中小股东权益保护的制度影响研究
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摘要
在股权高度集中的国家,中小股东和控股股东之间的代理问题非常严重,“资本多数决”原则把中小股东推入不利的境地。控股股东剥夺中小股东的现象普遍而且非常严重,中小股东利益受到侵害已经成为不争的事实。作为中国证券市场的主要投资者,中小股东权益长期受损将会影响中国资本市场乃至国民经济的稳定发展。如何保护中小股东权益,加强制度保护已经成为共识。
本文以制度为基石,主要回答以下几个问题:(1)制度(法律和声誉)是如何影响中小股东权益保护?(2)我国的中小股东权益保护水平到底是怎样的?我国目前的制度(法律和声誉)对我国的中小股东权益保护是否达到了应有的效果?(3)针对中小股东群体的特殊性,如何在制度上加强对中小股东权益的保护?首先分析制度是如何影响中小股东权益保护行为的,沿着以法律为代表的正式制度和以声誉为代表的非正式制度两条路径分析了中小股东权益的特别保护制度,然后在对我国中小股东权益保护的制度供给现状分析的基础上,提出了制度对我国中小股东权益保护影响效果的研究假设:(1)建立了法律制度对中小股东权益保护水平的作用模型,并分别从整个国家的立法和执法以及中小股东权益保护的立法和执法两个层面提出假设。(2)建立了声誉机制对中小股东权益保护水平的作用模型,并从声誉的不同层面提出假设。
本研究采用上市公司数据,使用STATA 10.0软件对数据进行处理,综合运用了描述性统计分析、主成分分析、t检验、面板随机效应模型对研究假设进行了检验。研究结论表明:(1)我国的中小股东权益保护水平较低,由于股利获得水平较低,导致资本利得仍然是中小股东获利的来源,中小股东承担着巨大的风险。(2)法律对中小股东权益保护水平有着显著的正向作用。(3)声誉对中小股东权益保护有着显著的正向作用。(4)尽管法律和声誉已经起到了作用,但是相对于我国较低的中小股东权益保护水平还是不够的,还需要进一步完善立法,加强执法和发挥声誉的作用。
本文主要工作和贡献有以下几个方面:
1、既有的研究从控股股东的视角来分析制度,而中小股东权益保护不仅来自于制度对控股股东剥夺行为的约束,还来自于制度对中小股东积极维权行为的激励。而当控股股东不可避免地出现时,强化中小股东的积极行为则是保护中小股东权益的另一条路径。研究从中小股东的行为出发,分析了制度是如何通过改变成本和收益,进而影响中小股东行为的选择从而导致中小股东权益保护程度的不同,提出中小股东权益保护的制度设计应该向着减少中小股东成本,降低外部性、强化中小股东积极行为的方向。
2、从法律和声誉两个路径对我国目前中小股东权益保护的制度的供给进行分析。尽管我国证券市场的法律制度不断完善,但是针对中小股东的分散、人数多以及小额收益和较高的行使权利的费用而言,我国目前的法律制度供给还存在不足。投票机制和救济机制是目前关系中小股东权益保护最重要的内容,对公司法新补充的累积投票制度和股东代表诉讼制度进行法经济学分析,指出其在公平和效率上的不足。运用重复博弈理论分析控股股东声誉对中小股东权益保护的影响,指出我国控股股东声誉机制没有起到作用,原因在于政府声誉的介入。
3、对我国中小股东权益保护制度的供给效果进行实证检验。从资产收益权角度,运用主成分分析法衡量中小股东权益保护水平。运用面板随机效应模型和t检验方法实证检验制度对我国中小股东权益保护的影响。结果表明我国法律和声誉对中小股东权益保护都起到正面影响。但是相对于低的股利获得水平和高的资本利得风险,我国目前的法律和声誉仍不足够。
4、如何降低中小股东监管和维权的成本,基于中小股东的弱势群体性质,集体行动则成为必然选择。对应现有的累积投票制和股东代表诉讼制度,运用法经济学分析了股票代理权征集制度和股东集团诉讼制度对公平和效率的实现,提出首先要建立股票代理权征集制度和股东集团诉讼制度。其次发挥声誉机制,以弥补法律缺失和弱的法律执行。法律和声誉共同作用提高中小股东权益保护。
本研究从理论和实证两方面揭示了我国中小股东权益保护的真实全貌,以及我国制度对中小股东权益保护的作用,为我国中小股东权益保护相关制度的制定和实施提供了切实依据。
In the contcentrated share right countries, the proxy problem between the minority shareholders and controlling shareholders is very serious and the principle of“Capital of majority”puts minority shareholders into adverse circumstance. Controlling shareholders expriorate minority shareholders greatly and unversely. It comes to an unquestionable fact that the right of minority shareholders is violated. As the major investors minority shareholders bear the major financing responsibility. So damaged right of minority shareholders will affect the financing function of secutity market and development of national economy. It has been a common consensus that instituation can protects right of minority shareholders not to be violated.
Based on the instituation, this study solves the questions as follows: (1) How does instiution including law and reputation affect protection of minority shareholder’right? (2)What on earth does the situation of protection of minority shareholder’right in China and does instiution in China protect minority shareholder’right ? (3) How to strengthen institution protection of minority shareholder’right against the minority shareholder’s characteristic? Firstly, analyzes how instiution affect protection behaviors of minority shareholders’right, then analyzes supply situation of institution following the two thought of law of formal instituation and reputation of informal institution, puts forward to three hypotheses and testing them:(1)Building the action model of law on protection level of minority shareholders’right and proposes hypothesis from law in paper and law in action (3) building the action model of reputaition on protection level of minority shareholders’right and proposes hypothesis from different point of reputaition.
Taking the Listed Companies as research object, this study uses STATA10.0 statistic software to deal with data, and comprehensively employs descriptive analysis, principal ananlysis, student t test, panel random effect model to test these hypotheses. The result shows: (1) The protection level of minority shareholder’right in China is very low. Dividend gains is so low that capital gains becomes the main resource of minority shareholder’s earning while minority shareholdes have to beargreat risk of stock market’s shock. (2) Law has the positive action on the protection of minority shareholder’right (3) Reputaition has the positive action on the protection of minority shareholders’right. (4) Although law and reputation have affected minority shareholders’right positively, contrast to the low right level of minority shareholders law and reputation are not enough.It is necessary to complete law in paper , strengthen law in action and exert reputation .
The study has made some works and attribution as follows:
Firstly, existing research to analyze the institution’s action is based on controlling shareholders .But protection of minority shareholder’right is not only from the restraint of instituation on controlling shareholders’behavior but also from the recentive of instituation on minority shareholders’behavior. When big sharholders emerges inevitably, strengthening the active behavior of minority shareholders becomes another way to protect minority shareholders’right. The study begins from the behavior of minority shareholders, analyzes how instiution including law and reputation affect protection of minority shareholders’right and proposes the instiutation should be developed into decreasing the cost and externality of minority shareholders and strengthening active behaviors of minority shareholders
Secondly, analyzes the supply of law protection on minority shareholders following law and reputation. Although the law institution is more perfect, law is still unadequate against numerous and disperse and small benefit and big cost of exerting right of right minority shareholders.Voting mechanism and relif mechanism are the more important content related to right protection of minority shareholders. Based on this, analyzes the cumulative voting instituation and derivative action instituation and points out the disadvantage of fair and efficiency against protection of minority shareholders using law and economy method. Uses repeated game theory to analyze the action of big shareholders on protection of minority shareholders’right and point out that the reputation mechanism has little affect because of the intervention of government’s reputation.
Thirdly, analyzes empirically the effect in affect of the institutional protection of the minority shareholders in China.Using principal factor analysis to measure protection level of the minority shareholders from the point of the right of return on asset. Using panel random effect model and t test method to test law and reputation’s real influence on the right protection of the minority shareholders. Results show that law and reputation have positive affect on the right protection of the minority shareholders including cash dividend earning level and capital gains level .Contratry to the low dividend earning level and high capital gains risk, law and reputation at present are not enough.
Forthly, how to decrease the cost of minority shareholder exerting right, the collective action is necessary choice considering the vulnerable groups characteristics of minority shareholders. Against cumulative voting instituation and derivative action instituation, analyzes the effect of voting right proxy solicitation instutation and shareholder class action instutation on the minority shareholders’protection and realization of fair and efficiency using law and economy methods. Then proposes to build the voting proxy solicitation institution and class action, and exert reputation mechanism and rebuild trust society to make up for the inadequate law building and weak law enforcing. Law and reputation together promote right protection of the minority shareholders.
This study shows the real sitution of protection of minority shareholders’right and the action of institution on the protection of minority shareholders’right in China theoretically and empirically, therefore provides the basis for formulating the related instutation of protection of minority shareholders’right.
本文以制度为基石,主要回答以下几个问题:(1)制度(法律和声誉)是如何影响中小股东权益保护?(2)我国的中小股东权益保护水平到底是怎样的?我国目前的制度(法律和声誉)对我国的中小股东权益保护是否达到了应有的效果?(3)针对中小股东群体的特殊性,如何在制度上加强对中小股东权益的保护?首先分析制度是如何影响中小股东权益保护行为的,沿着以法律为代表的正式制度和以声誉为代表的非正式制度两条路径分析了中小股东权益的特别保护制度,然后在对我国中小股东权益保护的制度供给现状分析的基础上,提出了制度对我国中小股东权益保护影响效果的研究假设:(1)建立了法律制度对中小股东权益保护水平的作用模型,并分别从整个国家的立法和执法以及中小股东权益保护的立法和执法两个层面提出假设。(2)建立了声誉机制对中小股东权益保护水平的作用模型,并从声誉的不同层面提出假设。
本研究采用上市公司数据,使用STATA 10.0软件对数据进行处理,综合运用了描述性统计分析、主成分分析、t检验、面板随机效应模型对研究假设进行了检验。研究结论表明:(1)我国的中小股东权益保护水平较低,由于股利获得水平较低,导致资本利得仍然是中小股东获利的来源,中小股东承担着巨大的风险。(2)法律对中小股东权益保护水平有着显著的正向作用。(3)声誉对中小股东权益保护有着显著的正向作用。(4)尽管法律和声誉已经起到了作用,但是相对于我国较低的中小股东权益保护水平还是不够的,还需要进一步完善立法,加强执法和发挥声誉的作用。
本文主要工作和贡献有以下几个方面:
1、既有的研究从控股股东的视角来分析制度,而中小股东权益保护不仅来自于制度对控股股东剥夺行为的约束,还来自于制度对中小股东积极维权行为的激励。而当控股股东不可避免地出现时,强化中小股东的积极行为则是保护中小股东权益的另一条路径。研究从中小股东的行为出发,分析了制度是如何通过改变成本和收益,进而影响中小股东行为的选择从而导致中小股东权益保护程度的不同,提出中小股东权益保护的制度设计应该向着减少中小股东成本,降低外部性、强化中小股东积极行为的方向。
2、从法律和声誉两个路径对我国目前中小股东权益保护的制度的供给进行分析。尽管我国证券市场的法律制度不断完善,但是针对中小股东的分散、人数多以及小额收益和较高的行使权利的费用而言,我国目前的法律制度供给还存在不足。投票机制和救济机制是目前关系中小股东权益保护最重要的内容,对公司法新补充的累积投票制度和股东代表诉讼制度进行法经济学分析,指出其在公平和效率上的不足。运用重复博弈理论分析控股股东声誉对中小股东权益保护的影响,指出我国控股股东声誉机制没有起到作用,原因在于政府声誉的介入。
3、对我国中小股东权益保护制度的供给效果进行实证检验。从资产收益权角度,运用主成分分析法衡量中小股东权益保护水平。运用面板随机效应模型和t检验方法实证检验制度对我国中小股东权益保护的影响。结果表明我国法律和声誉对中小股东权益保护都起到正面影响。但是相对于低的股利获得水平和高的资本利得风险,我国目前的法律和声誉仍不足够。
4、如何降低中小股东监管和维权的成本,基于中小股东的弱势群体性质,集体行动则成为必然选择。对应现有的累积投票制和股东代表诉讼制度,运用法经济学分析了股票代理权征集制度和股东集团诉讼制度对公平和效率的实现,提出首先要建立股票代理权征集制度和股东集团诉讼制度。其次发挥声誉机制,以弥补法律缺失和弱的法律执行。法律和声誉共同作用提高中小股东权益保护。
本研究从理论和实证两方面揭示了我国中小股东权益保护的真实全貌,以及我国制度对中小股东权益保护的作用,为我国中小股东权益保护相关制度的制定和实施提供了切实依据。
In the contcentrated share right countries, the proxy problem between the minority shareholders and controlling shareholders is very serious and the principle of“Capital of majority”puts minority shareholders into adverse circumstance. Controlling shareholders expriorate minority shareholders greatly and unversely. It comes to an unquestionable fact that the right of minority shareholders is violated. As the major investors minority shareholders bear the major financing responsibility. So damaged right of minority shareholders will affect the financing function of secutity market and development of national economy. It has been a common consensus that instituation can protects right of minority shareholders not to be violated.
Based on the instituation, this study solves the questions as follows: (1) How does instiution including law and reputation affect protection of minority shareholder’right? (2)What on earth does the situation of protection of minority shareholder’right in China and does instiution in China protect minority shareholder’right ? (3) How to strengthen institution protection of minority shareholder’right against the minority shareholder’s characteristic? Firstly, analyzes how instiution affect protection behaviors of minority shareholders’right, then analyzes supply situation of institution following the two thought of law of formal instituation and reputation of informal institution, puts forward to three hypotheses and testing them:(1)Building the action model of law on protection level of minority shareholders’right and proposes hypothesis from law in paper and law in action (3) building the action model of reputaition on protection level of minority shareholders’right and proposes hypothesis from different point of reputaition.
Taking the Listed Companies as research object, this study uses STATA10.0 statistic software to deal with data, and comprehensively employs descriptive analysis, principal ananlysis, student t test, panel random effect model to test these hypotheses. The result shows: (1) The protection level of minority shareholder’right in China is very low. Dividend gains is so low that capital gains becomes the main resource of minority shareholder’s earning while minority shareholdes have to beargreat risk of stock market’s shock. (2) Law has the positive action on the protection of minority shareholder’right (3) Reputaition has the positive action on the protection of minority shareholders’right. (4) Although law and reputation have affected minority shareholders’right positively, contrast to the low right level of minority shareholders law and reputation are not enough.It is necessary to complete law in paper , strengthen law in action and exert reputation .
The study has made some works and attribution as follows:
Firstly, existing research to analyze the institution’s action is based on controlling shareholders .But protection of minority shareholder’right is not only from the restraint of instituation on controlling shareholders’behavior but also from the recentive of instituation on minority shareholders’behavior. When big sharholders emerges inevitably, strengthening the active behavior of minority shareholders becomes another way to protect minority shareholders’right. The study begins from the behavior of minority shareholders, analyzes how instiution including law and reputation affect protection of minority shareholders’right and proposes the instiutation should be developed into decreasing the cost and externality of minority shareholders and strengthening active behaviors of minority shareholders
Secondly, analyzes the supply of law protection on minority shareholders following law and reputation. Although the law institution is more perfect, law is still unadequate against numerous and disperse and small benefit and big cost of exerting right of right minority shareholders.Voting mechanism and relif mechanism are the more important content related to right protection of minority shareholders. Based on this, analyzes the cumulative voting instituation and derivative action instituation and points out the disadvantage of fair and efficiency against protection of minority shareholders using law and economy method. Uses repeated game theory to analyze the action of big shareholders on protection of minority shareholders’right and point out that the reputation mechanism has little affect because of the intervention of government’s reputation.
Thirdly, analyzes empirically the effect in affect of the institutional protection of the minority shareholders in China.Using principal factor analysis to measure protection level of the minority shareholders from the point of the right of return on asset. Using panel random effect model and t test method to test law and reputation’s real influence on the right protection of the minority shareholders. Results show that law and reputation have positive affect on the right protection of the minority shareholders including cash dividend earning level and capital gains level .Contratry to the low dividend earning level and high capital gains risk, law and reputation at present are not enough.
Forthly, how to decrease the cost of minority shareholder exerting right, the collective action is necessary choice considering the vulnerable groups characteristics of minority shareholders. Against cumulative voting instituation and derivative action instituation, analyzes the effect of voting right proxy solicitation instutation and shareholder class action instutation on the minority shareholders’protection and realization of fair and efficiency using law and economy methods. Then proposes to build the voting proxy solicitation institution and class action, and exert reputation mechanism and rebuild trust society to make up for the inadequate law building and weak law enforcing. Law and reputation together promote right protection of the minority shareholders.
This study shows the real sitution of protection of minority shareholders’right and the action of institution on the protection of minority shareholders’right in China theoretically and empirically, therefore provides the basis for formulating the related instutation of protection of minority shareholders’right.
引文
注1 La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes,Andrei Sheifer以及Robert Viahny这四位作者被合并简称为LLSV
[1]转引自:小股东权益保护委员会.小股东权益保护手册[M].南京:江苏人民出版社. 2007:3
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