我国建筑节能财政政策研究
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摘要
随着能源紧张和环境污染问题的日益严峻,我国政府加大了节能减排工作力度,民用建筑领域的节能也成为了节能减排的重点。我国建筑节能自二十世纪八十年代开始,主要以政府的行政性强制措施为推进手段,而市场主体缺乏主动节能投资的积极性,建筑节能推进缓慢。如何有效发挥政府的宏观调控作用,引导市场主体的积极性和主动性成为政策研究的关键点。本文深入剖析我国建筑节能存在的制度障碍,研究如何运用财政政策有效促进建筑节能开展。本文采用定性分析与定量分析相结合的研究方法,对我国建筑节能财政政策的制定进行了深入研究,得出了一些有参考价值的结论。论文主要内容如下:
     从现实情况入手分析了我国建筑节能财政政策的需求,提出问题研究的必要性和紧迫性。我国建筑能耗存在着能耗大、能效低、污染重等现状,同时,城市化进程加快、居民消费水平提高、农村用能结构改变和产业结构调整等因素加剧了建筑用能需求,通过对建筑用能需求和建筑能效两方面的影响因素分析和预测,建立了我国建筑节能潜力动态评估模型。通过详细分析我国建筑节能的发展现状及存在的制度障碍,指出建筑节能财政政策缺失是建筑节能推进缓慢的重要因素之一,进而评析现有的建筑节能财政政策实施现状及激励作用缺失的问题,提出论文研究的必要性和重要意义。
     理论分析与经验借鉴相结合,研究了我国建筑节能财政政策的政府定位问题。运用公共财政学的外部性理论,分析了建筑节能投资的正外部性特征和市场机制失灵导致的建筑节能产品市场均衡状态偏离社会最优配置,同时分析了税收优惠和财政补贴等政策手段对于促进节能和约束非节能行为的激励作用,指出财政政策促进节能的有效性;进而从宏观层面分析实施建筑节能财政政策的成本效益,构建政策成本和政策效益指标体系,评估政策实施的宏观经济性能。运用公共物品理论分析建筑节能产品的准公共物品属性和实施主体缺失的根源,借鉴国外实施建筑节能财政政策的经验,并运用临界质量模型进行政府行为定位分析。
     对市场主体的建筑节能财政政策体系进行设计。根据机制设计理论,财政政策的设计应满足激励机制的参与约束和激励相容约束,才能引导市场主体在自利原则下的行为选择符合设定的社会总体目标。在明确建筑节能政策目标和重点领域的基础上,运用供求理论分析我国建筑产品市场的供求现状及趋势,指出现阶段建筑产品的供给端投资决策对于节能与否具有较强的决定作用。通过建立开发商群体和消费者群体的有限理性进化博弈模型分析,政府可根据两类群体的进化学习速度选择财政政策措施。通过建立理性政府与有限理性开发商群体的进化博弈模型,分析了政府选择财政政策激励力度的理论依据。基于前述研究基础上,提出了针对新建建筑节能、既有建筑节能和可再生能源建筑应用领域的市场主体财政政策框架设计。
     建立中央政府与地方政府的政策投入博弈模型,证明区域差异会对博弈结果产生影响,并对我国建筑节能区域差异进行划分,提出具有地区差异的财政政策选择建议。结合我国地域广阔,地区差异大的国情,根据建筑节能专项检查的数据进行差异指标分析,指出各地区开展建筑节能的基础条件存在很大差异,导致建筑节能进展不均衡。分析影响建筑节能的经济因素、现有节能工作基础因素、能源因素和建筑能耗因素等,运用主成分分析和系统聚类分析方法,对各省份开展建筑节能的现实条件进行区域划分,并依据区域划分结果,提出具有区域差异的财政政策选择建议。
     结合论文研究内容,选择上海市作为实证分析对象,分析了上海市能耗状况及节能潜力,并对上海市建筑节能财政政策的现状进行评析,结合上海市的地区特点,进行了财政政策方案优化设计,并预测了政策实施的经济、社会和环境效益。
     建筑节能财政政策的研究有利于政府充分发挥宏观调控职能,运用经济杠杆,引导市场主体的节能投资行为。有效运用财政政策手段和合理利用财政资金,发挥市场机制作用,充分挖掘建筑节能潜力,实现包括社会效益和环境效益在内的宏观经济效益,实现节能总体目标和能源可持续发展目标。
With the more severe problem of energy short and environment pollution, Chinese government increase the work power for energy efficiency and emission reduction and civil building region becomes the key point of energy efficiency and emission reduction. China building energy efficient work starts in the beginning of 1980’s, which is pushed by government’s administrative and compulsive measures. Therefore, it becomes the key research point that how to play the role of government’s macro regulating and controlling to induce the market agent’s enthusiasm and active for that market agent is absent of enthusiasm of voluntary investment and building energy efficient work is pushed slowly. The study deeply analyzes the system obstacle for building energy efficiency (BEE) in China and makes research on how to effectively promote the development of building energy efficient work by fiscal policy. It adopts the method with combining quantitative and qualitative research method. Get some results with much reference value on establish fiscal policy. The study contents are as followings.
     From the practice, analyze the requirement of fiscal policy of BEE in China, and propose the necessary and importance of research problem. In China, there is the condition of big energy consumption, low energy efficiency and serious pollution in building energy consumption. At the same time, it quickens energy utilization requirement that quickly development of city, improvement of resident consuming level, changing energy utilization frame in country, adjustment of industry structure and other factors. The study qualitatively analyzes the requirement of energy efficiency in China. And through analyzing and forecasting the influent factors of building energy utilization requirement and building energy efficiency, establish dynamic evaluation model of energy efficient potential ability. Quantitative analysis result proved that there is big potential ability in BEE. Analyze the development condition and existing system obstacle of BEE in China in detail. Through analyzing the existing problem, propose that absence of fiscal policy of BEE is one of important factors of slowly propelling BEE. Comment on the problem of implement condition of fiscal policy of BEE and absence of incentive role, and propose the necessary and important meaning of researching on policy.
     Combination with theory analysis and experience references, research on the problem of government orientation on fiscal policy of BEE in China. Using externality theory of public finance theory, analyze the market equilibrium condition departure with optimized social collocation by positive externality of building energy efficient investment and market failure. At the same time, analyze the incentive role of tax credit, fiscal subsidy and other policy measures to propelling energy efficiency and restricting non-energy-efficient behavior, and propose the effectiveness of fiscal policy propelling BEE. In macro-level, analyze cost and benefit of implementing fiscal policy of BEE, construct the index system of cost and benefit of policy, and evaluate macro-economic performance of policy implement. Utilizing public goods theory, analyze the quasi-public goods characteristics of building energy efficient goods and reason of absent of implement agents. Reference on the experience of implementing fiscal policy of BEE in foreign country and China, analyze the government behavior orientation by critical quality model.
     Design fiscal policy system of BEE to market agents. According the theory of mechanism design, design fiscal policy should satisfy with participant restriction and incentive compatible restriction so as to induce market agent to select total social aim under the self principle. On the basis of confirming aim and key fields of fiscal policy of BEE, utilize supply and demand theory to analyze the condition and tendency of building energy efficient goods market, and refer that investment decision on supply sides of building goods has the bigger determinative role to BEE. Through establishing evolutionary game model with bounded rationality between developers and consumers, the proportion energy efficient building established by developers and purchased by consumers are goods that the market is tend to optimized equilibrium. Government can select fiscal policy measure through evolutionary study speed of two groups. Through establish evolutionary game model with rationality between government and developers, analyze the theory basis of government selecting incentive degree of fiscal policy. On the basis of following research, propose the fiscal policy scheme including new building energy efficiency, existing building energy efficient retrofit and renewable energy applied in building.
     Establish investment game model between central government and local government, prove that regional difference has the influence on game result, carve up the regional difference of BEE in China, and propose suggestions on selecting different fiscal policy according to the regional characteristics. According to the national condition of wide field and big regional difference, analyze the different index of data on special checking on BEE, refer that there are big difference in basis condition on having building energy efficient work so as to un-balanced development. Analyze the economic factor influencing BEE, basic factor of existing building energy efficient work, energy factor, building energy consumption factor and other factors, utilize principal component analysis and system clustering analysis method to carve up the regional practical condition of each province taking building energy efficient work. And propose the corresponding fiscal policy suggestions according to the region carving results according to the result of regional carving.
     According the research contents, select Shanghai as the experimental analysis object, analyze energy consumption condition and energy efficient potential in Shanghai. And comment on the condition of fiscal policy of BEE. Considering the region characteristics of Shanghai, optimized design fiscal policy, and forecast the economic, social and environmental benefit.
     Research on fiscal policy for BEE is good for government fully playing the macro regulating and controlling function, inducing the energy efficient investment behavior of market agent by economic lever. Effectively utilize fiscal policy measures, fully utilize financial capital, take the role of market mechanism, and fully dig energy efficient potential in building field. Realize the general macro economic benefit including social benefit and environmental benefit, general energy efficient aims and energy sustainable development.
引文
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