地方政府预算监督机制的研究
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摘要
政府预算是指一个国家的财政收支计划表,集中反映了国家政府活动的范围和方向。按照宪法和《预算法》的规定,各级人民代表大会有权审查和批准同级政府的预算,并且监督预算的执行。这应该是人民监督政府参与管理国家事务的重要途径之一。作为政府主要的经济活动行为,政府预算理应受到来自民众和人大的监督,然而就像众多学者所言那样,我国政府预算监督机制的完善还有很长的路要走。令人欣慰的是我国各级政府目前都愿意并乐于在政府预算监督管理方面进行改革,然而遗憾的是尽管部门预算改革,国库集中支付改革,政府采购的改革等等都取得了不错的成效,比如人大代表手中有关预算的材料比过去厚实明细,部门预算从无到有,政府收入和支出越来越明晰化,审查程序逐步规范,随意性大为减少,我国整体的预算监督管理仍然没有达到应有的层次。这其中的原因很多,包括政治方面的因素,经济方面的因素以及文化方面因素。就目前我国政府预算管理的情况来看,进一步完善地方政府预算监督机制的建设是有必要,有意义的。考虑到政府预算活动是自下而上逐级审批和汇编的,中央政府应该立足基层政府来推进政府预算监督机制的建设和完善。特别是近年来我国地方政府在预算民主化的建设方面取得了不错的成绩,如浙江温岭的参与式预算模式已经被全国多地模仿和改进。参与式预算模式的引进表明在我国实施民主化的预算监督机制改革是可行的。但完善预算监督机制所涉及的领域很广,包括经济学,管理学,伦理学,政治学等等。因此研究如何改善政府的预算监督机制的研究并不是一份简单容易的工作。
本文对该问题的分析主要是立足于现实工作中公众与政府之间,政府机构与政府机构之间的委托代理关系来对政府预算监督机制的完善进行分析并提出公共预算过程中委托代理关系里常见的“逆向选择”和“道德风险”问题的政策建议。本文第一章主要分析了本文的写作前提和背景,以及国内外关于预算监督机制方面的文献综述。第二章在公共财政框架下讨论了完善政府预算监督机制的必要性,同时构建政府预算环节可能出现的零和博弈和合谋模型并结合委托代理的视角分析了公共预算资金在运行的过程中涉及到的利益相关方对于预算资金可能出现的竞争情况。第三章主要以浙江省为例分析了浙江省政府预算的编制、审批、执行、决算这四个环节在现实中面临的问题和原因。第四章,从公共资金运行过程中资金的需求方和资金的供给方之间的博弈构思了完善我国地方政府关于预算监督机制的建议。例如完善温岭的参与式模式中公民参与的深度,即设计好参与者的规模,环节,以及完善和加强相关的预算信息公开制度的建设。第五章是对全文的总结以及对本文研究内容的局限性分析,指出了地方政府应该进一步完善预算透明度,公共支出的绩效管理,公民参与预算的民主化建设以及财政体制的改革等等方面。通过对整个预算监督的各个环节的分析,指出了本文研究的局限性,预算监督体系还应该包含如预算透明、政府财政风险分析、公共支出绩效分析、公民参与预算的民主化建设等等。
Government budgeting refers to the revenue and expenditure in public sectors, which reflect governments’economic behaviors in certain areas. According to the constitution and Budget Act in China, People’s Congress are required to investigate and ratify governments’budgets and need to monitor the enforcement of budget plan. This is one important way for the public to keep an eye on the government’s economics behaviors. As the main economic behaviors of the government, government budget should be supervised by the public or the representatives of public, however, like most of the scholars in China had pointed out that there is still a long way to run to perfect the supervision mechanism of government budget. Gratifying thing for the moment is that most of the government organizations are willing to take reform in aspect of government budget management. Though we had made a great progress in department budget reform, treasury centralized paying reform and government purchase reform and so on, and compared to the past, the people’s congress nowadays have more specific details in the budgetary documents and information of the government revenue and expenditures are more clear, audit programs are more and more former, however, the government budgetary management of our country still far away from a reasonable situation. There are many reasons for this including political issues, economic issues and cultural issues and so on. It is necessary and significant to continue to carry forward the building of the local government budget mechanism if take a look of the framework of the whole government budget issue in our country. Considering the government budget documents are examined and approved from the bottom government organizations to the top government organization, it is important for the central government to strengthen the local government budget mechanism. We had, actually, made a great progress in perfecting the democratic budget mechanism in the local governments. For an example, Participatory Budgeting of Wenling City in Zhejiang province had been followed by many other cities in China due to its advantages in public budget. This sends out a sign that it is possible to promote democratic budget in China. However, government budget covers many complicated principles in economics, management, ethics and politics, and that's why no one would say it is an easy job to do.
So basically, this paper is going to discuss and analyze the main problems that the people’s congress, public and governments would encounter in the practice such as adverse selection and moral hazard issues in the framework of agency by agreement, and prepare to make some policy suggestions based on the analysis of the problems. In the first chapter of this paper, it mainly brings out the backgrounds and provides a literature review about the topic. In the second chapter, the importance and significance of strengthening supervision mechanism of government budget in the framework of public finance will be discussed and analyzed. At the same time, a Zero-game Model and Conspiring Model would be built in the process of government budget to discuss and analyze the factors that effects the competition and performance about public finance by the points of agency by agreement. Chapter 3 had analyzed the problems of local government budget in each separate four stages and reasons behind them such as budgeting examine and approve implementation and final budget. These problems send out a sign that it is necessary and important to perfect the budget mechanism in China. Chapter four provides some suggestions on how to specifically promote the budget mechanism after reviewing the games between the public capital suppliers and demanders. At the end of this paper is the conclusions and future direction of the academic research about this topic. Say, we need to analyze the issues of budgetary transparency, government finance risks, and performance of public expenditure and democracy political environment building in government budget and so on in the future.
本文对该问题的分析主要是立足于现实工作中公众与政府之间,政府机构与政府机构之间的委托代理关系来对政府预算监督机制的完善进行分析并提出公共预算过程中委托代理关系里常见的“逆向选择”和“道德风险”问题的政策建议。本文第一章主要分析了本文的写作前提和背景,以及国内外关于预算监督机制方面的文献综述。第二章在公共财政框架下讨论了完善政府预算监督机制的必要性,同时构建政府预算环节可能出现的零和博弈和合谋模型并结合委托代理的视角分析了公共预算资金在运行的过程中涉及到的利益相关方对于预算资金可能出现的竞争情况。第三章主要以浙江省为例分析了浙江省政府预算的编制、审批、执行、决算这四个环节在现实中面临的问题和原因。第四章,从公共资金运行过程中资金的需求方和资金的供给方之间的博弈构思了完善我国地方政府关于预算监督机制的建议。例如完善温岭的参与式模式中公民参与的深度,即设计好参与者的规模,环节,以及完善和加强相关的预算信息公开制度的建设。第五章是对全文的总结以及对本文研究内容的局限性分析,指出了地方政府应该进一步完善预算透明度,公共支出的绩效管理,公民参与预算的民主化建设以及财政体制的改革等等方面。通过对整个预算监督的各个环节的分析,指出了本文研究的局限性,预算监督体系还应该包含如预算透明、政府财政风险分析、公共支出绩效分析、公民参与预算的民主化建设等等。
Government budgeting refers to the revenue and expenditure in public sectors, which reflect governments’economic behaviors in certain areas. According to the constitution and Budget Act in China, People’s Congress are required to investigate and ratify governments’budgets and need to monitor the enforcement of budget plan. This is one important way for the public to keep an eye on the government’s economics behaviors. As the main economic behaviors of the government, government budget should be supervised by the public or the representatives of public, however, like most of the scholars in China had pointed out that there is still a long way to run to perfect the supervision mechanism of government budget. Gratifying thing for the moment is that most of the government organizations are willing to take reform in aspect of government budget management. Though we had made a great progress in department budget reform, treasury centralized paying reform and government purchase reform and so on, and compared to the past, the people’s congress nowadays have more specific details in the budgetary documents and information of the government revenue and expenditures are more clear, audit programs are more and more former, however, the government budgetary management of our country still far away from a reasonable situation. There are many reasons for this including political issues, economic issues and cultural issues and so on. It is necessary and significant to continue to carry forward the building of the local government budget mechanism if take a look of the framework of the whole government budget issue in our country. Considering the government budget documents are examined and approved from the bottom government organizations to the top government organization, it is important for the central government to strengthen the local government budget mechanism. We had, actually, made a great progress in perfecting the democratic budget mechanism in the local governments. For an example, Participatory Budgeting of Wenling City in Zhejiang province had been followed by many other cities in China due to its advantages in public budget. This sends out a sign that it is possible to promote democratic budget in China. However, government budget covers many complicated principles in economics, management, ethics and politics, and that's why no one would say it is an easy job to do.
So basically, this paper is going to discuss and analyze the main problems that the people’s congress, public and governments would encounter in the practice such as adverse selection and moral hazard issues in the framework of agency by agreement, and prepare to make some policy suggestions based on the analysis of the problems. In the first chapter of this paper, it mainly brings out the backgrounds and provides a literature review about the topic. In the second chapter, the importance and significance of strengthening supervision mechanism of government budget in the framework of public finance will be discussed and analyzed. At the same time, a Zero-game Model and Conspiring Model would be built in the process of government budget to discuss and analyze the factors that effects the competition and performance about public finance by the points of agency by agreement. Chapter 3 had analyzed the problems of local government budget in each separate four stages and reasons behind them such as budgeting examine and approve implementation and final budget. These problems send out a sign that it is necessary and important to perfect the budget mechanism in China. Chapter four provides some suggestions on how to specifically promote the budget mechanism after reviewing the games between the public capital suppliers and demanders. At the end of this paper is the conclusions and future direction of the academic research about this topic. Say, we need to analyze the issues of budgetary transparency, government finance risks, and performance of public expenditure and democracy political environment building in government budget and so on in the future.
引文
①数据来源:关于浙江省2008年度本级预算执行和其他财政收支的审计工作报告[R].浙江:浙江审计署, 2010
①阿克顿,权利与自由,商务印书馆, 1887年版, P342.
①Seabright, P.,“Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model”. European Economic Review, 1996, 40,pp.61-89.
②彭天斗等,政府预算编制管理中的寻租现象[J].合作经济与科技,2008,12:75-78.
①马蔡琛.政府预算管理中的“寻租”活动分析[J].财政监察, 2004年第11期.
①周文志,周红.政府雇员制度分析[J].税务与经济,2006年第6期.
②吴俊培.财政监督与财政改革简论[J].财政监察, 2002年第1期.
①钟晓敏,叶宁.中国地方财政体制改革研究[M].中国财政经济出版社2010年, p177.
①马蔡琛,变革世界中的政府预算管理—一种利益相关方视角的考察[M].社会科学出版社, 2010.
①程瑜.政府预算契约论—一种委托代理理论的研究视角[M],经济科学出版社, 2008, p123.
①徐曙娜.公共支出过程中的信息不对称与制度约束[M].中国财政经济出版社2005年版,p186.
①马蔡琛.变革世界中的政府预算管理—一种利益相关方视角的考察[M].中国社会科学出版社, 2010年.
②Congleton, R. Competitive Process, Competitive Waste, and Institutions [M], U.S.A: Texas A & M University Press, 1980.
③Congleton, R. Committees and Rent-Seeking Effort [J], The Journal of Public Economics, 1983, 41.
①资料来源:萧山区2100年区级部门预算编制手册[R].杭州:萧山区财政局,2010.
①Mirrlees, J. The optimal structure of authority and incentives within an organization, [ J ]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1976, 7 (8).
②Holmstrom B. Moral hazard and observability [ J ]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1979, 10 (12).
①王晟.财政监督理论探索与制度设计研究[M].北京:经济管理出版社,2009.
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①阿克顿,权利与自由,商务印书馆, 1887年版, P342.
①Seabright, P.,“Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model”. European Economic Review, 1996, 40,pp.61-89.
②彭天斗等,政府预算编制管理中的寻租现象[J].合作经济与科技,2008,12:75-78.
①马蔡琛.政府预算管理中的“寻租”活动分析[J].财政监察, 2004年第11期.
①周文志,周红.政府雇员制度分析[J].税务与经济,2006年第6期.
②吴俊培.财政监督与财政改革简论[J].财政监察, 2002年第1期.
①钟晓敏,叶宁.中国地方财政体制改革研究[M].中国财政经济出版社2010年, p177.
①马蔡琛,变革世界中的政府预算管理—一种利益相关方视角的考察[M].社会科学出版社, 2010.
①程瑜.政府预算契约论—一种委托代理理论的研究视角[M],经济科学出版社, 2008, p123.
①徐曙娜.公共支出过程中的信息不对称与制度约束[M].中国财政经济出版社2005年版,p186.
①马蔡琛.变革世界中的政府预算管理—一种利益相关方视角的考察[M].中国社会科学出版社, 2010年.
②Congleton, R. Competitive Process, Competitive Waste, and Institutions [M], U.S.A: Texas A & M University Press, 1980.
③Congleton, R. Committees and Rent-Seeking Effort [J], The Journal of Public Economics, 1983, 41.
①资料来源:萧山区2100年区级部门预算编制手册[R].杭州:萧山区财政局,2010.
①Mirrlees, J. The optimal structure of authority and incentives within an organization, [ J ]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1976, 7 (8).
②Holmstrom B. Moral hazard and observability [ J ]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1979, 10 (12).
①王晟.财政监督理论探索与制度设计研究[M].北京:经济管理出版社,2009.
[1]阿克顿.权利与自由[M].商务印书馆,1887.
[2]艾伦.威尔达夫斯基.预算过程的新政治学[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2006.
[3]艾伦.威尔达夫斯基.预算与治理[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2010.
[4]程瑜.政府预算契约论—一种委托代理理论的研究视角[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2008.
[5]包丽萍.政府预算[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社,2000.
[6]徐曙娜.公共支出过程中的信息不对称与制度约束[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2005.
[7]杨之刚.公共财政学:理论与实践[M].上海:上海人民出版社, 1999.
[8]麦履康,黄艳卿.中国政府预算[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,1999.
[9]郑建新.中国政府预算制度改革研究[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2003.
[10]王金秀,陈志勇.国家预算管理[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2001.
[11]胡乐亭.国家预算[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,1991.
[12]李保仁.国家预算理论与实务[M].北京:北京经济学院出版社,1996.
[13]王加林.中国财政法律理论与实务全书[M].北京:经济管理出版社,1998.
[14]沈汉,刘新城.英国议会政治史[M].南京:南京大学出版社,1991.
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