中国地方公债发展研究
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摘要
在现代社会,政府财政收支影响着社会经济发展的方方面面。从理论层面讲,与中央政府相比,地方政府在提供地方公共品方面具有信息上的优势,而地方公共品的支出一般属于资本性支出,同政府税收相比,用举债方式筹集地方公共建设资金更为合理,它将公共项目建设成本分摊到项目受益的若干时期内,实现了成本与收益相匹配,因此应允许地方政府发行地方公债来为地方公共基础建设项目筹集资金。而且地方政府是政府体系的重要组成部分,地方政府在履行其职能时需要有相应的财力作保证,而举债权则是地方政府财权的应有内容。
与国家层面上李嘉图等价定理成立条件不同,地方层面上李嘉图等价成立的假设条件不是利他主义动机导致债务负担的代际转移,而是政府税债的选择将反映到地方地产价格的变化上,这需要严格的假设前提如充分信息,地方实行单一的地产税等。如果现实不满足这些假设前提,则李嘉图等价成立条件将被破坏,发行地方公债将增进地方居民的福利水平,刺激地方经济增长和收入水平增加。
从现实情况看,中国在1994年实行分税制改革以来,地方财政收入和支出之间的不平衡不断加剧,地方政府在相应事权的压力下,需要相应的财力来保证其履行职能。从融资效率的角度,运用主成分分析和熵值法可以对土地融资、融资平台融资、地方债融资等四种现阶段地方政府常用的融资方式进行综合比较分析,从中可以看出,与其它融资方式相比,地方公债融资方式具有更高的融资效率,地方公债融资方式应成为地方政府融资的主要渠道。
中国现阶段发展地方公债市场有一定的市场基础,这可从地方公债市场的需求-供给框架中展开分析。目前中国债券市场初步形成,广大居民和机构投资者有巨大的投资需求,发展地方公债对中央、地方财政,对资本市场都有利,地方公债的供给条件和时机逐渐成熟。与此同时,中国应在地方公债二级市场发展,强化发债主体预算约束等方面进一步改进市场条件。
发行地方公债为地方公共基础设施项目融资是世界发展潮流和趋势。美、日等发达国家在这方面积累的经验教训可为中国发展地方公债市场提供借鉴。中国目前采用中央代发的方式发行地方公债,这有利于增强地方公债的信用,提高债券发行效率,减轻各地区之间发展不平衡状况,但中央代发的地方公债不利于发挥地方的积极性,影响地方债的利率水平和规模、期限等,具有过渡性特征。中国应从建立完备的地方公债制度,大力发展地方公债二级市场并不断推进地方公债融资的配套改革等方面采取具体的政策措施来促进地方公债市场发展。
In current society, governmental revenue and expenditure has great impact on all aspects of social and economic development. Theoretically speaking, in comparison with the central government, local governments have information advantage in the provision of local public goods. And the expenditure of local public goods generally belongs to capital expenditure, Compared with the government revenue, it is more reasonable to building up local public construction funds in the way of raising debts, which will allocate the cost of public project construction into a number of project-benefitted periods, achieving a balance between cost and benefit. Therefore, local governments should be allowed to issue local bonds for local public infrastructure projects to raise funds. And since the local governments are an important part of the government system, in carrying out their functions, local governments need to have appropriate financial guarantee, and debt financing right should be part of local government financial rights.
Different from the establishment conditions of David Ricardo's Equal Value Theorem on the national level, on the local level its assumed establishment condition is not that altruistic motives lead to the intergenerational transfer of the debt burden, but that the choice of government tax/debt will be reflected in changes of the local real estate prices, which requires strict presumptions such as sufficient information, the local implementation of single property tax, etc. If reality does not meet these presumptions, the establishment condition of the theorem will be destroyed. Local bonds will enhance the welfare of local residents and stimulate local economic growth and income increase.
In the light of reality, since the implementation of the tax sharing system reform in 1994 in China, the imbalance between local revenues and expenditures is growing. Under the pressure of the corresponding management rights, local governments need appropriate financial powers to ensure the fulfillment of their functions. From the perspective of financing efficiency, the use of principal component analysis method and entropy method can reach a comprehensive comparative analysis on the current four financing methods commonly used by the local governments, that is, land financing, platform financing, local bonds financing, etc. from which it can be seen that compared with other financing methods, the local bonds financing is more efficient, therefore it should be the main channel for local governments financing.
At present China has certain market basis for the development of local bonds, which can be analyzed form the demand-supply framework of the local bonds market. Now since China's bond market has been preliminarily formed, and the majority of residents and institutional investors have huge investment demand, the development of local bonds is favorable for the central government, the local finance and capital markets, therefore, the supply conditions of local bonds have gradually come to maturity. At the same time, China should develop the local bonds secondary market, and harden the budget constraints of the bonds issuing subjects to further improve the market conditions.
Issuing local bonds for local public infrastructure project financing is the world trend. The developed countries such as the U.S. and Japan, etc. have accumulated lots of experiences for China to learn from in developing local bonds market. At present, China's central government issue the local bonds on commission, which is good for strengthening the local bonds credit, increasing issuing efficiency, diminishing the imbalanced development situation among different regions. But it is unfavorable for local governments'initiative, affecting the local bonds'scale and level of interest rate, therefore, it has the transitional feature. China should take practical measures in the aspects such as establishing complete local bonds system, developing local bonds secondary markets, and continuously accelerating the local bonds financing reforms, to promote the development of the local bonds markets.
与国家层面上李嘉图等价定理成立条件不同,地方层面上李嘉图等价成立的假设条件不是利他主义动机导致债务负担的代际转移,而是政府税债的选择将反映到地方地产价格的变化上,这需要严格的假设前提如充分信息,地方实行单一的地产税等。如果现实不满足这些假设前提,则李嘉图等价成立条件将被破坏,发行地方公债将增进地方居民的福利水平,刺激地方经济增长和收入水平增加。
从现实情况看,中国在1994年实行分税制改革以来,地方财政收入和支出之间的不平衡不断加剧,地方政府在相应事权的压力下,需要相应的财力来保证其履行职能。从融资效率的角度,运用主成分分析和熵值法可以对土地融资、融资平台融资、地方债融资等四种现阶段地方政府常用的融资方式进行综合比较分析,从中可以看出,与其它融资方式相比,地方公债融资方式具有更高的融资效率,地方公债融资方式应成为地方政府融资的主要渠道。
中国现阶段发展地方公债市场有一定的市场基础,这可从地方公债市场的需求-供给框架中展开分析。目前中国债券市场初步形成,广大居民和机构投资者有巨大的投资需求,发展地方公债对中央、地方财政,对资本市场都有利,地方公债的供给条件和时机逐渐成熟。与此同时,中国应在地方公债二级市场发展,强化发债主体预算约束等方面进一步改进市场条件。
发行地方公债为地方公共基础设施项目融资是世界发展潮流和趋势。美、日等发达国家在这方面积累的经验教训可为中国发展地方公债市场提供借鉴。中国目前采用中央代发的方式发行地方公债,这有利于增强地方公债的信用,提高债券发行效率,减轻各地区之间发展不平衡状况,但中央代发的地方公债不利于发挥地方的积极性,影响地方债的利率水平和规模、期限等,具有过渡性特征。中国应从建立完备的地方公债制度,大力发展地方公债二级市场并不断推进地方公债融资的配套改革等方面采取具体的政策措施来促进地方公债市场发展。
In current society, governmental revenue and expenditure has great impact on all aspects of social and economic development. Theoretically speaking, in comparison with the central government, local governments have information advantage in the provision of local public goods. And the expenditure of local public goods generally belongs to capital expenditure, Compared with the government revenue, it is more reasonable to building up local public construction funds in the way of raising debts, which will allocate the cost of public project construction into a number of project-benefitted periods, achieving a balance between cost and benefit. Therefore, local governments should be allowed to issue local bonds for local public infrastructure projects to raise funds. And since the local governments are an important part of the government system, in carrying out their functions, local governments need to have appropriate financial guarantee, and debt financing right should be part of local government financial rights.
Different from the establishment conditions of David Ricardo's Equal Value Theorem on the national level, on the local level its assumed establishment condition is not that altruistic motives lead to the intergenerational transfer of the debt burden, but that the choice of government tax/debt will be reflected in changes of the local real estate prices, which requires strict presumptions such as sufficient information, the local implementation of single property tax, etc. If reality does not meet these presumptions, the establishment condition of the theorem will be destroyed. Local bonds will enhance the welfare of local residents and stimulate local economic growth and income increase.
In the light of reality, since the implementation of the tax sharing system reform in 1994 in China, the imbalance between local revenues and expenditures is growing. Under the pressure of the corresponding management rights, local governments need appropriate financial powers to ensure the fulfillment of their functions. From the perspective of financing efficiency, the use of principal component analysis method and entropy method can reach a comprehensive comparative analysis on the current four financing methods commonly used by the local governments, that is, land financing, platform financing, local bonds financing, etc. from which it can be seen that compared with other financing methods, the local bonds financing is more efficient, therefore it should be the main channel for local governments financing.
At present China has certain market basis for the development of local bonds, which can be analyzed form the demand-supply framework of the local bonds market. Now since China's bond market has been preliminarily formed, and the majority of residents and institutional investors have huge investment demand, the development of local bonds is favorable for the central government, the local finance and capital markets, therefore, the supply conditions of local bonds have gradually come to maturity. At the same time, China should develop the local bonds secondary market, and harden the budget constraints of the bonds issuing subjects to further improve the market conditions.
Issuing local bonds for local public infrastructure project financing is the world trend. The developed countries such as the U.S. and Japan, etc. have accumulated lots of experiences for China to learn from in developing local bonds market. At present, China's central government issue the local bonds on commission, which is good for strengthening the local bonds credit, increasing issuing efficiency, diminishing the imbalanced development situation among different regions. But it is unfavorable for local governments'initiative, affecting the local bonds'scale and level of interest rate, therefore, it has the transitional feature. China should take practical measures in the aspects such as establishing complete local bonds system, developing local bonds secondary markets, and continuously accelerating the local bonds financing reforms, to promote the development of the local bonds markets.
引文
①亚当·斯密.国民财富的性质和原因的研究(下卷).郭大力,王亚南译.商务印书馆,2009：500
①布坎南(J.M.Buchanan)民主财政论.穆怀朋译.商务印书馆,1999
①关于李嘉图等价定理及其争论的论述参考了新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典《李嘉图等价定理》和高培勇《国债运行机制》中的论述方法。
②大卫·李嘉图.政治经济学及赋税原理.郭大力,王亚南译.商务印书馆,2009：206
①根据大卫·N·海曼.《公共财政》(北京：中国财政经济出版社,2001)和《中国统计年鉴》中的数据计算。
②资料来源：世界银行WDI数据库。
①审计署审计结果公告(二〇一一年第三十五号)：《全国地方政府性债务审计结果》,中华人民共和国审计署网站,2011年06月27日。
②同上。
①国土资源部：2011年上半年国土资源有关统计数据,国土资源部网站,2011-08-23。
②审计署审计结果公告(二O一一年第三十五号)：《全国地方政府性债务审计结果》,中华人民共和国审计署网站,2011年06月27日。
①审计署：《关于2010年度中央预算执行和其他财政收支的审计工作报告》,中华人民共和国审计署网站,2011年06月27日。
①审计署公告(二〇〇八年第四号总第二十八号)：《国有土地使用权出让金审计调查结果》,中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站。
①岳锋,王智慧,周国新.制度均衡与制度非均衡.天府新论,2005,6：71-74
①边卫红,陆晓明,戴道华.美国债券市场结构分析及策略研究.全球经济金融问题研究,2011,72(3)：1-26
②同上。
①童适平.战后日本财政和财政政策研究.上海：上海财经大学出版社,2002：19-23
①刘长琨.日本财政制度.北京：中国财政经济出版社,1998：104-111
①王朝才.日本90年代以来的财政政策.财政研究,2002,7：68-73
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①布坎南(J.M.Buchanan)民主财政论.穆怀朋译.商务印书馆,1999
①关于李嘉图等价定理及其争论的论述参考了新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典《李嘉图等价定理》和高培勇《国债运行机制》中的论述方法。
②大卫·李嘉图.政治经济学及赋税原理.郭大力,王亚南译.商务印书馆,2009：206
①根据大卫·N·海曼.《公共财政》(北京：中国财政经济出版社,2001)和《中国统计年鉴》中的数据计算。
②资料来源：世界银行WDI数据库。
①审计署审计结果公告(二〇一一年第三十五号)：《全国地方政府性债务审计结果》,中华人民共和国审计署网站,2011年06月27日。
②同上。
①国土资源部：2011年上半年国土资源有关统计数据,国土资源部网站,2011-08-23。
②审计署审计结果公告(二O一一年第三十五号)：《全国地方政府性债务审计结果》,中华人民共和国审计署网站,2011年06月27日。
①审计署：《关于2010年度中央预算执行和其他财政收支的审计工作报告》,中华人民共和国审计署网站,2011年06月27日。
①审计署公告(二〇〇八年第四号总第二十八号)：《国有土地使用权出让金审计调查结果》,中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站。
①岳锋,王智慧,周国新.制度均衡与制度非均衡.天府新论,2005,6：71-74
①边卫红,陆晓明,戴道华.美国债券市场结构分析及策略研究.全球经济金融问题研究,2011,72(3)：1-26
②同上。
①童适平.战后日本财政和财政政策研究.上海：上海财经大学出版社,2002：19-23
①刘长琨.日本财政制度.北京：中国财政经济出版社,1998：104-111
①王朝才.日本90年代以来的财政政策.财政研究,2002,7：68-73
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