作为基础研究公司在变更募资投向前后的绩效水平及其变化情况,本文得到以下结论：在变更募资投向之前变更样本的绩效水平更低,说明经营绩效较差的公司更容易变更募资投向；对变更样本在变更前后公司绩效的t检验结果表明,虽然统计上并不显著,但改变募资投向的行为确实提高了公司的总体经营绩效水平。
本文的研究主要在以下三个方面有所创新：
第一,研究对象的创新。已有文献的实证研究样本局限于有限年份的截面数据或者某一行业领域的样本公司,这在一定程度上影响了研究结果的的说服力。本文的数据统计在1990～2009历年首次公开发行股票公司的相关公告的基础上得出,涉及中国股票市场建立以来所有变更过IPO募资投向的公司,对募资投向变更总体情况的反映更为全面。
第二,研究视角的创新。本文对募资投向变更问题的研究遵循一条“前因-后果”的逻辑线索；对于募资变更动因的探讨,无论是制度诱因还是非制度诱因,均从变更行为“事前”与“事后”两个方面考察引致该种行为的激励机制与约束机制；对于募资变更后果的探讨,则以该种行为产生影响的短期效应和长期效应为线索展开研究,分别检验作为短期效应的市场反应和作为长期效应的公司绩效。这是以往的研究文献不曾有过的尝试。
第三,研究方法的创新。已有涉及上市公司募资投向与公司业绩关系的研究文献均采用单一财务指标,如息前税后利润、净资产收益率、总资产收益率等。本文在检验募资投向变更行为对公司绩效的影响时,选取了反映公司资产运营能力、债务清偿能力、盈利能力的12个财务指标构成指标体系,采用因子分析法计算反映公司整体绩效水平的综合得分,并以此作为被解释变量考察上市公司募资投向变更行为的作用后果。
上市公司募资投向变更是上市公司投融资行为研究的一个组成部分,其中有很多具体的问题有待深入的探究。本文在尝试理清募资投向变更行为的“前因-后果”这一逻辑线索的同时,在研究的内容和方法上还存在着相当的不足,如股权再融资中的募资变更问题、募资变更行为的监管问题、关联变更行为中的大股东利益侵占问题尚未涉及,实证检验未能结合问卷调查或者具体案例比较分析等方法,这将是本文今后继续深入研究努力的方向。
One of the basic functions of a stock market is the allocation of financial resources. A stock market is a place where surplus capital is transferred from the public to enterprises which need the capital by means of issuing virtual security, thereby provides a facility to direct financing for enterprises. By this time, the first step of a stock market to allocate financial resources has been finished, and the next step for enterprises is to get use of this capital so as to enhance their intrinsic value. How the listed companies get use of their proceeds through issuance of common stock is of great importance to an economy to every extent:to that of micro-economy, it determines the inner power of the companies'self development, and comes to be the base for protection of investors' interests; to the extent of medium-economy, it determines whether the stock market's allocation function has any effect, and all the activities relevant to the use of financing capital is the core link of stock market activities; to the extent of macro-economy, it even relates to the rapid healthy development of the whole national economy.
However, there arises a special phenomenon during the process of using the initial public offering proceeds, that is, the listed companies frequently altering the proclaimed use of IPO proceeds in great force. Is it a normal business decision which applies to the market changes, or some malicious financing at the background of distortion of stock market function? Is it the drive of the listed companies'profit promotion, or an aura of corporate performance? It is quite difficult to precisely answer all these questions. Massive alteration of proclaimed use of IPO proceeds is the specific manifestation of the behavioral laws of Chinese listed companies. With the development and improvement of capital market, it is of great theoretical and realistic meaning to explore and research the logic clue of such behavioral laws.
Among current foreign literature, researches on the issue of the use of financing capital are mainly focused on over-investment, under-investment, abuse of free cash flows, the inefficient investment activities by companies, and the poor performance after issue of new stock. There are few researches on the issue of alteration of financing capital. As for domestic literature, researches on this issue usually involve the motives and consequences of the alteration behavior.
The exploration about the motives of the alteration behavior is a field most researches are concentrated on. Cutting through different perspectives, relevant study investigates the main causes that initiate such alteration behavior using a method of either empirical study or normative study, which could be summarized into two viewpoints:one is that altering the proclaimed use of IPO proceeds has had a very bad impact upon market and the firm, and is subject to strict supervision; the other is that the behavior of altering the use of IPO proceeds is a natural response of listed firms to the changes of market conditions and the adjustment of macro-economic policies in their operation, which has its rationality, and should not be denied blindly.
Researches on the effects of the alteration behavior on a firm are mainly focused upon two problems:one is the effects of the alteration behavior on corporate performances, the other is the market responses to such behavior. All the study about market response to the alteration behavior has applied the event-study methodology, but resulted in two conclusions that are poles apart. The divergence lies in two levels:the first one is whether the stock market gives any response to the alteration behavior, which is an important basis for judgment of a market's efficiency; the second one is whether the market response is positive or negative, which is an important basis for judgment of investors' rationality. As for the effects of the alteration behavior to corporate performances, current literature involves both empirical and normative study. Most of the empirical study about this issue takes financial ratios as the dependant variables using the accounting research method, and results in two different conclusions as well:one is that the alteration behavior reduces corporate performances, the other is that it enhances them.
Current literature about the alteration of proclaimed use of IPO proceeds covers each aspect of this issue including its motives and effects, which could be considered as comprehensive. But there exists some deficiencies in these achievements. Firstly, current researches on the issue of altering the use of IPO proceeds are static and isolated. Those normative researches in current literature simply consider all types of alteration behaviors as of same quality, and consider "altering or not altering" as the judgment for a good or bad listed company; as for empirical researches, either the listed company data used in those researches covers only 1 to 3 years, or only some specific cases are used, which are all lacking in explanatory power. Secondly, there is a lack of a clear clue in current exploration about the issue of altering the use of IPO proceeds lack. Current researches haven't made a further investigation into the inner connections among the many market dealers including the listed companies, controlling shareholder, public investors and supervision department and the roles they respectively play. In view of these deficiencies, this paper intends to provide an overall data of the alteration behavior and a logic clue running through the whole study.
This paper takes all the companies that have conducted IPO in the stock market and have altered the proclaimed use the IPO proceeds during 1990 to 2009 as studying object, shows the alteration behaviors since the establishment of the Chinese stock markets from multiple perspectives, and makes empirical researches on the motives to the alteration behavior and the results on the corporation performance. According the definition of the behavior of altering the use of IPO proceeds and the standards by which the data is collected, there are 538 listed companies that have ever altered the proclaimed use IPO proceeds, which are confirmed as primary studying sample. Empirical researches in this paper include:(1) the co-relationship between the alteration behavior and different corporate governance mechanisms; (2) the co-relationship between the alteration behavior and preference by management to equity financing and that by investors to certain assets; (3) how does the stock market responses to the behavior of altering use of proceeds by listed companies; (4) what impacts the behavior of altering use of proceeds by listed companies have upon the corporate performance.
Through theoretical analysis and quantitative study, this paper has got some achievements:
1. As for the institutional and non-institutional incentives of the alteration of proclaimed use of IPO proceeds, this paper explains as follows:
No matter examined from a historical perspective or through horizontal comparisons among different countries, current securities issue auditing system exhibits an apparent government- oriented characteristic, which results in a state of short supply of stocks on the part of both total quantity and supply structure. Together with the projects-oriented characteristic, current system obviously encourages enterprises that are intended to issue stocks to make decision merely on account of the possible projects in the contests for the issuing qualifications, which comes to be an ex ante incentive mechanism to the alteration behavior that is strengthened. After the alteration of use of IPO proceeds, the invalidation of punishment mechanism of the supervision department from outside the altering companies and the deletion of litigation mechanism for minor shareholders from inside the altering companies display an ex post constraint mechanism to the alteration behavior that is weakened. The strengthened ex ante incentive mechanism and the weakened ex post constraint mechanism are just the institutional roots for the massive alteration of proclaimed use of IPO proceeds.
In Chinese financial markets, the costs for equity financing are quite low, which provides an incentive from outside for the management to collect capital by equity. Meanwhile, the constraints of free cash flows derived from equity financing is almost zero, which provides an incentive from inside that enhances the management's preference for equity financing. The craving for capital by firms and the preference for equity financing by managers, encountered with the institutional strengthened incentives and weakened constraints, expedites the behavior of altering the proclaimed use of proceeds. At the same time, investors have a preference for the projected investment, which is manifested as the "single-asset preference" resulted from information asymmetry and "investment selection preference" derived from macro-economic policies; the listed companies choose to satisfy investors'preference when they prepare for the prospectus before IPOs, so as to guarantee a successful issurance and a high offering price, and alter the proclaimed use in the prospectus after they finish IPOs. As the main participants of stock market, the preferences of managers and investors result in a non-institutionsl strengthened incentive to the altering behavior, while the defects of interal and external corporate governance mechanism become the manifestation of a non-institutional weakened constraint.
2. As for the motivation and consequences of the alteration behavior, this paper draws the following conclusions through empirical study:
By logistic regression and multiple linear regression this paper discovers that, the probability and degree of the altering behaviors are negatively related to the listed companies'corporate governance level. As the main components of corporate governance mechanism, the ownership structure, property structure, proporation of independent directors, issuance of B share and H share, as well as the transition of corporate control power are all significantly correlated to the probability and degree of the altering behaviors.
By factor analysis, this paper summarizes those influential factors as cost factor, debt factor, free cash flow factor and diversification factor. The results of multiple linear regression show that cost factor, debt factor and diversification factor are significantly correlated to the probability and degree of the altering behaviors.
By event study, this paper draws the following conclusions:the behavior of altering the proclaimed use of IPO procceds doen not induce a violent reaction by the market investors, which shows that investors do not pay much concern to such behaviors. However, such behaviors result in an abnormal return by the investors, that is to say, the market does not "punish" the companies for their altering behaviors but consider the altering event as aome valuable information.
By factor analysis, this paper converts a series of financial ratios to a comprehensive score, based on which some studies on the changes before and after the altering events are carried out, and draws the following conclusions:Corporate performance before the altering events are lower than that after the events, which shows that companies with a poorer performance tend to alter use of IPO proceeds. Altering the use of IPO proceeds does improve the overall performance, although it is not statistically significant.
There are three main innovations in this pape:
The first is the innovation on the part of the datas. Current researches use data of a certain period of time or that of a certain industry, which is lack of convincingness. This paper use a data from 1990 to 2009, which covers all the listed companies, and gives a much more complete description of the altering behavior.
The second is the innovation on the perspective. In general, this paper follows a logic clue of "cause and result". In the study of incentives of the altering behaviors, it follows a clue of "ex ante and ex post". In the study of consequences of the altering behaviors, it follows a clue of "short-term and long-term". These are different from previous researches.
The third is the innovation on the methodology. In the researches of relationship between corporate events and corporate performances, current literatures usually apply a singe financial ratio as the measurement of corporate performance, while this paper chooses 12 financial ratios reflecting corporates'activities, leverages and profitabilities, constructs a comprehensive score used as the measurement of corporate performance.
As part of the study on financing and investment of Chinese listed companies, the behavior of altering the proclaimed use of IPO proceeds involves plenty of specific problems, which are not completely covered in this paper, such as the altering behaviors in SEOs, supervision of the altering behaviors, altering events that involve related parties, etc. These are all included in the subsequent research plan of this paper.
在现有的国外文献中,对募集资金使用问题的研究主要集中于过度投资、投资不足和随意使用自由现金流、公司的低效率投资行为、以及新股发行后长期业绩不良等问题,专门研究募资投向变更问题的相关成果几乎未见；而国内对于这一问题的研究,主要涉及募资投向变更的动因和募资投向变更的后果的研究。其中对募资变更动因的探讨是这一研究相对集中的领域,相关研究文献从不同的视角切入,或用规范分析方法或用实证研究方法论证了引发上市公司募资投向变更行为的原因,概括起来有两种截然不同的观点：一种观点认为募资投向变更行为对公司及市场产生了严重的负面影响,应对其进行严格监管；另一种观点则认为变更募资投向是上市公司在经营过程中应对市场环境变化及宏观政策调整的一种自然反应,有其自身的合理性,不应盲目否定。
对上市公司变更募集资金投向产生的影响的研究主要集中于两个方面：一是市场对募资投向变更行为的反应,一是募资投向变更对公司业绩的影响。对募资投向变更后的市场反应的研究文献均采用了事件研究法,但研究结果却出现了两种相反的观点,其分歧主要表现在两个层面：第一,市场对于上市公司变更募资投向的行为是否作出了反应,这是判断市场有效性的重要依据之一；第二,市场对于上市公司募资变更行为作出了积极反应还是消极反应,这是判断投资者对改变募集资金投向这种行为的态度是否理性的重要依据。对于募资投向变更对公司业绩的影响,现有文献涉及规范研究和实证研究两种方法。在相关的实证研究中,已有文献绝大多数采取会计研究法以财务指标作为被解释变量。研究结论也有两种相反的观点：一种认为变更募资投向使公司业绩下降,另一种则认为变更募资投向提高了公司业绩。
关于上市公司募资投向变更的现有研究成果涉及到这一行为的动因及其产生的影响,内容可谓全面,但尚未形成有机的整体,且存在一些不足,主要表现为：第一,对于上市公司募资投向变更问题的探索静态而孤立。现有文献中的规范研究简单地将各种募资变更行为同质化,以“变更”和“不变更”作为判断上市公司优劣的标准；实证研究则通常只考察1-3年的数据或者典型个案,分析结果的解释力有限。第二,对于上市公司募资投向变更问题的探索缺乏清晰的逻辑线索。现有文献没有深入地探究上市公司、控股股东、公众投资者以及监管部门这些市场行为主体在改变募资投向这一行为产生及发展过程中各自的作用以及内在的关联,缺乏对募资变更行为生成机制的系统分析。有鉴于此,本文试图在研究上市公司募资投向变更行为方面,提供一份完整的募资变更资料和一条贯穿首尾的逻辑线索。
本文以1990年～2009年在中国股票市场进行IPO且发生过募资投向变更行为的上市公司为研究对象,全景式地展示了自中国股市建立以来上市公司募资投向变更的情况,对引发上市公司募资投向变更的制度及非制度诱因进行了理论上的阐释,并对募资投向变更行为的动因,及其对市场及公司绩效的作用后果进行了实证检验。根据本文对募资投向变更行为的定义以及设定的相关数据采集标准,从第一例募资投向变更行为发生的1993年至考察期末的2009年,中国股票市场上累计有538家上市公司变更过IPO募资投向,这成为本文进行实证研究的基础样本。在此基础之上本文的实证研究内容主要包括：(1)公司治理总体水平以及内外部公司治理机制与募资投向变更行为是否存在相关关系；(2)管理者的股权融资偏好以及投资者的资产选择偏好与募资投向变更行为是否存在相关关系；(3)股票市场对上市公司改变IPO募资投向的行为做出了怎样的反应；(4)上市公司改变IPO募资投向对公司的绩效产生了怎样的影响。
经过理论分析和实证检验,本文得到了以下几组研究成果：
1.关于募资投向变更行为的制度及非制度诱因,本文给出如下解释：
就制度性因素而言,中国现行的股票发审制度,具有很强的政府主导特性,这种政府主导的对股票的供给从总量到结构都呈现出一种“供不应求”的状态,加之制度具有的项目主导特性,这使得拟发行股票的企业在争夺发行资格的竞争中,以项目作为唯一的核心指导企业的决策行为,从而形成募资变更行为事前强化的激励机制。上市公司在变更IPO募资投向行为发生之后,来自公司外部监管层面的处罚惩戒机制失效,来自公司内部中小股东层面的诉讼赔偿机制缺失,表现出制度约束弱化的特征。这种变更行为事后弱化的约束机制,加上以供给主导特性、项目主导特性和供给非有效性的形式表现出来的事前强化的激励机制,形成了中国上市公司大面积变更IPO募资投向行为的制度根源。
就非制度因素而言,一方面,中国金融市场上的低股权融资成本使企业的管理者具有了股权融资的外在激励,股权融资近乎为零的自由现金流约束又产生了内在激励,使其具有较强的股权融资偏好；企业本身对资金的渴求与管理者对股权融资的偏好遇上制度性的强激励与弱约束,便催生了上市公司的募资投向变更行为。另一方面,投资者对上市公司选择的投资项目具有相当的偏好,具体表现为由信息不对称导致的单一资产偏好以及由宏观经济政策导向引发的投资选择偏好,上市公司为确保发行成功以及发行时获得较高的定价,会在发行前选择项目时有意识地迎合投资者的偏好,而在发行成功募集资金到位后,又变更这些项目。作为市场参与主体的管理者与投资者的偏好导致了上市公司变更募资投向行为的非制度性激励机制的强化,而以所有权性质结构中的“委托人-代理人缺位”问题和股权分配结构中的“大股东控制”问题为特征的上市公司内部治理机制缺陷,和以公司控制权市场及经理人市场约束失效为特征的公司外部治理机制缺陷则是上市公司募资投向变更行为非制度性约束机制弱化的具体表现。非制度性激励机制的强化与非制度性约束机制的弱化同样成为上市公司变更募集资金投向的重要诱因。
2.关于募资投向变更的动因及后果,本文通过实证研究得到以下结论：
通过二项回归分析和多元线性回归分析发现,公司治理水平越高,上市公司变更募资投向的可能性越小,募资变更的概率与公司治理水平负相关；公司治理水平越高,募资变更的程度越低,募资变更程度与公司治理水平负相关。作为公司治理机制组成部分的所有权性质结构、股权分配结构、独立董事占比、B股H股发行状况、以及公司控制权转移状况等均与上市公司募资投向变更的概率和程度呈显著的相关关系。
通过因子分析,本文将影响上市公司募资投向变更的非制度因素归结为资本成本因子、负债水平因子、自由现金流因子和多元化经营因子,而多元线性回归分析的结果表明上市公司募资投向变更的概率和程度与资本成本因子、负债水平因子和多元化经营因子都有显著的相关关系。
通过事件研究法对上市公司变更募资投向行为的市场反应进行实证检验,本文发现：上市公司变更募集资金投向的行为在短期内并没有引起市场的剧烈反应,说明市场对于募资投向变更这一行为并没有给予过多的关注。但上市公司的募资投向变更行为却使投资者在短期内获得了超额收益,也就是说市场并没有将募资变更行为当作一种“失信行为”而通过股票价格予以惩罚,反而将其当作具有某种“价值”的信息予以追捧,这在一定程度上成为上市公司随意变更募资投向的助推剂。
通过因子分析方法将上市公司的系列财务指标转换成为反映公司经营绩效的综合得分,以此作为基础研究公司在变更募资投向前后的绩效水平及其变化情况,本文得到以下结论：在变更募资投向之前变更样本的绩效水平更低,说明经营绩效较差的公司更容易变更募资投向；对变更样本在变更前后公司绩效的t检验结果表明,虽然统计上并不显著,但改变募资投向的行为确实提高了公司的总体经营绩效水平。
本文的研究主要在以下三个方面有所创新：
第一,研究对象的创新。已有文献的实证研究样本局限于有限年份的截面数据或者某一行业领域的样本公司,这在一定程度上影响了研究结果的的说服力。本文的数据统计在1990～2009历年首次公开发行股票公司的相关公告的基础上得出,涉及中国股票市场建立以来所有变更过IPO募资投向的公司,对募资投向变更总体情况的反映更为全面。
第二,研究视角的创新。本文对募资投向变更问题的研究遵循一条“前因-后果”的逻辑线索；对于募资变更动因的探讨,无论是制度诱因还是非制度诱因,均从变更行为“事前”与“事后”两个方面考察引致该种行为的激励机制与约束机制；对于募资变更后果的探讨,则以该种行为产生影响的短期效应和长期效应为线索展开研究,分别检验作为短期效应的市场反应和作为长期效应的公司绩效。这是以往的研究文献不曾有过的尝试。
第三,研究方法的创新。已有涉及上市公司募资投向与公司业绩关系的研究文献均采用单一财务指标,如息前税后利润、净资产收益率、总资产收益率等。本文在检验募资投向变更行为对公司绩效的影响时,选取了反映公司资产运营能力、债务清偿能力、盈利能力的12个财务指标构成指标体系,采用因子分析法计算反映公司整体绩效水平的综合得分,并以此作为被解释变量考察上市公司募资投向变更行为的作用后果。
上市公司募资投向变更是上市公司投融资行为研究的一个组成部分,其中有很多具体的问题有待深入的探究。本文在尝试理清募资投向变更行为的“前因-后果”这一逻辑线索的同时,在研究的内容和方法上还存在着相当的不足,如股权再融资中的募资变更问题、募资变更行为的监管问题、关联变更行为中的大股东利益侵占问题尚未涉及,实证检验未能结合问卷调查或者具体案例比较分析等方法,这将是本文今后继续深入研究努力的方向。
One of the basic functions of a stock market is the allocation of financial resources. A stock market is a place where surplus capital is transferred from the public to enterprises which need the capital by means of issuing virtual security, thereby provides a facility to direct financing for enterprises. By this time, the first step of a stock market to allocate financial resources has been finished, and the next step for enterprises is to get use of this capital so as to enhance their intrinsic value. How the listed companies get use of their proceeds through issuance of common stock is of great importance to an economy to every extent:to that of micro-economy, it determines the inner power of the companies'self development, and comes to be the base for protection of investors' interests; to the extent of medium-economy, it determines whether the stock market's allocation function has any effect, and all the activities relevant to the use of financing capital is the core link of stock market activities; to the extent of macro-economy, it even relates to the rapid healthy development of the whole national economy.
However, there arises a special phenomenon during the process of using the initial public offering proceeds, that is, the listed companies frequently altering the proclaimed use of IPO proceeds in great force. Is it a normal business decision which applies to the market changes, or some malicious financing at the background of distortion of stock market function? Is it the drive of the listed companies'profit promotion, or an aura of corporate performance? It is quite difficult to precisely answer all these questions. Massive alteration of proclaimed use of IPO proceeds is the specific manifestation of the behavioral laws of Chinese listed companies. With the development and improvement of capital market, it is of great theoretical and realistic meaning to explore and research the logic clue of such behavioral laws.
Among current foreign literature, researches on the issue of the use of financing capital are mainly focused on over-investment, under-investment, abuse of free cash flows, the inefficient investment activities by companies, and the poor performance after issue of new stock. There are few researches on the issue of alteration of financing capital. As for domestic literature, researches on this issue usually involve the motives and consequences of the alteration behavior.
The exploration about the motives of the alteration behavior is a field most researches are concentrated on. Cutting through different perspectives, relevant study investigates the main causes that initiate such alteration behavior using a method of either empirical study or normative study, which could be summarized into two viewpoints:one is that altering the proclaimed use of IPO proceeds has had a very bad impact upon market and the firm, and is subject to strict supervision; the other is that the behavior of altering the use of IPO proceeds is a natural response of listed firms to the changes of market conditions and the adjustment of macro-economic policies in their operation, which has its rationality, and should not be denied blindly.
Researches on the effects of the alteration behavior on a firm are mainly focused upon two problems:one is the effects of the alteration behavior on corporate performances, the other is the market responses to such behavior. All the study about market response to the alteration behavior has applied the event-study methodology, but resulted in two conclusions that are poles apart. The divergence lies in two levels:the first one is whether the stock market gives any response to the alteration behavior, which is an important basis for judgment of a market's efficiency; the second one is whether the market response is positive or negative, which is an important basis for judgment of investors' rationality. As for the effects of the alteration behavior to corporate performances, current literature involves both empirical and normative study. Most of the empirical study about this issue takes financial ratios as the dependant variables using the accounting research method, and results in two different conclusions as well:one is that the alteration behavior reduces corporate performances, the other is that it enhances them.
Current literature about the alteration of proclaimed use of IPO proceeds covers each aspect of this issue including its motives and effects, which could be considered as comprehensive. But there exists some deficiencies in these achievements. Firstly, current researches on the issue of altering the use of IPO proceeds are static and isolated. Those normative researches in current literature simply consider all types of alteration behaviors as of same quality, and consider "altering or not altering" as the judgment for a good or bad listed company; as for empirical researches, either the listed company data used in those researches covers only 1 to 3 years, or only some specific cases are used, which are all lacking in explanatory power. Secondly, there is a lack of a clear clue in current exploration about the issue of altering the use of IPO proceeds lack. Current researches haven't made a further investigation into the inner connections among the many market dealers including the listed companies, controlling shareholder, public investors and supervision department and the roles they respectively play. In view of these deficiencies, this paper intends to provide an overall data of the alteration behavior and a logic clue running through the whole study.
This paper takes all the companies that have conducted IPO in the stock market and have altered the proclaimed use the IPO proceeds during 1990 to 2009 as studying object, shows the alteration behaviors since the establishment of the Chinese stock markets from multiple perspectives, and makes empirical researches on the motives to the alteration behavior and the results on the corporation performance. According the definition of the behavior of altering the use of IPO proceeds and the standards by which the data is collected, there are 538 listed companies that have ever altered the proclaimed use IPO proceeds, which are confirmed as primary studying sample. Empirical researches in this paper include:(1) the co-relationship between the alteration behavior and different corporate governance mechanisms; (2) the co-relationship between the alteration behavior and preference by management to equity financing and that by investors to certain assets; (3) how does the stock market responses to the behavior of altering use of proceeds by listed companies; (4) what impacts the behavior of altering use of proceeds by listed companies have upon the corporate performance.
Through theoretical analysis and quantitative study, this paper has got some achievements:
1. As for the institutional and non-institutional incentives of the alteration of proclaimed use of IPO proceeds, this paper explains as follows:
No matter examined from a historical perspective or through horizontal comparisons among different countries, current securities issue auditing system exhibits an apparent government- oriented characteristic, which results in a state of short supply of stocks on the part of both total quantity and supply structure. Together with the projects-oriented characteristic, current system obviously encourages enterprises that are intended to issue stocks to make decision merely on account of the possible projects in the contests for the issuing qualifications, which comes to be an ex ante incentive mechanism to the alteration behavior that is strengthened. After the alteration of use of IPO proceeds, the invalidation of punishment mechanism of the supervision department from outside the altering companies and the deletion of litigation mechanism for minor shareholders from inside the altering companies display an ex post constraint mechanism to the alteration behavior that is weakened. The strengthened ex ante incentive mechanism and the weakened ex post constraint mechanism are just the institutional roots for the massive alteration of proclaimed use of IPO proceeds.
In Chinese financial markets, the costs for equity financing are quite low, which provides an incentive from outside for the management to collect capital by equity. Meanwhile, the constraints of free cash flows derived from equity financing is almost zero, which provides an incentive from inside that enhances the management's preference for equity financing. The craving for capital by firms and the preference for equity financing by managers, encountered with the institutional strengthened incentives and weakened constraints, expedites the behavior of altering the proclaimed use of proceeds. At the same time, investors have a preference for the projected investment, which is manifested as the "single-asset preference" resulted from information asymmetry and "investment selection preference" derived from macro-economic policies; the listed companies choose to satisfy investors'preference when they prepare for the prospectus before IPOs, so as to guarantee a successful issurance and a high offering price, and alter the proclaimed use in the prospectus after they finish IPOs. As the main participants of stock market, the preferences of managers and investors result in a non-institutionsl strengthened incentive to the altering behavior, while the defects of interal and external corporate governance mechanism become the manifestation of a non-institutional weakened constraint.
2. As for the motivation and consequences of the alteration behavior, this paper draws the following conclusions through empirical study:
By logistic regression and multiple linear regression this paper discovers that, the probability and degree of the altering behaviors are negatively related to the listed companies'corporate governance level. As the main components of corporate governance mechanism, the ownership structure, property structure, proporation of independent directors, issuance of B share and H share, as well as the transition of corporate control power are all significantly correlated to the probability and degree of the altering behaviors.
By factor analysis, this paper summarizes those influential factors as cost factor, debt factor, free cash flow factor and diversification factor. The results of multiple linear regression show that cost factor, debt factor and diversification factor are significantly correlated to the probability and degree of the altering behaviors.
By event study, this paper draws the following conclusions:the behavior of altering the proclaimed use of IPO procceds doen not induce a violent reaction by the market investors, which shows that investors do not pay much concern to such behaviors. However, such behaviors result in an abnormal return by the investors, that is to say, the market does not "punish" the companies for their altering behaviors but consider the altering event as aome valuable information.
By factor analysis, this paper converts a series of financial ratios to a comprehensive score, based on which some studies on the changes before and after the altering events are carried out, and draws the following conclusions:Corporate performance before the altering events are lower than that after the events, which shows that companies with a poorer performance tend to alter use of IPO proceeds. Altering the use of IPO proceeds does improve the overall performance, although it is not statistically significant.
There are three main innovations in this pape:
The first is the innovation on the part of the datas. Current researches use data of a certain period of time or that of a certain industry, which is lack of convincingness. This paper use a data from 1990 to 2009, which covers all the listed companies, and gives a much more complete description of the altering behavior.
The second is the innovation on the perspective. In general, this paper follows a logic clue of "cause and result". In the study of incentives of the altering behaviors, it follows a clue of "ex ante and ex post". In the study of consequences of the altering behaviors, it follows a clue of "short-term and long-term". These are different from previous researches.
The third is the innovation on the methodology. In the researches of relationship between corporate events and corporate performances, current literatures usually apply a singe financial ratio as the measurement of corporate performance, while this paper chooses 12 financial ratios reflecting corporates'activities, leverages and profitabilities, constructs a comprehensive score used as the measurement of corporate performance.
As part of the study on financing and investment of Chinese listed companies, the behavior of altering the proclaimed use of IPO proceeds involves plenty of specific problems, which are not completely covered in this paper, such as the altering behaviors in SEOs, supervision of the altering behaviors, altering events that involve related parties, etc. These are all included in the subsequent research plan of this paper.
引文
①董屹,成蕾：《募资投向变更的监管失效研究》,《当代财经》,2007年第9期。
②中国证监会《关于募集资金使用管理的通知》,2001年11月14日。
③中国证监会《关于募集资金使用管理的通知》,2001年11月14日。
④中国证监会《中小企业板上市公司募集资金管理细则》,2006年7月。
①沈艺峰、沈洪涛：《公司财务理论主流》,第227页,东北财经大学出版社,2004年8月。
②王满四：上市公司自由现金流效应实证分析,《证券市场导报》,2004年第8期。
①这一非正常的“单一化趋势”是相对于公司股票发行前经营业务的多元化程度而言的。
①本文在以该属性设置变量时,按照行政控制力排序：国家股=0,国有法人股=1,私有股=2。
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②中国证监会《关于募集资金使用管理的通知》,2001年11月14日。
③中国证监会《关于募集资金使用管理的通知》,2001年11月14日。
④中国证监会《中小企业板上市公司募集资金管理细则》,2006年7月。
①沈艺峰、沈洪涛：《公司财务理论主流》,第227页,东北财经大学出版社,2004年8月。
②王满四：上市公司自由现金流效应实证分析,《证券市场导报》,2004年第8期。
①这一非正常的“单一化趋势”是相对于公司股票发行前经营业务的多元化程度而言的。
①本文在以该属性设置变量时,按照行政控制力排序：国家股=0,国有法人股=1,私有股=2。
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