企业集团内部资本市场与外部融资约束研究
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摘要
在现代市场经济条件下,资金的获取主要有两种渠道:一是通过外部资本市场,即证券市场和信贷市场;二是通过企业内部获取,即内部资本市场。我国外部资本市场经历了20多年的发展逐渐完善,但仍不发达。因此内部资本市场的出现从某种意义上讲是外部资本市场很好的补充。融资约束是企业普遍存在的问题,在我国,随着企业规模的不断扩大以及企业集团和系族企业的迅速增加,内部资本市场的发展也由于能够缓解外部融资约束等优势而开始日益受到重视。但是,随着内部资本市场的发展,其在企业中的功能会产生异化的趋势,出现诸如“交叉主义”、“隧道效应”等问题。那么,内部资本市场在我国的企业集团中究竟是缓解了融资约束还是加剧了这一现象呢,如何在发挥内部资本市场的积极作用的同时避免其功能异化,这不仅是一个现实选择的问题,而且是一个从理论上有待于研究并给予明确回答的问题。
本文在综述国内外相关研究成果,着重运用内部资本市场理论,采用规范研究与实证研究相结合的研究方法,借鉴国际经验,结合我国的市场环境和制度背景,对内部资本市场对企业融资约束的影响进行了较系统的研究。首先,本文对内部资本市场现有的研究文献按不同观点进行了梳理归纳,发现内部资本市场具有积极作用,也有消极作用。然后,对内部资本市场与企业外部融资约束进行理论分析和模型分析,在此基础上结合中粮集团的案例,对内部资本市场与企业融资约束的关系进行了实证考察,为判断我国企业内部资本市场缓解融资约束提出了较客观的经验证据。最后,为我国企业集团完善内部资本市场,提高资金配置效率提出了政策建议。通过研究发现,内部资本市场是一把“双刃剑”,即既可能产生正效应也可能产生负效应,因此要发挥内部资本市场的积极作用,就必须建立一套有效的制度安排,包括董事会制度、监事会制度、内部控制制度以及财务管理体制、资金使用考评制度等内容。
In the modern market-oriented economy, there are two main channels for companies to obtain the capital they need: one is external capital markets: stock market and credit market; the other is internal capital market. The external capital market in our country has being developing for over 20 years, but still haven’t achieve a developed level. Therefore, the arise of ICM is a complement to ECM in a sense. Financial constraint is a common problem that all the companies are facing. In China, as the continuous expansion of business scale and the rapid increase of the Enterprise Group and the family enterprises, the development of ICM have been paid more and more attention because of its superiorities such as the function of releasing financial constraints and so on. But there also some catabolic functions emerge, such as“socialization”and“tunneling effect”. So, whether the function is positive or negative in enterprise group in China and how to play the positive role of internal capital markets are not only realistic choices, but questions to be studied and given a clear answer theoretically.
In this paper, it’s on the basis of the results of recent studies reviewed and mainly use the theory of internal capital market, with the research methods of theory related with practice, drawing on international experience, combined with China's market environment and institutional background, this paper has a more systematic study on the the efficiency of internal capital market allocation of capital. Firstly, this paper has a theory research on the characteristics of internal capital markets and the effectiveness of basic issues, and it finds that the role of internal capital market has positive and also negative effects. Then, on the basis of combining the Zhongliang Group case, it has an empirical study on the efficiency of capital allocation of the internal capital markets, to determine efficiency of capital allocation of internal capital markets raises more objective empirical evidence. Finally, it proposes polices and recommendations to improve the internal capital market and the efficiency of capital allocation. After the study, we find that the internal capital market is a "double-edged sword", that it may have both positive and negative effect. It must establish effective institution arrangements which including the Board of Directors system, supervisory system, the internal control system and the financial management system, the use of capital appraisal system and so on, if it wants to play an active role in the internal capital market.
本文在综述国内外相关研究成果,着重运用内部资本市场理论,采用规范研究与实证研究相结合的研究方法,借鉴国际经验,结合我国的市场环境和制度背景,对内部资本市场对企业融资约束的影响进行了较系统的研究。首先,本文对内部资本市场现有的研究文献按不同观点进行了梳理归纳,发现内部资本市场具有积极作用,也有消极作用。然后,对内部资本市场与企业外部融资约束进行理论分析和模型分析,在此基础上结合中粮集团的案例,对内部资本市场与企业融资约束的关系进行了实证考察,为判断我国企业内部资本市场缓解融资约束提出了较客观的经验证据。最后,为我国企业集团完善内部资本市场,提高资金配置效率提出了政策建议。通过研究发现,内部资本市场是一把“双刃剑”,即既可能产生正效应也可能产生负效应,因此要发挥内部资本市场的积极作用,就必须建立一套有效的制度安排,包括董事会制度、监事会制度、内部控制制度以及财务管理体制、资金使用考评制度等内容。
In the modern market-oriented economy, there are two main channels for companies to obtain the capital they need: one is external capital markets: stock market and credit market; the other is internal capital market. The external capital market in our country has being developing for over 20 years, but still haven’t achieve a developed level. Therefore, the arise of ICM is a complement to ECM in a sense. Financial constraint is a common problem that all the companies are facing. In China, as the continuous expansion of business scale and the rapid increase of the Enterprise Group and the family enterprises, the development of ICM have been paid more and more attention because of its superiorities such as the function of releasing financial constraints and so on. But there also some catabolic functions emerge, such as“socialization”and“tunneling effect”. So, whether the function is positive or negative in enterprise group in China and how to play the positive role of internal capital markets are not only realistic choices, but questions to be studied and given a clear answer theoretically.
In this paper, it’s on the basis of the results of recent studies reviewed and mainly use the theory of internal capital market, with the research methods of theory related with practice, drawing on international experience, combined with China's market environment and institutional background, this paper has a more systematic study on the the efficiency of internal capital market allocation of capital. Firstly, this paper has a theory research on the characteristics of internal capital markets and the effectiveness of basic issues, and it finds that the role of internal capital market has positive and also negative effects. Then, on the basis of combining the Zhongliang Group case, it has an empirical study on the efficiency of capital allocation of the internal capital markets, to determine efficiency of capital allocation of internal capital markets raises more objective empirical evidence. Finally, it proposes polices and recommendations to improve the internal capital market and the efficiency of capital allocation. After the study, we find that the internal capital market is a "double-edged sword", that it may have both positive and negative effect. It must establish effective institution arrangements which including the Board of Directors system, supervisory system, the internal control system and the financial management system, the use of capital appraisal system and so on, if it wants to play an active role in the internal capital market.
引文
[1] Scharfstein, D. S. and J. C. Stein. The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment, Journal of Finance, 2000
[2] Shin, HyunHan, and Rene Stulz, Are internal Capital Markets Efficient?, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1998
[3] Stein, J. C. Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate resources, Journal of Finance, 1997
[4] Williamson, O. E. Market and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York: Collier Macmillan Publishers Inc, 1975
[5] Gertner R. Scharfstein D. and Stein J. Internal Versus External Capital Market, The Quarterly Journal Economics,1994
[6] Gautier, A. & Hamadi, M. Internal Capital market Efficiency of Belgian Holding Companies. IRES Discussion Paper, 2005: 77~89.
[7] Hill, CWL. Internal Capital Market Controls and Financial Performance in Multidivisional Firms. Journal of Industrial Economics, 1988.
[8] Lamont, Owen. Cash Flow and Investment: Evidence from Internal Capital Markets. Journal of Finance, 1997(52): 83~109.
[9] Lewellen, W. G. A pure financial rational for the conglomerate merge. Journal of Finance, 1971
[10] Myers, S. C. and N. C. Majluf. Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, Journal of Financial Economics, 1984.
[11] Peyer, Urs C., Shivdasani, Anil. Leverage and Internal Capital Markets: Evidence from Leveraged Recapilizations. Journal of Financial Economies, 2001(59): 477~515.
[12] Powell, Lawrence S., Sommer, David W., Eckles, David L.. The role of internal capital market in financial intermediaries: evidence from insure groups. Journal of Risk & Insurance, 2008, (75): 439~461.
[13] Scharfstein, D. S. and J. C. Stein. The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment, Journal of Finance, 2000
[14] Schnure, Calivin. Internal Capital Markets and Invest. Working Paper- US Federal Reserve Board’s Finance & Economic Discussion Series, 1997.
[15] Shin, HyunHan, and Rene Stulz, Are internal Capital Markets Efficient? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1998
[16] Stein, J. C. Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate resources, Journal of Finance, 1997(52): 83~109.
[17] Williamson, O. E. Market and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications[M]. New York: Collier Macmillan Publishers Inc, 1975.
[18] Wulf, J..Influence and Inefficiency in the Internal Capital Market: Theory and Evidence, working paper, University of Pennsylvania, 1999.
[19] Dalton D. R., C. M. Daily, J. L. Johnson. Number of directors and financial performance: A meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 1999, 42: 674-388
[20] Rosenstein s., Wyatt J.G. Outside Directors, Board Independence and Shareholder Wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, 1999, 26(2): 175-192
[21] Beasley, M.S., Joseph V. Careello, Dan R. Fraudulent Financial Reporting: Consideration of Industry Traits and Corporate Governance Mechanisms. Accounting Horizons, 2000, 4: 441-45
[22] Klein, A. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2002, 3: 375-400
[23] Geiger, M., Taylor, P. CEO and CFO certifications of financial information. Accounting Horizons, 2003, 17: 357-368
[24] Hatice Uzun, Samuel H. Szewczyk, Raj Varma. Board Composition and Corporate Fraud. Financial Analysts Journal, 2004, 60: 33-43
[25] Butler, M., Leone, A., Willenborg, M. An empirical analysis of auditor reporting and is association with abnormal accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2004, 37: 139-165
[26] Bedard, J., Marrakchi, S. and Courteau, L. The effect of audit committee expertise, independence and activity on aggressive earnings management. Auditing: a journalof practice and theory, 2004, 23: 13-35
[27] Bryan, S., Lilien, S. Characteristics of firms with material weaknesses in internal control: an assessment of Section of 404 of Sarbanes Oxley. Working paper, Wake Forest University and Baruch College, 2005
[28] Ge, W., McVay, S. The disclosure of material weaknesses in internal control after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Accounting Horizons, 2005, 19: 137-158
[29] Bronson, S.N., Carcello, J.V. and Raghunandan, K. Firm characteristics and voluntary management reports on internal control. Auditing: a journal of practice and theory, 2006, 25: 25-39
[30] Doyle, J., W. Ge, S. McVay. Determinants of weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2007, 44: 193-223
[31] Doyle, J., Ge, W., McVay, S. The determinants of weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting. Working paper, New York University, 2007
[32] Vafeas, Nikos. Board Meeting Frequency and Firm Performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 1999, 53(1): 113-142
[33] Dechow, P. W, Sloan R. G., Sweeney A. P. Cause and consequences of earnings manipulation: an analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research, 1996, 13(10): 1-13
[34] Krishnan, J. Audit committee quality and internal control: an empirical analysis. The Accounting Review, 2005, 80: 649-675
[35] Yemack, David. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 1996, 40(2): 185-211
[36] Rosenstein, S., Wyatt, J. G. Outside directors, board independence and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, 26(2): 175-192
[37] Fama E.F., Jensen M.C. Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983, 26: 301-326
[38]冯丽霞,肖一婷.内部资本市场超额价值创造研究——基于资源基础理论的思考.会计研究, 2008.4.
[39]韩忠雪,周婷婷.控股股东为何偏爱企业集团——以鸿仪系为例.现代管理科学, 2009.1.
[40]李焰,陈才东,黄磊。集团化运作、融资约束与财务风险,《管理世界》,2007.12: 117~135
[41]卢建新.内部资本市场理论综述.中南财经政法大学学报, 2006.2.
[42]卢建新.股权结构、公司治理与内部资本市场效率.中南财经政法大学学报, 2009. 4
[43]卢现祥,朱巧玲.新制度经济学.北京:北京大学出版社, 2008.1
[44]邵军,刘志远。“系族企业”内部资本市场有效率吗?——基于鸿仪系的案例研究。管理世界,2007.6
[45]万良勇,万良涛,饶静.我国企业集团内部资本市场的形成机制分析.金融与经济, 2007.10
[46]万良勇。集团内部资本市场、产权性质与上市公司融资约束——基于中国上市公司的实证研究,《华南理工大学学报(社会科学版)》,2010.2:14~19
[47]王峰娟,邹存良。多元化程度与内部资本市场效率——基于分部数据的多案例研究,《管理世界》,2009.4:153~161
[48]颜琴,王婧.基于不同视角的内部资本市场理论综述.合作经济与科技, 2009. 8
[49]杨锦之,孙建,卢闯。企业集团内部资本市场的存在性与效率性,《会计研究》,2010.4:50~56
[50]杨棉之.内部资本市场、公司绩效与控制权私有收益——以华通天香集团为例分析.会计研究, 2006.12.
[51]杨棉之.多元化公司内部资本市场配置效率——国内外研究述评与启示.会计研究, 2007.11.
[52]周业安,韩梅.上市公司内部资本市场研究——以华联超市借壳上市为例分析.管理世界, 2003.11.
[2] Shin, HyunHan, and Rene Stulz, Are internal Capital Markets Efficient?, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1998
[3] Stein, J. C. Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate resources, Journal of Finance, 1997
[4] Williamson, O. E. Market and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York: Collier Macmillan Publishers Inc, 1975
[5] Gertner R. Scharfstein D. and Stein J. Internal Versus External Capital Market, The Quarterly Journal Economics,1994
[6] Gautier, A. & Hamadi, M. Internal Capital market Efficiency of Belgian Holding Companies. IRES Discussion Paper, 2005: 77~89.
[7] Hill, CWL. Internal Capital Market Controls and Financial Performance in Multidivisional Firms. Journal of Industrial Economics, 1988.
[8] Lamont, Owen. Cash Flow and Investment: Evidence from Internal Capital Markets. Journal of Finance, 1997(52): 83~109.
[9] Lewellen, W. G. A pure financial rational for the conglomerate merge. Journal of Finance, 1971
[10] Myers, S. C. and N. C. Majluf. Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, Journal of Financial Economics, 1984.
[11] Peyer, Urs C., Shivdasani, Anil. Leverage and Internal Capital Markets: Evidence from Leveraged Recapilizations. Journal of Financial Economies, 2001(59): 477~515.
[12] Powell, Lawrence S., Sommer, David W., Eckles, David L.. The role of internal capital market in financial intermediaries: evidence from insure groups. Journal of Risk & Insurance, 2008, (75): 439~461.
[13] Scharfstein, D. S. and J. C. Stein. The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment, Journal of Finance, 2000
[14] Schnure, Calivin. Internal Capital Markets and Invest. Working Paper- US Federal Reserve Board’s Finance & Economic Discussion Series, 1997.
[15] Shin, HyunHan, and Rene Stulz, Are internal Capital Markets Efficient? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1998
[16] Stein, J. C. Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate resources, Journal of Finance, 1997(52): 83~109.
[17] Williamson, O. E. Market and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications[M]. New York: Collier Macmillan Publishers Inc, 1975.
[18] Wulf, J..Influence and Inefficiency in the Internal Capital Market: Theory and Evidence, working paper, University of Pennsylvania, 1999.
[19] Dalton D. R., C. M. Daily, J. L. Johnson. Number of directors and financial performance: A meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 1999, 42: 674-388
[20] Rosenstein s., Wyatt J.G. Outside Directors, Board Independence and Shareholder Wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, 1999, 26(2): 175-192
[21] Beasley, M.S., Joseph V. Careello, Dan R. Fraudulent Financial Reporting: Consideration of Industry Traits and Corporate Governance Mechanisms. Accounting Horizons, 2000, 4: 441-45
[22] Klein, A. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2002, 3: 375-400
[23] Geiger, M., Taylor, P. CEO and CFO certifications of financial information. Accounting Horizons, 2003, 17: 357-368
[24] Hatice Uzun, Samuel H. Szewczyk, Raj Varma. Board Composition and Corporate Fraud. Financial Analysts Journal, 2004, 60: 33-43
[25] Butler, M., Leone, A., Willenborg, M. An empirical analysis of auditor reporting and is association with abnormal accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2004, 37: 139-165
[26] Bedard, J., Marrakchi, S. and Courteau, L. The effect of audit committee expertise, independence and activity on aggressive earnings management. Auditing: a journalof practice and theory, 2004, 23: 13-35
[27] Bryan, S., Lilien, S. Characteristics of firms with material weaknesses in internal control: an assessment of Section of 404 of Sarbanes Oxley. Working paper, Wake Forest University and Baruch College, 2005
[28] Ge, W., McVay, S. The disclosure of material weaknesses in internal control after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Accounting Horizons, 2005, 19: 137-158
[29] Bronson, S.N., Carcello, J.V. and Raghunandan, K. Firm characteristics and voluntary management reports on internal control. Auditing: a journal of practice and theory, 2006, 25: 25-39
[30] Doyle, J., W. Ge, S. McVay. Determinants of weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2007, 44: 193-223
[31] Doyle, J., Ge, W., McVay, S. The determinants of weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting. Working paper, New York University, 2007
[32] Vafeas, Nikos. Board Meeting Frequency and Firm Performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 1999, 53(1): 113-142
[33] Dechow, P. W, Sloan R. G., Sweeney A. P. Cause and consequences of earnings manipulation: an analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research, 1996, 13(10): 1-13
[34] Krishnan, J. Audit committee quality and internal control: an empirical analysis. The Accounting Review, 2005, 80: 649-675
[35] Yemack, David. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 1996, 40(2): 185-211
[36] Rosenstein, S., Wyatt, J. G. Outside directors, board independence and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, 26(2): 175-192
[37] Fama E.F., Jensen M.C. Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983, 26: 301-326
[38]冯丽霞,肖一婷.内部资本市场超额价值创造研究——基于资源基础理论的思考.会计研究, 2008.4.
[39]韩忠雪,周婷婷.控股股东为何偏爱企业集团——以鸿仪系为例.现代管理科学, 2009.1.
[40]李焰,陈才东,黄磊。集团化运作、融资约束与财务风险,《管理世界》,2007.12: 117~135
[41]卢建新.内部资本市场理论综述.中南财经政法大学学报, 2006.2.
[42]卢建新.股权结构、公司治理与内部资本市场效率.中南财经政法大学学报, 2009. 4
[43]卢现祥,朱巧玲.新制度经济学.北京:北京大学出版社, 2008.1
[44]邵军,刘志远。“系族企业”内部资本市场有效率吗?——基于鸿仪系的案例研究。管理世界,2007.6
[45]万良勇,万良涛,饶静.我国企业集团内部资本市场的形成机制分析.金融与经济, 2007.10
[46]万良勇。集团内部资本市场、产权性质与上市公司融资约束——基于中国上市公司的实证研究,《华南理工大学学报(社会科学版)》,2010.2:14~19
[47]王峰娟,邹存良。多元化程度与内部资本市场效率——基于分部数据的多案例研究,《管理世界》,2009.4:153~161
[48]颜琴,王婧.基于不同视角的内部资本市场理论综述.合作经济与科技, 2009. 8
[49]杨锦之,孙建,卢闯。企业集团内部资本市场的存在性与效率性,《会计研究》,2010.4:50~56
[50]杨棉之.内部资本市场、公司绩效与控制权私有收益——以华通天香集团为例分析.会计研究, 2006.12.
[51]杨棉之.多元化公司内部资本市场配置效率——国内外研究述评与启示.会计研究, 2007.11.
[52]周业安,韩梅.上市公司内部资本市场研究——以华联超市借壳上市为例分析.管理世界, 2003.11.