中国上市公司现金持有调整的原因与价值影响研究
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摘要
公司为什么要储蓄现金?换言之,为什么公司要把现金流变成低回报率的流动性资产,而不是投资于高回报率的盈利性资产或返还给股东?这样做究竟有利于还是有害于公司的市场价值?这个看似简单的问题实则不易回答。因此现金持有问题现已成为公司金融领域中的一个重要研究课题,国内外学者都对此进行了大量的理论与实证研究,取得了丰富的研究成果,然而众说纷纭的研究结论同时也说明了现金持有问题的研究还尚未成熟,存在继续研究的空间。
由于在MM定理的理想世界中,公司若有合理资金需求都可以从外部融资中获得,没有必要自己持有现金资产,因此公司现金持有的主要驱动因素必然与融资约束问题有关。本文以公司现金持有水平随时间的调整变化问题为研究对象,以融资约束为研究视角,借助新制度经济学中的交易费用概念将公司现金持有的理论分析进一步简化,并结合中国企业融资的实际特点进行了相关的实证分析。在研究内容上,全文主要从行为影响因素和行为绩效评价两方面对公司的现金持有调整行为进行了探讨,想要解决的两个主要问题是,中国上市公司现金持有水平的调整变化主要取决于哪些决定因素?增加或者削减现金资产储备对于中国上市公司的资本市场表现究竟有何实际影响?
本文主要内容共分为九章,各章结构安排和基本内容概括如下：
第1章,导论。主要阐明了本文的研究对象、研究背景以及研究的目的与方法,概述了本文的主要思路框架和研究内容,并介绍了本文的主要创新与贡献。
第2章,主要梳理了与公司现金持有行为相关的理论基础和研究文献。本章首先回顾与评述了与公司现金持有问题相关的各种理论分析,然后综述了近十年多来关于公司现金持有决定因素的研究以及关于现金持有行为经济后果的研究,最后专门介绍了国内学者针对中国上市公司的相关研究成果。在此基础上,本章对当前关于现金持有问题的研究进行了简单评价。
第3章,对中国上市公司融资特征及现金持有现状进行了综括性的考察。首先考察了与融资约束问题密切相关的公司融资特征及相关制度背景,其次从融资来源、时间序列特征、行业特征、公司规模与股权特征等方面考察了中国上市公司现金持有行为的基本现状。通过掌握上述基本事实及特点,为后续章节的理论与实证分析提供现实基础。
第4章,基于一个相关文献较少采用的视角：新制度经济学的交易费用理论,对融资约束与公司现金持有调整行为进行了理论分析。在探讨了融资约束问题的内生性及其与交易费用概念的关系之后,本章提出,现金持有是为了替代外部融资,减少交易费用对投资项目净现值的侵蚀。进而本章对现金持有的成本和收益进行了分析,并对公司现金持有的调整行为做出了基本的理论推断。本章最后对融资交易费用的来源进行了分析和分类,并据此提出了实证检验的大体思路。
第5章,从微观企业层面研究融资约束对中国上市公司现金持有调整行为的影响。本章借鉴相关文献的研究思路,基于企业债务融资中所支付的利息溢价,构建了一个衡量企业融资约束程度的指标：“债务融资溢价”,并用于检验我国上市公司的现金持有调整行为。回归分析证实了,外部融资与公司持有的现金资产确实存在替代关系,当前的融资约束程度越严重,公司越愿意动用自己的现金储备以减少融资交易费用对公司价值的侵蚀。
第6章,从宏观政策层面研究融资约束的变化对中国上市公司现金持有调整行为的影响。本章通过宏观信贷政策变化这一角度间接衡量公司外部融资约束程度的变化。实证结果发现,宏观信贷政策逐步宽松时,公司所增加的贷款并没有转化为现金持有,而宏观信贷政策趋于紧缩时,公司反而会想方设法增加现金持有。这证明了外部融资交易费用变化趋势与现金持有变化的正相关关系。同时,还将影响融资交易费用的部分公司特质作为分组变量,进一步深化了本章的实证分析。
第7章,从金融制度层面考察市场化的金融创新如何影响中国上市公司现金持有调整行为。由于非市场化的金融制度是融资交易费用的来源之一,导致了更为严重的融资约束,因此市场化的金融创新或制度变迁必将带来公司融资约束程度的改善。本章利用“2005年短期融资券的推出”作为自然实验,通过双重差分法进行回归估计。实证结果表明,市场化的金融创新通过改善公司的融资约束显著影响了公司的现金持有调整行为。
第8章,将融资约束与代理冲突因素相结合,考察现金持有调整行为对公司的资本市场价值产生的实际影响。借鉴前期文献中的“超额现金持有”的概念,本章定义了“现金持有过度调整”指标并用于回归分析。实证结果发现,正向或负向的现金持有过度调整都会导致现金的边际价值下降,这意味着现金持有调整行为的边际市场价值可能并非随现金持有量而单调递增或递减。这间接表明了中国上市公司现金持有行为有相当部分并非是目标于股东价值的最大化,证实了代理问题的存在；同时也说明代理冲突问题既可能导致现金持有调整幅度的过大,也可能导致现金持有调整幅度的不足。
第9章,全文总结。本章对本文各章的基本研究结论进行概括和总结,并指出本文存在的不足以及今后研究可以深入拓展的方向。
对比相关研究成果,我们认为本文的研究贡献和创新之处可能主要表现在三个方面：
第一,从公司融资的交易费用视角对融资约束问题和现金持有的调整行为进行了理论分析,深化了对融资约束问题的理解,并以此为理论基础实证研究了现金持有调整行为的主要动因。
第二,从从微观企业、宏观政策、金融制度三个层面分别使用了新的代理变量或研究方法对现金持有调整行为的动因进行了实证检验,研究角度较为系统。具体的,在微观层面部分,首次将相关文献中的“债务融资溢价”指标应用于公司现金持有的实证研究；在宏观层面部分,利用宏观信贷政策变化作为融资交易费用变化的指示器,较好的反映了公司在信贷市场中面临的融资约束程度变化；在制度层面部分,结合中国金融发展进程中的金融创新事件,使用了自然实验的研究方法,更大程度上回避了内生性问题的影响。
第三,受前期文献中“超额现金持有量”概念的启发,构造了“现金持有过度调整”指标,考察了现金持有调整行为对公司资本市场价值产生的实际影响,并间接表明代理冲突对现金持有变化的影响不是单向的。
Why do firms save cash? In other words, why do firms turn cash flows into low-return liquid assets, other than high-return productive assets or paying back to shareholders? Is it helpful or harmful to firms'value? This seemingly easy problem is actually hard to answer. Therefore, the problem of cash holdings has become an important theme in corporate finance research. Scholars domestic and abroad have done a lot of theoretic and empirical researches, and acquired plenty of fruits. However, various opinions show the immaturity of cash holdings studies, and the room to probe deeper.
In the ideal world of MM theorem, firms'reasonable need for fund can be met by external finance, and they do not have to hold cash. Therefore, the main determinants of corporate cash holdings are surely related to financial constraints. This dissertation, from the perspective of financial constraints, focuses the adjustments of corporate cash holdings varying with time, and simplifies the its theoretic analysis through the concept of transaction cost in neo-institutional economics, and takes related empirical studies according to the characteristics of Chinese corporates'finance practice. The dissertation discusses the adjustments of corporate cash holdings from2aspects:determinants and effects, aiming to solve2questions:What are the main determinants of the adjustments of corporate cash holdings? What are the actual effects on corporate's performance in capital market by changing cash reserve?
There are9chapters in the dissertation, whose structures and contents are as follows:
Chapter1, introduction, illuminates the object, background, purpose and methods of this research, and summarizes the dissertation's basic thought and frame, the main innovation and contribution.
Chapter2reviews the literatures related to corporate cash holdings. Firstly, we introduce and comment a series of theoretic analysis on cash holdings, then categorize and review the studies about cash holdings determinants and effects in recent decades. We specially introduce the domestic researches on Chinese listed companies. Finally, we make brief comments on cash holdings studies.
Chapter3generally investigates the characteristics of Chinese listed companies'funding problems and the status quo of their cash holdings. Firstly, we research the characteristics of corporate finance and its Institutional background which is tied up to financial constraint problem. Secondly, we investigate the status quo of Chinese listed companies'cash holdings from the aspects of funding sources, time-series characteristic, industry, corporate size and equity nature, etc. By researching those basic facts and characteristics above, Chapter3provide realistic basis for the theoretic and empirical analysis in sequent chapters.
Chapter4, based on a perspective rarely used by related literatures: transaction cost theory in neo-institutional economics, theoretically analyses the financial constraints and corporate cash holdings. After discussing the endogeneity of financial constraint problem and its connection with the concept of transaction cost, we point that cash holdings are substitutes for external finance, which can lessen the reduction of investments'NPV caused by transaction cost. On the basis of those above, we analyze the cost and revenue of cash holdings, and theoretically deduce the behavior of corporate cash holding adjustments. Finally, we analyze and categorize the source of transaction cost in external finance, according to which we put forward general ideas of empirical studies.
Chapter5investigates the impact of financial constraints on the behavior of corporate cash holding adjustments in the micro level of firms. Using related literature's idea for reference, based on the interest premium in firms'debt finance, we construct a "debt finance premium" which can measure the extent of financial constraints, and we use it to test the behavior of corporate cash holding adjustments. The regression result proves that cash holdings are substitutes for external finance, and the severer the present financial constraint is, the more willing to use cash reserve the corporate is, in order to lessen the reduction of corporate value caused by transaction cost in external finance.
Chapter6investigates the impact of changing financial constraints on the behavior of corporate cash holding adjustments in the macro level of central bank policy. We use the change of macro credit policy to indirectly measure the change of corporate financial constraints. The empirical result shows that when macro credit policy becomes loose, the corporates'loan added does not convert to cash; when macro credit policy becomes tightened, corporates seek to increase cash holdings. It proves that the trend of the transaction cost change in external finance is positively correlated with the change of corporate cash holdings. Meanwhile, we take some firm's characters affecting transaction cost in external finance as grouping variables, which deepens this chapter's empirical analysis.
Chapter7investigates the impact of financial innovation on the behavior of corporate cash holding adjustments in the institutional level of financial development. Because non-market financial institution is one of transaction cost sources in external finance, result in severer financial constraint, market-oriented financial innovation will surely improve corporate financial constraints. We use "the introduction of short-term financing bonds in2005" as a natural experiment, and analyze with differences-in-differences method, whose result shows that market-oriented financial innovation significantly affect the behavior of corporate cash holding adjustments by improving corporate financial constraints.
Chapter8, combining factors of financial constraints and agency conflicts, investigates the impact of the behavior of cash holding adjustments on corporate value in capital market. Taking the concept of "excess cash holdings" in related literatures as reference, we define a variable of "excess adjustment of cash holdings" and apply it to regression analysis. The result indicates that both positive and negative excess adjustment of cash holdings reduce the marginal value of cash, which means that the marginal market value of the behavior of cash holding adjustments may not monotonously increase or decrease with the amount of cash. It indirectly shows that the behavior of cash holding in a lot of Chinese listed companies is not aiming to maximize shareholders'value, and agency problem exists. It also indicates that agency conflict not only causes overmuch adjustment of cash holdings, but also inadequate.
Chapter9, conclusion, summarizes the basic conclusions in all chapters above, and points out the shortages of the dissertation and the directions further researches can expand in the future.
Compared to related studies, the dissertation's contributions and innovations may exist in3aspects:
1. By theoretically analyzing the financial constraints and the behavior of cash holding adjustments from the perspective of transaction cost, we deepen the understanding of financial constraint problem, on the basis of which we empirically study the main driving factor of cash holding adjustments.
2. We empirically study the main driving factor of cash holding adjustments with new methods in3levels respectively:micro firm, macro policy and financial institution. Specifically, in micro level, it is the first to apply the concept of "debt finance premium" in related literatures to the empirical study of corporate cash holdings; in macro level, we use the change of macro credit policy as the indicator of the change of transaction cost in external finance, which properly measures corporate financial constraints in credit market; in institution level, considering the financial innovation in China's financial development, we use the method of natural experiment, further avoiding the impact of endogeneity.
3. Enlightened by the concept of "excess cash holdings''in related literatures, we construct a variable of "excess adjustment of cash holdings", and investigate the impact of the behavior of cash holding adjustments on corporate value in capital market, indirectly proving that the effect of agency conflict on the change of cash holdings can be double directions.
由于在MM定理的理想世界中,公司若有合理资金需求都可以从外部融资中获得,没有必要自己持有现金资产,因此公司现金持有的主要驱动因素必然与融资约束问题有关。本文以公司现金持有水平随时间的调整变化问题为研究对象,以融资约束为研究视角,借助新制度经济学中的交易费用概念将公司现金持有的理论分析进一步简化,并结合中国企业融资的实际特点进行了相关的实证分析。在研究内容上,全文主要从行为影响因素和行为绩效评价两方面对公司的现金持有调整行为进行了探讨,想要解决的两个主要问题是,中国上市公司现金持有水平的调整变化主要取决于哪些决定因素?增加或者削减现金资产储备对于中国上市公司的资本市场表现究竟有何实际影响?
本文主要内容共分为九章,各章结构安排和基本内容概括如下：
第1章,导论。主要阐明了本文的研究对象、研究背景以及研究的目的与方法,概述了本文的主要思路框架和研究内容,并介绍了本文的主要创新与贡献。
第2章,主要梳理了与公司现金持有行为相关的理论基础和研究文献。本章首先回顾与评述了与公司现金持有问题相关的各种理论分析,然后综述了近十年多来关于公司现金持有决定因素的研究以及关于现金持有行为经济后果的研究,最后专门介绍了国内学者针对中国上市公司的相关研究成果。在此基础上,本章对当前关于现金持有问题的研究进行了简单评价。
第3章,对中国上市公司融资特征及现金持有现状进行了综括性的考察。首先考察了与融资约束问题密切相关的公司融资特征及相关制度背景,其次从融资来源、时间序列特征、行业特征、公司规模与股权特征等方面考察了中国上市公司现金持有行为的基本现状。通过掌握上述基本事实及特点,为后续章节的理论与实证分析提供现实基础。
第4章,基于一个相关文献较少采用的视角：新制度经济学的交易费用理论,对融资约束与公司现金持有调整行为进行了理论分析。在探讨了融资约束问题的内生性及其与交易费用概念的关系之后,本章提出,现金持有是为了替代外部融资,减少交易费用对投资项目净现值的侵蚀。进而本章对现金持有的成本和收益进行了分析,并对公司现金持有的调整行为做出了基本的理论推断。本章最后对融资交易费用的来源进行了分析和分类,并据此提出了实证检验的大体思路。
第5章,从微观企业层面研究融资约束对中国上市公司现金持有调整行为的影响。本章借鉴相关文献的研究思路,基于企业债务融资中所支付的利息溢价,构建了一个衡量企业融资约束程度的指标：“债务融资溢价”,并用于检验我国上市公司的现金持有调整行为。回归分析证实了,外部融资与公司持有的现金资产确实存在替代关系,当前的融资约束程度越严重,公司越愿意动用自己的现金储备以减少融资交易费用对公司价值的侵蚀。
第6章,从宏观政策层面研究融资约束的变化对中国上市公司现金持有调整行为的影响。本章通过宏观信贷政策变化这一角度间接衡量公司外部融资约束程度的变化。实证结果发现,宏观信贷政策逐步宽松时,公司所增加的贷款并没有转化为现金持有,而宏观信贷政策趋于紧缩时,公司反而会想方设法增加现金持有。这证明了外部融资交易费用变化趋势与现金持有变化的正相关关系。同时,还将影响融资交易费用的部分公司特质作为分组变量,进一步深化了本章的实证分析。
第7章,从金融制度层面考察市场化的金融创新如何影响中国上市公司现金持有调整行为。由于非市场化的金融制度是融资交易费用的来源之一,导致了更为严重的融资约束,因此市场化的金融创新或制度变迁必将带来公司融资约束程度的改善。本章利用“2005年短期融资券的推出”作为自然实验,通过双重差分法进行回归估计。实证结果表明,市场化的金融创新通过改善公司的融资约束显著影响了公司的现金持有调整行为。
第8章,将融资约束与代理冲突因素相结合,考察现金持有调整行为对公司的资本市场价值产生的实际影响。借鉴前期文献中的“超额现金持有”的概念,本章定义了“现金持有过度调整”指标并用于回归分析。实证结果发现,正向或负向的现金持有过度调整都会导致现金的边际价值下降,这意味着现金持有调整行为的边际市场价值可能并非随现金持有量而单调递增或递减。这间接表明了中国上市公司现金持有行为有相当部分并非是目标于股东价值的最大化,证实了代理问题的存在；同时也说明代理冲突问题既可能导致现金持有调整幅度的过大,也可能导致现金持有调整幅度的不足。
第9章,全文总结。本章对本文各章的基本研究结论进行概括和总结,并指出本文存在的不足以及今后研究可以深入拓展的方向。
对比相关研究成果,我们认为本文的研究贡献和创新之处可能主要表现在三个方面：
第一,从公司融资的交易费用视角对融资约束问题和现金持有的调整行为进行了理论分析,深化了对融资约束问题的理解,并以此为理论基础实证研究了现金持有调整行为的主要动因。
第二,从从微观企业、宏观政策、金融制度三个层面分别使用了新的代理变量或研究方法对现金持有调整行为的动因进行了实证检验,研究角度较为系统。具体的,在微观层面部分,首次将相关文献中的“债务融资溢价”指标应用于公司现金持有的实证研究；在宏观层面部分,利用宏观信贷政策变化作为融资交易费用变化的指示器,较好的反映了公司在信贷市场中面临的融资约束程度变化；在制度层面部分,结合中国金融发展进程中的金融创新事件,使用了自然实验的研究方法,更大程度上回避了内生性问题的影响。
第三,受前期文献中“超额现金持有量”概念的启发,构造了“现金持有过度调整”指标,考察了现金持有调整行为对公司资本市场价值产生的实际影响,并间接表明代理冲突对现金持有变化的影响不是单向的。
Why do firms save cash? In other words, why do firms turn cash flows into low-return liquid assets, other than high-return productive assets or paying back to shareholders? Is it helpful or harmful to firms'value? This seemingly easy problem is actually hard to answer. Therefore, the problem of cash holdings has become an important theme in corporate finance research. Scholars domestic and abroad have done a lot of theoretic and empirical researches, and acquired plenty of fruits. However, various opinions show the immaturity of cash holdings studies, and the room to probe deeper.
In the ideal world of MM theorem, firms'reasonable need for fund can be met by external finance, and they do not have to hold cash. Therefore, the main determinants of corporate cash holdings are surely related to financial constraints. This dissertation, from the perspective of financial constraints, focuses the adjustments of corporate cash holdings varying with time, and simplifies the its theoretic analysis through the concept of transaction cost in neo-institutional economics, and takes related empirical studies according to the characteristics of Chinese corporates'finance practice. The dissertation discusses the adjustments of corporate cash holdings from2aspects:determinants and effects, aiming to solve2questions:What are the main determinants of the adjustments of corporate cash holdings? What are the actual effects on corporate's performance in capital market by changing cash reserve?
There are9chapters in the dissertation, whose structures and contents are as follows:
Chapter1, introduction, illuminates the object, background, purpose and methods of this research, and summarizes the dissertation's basic thought and frame, the main innovation and contribution.
Chapter2reviews the literatures related to corporate cash holdings. Firstly, we introduce and comment a series of theoretic analysis on cash holdings, then categorize and review the studies about cash holdings determinants and effects in recent decades. We specially introduce the domestic researches on Chinese listed companies. Finally, we make brief comments on cash holdings studies.
Chapter3generally investigates the characteristics of Chinese listed companies'funding problems and the status quo of their cash holdings. Firstly, we research the characteristics of corporate finance and its Institutional background which is tied up to financial constraint problem. Secondly, we investigate the status quo of Chinese listed companies'cash holdings from the aspects of funding sources, time-series characteristic, industry, corporate size and equity nature, etc. By researching those basic facts and characteristics above, Chapter3provide realistic basis for the theoretic and empirical analysis in sequent chapters.
Chapter4, based on a perspective rarely used by related literatures: transaction cost theory in neo-institutional economics, theoretically analyses the financial constraints and corporate cash holdings. After discussing the endogeneity of financial constraint problem and its connection with the concept of transaction cost, we point that cash holdings are substitutes for external finance, which can lessen the reduction of investments'NPV caused by transaction cost. On the basis of those above, we analyze the cost and revenue of cash holdings, and theoretically deduce the behavior of corporate cash holding adjustments. Finally, we analyze and categorize the source of transaction cost in external finance, according to which we put forward general ideas of empirical studies.
Chapter5investigates the impact of financial constraints on the behavior of corporate cash holding adjustments in the micro level of firms. Using related literature's idea for reference, based on the interest premium in firms'debt finance, we construct a "debt finance premium" which can measure the extent of financial constraints, and we use it to test the behavior of corporate cash holding adjustments. The regression result proves that cash holdings are substitutes for external finance, and the severer the present financial constraint is, the more willing to use cash reserve the corporate is, in order to lessen the reduction of corporate value caused by transaction cost in external finance.
Chapter6investigates the impact of changing financial constraints on the behavior of corporate cash holding adjustments in the macro level of central bank policy. We use the change of macro credit policy to indirectly measure the change of corporate financial constraints. The empirical result shows that when macro credit policy becomes loose, the corporates'loan added does not convert to cash; when macro credit policy becomes tightened, corporates seek to increase cash holdings. It proves that the trend of the transaction cost change in external finance is positively correlated with the change of corporate cash holdings. Meanwhile, we take some firm's characters affecting transaction cost in external finance as grouping variables, which deepens this chapter's empirical analysis.
Chapter7investigates the impact of financial innovation on the behavior of corporate cash holding adjustments in the institutional level of financial development. Because non-market financial institution is one of transaction cost sources in external finance, result in severer financial constraint, market-oriented financial innovation will surely improve corporate financial constraints. We use "the introduction of short-term financing bonds in2005" as a natural experiment, and analyze with differences-in-differences method, whose result shows that market-oriented financial innovation significantly affect the behavior of corporate cash holding adjustments by improving corporate financial constraints.
Chapter8, combining factors of financial constraints and agency conflicts, investigates the impact of the behavior of cash holding adjustments on corporate value in capital market. Taking the concept of "excess cash holdings" in related literatures as reference, we define a variable of "excess adjustment of cash holdings" and apply it to regression analysis. The result indicates that both positive and negative excess adjustment of cash holdings reduce the marginal value of cash, which means that the marginal market value of the behavior of cash holding adjustments may not monotonously increase or decrease with the amount of cash. It indirectly shows that the behavior of cash holding in a lot of Chinese listed companies is not aiming to maximize shareholders'value, and agency problem exists. It also indicates that agency conflict not only causes overmuch adjustment of cash holdings, but also inadequate.
Chapter9, conclusion, summarizes the basic conclusions in all chapters above, and points out the shortages of the dissertation and the directions further researches can expand in the future.
Compared to related studies, the dissertation's contributions and innovations may exist in3aspects:
1. By theoretically analyzing the financial constraints and the behavior of cash holding adjustments from the perspective of transaction cost, we deepen the understanding of financial constraint problem, on the basis of which we empirically study the main driving factor of cash holding adjustments.
2. We empirically study the main driving factor of cash holding adjustments with new methods in3levels respectively:micro firm, macro policy and financial institution. Specifically, in micro level, it is the first to apply the concept of "debt finance premium" in related literatures to the empirical study of corporate cash holdings; in macro level, we use the change of macro credit policy as the indicator of the change of transaction cost in external finance, which properly measures corporate financial constraints in credit market; in institution level, considering the financial innovation in China's financial development, we use the method of natural experiment, further avoiding the impact of endogeneity.
3. Enlightened by the concept of "excess cash holdings''in related literatures, we construct a variable of "excess adjustment of cash holdings", and investigate the impact of the behavior of cash holding adjustments on corporate value in capital market, indirectly proving that the effect of agency conflict on the change of cash holdings can be double directions.
引文
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