司法事实认定中的科学证据研究
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摘要
随着科学技术的迅猛发展,司法事实认定越来越受到科学技术的猛烈冲击。大量科学证据涌入法庭,使得双方当事人及事实审理者难以掌握,纵观司法事实认定中科学证据的发展历史,可以看出,其呈现出多学科化、理论化和专业化的趋势,这一趋势更加使得司法事实认定中的科学证据超出法庭的掌控之外。
本文认为主观上对于客观真实的追求是司法事实认定引入科学证据的原因,客观上专业化的社会分工使这一趋势成为必然。从世界各国的司法实践来看,解决事实审理者知识上的欠缺与事实问题专业化程度不断提高之间的矛盾,主要是通过将科学技术以科学证据的形式引入司法领域这一路径。尽管各国在具体引入方式和制度设置方面迥异,但是总的来说均是这一思路。然而由于当事人及事实审理者缺乏相应的科学知识,使得科学证据在法庭上难以得到公正的评价,科学证据本应具有的辅助事实认定的功能难以实现,并由此而产生了理论上的悖论,有违司法独立的理念。实践中更有将司法事实认定中的科学证据视为真理而盲目崇拜或将其视为科学研究活动而使法庭成为无尽的科学论战战场的现象。因此科学证据的正当性及其使用实效受到质疑。
实践中各国也相继出现了大量的问题,例如美国对于专家证言证据能力规则曾几度变迁,且至今尚未达成统一的结论。从中国的实践来看,鉴定结论混乱的现状已经成为当今司法领域的突出问题。将科学证据引入到司法领域究竟能否弥补事实审理者知识、能力上的缺陷,是现在亟待考察的问题。
面对上述理论及实践问题,本文认为司法事实认定中的科学证据的本质是专家根据科学知识所作出的对于案件事实的意见,因此带有一定的主观性,这便为其受到法律规制提供了正当性基础。而科学技术进入司法事实认定的主要形式是鉴定结论和专家证言,即科学证据,除此之外还包括质证、认证等程序中使用的科学技术,因此对其进行规制既需重视其证据能力,又要构建适合科学证据的程序,正确评价其证明力。
证据能力是对科学证据质的考察,可借鉴英美法系的专家证据的可采性规则,并辅之以专家咨询制度和鉴定费的相关安排予以解决。证明力是对科学证据量的考察,是在以认证为最终环节的整个程序中确定的,因此应该建立科学的适应科学证据发展趋势的事实认定程序。只有这样才能使司法事实认定中的科学证据走上正途。
The rapid development of science and technology make more and more influence on judicial finding of fact. A lot of scientific evidence in the court makes the both sides parties and the judge difficult to grasp it. Facing history of the scientific evidence, we can see it showing a multi-disciplinary, theoretical and professional tendency; these trends make scientific evidence though judicial finding of fact out of the control of the court.
This paper argues that the pursuit of objective truth is the reason for the introduction of scientific evidence, professional social division of labor makes this trend inevitable. Analyzing the judicial practice around the world, to address the contradiction between lack of knowledge on the issue and increasing degree of specialization, the court introduce scientific knowledge in the form of scientific evidence. Although different countries structure different methods and system settings, but they are the same in general. However, due to the fact that the parties and the judge are lack of appropriate scientific knowledge, scientific evidence in court is so hard to get a fair evaluation. The function of scientific evidence that supporting finding the fact is difficult to achieve, and result theoretical paradox, which is contrary to the concept of judicial independence. In the judicial practice, there are two different phenomenons, one is to see scientific evidence as the truth and blind worship, the other is to see it as scientific research activities and debate endless in court. Therefore, the legitimacy and effectiveness of scientific evidence is questioned.
Countries have also emerged a number of issues in the judicial practice, such as the rules of expert testimony has several times changing in the United States, and has not reached a unified conclusion yet. Scanning Chinese judicial practice, expert conclusions have become the outstanding issues of justice. The question whether scientific evidence will make up for the deficiencies in the knowledge and capacity of the parties and the judge, needs urgent investigation.
Facing the theoretical and practical issues above, this paper reveal that scientific evidence is in the nature of the comments based on scientific knowledge of the experts, which has a certain degree of subjectivity. This is the legitimacy for scientific evidence to be regulated. Scientific evidence is the main form of science and technology in the judicial finding of fact, so to regulate it requires attention not only on the competency of evidence but also the probative force of evidence.
Competency of evidence is a qualitative category, to govern it of scientific evidence; we can learn from rule of expert testimony in America and U.K., structure expert consulting system and distribute the costs of identification. Probative force is a metrizable category, which is fixed though the certification process. To govern it of scientific evidence, we should improve the whole procedures to meet the scientific evidence. Only in this way can the scientific evidence be treated correctly.
本文认为主观上对于客观真实的追求是司法事实认定引入科学证据的原因,客观上专业化的社会分工使这一趋势成为必然。从世界各国的司法实践来看,解决事实审理者知识上的欠缺与事实问题专业化程度不断提高之间的矛盾,主要是通过将科学技术以科学证据的形式引入司法领域这一路径。尽管各国在具体引入方式和制度设置方面迥异,但是总的来说均是这一思路。然而由于当事人及事实审理者缺乏相应的科学知识,使得科学证据在法庭上难以得到公正的评价,科学证据本应具有的辅助事实认定的功能难以实现,并由此而产生了理论上的悖论,有违司法独立的理念。实践中更有将司法事实认定中的科学证据视为真理而盲目崇拜或将其视为科学研究活动而使法庭成为无尽的科学论战战场的现象。因此科学证据的正当性及其使用实效受到质疑。
实践中各国也相继出现了大量的问题,例如美国对于专家证言证据能力规则曾几度变迁,且至今尚未达成统一的结论。从中国的实践来看,鉴定结论混乱的现状已经成为当今司法领域的突出问题。将科学证据引入到司法领域究竟能否弥补事实审理者知识、能力上的缺陷,是现在亟待考察的问题。
面对上述理论及实践问题,本文认为司法事实认定中的科学证据的本质是专家根据科学知识所作出的对于案件事实的意见,因此带有一定的主观性,这便为其受到法律规制提供了正当性基础。而科学技术进入司法事实认定的主要形式是鉴定结论和专家证言,即科学证据,除此之外还包括质证、认证等程序中使用的科学技术,因此对其进行规制既需重视其证据能力,又要构建适合科学证据的程序,正确评价其证明力。
证据能力是对科学证据质的考察,可借鉴英美法系的专家证据的可采性规则,并辅之以专家咨询制度和鉴定费的相关安排予以解决。证明力是对科学证据量的考察,是在以认证为最终环节的整个程序中确定的,因此应该建立科学的适应科学证据发展趋势的事实认定程序。只有这样才能使司法事实认定中的科学证据走上正途。
The rapid development of science and technology make more and more influence on judicial finding of fact. A lot of scientific evidence in the court makes the both sides parties and the judge difficult to grasp it. Facing history of the scientific evidence, we can see it showing a multi-disciplinary, theoretical and professional tendency; these trends make scientific evidence though judicial finding of fact out of the control of the court.
This paper argues that the pursuit of objective truth is the reason for the introduction of scientific evidence, professional social division of labor makes this trend inevitable. Analyzing the judicial practice around the world, to address the contradiction between lack of knowledge on the issue and increasing degree of specialization, the court introduce scientific knowledge in the form of scientific evidence. Although different countries structure different methods and system settings, but they are the same in general. However, due to the fact that the parties and the judge are lack of appropriate scientific knowledge, scientific evidence in court is so hard to get a fair evaluation. The function of scientific evidence that supporting finding the fact is difficult to achieve, and result theoretical paradox, which is contrary to the concept of judicial independence. In the judicial practice, there are two different phenomenons, one is to see scientific evidence as the truth and blind worship, the other is to see it as scientific research activities and debate endless in court. Therefore, the legitimacy and effectiveness of scientific evidence is questioned.
Countries have also emerged a number of issues in the judicial practice, such as the rules of expert testimony has several times changing in the United States, and has not reached a unified conclusion yet. Scanning Chinese judicial practice, expert conclusions have become the outstanding issues of justice. The question whether scientific evidence will make up for the deficiencies in the knowledge and capacity of the parties and the judge, needs urgent investigation.
Facing the theoretical and practical issues above, this paper reveal that scientific evidence is in the nature of the comments based on scientific knowledge of the experts, which has a certain degree of subjectivity. This is the legitimacy for scientific evidence to be regulated. Scientific evidence is the main form of science and technology in the judicial finding of fact, so to regulate it requires attention not only on the competency of evidence but also the probative force of evidence.
Competency of evidence is a qualitative category, to govern it of scientific evidence; we can learn from rule of expert testimony in America and U.K., structure expert consulting system and distribute the costs of identification. Probative force is a metrizable category, which is fixed though the certification process. To govern it of scientific evidence, we should improve the whole procedures to meet the scientific evidence. Only in this way can the scientific evidence be treated correctly.
引文
[1]509 U.S.579http://openjuristorg/509/us/579/daubert-v-merrell-dow-pharmaceuticals -inc.
[2][美]杰罗姆·弗兰克.初审法院——美国司法的神话与现实[M].赵承寿,译.北京：中国政法大学出版社,2007：50.
[3]常林.法医学[M].北京：中国政法大学出版社,2010：14-17.
[4]黄冬艳.对科技“证据”的重释[J].《金卡工程(经济与法)》2009(2)：13.
[5]陈学权.科技证据论——以刑事诉讼为视角[M].北京：中国政法大学出版社,2007.
[6]贾静涛.中国古代法医学史[M].北京：群众出版社,1984.
[7]《枕碧楼丛书·无冤录序》
[8]范列.笔迹与犯罪[M].北京：华夏出版社,1993：1-2.
[9]刘少聪.新指纹学[M].北京：群众出版社,1987：8.
[10]参见《唐律·诈伪·诈病死伤不实》
[11]《大清光绪新法令》
[12]王传道.侦查学原理[M].北京：中国政法大学出版社,2001：323.
[13]贾静涛.世界法医学与法科学史(上)[M].北京：科学出版社,2000.
[14]贾静涛.辛亥革命以后的中国法医学[J].中华医史杂志,1986(1)：205.
[15]刘文.刑事科学技术总论[M].北京：中国人民公安大学出版社,2003：73.
[16][法]埃米尔·涂尔干.社会分工论[M].渠东,译.上海：生活·读书·新知三联书店出版社,2000：2.
[17][美]克利福德·吉尔兹.地方性知识[M].王海龙,张家瑄,译.北京：中央编译出版社,2000：226.
[18][美]肯尼斯·R·福斯特.对科学证据的认定——科学知识与联邦法院[M].王增森,译.北京：法律出版社,2001.
[19]张立卿.刑事诉讼法理论与运用[M].台湾：台湾五南出版公司,1990：33.
[20]陈光中.刑事诉讼法(第二版)[M].北京：北京大学出版社,北京,高等教育出版社,2005：148.
[21]江伟.民事诉讼法(第二版)[M].北京：高等教育出版社,2004.
[22]季美君.专家证据制度比较研究[M].北京：北京大学出版社2008：71.
[23]R. D. Makay and Andrew M. Colman,"Excluding Expert Evidence:A Tale of Ordinary Folk and Common Experience"(1991) Crim LR 800.
[24]Roberts, Zuckerman.Criminal Evidence (1st edition)[M].Oxford University Press,2004:306.
[25][美]米尔建·R·达马斯卡.漂移的证据法[M].李学军,刘晓丹,姚永吉,刘为军,译.北京：中国政法大学出版社,2003：212.
[26]周叶谦.英美刑法刑事诉讼法概论[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,1984：269.
[27][奥]维特根斯坦.逻辑哲学论[M].郭英,译.北京：商务印书馆,2002：23.
[28]谢佛荣、罗蓓.可证实性原则与逻辑实证主义[J].重庆科技学院学报(社会科学版),2007(5)：29.
[29]邱仁宗.卡尔·波普尔是逻辑实证主义者吗?[J].复旦学报(社会科学版),1981(3)：73.
[30][德]石里克.意义和证实[G]//洪谦.逻辑经验主义(上)[M].北京：商务印书馆,1982:47.
[31]卡尔纳普.逻辑与句法分析[M].傅季重,译.上海：上海译文出版社,1962：84.
[32]洪谦.现代西方哲学论丛选辑[M].北京：商务印书馆,1993：499.
[33][英]波普尔.猜想与反驳——科学知识的增长[M].傅季重,译.上海：上海译文出版社,2005.
[34]舒炜光.当代西方科学哲学述评(第二版)[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2007：98.
[35]丛林.波普尔证伪主义方法论评述[D].吉林：吉林大学哲学社会学院,2008.
[36][美]托马斯·库恩.科学革命的结构.金吾伦,胡新和,译.北京：北京大学出版社,2003：157.
[37][美]库恩.必要的张力[M].范岱年,纪树立,译.北京：北京大学出版社, 2004:219.
[38]参见[美]费耶阿本德.无根基的知识[M].陈建,译.江苏：江苏人民出版社,2006.
[39]《后汉书·马援传》
[40][南]米尔伊安·R·达玛什卡.国家和权力的多种面孔[M].郑戈,译.北京：中国政法大学出版社,2004：149.
[41]何青,晓雷.胜辩为王[M].天津：天津人民出版社,1997：311-312.
[42]郭华.鉴定结论论[M].北京：中国人民公安大学出版社,2007：167.
[43]D.Alcor.Independent Expert Evidence in Civil Litigation[J]. Queensland Lawyer,1996(4):125.
[44]刘昊阳.诉讼证明科学[M].北京：中国人民公安大学出版社,2007：128.
[45][美]黛博拉·J·本内特.随机性[M].严子谦,严磊,译.吉林：吉林人民出版社,2001：2-3.
[2][美]杰罗姆·弗兰克.初审法院——美国司法的神话与现实[M].赵承寿,译.北京：中国政法大学出版社,2007：50.
[3]常林.法医学[M].北京：中国政法大学出版社,2010：14-17.
[4]黄冬艳.对科技“证据”的重释[J].《金卡工程(经济与法)》2009(2)：13.
[5]陈学权.科技证据论——以刑事诉讼为视角[M].北京：中国政法大学出版社,2007.
[6]贾静涛.中国古代法医学史[M].北京：群众出版社,1984.
[7]《枕碧楼丛书·无冤录序》
[8]范列.笔迹与犯罪[M].北京：华夏出版社,1993：1-2.
[9]刘少聪.新指纹学[M].北京：群众出版社,1987：8.
[10]参见《唐律·诈伪·诈病死伤不实》
[11]《大清光绪新法令》
[12]王传道.侦查学原理[M].北京：中国政法大学出版社,2001：323.
[13]贾静涛.世界法医学与法科学史(上)[M].北京：科学出版社,2000.
[14]贾静涛.辛亥革命以后的中国法医学[J].中华医史杂志,1986(1)：205.
[15]刘文.刑事科学技术总论[M].北京：中国人民公安大学出版社,2003：73.
[16][法]埃米尔·涂尔干.社会分工论[M].渠东,译.上海：生活·读书·新知三联书店出版社,2000：2.
[17][美]克利福德·吉尔兹.地方性知识[M].王海龙,张家瑄,译.北京：中央编译出版社,2000：226.
[18][美]肯尼斯·R·福斯特.对科学证据的认定——科学知识与联邦法院[M].王增森,译.北京：法律出版社,2001.
[19]张立卿.刑事诉讼法理论与运用[M].台湾：台湾五南出版公司,1990：33.
[20]陈光中.刑事诉讼法(第二版)[M].北京：北京大学出版社,北京,高等教育出版社,2005：148.
[21]江伟.民事诉讼法(第二版)[M].北京：高等教育出版社,2004.
[22]季美君.专家证据制度比较研究[M].北京：北京大学出版社2008：71.
[23]R. D. Makay and Andrew M. Colman,"Excluding Expert Evidence:A Tale of Ordinary Folk and Common Experience"(1991) Crim LR 800.
[24]Roberts, Zuckerman.Criminal Evidence (1st edition)[M].Oxford University Press,2004:306.
[25][美]米尔建·R·达马斯卡.漂移的证据法[M].李学军,刘晓丹,姚永吉,刘为军,译.北京：中国政法大学出版社,2003：212.
[26]周叶谦.英美刑法刑事诉讼法概论[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,1984：269.
[27][奥]维特根斯坦.逻辑哲学论[M].郭英,译.北京：商务印书馆,2002：23.
[28]谢佛荣、罗蓓.可证实性原则与逻辑实证主义[J].重庆科技学院学报(社会科学版),2007(5)：29.
[29]邱仁宗.卡尔·波普尔是逻辑实证主义者吗?[J].复旦学报(社会科学版),1981(3)：73.
[30][德]石里克.意义和证实[G]//洪谦.逻辑经验主义(上)[M].北京：商务印书馆,1982:47.
[31]卡尔纳普.逻辑与句法分析[M].傅季重,译.上海：上海译文出版社,1962：84.
[32]洪谦.现代西方哲学论丛选辑[M].北京：商务印书馆,1993：499.
[33][英]波普尔.猜想与反驳——科学知识的增长[M].傅季重,译.上海：上海译文出版社,2005.
[34]舒炜光.当代西方科学哲学述评(第二版)[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2007：98.
[35]丛林.波普尔证伪主义方法论评述[D].吉林：吉林大学哲学社会学院,2008.
[36][美]托马斯·库恩.科学革命的结构.金吾伦,胡新和,译.北京：北京大学出版社,2003：157.
[37][美]库恩.必要的张力[M].范岱年,纪树立,译.北京：北京大学出版社, 2004:219.
[38]参见[美]费耶阿本德.无根基的知识[M].陈建,译.江苏：江苏人民出版社,2006.
[39]《后汉书·马援传》
[40][南]米尔伊安·R·达玛什卡.国家和权力的多种面孔[M].郑戈,译.北京：中国政法大学出版社,2004：149.
[41]何青,晓雷.胜辩为王[M].天津：天津人民出版社,1997：311-312.
[42]郭华.鉴定结论论[M].北京：中国人民公安大学出版社,2007：167.
[43]D.Alcor.Independent Expert Evidence in Civil Litigation[J]. Queensland Lawyer,1996(4):125.
[44]刘昊阳.诉讼证明科学[M].北京：中国人民公安大学出版社,2007：128.
[45][美]黛博拉·J·本内特.随机性[M].严子谦,严磊,译.吉林：吉林人民出版社,2001：2-3.