我国环境税收问题研究
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摘要
环境问题事关各国福祉,影响到人类社会长远发展,一直以来,都是各世界国政府和社会各界重点关注的问题之一,世界各国都不遗余力地寻求解决环境问题的方法和途径,研究完善促进环境保护的政策工具。
在当前政府制定的各种环保政策工具中,政府直接管制因缺乏弹性和经济效率低下而很少被采用；排污收费因其征收标准不规范和征收手段缺乏刚性,而且由于政府不规范行为导致随意性较大,缺乏严肃性和强制性,不仅不利于理顺分配关系,还会影响国家环保政策的权威性和统一性。相比之下,征收环保税以其公平、高效、简单、易行而受到目前大多数国家的普遍认可。
我国现行的环境保护财税政策是以排污收费为主,各税种配合分散的制度安排,尽管在一定程度上约束了非环保行为,限制了污染的产生,为治理污染筹集了一定的资金。但是,我国的排污收费本身存在着许多缺点,而有关的税种并不直接以促进持续发展为目标,无法形成一个专门的税收来源,限制了税收及收费制度对环境污染的调控力度。我国亟需开征专项环境税。
当前我国环境税费制度存在的种种弊端表面上看是制度安排不合理造成的,其深层次原因却要从我国现行财政体制、地方政府政绩考核、财政监督机制等方面来认识和研究。现行的财政体制导致了地方财力不足,而以经济增长为考核标准的政绩考核又促使地方政府以发展经济为首要目标,加上当前财政监督体制的不完善,使得地方政府宁可以环境污染而换取经济增长,对环保政策执行力度不够,甚至将治污资金挪作它用。因此,如果能在完善上述制度的情况下实行废水改革,我国开征环境税就有了很好的制度基础。然而,任何制度改进都不可能是在一种理想的环境下进行的,总是在同各项制度不断融合、改进中产生,因此,我国的环境税改革也只能是在上述不完善的制度环境下进行。当然,伴随着这些制度的逐渐完善,我国环境税所体现出来的环保绩效将逐渐提高。
如果要在我国开征环境税,那么,接下来的问题就是,在我国开征环境税的政策效应究竟如何体现?本文认为,这一方面取决于环境税本身的功效,另一方面也取决于政府的作为。我们通过对我国部分社会公众关于环境税开征意识的调查,反映公众对于环境税开征向政府所提出的要求,以此来表现出政府对环境税开征政策效应的影响程度。
基于数据的可得性与实际工作的需要,本文以山东省为例来考查公众对我国开征环境税的认识情况,运用主成分分析法研究公众对环境税开征关注的焦点。研究结果显示,目前公众关注的问题集中在目前环保状况、开征环境税的困难性、对现行环境税收政策了解、社会公布企业缴纳环境税的必要性、开征环境税征求公众意见的必要性、开征环境税的必要性等问题上,而对开征环境税后让政府开具完税证明的必要性、开征环境税前向公众普及环境税的必要性、环境税支出向公众公开的必要性等问题,则关注不大,很多人认为这些问题应该在开征环境税后予以考虑。
运用灰色关联度分析法研究要开征环境税政府目前的工作重点,研究结果显示,目前政府应该把工作重点放在“开征环境税时征求公众意见”、“开征环境税时向公众普及环境税的知识”、“环境税支出向公众公开”、“向社会公布企业缴纳环境税”等问题上。
综上所述,对于我国环境税的开征,公众总体上是持认可态度的,但是对政府对环境税开征要做的准备工作和开征后的管理提出了较高的要求。
开征环境税以后,另一个必须面对的问题就是纳税人和征税人(政府)就税收的征纳而展开的博弈关系。纳税人对环境税的遵从度如何直接影响到环境税政策效应的发挥,如何形成一种和谐的征纳关系是本章要重点解决的问题。本文构建了关于环境税征纳的演化博弈模型,研究结果指出：(1)保证一定的政府监管效率是构建和谐环境税收征纳关系的前提；(2)高税率和高惩罚率一样都不利于和谐征纳关系的形成；(3)征税人与纳税人之间的博弈是一个相互作用的、重复的、动态变化的过程。当征税人的监督成本和征管概率一定的情况下,纳税人的选择至关重要。通常,限于征管成本的预算约束,征税人的监管概率是一定的,而在这一博弈关系中,大部分纳税人出于对纳税义务的认识或对逃税后果的考虑,也一般会倾向于诚信纳税。此时,维持纳税人诚信纳税的倾向并把它转化为现实成为征税人的最佳选择。
可见,要实现环境税和谐征纳关系需要政府和纳税人共同构建,而且,政府在其中起主导作用,因此,现阶段政府应积极创造条件,努力营造一个和谐的环境税收征纳环境。
最后,本文借鉴国际先进经验,结合我国实际情况,就我国开征的环境税做了框架性的制度设计。
As the environmental issue is related to national well-being and affects the prospects for development of human society, therefore, it is one of the highest profiles that have always attracted the attention of the international community. Countries around the world have been working diligently to find solutions to environmental problems and means.
In a variety of current environmental policy instruments which are settled down by Government, the ones that are directly controlled by government are rarely used because of the lack of flexibility and economic inefficiencies; sewage charges are lack of seriousness and mandatory because of its non-standard standards, a lack of rigidity for the imposition, and even the large arbitrary as government does not regulate its behavior, which not only makes against smooth distribution relations, but influences the authority and unity of country's environmental policy. In contrast, a carbon tax is accepted by most countries for its fair, efficient, simple, and easy to be done.
China's current environmental tax policy is mainly the sewage charges and all other kinds of taxes are decentralized arrangements. Although this, to some extent, bound by the non-environmental behavior, limited the generation of pollution and raised some funds for controlling pollution, there are many shortcomings for sewage charges itself. Because some related kinds of taxes do not directly promote sustainable development and can not create a dedicated source of revenue, which limited the tax and fee system for the regulation control to environmental pollution. So it is very urgent for China to levy a special environmental tax.
China's current environmental taxes and charges system have many defects, on the surface, which is because of the irrational arrangements, but its deep-seated reasons come from China's current financial system, the local government performance evaluation, financial monitoring mechanisms, etc. The existing financial system has led to local financial resources' deficiency, while the assessment on economic growth as a standard performance evaluation has prompted local governments which seek for economic development as their primary goal. Coupled with the imperfect current financial supervision system, local governments preferred to economic growth in exchange for environmental pollution. Inadequate enforcement of environmental policies resulted in that pollution control funds are used for other purposes. Therefore, if the tax reform is practiced in these circumstances that the above system can be perfect, China's introduction of environmental taxes will have a good institutional basis. However, any system improvements can not be conducted in an ideal environment, and always with the continued integration and improvements of various systems, therefore, China's environmental tax reform can only be done in the circumstances of the above-mentioned imperfect system, of course, accompanied by the gradual improvement of these systems, the environmental performance that China's environmental taxes reflect will be increased gradually.
If we want to introduce environmental tax in our country, then the next question is that how the policy effects of the introduction of the environmental tax reflect in China? This paper argues that this depends on the effectiveness of the environmental tax itself, and it also depends on the government action. We survey part of the public about their awareness on the introduction of environmental tax, and reflect the request of the public on environmental tax levy to the government to demonstrate the degree of the influence of the government's policy effects for the introduction of the environmental tax.
Based on the data's availability and the needs of actual work, this article examines the cognition of the public for the introduction of the environmental tax in Shandong Province as an example. We study the focus of attention of the public on the introduction of environmental tax by using principal component analysis. The results shows that the current issue of public concern focus on the current environmental situation, the difficulty of the introduction of environmental tax, the understanding of the current environmental tax policy, the necessity of the publication of the enterprises to pay environmental taxes, the necessity of soliciting public views on the introduction of environmental tax, the necessity of the introduction of the environmental tax and other issues. And the necessity of tax clearance certificate issued by the government after paying the environment tax, the necessity of gaining ground environmental tax to the public after the introduction of environmental tax, and the necessity of the publication of the environmental tax expenditures and so on are not currently concerned. Many people think that these issues should be considered in the introduction of environmental tax.
Using Gray Correlation Analysis Study to research the introduction of environmental taxes is the government's current focus, the results show that from the results of the calculation, government should focus on "the introduction of environmental taxes to consult public opinions," "the introduction of environmental taxes to the public knowledge of universal environmental taxes", "environmental tax payments to the public", "to the public the enterprise to pay environmental taxes" and other issues.
In summary, the introduction of environmental taxes in our country, the public is to recognize the overall, but require a higher demand to the government levying taxes on the environment to do the preparation work and post-management after the introduction.
After the introduction of environmental taxes, the other must face the problem is that taxpayers and tax (the government) in relation to tax levied for the relationship between the start of the game. Taxpayers to comply with environmental taxes directly affect the degree of how tax policy effects to the environment to play, how to form a harmonious relationship is levied for this chapter should focus on. We built on an environmental tax levied for the evolution of game model, the findings show that:(1) to ensure a certain degree of government regulation to build a harmonious environment, efficiency is the relationship between taxes levied for the premise; (2) high tax rates and high penalty rates are not as conducive to levied for the formation of a harmonious relationship; (3) tax game between the people and the taxpayer is an interaction, repetitive, dynamic change process. When the tax administration's oversight costs and the probability of certain circumstances, the taxpayer's choice is essential. In general, limited to the cost of collection and budget constraints, supervision over collect tax is a certain probability, while the relationship in this game, the majority of taxpayers out of tax liabilities of awareness or consideration of the consequences of tax evasion, it will in general tend tax credit. At this point, the tendency to maintain the taxpayer's tax credit and put it into reality is the tax person's best choice.
It can be seen that to achieve environmental tax levied for a harmonious relationship between the government and taxpayers need to jointly build, and the government play a leading role in which, therefore, at this stage the government should actively create conditions and strive to create a harmonious environment for taxes levied for the environment.
Finally, we learned from advanced international experiences, combined with Chinese actual situations, designed the framework of the system of the introduction of environmental taxes in our country.
在当前政府制定的各种环保政策工具中,政府直接管制因缺乏弹性和经济效率低下而很少被采用；排污收费因其征收标准不规范和征收手段缺乏刚性,而且由于政府不规范行为导致随意性较大,缺乏严肃性和强制性,不仅不利于理顺分配关系,还会影响国家环保政策的权威性和统一性。相比之下,征收环保税以其公平、高效、简单、易行而受到目前大多数国家的普遍认可。
我国现行的环境保护财税政策是以排污收费为主,各税种配合分散的制度安排,尽管在一定程度上约束了非环保行为,限制了污染的产生,为治理污染筹集了一定的资金。但是,我国的排污收费本身存在着许多缺点,而有关的税种并不直接以促进持续发展为目标,无法形成一个专门的税收来源,限制了税收及收费制度对环境污染的调控力度。我国亟需开征专项环境税。
当前我国环境税费制度存在的种种弊端表面上看是制度安排不合理造成的,其深层次原因却要从我国现行财政体制、地方政府政绩考核、财政监督机制等方面来认识和研究。现行的财政体制导致了地方财力不足,而以经济增长为考核标准的政绩考核又促使地方政府以发展经济为首要目标,加上当前财政监督体制的不完善,使得地方政府宁可以环境污染而换取经济增长,对环保政策执行力度不够,甚至将治污资金挪作它用。因此,如果能在完善上述制度的情况下实行废水改革,我国开征环境税就有了很好的制度基础。然而,任何制度改进都不可能是在一种理想的环境下进行的,总是在同各项制度不断融合、改进中产生,因此,我国的环境税改革也只能是在上述不完善的制度环境下进行。当然,伴随着这些制度的逐渐完善,我国环境税所体现出来的环保绩效将逐渐提高。
如果要在我国开征环境税,那么,接下来的问题就是,在我国开征环境税的政策效应究竟如何体现?本文认为,这一方面取决于环境税本身的功效,另一方面也取决于政府的作为。我们通过对我国部分社会公众关于环境税开征意识的调查,反映公众对于环境税开征向政府所提出的要求,以此来表现出政府对环境税开征政策效应的影响程度。
基于数据的可得性与实际工作的需要,本文以山东省为例来考查公众对我国开征环境税的认识情况,运用主成分分析法研究公众对环境税开征关注的焦点。研究结果显示,目前公众关注的问题集中在目前环保状况、开征环境税的困难性、对现行环境税收政策了解、社会公布企业缴纳环境税的必要性、开征环境税征求公众意见的必要性、开征环境税的必要性等问题上,而对开征环境税后让政府开具完税证明的必要性、开征环境税前向公众普及环境税的必要性、环境税支出向公众公开的必要性等问题,则关注不大,很多人认为这些问题应该在开征环境税后予以考虑。
运用灰色关联度分析法研究要开征环境税政府目前的工作重点,研究结果显示,目前政府应该把工作重点放在“开征环境税时征求公众意见”、“开征环境税时向公众普及环境税的知识”、“环境税支出向公众公开”、“向社会公布企业缴纳环境税”等问题上。
综上所述,对于我国环境税的开征,公众总体上是持认可态度的,但是对政府对环境税开征要做的准备工作和开征后的管理提出了较高的要求。
开征环境税以后,另一个必须面对的问题就是纳税人和征税人(政府)就税收的征纳而展开的博弈关系。纳税人对环境税的遵从度如何直接影响到环境税政策效应的发挥,如何形成一种和谐的征纳关系是本章要重点解决的问题。本文构建了关于环境税征纳的演化博弈模型,研究结果指出：(1)保证一定的政府监管效率是构建和谐环境税收征纳关系的前提；(2)高税率和高惩罚率一样都不利于和谐征纳关系的形成；(3)征税人与纳税人之间的博弈是一个相互作用的、重复的、动态变化的过程。当征税人的监督成本和征管概率一定的情况下,纳税人的选择至关重要。通常,限于征管成本的预算约束,征税人的监管概率是一定的,而在这一博弈关系中,大部分纳税人出于对纳税义务的认识或对逃税后果的考虑,也一般会倾向于诚信纳税。此时,维持纳税人诚信纳税的倾向并把它转化为现实成为征税人的最佳选择。
可见,要实现环境税和谐征纳关系需要政府和纳税人共同构建,而且,政府在其中起主导作用,因此,现阶段政府应积极创造条件,努力营造一个和谐的环境税收征纳环境。
最后,本文借鉴国际先进经验,结合我国实际情况,就我国开征的环境税做了框架性的制度设计。
As the environmental issue is related to national well-being and affects the prospects for development of human society, therefore, it is one of the highest profiles that have always attracted the attention of the international community. Countries around the world have been working diligently to find solutions to environmental problems and means.
In a variety of current environmental policy instruments which are settled down by Government, the ones that are directly controlled by government are rarely used because of the lack of flexibility and economic inefficiencies; sewage charges are lack of seriousness and mandatory because of its non-standard standards, a lack of rigidity for the imposition, and even the large arbitrary as government does not regulate its behavior, which not only makes against smooth distribution relations, but influences the authority and unity of country's environmental policy. In contrast, a carbon tax is accepted by most countries for its fair, efficient, simple, and easy to be done.
China's current environmental tax policy is mainly the sewage charges and all other kinds of taxes are decentralized arrangements. Although this, to some extent, bound by the non-environmental behavior, limited the generation of pollution and raised some funds for controlling pollution, there are many shortcomings for sewage charges itself. Because some related kinds of taxes do not directly promote sustainable development and can not create a dedicated source of revenue, which limited the tax and fee system for the regulation control to environmental pollution. So it is very urgent for China to levy a special environmental tax.
China's current environmental taxes and charges system have many defects, on the surface, which is because of the irrational arrangements, but its deep-seated reasons come from China's current financial system, the local government performance evaluation, financial monitoring mechanisms, etc. The existing financial system has led to local financial resources' deficiency, while the assessment on economic growth as a standard performance evaluation has prompted local governments which seek for economic development as their primary goal. Coupled with the imperfect current financial supervision system, local governments preferred to economic growth in exchange for environmental pollution. Inadequate enforcement of environmental policies resulted in that pollution control funds are used for other purposes. Therefore, if the tax reform is practiced in these circumstances that the above system can be perfect, China's introduction of environmental taxes will have a good institutional basis. However, any system improvements can not be conducted in an ideal environment, and always with the continued integration and improvements of various systems, therefore, China's environmental tax reform can only be done in the circumstances of the above-mentioned imperfect system, of course, accompanied by the gradual improvement of these systems, the environmental performance that China's environmental taxes reflect will be increased gradually.
If we want to introduce environmental tax in our country, then the next question is that how the policy effects of the introduction of the environmental tax reflect in China? This paper argues that this depends on the effectiveness of the environmental tax itself, and it also depends on the government action. We survey part of the public about their awareness on the introduction of environmental tax, and reflect the request of the public on environmental tax levy to the government to demonstrate the degree of the influence of the government's policy effects for the introduction of the environmental tax.
Based on the data's availability and the needs of actual work, this article examines the cognition of the public for the introduction of the environmental tax in Shandong Province as an example. We study the focus of attention of the public on the introduction of environmental tax by using principal component analysis. The results shows that the current issue of public concern focus on the current environmental situation, the difficulty of the introduction of environmental tax, the understanding of the current environmental tax policy, the necessity of the publication of the enterprises to pay environmental taxes, the necessity of soliciting public views on the introduction of environmental tax, the necessity of the introduction of the environmental tax and other issues. And the necessity of tax clearance certificate issued by the government after paying the environment tax, the necessity of gaining ground environmental tax to the public after the introduction of environmental tax, and the necessity of the publication of the environmental tax expenditures and so on are not currently concerned. Many people think that these issues should be considered in the introduction of environmental tax.
Using Gray Correlation Analysis Study to research the introduction of environmental taxes is the government's current focus, the results show that from the results of the calculation, government should focus on "the introduction of environmental taxes to consult public opinions," "the introduction of environmental taxes to the public knowledge of universal environmental taxes", "environmental tax payments to the public", "to the public the enterprise to pay environmental taxes" and other issues.
In summary, the introduction of environmental taxes in our country, the public is to recognize the overall, but require a higher demand to the government levying taxes on the environment to do the preparation work and post-management after the introduction.
After the introduction of environmental taxes, the other must face the problem is that taxpayers and tax (the government) in relation to tax levied for the relationship between the start of the game. Taxpayers to comply with environmental taxes directly affect the degree of how tax policy effects to the environment to play, how to form a harmonious relationship is levied for this chapter should focus on. We built on an environmental tax levied for the evolution of game model, the findings show that:(1) to ensure a certain degree of government regulation to build a harmonious environment, efficiency is the relationship between taxes levied for the premise; (2) high tax rates and high penalty rates are not as conducive to levied for the formation of a harmonious relationship; (3) tax game between the people and the taxpayer is an interaction, repetitive, dynamic change process. When the tax administration's oversight costs and the probability of certain circumstances, the taxpayer's choice is essential. In general, limited to the cost of collection and budget constraints, supervision over collect tax is a certain probability, while the relationship in this game, the majority of taxpayers out of tax liabilities of awareness or consideration of the consequences of tax evasion, it will in general tend tax credit. At this point, the tendency to maintain the taxpayer's tax credit and put it into reality is the tax person's best choice.
It can be seen that to achieve environmental tax levied for a harmonious relationship between the government and taxpayers need to jointly build, and the government play a leading role in which, therefore, at this stage the government should actively create conditions and strive to create a harmonious environment for taxes levied for the environment.
Finally, we learned from advanced international experiences, combined with Chinese actual situations, designed the framework of the system of the introduction of environmental taxes in our country.
引文
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1 地方性环境资源的枯竭导致的人口搬迁,在我国某些自然资源储藏原来较为丰富但由于过度开发导致资源匮乏的地区已经开始上演。而且,在这样的人口搬迁过程中,穷人受到的影响最大,富人往往是原有资源开发的受益者,因而其所受到的影响不大。
2 这一项目是欧盟为了评估环境税改革的社会反映而实施的。该项目按照经济人理性、历史制度主义和国际比较等研究方法,采用访谈和分组座谈的形式首次从国际比较研究的角度评估了社会公众和工商业人士对环境税改革措施的认知度与反映,分析改革过程中存在的问题和阻力,并提出了一些增加环境税的政治接受度的措施。
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1 地方性环境资源的枯竭导致的人口搬迁,在我国某些自然资源储藏原来较为丰富但由于过度开发导致资源匮乏的地区已经开始上演。而且,在这样的人口搬迁过程中,穷人受到的影响最大,富人往往是原有资源开发的受益者,因而其所受到的影响不大。
2 这一项目是欧盟为了评估环境税改革的社会反映而实施的。该项目按照经济人理性、历史制度主义和国际比较等研究方法,采用访谈和分组座谈的形式首次从国际比较研究的角度评估了社会公众和工商业人士对环境税改革措施的认知度与反映,分析改革过程中存在的问题和阻力,并提出了一些增加环境税的政治接受度的措施。