现金流视角下上市公司并购绩效评价及其影响机制研究
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摘要
企业并购作为一种重要的资源配置方式,对推动社会生产力的进步发挥了重要作用。进入21世纪以后,我国企业并购市场获得了突飞猛进的发展,因此并购绩效如何、哪些因素导致了并购绩效的个体差异就成为企业并购理论和实证研究需要回答的基础问题。本研究以现金流分析作为并购绩效评价的基础,以上市公司2003至2005年的并购交易作为实证分析样本,同时突破以往对并购绩效研究仅局限于财务绩效的缺陷,力图系统把握上市公司并购的真实演变规律。
论文首先研究了上市公司并购财务绩效,以现金流指标结合因子分析模型作为综合绩效评价方法,采用对照样本年度均值调整方法排除非并购因素影响,最后利用对比模型和回归截距模型识别出并购财务绩效。研究发现,并购活动对主并企业财务绩效有显著负向影响,但并购长期绩效有一定改善趋势;并购活动对目标企业财务绩效无显著影响。研究发现,以现金流为基础和以传统盈利能力指标为基础的并购财务绩效出现明显背离现象,证实了传统盈余相关指标所识别的并购财务绩效存在一定程度的失真问题。
论文采用相同的方法考察了上市公司并购社会绩效,研究发现并购活动对主并企业总体社会绩效无显著影响,但对目标企业社会绩效却有显著的负向影响。进一步研究发现,导致目标企业社会绩效显著下降的主要原因是员工福利水平的大幅度降低,表明控制权转移过程员工权益没有得到切实维护。对并购财务绩效和并购社会绩效相关性研究发现,主并企业并购财务绩效和并购员工福利绩效有显著负相关关系,而目标企业则有不显著的负相关关系;所有样本企业并购财务绩效和并购税费贡献绩效、并购违规状况绩效均表现出正相关关系,表明三者之间有较好的协调性。
对主并企业并购财务绩效影响机制研究发现,追求协同效应、并购相对规模、战略委员会设置、并购前ST情况以及并购发生年度对其有显著解释能力;而管理者主义、自由现金流假说、民营控股、高管持股比例也有一定的解释能力。对目标企业并购财务绩效影响机制研究发现,追求协同效应、保护壳资源、资本结构状况、财务资源状况、行业匹配性以及并购发生年度对目标企业并购财务绩效有显著解释能力;而Z指数、董事长总经理设置状况以及高管相对规模也有一定的解释能力。以并购财务绩效影响机制研究结论为依据,分别构建了主并企业和目标企业并购财务绩效预测模型,准确率分别为72.4%和74.2%。
As an indispensible measure of resource collocation, M&A plays a crucial role in social capacity development. In 21st century, M&A has developed rapidly in China. It becomes the basic problems among M&A theory and empirical study that how M&A performance goes and which factor induces the individual differences of M&A performance. Regarding cash flow analysis as the basis of M&A performance evaluation, this study selects M&A transactions of listed companies during the year from 2003 to 2005 as the samples for empirical analysis. The former studies of M&A only focus on financial performance, while this study makes up this shortage and tries to grasp the real evolving rule of M&A performance.
Regarding cash flow indexes combined with factor analysis model as a comprehensive performance evaluation method, this article firstly studies the M&A financial performance of listed companies. Then, the approach of year’s mean adjustment between comparison samples is adopted to exclude the influence from non-M&A factors. Finally, the comparison model and intercept model are applied to identify the M&A financial performance. The research discovers that the M&A action has brought remarkable negative influence on M&A financial performance of acquiring firms, but the long-term performance of M&A has meliorative trend; on the other side, the M&A action has no remarkable influence on financial performance of target firms, which does not accord with prior research conclusions. The study finds that the M&A financial performance based on cash flow obviously deviates from the M&A financial performance based on traditional earning capacity indexes, which demonstrates that the M&A financial performance identified by traditional earning related indexes occurs distortion on some degree.
Using the same method to evaluate the M&A social performance of listed companies, this paper reveals that the M&A action has no significant influence on social performance of acquiring firms, but has remarkable negative influence on social performance of target firms. It is found that employee’s welfare lever dropping sharply caused the social performance’s great incline of target firms in further research. Empirical study shows that employee rights and interests of target firms don’t be protected effectively during control right changing process. The study on M&A financial performance and M&A social performance observes that there is a negative significant correlation between M&A financial performance and M&A employee benefits performance among acquiring firms, but the negative correlation is not significant among target firms; meanwhile, there is a positive correlation among M&A financial performance, tax and fee contribution performance of M&A, infringing situation performance of M&A for all sample firms, which shows there exists a good compatibility among them.
For M&A financial performance influence mechanism of acquiring firms, the research finds that the pursuit of synergy effect, relative scales of M&A, establishment of strategy committee of board, ST situation before M&A and the year when M&A happened has significant ability to explain the M&A financial performance of acquiring firms. Meanwhile, we find that managerialism, free cash flow hypothesis, the private controlling shareholder and share proportion held by management also has certain explanatory capacity. For M&A financial performance influence mechanism of target firms, we find that the pursuit of synergy effect, the protection of listing status, capital structure, financial resources, industry matching situation and the year when M&A happened has significant ability to explain the M&A financial performance of target firms. At the same time, Z indicator, establishment of board chairman and general manager, the relative size of top managers also has certain explanatory capacity. Based on the conclusions of influence mechanism research, we construct the forecast model of M&A financial performance of target acquiring firms and target firms by Logistic regression, the general accuracy of forecast model respectively achieves 72.4 percent and 74.2 percent.
论文首先研究了上市公司并购财务绩效,以现金流指标结合因子分析模型作为综合绩效评价方法,采用对照样本年度均值调整方法排除非并购因素影响,最后利用对比模型和回归截距模型识别出并购财务绩效。研究发现,并购活动对主并企业财务绩效有显著负向影响,但并购长期绩效有一定改善趋势;并购活动对目标企业财务绩效无显著影响。研究发现,以现金流为基础和以传统盈利能力指标为基础的并购财务绩效出现明显背离现象,证实了传统盈余相关指标所识别的并购财务绩效存在一定程度的失真问题。
论文采用相同的方法考察了上市公司并购社会绩效,研究发现并购活动对主并企业总体社会绩效无显著影响,但对目标企业社会绩效却有显著的负向影响。进一步研究发现,导致目标企业社会绩效显著下降的主要原因是员工福利水平的大幅度降低,表明控制权转移过程员工权益没有得到切实维护。对并购财务绩效和并购社会绩效相关性研究发现,主并企业并购财务绩效和并购员工福利绩效有显著负相关关系,而目标企业则有不显著的负相关关系;所有样本企业并购财务绩效和并购税费贡献绩效、并购违规状况绩效均表现出正相关关系,表明三者之间有较好的协调性。
对主并企业并购财务绩效影响机制研究发现,追求协同效应、并购相对规模、战略委员会设置、并购前ST情况以及并购发生年度对其有显著解释能力;而管理者主义、自由现金流假说、民营控股、高管持股比例也有一定的解释能力。对目标企业并购财务绩效影响机制研究发现,追求协同效应、保护壳资源、资本结构状况、财务资源状况、行业匹配性以及并购发生年度对目标企业并购财务绩效有显著解释能力;而Z指数、董事长总经理设置状况以及高管相对规模也有一定的解释能力。以并购财务绩效影响机制研究结论为依据,分别构建了主并企业和目标企业并购财务绩效预测模型,准确率分别为72.4%和74.2%。
As an indispensible measure of resource collocation, M&A plays a crucial role in social capacity development. In 21st century, M&A has developed rapidly in China. It becomes the basic problems among M&A theory and empirical study that how M&A performance goes and which factor induces the individual differences of M&A performance. Regarding cash flow analysis as the basis of M&A performance evaluation, this study selects M&A transactions of listed companies during the year from 2003 to 2005 as the samples for empirical analysis. The former studies of M&A only focus on financial performance, while this study makes up this shortage and tries to grasp the real evolving rule of M&A performance.
Regarding cash flow indexes combined with factor analysis model as a comprehensive performance evaluation method, this article firstly studies the M&A financial performance of listed companies. Then, the approach of year’s mean adjustment between comparison samples is adopted to exclude the influence from non-M&A factors. Finally, the comparison model and intercept model are applied to identify the M&A financial performance. The research discovers that the M&A action has brought remarkable negative influence on M&A financial performance of acquiring firms, but the long-term performance of M&A has meliorative trend; on the other side, the M&A action has no remarkable influence on financial performance of target firms, which does not accord with prior research conclusions. The study finds that the M&A financial performance based on cash flow obviously deviates from the M&A financial performance based on traditional earning capacity indexes, which demonstrates that the M&A financial performance identified by traditional earning related indexes occurs distortion on some degree.
Using the same method to evaluate the M&A social performance of listed companies, this paper reveals that the M&A action has no significant influence on social performance of acquiring firms, but has remarkable negative influence on social performance of target firms. It is found that employee’s welfare lever dropping sharply caused the social performance’s great incline of target firms in further research. Empirical study shows that employee rights and interests of target firms don’t be protected effectively during control right changing process. The study on M&A financial performance and M&A social performance observes that there is a negative significant correlation between M&A financial performance and M&A employee benefits performance among acquiring firms, but the negative correlation is not significant among target firms; meanwhile, there is a positive correlation among M&A financial performance, tax and fee contribution performance of M&A, infringing situation performance of M&A for all sample firms, which shows there exists a good compatibility among them.
For M&A financial performance influence mechanism of acquiring firms, the research finds that the pursuit of synergy effect, relative scales of M&A, establishment of strategy committee of board, ST situation before M&A and the year when M&A happened has significant ability to explain the M&A financial performance of acquiring firms. Meanwhile, we find that managerialism, free cash flow hypothesis, the private controlling shareholder and share proportion held by management also has certain explanatory capacity. For M&A financial performance influence mechanism of target firms, we find that the pursuit of synergy effect, the protection of listing status, capital structure, financial resources, industry matching situation and the year when M&A happened has significant ability to explain the M&A financial performance of target firms. At the same time, Z indicator, establishment of board chairman and general manager, the relative size of top managers also has certain explanatory capacity. Based on the conclusions of influence mechanism research, we construct the forecast model of M&A financial performance of target acquiring firms and target firms by Logistic regression, the general accuracy of forecast model respectively achieves 72.4 percent and 74.2 percent.
引文
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