定向增发、资产注入与大股东侵害
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摘要
股权分置改革解决了我国资本市场上内生性、制度性的缺陷,使各类股东的利益标准趋于一致。但是由于文化、制度、法律环境等一系列因素的影响,加上“一股独大”的结构缺陷没有得到根本解决,后股权分置时期大股东的侵害行为将依然存在,只不过更加隐蔽和复杂。而在上市公司面向大股东及其关联方的定向增发、大股东又是以非现金资产作为对价支付的事件中,在买与卖的“双重关联交易”中理论上更容易滋生大股东的利益侵害行为。
本文采用规范分析、实证研究并结合比较分析的方法对定向增发资产注入中的大股东侵害行为进行了研究.
主要工作和结论如下：(1)通过实证检验了定向增发公司大股东注入资产的质量：主要是运用单指标分析、综合绩效检验、配对样本比较及用综合因子得分为因变量进行多元回归做稳健性分析,结论均表明大股东所注入资产的中长期绩效并不理想,并非是优质资产。(2)通过手工收集数据计算所注入资产评估增值率,并与行业均值进行比较后发现,评估增值率普遍高于行业平均水平。(3)实证检验了样本公司在事件前后是否存在盈余管理行为：无论是描述性统计、配对样本比较分析还是多元回归分析均表明,定向增发资产注入中确实存在大股东的盈余管理行为,只不过股市上行期更加显著：事件前负向管理,事件后正向管理,而变相认为是所注入资产带来的,但事实证明资产质量是不理想的。(4)实证分析了增发定价的合理性：将增发价与每股内在价值比较后发现,增发价格普遍低于每股内在价值;通过计算折扣率比较分析后发现,面向大股东增发且大股东以资产注入样本公司的折扣率最高,而且研究期间所有定向增发公司的平均折扣率也要高于国外某些国家。(5)实证检验了定向增发资产注入事件中是否存在大股东的时机选择问题以及该种选择是否对中小股东利益造成侵害,结论表明在基准价格越低于每股内在价值时上市公司进行定向增发大股东进行资产注入的可能性越大。而且回归检验表明基准价格与内在价值偏离越大的公司,大股东获利越丰厚但公司经营业绩越差,说明对于定向增发资产注入公司大股东择时确实存在利益侵害的问题。(6)针对前面大股东侵害的具体行为表现,实证检验了定向增发资产注入产生的经济后果：发现大股东确实在定向增发资产注入事件中获取了超额收益,但这与样本公司的实际经营绩效不符,而且回归分析表明前述几种行为表现都是大股东获取超额收益大小的直接影响因素,印证了大股东侵害的存在性以及前述研究结论的可靠性;另外还发现市场对解禁的限售股的反应是消极的。
在上述每部分行为研究过程中都配以了具体案例解析。最后针对后股改时期,股份全流通的市场环境,对定向增发资产注入事件中存在的大股东侵害现象从公司治理、法律保护、证券市场监管三方面提出了中小投资者权益保护的政策建议。
整篇文章研究的一个总的结论是：定向增发资产注入过程中确实存在大股东的利益侵害问题；但这并不能代表全部,文中比较研究已表明,面向大股东发行而大股东又是以资产注入的样本公司这种情况比较普遍,尤其在股市上行期。可能因为这是一个比较具有中国特色的现象,更需要结合中国特殊的制度背景予以解释。
本文主要的创新点或新发现有：(1)与国外纯粹的融资和现金认购不同,我国上市公司的定向增发中有相当一部分是大股东资产认购,因此本文结合国情重点关注定向增发中的资产注入部分。区别于已有研究之处在于本文运用因子分析法计算综合绩效得分来观察资产注入后企业的中长期绩效表现,并计算所注入资产的非正常增值率来观察大股东是否通过高估资产价值以获取更多增发股份。(2)在注入资产质量分析中,观察了所注入资产的中长期绩效,由于所注入资产跟上市公司资产整合需要一个过程,绩效呈现应该有个迟滞,所以观察中长期的业绩,得出的结论也许会更加客观。(3)在定向增发定价中,借鉴F-O模型计算每股内在价值,并将增发定价与其比较看是否合理。以每股内在价值作为比较标准,可以避免市价比较中股市波动性及脆弱性的严重影响,尤其是2007年底出现的全球性金融危机对股市的剧烈影响。(4)本文将市场择时理论拓展应用到定向增发融资,创新性地用以分析控股股东定向增发资产注入的决策选择以及是否以资产作为增发对价的选择。
Stock-liquidity reform has resolved the capital market's endogenous and institutional deficiencies of our country. Different kinds of shareholders'interests begin to reach unanimity. However, due to the impact of a series of factors such as culture, institution, legal environment, and the none fundamentally resolved problem of structural defect of single-large shareholder, Majority shareholders'invasion of small and medium sized shareholders'benefits still exist in practice after the ending of this reform., but more subtle and complex. It is more likely to breed the majority shareholders'benefit invasion in the event of listed companies'private placement and majority shareholders'assets-injecting theoretically, for this is a double related transaction in the course of buying and selling.
This paper uses normative methods, empirical methods and comparative analysis to research the majority shareholders'invasion of small and medium sized shareholders'benefits in the event of private placement and assets-injecting.
The main research work and brief conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1) Test the quality of majority shareholders'injected assets by empirical research:Use the methods of single index analysis, comprehensive performance analysis, partnership samples comparison and multiple regression analysis by taking the comprehensive performance marks as origin variable, all the results state that the medium and long performance of the injected assets is not good, the assets are not high quality.(2) Compare the injected assets'revaluation rate, which calculated all by manual, with the industry average, discover that the rate is generally above the industry average level.(3) Test the existence of earning management behaviors before or after the events:description statistics, partnership sample comparison and multiple regression analysis all demonstrate that there exists earning managements in the event of private placement, and it is more outstanding in bull market:there is negative management before the event and positive management after the event. Then attribute the positive performance to the injected assets which is really low quality confirmed in the chapter four.(4) Test the rationality of price in the private placement:discover the price is generally lower than the intrinsic value by comparing the price per share with the intrinsic value per share; By calculating and comparing the discount, this paper also discovers that the discount is the highest when the object is majority shareholders and their pay form is non-cash assets, and the average discount is also higher than some foreign countries.(5) Test the existence of timing in the private placement and whether it harm the benefit of the small and medium sized shareholders. The results demonstrate that the lower the base price minus the intrinsic price is, the probability is higher that the majority shareholders to inject assets. The regression analysis also demonstrates the larger of the deviation of base price with intrinsic price is, the more the majority shareholders private benefits are, but the worse the company's performance is. This states that the majority shareholders'timing behavior really harms others'benefits.(6) Based on the above cases, finally this paper tests the economic results of assets-inject in private placement and discover that majority shareholders obtain abnormal benefits through the event but the benefits aren't in conformity with the real performance, And the cases discussed above are all the directly influencing factors of majority shareholders abnormal benefits. All the results obtained in this chapter suggest again that there exists majority shareholders invasion and the above research results are reliable. Additionally, this paper discovers that the market's response to the circulation of restricted stock is negative.
This paper matches detail cases to each majority shareholders' invasion behavior. Finally, this paper puts forward suggestions catering to the background of past-reform and full circulation period to protect the small and medium sized shareholders benefits from three aspects: corporate governance, law protection, stock market supervision.
The main conclusion of this paper is:There is majority shareholders' invasion in the course of assets-injecting and private placement. But this is not a common phenomenon. Through the comparison study, It shows that the invasion is more universal in the case when the stock is issuing to the majority shareholders and they pay by non-cash assets, especially in the bull market. Maybe this is a rather Chinese phenomenon and should be illustrated on the special system background of China.
This paper's innovations or new findings are:(1)Be different from foreign countries'private placement which is aimed to financing purely and mostly paid by cash, China's listed companies are used to purchase by assets. So this paper focuses on the assets-injecting part in private placement according to China's condition, and calculates comprehensive performance score to observe companies'medium and long term performance after assets-injecting, calculates abnormal value increase rate to observe whether majority shareholders have obtain more shares by overrating the value of the injected assets.(2)This paper tests the medium and long-term performance of the injected assets to analyze the quality. It takes times to integrate injected assets with listed companies'assets. The performance show may be postponed. So the medium and long term performance will be more objective.(3) This paper consults F-O model to calculate intrinsic value per share, and compare it with the price of private placement to see whether it is reasonable. It can avoid the serious impact of stock market's volatility and fragility when this paper takes intrinsic value per share as the comparative standard, especially the dramatic impact brought by the global financial crisis in the end of2007.(4) Market timing theory is applied to private placement financing. It is used to analyze majority shareholders'decision-making choice on the events of private placement and assets-injecting and payment form.
本文采用规范分析、实证研究并结合比较分析的方法对定向增发资产注入中的大股东侵害行为进行了研究.
主要工作和结论如下：(1)通过实证检验了定向增发公司大股东注入资产的质量：主要是运用单指标分析、综合绩效检验、配对样本比较及用综合因子得分为因变量进行多元回归做稳健性分析,结论均表明大股东所注入资产的中长期绩效并不理想,并非是优质资产。(2)通过手工收集数据计算所注入资产评估增值率,并与行业均值进行比较后发现,评估增值率普遍高于行业平均水平。(3)实证检验了样本公司在事件前后是否存在盈余管理行为：无论是描述性统计、配对样本比较分析还是多元回归分析均表明,定向增发资产注入中确实存在大股东的盈余管理行为,只不过股市上行期更加显著：事件前负向管理,事件后正向管理,而变相认为是所注入资产带来的,但事实证明资产质量是不理想的。(4)实证分析了增发定价的合理性：将增发价与每股内在价值比较后发现,增发价格普遍低于每股内在价值;通过计算折扣率比较分析后发现,面向大股东增发且大股东以资产注入样本公司的折扣率最高,而且研究期间所有定向增发公司的平均折扣率也要高于国外某些国家。(5)实证检验了定向增发资产注入事件中是否存在大股东的时机选择问题以及该种选择是否对中小股东利益造成侵害,结论表明在基准价格越低于每股内在价值时上市公司进行定向增发大股东进行资产注入的可能性越大。而且回归检验表明基准价格与内在价值偏离越大的公司,大股东获利越丰厚但公司经营业绩越差,说明对于定向增发资产注入公司大股东择时确实存在利益侵害的问题。(6)针对前面大股东侵害的具体行为表现,实证检验了定向增发资产注入产生的经济后果：发现大股东确实在定向增发资产注入事件中获取了超额收益,但这与样本公司的实际经营绩效不符,而且回归分析表明前述几种行为表现都是大股东获取超额收益大小的直接影响因素,印证了大股东侵害的存在性以及前述研究结论的可靠性;另外还发现市场对解禁的限售股的反应是消极的。
在上述每部分行为研究过程中都配以了具体案例解析。最后针对后股改时期,股份全流通的市场环境,对定向增发资产注入事件中存在的大股东侵害现象从公司治理、法律保护、证券市场监管三方面提出了中小投资者权益保护的政策建议。
整篇文章研究的一个总的结论是：定向增发资产注入过程中确实存在大股东的利益侵害问题；但这并不能代表全部,文中比较研究已表明,面向大股东发行而大股东又是以资产注入的样本公司这种情况比较普遍,尤其在股市上行期。可能因为这是一个比较具有中国特色的现象,更需要结合中国特殊的制度背景予以解释。
本文主要的创新点或新发现有：(1)与国外纯粹的融资和现金认购不同,我国上市公司的定向增发中有相当一部分是大股东资产认购,因此本文结合国情重点关注定向增发中的资产注入部分。区别于已有研究之处在于本文运用因子分析法计算综合绩效得分来观察资产注入后企业的中长期绩效表现,并计算所注入资产的非正常增值率来观察大股东是否通过高估资产价值以获取更多增发股份。(2)在注入资产质量分析中,观察了所注入资产的中长期绩效,由于所注入资产跟上市公司资产整合需要一个过程,绩效呈现应该有个迟滞,所以观察中长期的业绩,得出的结论也许会更加客观。(3)在定向增发定价中,借鉴F-O模型计算每股内在价值,并将增发定价与其比较看是否合理。以每股内在价值作为比较标准,可以避免市价比较中股市波动性及脆弱性的严重影响,尤其是2007年底出现的全球性金融危机对股市的剧烈影响。(4)本文将市场择时理论拓展应用到定向增发融资,创新性地用以分析控股股东定向增发资产注入的决策选择以及是否以资产作为增发对价的选择。
Stock-liquidity reform has resolved the capital market's endogenous and institutional deficiencies of our country. Different kinds of shareholders'interests begin to reach unanimity. However, due to the impact of a series of factors such as culture, institution, legal environment, and the none fundamentally resolved problem of structural defect of single-large shareholder, Majority shareholders'invasion of small and medium sized shareholders'benefits still exist in practice after the ending of this reform., but more subtle and complex. It is more likely to breed the majority shareholders'benefit invasion in the event of listed companies'private placement and majority shareholders'assets-injecting theoretically, for this is a double related transaction in the course of buying and selling.
This paper uses normative methods, empirical methods and comparative analysis to research the majority shareholders'invasion of small and medium sized shareholders'benefits in the event of private placement and assets-injecting.
The main research work and brief conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1) Test the quality of majority shareholders'injected assets by empirical research:Use the methods of single index analysis, comprehensive performance analysis, partnership samples comparison and multiple regression analysis by taking the comprehensive performance marks as origin variable, all the results state that the medium and long performance of the injected assets is not good, the assets are not high quality.(2) Compare the injected assets'revaluation rate, which calculated all by manual, with the industry average, discover that the rate is generally above the industry average level.(3) Test the existence of earning management behaviors before or after the events:description statistics, partnership sample comparison and multiple regression analysis all demonstrate that there exists earning managements in the event of private placement, and it is more outstanding in bull market:there is negative management before the event and positive management after the event. Then attribute the positive performance to the injected assets which is really low quality confirmed in the chapter four.(4) Test the rationality of price in the private placement:discover the price is generally lower than the intrinsic value by comparing the price per share with the intrinsic value per share; By calculating and comparing the discount, this paper also discovers that the discount is the highest when the object is majority shareholders and their pay form is non-cash assets, and the average discount is also higher than some foreign countries.(5) Test the existence of timing in the private placement and whether it harm the benefit of the small and medium sized shareholders. The results demonstrate that the lower the base price minus the intrinsic price is, the probability is higher that the majority shareholders to inject assets. The regression analysis also demonstrates the larger of the deviation of base price with intrinsic price is, the more the majority shareholders private benefits are, but the worse the company's performance is. This states that the majority shareholders'timing behavior really harms others'benefits.(6) Based on the above cases, finally this paper tests the economic results of assets-inject in private placement and discover that majority shareholders obtain abnormal benefits through the event but the benefits aren't in conformity with the real performance, And the cases discussed above are all the directly influencing factors of majority shareholders abnormal benefits. All the results obtained in this chapter suggest again that there exists majority shareholders invasion and the above research results are reliable. Additionally, this paper discovers that the market's response to the circulation of restricted stock is negative.
This paper matches detail cases to each majority shareholders' invasion behavior. Finally, this paper puts forward suggestions catering to the background of past-reform and full circulation period to protect the small and medium sized shareholders benefits from three aspects: corporate governance, law protection, stock market supervision.
The main conclusion of this paper is:There is majority shareholders' invasion in the course of assets-injecting and private placement. But this is not a common phenomenon. Through the comparison study, It shows that the invasion is more universal in the case when the stock is issuing to the majority shareholders and they pay by non-cash assets, especially in the bull market. Maybe this is a rather Chinese phenomenon and should be illustrated on the special system background of China.
This paper's innovations or new findings are:(1)Be different from foreign countries'private placement which is aimed to financing purely and mostly paid by cash, China's listed companies are used to purchase by assets. So this paper focuses on the assets-injecting part in private placement according to China's condition, and calculates comprehensive performance score to observe companies'medium and long term performance after assets-injecting, calculates abnormal value increase rate to observe whether majority shareholders have obtain more shares by overrating the value of the injected assets.(2)This paper tests the medium and long-term performance of the injected assets to analyze the quality. It takes times to integrate injected assets with listed companies'assets. The performance show may be postponed. So the medium and long term performance will be more objective.(3) This paper consults F-O model to calculate intrinsic value per share, and compare it with the price of private placement to see whether it is reasonable. It can avoid the serious impact of stock market's volatility and fragility when this paper takes intrinsic value per share as the comparative standard, especially the dramatic impact brought by the global financial crisis in the end of2007.(4) Market timing theory is applied to private placement financing. It is used to analyze majority shareholders'decision-making choice on the events of private placement and assets-injecting and payment form.
引文
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