WTO背景下技术标准中专利并入的法律问题研究
摘要
本文研究WTO背景下技术标准中专利并入的法律问题,“导论”提出问题,第一章分析问题产生原因,第二章到第四章分别从标准设定组织专利政策、专利法、反垄断角度,分析了问题及解决方法,“结论”结合我国面临形势及存在问题,提出了应对之策。
“导论”提出本文研究的问题、解决现状及研究意义。通过对我国政府向WTO技术性贸易壁垒委员会提出《标准化中的知识产权问题》议案、后无果而终这一事件的追问与反思,将WTO背景下技术标准中专利并入的法律问题作为研究对象。通过对这一命题的解读,指出技术标准中专利并入,可能产生标准阻抑及竞争阻碍问题,主要表现为专利信息不披露、专利联合许可、专利拒绝许可、专利超高定价许可四种形式,在国际贸易领域,该问题还表现为新形式的贸易壁垒。随后提出了解决该问题的三种方法,即标准设定组织专利政策、专利法、反垄断,分析其可能存在的不足。我国在实施国内技术标准、采用国际标准、遵守外国(含区域)技术标准三个层面,都面临技术标准中专利并入问题。我国现有标准化政策与法律、专利法、反垄断法等尚不完善,难以有效解决这一问题,需进一步完善。正因如此,该问题的研究具有十分重要的理论意义和实践价值。
第一章“技术标准中专利并入的基础理论”,论述了技术标准中专利并入的基本原理。分五节。第一节研究了技术标准的定义、分类、目的、性质。技术标准在不同情境下有不同含义,明确特定话语环境对正确理解技术标准至关重要;技术标准可从不同角度分类,法律意义也有所不同,并通过分类确定本文要研究的技术标准;技术标准的目的解决了为什么需要技术标准的问题,并从网络外在性、信息不对称、生产外部性原理,分析了兼容性标准、安全标准、环境标准等技术标准产生原因;技术标准在经济学上属公共物品,决定了其法律上公有物权性质。第二节研究了TBT协定下成员方对技术标准的义务。根据TBT协定,WTO成员方在制定技术法规和技术标准方面,有优先国际标准或以国际标准为基础的义务,仅在存在安全、健康、环境等法定事由并履行法律程序下,方可背离国际标准,制定本国技术法规和技术标准,随后结合TBT协定内容,对中美围绕无线局域网国际标准的纠纷进行了解读。第三节论述了专利的种类、授予条件、本质特征及法律性质。大多国家按照“先申请原则”授予发明专利,但美国法采取了“先发明原则”,为标准设定情境下专利并入技术标准提供了便利。专利本质特征是:专利权人以公开技术方案为条件,获得对新技术方案的垄断实施;专利权性质属私权。第四节论述技术标准中的专利并入。分析了技术标准中专利并入的四方面原因。技术标准中并入的专利以方法专利为主,且为必要专利。并入技术标准中专利的专利权人一般为技术标准提案人本身,在特定情形下,也包括技术标准提案人之外的第三人。技术标准中专利并入的时间,因专利授予原则不同而有所差异,在先申请原则下,专利披露时间不能太早,否则失去新颖性,在先发明原则下,专利披露可相对滞后。第五节论述技术标准中并入专利产生的法律问题。技术标准中专利并入可能会产生标准阻抑及竞争阻碍问题。标准阻抑问题是指,如果标准设定组织成员进行标准选择后,发现标准侵权了某一专利权,或者专利权人知道标准设定组织已经选定其专利技术作为优先的方法后,可比在标准设定前进行的谈判中索取更高的许可费,与标准设定组织没有实际上授予专利市场力量(或某种便利)之前专利许可可能达成的许可费率相比,专利权人可获得更高专利许可费率,从而阻碍了技术标准的采用。竞争阻碍问题是指,一旦专利并入技术标准,技术标准有强化专利实施的效果,一些标准提案人不披露技术标准中专利信息,或不正当的专利联合许可,或收取高额许可费,或拒绝许可,产生或试图产生垄断,或产生其他危害后果,从而损害了竞争,减少了消费者福利。这些问题在国际贸易中表现为新形式的贸易壁垒。最后从四个方面分析了技术标准中专利并入产生问题的主要原因。
第二章“技术标准中专利并入问题的专利政策调整”,论述如何以标准设定组织专利政策调整技术标准专利并入问题。分四节。第一节论述了标准设定组织专利政策。专利政策主要内容包括:允许必要专利并入原则;事前披露原则;合理无歧视许可原则;专利权人无专利检索义务;标准设定组织中立原则。第二节论述了标准设定组织专利政策的效力依据。标准设定组织章程是标准设定组织赖以存在和开展活动的法律依据;标准设定组织章程除约束约束成员外,当专利权人向标准设定组织作出免费许可或RAND许可承诺后,产生第三方受益人,主要国家立法趋势是赋予第三人直接请求权。为防止标准设定组织成员策略性退出问题,应承担后续义务。第三节论述司法实践对标准设定组织专利政策的适用与发展。对专利权人在标准设定中违反事前披露原则的行为,采取衡平禁止反言抗辩较为合适,也可以欺诈进行抗辩,但法院认定构成欺诈的条件较高;如果标准提案人作出FRAND承诺,则构成对标准采用人的默示专利许可。第四节对标准设定组织专利政策作出评价。标准设定组织专利政策部分解决了标准阻抑和限制竞争问题,具有积极作用,但也存在明显不足。
第三章“技术标准中专利并入问题的专利法调整”,论述从如何从专利法角度调整技术标准中专利并入问题。分三节。第一节论述了专利权滥用的基本理论与实践。专利权滥用是针对专利侵权提出的确定性抗辩,根据专利权滥用抗辩原则,如果专利权人行使权利违反公共利益,就不能要求法院保护其权利,美国是少有的在专利法中对专利权滥用作出明确规定的国家。专利权滥用构成要件有二:须有专利权存在或与专利权行使有关;须专利权行使损害他人或社会利益。专利权滥用的法律效果是:在滥用行为被矫正之前,专利权人请求执行专利和禁令的救济请求,得不到法院支持。专利权滥用和反垄断法存在明显差别:产生时间不同;作用机理不同;性质程度不同;法律后果不同。第二节论述技术标准中专利并入问题的专利权滥用调整,运用专利权滥用原则,可解决技术标准中专利并入产生的不披露专利信息、许可费歧视、一揽子许可等问题;运用专利权滥用调整技术标准中专利并入问题,既有积极作用,也存在相应不足。第三节论述技术标准中并入专利的强制许可调整。TRIPS协定关于专利强制许可法定事由和许可程序作出了明确规定,根据TRIPS协定专利强制许可实施的条件,技术标准中专利权人行为构成限制竞争时,可适用强制许可;另一方面,即使技术标准中专利权人行为并不构成限制竞争,但技术标准采用人在使用专利前,已按合理商业条款和条件努力从专利权人处获得授权,但此类努力在合理时间内未获得成功,也可请求强制许可。
第四章“技术标准中专利并入问题的反垄断法调整”,论述如何从反垄断法角度调整技术标准中专利并入问题。分六节。第一节从竞争法调整对象和立法体例、反垄断法调整的垄断行为、合理原则与本身违法原则、反垄断法的域外效力、反垄断的分析范式、违反反垄断法的法律责任等六个方面,介绍了反垄断法的基本理论。第二节论述了专利权行使的反垄断法调整。反垄断法与知识产权法关系是:两者具有共同立法目的;知识产权正当行使属反垄断法豁免,滥用知识产权受反垄断法调整;反垄断法对专利权行使的调整不断发展,美国、欧盟专门制定实施知识产权反垄断法规,调整知识产权行使。第三节以美国Dell案、Unocal案、Rambus案为例,论述了如何以反垄断法调整技术标准中专利信息不披露问题,分析了其责任依据和责任性质。要证明技术标准中专利信息的不披露构成垄断或试图垄断,须证明标准提案人存在误述、通过技术标准获得市场力量、标准提案人存在垄断意图。第四节论述如何以反垄断法调整技术标准中专利联合许可问题。通过三个案例的比较分析,总结出判断技术标准中专利联合许可是否违反反垄断法的标准是:是否为互补专利、是否允许单独许可、是否允许与专利及标准竞争、是否存在价格固定或价格操纵。第五节论述如何以反垄断法调整技术标准中专利拒绝许可问题。欧美反垄断法以必要设施原则解决物理资产的拒绝交易问题,近年来逐步扩展到适用于知识产权拒绝交易。适用该原则解决技术标准中专利权人拒绝专利许可产生的限制竞争问题,具有必要性和可能性。第六节论述如何以反垄断法调整技术标准中专利许可超高定价问题,虽然大多国家反垄断法将超高定价作为垄断行为加以调整,但司法实践表明,对超高定价的反垄断指控并不容易,事前许可可作为替代性解决方法。
结论“完善与运用多种法律制度,解决技术标准中专利并入问题”,结合我国在实施国内技术标准、采用国际标准、遵守外国(含区域)技术标准三个层面,面临专利并入产生的标准阻抑及竞争阻碍问题,根据前述几章的分析结论,提出我国的应对方法。分三节。第一节论述我国应完善标准化管理体制、专利政策及TBT协定的实施。我国现行的行政主导标准化管理体制存在不足,应按照“国家标准行政主管机关(制定国家标准)——民间标准设定组织(制定行业标准)——企业(标准提案人)”模式进行完善。国家标准化管理委员会起草的《国家标准涉及专利的规定(暂行草案)》存在先天不足,应加以修改。我国在实施TBT协定过程中,应按一定顺位采用国际标准,在遵守外国技术标准时,若成员方违反TBT协定,我国政府可向WTO争端解决机构提起违反之诉。第二节论述我国专利法相关法律制度的完善与运用。最高人民法院《关于审理专利侵权纠纷案件若干问题的规定(征求意见稿)》第75条关于技术标准与专利侵权的规定,存在不足,需进一步完善。我国应按照禁止专利权滥用与反垄断法并存模式,建立禁止专利权滥用制度。我国专利强制许可制度与TRIPS协定仍有差距,应根据TRIPS协定进行完善。第三节论述我国知识产权反垄断法立法的完善与运用,我国反垄断法应从评估原则、相关市场界定、反垄断执法机构、反垄断执法工作制度、反垄断责任制度、反垄断私人诉讼制度、反垄断域外效力等方面进行完善。我国知识产权反垄断法律制度应借鉴美国《知识产权许可反垄断指南》,以总则形式明确知识产权法与反垄断法关系、知识产权反垄断法分析基本原则、评估原则、反垄断“安全区”、专利权人不得利用标准限制竞争等内容,以分则形式明确各类知识产权行使行为的促进及限制竞争因素,为反垄断分析提供具体指导。最后,依据知识产权反垄断基本原理,结合我国面临技术标准中专利并入产生限制竞争的具体情形,对其处理思路进行总结。
This article studies the legal issues arising from patent incorporation into technical standard. Introduction puts forward problems. Chapter 1 analyses how the problems arise from. Chapter 2– 4 analyses the problems and its solution methods from the perspectives of Patent Policy of Standard Setting Organizations(SSO),Patent Law and Antitrust Law. Conclusion puts forward the methods to solve the problems according to China’s situations and existing problems.
Introduction puts forward the problems, the status quo of solving problems and the research purport. By enquiring and reflecting the event that China presents a proposal named INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT (IPR) ISSUES IN STANDARDIZATION to WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade and has no result,this article take the legal issues arising from patent incorporation into technical standard as the object of this study. Patent incorporation into technical standard may lead to Standard Hold-up Problem and Competition-bloching Problem The problems appear in the form of non-disclosure of patent information, patent pool, refusal to license, excessive pricing on license. The Problem behaves a new kind of barrier to trade in international trade. This article puts forward three methods to solve the problems, including the SSO’s patent policy, Patent Law and Antitrust law,and analyses their merits and demerits. During practicing the domestic technical standard, adopting international standard and observe foreig(nIncluding area standard)technical standard,China is facing the legal issues arising from patent incorporation into technical standard. China’s patent policy and law relating to standardization, Patent Law and Antitrust Law have some loopholes,and it is difficulty to solve the problems,so it is necessary to perfect relevant laws Therefore, this study has very important values in theory and practice.
Chapter 1 deals with the basic theory of patent incorporation into technical standard. There are 5 sections. Section 1 deals with the definition, classification, purpose, and nature of technical standard. Technical standard has different meaning in the different circumstances, so it is vital to ascertain the given context to understand it. Technical standard may be classified from different angle and their legal meanings are not the same. This article ascertains the studied technical standard via these classifications. The purpose of Technical standard explains why need technical standard, and this article analyses why need compatibility standard, security standard, and environment standard from the Network Externality, Information Asymmetry and External Effect of Production. The public goods attribute of technical standard in Economics governs its public property rights in law. Section 2 deals with the WTO member’s obligation to technical standard. According to TBT,during setting up technical regulations and Technical standard, WTO members have compulsory obligation to adopt International Standard or take International Standard as basis. WTO member can deviate from International Standard and set up domestic technical regulations and technical standard only from security, health, and environment considerations and legal procedures According to TBT, this article interprets the dispute over setting up WLAN International Standard between China and America. Section 3 deals with the classification, granting conditions, characteristics; and nature of patent. Most countries grants patent according to first-to-applying rule. But US patent law grants patent according to first- to–invention rule and this facilitates patent incorporation into technical standard in standardization setting context. The characteristics of patent is that patent owner gets monopoly power over practicing new technology scheme at the expense of publishing new technology scheme. Patent right is a kind of private rights. Section 4 deals with how patent incorporates into technical standard. This section analyses four reasons why patent could incorporated into Technical standard. The patent incorporating into technical standard mainly is method patent and it is essential to technical standard. The patent owner usually is the proposer of technical standard,and may be someone else. The time of patent incorporation into technical standard varies from granting rule. Under first-to-applying rule, the disclosure time cannot be too earlier, or it will lose the novelty. Under first–to-invention rule, the disclosure time may be lagged. Section 5 deals with the legal issues arising from patent incorporating into technical standard. patent incorporation into technical standard may result standard Hold-up Problem and competition-blocking problem. Hold-up problems means that after SSO member choses standard,he finds that adopting the standard infringes a certain patent, or that patent owner have known that SSO has chosen its patent as priority,he can get higher licensing fee than he can get where SSO has not confer market power or other facilitation before the standard set up, so this blocks the adoption of technical standard. Competition-blocking problem means that once patent incorporates into technical standard, because the technical standard has the effect of enhancing practicing patent,some proposers of technical standard take actions as non-disclosure of patent information, patent pool, refusal to license, excessive pricing on license,produces monopoly or attempt to produce monopoly,or leads to other hazard,hence makes damages to competition and eliminates consumer’s welfare. These problems appear as a new kind of barrier to trade in international trade. Finally, this section analyses the four reasons why the problems arise from patent incorporation into technical standard.
Chapter 2 deals with how regulates the legal issues arising from patent incorporation into technical standard by SSO patent policy. There are 3 sections. Section 1 deals with the contents of SSO patent policy. It contains that permitting essential patent incorporate into technical standard;Ex-ante disclosure;free royalty or royalty on reasonable and non-discrimination(FRAND);Patent owner has no duty to search patent; neutrality standing of SSO. Section 2 deals with the legal force of SSO patent policy. SSO bylaw is the legal basis on which SSO exists and operates. Besides binding the members, when patent owner make FRAND promise to SSO,it produces a third beneficiary. Most countries law empowers the third beneficiary a legal claim. In case of SSO member tactic exit, SSO member shall undertake on-going obligations. Section 3 deals with the applying and developing the patent policy of SSO in practice. In the case of patent owner’s breach Ex -ante disclosure rule,it is proper to apply Estopple by Conduct principle. The adopter of technical standard also makes fraudulent defense, but the requirements is relatively higher. If the proposer of technical standard makes FRAND promise,it constitutes implied license to the adopter. Section 4 makes a review on SSO patent policy. SSO patent policy resolves partially standard hold-up problem and competition-blocking problem. It has good effects, but it also has some shortcomings.
Chapter 3 deals with how regulates the legal issues arising from patent incorporation into technical standard by Patent Law. There are 3 Sections. Section 1 deals with the theory and practice of patent misuse. Patent misuse is affirmative defense against patent infringement. According to the defense of patent misuse,if patent owner’s exercising its rights breaches public interest, he cannot ask the court safeguard its rights. U.S. Patent Law provides patent misuse. There are two elements of patent misuse. First, there exists patent or being related to exercising patent; Second, exercising patent does harm to others or public interests. The consequence of patent misuse is that the court does not support the patent owner’s claims for exercising his rights and applying for injunction before the misuse act is adjusted. There are some differences between patent misuse and antitrust law, and they are coming into being , function, nature and legal consequence. Section 2 deals with how patent misuse regulates the legal issues arising from patent incorporation into technical standard. Patent misuse may solve the legal issues arising from patent incorporation into technical standard, such as non-disclosure of patent information, license fee discrimination, patent pool and so on. Applying patent misuse to regulate the legal issues arising from patent incorporation into technical standard has merits and demerits. Section 3 deals with how compulsory license regulates the legal issues arising from patent incorporation into technical standard. TRIPS provides the legal reasons and procedures of compulsory license. According to the conditions of patent compulsory license provided in TRIPS, when technical standard patent owner’s act constitutes restrictive competition, compulsory license may apply; on the other hand,even if the patent owner’s act does not constitutes restrictive competition,but the prospective adopter of technical standard attempts to get license from patent owner in accordance with reasonable commercial terms but does not succeed in reasonable time, he can also apply compulsory license.
Chapter 4 deals with how regulates the legal issues arising from Patent incorporation into technical standard by antitrust law. There are 5 Sections. Section 1 introduces the basic theory of antitrust law from the regulating object and legislative mode of competition law, monopolization act regulated by antitrust law , reasonable rule and per se rule, extraterritorial effect , analytical mode, liability. Section 2 deals with how regulates the patent’s exercising by antitrust law. The relationship between antitrust law and intellectual property law is close. First, they have both the same legislative purposes; Second, exercising intellectual property rights properly is immunized by antitrust law; Third, the misuse of intellectual property rights shall be regulated by antitrust law. U.S. and European Union lay down antitrust regulations to regulate the exercising of intellectual property rights. Section 3, taking Dell case, Unocal case and Rambus case as examples,deals with how regulates non-disclosure of patent information in technical standard by antitrust law,and analyses the basis and nature of liability. Proving the non-disclosure of patent information in technical standard to constitute monopoly or attempt to monopoly, it shall establish that: First, the proposer of technical standard misrepresents; Second, he get market power by technical standard; Third, he has intent to monopoly. Section 4 deals with how regulates patent pool in technical standard by antitrust law. By contrasting 3 cases, this section summing up the criteria whether the patent pool in Technical standard violates Antitrust Law. First, whether the incorporation patents is complementary or not; Second, whether permit the incorporation patents license alone or not, Third, whether permit the competition with the patent and standard; Fourth, whether exist price-fixing or price manipulation. Section 5 deals with how regulates the refusal to licensing patent in technical standard by antitrust law. Antitrust law of U.S. and European Union apply essential facilities doctrine to solve the problem of refusal to deal,and the doctrine’s applying extends to refusal to deal of intellectual property rights in recent years. It is necessary and possible to apply the doctrine to solve patent owner’s refusal to license in technical standard. Section 6 deals with how regulates excessive pricing on license in technical standard by antitrust law. Most antitrust law takes excessive prices as a kind of monopoly and regulates it, but judicial practice indicates that it is not easy to decide excessive price. Hence, Ex-ante license will be a alternative method.
Conclusion entitled perfecting and applying legal systems to resolve the legal issue arising from patent incorporation into technical standard. According to China’s facing standard hold-up problem and competition-blocking problem arising from patent incorporation into technical standard during practicing domestic technical standard, adopting international standard and observing foreign(including area standard)technical standard, based on the foresaid analytical conclusions, puts forward the methods to solve problems. There are 3 Sections. Section 1 deals with China should perfect standardization administrative system, patent policy and the practicing of TBT. Our administration—orientated standardization system exists some inadequacy,it should be perfected according to the mode of“national standardization administrative agency(setting up national standard)—SSO(setting up industry standard)-enterprise(the proposer of technical standard)”. The rules on national standard related to patent (draft) drawn up by Standardization Administration Committee (SAC) of P.R.C. exists inadequacy, it should be perfected. China should adopt international standard according to the given order during practicing TBT. During observing foreign (including area standard) technical standard, if WTO member violates TBT,China government can bring a complaint to WTO Dispute Settling Body. Section 2 deals with China should perfect and apply patent law. Article 75“Technical standard and patent infringement”of The rules on trial of patent infringement (draft) made by the Supreme Court of the People's Republic of China exists inadequacy, and it need perfecting. China should establish patent misuse system according to the coexistence mode of patent misuse and antitrust law. China’s compulsory patent license has some gaps in contrast with TRIPS,it should be perfected according to TRIPS. Section 3 deals with the perfecting and applying china’s antitrust rules for intellectual property. China‘s antitrust law should be perfected from evaluating rule, the definition of relevant market, antitrust executing agency, antitrust executing work system, antitrust law liability, antitrust law private litigation, the extraterritorial effect of antitrust law. China should perfect antitrust rule for intellectual property by referring U.S. Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property. It should provide the relationship between intellectual property law and antitrust law, the basic principle of intellectual property’s antitrust analysis, evaluating rule, safe zone, prohibiting patent owner’s restrictive competition via standard setting in general provisions; and it should provide the elements of pro-competition and anti-competition of each act of practicing intellectual property rights as guideline for antitrust analysis.in sub-provisions Eventually, according to the basic theory of antitrust law, this section make a summery on how to deal with China’s facing restrictive competition problems China which arises from patent incorporation into technical standard.
“导论”提出本文研究的问题、解决现状及研究意义。通过对我国政府向WTO技术性贸易壁垒委员会提出《标准化中的知识产权问题》议案、后无果而终这一事件的追问与反思,将WTO背景下技术标准中专利并入的法律问题作为研究对象。通过对这一命题的解读,指出技术标准中专利并入,可能产生标准阻抑及竞争阻碍问题,主要表现为专利信息不披露、专利联合许可、专利拒绝许可、专利超高定价许可四种形式,在国际贸易领域,该问题还表现为新形式的贸易壁垒。随后提出了解决该问题的三种方法,即标准设定组织专利政策、专利法、反垄断,分析其可能存在的不足。我国在实施国内技术标准、采用国际标准、遵守外国(含区域)技术标准三个层面,都面临技术标准中专利并入问题。我国现有标准化政策与法律、专利法、反垄断法等尚不完善,难以有效解决这一问题,需进一步完善。正因如此,该问题的研究具有十分重要的理论意义和实践价值。
第一章“技术标准中专利并入的基础理论”,论述了技术标准中专利并入的基本原理。分五节。第一节研究了技术标准的定义、分类、目的、性质。技术标准在不同情境下有不同含义,明确特定话语环境对正确理解技术标准至关重要;技术标准可从不同角度分类,法律意义也有所不同,并通过分类确定本文要研究的技术标准;技术标准的目的解决了为什么需要技术标准的问题,并从网络外在性、信息不对称、生产外部性原理,分析了兼容性标准、安全标准、环境标准等技术标准产生原因;技术标准在经济学上属公共物品,决定了其法律上公有物权性质。第二节研究了TBT协定下成员方对技术标准的义务。根据TBT协定,WTO成员方在制定技术法规和技术标准方面,有优先国际标准或以国际标准为基础的义务,仅在存在安全、健康、环境等法定事由并履行法律程序下,方可背离国际标准,制定本国技术法规和技术标准,随后结合TBT协定内容,对中美围绕无线局域网国际标准的纠纷进行了解读。第三节论述了专利的种类、授予条件、本质特征及法律性质。大多国家按照“先申请原则”授予发明专利,但美国法采取了“先发明原则”,为标准设定情境下专利并入技术标准提供了便利。专利本质特征是:专利权人以公开技术方案为条件,获得对新技术方案的垄断实施;专利权性质属私权。第四节论述技术标准中的专利并入。分析了技术标准中专利并入的四方面原因。技术标准中并入的专利以方法专利为主,且为必要专利。并入技术标准中专利的专利权人一般为技术标准提案人本身,在特定情形下,也包括技术标准提案人之外的第三人。技术标准中专利并入的时间,因专利授予原则不同而有所差异,在先申请原则下,专利披露时间不能太早,否则失去新颖性,在先发明原则下,专利披露可相对滞后。第五节论述技术标准中并入专利产生的法律问题。技术标准中专利并入可能会产生标准阻抑及竞争阻碍问题。标准阻抑问题是指,如果标准设定组织成员进行标准选择后,发现标准侵权了某一专利权,或者专利权人知道标准设定组织已经选定其专利技术作为优先的方法后,可比在标准设定前进行的谈判中索取更高的许可费,与标准设定组织没有实际上授予专利市场力量(或某种便利)之前专利许可可能达成的许可费率相比,专利权人可获得更高专利许可费率,从而阻碍了技术标准的采用。竞争阻碍问题是指,一旦专利并入技术标准,技术标准有强化专利实施的效果,一些标准提案人不披露技术标准中专利信息,或不正当的专利联合许可,或收取高额许可费,或拒绝许可,产生或试图产生垄断,或产生其他危害后果,从而损害了竞争,减少了消费者福利。这些问题在国际贸易中表现为新形式的贸易壁垒。最后从四个方面分析了技术标准中专利并入产生问题的主要原因。
第二章“技术标准中专利并入问题的专利政策调整”,论述如何以标准设定组织专利政策调整技术标准专利并入问题。分四节。第一节论述了标准设定组织专利政策。专利政策主要内容包括:允许必要专利并入原则;事前披露原则;合理无歧视许可原则;专利权人无专利检索义务;标准设定组织中立原则。第二节论述了标准设定组织专利政策的效力依据。标准设定组织章程是标准设定组织赖以存在和开展活动的法律依据;标准设定组织章程除约束约束成员外,当专利权人向标准设定组织作出免费许可或RAND许可承诺后,产生第三方受益人,主要国家立法趋势是赋予第三人直接请求权。为防止标准设定组织成员策略性退出问题,应承担后续义务。第三节论述司法实践对标准设定组织专利政策的适用与发展。对专利权人在标准设定中违反事前披露原则的行为,采取衡平禁止反言抗辩较为合适,也可以欺诈进行抗辩,但法院认定构成欺诈的条件较高;如果标准提案人作出FRAND承诺,则构成对标准采用人的默示专利许可。第四节对标准设定组织专利政策作出评价。标准设定组织专利政策部分解决了标准阻抑和限制竞争问题,具有积极作用,但也存在明显不足。
第三章“技术标准中专利并入问题的专利法调整”,论述从如何从专利法角度调整技术标准中专利并入问题。分三节。第一节论述了专利权滥用的基本理论与实践。专利权滥用是针对专利侵权提出的确定性抗辩,根据专利权滥用抗辩原则,如果专利权人行使权利违反公共利益,就不能要求法院保护其权利,美国是少有的在专利法中对专利权滥用作出明确规定的国家。专利权滥用构成要件有二:须有专利权存在或与专利权行使有关;须专利权行使损害他人或社会利益。专利权滥用的法律效果是:在滥用行为被矫正之前,专利权人请求执行专利和禁令的救济请求,得不到法院支持。专利权滥用和反垄断法存在明显差别:产生时间不同;作用机理不同;性质程度不同;法律后果不同。第二节论述技术标准中专利并入问题的专利权滥用调整,运用专利权滥用原则,可解决技术标准中专利并入产生的不披露专利信息、许可费歧视、一揽子许可等问题;运用专利权滥用调整技术标准中专利并入问题,既有积极作用,也存在相应不足。第三节论述技术标准中并入专利的强制许可调整。TRIPS协定关于专利强制许可法定事由和许可程序作出了明确规定,根据TRIPS协定专利强制许可实施的条件,技术标准中专利权人行为构成限制竞争时,可适用强制许可;另一方面,即使技术标准中专利权人行为并不构成限制竞争,但技术标准采用人在使用专利前,已按合理商业条款和条件努力从专利权人处获得授权,但此类努力在合理时间内未获得成功,也可请求强制许可。
第四章“技术标准中专利并入问题的反垄断法调整”,论述如何从反垄断法角度调整技术标准中专利并入问题。分六节。第一节从竞争法调整对象和立法体例、反垄断法调整的垄断行为、合理原则与本身违法原则、反垄断法的域外效力、反垄断的分析范式、违反反垄断法的法律责任等六个方面,介绍了反垄断法的基本理论。第二节论述了专利权行使的反垄断法调整。反垄断法与知识产权法关系是:两者具有共同立法目的;知识产权正当行使属反垄断法豁免,滥用知识产权受反垄断法调整;反垄断法对专利权行使的调整不断发展,美国、欧盟专门制定实施知识产权反垄断法规,调整知识产权行使。第三节以美国Dell案、Unocal案、Rambus案为例,论述了如何以反垄断法调整技术标准中专利信息不披露问题,分析了其责任依据和责任性质。要证明技术标准中专利信息的不披露构成垄断或试图垄断,须证明标准提案人存在误述、通过技术标准获得市场力量、标准提案人存在垄断意图。第四节论述如何以反垄断法调整技术标准中专利联合许可问题。通过三个案例的比较分析,总结出判断技术标准中专利联合许可是否违反反垄断法的标准是:是否为互补专利、是否允许单独许可、是否允许与专利及标准竞争、是否存在价格固定或价格操纵。第五节论述如何以反垄断法调整技术标准中专利拒绝许可问题。欧美反垄断法以必要设施原则解决物理资产的拒绝交易问题,近年来逐步扩展到适用于知识产权拒绝交易。适用该原则解决技术标准中专利权人拒绝专利许可产生的限制竞争问题,具有必要性和可能性。第六节论述如何以反垄断法调整技术标准中专利许可超高定价问题,虽然大多国家反垄断法将超高定价作为垄断行为加以调整,但司法实践表明,对超高定价的反垄断指控并不容易,事前许可可作为替代性解决方法。
结论“完善与运用多种法律制度,解决技术标准中专利并入问题”,结合我国在实施国内技术标准、采用国际标准、遵守外国(含区域)技术标准三个层面,面临专利并入产生的标准阻抑及竞争阻碍问题,根据前述几章的分析结论,提出我国的应对方法。分三节。第一节论述我国应完善标准化管理体制、专利政策及TBT协定的实施。我国现行的行政主导标准化管理体制存在不足,应按照“国家标准行政主管机关(制定国家标准)——民间标准设定组织(制定行业标准)——企业(标准提案人)”模式进行完善。国家标准化管理委员会起草的《国家标准涉及专利的规定(暂行草案)》存在先天不足,应加以修改。我国在实施TBT协定过程中,应按一定顺位采用国际标准,在遵守外国技术标准时,若成员方违反TBT协定,我国政府可向WTO争端解决机构提起违反之诉。第二节论述我国专利法相关法律制度的完善与运用。最高人民法院《关于审理专利侵权纠纷案件若干问题的规定(征求意见稿)》第75条关于技术标准与专利侵权的规定,存在不足,需进一步完善。我国应按照禁止专利权滥用与反垄断法并存模式,建立禁止专利权滥用制度。我国专利强制许可制度与TRIPS协定仍有差距,应根据TRIPS协定进行完善。第三节论述我国知识产权反垄断法立法的完善与运用,我国反垄断法应从评估原则、相关市场界定、反垄断执法机构、反垄断执法工作制度、反垄断责任制度、反垄断私人诉讼制度、反垄断域外效力等方面进行完善。我国知识产权反垄断法律制度应借鉴美国《知识产权许可反垄断指南》,以总则形式明确知识产权法与反垄断法关系、知识产权反垄断法分析基本原则、评估原则、反垄断“安全区”、专利权人不得利用标准限制竞争等内容,以分则形式明确各类知识产权行使行为的促进及限制竞争因素,为反垄断分析提供具体指导。最后,依据知识产权反垄断基本原理,结合我国面临技术标准中专利并入产生限制竞争的具体情形,对其处理思路进行总结。
This article studies the legal issues arising from patent incorporation into technical standard. Introduction puts forward problems. Chapter 1 analyses how the problems arise from. Chapter 2– 4 analyses the problems and its solution methods from the perspectives of Patent Policy of Standard Setting Organizations(SSO),Patent Law and Antitrust Law. Conclusion puts forward the methods to solve the problems according to China’s situations and existing problems.
Introduction puts forward the problems, the status quo of solving problems and the research purport. By enquiring and reflecting the event that China presents a proposal named INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT (IPR) ISSUES IN STANDARDIZATION to WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade and has no result,this article take the legal issues arising from patent incorporation into technical standard as the object of this study. Patent incorporation into technical standard may lead to Standard Hold-up Problem and Competition-bloching Problem The problems appear in the form of non-disclosure of patent information, patent pool, refusal to license, excessive pricing on license. The Problem behaves a new kind of barrier to trade in international trade. This article puts forward three methods to solve the problems, including the SSO’s patent policy, Patent Law and Antitrust law,and analyses their merits and demerits. During practicing the domestic technical standard, adopting international standard and observe foreig(nIncluding area standard)technical standard,China is facing the legal issues arising from patent incorporation into technical standard. China’s patent policy and law relating to standardization, Patent Law and Antitrust Law have some loopholes,and it is difficulty to solve the problems,so it is necessary to perfect relevant laws Therefore, this study has very important values in theory and practice.
Chapter 1 deals with the basic theory of patent incorporation into technical standard. There are 5 sections. Section 1 deals with the definition, classification, purpose, and nature of technical standard. Technical standard has different meaning in the different circumstances, so it is vital to ascertain the given context to understand it. Technical standard may be classified from different angle and their legal meanings are not the same. This article ascertains the studied technical standard via these classifications. The purpose of Technical standard explains why need technical standard, and this article analyses why need compatibility standard, security standard, and environment standard from the Network Externality, Information Asymmetry and External Effect of Production. The public goods attribute of technical standard in Economics governs its public property rights in law. Section 2 deals with the WTO member’s obligation to technical standard. According to TBT,during setting up technical regulations and Technical standard, WTO members have compulsory obligation to adopt International Standard or take International Standard as basis. WTO member can deviate from International Standard and set up domestic technical regulations and technical standard only from security, health, and environment considerations and legal procedures According to TBT, this article interprets the dispute over setting up WLAN International Standard between China and America. Section 3 deals with the classification, granting conditions, characteristics; and nature of patent. Most countries grants patent according to first-to-applying rule. But US patent law grants patent according to first- to–invention rule and this facilitates patent incorporation into technical standard in standardization setting context. The characteristics of patent is that patent owner gets monopoly power over practicing new technology scheme at the expense of publishing new technology scheme. Patent right is a kind of private rights. Section 4 deals with how patent incorporates into technical standard. This section analyses four reasons why patent could incorporated into Technical standard. The patent incorporating into technical standard mainly is method patent and it is essential to technical standard. The patent owner usually is the proposer of technical standard,and may be someone else. The time of patent incorporation into technical standard varies from granting rule. Under first-to-applying rule, the disclosure time cannot be too earlier, or it will lose the novelty. Under first–to-invention rule, the disclosure time may be lagged. Section 5 deals with the legal issues arising from patent incorporating into technical standard. patent incorporation into technical standard may result standard Hold-up Problem and competition-blocking problem. Hold-up problems means that after SSO member choses standard,he finds that adopting the standard infringes a certain patent, or that patent owner have known that SSO has chosen its patent as priority,he can get higher licensing fee than he can get where SSO has not confer market power or other facilitation before the standard set up, so this blocks the adoption of technical standard. Competition-blocking problem means that once patent incorporates into technical standard, because the technical standard has the effect of enhancing practicing patent,some proposers of technical standard take actions as non-disclosure of patent information, patent pool, refusal to license, excessive pricing on license,produces monopoly or attempt to produce monopoly,or leads to other hazard,hence makes damages to competition and eliminates consumer’s welfare. These problems appear as a new kind of barrier to trade in international trade. Finally, this section analyses the four reasons why the problems arise from patent incorporation into technical standard.
Chapter 2 deals with how regulates the legal issues arising from patent incorporation into technical standard by SSO patent policy. There are 3 sections. Section 1 deals with the contents of SSO patent policy. It contains that permitting essential patent incorporate into technical standard;Ex-ante disclosure;free royalty or royalty on reasonable and non-discrimination(FRAND);Patent owner has no duty to search patent; neutrality standing of SSO. Section 2 deals with the legal force of SSO patent policy. SSO bylaw is the legal basis on which SSO exists and operates. Besides binding the members, when patent owner make FRAND promise to SSO,it produces a third beneficiary. Most countries law empowers the third beneficiary a legal claim. In case of SSO member tactic exit, SSO member shall undertake on-going obligations. Section 3 deals with the applying and developing the patent policy of SSO in practice. In the case of patent owner’s breach Ex -ante disclosure rule,it is proper to apply Estopple by Conduct principle. The adopter of technical standard also makes fraudulent defense, but the requirements is relatively higher. If the proposer of technical standard makes FRAND promise,it constitutes implied license to the adopter. Section 4 makes a review on SSO patent policy. SSO patent policy resolves partially standard hold-up problem and competition-blocking problem. It has good effects, but it also has some shortcomings.
Chapter 3 deals with how regulates the legal issues arising from patent incorporation into technical standard by Patent Law. There are 3 Sections. Section 1 deals with the theory and practice of patent misuse. Patent misuse is affirmative defense against patent infringement. According to the defense of patent misuse,if patent owner’s exercising its rights breaches public interest, he cannot ask the court safeguard its rights. U.S. Patent Law provides patent misuse. There are two elements of patent misuse. First, there exists patent or being related to exercising patent; Second, exercising patent does harm to others or public interests. The consequence of patent misuse is that the court does not support the patent owner’s claims for exercising his rights and applying for injunction before the misuse act is adjusted. There are some differences between patent misuse and antitrust law, and they are coming into being , function, nature and legal consequence. Section 2 deals with how patent misuse regulates the legal issues arising from patent incorporation into technical standard. Patent misuse may solve the legal issues arising from patent incorporation into technical standard, such as non-disclosure of patent information, license fee discrimination, patent pool and so on. Applying patent misuse to regulate the legal issues arising from patent incorporation into technical standard has merits and demerits. Section 3 deals with how compulsory license regulates the legal issues arising from patent incorporation into technical standard. TRIPS provides the legal reasons and procedures of compulsory license. According to the conditions of patent compulsory license provided in TRIPS, when technical standard patent owner’s act constitutes restrictive competition, compulsory license may apply; on the other hand,even if the patent owner’s act does not constitutes restrictive competition,but the prospective adopter of technical standard attempts to get license from patent owner in accordance with reasonable commercial terms but does not succeed in reasonable time, he can also apply compulsory license.
Chapter 4 deals with how regulates the legal issues arising from Patent incorporation into technical standard by antitrust law. There are 5 Sections. Section 1 introduces the basic theory of antitrust law from the regulating object and legislative mode of competition law, monopolization act regulated by antitrust law , reasonable rule and per se rule, extraterritorial effect , analytical mode, liability. Section 2 deals with how regulates the patent’s exercising by antitrust law. The relationship between antitrust law and intellectual property law is close. First, they have both the same legislative purposes; Second, exercising intellectual property rights properly is immunized by antitrust law; Third, the misuse of intellectual property rights shall be regulated by antitrust law. U.S. and European Union lay down antitrust regulations to regulate the exercising of intellectual property rights. Section 3, taking Dell case, Unocal case and Rambus case as examples,deals with how regulates non-disclosure of patent information in technical standard by antitrust law,and analyses the basis and nature of liability. Proving the non-disclosure of patent information in technical standard to constitute monopoly or attempt to monopoly, it shall establish that: First, the proposer of technical standard misrepresents; Second, he get market power by technical standard; Third, he has intent to monopoly. Section 4 deals with how regulates patent pool in technical standard by antitrust law. By contrasting 3 cases, this section summing up the criteria whether the patent pool in Technical standard violates Antitrust Law. First, whether the incorporation patents is complementary or not; Second, whether permit the incorporation patents license alone or not, Third, whether permit the competition with the patent and standard; Fourth, whether exist price-fixing or price manipulation. Section 5 deals with how regulates the refusal to licensing patent in technical standard by antitrust law. Antitrust law of U.S. and European Union apply essential facilities doctrine to solve the problem of refusal to deal,and the doctrine’s applying extends to refusal to deal of intellectual property rights in recent years. It is necessary and possible to apply the doctrine to solve patent owner’s refusal to license in technical standard. Section 6 deals with how regulates excessive pricing on license in technical standard by antitrust law. Most antitrust law takes excessive prices as a kind of monopoly and regulates it, but judicial practice indicates that it is not easy to decide excessive price. Hence, Ex-ante license will be a alternative method.
Conclusion entitled perfecting and applying legal systems to resolve the legal issue arising from patent incorporation into technical standard. According to China’s facing standard hold-up problem and competition-blocking problem arising from patent incorporation into technical standard during practicing domestic technical standard, adopting international standard and observing foreign(including area standard)technical standard, based on the foresaid analytical conclusions, puts forward the methods to solve problems. There are 3 Sections. Section 1 deals with China should perfect standardization administrative system, patent policy and the practicing of TBT. Our administration—orientated standardization system exists some inadequacy,it should be perfected according to the mode of“national standardization administrative agency(setting up national standard)—SSO(setting up industry standard)-enterprise(the proposer of technical standard)”. The rules on national standard related to patent (draft) drawn up by Standardization Administration Committee (SAC) of P.R.C. exists inadequacy, it should be perfected. China should adopt international standard according to the given order during practicing TBT. During observing foreign (including area standard) technical standard, if WTO member violates TBT,China government can bring a complaint to WTO Dispute Settling Body. Section 2 deals with China should perfect and apply patent law. Article 75“Technical standard and patent infringement”of The rules on trial of patent infringement (draft) made by the Supreme Court of the People's Republic of China exists inadequacy, and it need perfecting. China should establish patent misuse system according to the coexistence mode of patent misuse and antitrust law. China’s compulsory patent license has some gaps in contrast with TRIPS,it should be perfected according to TRIPS. Section 3 deals with the perfecting and applying china’s antitrust rules for intellectual property. China‘s antitrust law should be perfected from evaluating rule, the definition of relevant market, antitrust executing agency, antitrust executing work system, antitrust law liability, antitrust law private litigation, the extraterritorial effect of antitrust law. China should perfect antitrust rule for intellectual property by referring U.S. Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property. It should provide the relationship between intellectual property law and antitrust law, the basic principle of intellectual property’s antitrust analysis, evaluating rule, safe zone, prohibiting patent owner’s restrictive competition via standard setting in general provisions; and it should provide the elements of pro-competition and anti-competition of each act of practicing intellectual property rights as guideline for antitrust analysis.in sub-provisions Eventually, according to the basic theory of antitrust law, this section make a summery on how to deal with China’s facing restrictive competition problems China which arises from patent incorporation into technical standard.
引文
1商务部世贸司:《中、美在“标准化中的知识产权问题”上在WTO内形成对峙》,http://chinawto.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/i/af/200606/20060602486279.html,2008年2日7日访问。
1 In re dell computer corp., 121 FTC 616 (1995).
2视频电子标准协会是由代表来自世界各地的、享有投票权利的超过165家成员公司的董事会领导的非盈利国际组织。http://www.vesa.org.cn/organization/bylaws.htm. 2008年2日7日访问。
1 ISO-IEC JTC1 patents database,www.iso.ch 2006年5月29日访问。
2 ISO patents database-without ISO-IEC Jtc1 standard,www.iso.ch 2006年5月29日访问。
1见《“硬”规范与专利权起冲突》,《工人日报》2001年9月5日。
1“高通高层紧急飞赴中国平息与大唐的专利之争”,http://www.unsn.cn/un/jmxx_disp.asp?recno=49455,2006年9月6日访问。
1中华人民共和国国家标准GB/T 20000.1-2002(代替GB/T 3935.1-1996),《标准化工作指南第1部分:标准化和相关活动的通用词汇》(ISO/IEC Guide 2:1996,Standardization and related activities-Genaral vocabulaary,MOD),中华人民共和国国家质量监督检验检疫总局2002年6月20日发布,2003年1月1日实施。
2 See ISO/IEC Guide 2:2004, definition 3.2 standard means that“document, established by consensus and approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context NOTE: Standards should be based on the consolidated results of science, technology and experience, and aimed at the promotion of optimum community benefits.”
1〔美〕E·博登海默著、邓正来译:《法理学:法律哲学与法律方法》中国政法大学出版社2004年1月修订版,第246-247页。
1更多了解CENELEC,登录http://www.cenelec.org/
2更多了解CEN,登录http://www.cen.eu/
1《中国高科技标准战略研究报告》、European Standards Survey-Glossary of TermsPublished将事实标准界定为Standards that have been ratified by the ISO and/or a range of national standards-setting bodies.
1上诉机构“欧共体-石棉”案报告,第70段。
1上诉机构“欧共体-石棉”案报告,第67-69段。
2 European Communities - Trade Description of Sardines WT/DS231/R.
1郭雪艳:《开放标准的呼声日渐高涨》,《WTO经济导刊》2007年第6期,第64页。
1更多了解IEEE,登录http://www.ieee.org/
2房庆、汤万金、杨赛:《关于我国技术标准管理体制转型战略重点的思考》,《中国标准化》2003年12期。
1 http://www.usatour.com.cn/art/467/,2007年1月26日访问。
1 WTO WORLD TRADE REPORT 2005: Exploring the Links between Trade, Standards and the WTO, P.31.
1 Nelson,Phillip(1970),information and consumer behavior[J].78 Journal of Political Economic, pp.311-329.
1 Musgrave,Richard A.(1969),Provision for Social Goods,in Margolis, Julius and Guitton H.(eds)Public Economics[M].New York, St.Martin's Press, pp.124-125.
1 European Communities - Trade Description of Sardines WT/DS231/R.
1更多了解IEC,登录http://www.iec.ch/
2更多了解ITU,登录http://www.itu.int/
1《2005年度世界贸易报告》,第120-122页。
2 See Consolidated Procedures For The Technical Work Of ISO, Development Of International Standards, pp.27-46.
1李明德著:《美国知识产权法》,法律出版社2003年10月第1版,第31页。
1李明德著:《美国知识产权法》,法律出版社2003年10月第1版,第37-38页。
1同前引,38页。
2引自1980年6月26日美国路易斯安那州联邦地方法院的判决,〔日〕竹田和彦著:《专利基础知识》(莫邦富等译),上海翻译出版公司,1986年1月第1版。
3引自1980年12月18日日本最高法院的判决,〔日〕竹田和彦著:《专利基础知识》(莫邦富等译),上海翻译出版公司,1986年1月第1版。
1中华人民共和国国家知识产权局:《审查指南(2006)》,知识产权出版社2006年6月修订版,第463页。
1 P·D罗森堡(美)著、郑成思译:《专利法基础》,对外贸易出版社1982年出版,第146页。
2张玉瑞:《应慎用“知识产权是私权”》,《知识产权报》2006年12月22日。其列举的主要理由包括:发达国家的政府政策、法院判决中很少使用;知识产权制度中存在大量知识产权的限制和规范;TRIPS是发达国家、发展中国家争执的结果,TRIPS强化了私权概念;“知识产权是私权”是国际条约上的概念,与国内法、国内政策有相当距离;知识产权是私权这一概念,会掩盖专利等知识产权的垄断性;私权这种划分,在我国的民法、行政法、刑法体系当中,没有对应的分类基础。私权概念的主要含义,应当是“民事权利”加“官方不得干预”,官方不得干预的民事权利这种法律概念,在我国法律体系当中,没有合适的位置。
3冯晓青、刘淑华:《试论知识产权和私权属性及其公权化趋向》,《中国法学》2004年第1期。
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1吴汉东:《关于知识产权私权属性的再认识--兼评“知识产权公权化”理论》,http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=23198. 2008年2月7日访问。
1 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
1 Amercan Society Sntitary Engineering, Dkt, C-3169, 106 F.T.C.324(1985).
1 Sheila F., Anthony, Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law: From Adversaries to Partners, AIPLA Quarterly Journal, Vol.28 Number 1, winter 2000.转引自张平、马骁:《标准化与知识产权战略》(第2版),知识产权出版社,2005年6月第2版,第133页。
2 ESTI Guide on Intellectual Property Right(iprs) (as endorsed by the ETSI ga#46 on 23 novermber 2005).
1《高通卖专利起家终成3G时代霸主》,www.dedecms.com/web-manage/yejiedongtai/20070505/38742.html
1 http://economics.about.com/library/glossary/bldef-hold-up-problem.htm,2007年3月12日访问。
2 GERALD F. MASOUDI: EFFICIENCY IN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST, STANDARDSETTING, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY. Speech at High-Level Workshop on Standardization, IP Licensing, and Antitrust,Tilburg Law & Economic Center, Tilburg University,Chateau du Lac, Brussels, Belgium,January 18, 2007.
1 Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1224 (C. D. Cal. 1998). caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase. pl?navby=search&case=/data2/circs/10th/961202v3.html - 56k
2 Mueller, Janice,“Patent misuse through the capture of industry standards”, 17:2, Berkley technical law journal, 623, 2002.
1 Sheila F., Anthony, Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law: From Adversaries to Partners, AIPLA Quarterly Journal, Vol.28 Number 1, winter 2000.转引自张平、马骁:《标准化与知识产权战略》(第2版),知识产权出版社2005年6月第2版,第133页。
1 http: //www.itu.int/itu-t/patent/index.html.
2 See Guidelines for Implementation of ITU-T Patent Policy 5.1 Database Information, http://www.itu.int.
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1 Black’s law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, West Group St. Paul, Mini., 1999. p.570.
2 Black’s law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, West Group St. Paul, Mini., 1999. p.571.
3 Zayka v. Giambro, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 748, 594 N.E.2d 894 [1992]
1 Stamber v. Diebold,Inc.1998 WL 95479, 11 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1709(E D.N.Y. 1988), affd. 878 F 2d 1445(Fed. Cir. 1989).
2 Estsoople by laches,迟延禁止反言,是指当原告不合理地延误或主张请求时存在疏忽时,法庭可拒绝对其救济。Black’s law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, West Group St. Paul, Mini., 1999. p.571.
1郭雪艳:《开放标准的呼声日渐高涨》,《WTO经济导刊》2007年第6期,第64页。
1 See aukerman,960 F.2d
1 318 F 3d 1081(Fed. Cir. 2003).
2 Tom Krazit, Analysts: Rambus case to alter standards-setting rules, http://www.infoworld.com/article/03/01/30/030130hnrambus_1.html.
1 Tom Krazit, Rambus, Infineon end DRAM dispute, sign licensing deal, http://computerworld.com.sg/ShowPage.aspx?pagetype=2&articleid=230& pubid=3&issueid=29.
1 Wang lab v. Mitsubishi Elecs Am .,29U.S.P.Q (BNA)1481(C.D..Cal1993); 103 F 3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1 Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 52 USPQ 30 (1942).
2 Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 493.
1 New England Merchants National Bank of Boston v.Kann,363Mass.425(1973) (He who seeks equity must do equity.)or“A court of equity will not aid who resorts to unjust and unfair conduct.”, see Meknight v.Midwest Eye Institute,799 S.W.2d 909(Mo.App.W.D.1990.
2 1938年,美国《联邦民事诉讼规则》生效,独立的衡平法院被纳入了单一的司法制度。
3 Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U. S. 240, 244 (1933)
4 United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U. S. 457, 465 (1957).
5罗伯特?P?墨杰斯等著:《新技术时代的知识产权法》(齐筠等译),中国政法大学出版社2003年版,第240页。
6 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
1李明德:《美国知识产权法》,第64页。
2 The act of aiding or abetting another's patent infringement by knowingly selling a nonstape item that has no substantial noninfringement use and is especially adapted for use in a patened combination or process. In the patent context, contributory infringement is statutorily defined in the patent act 35 U.S.C.A. 217(c)
1 Dawson Chem Co v. Rohm Hass co.,448 U.S. 176, 206 U.S.P.Q. 385(1980)。本案例的介绍部分参考了该条译文参考了李明德《美国知识产权法》,第65、77页。
1 803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
2梁慧星著:《民法总论》,法律出版社2001年5月第2版,第297页。
1梁慧星著:《民法总论》,法律出版社2001年5月第2版,第300页。
2梁慧星著:《民法总论》,法律出版社2001年5月第2版,第69页。
3 See United States Gypsum Co. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457 (1957); B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942); Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
1 Usm Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F. 2d 505, 511(7th Cir. 1982)
2〔美〕约翰·理查兹等:《产品进入美国市场的法律问题》(侯国云等译),中国政法大学出版社1991年版,第215-216页。转引自王先林著《知识产权滥用反垄断问题研究》,法律出版社2001年9月第1版,第94-95页。
3转引自王先林著《知识产权滥用反垄断问题研究》,法律出版社2001年9月第1版,第95页。
1 2000 U.S. Dist Lexsis 5070, 55 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
2 Robin C. Feldman,“The insufficiency of antitrust analysis for patent misuse”, 55 Hastings L.J. 399.
1 USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982).
2 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982)
1 Laitram Corp. v. King-Crab, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Alaska 1965).
2 Bela Seating Co., v. Poloron Prods., Inc., 438 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1971).
3 359 F.2d 745, 747 (7th Cir. 1966).
4 PSC Inc. v. Symbol Techs., 48 USPQ2d 1838 (W.D.N.Y. 1998)
5 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965).
6 Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395 U.S. 100 (1969); Automatic Radio Co. v. Hazeltine, 339 U.S. 827 (1950)
1尚明主编:《主要国家(地区)反垄断法律汇编》,法律出版社2004年5月第1版,第812页。
1美国反垄断法主要由《谢尔曼法》(Sherman Act)、《克莱顿法》(Clayton Act)、《联邦贸易委员会法》(Federal Trade Commission Act)三大法律组成。
2竞争法主要体现在《欧洲共同体条约》(《罗马条约》)第81条至第86条。
3尚明主编:《主要国家(地区)反垄断法律汇编》,法律出版社2004年5月第1版。
1王保树主编:《经济法原理》社会科学文献出版社1999年版,第230-231页。
2 Standard Oil Co.of N.J .v..United State, 221 U.S. 1(1911).
1文学国:《滥用与规制-反垄断法对企业滥用市场地位行为的规制》,法律出版社2003年8月第1版,第58页。
2 .United State v. Sony-vacuum Oil Co.,
1 897 F.2d 1572, 1576, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1034, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 876-77, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 90, 100-01 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
2 Hewitt Pate, Competition and Intellectual Property in U.S.: Licensing Freedom and Limits of Antitrust.
1 186 U.S. 70 (1902) (patent pooling arrangement exempted from antitrust scrutiny even though pool amounted to outright price fixing with no apparent transfer of technology or other efficiency).
1全国人大常委会法制工作委员会经济法室编:《〈中国人民共和国反垄断法〉条文说明、立法理由及相关规定》,北京大学出版社2007年9月第1版,第343页。
1 In re Union Oil Company of California (Unocal), FTC Docket no. 9305 (March 4, 2003)
1 In re Rambus., FTC Docket no. 9302 (June 18, 2002)
1 FTC, Initial Decision Released in Rambus Case,http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/02/rambusid.htm.
2 FTC’s Bureau of Competition, FTC Finds Rambus Unlawfully Obtained Monopoly Power, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/08/rambus.htm.
3 David Balto , FTC v. RAMBUS: Time to Reexamine Standard Setting Rules, http: //www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/intell_property/ftcrambus.doc.
4 FTC, In the Matter of Rambus Incorporated, http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/index.htm.
1李文贤、张荣吉、谢欣哲、孙自祥:《产业标准与专利授权之研究》,第5页。
2同上。
3 Carl shapiro:Navigating the Patent Thicket:Cross Licenses,Patent Pools,and Standard-setting
1 See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq. (June 26, 1997)
2 See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq. (Dec. 16, 1998)
1 See In re Summit Tech., Inc. & VISX, Inc., No. 9286 (FTC Mar. 24, 1998) (complaint)
1 Robert Pitofsky: The Essential Facilities Doctrine under U.S. Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol.70
2 224 U.S. 383, 411-12(1912).
1 MCI Communications , 708 F. 2d at 1132-33.
2 See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F. 3d 1346, 1356 , 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
3 948 F 2d 536,542 (9tth Cir,1991)
1 Byars,609 F. 2d at 542.
2 Hencht v. Pro-football,Inc.,570 F 2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir,1977 ).
3 CTC Communications Corp., 77 F.Supp.at147–48 (D.Me.1999) (voice mail services provided by local telecommunications company may constitute essential facility fo competing reseller of local telecommunications services);ApartmentSourceofPhila-delphiav.PhiladelphiaNewspapers,Civ.ActionNo.98-5472,1999WL191649,at*7–*10(E.D.Pa.Apr.1,1999) (dominant city news papers could be essential facility for plaintiff Apartment locator service where newspapers ran competing service) ; Direct Media Corp. v. CamdenTel.&Tel.Co.,989 F. Supp. 1211, 1218–19 (S.D. Ga.1997) (access to telephone company’s subscriber phone list could be essential facility for competing telephone book producer notwithstanding availability of telephone company’s printed listings); BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ’g,Inc.,719 F.Supp.1551,1566 (S.D.Fla. 1988) (applying essential facilities doctrine to directory listings in which defendant phone company claimed copyright), rev’d on other grounds, 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993); see also ColonialPennGroupv.Am.Ass’n of Retired Persons, 698 F. Supp. 69, 72–73(E.D.Pa.1988).转引自Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson, Jonathan Hooks, The Essential Facilities Doctrine under U. S. Antitrust Law,第448-449页。
4 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 121 S.Ct. 1077 (2001).
1 141 F 3d 1059. 1068(Fed. Cir. 1998).
2 382 U.S. 172, 177(1965).
3 BellSouth Adver.&Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info.Publ’g,Inc.,719F.Supp.1551,1566(S.D.Fla.1988), rev’d on other grounds, 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993).
4 761 F. Supp.185,191–92 (D.Mass.1991), aff’d in part and remanded, 36 F.3d 1147(1st Cir.1994).
1 Serv.&Training,Inc.v.DataGen.Corp.,737 F.Supp.334,343–44(D.Md.1990)(allowing monopolization claim to proceed based on computer manufacturer’s unwillingness to license diagnostic software to competitor computer repair service pro-video); see also Poster Exch., Inc. v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 431 F.2d 334, 338–40 (5th Cir.1970) (exclusive licensee of movie promotional materials, such as posters, could constitute essential facility required to supply additional materials to competitor distribu- tor); Montgomery County Ass’n of Realtors, Inc. v. Realty Photo Master Corp., 878 F.Supp.804,817(D.Md.1995) (considering essential lf acilities claims to copyrighted realestate listing service; dismissing claim because no evidence presented that service constituted an essential facility), aff’d, 91 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 1996).
2 Joined Cases C-241/91P and C-242/91P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1995 O.J. (C 137) 3.
1 See Press Release, Commission Imposes Interim Measures on IMS Health in Germany(July 3, 2001),Available At Http://www.Europa.Eu.Int/Rapid/Start/Cgi/
1《欧洲委员会继续对高通进行调查受到普遍欢迎》,http://it.hexun.com/2007-10-03/100828403.html 2008年2月7日访问。
1 General Motors Continental NV v Commission of the European Communities. Case 26-75. Judgment at 13 November 1975.
2 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European Communities. Case 27/76. Judgment at 14 February 1978.
1 VITA, Disclosure and Licensingof Patents In Standards, http://www.vita.com/disclosure/
1参见R. Hewitt Pate:《美国的知识产权与竞争:许可自由及反托拉斯限制》,在第9届2005欧盟竞争研讨会的演讲(意大利佛罗伦萨,2005年6月3日), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/209359.pdf
1 Deborah Platt Majoras:“认识标准制定中的版税讨论对推动竞争的可能作用,在“标准化与法律”上的演讲:Developing the golden mean for global trade(斯坦福大学,2005年9月23日)(“价格的透明能提高竞争对手在努力争取被纳入标准中的竞争力”), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050923stanford.pdf
1 Colleen Taylor, IEEE-SA Amends Patent Policy , http://www.eb-mag.com.cn/detail.asp?unid=6749
2 Electronicstalk Editorial Team, ETSI aims to level field for next generation radio, http://www.electronicstalk.com/news/acg/acg114.html,.
1中国标准化研究院编:《2006中国标准化发展研究报告》,中国标准出版社2006年11月第1版,第26-28页。
1中国标准化研究院编:《2006中国标准化发展研究报告》,中国标准出版社2006年11月第1版,第58页。
1 Commission notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law(97/C 372/03), http://www.legaltext.ee/text/en/T71346.htm,2007年7月23访问。
2 (Case T-504/93) Tierce Ladbroke SA v. E.C. Commission (1997) 5 C.M.L.R. 309.
3产品的可替代性可分为功能上的可替代性(Function Interchangeability)与实用的可替代性(Practical Interchangeability)。前者指两个产品具有相同功用,后者指若两个产品之间存在价格差异,消费者能够在他们之间进行挑选。See Per Jebsen & Robert Stevens, Assumptions, Goals and Dominant Undertakings: The Regulation of Competition Under Article 86 of the European Union, 64 Antitrust L.J. 443, 468-72 (1996).
1 See Darry E. Holt,“a competition of ideals:the competition policies of the European Union and the United States compared”, http://www.nesl.edu/intljournal/vol3/ideals.htm, 2007年7月23日访问。
2第九条第1款规定:“国务院设立反垄断委员会,负责组织、协调、指导反垄断工作,履行下列职责:(一)研究拟订有关竞争政策;(二)组织调查、评估市场总体竞争状况,发布评估报告;(三)制定、发布反垄断指南;(四)协调反垄断行政执法工作;(五)国务院规定的其他职责。第2款规定:“国务院反垄断委员会的组成和工作规则由国务院规定。”
1更多了解美国司法部企业评审程序,登录http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/procedure.htm.
2 28 C.F.R.§50.6.
1 Government of Japan, Fair Trade Commission Guidelines for Patent and Know-how Licensing Agreements under the Antimonopoly Act V. www2.jftc.go.jp/e-page/guideli/patent99.htm
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8、李明德著:《美国知识产权法》,法律出版社2003年10月第1版。
9、郑成思著:《世界贸易组织与贸易有关的知识产权》,中国人民大学出版社1996年10月第1版。
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12、中华人民共和国国家知识产权局:《审查指南(2006)》,知识产权出版社2006年6月修订版。
13、尚明著:《对企业滥用市场支配地位的反垄断法规制》,法律出版社2007年4月第1版。
14、文学国著:《滥用与规制——反垄断法对企业滥用市场地位行为的规制》,法律出版社2003年8月第1版。
15、毛丰付著:《标准竞争与竞争政策:以ICT产业为例》,上海三联书店2007年1月第1版。
16、陈淑梅著:《欧洲经济一体化背景下的技术标准化》,东南大学出版社2005年9月第1版。
17、王仲辉著:《跨越贸易壁垒——技术性贸易壁垒对中国纺织品服装贸易的影响》,中国社会科学出版社2005年5月第1版。
18、孔庆峰著:《技术性贸易壁垒:理论、规则和案例》,中国海关出版社2004年2月第1版。
19、周昀著:《反垄断法新论》,中国政法大学出版社2006年9月第1版。
20、梁慧星著:《民法总论》,法律出版社2001年5月第2版。
21、傅静坤著:《二十世纪契约法》,法律出版社1997年版。
22、黄立著:《民法债编总论》,中国政法大学出版社2002年版。
23、中华人民共和国国家标准GB/T 20000.1-2002(代替GB/T 3935.1-1996),《标准化工作指南第1部分:标准化和相关活动的通用词汇》(ISO/IEC Guide 2:1996,Standardization and related activities-Genaral vocabulary,MOD),中华人民共和国国家质量监督检验检疫总局2002年6月20日发布,2003年1月1日实施。
24、WTO/TBT委员会文件:《标准、技术法规和合格评定程序对贸易的限制性影响》,G/TBT/W/42,1997年4月28日发布。
25、联合国贸易和发展会议贸发会议秘书处报告:《竞争政策与知识产权的行使》,TD/RBP/CONF.5/6,11 August 2000。
26、〔日〕根岸哲、舟田正之著:《日本禁止垄断法概论》(第三版),王为农、陈杰译,中国法制出版社2007年1月第1版。
27、〔美〕Jay Dratler.Jr.著:《知识产权许可》(上、下卷),王春燕等译,清华大学出版社2003年4月第1版。
28、〔比〕约斯特·鲍威林著:《国际公法规则之冲突-WTO法与其他国际法规则如何联系》,周忠海等译,法律出版社2005年6月第1版。
29、〔美〕E·博登海默著:《法理学:法律哲学与法律方法》,邓正来译,中国政法大学出版社2004年1月修订版。
30、〔日〕竹田和彦著:《专利基础知识》,莫邦富等译,上海翻译出版公司1986年1月第1版。
31、伯纳德·霍克曼,迈克尔·考斯泰基著:《世界贸易组织的政治经济学:从关贸总协定到世界贸易组织》,刘平、洪晓东、许明德译,法律出版社1999年1月第1版。
32、〔英〕A.G.盖斯特著:《英国合同法与案例》,中国大百科全书出版社1998年版。
33、〔美〕A.L.科宾著:《科宾论合同》(下册),王卫国、徐国栋等译,中国大百科全书出版社1998年版。
34、〔美〕罗伯特·P·墨杰斯等著:《新技术时代的知识产权法》,齐筠等译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版。
1、周汉民主编:《与WTO规则的融合——中国外经贸法律新制度》,上海人民出版社2003年2月第1版。
2、对外贸易经济合作部国际经贸关系司:《世界贸易组织乌拉圭回合多边贸易谈判结果法律文本》,法律出版社2000年10月第1版。
3、桑德斯(T.R.B. Sanders)主编:《标准化的目的与原理》,科学技术文献出版社1974年10月出版。
4、朱榄叶主编:《世界贸易组织国际贸易纠纷案例评析(1995——2002)》(上、下册),法律出版社2004年1月第1版。
5、朱榄叶主编:《世界贸易组织国际贸易纠纷案例评析》,法律出版社2000年11月第1版。
6、韩立余主编:《攻克出口贸易中的九大法律障碍》,知识产权出版社2005年1月第1版。
7、刘春田主编:《知识产权法》(第二版),中国人民大学出版社2000年3月第1版。
8、许光耀主编:《欧共体竞争法》,武汉大学出版社2006年10月第1版。
9、刘春青、鲍建忠主编:《欧盟技术法规:市场准入的依据》,中国计量出版社2004年5月第1版。
10、尚明主编:《主要国家(地区)反垄断法律汇编》,法律出版社2004年5月第1版。
11、全国人大常委会法制工作委员会经济法室:《〈中国人民共和国反垄断法〉条文说明、立法理由及相关规定》,北京大学出版社2007年9月第1版。
12、中国标准化研究院:《2006中国标准化发展研究报告》,中国标准出版社2006年11月第1版。
13、国家标准化管理委员会编:《国内外标准、专利概要》,中国标准出版社2006年6月第1版。
14、王保树主编:《经济法原理》,社会科学文献出版社1999年版。
15、王文杰主编:《月旦民商法研究——国际贸易法新课题》,清华大学出版社2006年1月第1版。
16、黄辉主编:《中欧贸易摩擦》,社会科学文献出版社2005年12月第1版。
1、郭雪艳:《开放标准的呼声日渐高涨》,载《WTO经济导刊》2007年第6期。
2、房庆、汤万金、杨赛:《关于我国技术标准管理体制转型战略重点的思考》,载《中国标准化》2003年12期。
3、杨丽君:《论英美法合同相对性原则》,载《民商法论丛》第12卷。
4、朱晓薇、朱雪忠:《专利与技术标准的冲突及对策》,载《科研管理》第24卷第1期。
5、王琛(译):《打赢IP标准战争》,载Manage IP 2005年第7期。
6、古祖雪:《论国际技术贸易中的知识产权限制》,载《当代法学》2005年第3期。
7、冯晓青、刘淑华:《试论知识产权和私权属性及其公权化趋向》,载《中国法学》2004年第1期。
8、吴汉东:《科技、经济、法律协调机制中的知识产权法》,载《法学研究》2001年第6期。
1、安佰生:《国家标准化战略的经济学分析》,中国人民大学经济学院经济系博士学位论文。
2、李文贤、张荣吉、谢欣哲、孙自祥:《产业标准与专利授权之研究》。
1、《“硬”规范与专利权起冲突》,载《工人日报》2001年9月5日。
2、张玉瑞:《应慎用“知识产权是私权”》,载《知识产权报》2006年12月22日。
1、李健、安佰生:《标准化、知识产权与反垄断》,http://web.cenet.org.cn/web/std/index.php3?file=detail.php3&nowdir=&id=71776&detail=1,(2008年2月11日访问)。
2、安佰生:《标准化与技术进步的发生学分析》,http://web.cenet.org.cn/web/std/index.php3?file=detail.php3&nowdir=&id=71776&detail=1,(2008年2月11日访问)。
3、安佰生:《“洛夏墨点”:关于知识产权保护制度与竞争政策关系的争论》,http://web.cenet.org.cn/web/std/index.php3?file=detail.php3&nowdir=&id=71776&detail=1,(2008年2月11日访问)。
4、An Baisheng : Public Policies for Intellectual Property Rights in Standardization ,http://web.cenet.org.cn/web/std/index.php3?file=detail.php3&nowdir=&id=100349&detail=1,(2008年2月11日访问)。
5、An Baisheng:Intellectual Property Rights Issues in Standardization,http://web.cenet.org.cn/web/std/index.php3?file=detail.php3&nowdir=&id=100348&detail=1,(2008年2月11日访问)。
6、张平马骁:《从思科诉华为案谈发明、产业标准与知识产权——“企业技术标准与知识产权战略”专题之一》,http://article1.chinalawinfo.com/ article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID=27644,(2008年2月13日访问)。
7、张平、马骁:《技术标准与知识产权的关系——“企业技术标准与知识产权战略”专题之二》, http://article1.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_ display.asp?ArticleID=27642,(2008年2月13日访问)。
8、张平、马骁:《标准化组织的知识产权政策——“企业技术标准与知识产权战略”专题之三》, http://article1.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID=27727 ,2008-2-13访问。
9、张平、马骁:《标准化组织的标识管理政策——“企业技术标准与知识产权战略”专题之四》, http://article1.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_ display.asp?ArticleID=27646,(2008年2月13日访问)。
10、赵莹:《浅析标准知识产权战略》,http://www.szip.org/llyjzl13.html,(2008年2月11日访问)。
11、张志成:《关于美国专利制度“先发明”原则的评论》,www.hllaw.com,(2007年2月18日访问)。
12、姜晖(国家知识产权局):《美国专利法的历史沿革》,http://www.acpaa.cn/publication/200602/006.htm,(2007年2月18访问)。
13、王晓晔:《紧盯国际卡特尔——美国反托拉斯法及其新发展》,http://www.competitionlaw.cn/n1133c40.aspx,(2008年2月11日访问)。
1、〔英〕斯蒂芬·戈文:《英国法律委员会合同法<第三人权利>议案草案和海上货物运输》,张明远译,《外国法译评》2000年第1期。
2、Hill B. Wellford(美国司法部反托拉斯处):《标准制定中的反托拉斯问题》,http://chinese.usembassy-china.org.cn/econ1.html,(2007年12月4日访问)。
3、托马斯?李瑞( Thomas B. Leary):《反托拉斯法的经济学渊源》http://chinese.usembassy-china.org.cn/072004c.html,(2007年12月4日访问)。
1、In re dell computer corp., 121 FTC 616 (1995).
2、Stamber v. Diebold,Inc.1998 WL 95479, 11 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1709(E D.N.Y. 1988), affd. 878 F 2d 1445(Fed. Cir. 1989).
3、Rambus v Infineon 318 F 3d 1081(Fed. Cir. 2003).
4、Wang Laboratories Inc. v. Mitsubishi Electronics America,Inc. 29U.S.P.Q (BNA)1481(C.D..Cal1993); 103 F 3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
5、In re Union Oil Company of California (Unocal), FTC Docket no. 9305 (March 4, 2003).
6、In re Rambus., FTC Docket no. 9302 (June 18, 2002).
7、Mpeg-2 patent pool case: Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq. (June 26, 1997), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/1170.htm
8、DVD patent pool case: Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq. (Dec. 16, 1998), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.htm
9、In re Summit Tech., Inc. & VISX, Inc., No. 9286 (FTC Mar. 24, 1998) (complaint) .
10、United States v. Terminal R.R. Association of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 411-12(1912).
11、MCI Communication vs. AT&T, 708 F. 2d at 1132-33.
12、Joined Cases C-241/91P and C-242/91P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1995 O.J. (C 137) 3.
13、Sony Electronics, Inc.,et al.v. Soundview Technologies, Inc.
1、David Palmeter and Petros C. Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: Practice and Procedure.(Second Edition, Cambridge, 2004).
2、Peter Van Den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials, Cambridge University Press, First published 2005.
3、WORLD TRADE REPORT 2005, Exploring the links between trade, standards and the WTO。
4、Black’s law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, West Group St. Paul, Mini., 1999.
1、Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard Setting Organizations.
2、Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patent Rights and Access Lock-In: The Core Meaning of the RAND Licensing Promise.
3、Carl Shapiro, Setting Compatibility Standards: Cooperation or Collusion?
4、Massimiliano Granieri, Standard Setting, Intellectual Property Rights andAntitrust.
5、David A. Balto and Daniel I. Prywes, Standard-Setting Disputes: The Need for Guidelines.
6、Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Standard-Setting,Institute of Business and Economic Research,Competition Policy Center (University of California, Berkeley), Year 2000 Paper CPC00-011.
7、Mueller Janice, Patent Misuse through the Capture of Industry Standards, 17:2, Berkley Technical Law Journal, 623, 2002.
8、Amy A. Marasco (ANSI Vice-president and General Counsel), Invention and Innovation Protecting Intellectual property in Standards-setting.
9、Michael a. Shimokaji, Inducement and Contributory Infringement Theories to Regulate Pre-patent Issuance Activity Idea: The Journal of Law and Technology 1997,37 IDEA 571.
10、Blind, Knut; Thumm, N.; Iversen, E.; Hossain, K. ; Reekum, R. van ; Rixius, B. ; Bierhals, R.ainer; Sillwood, J : Interaction between Standardisation and Intellectual Property rights, Brussels, European Commission, 2004, 245 S. IPTS Technical Report Series; European Commission Studies EUR, 21074 EN (ISI-B-12-04).
11、Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust, Intellectual Property and Standard Setting Organizations.
12、Timothy J. Muris, Competition and Intellectual Property Policy: The Way Ahead,Before American Bar Association Antitrust Section, Fall Forum, Washington, DC, November 15, 2001.
13、Myths And Reality, Ex-Ante Licensing in Standards Development, Presented to AIPLA Spring Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, May 4, 2006.
14、Thomas O. Barnett(Assistant Attorney General,Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice), Interoperability between Antitrust and Intellectual Property, Presentation to the George Mason University School of Law, Symposium Managing Antitrust Issues in a Global Marketplace, Washington, DC, September 13, 2006.
15、Kenneth J. BurchJiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: "Blessed Be The Tie?" Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Volume 4, Spring Issue, 1991.
16、David Friedman, Standards as Intellectual Property: an Economic Approach.
17、Eric James Iversen, Esten Oversjoen and Haakon Thue Lie, Standardization, Innovation and IPR.
18、Sanford v. Berg, Technical Standards as Public Goods: Demand Incentives for Cooperative Behavior, Public Finance Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 29-54 (1989).
19、Ken Krechmer Fellow, The Fundamental Nature of Standards: Technical Perspective.
20、RobertPitofsky,DonnaPatterson,JonathanHooks, The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust Law.
21、Melissa Landau Steinman, Standards, Intellectual Property and Antitrust, Speech for NCITS TC Officers Symposium,October 17, 2000.
22、Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl Shapiro, and Theresa Sullivan, Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 1 May 2007
23、David Encaoua, Abraham Hollander, Competition Policy and Innovation, January 2002.
24、Keith E. Maskus, Reforming U.S. Patent Policy: Getting the Incentives Right, CSR NO. 19, November 2006.
25、Richard J. Gilbert, Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evolution October 3, 2002.
26、Teague i. Donahey, Antitrust Counterclaims in Patent Infringement Litigation: Clarifying the Supreme Court's Enigmatic Mercoid Decision Idea, The Journal of Law and Technology,1999, 39 J.L. & TECH. 225.
1、R. Hewitt Pate R., Competition and Intellectual Property in the U.S: Licensing Freedom and the Limits of Antitrust,June 3, 2005,2005 EU Competition Workshop Florence, Italy, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/209359.pdf,(2008年2月11日访问)。
2、Deborah Platt Majoras, Recognizing the Procompetitive Potential of Royalty Discussions In Standard Setting”, September 23, 2005 Stanford University,Preparedfor Standardization and the Law: Developing the Golden Mean for Global Trade, http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050923stanford.pdf,( 2008年2月11日访问)。
3、WTO官方网站:http:/www.wto.org
4、国际标准化组织官方网站:http://www.iso.org/
5、国际电工协会官方网站:http://www.iec.ch/
6、国际电信联盟官方网站:http://www.itu.int/
7、欧洲电信标准协会网站:http://www.etsi.org/
8、欧洲标准化委员会官方网站:http://www.cen.eu/
9、美国电气工程协会网站:http://www.ieee.org/
10、美国联邦贸易委员会官方网站:http://www.ftc.gov/
11、美国司法部官方网站:http://www.usdoj.gov/
12、欧盟委员会官方网站:http://ec.europa.eu/
1 In re dell computer corp., 121 FTC 616 (1995).
2视频电子标准协会是由代表来自世界各地的、享有投票权利的超过165家成员公司的董事会领导的非盈利国际组织。http://www.vesa.org.cn/organization/bylaws.htm. 2008年2日7日访问。
1 ISO-IEC JTC1 patents database,www.iso.ch 2006年5月29日访问。
2 ISO patents database-without ISO-IEC Jtc1 standard,www.iso.ch 2006年5月29日访问。
1见《“硬”规范与专利权起冲突》,《工人日报》2001年9月5日。
1“高通高层紧急飞赴中国平息与大唐的专利之争”,http://www.unsn.cn/un/jmxx_disp.asp?recno=49455,2006年9月6日访问。
1中华人民共和国国家标准GB/T 20000.1-2002(代替GB/T 3935.1-1996),《标准化工作指南第1部分:标准化和相关活动的通用词汇》(ISO/IEC Guide 2:1996,Standardization and related activities-Genaral vocabulaary,MOD),中华人民共和国国家质量监督检验检疫总局2002年6月20日发布,2003年1月1日实施。
2 See ISO/IEC Guide 2:2004, definition 3.2 standard means that“document, established by consensus and approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context NOTE: Standards should be based on the consolidated results of science, technology and experience, and aimed at the promotion of optimum community benefits.”
1〔美〕E·博登海默著、邓正来译:《法理学:法律哲学与法律方法》中国政法大学出版社2004年1月修订版,第246-247页。
1更多了解CENELEC,登录http://www.cenelec.org/
2更多了解CEN,登录http://www.cen.eu/
1《中国高科技标准战略研究报告》、European Standards Survey-Glossary of TermsPublished将事实标准界定为Standards that have been ratified by the ISO and/or a range of national standards-setting bodies.
1上诉机构“欧共体-石棉”案报告,第70段。
1上诉机构“欧共体-石棉”案报告,第67-69段。
2 European Communities - Trade Description of Sardines WT/DS231/R.
1郭雪艳:《开放标准的呼声日渐高涨》,《WTO经济导刊》2007年第6期,第64页。
1更多了解IEEE,登录http://www.ieee.org/
2房庆、汤万金、杨赛:《关于我国技术标准管理体制转型战略重点的思考》,《中国标准化》2003年12期。
1 http://www.usatour.com.cn/art/467/,2007年1月26日访问。
1 WTO WORLD TRADE REPORT 2005: Exploring the Links between Trade, Standards and the WTO, P.31.
1 Nelson,Phillip(1970),information and consumer behavior[J].78 Journal of Political Economic, pp.311-329.
1 Musgrave,Richard A.(1969),Provision for Social Goods,in Margolis, Julius and Guitton H.(eds)Public Economics[M].New York, St.Martin's Press, pp.124-125.
1 European Communities - Trade Description of Sardines WT/DS231/R.
1更多了解IEC,登录http://www.iec.ch/
2更多了解ITU,登录http://www.itu.int/
1《2005年度世界贸易报告》,第120-122页。
2 See Consolidated Procedures For The Technical Work Of ISO, Development Of International Standards, pp.27-46.
1李明德著:《美国知识产权法》,法律出版社2003年10月第1版,第31页。
1李明德著:《美国知识产权法》,法律出版社2003年10月第1版,第37-38页。
1同前引,38页。
2引自1980年6月26日美国路易斯安那州联邦地方法院的判决,〔日〕竹田和彦著:《专利基础知识》(莫邦富等译),上海翻译出版公司,1986年1月第1版。
3引自1980年12月18日日本最高法院的判决,〔日〕竹田和彦著:《专利基础知识》(莫邦富等译),上海翻译出版公司,1986年1月第1版。
1中华人民共和国国家知识产权局:《审查指南(2006)》,知识产权出版社2006年6月修订版,第463页。
1 P·D罗森堡(美)著、郑成思译:《专利法基础》,对外贸易出版社1982年出版,第146页。
2张玉瑞:《应慎用“知识产权是私权”》,《知识产权报》2006年12月22日。其列举的主要理由包括:发达国家的政府政策、法院判决中很少使用;知识产权制度中存在大量知识产权的限制和规范;TRIPS是发达国家、发展中国家争执的结果,TRIPS强化了私权概念;“知识产权是私权”是国际条约上的概念,与国内法、国内政策有相当距离;知识产权是私权这一概念,会掩盖专利等知识产权的垄断性;私权这种划分,在我国的民法、行政法、刑法体系当中,没有对应的分类基础。私权概念的主要含义,应当是“民事权利”加“官方不得干预”,官方不得干预的民事权利这种法律概念,在我国法律体系当中,没有合适的位置。
3冯晓青、刘淑华:《试论知识产权和私权属性及其公权化趋向》,《中国法学》2004年第1期。
4吴汉东:《科技、经济、法律协调机制中的知识产权法》,《法学研究》2001年第6期。
1吴汉东:《关于知识产权私权属性的再认识--兼评“知识产权公权化”理论》,http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=23198. 2008年2月7日访问。
1 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
1 Amercan Society Sntitary Engineering, Dkt, C-3169, 106 F.T.C.324(1985).
1 Sheila F., Anthony, Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law: From Adversaries to Partners, AIPLA Quarterly Journal, Vol.28 Number 1, winter 2000.转引自张平、马骁:《标准化与知识产权战略》(第2版),知识产权出版社,2005年6月第2版,第133页。
2 ESTI Guide on Intellectual Property Right(iprs) (as endorsed by the ETSI ga#46 on 23 novermber 2005).
1《高通卖专利起家终成3G时代霸主》,www.dedecms.com/web-manage/yejiedongtai/20070505/38742.html
1 http://economics.about.com/library/glossary/bldef-hold-up-problem.htm,2007年3月12日访问。
2 GERALD F. MASOUDI: EFFICIENCY IN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST, STANDARDSETTING, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY. Speech at High-Level Workshop on Standardization, IP Licensing, and Antitrust,Tilburg Law & Economic Center, Tilburg University,Chateau du Lac, Brussels, Belgium,January 18, 2007.
1 Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1224 (C. D. Cal. 1998). caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase. pl?navby=search&case=/data2/circs/10th/961202v3.html - 56k
2 Mueller, Janice,“Patent misuse through the capture of industry standards”, 17:2, Berkley technical law journal, 623, 2002.
1 Sheila F., Anthony, Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law: From Adversaries to Partners, AIPLA Quarterly Journal, Vol.28 Number 1, winter 2000.转引自张平、马骁:《标准化与知识产权战略》(第2版),知识产权出版社2005年6月第2版,第133页。
1 http: //www.itu.int/itu-t/patent/index.html.
2 See Guidelines for Implementation of ITU-T Patent Policy 5.1 Database Information, http://www.itu.int.
1傅静坤:《二十世纪契约法》,法律出版社1997年版,第153页,第1页。
2杨丽君:“论英美法合同相对性原则”,载梁慧星主编:《民商法论丛》(第12卷),法律出版社1999年版,第354页。
3〔英〕A.G.盖斯特:《英国合同法与案例》,中国大百科全书出版社1998年版,第380-394页。
4〔英〕斯蒂芬·戈文:“英国法律委员会合同法<第三人权利>议案草案和海上货物运输”(张明远译),《外国法译评》2000年第1期。
5〔美〕A.L.科宾:《科宾论合同》(下册),王卫国、徐国栋等译,中国大百科全书出版社1998年版,第178页。
1 Black’s law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, West Group St. Paul, Mini., 1999. p.570.
2 Black’s law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, West Group St. Paul, Mini., 1999. p.571.
3 Zayka v. Giambro, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 748, 594 N.E.2d 894 [1992]
1 Stamber v. Diebold,Inc.1998 WL 95479, 11 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1709(E D.N.Y. 1988), affd. 878 F 2d 1445(Fed. Cir. 1989).
2 Estsoople by laches,迟延禁止反言,是指当原告不合理地延误或主张请求时存在疏忽时,法庭可拒绝对其救济。Black’s law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, West Group St. Paul, Mini., 1999. p.571.
1郭雪艳:《开放标准的呼声日渐高涨》,《WTO经济导刊》2007年第6期,第64页。
1 See aukerman,960 F.2d
1 318 F 3d 1081(Fed. Cir. 2003).
2 Tom Krazit, Analysts: Rambus case to alter standards-setting rules, http://www.infoworld.com/article/03/01/30/030130hnrambus_1.html.
1 Tom Krazit, Rambus, Infineon end DRAM dispute, sign licensing deal, http://computerworld.com.sg/ShowPage.aspx?pagetype=2&articleid=230& pubid=3&issueid=29.
1 Wang lab v. Mitsubishi Elecs Am .,29U.S.P.Q (BNA)1481(C.D..Cal1993); 103 F 3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1 Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 52 USPQ 30 (1942).
2 Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 493.
1 New England Merchants National Bank of Boston v.Kann,363Mass.425(1973) (He who seeks equity must do equity.)or“A court of equity will not aid who resorts to unjust and unfair conduct.”, see Meknight v.Midwest Eye Institute,799 S.W.2d 909(Mo.App.W.D.1990.
2 1938年,美国《联邦民事诉讼规则》生效,独立的衡平法院被纳入了单一的司法制度。
3 Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U. S. 240, 244 (1933)
4 United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U. S. 457, 465 (1957).
5罗伯特?P?墨杰斯等著:《新技术时代的知识产权法》(齐筠等译),中国政法大学出版社2003年版,第240页。
6 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
1李明德:《美国知识产权法》,第64页。
2 The act of aiding or abetting another's patent infringement by knowingly selling a nonstape item that has no substantial noninfringement use and is especially adapted for use in a patened combination or process. In the patent context, contributory infringement is statutorily defined in the patent act 35 U.S.C.A. 217(c)
1 Dawson Chem Co v. Rohm Hass co.,448 U.S. 176, 206 U.S.P.Q. 385(1980)。本案例的介绍部分参考了该条译文参考了李明德《美国知识产权法》,第65、77页。
1 803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
2梁慧星著:《民法总论》,法律出版社2001年5月第2版,第297页。
1梁慧星著:《民法总论》,法律出版社2001年5月第2版,第300页。
2梁慧星著:《民法总论》,法律出版社2001年5月第2版,第69页。
3 See United States Gypsum Co. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457 (1957); B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942); Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
1 Usm Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F. 2d 505, 511(7th Cir. 1982)
2〔美〕约翰·理查兹等:《产品进入美国市场的法律问题》(侯国云等译),中国政法大学出版社1991年版,第215-216页。转引自王先林著《知识产权滥用反垄断问题研究》,法律出版社2001年9月第1版,第94-95页。
3转引自王先林著《知识产权滥用反垄断问题研究》,法律出版社2001年9月第1版,第95页。
1 2000 U.S. Dist Lexsis 5070, 55 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
2 Robin C. Feldman,“The insufficiency of antitrust analysis for patent misuse”, 55 Hastings L.J. 399.
1 USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982).
2 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982)
1 Laitram Corp. v. King-Crab, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Alaska 1965).
2 Bela Seating Co., v. Poloron Prods., Inc., 438 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1971).
3 359 F.2d 745, 747 (7th Cir. 1966).
4 PSC Inc. v. Symbol Techs., 48 USPQ2d 1838 (W.D.N.Y. 1998)
5 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965).
6 Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395 U.S. 100 (1969); Automatic Radio Co. v. Hazeltine, 339 U.S. 827 (1950)
1尚明主编:《主要国家(地区)反垄断法律汇编》,法律出版社2004年5月第1版,第812页。
1美国反垄断法主要由《谢尔曼法》(Sherman Act)、《克莱顿法》(Clayton Act)、《联邦贸易委员会法》(Federal Trade Commission Act)三大法律组成。
2竞争法主要体现在《欧洲共同体条约》(《罗马条约》)第81条至第86条。
3尚明主编:《主要国家(地区)反垄断法律汇编》,法律出版社2004年5月第1版。
1王保树主编:《经济法原理》社会科学文献出版社1999年版,第230-231页。
2 Standard Oil Co.of N.J .v..United State, 221 U.S. 1(1911).
1文学国:《滥用与规制-反垄断法对企业滥用市场地位行为的规制》,法律出版社2003年8月第1版,第58页。
2 .United State v. Sony-vacuum Oil Co.,
1 897 F.2d 1572, 1576, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1034, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 876-77, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 90, 100-01 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
2 Hewitt Pate, Competition and Intellectual Property in U.S.: Licensing Freedom and Limits of Antitrust.
1 186 U.S. 70 (1902) (patent pooling arrangement exempted from antitrust scrutiny even though pool amounted to outright price fixing with no apparent transfer of technology or other efficiency).
1全国人大常委会法制工作委员会经济法室编:《〈中国人民共和国反垄断法〉条文说明、立法理由及相关规定》,北京大学出版社2007年9月第1版,第343页。
1 In re Union Oil Company of California (Unocal), FTC Docket no. 9305 (March 4, 2003)
1 In re Rambus., FTC Docket no. 9302 (June 18, 2002)
1 FTC, Initial Decision Released in Rambus Case,http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/02/rambusid.htm.
2 FTC’s Bureau of Competition, FTC Finds Rambus Unlawfully Obtained Monopoly Power, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/08/rambus.htm.
3 David Balto , FTC v. RAMBUS: Time to Reexamine Standard Setting Rules, http: //www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/intell_property/ftcrambus.doc.
4 FTC, In the Matter of Rambus Incorporated, http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/index.htm.
1李文贤、张荣吉、谢欣哲、孙自祥:《产业标准与专利授权之研究》,第5页。
2同上。
3 Carl shapiro:Navigating the Patent Thicket:Cross Licenses,Patent Pools,and Standard-setting
1 See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq. (June 26, 1997)
2 See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq. (Dec. 16, 1998)
1 See In re Summit Tech., Inc. & VISX, Inc., No. 9286 (FTC Mar. 24, 1998) (complaint)
1 Robert Pitofsky: The Essential Facilities Doctrine under U.S. Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol.70
2 224 U.S. 383, 411-12(1912).
1 MCI Communications , 708 F. 2d at 1132-33.
2 See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F. 3d 1346, 1356 , 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
3 948 F 2d 536,542 (9tth Cir,1991)
1 Byars,609 F. 2d at 542.
2 Hencht v. Pro-football,Inc.,570 F 2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir,1977 ).
3 CTC Communications Corp., 77 F.Supp.at147–48 (D.Me.1999) (voice mail services provided by local telecommunications company may constitute essential facility fo competing reseller of local telecommunications services);ApartmentSourceofPhila-delphiav.PhiladelphiaNewspapers,Civ.ActionNo.98-5472,1999WL191649,at*7–*10(E.D.Pa.Apr.1,1999) (dominant city news papers could be essential facility for plaintiff Apartment locator service where newspapers ran competing service) ; Direct Media Corp. v. CamdenTel.&Tel.Co.,989 F. Supp. 1211, 1218–19 (S.D. Ga.1997) (access to telephone company’s subscriber phone list could be essential facility for competing telephone book producer notwithstanding availability of telephone company’s printed listings); BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ’g,Inc.,719 F.Supp.1551,1566 (S.D.Fla. 1988) (applying essential facilities doctrine to directory listings in which defendant phone company claimed copyright), rev’d on other grounds, 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993); see also ColonialPennGroupv.Am.Ass’n of Retired Persons, 698 F. Supp. 69, 72–73(E.D.Pa.1988).转引自Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson, Jonathan Hooks, The Essential Facilities Doctrine under U. S. Antitrust Law,第448-449页。
4 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 121 S.Ct. 1077 (2001).
1 141 F 3d 1059. 1068(Fed. Cir. 1998).
2 382 U.S. 172, 177(1965).
3 BellSouth Adver.&Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info.Publ’g,Inc.,719F.Supp.1551,1566(S.D.Fla.1988), rev’d on other grounds, 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993).
4 761 F. Supp.185,191–92 (D.Mass.1991), aff’d in part and remanded, 36 F.3d 1147(1st Cir.1994).
1 Serv.&Training,Inc.v.DataGen.Corp.,737 F.Supp.334,343–44(D.Md.1990)(allowing monopolization claim to proceed based on computer manufacturer’s unwillingness to license diagnostic software to competitor computer repair service pro-video); see also Poster Exch., Inc. v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 431 F.2d 334, 338–40 (5th Cir.1970) (exclusive licensee of movie promotional materials, such as posters, could constitute essential facility required to supply additional materials to competitor distribu- tor); Montgomery County Ass’n of Realtors, Inc. v. Realty Photo Master Corp., 878 F.Supp.804,817(D.Md.1995) (considering essential lf acilities claims to copyrighted realestate listing service; dismissing claim because no evidence presented that service constituted an essential facility), aff’d, 91 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 1996).
2 Joined Cases C-241/91P and C-242/91P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1995 O.J. (C 137) 3.
1 See Press Release, Commission Imposes Interim Measures on IMS Health in Germany(July 3, 2001),Available At Http://www.Europa.Eu.Int/Rapid/Start/Cgi/
1《欧洲委员会继续对高通进行调查受到普遍欢迎》,http://it.hexun.com/2007-10-03/100828403.html 2008年2月7日访问。
1 General Motors Continental NV v Commission of the European Communities. Case 26-75. Judgment at 13 November 1975.
2 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European Communities. Case 27/76. Judgment at 14 February 1978.
1 VITA, Disclosure and Licensingof Patents In Standards, http://www.vita.com/disclosure/
1参见R. Hewitt Pate:《美国的知识产权与竞争:许可自由及反托拉斯限制》,在第9届2005欧盟竞争研讨会的演讲(意大利佛罗伦萨,2005年6月3日), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/209359.pdf
1 Deborah Platt Majoras:“认识标准制定中的版税讨论对推动竞争的可能作用,在“标准化与法律”上的演讲:Developing the golden mean for global trade(斯坦福大学,2005年9月23日)(“价格的透明能提高竞争对手在努力争取被纳入标准中的竞争力”), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050923stanford.pdf
1 Colleen Taylor, IEEE-SA Amends Patent Policy , http://www.eb-mag.com.cn/detail.asp?unid=6749
2 Electronicstalk Editorial Team, ETSI aims to level field for next generation radio, http://www.electronicstalk.com/news/acg/acg114.html,.
1中国标准化研究院编:《2006中国标准化发展研究报告》,中国标准出版社2006年11月第1版,第26-28页。
1中国标准化研究院编:《2006中国标准化发展研究报告》,中国标准出版社2006年11月第1版,第58页。
1 Commission notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law(97/C 372/03), http://www.legaltext.ee/text/en/T71346.htm,2007年7月23访问。
2 (Case T-504/93) Tierce Ladbroke SA v. E.C. Commission (1997) 5 C.M.L.R. 309.
3产品的可替代性可分为功能上的可替代性(Function Interchangeability)与实用的可替代性(Practical Interchangeability)。前者指两个产品具有相同功用,后者指若两个产品之间存在价格差异,消费者能够在他们之间进行挑选。See Per Jebsen & Robert Stevens, Assumptions, Goals and Dominant Undertakings: The Regulation of Competition Under Article 86 of the European Union, 64 Antitrust L.J. 443, 468-72 (1996).
1 See Darry E. Holt,“a competition of ideals:the competition policies of the European Union and the United States compared”, http://www.nesl.edu/intljournal/vol3/ideals.htm, 2007年7月23日访问。
2第九条第1款规定:“国务院设立反垄断委员会,负责组织、协调、指导反垄断工作,履行下列职责:(一)研究拟订有关竞争政策;(二)组织调查、评估市场总体竞争状况,发布评估报告;(三)制定、发布反垄断指南;(四)协调反垄断行政执法工作;(五)国务院规定的其他职责。第2款规定:“国务院反垄断委员会的组成和工作规则由国务院规定。”
1更多了解美国司法部企业评审程序,登录http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/procedure.htm.
2 28 C.F.R.§50.6.
1 Government of Japan, Fair Trade Commission Guidelines for Patent and Know-how Licensing Agreements under the Antimonopoly Act V. www2.jftc.go.jp/e-page/guideli/patent99.htm
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8、李明德著:《美国知识产权法》,法律出版社2003年10月第1版。
9、郑成思著:《世界贸易组织与贸易有关的知识产权》,中国人民大学出版社1996年10月第1版。
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11、林秀芹著:《TRIPS体制下专利强制许可制度研究》,法律出版社2006年10月第1版。
12、中华人民共和国国家知识产权局:《审查指南(2006)》,知识产权出版社2006年6月修订版。
13、尚明著:《对企业滥用市场支配地位的反垄断法规制》,法律出版社2007年4月第1版。
14、文学国著:《滥用与规制——反垄断法对企业滥用市场地位行为的规制》,法律出版社2003年8月第1版。
15、毛丰付著:《标准竞争与竞争政策:以ICT产业为例》,上海三联书店2007年1月第1版。
16、陈淑梅著:《欧洲经济一体化背景下的技术标准化》,东南大学出版社2005年9月第1版。
17、王仲辉著:《跨越贸易壁垒——技术性贸易壁垒对中国纺织品服装贸易的影响》,中国社会科学出版社2005年5月第1版。
18、孔庆峰著:《技术性贸易壁垒:理论、规则和案例》,中国海关出版社2004年2月第1版。
19、周昀著:《反垄断法新论》,中国政法大学出版社2006年9月第1版。
20、梁慧星著:《民法总论》,法律出版社2001年5月第2版。
21、傅静坤著:《二十世纪契约法》,法律出版社1997年版。
22、黄立著:《民法债编总论》,中国政法大学出版社2002年版。
23、中华人民共和国国家标准GB/T 20000.1-2002(代替GB/T 3935.1-1996),《标准化工作指南第1部分:标准化和相关活动的通用词汇》(ISO/IEC Guide 2:1996,Standardization and related activities-Genaral vocabulary,MOD),中华人民共和国国家质量监督检验检疫总局2002年6月20日发布,2003年1月1日实施。
24、WTO/TBT委员会文件:《标准、技术法规和合格评定程序对贸易的限制性影响》,G/TBT/W/42,1997年4月28日发布。
25、联合国贸易和发展会议贸发会议秘书处报告:《竞争政策与知识产权的行使》,TD/RBP/CONF.5/6,11 August 2000。
26、〔日〕根岸哲、舟田正之著:《日本禁止垄断法概论》(第三版),王为农、陈杰译,中国法制出版社2007年1月第1版。
27、〔美〕Jay Dratler.Jr.著:《知识产权许可》(上、下卷),王春燕等译,清华大学出版社2003年4月第1版。
28、〔比〕约斯特·鲍威林著:《国际公法规则之冲突-WTO法与其他国际法规则如何联系》,周忠海等译,法律出版社2005年6月第1版。
29、〔美〕E·博登海默著:《法理学:法律哲学与法律方法》,邓正来译,中国政法大学出版社2004年1月修订版。
30、〔日〕竹田和彦著:《专利基础知识》,莫邦富等译,上海翻译出版公司1986年1月第1版。
31、伯纳德·霍克曼,迈克尔·考斯泰基著:《世界贸易组织的政治经济学:从关贸总协定到世界贸易组织》,刘平、洪晓东、许明德译,法律出版社1999年1月第1版。
32、〔英〕A.G.盖斯特著:《英国合同法与案例》,中国大百科全书出版社1998年版。
33、〔美〕A.L.科宾著:《科宾论合同》(下册),王卫国、徐国栋等译,中国大百科全书出版社1998年版。
34、〔美〕罗伯特·P·墨杰斯等著:《新技术时代的知识产权法》,齐筠等译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版。
1、周汉民主编:《与WTO规则的融合——中国外经贸法律新制度》,上海人民出版社2003年2月第1版。
2、对外贸易经济合作部国际经贸关系司:《世界贸易组织乌拉圭回合多边贸易谈判结果法律文本》,法律出版社2000年10月第1版。
3、桑德斯(T.R.B. Sanders)主编:《标准化的目的与原理》,科学技术文献出版社1974年10月出版。
4、朱榄叶主编:《世界贸易组织国际贸易纠纷案例评析(1995——2002)》(上、下册),法律出版社2004年1月第1版。
5、朱榄叶主编:《世界贸易组织国际贸易纠纷案例评析》,法律出版社2000年11月第1版。
6、韩立余主编:《攻克出口贸易中的九大法律障碍》,知识产权出版社2005年1月第1版。
7、刘春田主编:《知识产权法》(第二版),中国人民大学出版社2000年3月第1版。
8、许光耀主编:《欧共体竞争法》,武汉大学出版社2006年10月第1版。
9、刘春青、鲍建忠主编:《欧盟技术法规:市场准入的依据》,中国计量出版社2004年5月第1版。
10、尚明主编:《主要国家(地区)反垄断法律汇编》,法律出版社2004年5月第1版。
11、全国人大常委会法制工作委员会经济法室:《〈中国人民共和国反垄断法〉条文说明、立法理由及相关规定》,北京大学出版社2007年9月第1版。
12、中国标准化研究院:《2006中国标准化发展研究报告》,中国标准出版社2006年11月第1版。
13、国家标准化管理委员会编:《国内外标准、专利概要》,中国标准出版社2006年6月第1版。
14、王保树主编:《经济法原理》,社会科学文献出版社1999年版。
15、王文杰主编:《月旦民商法研究——国际贸易法新课题》,清华大学出版社2006年1月第1版。
16、黄辉主编:《中欧贸易摩擦》,社会科学文献出版社2005年12月第1版。
1、郭雪艳:《开放标准的呼声日渐高涨》,载《WTO经济导刊》2007年第6期。
2、房庆、汤万金、杨赛:《关于我国技术标准管理体制转型战略重点的思考》,载《中国标准化》2003年12期。
3、杨丽君:《论英美法合同相对性原则》,载《民商法论丛》第12卷。
4、朱晓薇、朱雪忠:《专利与技术标准的冲突及对策》,载《科研管理》第24卷第1期。
5、王琛(译):《打赢IP标准战争》,载Manage IP 2005年第7期。
6、古祖雪:《论国际技术贸易中的知识产权限制》,载《当代法学》2005年第3期。
7、冯晓青、刘淑华:《试论知识产权和私权属性及其公权化趋向》,载《中国法学》2004年第1期。
8、吴汉东:《科技、经济、法律协调机制中的知识产权法》,载《法学研究》2001年第6期。
1、安佰生:《国家标准化战略的经济学分析》,中国人民大学经济学院经济系博士学位论文。
2、李文贤、张荣吉、谢欣哲、孙自祥:《产业标准与专利授权之研究》。
1、《“硬”规范与专利权起冲突》,载《工人日报》2001年9月5日。
2、张玉瑞:《应慎用“知识产权是私权”》,载《知识产权报》2006年12月22日。
1、李健、安佰生:《标准化、知识产权与反垄断》,http://web.cenet.org.cn/web/std/index.php3?file=detail.php3&nowdir=&id=71776&detail=1,(2008年2月11日访问)。
2、安佰生:《标准化与技术进步的发生学分析》,http://web.cenet.org.cn/web/std/index.php3?file=detail.php3&nowdir=&id=71776&detail=1,(2008年2月11日访问)。
3、安佰生:《“洛夏墨点”:关于知识产权保护制度与竞争政策关系的争论》,http://web.cenet.org.cn/web/std/index.php3?file=detail.php3&nowdir=&id=71776&detail=1,(2008年2月11日访问)。
4、An Baisheng : Public Policies for Intellectual Property Rights in Standardization ,http://web.cenet.org.cn/web/std/index.php3?file=detail.php3&nowdir=&id=100349&detail=1,(2008年2月11日访问)。
5、An Baisheng:Intellectual Property Rights Issues in Standardization,http://web.cenet.org.cn/web/std/index.php3?file=detail.php3&nowdir=&id=100348&detail=1,(2008年2月11日访问)。
6、张平马骁:《从思科诉华为案谈发明、产业标准与知识产权——“企业技术标准与知识产权战略”专题之一》,http://article1.chinalawinfo.com/ article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID=27644,(2008年2月13日访问)。
7、张平、马骁:《技术标准与知识产权的关系——“企业技术标准与知识产权战略”专题之二》, http://article1.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_ display.asp?ArticleID=27642,(2008年2月13日访问)。
8、张平、马骁:《标准化组织的知识产权政策——“企业技术标准与知识产权战略”专题之三》, http://article1.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID=27727 ,2008-2-13访问。
9、张平、马骁:《标准化组织的标识管理政策——“企业技术标准与知识产权战略”专题之四》, http://article1.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_ display.asp?ArticleID=27646,(2008年2月13日访问)。
10、赵莹:《浅析标准知识产权战略》,http://www.szip.org/llyjzl13.html,(2008年2月11日访问)。
11、张志成:《关于美国专利制度“先发明”原则的评论》,www.hllaw.com,(2007年2月18日访问)。
12、姜晖(国家知识产权局):《美国专利法的历史沿革》,http://www.acpaa.cn/publication/200602/006.htm,(2007年2月18访问)。
13、王晓晔:《紧盯国际卡特尔——美国反托拉斯法及其新发展》,http://www.competitionlaw.cn/n1133c40.aspx,(2008年2月11日访问)。
1、〔英〕斯蒂芬·戈文:《英国法律委员会合同法<第三人权利>议案草案和海上货物运输》,张明远译,《外国法译评》2000年第1期。
2、Hill B. Wellford(美国司法部反托拉斯处):《标准制定中的反托拉斯问题》,http://chinese.usembassy-china.org.cn/econ1.html,(2007年12月4日访问)。
3、托马斯?李瑞( Thomas B. Leary):《反托拉斯法的经济学渊源》http://chinese.usembassy-china.org.cn/072004c.html,(2007年12月4日访问)。
1、In re dell computer corp., 121 FTC 616 (1995).
2、Stamber v. Diebold,Inc.1998 WL 95479, 11 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1709(E D.N.Y. 1988), affd. 878 F 2d 1445(Fed. Cir. 1989).
3、Rambus v Infineon 318 F 3d 1081(Fed. Cir. 2003).
4、Wang Laboratories Inc. v. Mitsubishi Electronics America,Inc. 29U.S.P.Q (BNA)1481(C.D..Cal1993); 103 F 3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
5、In re Union Oil Company of California (Unocal), FTC Docket no. 9305 (March 4, 2003).
6、In re Rambus., FTC Docket no. 9302 (June 18, 2002).
7、Mpeg-2 patent pool case: Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq. (June 26, 1997), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/1170.htm
8、DVD patent pool case: Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq. (Dec. 16, 1998), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.htm
9、In re Summit Tech., Inc. & VISX, Inc., No. 9286 (FTC Mar. 24, 1998) (complaint) .
10、United States v. Terminal R.R. Association of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 411-12(1912).
11、MCI Communication vs. AT&T, 708 F. 2d at 1132-33.
12、Joined Cases C-241/91P and C-242/91P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1995 O.J. (C 137) 3.
13、Sony Electronics, Inc.,et al.v. Soundview Technologies, Inc.
1、David Palmeter and Petros C. Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: Practice and Procedure.(Second Edition, Cambridge, 2004).
2、Peter Van Den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials, Cambridge University Press, First published 2005.
3、WORLD TRADE REPORT 2005, Exploring the links between trade, standards and the WTO。
4、Black’s law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, West Group St. Paul, Mini., 1999.
1、Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard Setting Organizations.
2、Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patent Rights and Access Lock-In: The Core Meaning of the RAND Licensing Promise.
3、Carl Shapiro, Setting Compatibility Standards: Cooperation or Collusion?
4、Massimiliano Granieri, Standard Setting, Intellectual Property Rights andAntitrust.
5、David A. Balto and Daniel I. Prywes, Standard-Setting Disputes: The Need for Guidelines.
6、Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Standard-Setting,Institute of Business and Economic Research,Competition Policy Center (University of California, Berkeley), Year 2000 Paper CPC00-011.
7、Mueller Janice, Patent Misuse through the Capture of Industry Standards, 17:2, Berkley Technical Law Journal, 623, 2002.
8、Amy A. Marasco (ANSI Vice-president and General Counsel), Invention and Innovation Protecting Intellectual property in Standards-setting.
9、Michael a. Shimokaji, Inducement and Contributory Infringement Theories to Regulate Pre-patent Issuance Activity Idea: The Journal of Law and Technology 1997,37 IDEA 571.
10、Blind, Knut; Thumm, N.; Iversen, E.; Hossain, K. ; Reekum, R. van ; Rixius, B. ; Bierhals, R.ainer; Sillwood, J : Interaction between Standardisation and Intellectual Property rights, Brussels, European Commission, 2004, 245 S. IPTS Technical Report Series; European Commission Studies EUR, 21074 EN (ISI-B-12-04).
11、Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust, Intellectual Property and Standard Setting Organizations.
12、Timothy J. Muris, Competition and Intellectual Property Policy: The Way Ahead,Before American Bar Association Antitrust Section, Fall Forum, Washington, DC, November 15, 2001.
13、Myths And Reality, Ex-Ante Licensing in Standards Development, Presented to AIPLA Spring Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, May 4, 2006.
14、Thomas O. Barnett(Assistant Attorney General,Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice), Interoperability between Antitrust and Intellectual Property, Presentation to the George Mason University School of Law, Symposium Managing Antitrust Issues in a Global Marketplace, Washington, DC, September 13, 2006.
15、Kenneth J. BurchJiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: "Blessed Be The Tie?" Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Volume 4, Spring Issue, 1991.
16、David Friedman, Standards as Intellectual Property: an Economic Approach.
17、Eric James Iversen, Esten Oversjoen and Haakon Thue Lie, Standardization, Innovation and IPR.
18、Sanford v. Berg, Technical Standards as Public Goods: Demand Incentives for Cooperative Behavior, Public Finance Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 29-54 (1989).
19、Ken Krechmer Fellow, The Fundamental Nature of Standards: Technical Perspective.
20、RobertPitofsky,DonnaPatterson,JonathanHooks, The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust Law.
21、Melissa Landau Steinman, Standards, Intellectual Property and Antitrust, Speech for NCITS TC Officers Symposium,October 17, 2000.
22、Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl Shapiro, and Theresa Sullivan, Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 1 May 2007
23、David Encaoua, Abraham Hollander, Competition Policy and Innovation, January 2002.
24、Keith E. Maskus, Reforming U.S. Patent Policy: Getting the Incentives Right, CSR NO. 19, November 2006.
25、Richard J. Gilbert, Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evolution October 3, 2002.
26、Teague i. Donahey, Antitrust Counterclaims in Patent Infringement Litigation: Clarifying the Supreme Court's Enigmatic Mercoid Decision Idea, The Journal of Law and Technology,1999, 39 J.L. & TECH. 225.
1、R. Hewitt Pate R., Competition and Intellectual Property in the U.S: Licensing Freedom and the Limits of Antitrust,June 3, 2005,2005 EU Competition Workshop Florence, Italy, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/209359.pdf,(2008年2月11日访问)。
2、Deborah Platt Majoras, Recognizing the Procompetitive Potential of Royalty Discussions In Standard Setting”, September 23, 2005 Stanford University,Preparedfor Standardization and the Law: Developing the Golden Mean for Global Trade, http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050923stanford.pdf,( 2008年2月11日访问)。
3、WTO官方网站:http:/www.wto.org
4、国际标准化组织官方网站:http://www.iso.org/
5、国际电工协会官方网站:http://www.iec.ch/
6、国际电信联盟官方网站:http://www.itu.int/
7、欧洲电信标准协会网站:http://www.etsi.org/
8、欧洲标准化委员会官方网站:http://www.cen.eu/
9、美国电气工程协会网站:http://www.ieee.org/
10、美国联邦贸易委员会官方网站:http://www.ftc.gov/
11、美国司法部官方网站:http://www.usdoj.gov/
12、欧盟委员会官方网站:http://ec.europa.eu/