社会转型期企业突发事件的博弈分析
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摘要
近年来,随着社会经济结构转型的继续进行,大量社会经济矛盾交织在一起,突发事件也呈迅速上升趋势,它严重影响了我国社会稳定和经济发展。当前对于突发事件的研究以及相应的应急管理措施的提出大多是针对交通事故灾难、自然灾害、社会安全事件等。而对于现在频繁发生的企业与员工之间的个体性突发事件和群体性突发事件的研究却相对较少。但是企业突发事件已经成为影响企业发展,经济结构转型和社会进步的关键因素,因此,加强对企业突发事件的理论研究,深入探索企业突发事件发生的内在机制,从而有效预防企业突发事件的发生,妥善处理已经发生的突发事件有着重要的理论和现实意义。
本文首先概述了国内外现在关于突发事件应急管理的发展现状和发展趋势。突发事件应急管理是近几年学术界研究的热点问题之一,积极有效的应急管理方法和手段,可以达到事前降低发生率、事中很好地应对并降低危害程度、事后减少损失的目的。故短短几年间,应急管理的理论、方法、技术、应用和实践等有了较大的发展。但也存在很多问题,比如研究缺乏对于突发事件产生的社会条件的深入分析,应急预案的制定主要基于各级部门总结的实践经验,缺少基于严谨的理论推理基础上得出的优化分析结果和方案设计等。针对这些问题,本文进行了几点创新：从当前国内外对突发事件的研究现状来看,主要研究的是社会群体性突发事件,而对发生越来越频繁的企业突发事件鲜少研究,本文的研究对象是以前鲜少研究的企业劳资冲突诱发的突发事件,并把它置于经济结构转型期这一历史背景之下进行分析,从管理科学的角度揭示出企业突发事件的演化规律,并提出了更全面的应对策略,不仅包括政府的应对策略,还包括企业的应对策略。
在对企业突发事件进行分析的过程中,本文采用的是理论研究和实证研究相结合的方法,理论指导实践,实践验证理论。先分别运用三阶段动态博弈模型和演化博弈模型对企业个体性突发事件和企业群体性突发事件进行分析,并提出相应的应对策略,然后再通过具体的实例—富士康跳楼事件、本田罢工事件分别验证上面的分析及提出的对策的可实施性。
本文将企业突发事件置于经济结构转型期的背景之下进行研究,通过分析经济结构转型期的基本特征,揭示当前企业突发事件发生的社会条件和现实原因,同时结合企业员工基于工资,心理,娱乐,交往等的效用函数分析企业突发事件的内在机制,研究企业突发事件产生的条件。本文试图有针对性地提出预防和处置企业突发事件的政策建议。
本文一共包含五个部分的内容：第一部分是绪论,主要讲述了本文选题的背景、意义、国内外的发展现状和发展趋势、本文的主要内容和研究思路以及本文的创新之处。第二部分是对个体性突发事件的三阶段动态博弈分析,在介绍了相关概念并对其模型进行了一些基本假设之后,运用逆推归纳法得出了模型中的子博弈完美纳什均衡,揭示了个体性突发事件的产生根源,并对其影响因素进行了分析,提出了相应的应对策略。第三部分是对企业群体性突发事件的演化博弈分析,本部分运用演化博弈理论建立了企业与企业员工的复制动态演化模型,分析了模型均衡解的条件,揭示了非常规型企业群体性突发事件的产生根源,阐述了此结论的现实意义。第四部分是通过富士康跳楼事件和本田罢工事件的具体实例分别对企业个体性突发事件和群体性突发事件进行分析研究,验证了本文第二、第三部分的模型分析的正确性和应对策略的可实施性。第五部分是总结,通过上述模型分析,对企业突发事件的应对策略进行总结,并提出解决这些事件的方法和建议。并对本文的一些不足之处进行阐述,并提出今后发展展望。
本文最后提出相应的政策建议。为了避免或减少企业突发事件的发生,需要政府、企业、,员工、社会各方面的努力,如要建立健全社会保障体系,加强企业与员工的沟通,加强企业工会组织建设,改善劳资关系等。只有这样才能更加全面的应对企业突发事件,进而妥善处理企业突发事件,从而达到促进企业进步,员工满足,社会发展的目的。
In recent years, along with the social economy structure transformation of social economy, continual contradiction intertwines, and incident also assumes a rapidly rising trend, which seriously affects China's economic development and social stability. The current study for emergencies and corresponding emergency management measures proposed mostly for traffic accidents disaster, natural disasters, social security incident, etc. But for now frequent enterprise between the employees, individuality emergencies and colony accidents studies have been relatively fewer. But enterprise emergencies has become key factors that influences the development of enterprises, economic restructuring and social progress, therefore, to strengthen enterprise emergencies in the theoretical research, and to explore the enterprise events in intrinsic mechanism, thus prevent enterprise from sudden incident effectively, properly handle emergencies that have already happened has important theoretical and practical significance.
This paper briefly introduces emergency management development in present situation and developing trend. Emergency management in academic circle is one of the hot issues. Positive and effective emergency management methods can reduce incidence, cope with them beforehand, or reduce the harm degree during the course, and achieve the goat to reduce the loss afterwards. So in a few short years, the theory, method and technology, application and practice of emergency management, has witnessed a rapid development. But there are also many problems, such as research lacks for thorough analysis of social conditions that produces emergencies, emergency plan formulation mainly based on summarizing the practical experience of various departments, strict theoretical reasoning which lacks of multi-media and on optimization analysis results as well as the project design. Aiming at these problems, this article has conducted the few creations:from the current domestic and international research current situation of emergencies, the main research is about social colony accidents, while rarely research to enterprise emergencies which become increasingly frequent. The research object in the thesis is about rare research enterprise before labor conflicts induced emergency and put it on the historical backgrounds of economic structure transition, from the angle of management science, it reveals enterprise emergencies'evolution rule, and puts forward the more comprehensive strategies, including not only the government's strategy, but also the enterprise strategy.
In the process of analyzing on enterprise emergencies, this article uses the theory research, combined with empirical research method, the theory instruction practice, and practice proves the theoretical. First, using respectively three-stage game theory model and evolutionary game model to analyze enterprise individuality emergencies and enterprise colony accidents, and give out corresponding countermeasures. Then through a specific example-foxconn jump events, Honda strikes respectively validation above analysis and put forward the countermeasures of constructability.
This paper put enterprise emergencies on a background of economic structure transition. By analyzing the basic characteristics of the economic structure transition, it reveals the enterprise events in the social conditions and practical reasons, and combining with the enterprise staff based on wages, psychological, entertainment, and the communication between the utility function analysis enterprise emergencies intrinsic mechanism, enterprise study emergencies condition of occurring. This paper attempts to give pertinent prevention and policy suggestions on treatment of enterprise emergencies.
This paper altogether contains five parts:the first part is the introduction, which mainly introduces the background and significance of the research. It expatiates the domestic and foreign development in present situation and the development trend, the main content of this article and research ideas and the innovation of this paper place. The second part is the three-stage game analysis of individuality emergencies. After introducing the related concept and some basic assumptions of its model, by backward induction, it obtained a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, reveals the emergence of individual causes of unexpected events, and its influential factors were analyzed as well, and then come to countermeasures. The third part is evolutionary game analysis of enterprise colony accidents:this part uses evolutionary game theory to establish enterprise and enterprise staffs replicated dynamic evolution model, analyses the model of equilibrium condition, reveals the root of unconventional type enterprise colony accidents, and expounds practical significance of this conclusion. The fourth part shows that this the second and the third part of the model analysis is correct and the strategies of constructability, through foxconn jump events and Honda strikes respectively on the specific example of enterprise individuality emergencies and colony accidents analysis. The fifth part is summary:through the above model analysis for enterprises, and emergency countermeasures were summarized, and proposes the solution methods and suggestions of these events. And this paper expounds some deficiencies, and put forward prospect of development.
This paper finally puts forward some corresponding policy recommendations. In order to avoid or minimize enterprise sudden incident, we need the efforts from all sides of government, enterprise, employees and the society; such as to build a healthy social security system, strengthen the enterprise and staff communication, strengthen labor union organization construction of the enterprise, and improve labor relations, etc. Only then can we more fully cope with the enterprise emergencies, and properly handle the enterprise emergencies, achieve promotion enterprise progress, staff satisfaction, and social development purposes.
本文首先概述了国内外现在关于突发事件应急管理的发展现状和发展趋势。突发事件应急管理是近几年学术界研究的热点问题之一,积极有效的应急管理方法和手段,可以达到事前降低发生率、事中很好地应对并降低危害程度、事后减少损失的目的。故短短几年间,应急管理的理论、方法、技术、应用和实践等有了较大的发展。但也存在很多问题,比如研究缺乏对于突发事件产生的社会条件的深入分析,应急预案的制定主要基于各级部门总结的实践经验,缺少基于严谨的理论推理基础上得出的优化分析结果和方案设计等。针对这些问题,本文进行了几点创新：从当前国内外对突发事件的研究现状来看,主要研究的是社会群体性突发事件,而对发生越来越频繁的企业突发事件鲜少研究,本文的研究对象是以前鲜少研究的企业劳资冲突诱发的突发事件,并把它置于经济结构转型期这一历史背景之下进行分析,从管理科学的角度揭示出企业突发事件的演化规律,并提出了更全面的应对策略,不仅包括政府的应对策略,还包括企业的应对策略。
在对企业突发事件进行分析的过程中,本文采用的是理论研究和实证研究相结合的方法,理论指导实践,实践验证理论。先分别运用三阶段动态博弈模型和演化博弈模型对企业个体性突发事件和企业群体性突发事件进行分析,并提出相应的应对策略,然后再通过具体的实例—富士康跳楼事件、本田罢工事件分别验证上面的分析及提出的对策的可实施性。
本文将企业突发事件置于经济结构转型期的背景之下进行研究,通过分析经济结构转型期的基本特征,揭示当前企业突发事件发生的社会条件和现实原因,同时结合企业员工基于工资,心理,娱乐,交往等的效用函数分析企业突发事件的内在机制,研究企业突发事件产生的条件。本文试图有针对性地提出预防和处置企业突发事件的政策建议。
本文一共包含五个部分的内容：第一部分是绪论,主要讲述了本文选题的背景、意义、国内外的发展现状和发展趋势、本文的主要内容和研究思路以及本文的创新之处。第二部分是对个体性突发事件的三阶段动态博弈分析,在介绍了相关概念并对其模型进行了一些基本假设之后,运用逆推归纳法得出了模型中的子博弈完美纳什均衡,揭示了个体性突发事件的产生根源,并对其影响因素进行了分析,提出了相应的应对策略。第三部分是对企业群体性突发事件的演化博弈分析,本部分运用演化博弈理论建立了企业与企业员工的复制动态演化模型,分析了模型均衡解的条件,揭示了非常规型企业群体性突发事件的产生根源,阐述了此结论的现实意义。第四部分是通过富士康跳楼事件和本田罢工事件的具体实例分别对企业个体性突发事件和群体性突发事件进行分析研究,验证了本文第二、第三部分的模型分析的正确性和应对策略的可实施性。第五部分是总结,通过上述模型分析,对企业突发事件的应对策略进行总结,并提出解决这些事件的方法和建议。并对本文的一些不足之处进行阐述,并提出今后发展展望。
本文最后提出相应的政策建议。为了避免或减少企业突发事件的发生,需要政府、企业、,员工、社会各方面的努力,如要建立健全社会保障体系,加强企业与员工的沟通,加强企业工会组织建设,改善劳资关系等。只有这样才能更加全面的应对企业突发事件,进而妥善处理企业突发事件,从而达到促进企业进步,员工满足,社会发展的目的。
In recent years, along with the social economy structure transformation of social economy, continual contradiction intertwines, and incident also assumes a rapidly rising trend, which seriously affects China's economic development and social stability. The current study for emergencies and corresponding emergency management measures proposed mostly for traffic accidents disaster, natural disasters, social security incident, etc. But for now frequent enterprise between the employees, individuality emergencies and colony accidents studies have been relatively fewer. But enterprise emergencies has become key factors that influences the development of enterprises, economic restructuring and social progress, therefore, to strengthen enterprise emergencies in the theoretical research, and to explore the enterprise events in intrinsic mechanism, thus prevent enterprise from sudden incident effectively, properly handle emergencies that have already happened has important theoretical and practical significance.
This paper briefly introduces emergency management development in present situation and developing trend. Emergency management in academic circle is one of the hot issues. Positive and effective emergency management methods can reduce incidence, cope with them beforehand, or reduce the harm degree during the course, and achieve the goat to reduce the loss afterwards. So in a few short years, the theory, method and technology, application and practice of emergency management, has witnessed a rapid development. But there are also many problems, such as research lacks for thorough analysis of social conditions that produces emergencies, emergency plan formulation mainly based on summarizing the practical experience of various departments, strict theoretical reasoning which lacks of multi-media and on optimization analysis results as well as the project design. Aiming at these problems, this article has conducted the few creations:from the current domestic and international research current situation of emergencies, the main research is about social colony accidents, while rarely research to enterprise emergencies which become increasingly frequent. The research object in the thesis is about rare research enterprise before labor conflicts induced emergency and put it on the historical backgrounds of economic structure transition, from the angle of management science, it reveals enterprise emergencies'evolution rule, and puts forward the more comprehensive strategies, including not only the government's strategy, but also the enterprise strategy.
In the process of analyzing on enterprise emergencies, this article uses the theory research, combined with empirical research method, the theory instruction practice, and practice proves the theoretical. First, using respectively three-stage game theory model and evolutionary game model to analyze enterprise individuality emergencies and enterprise colony accidents, and give out corresponding countermeasures. Then through a specific example-foxconn jump events, Honda strikes respectively validation above analysis and put forward the countermeasures of constructability.
This paper put enterprise emergencies on a background of economic structure transition. By analyzing the basic characteristics of the economic structure transition, it reveals the enterprise events in the social conditions and practical reasons, and combining with the enterprise staff based on wages, psychological, entertainment, and the communication between the utility function analysis enterprise emergencies intrinsic mechanism, enterprise study emergencies condition of occurring. This paper attempts to give pertinent prevention and policy suggestions on treatment of enterprise emergencies.
This paper altogether contains five parts:the first part is the introduction, which mainly introduces the background and significance of the research. It expatiates the domestic and foreign development in present situation and the development trend, the main content of this article and research ideas and the innovation of this paper place. The second part is the three-stage game analysis of individuality emergencies. After introducing the related concept and some basic assumptions of its model, by backward induction, it obtained a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, reveals the emergence of individual causes of unexpected events, and its influential factors were analyzed as well, and then come to countermeasures. The third part is evolutionary game analysis of enterprise colony accidents:this part uses evolutionary game theory to establish enterprise and enterprise staffs replicated dynamic evolution model, analyses the model of equilibrium condition, reveals the root of unconventional type enterprise colony accidents, and expounds practical significance of this conclusion. The fourth part shows that this the second and the third part of the model analysis is correct and the strategies of constructability, through foxconn jump events and Honda strikes respectively on the specific example of enterprise individuality emergencies and colony accidents analysis. The fifth part is summary:through the above model analysis for enterprises, and emergency countermeasures were summarized, and proposes the solution methods and suggestions of these events. And this paper expounds some deficiencies, and put forward prospect of development.
This paper finally puts forward some corresponding policy recommendations. In order to avoid or minimize enterprise sudden incident, we need the efforts from all sides of government, enterprise, employees and the society; such as to build a healthy social security system, strengthen the enterprise and staff communication, strengthen labor union organization construction of the enterprise, and improve labor relations, etc. Only then can we more fully cope with the enterprise emergencies, and properly handle the enterprise emergencies, achieve promotion enterprise progress, staff satisfaction, and social development purposes.
引文
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