中国上市公司资本结构之谜剖析
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摘要
在资本结构研究领域，存在一个著名的问题——资本结构之谜，它的核心是分析资本结构的成因。西方研究者在破解这一难题上取得了许多成果，国内相关研究也取得了一些进展，但存在的问题是研究上还比较零散。本文力图相对系统地破解中国上市公司资本结构之谜。通过引入在我国A股市场上上市的209家公司1994～2004年的面板数据，围绕我国上市公司资本结构的成因问题，本文从资本结构与公司价值的关系、资本结构的形成路径、资本结构形成的内因、资本结构的动态调整以及资本结构形成的环境约束等五个方面进行了分析，并重点探讨了行业之间的差异。
资本结构之谜的开端是MM定理的“无关”命题，因此澄清资本结构与公司价值的关系成了本文首先要解决的问题。但相关研究并没有基于MM定理分析资本结构与公司价值的关系，本文则按照MM定理中对资本结构与公司价值的界定，将Granger因果检验的方法扩展到适合面板数据的情形，利用Granger因果检验的判定原理，发现我国上市公司的资本结构与公司价值关系不显著，相反公司价值对资本结构却有显著的影响，即表现为公司价值单向地决定资本结构。具体到各个行业，公司价值与资本结构的“相关”关系呈现多样性的特点，制造业、批零贸易业以及综合类的上市公司，它们的资本结构与公司价值之间具有双向决定关系；而房地产行业的上市公司也表现为公司价值单向地决定资本结构。
在破解资本结构之谜上有两种主流理论——静态权衡理论与啄序理论，这两种理论着眼于判断上市公司资本结构的形成路径。以往采用因子分析和财务赤字框架的相关研究不足以说明两种理论的区别，因此本文引入资产增长框架来解决这一问题，并首次证明中国上市公司的资本结构形成体现出逆啄序的特征，即在各种融资方式的选择上，股本融资的优先性高于债务融资，债务融资又高于对企业内部未分配利润的利用；在债务融资上，长期债务的选择优于短期债务选择。在行业差异方面，除房地产、电煤气水行业上市公司对选择长短期债务差别不大，以及电煤气水行业上市公司的资本结构的形成路径符合静态权衡理论假设外，其它行业的上市公司资本结构的形成也遵循逆啄序路径。
前两种理论所包含的影响资本结构形成的因素较少，因此破解资本结构之谜要深入到资本结构形成的内部，考查资本结构形成的内因。国内相关研究在影响因素的选择上没有一致意见，本文从资本市场摩擦对资本成本影响入手分析中国上市公司资本结构形成的内因，将造成资本市场摩擦的原因归纳为三个方面——税收、代理成本以及信息成本，并发现对中国上市公司而言，税收和信息成本方面的因素对企业资本结构具有显著影响，而代理成本方面的因素影响不明显。整体上看，中国上市公司总负债水平受企业税收、盈利性、经营风险、企业规模和年龄等因素的显著影响，短期债务水平的显著性影响因素是税收、盈利性、经营风险和企业年龄，而长期债务水平的影响因素则存在明显的行业差异；对处于不同行业的企业而言，行业间企业资本结构的影响因素存在很大差别，体现出明显的行业特征。
资本结构的动态调整是形成资本结构之谜的重要方面，因此有必要分析现实的资本结构如何向最优资本结构调整。以前的研究忽视了内部调整的差异，本文利用部分调整模型分析发现对上市公司最优资本结构的形成具有显著影响的因素是公司的非债务税盾、盈利性、经营风险、有形资产以及企业规模；同一产业内的上市公司由于产业特征不同，影响最优资本结构形成的因素不尽相同；中国上市公司资本结构的调整成本从内部比较来看依然很高，总负债率每年只能向最优负债率调整一成以上、短期负债率能向最优负债率调整二成，只有长期负债率能调整到五成左右；产业之间长短期目标负债率的调整速度差异比较明显，产业内部目标负债率调整速度也不一致。
破解资本结构之谜还需要分析融资环境对资本结构形成的影响。以往的研究只涉及到融资环境的某些方面，本文构建了一个融资环境与资本结构作用的整体框架，发现环境因素通过改变融资成本而影响资本结构，并且提出了一个总的假设——公司的债务水平与环境的宽松程度正相关。这个假设具体包含如下方面：首先，上市公司的负债率与作为内部治理机制的董事兼任CEO与否、独立董事的比例、投行董事的比例、国有股比例、前几位法人股比例、激励计划的有无和多少正相关，而与董事会人数以及公众股比例负相关；其次，上市公司的负债率还与作为外部治理机制的公司是否会成为接管目标、是否具有反接管安排以及CEO的更换频率正相关，而与CEO的在位时间负相关；再次，上市公司债务水平与产业竞争激烈程度负相关，其中上市公司的负债率与市场集中度、产业资产回报率以及产业政策类别正相关，而与产业无形资产增量负相关；此外，上市公司的负债水平还与金融市场的完善程度、经济的景气程度以及法律法规的完备程度正相关，甚至文化上的保守与开放也对公司的负债具有影响。
There is a famous question in the field of capital structure researches, which is thecapital structure puzzle, whose core is analyzing formative factors of capital structure.West researchers have contributed much to this puzzle, and domestic researches havemade some progress, but the shortage lying in these researches is not systemic enough.The purpose of this dissertation is to systemically analyze the capital structure puzzle ofChinese-listed companies. Using the panel data of209Chinese-listed companies in1994～2004, this dissertation deeply analyses the following issues for the purpose, therelationship between capital structure and company value, the forming route of capitalstructure, the internal formative factors of capital structure, the dynamic adjustment ofcapital structure and the environmental restriction of capital structure, furthermore thisdissertation discusses industrial differences about these issues.
The beginning of capital structure puzzle is the irrelative proposition of MM theorem,so clarifying relationships between capital structure and company value is the first aim ofthis dissertation. Involved researches didn’t analyzed this issue based on MM theorem, sothis paper defines the capital structure and company value form the theorem, and expandsGranger causality test model to panel data. Based on the Granger causality test principles,it has been found the relationships between capital structure and company value as fellow.Captial structures of Chinese-listed companies don't have significant ralationship withcompany values, on the contrary company values significantly affects capital structure,which shows company values determines unilaterally capial structures. As for theindustries in detail, there are various appearances for this relativity, the capital structuresand company values in manufacturing, commerce and synthetically industries havedistinctly bidirectional relationships, and the company values in realty determinesunilaterally the capial structures.
There are two mainstreams theories in resolving the capital structure puzzle, statictradeoff and pecking order which focus on the forming route of capital structure. Theresearches previously adopting factor analysis and financial deficit didn’t enoughdistinguish the difference of the two theories, so this paper introduces the framework of asset growth, and proves that capital structure of Chinese-listed companies adoptsanti-pecking order financing route for the first time. That is to say, when choosingfinancing approaches, equity priorities debt, and earnings priorities debt; when choosingdebt, long-term debt priorities short-term debt. As for the differences within industries,except the listed companies in utilities and realty which have nearly same preference inchoosing long-term debt and short-term debt, and the companies in utilities according withthe static tradeoff theory, the companies in other industries accord with anti-pecking ordertheory, that is first equity, then debt, and then earnings, and long-term debt prior toshort-term debt.
The former two theories don’t include enough determinant factors in resolving thecapital structure puzzle, so that’s necessary to check the internal forming factors of capitalstructure. Domestic researches weren’t identically in choosing determinant factors ofcapital structure, and this paper analyzes the issue based on the effects of the friction ofcapital market on capital cost. This dissertation classifies the friction of capital market intothree parts: tax, agent cost and information cost, and the following conclusions can beendrawn. Tax and information cost have significant impact on capital structure ofChinese-listed companies, while the effects of agent cost isn't significant. The factors oftax, profitability, business risk, size and age determine the total debt, and the factors of tax,profitability, business risk and age determine the short-time debt. The determinant factorsamong industries significantly show industries’ characteristics.
The dynamic adjustment is important part of capital structure puzzle, so it is neededto analyze the realistic capital structures how to adjust towards optimum capital structures.The former researches ignored differences of internal adjustment, and this paper uses thepartial adjustment model and concludes the following results. NDTS, profitability, businessrisk, tangible assets and size determine optimum capital structures of listed companies. For thelisted companies in different industries, there are different determinant factors due to thedifferent industries' characteristics. As a whole, the adjust costs of capital structure are stillhigh based on inner comparison, total debt rate just adjusts10percent towards optimumdebt rate, and short-term debt just adjusts20percent towards optimum debt rate, whilelong-term debt half adjusts towards optimum debt rate. There are distinctly differences inadjustment paces between short-term and long-term target debt rats among industries, and the adjustment paces are inconsistent within industries.
Analyzing effects of financing environment on capital structures is needed forresolving the puzzle. The former concerned researches just covered some part of financingenvironment, and this dissertation offers a whole framework about the effects of financingenvironment on capital structures. This paper finds that financing environment affectscapital structure by changing capital costs, and offers a total hypothesis that debt rate ofcompany is positively relative to loose degree of financing environment, it includes thefollowing hypotheses. At first, debt rate of company is positively relative to the perfectdegree of corporation governance. As for interior governance institutions, debt rates oflisted companies are positively relative to whether director is CEO or not, independentdirectors rate, investment bank directors rate, national stock rate, corporation stock rateand incentive plan, and negatively relative to amount of directors and public stock rate. Asto exterior governance, debt rates of listed companies are positively relative to whethercompany is the takeover target or not, whether company has anti-takeover arrangement ornot and the replacing frequency of CEO, and negatively relative to incumbency time ofCEO. Then debt rate of company is negatively relative to the stinging degree of industrycompetition. In detail, debt rates of listed companies are positively relative to themonopoly level of market, return rate of the industry and industry policies, and negativelyrelative to intangible asset of the industry. Otherwise, debt rates of listed companies arepositively relative to the perfect degree of finance market, business prosperity and thematurity degree of law regulation. Even conservation or openness in culture does haveeffect on debt rates of listed companies.
资本结构之谜的开端是MM定理的“无关”命题，因此澄清资本结构与公司价值的关系成了本文首先要解决的问题。但相关研究并没有基于MM定理分析资本结构与公司价值的关系，本文则按照MM定理中对资本结构与公司价值的界定，将Granger因果检验的方法扩展到适合面板数据的情形，利用Granger因果检验的判定原理，发现我国上市公司的资本结构与公司价值关系不显著，相反公司价值对资本结构却有显著的影响，即表现为公司价值单向地决定资本结构。具体到各个行业，公司价值与资本结构的“相关”关系呈现多样性的特点，制造业、批零贸易业以及综合类的上市公司，它们的资本结构与公司价值之间具有双向决定关系；而房地产行业的上市公司也表现为公司价值单向地决定资本结构。
在破解资本结构之谜上有两种主流理论——静态权衡理论与啄序理论，这两种理论着眼于判断上市公司资本结构的形成路径。以往采用因子分析和财务赤字框架的相关研究不足以说明两种理论的区别，因此本文引入资产增长框架来解决这一问题，并首次证明中国上市公司的资本结构形成体现出逆啄序的特征，即在各种融资方式的选择上，股本融资的优先性高于债务融资，债务融资又高于对企业内部未分配利润的利用；在债务融资上，长期债务的选择优于短期债务选择。在行业差异方面，除房地产、电煤气水行业上市公司对选择长短期债务差别不大，以及电煤气水行业上市公司的资本结构的形成路径符合静态权衡理论假设外，其它行业的上市公司资本结构的形成也遵循逆啄序路径。
前两种理论所包含的影响资本结构形成的因素较少，因此破解资本结构之谜要深入到资本结构形成的内部，考查资本结构形成的内因。国内相关研究在影响因素的选择上没有一致意见，本文从资本市场摩擦对资本成本影响入手分析中国上市公司资本结构形成的内因，将造成资本市场摩擦的原因归纳为三个方面——税收、代理成本以及信息成本，并发现对中国上市公司而言，税收和信息成本方面的因素对企业资本结构具有显著影响，而代理成本方面的因素影响不明显。整体上看，中国上市公司总负债水平受企业税收、盈利性、经营风险、企业规模和年龄等因素的显著影响，短期债务水平的显著性影响因素是税收、盈利性、经营风险和企业年龄，而长期债务水平的影响因素则存在明显的行业差异；对处于不同行业的企业而言，行业间企业资本结构的影响因素存在很大差别，体现出明显的行业特征。
资本结构的动态调整是形成资本结构之谜的重要方面，因此有必要分析现实的资本结构如何向最优资本结构调整。以前的研究忽视了内部调整的差异，本文利用部分调整模型分析发现对上市公司最优资本结构的形成具有显著影响的因素是公司的非债务税盾、盈利性、经营风险、有形资产以及企业规模；同一产业内的上市公司由于产业特征不同，影响最优资本结构形成的因素不尽相同；中国上市公司资本结构的调整成本从内部比较来看依然很高，总负债率每年只能向最优负债率调整一成以上、短期负债率能向最优负债率调整二成，只有长期负债率能调整到五成左右；产业之间长短期目标负债率的调整速度差异比较明显，产业内部目标负债率调整速度也不一致。
破解资本结构之谜还需要分析融资环境对资本结构形成的影响。以往的研究只涉及到融资环境的某些方面，本文构建了一个融资环境与资本结构作用的整体框架，发现环境因素通过改变融资成本而影响资本结构，并且提出了一个总的假设——公司的债务水平与环境的宽松程度正相关。这个假设具体包含如下方面：首先，上市公司的负债率与作为内部治理机制的董事兼任CEO与否、独立董事的比例、投行董事的比例、国有股比例、前几位法人股比例、激励计划的有无和多少正相关，而与董事会人数以及公众股比例负相关；其次，上市公司的负债率还与作为外部治理机制的公司是否会成为接管目标、是否具有反接管安排以及CEO的更换频率正相关，而与CEO的在位时间负相关；再次，上市公司债务水平与产业竞争激烈程度负相关，其中上市公司的负债率与市场集中度、产业资产回报率以及产业政策类别正相关，而与产业无形资产增量负相关；此外，上市公司的负债水平还与金融市场的完善程度、经济的景气程度以及法律法规的完备程度正相关，甚至文化上的保守与开放也对公司的负债具有影响。
There is a famous question in the field of capital structure researches, which is thecapital structure puzzle, whose core is analyzing formative factors of capital structure.West researchers have contributed much to this puzzle, and domestic researches havemade some progress, but the shortage lying in these researches is not systemic enough.The purpose of this dissertation is to systemically analyze the capital structure puzzle ofChinese-listed companies. Using the panel data of209Chinese-listed companies in1994～2004, this dissertation deeply analyses the following issues for the purpose, therelationship between capital structure and company value, the forming route of capitalstructure, the internal formative factors of capital structure, the dynamic adjustment ofcapital structure and the environmental restriction of capital structure, furthermore thisdissertation discusses industrial differences about these issues.
The beginning of capital structure puzzle is the irrelative proposition of MM theorem,so clarifying relationships between capital structure and company value is the first aim ofthis dissertation. Involved researches didn’t analyzed this issue based on MM theorem, sothis paper defines the capital structure and company value form the theorem, and expandsGranger causality test model to panel data. Based on the Granger causality test principles,it has been found the relationships between capital structure and company value as fellow.Captial structures of Chinese-listed companies don't have significant ralationship withcompany values, on the contrary company values significantly affects capital structure,which shows company values determines unilaterally capial structures. As for theindustries in detail, there are various appearances for this relativity, the capital structuresand company values in manufacturing, commerce and synthetically industries havedistinctly bidirectional relationships, and the company values in realty determinesunilaterally the capial structures.
There are two mainstreams theories in resolving the capital structure puzzle, statictradeoff and pecking order which focus on the forming route of capital structure. Theresearches previously adopting factor analysis and financial deficit didn’t enoughdistinguish the difference of the two theories, so this paper introduces the framework of asset growth, and proves that capital structure of Chinese-listed companies adoptsanti-pecking order financing route for the first time. That is to say, when choosingfinancing approaches, equity priorities debt, and earnings priorities debt; when choosingdebt, long-term debt priorities short-term debt. As for the differences within industries,except the listed companies in utilities and realty which have nearly same preference inchoosing long-term debt and short-term debt, and the companies in utilities according withthe static tradeoff theory, the companies in other industries accord with anti-pecking ordertheory, that is first equity, then debt, and then earnings, and long-term debt prior toshort-term debt.
The former two theories don’t include enough determinant factors in resolving thecapital structure puzzle, so that’s necessary to check the internal forming factors of capitalstructure. Domestic researches weren’t identically in choosing determinant factors ofcapital structure, and this paper analyzes the issue based on the effects of the friction ofcapital market on capital cost. This dissertation classifies the friction of capital market intothree parts: tax, agent cost and information cost, and the following conclusions can beendrawn. Tax and information cost have significant impact on capital structure ofChinese-listed companies, while the effects of agent cost isn't significant. The factors oftax, profitability, business risk, size and age determine the total debt, and the factors of tax,profitability, business risk and age determine the short-time debt. The determinant factorsamong industries significantly show industries’ characteristics.
The dynamic adjustment is important part of capital structure puzzle, so it is neededto analyze the realistic capital structures how to adjust towards optimum capital structures.The former researches ignored differences of internal adjustment, and this paper uses thepartial adjustment model and concludes the following results. NDTS, profitability, businessrisk, tangible assets and size determine optimum capital structures of listed companies. For thelisted companies in different industries, there are different determinant factors due to thedifferent industries' characteristics. As a whole, the adjust costs of capital structure are stillhigh based on inner comparison, total debt rate just adjusts10percent towards optimumdebt rate, and short-term debt just adjusts20percent towards optimum debt rate, whilelong-term debt half adjusts towards optimum debt rate. There are distinctly differences inadjustment paces between short-term and long-term target debt rats among industries, and the adjustment paces are inconsistent within industries.
Analyzing effects of financing environment on capital structures is needed forresolving the puzzle. The former concerned researches just covered some part of financingenvironment, and this dissertation offers a whole framework about the effects of financingenvironment on capital structures. This paper finds that financing environment affectscapital structure by changing capital costs, and offers a total hypothesis that debt rate ofcompany is positively relative to loose degree of financing environment, it includes thefollowing hypotheses. At first, debt rate of company is positively relative to the perfectdegree of corporation governance. As for interior governance institutions, debt rates oflisted companies are positively relative to whether director is CEO or not, independentdirectors rate, investment bank directors rate, national stock rate, corporation stock rateand incentive plan, and negatively relative to amount of directors and public stock rate. Asto exterior governance, debt rates of listed companies are positively relative to whethercompany is the takeover target or not, whether company has anti-takeover arrangement ornot and the replacing frequency of CEO, and negatively relative to incumbency time ofCEO. Then debt rate of company is negatively relative to the stinging degree of industrycompetition. In detail, debt rates of listed companies are positively relative to themonopoly level of market, return rate of the industry and industry policies, and negativelyrelative to intangible asset of the industry. Otherwise, debt rates of listed companies arepositively relative to the perfect degree of finance market, business prosperity and thematurity degree of law regulation. Even conservation or openness in culture does haveeffect on debt rates of listed companies.
引文
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