战略联盟中交易成本、联盟能力对效率边界影响的实证研究
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摘要
经济组织的边界问题历来都是学术界和企业界关注的焦点。战略联盟作为一种界于企业与市场之间的中间组织,其边界问题更是企业界进行联盟活动所必须关注的问题之一,但是,由于战略联盟的边界涉及到两个或者两个以上企业共同的选择问题,因此战略联盟的效率边界相对于科层组织边界来说显得更加的复杂和难以测量。现有文献大多是研究纵向关系下的企业边界问题的,研究方法也比较单一,部分原因是经典的交易成本、市场失灵等问题的分析可以很精确地对企业业务范围作出合理判断,因此,先前的研究尚未涉及到战略联盟,且对效率边界的刻画指标也比较模糊。
本文借鉴先前纵向中间组织和企业效率边界研究的基础,如:借鉴用交易成本和企业能力共同审视中间组织效率边界以及国外学者对合作范围的探讨,参考中间组织效率边界的研究成果,用合作范围和契约复杂性来分别刻画效率边界的广度和深度,并重点研究了交易成本和联盟能力对战略联盟的效率边界的影响,提出概念模型并形成了研究假设。
为验证文章中提出的六个相关假设和本文的概念模型,本文以深圳地区参与联盟的企业为研究对象,通过集中发放大样本问卷调查的方式,获得有效问卷179份,为本文随后的实证研究提供了比较充分的数据基础。对于回收的179份来自企业的数据,本文先用SPSS16.0软件进行大样本分析和小样本分析,以保证指标体系的可靠性和有效性,利用AMOS7.0软件进行结构方程模型检验,检验结果验证了资产专用性、不确定性、联盟能力对效率边界之间提出的假设。本文实证研究结果表明,资产专用性、不确定性对契约复杂性(联盟深度)具有显著的正向影响,对合作范围(联盟广度)具有显著的负向影响,联盟能力对契约复杂性(联盟深度)具有显著的负向影响,对合作范围(联盟广度)具有显著的正向影响。
本文的贡献在于用合作范围和契约复杂性来分别刻画效率边界的广度和深度,并运用实证研究方法对战略联盟中,交易成本和联盟能力对效率边界的影响进行了实证研究,因此,根据本文的研究结论,我国的企业参与战略联盟中若投入的专用性资产较高或环境不确定性较高,企业应该选择相对紧密的合作模式,而若企业的联盟能力较强,企业则应该选择相对松散的合作模式。
The Boundary of economic organization has always been brought into focus by academic interests and business interests. As an intermediate organization on the confines of firms and market, the frontier problem of strategic alliances must be paid close attention when business interests have activities. As the boundary problem of strategic alliances come down to a common choice by two and above firms, the efficiency frontier of strategic alliances is much more complicated and difficult to measure compared to bureaucracy boundary. Most of now available literatures study boundary of firm from vertical relationship with a single method, and partly because the analyze of classic trade cost, market failure could make precise, considerable judgment for enterprises business. So previous researches have not come down to transverse alliance, and undefined theindex of efficiency frontier.
This article takes the previous research of vertical strategic alliance efficiency frontier as a basis, such as: review intermediate organization efficiency frontier in concert with trade cost and enterprise ability, use discussion of alliance range by foreign scholars as a reference, consult the research result of intermediate organization efficiency frontier, use alliance range and contract complexity to describe the breadth and depth of efficiency frontier, focus on the competitive strategic alliance efficiency frontier influence, submit conceptual model and form research hypothesis.
In order to prove six related hypothesis and conceptual models, we took the enterprises which joined the alliance in Shenzhen, concentrated issued and collect a total issuance volume of 179 copies which are effective questionnaires. These questionnaires proved a sufficient data basis for succedent empirical research. For the 179 effective questionnaires copies from the enterprises, we use software SPSS 16.0 to analyze large and small samples to guarantee index system reliable and effective, and then use software AMOS7.0 to checkout Structural equation model. The result shows the hypothesis to managerial hierarchy of efficiency frontier is right which put forward by asset specificity, uncertainty and alliance capability. The empirical research indicate that asset specificity, uncertainty have positive effects on contractual complexity (the depth of alliance), have negative effects on alliance range (the breadth of alliance); and alliance capability have positive effects on alliance range (the breadth of alliance), have negative effects on contractual complexity (the depth of alliance).
The contribution of this article is utilizing alliance range and contractual complexity to indicate efficiency frontier breadth and depth, also utilizing research and methodology to research whether trade cost and alliance capability have influence on efficiency frontier in competitive strategic alliance. So, the conclusion shows, when the enterprise participates in Strategic Alliances, it should find a relatively close cooperation model if invests big amount of specialized assets or has a highly uncertain environment; and it should find a relatively loose cooperation model if it has a strong alliance capability.
本文借鉴先前纵向中间组织和企业效率边界研究的基础,如:借鉴用交易成本和企业能力共同审视中间组织效率边界以及国外学者对合作范围的探讨,参考中间组织效率边界的研究成果,用合作范围和契约复杂性来分别刻画效率边界的广度和深度,并重点研究了交易成本和联盟能力对战略联盟的效率边界的影响,提出概念模型并形成了研究假设。
为验证文章中提出的六个相关假设和本文的概念模型,本文以深圳地区参与联盟的企业为研究对象,通过集中发放大样本问卷调查的方式,获得有效问卷179份,为本文随后的实证研究提供了比较充分的数据基础。对于回收的179份来自企业的数据,本文先用SPSS16.0软件进行大样本分析和小样本分析,以保证指标体系的可靠性和有效性,利用AMOS7.0软件进行结构方程模型检验,检验结果验证了资产专用性、不确定性、联盟能力对效率边界之间提出的假设。本文实证研究结果表明,资产专用性、不确定性对契约复杂性(联盟深度)具有显著的正向影响,对合作范围(联盟广度)具有显著的负向影响,联盟能力对契约复杂性(联盟深度)具有显著的负向影响,对合作范围(联盟广度)具有显著的正向影响。
本文的贡献在于用合作范围和契约复杂性来分别刻画效率边界的广度和深度,并运用实证研究方法对战略联盟中,交易成本和联盟能力对效率边界的影响进行了实证研究,因此,根据本文的研究结论,我国的企业参与战略联盟中若投入的专用性资产较高或环境不确定性较高,企业应该选择相对紧密的合作模式,而若企业的联盟能力较强,企业则应该选择相对松散的合作模式。
The Boundary of economic organization has always been brought into focus by academic interests and business interests. As an intermediate organization on the confines of firms and market, the frontier problem of strategic alliances must be paid close attention when business interests have activities. As the boundary problem of strategic alliances come down to a common choice by two and above firms, the efficiency frontier of strategic alliances is much more complicated and difficult to measure compared to bureaucracy boundary. Most of now available literatures study boundary of firm from vertical relationship with a single method, and partly because the analyze of classic trade cost, market failure could make precise, considerable judgment for enterprises business. So previous researches have not come down to transverse alliance, and undefined theindex of efficiency frontier.
This article takes the previous research of vertical strategic alliance efficiency frontier as a basis, such as: review intermediate organization efficiency frontier in concert with trade cost and enterprise ability, use discussion of alliance range by foreign scholars as a reference, consult the research result of intermediate organization efficiency frontier, use alliance range and contract complexity to describe the breadth and depth of efficiency frontier, focus on the competitive strategic alliance efficiency frontier influence, submit conceptual model and form research hypothesis.
In order to prove six related hypothesis and conceptual models, we took the enterprises which joined the alliance in Shenzhen, concentrated issued and collect a total issuance volume of 179 copies which are effective questionnaires. These questionnaires proved a sufficient data basis for succedent empirical research. For the 179 effective questionnaires copies from the enterprises, we use software SPSS 16.0 to analyze large and small samples to guarantee index system reliable and effective, and then use software AMOS7.0 to checkout Structural equation model. The result shows the hypothesis to managerial hierarchy of efficiency frontier is right which put forward by asset specificity, uncertainty and alliance capability. The empirical research indicate that asset specificity, uncertainty have positive effects on contractual complexity (the depth of alliance), have negative effects on alliance range (the breadth of alliance); and alliance capability have positive effects on alliance range (the breadth of alliance), have negative effects on contractual complexity (the depth of alliance).
The contribution of this article is utilizing alliance range and contractual complexity to indicate efficiency frontier breadth and depth, also utilizing research and methodology to research whether trade cost and alliance capability have influence on efficiency frontier in competitive strategic alliance. So, the conclusion shows, when the enterprise participates in Strategic Alliances, it should find a relatively close cooperation model if invests big amount of specialized assets or has a highly uncertain environment; and it should find a relatively loose cooperation model if it has a strong alliance capability.
引文
杜尚哲,加雷特,李东红. 2006.战略联盟[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社.
韩智勇,高玲玲. 2004.基于交易费用理论的虚拟企业动力机制及效率边界分析[J].科研管理, (01).
和炳全,梅明君. 2004.企业“竞合”战略博弈[J].昆明理工大学学报(社会科学版). 4(3):36-38.
何晓群. 1999.多元统计分析[M].北京.中国财政经济出版社, 10.
江旭,高山行,李垣. 2009.战略联盟的范围、治理与稳定性间关系的实证研究.管理工程学报, (02):1-5.
李军锋. 2003.重庆市制造企业先进制造技术质量管理与企业绩效之实证研究[D].重庆大学硕士论文.
连建辉,孙焕民,钟惠波. 2005.金融企业集群:经济性质,效率边界与竞争优势[J].金融研究, (06).
沈磊,张民. 2008.企业间网络功能和效率边界的分析——对Williamson治理模式选择模型的修正[J].中央财经大学学报, (06):69-73.
龙勇,李薇. 2007.竞争性双寡头的联盟绩效研究[J].中国管理科学, 15(5):119-125.
龙勇,李薇. 2008.战略联盟中合作R&D效率的DEA分析[J].科研管理, 29(4):76-81.
Williamson. 2002.资本主义经济制度.商务印书馆, (6).
吴昊,杨梅英,陈良猷. 2003.超竞争环境下企业的纵向效率边界分析[J].北京航空航天大学学报(社会科学版), (02):32-36.
吴明隆. 2000. SPSS统计应用实务[M].北京:中国铁道出版社.
杨瑞龙,冯健. 2003.企业间网络的效率边界:经济组织逻辑的重新审视[J].中国工业经济, (11):5-13.
张彤玉,巨荣良. 2006.产业组织范式的演进:从竞争垄断到竞争合作[J].经济学家, 6:83-88.
Anand BN, Khanna T. 2000. Do firms learn to create value? The case of alliances. Strategic Management Journal, March Special Issue 21:295–315.
Badaracco J.L .1991..The knowledge Link:How Firm Compete Through Strategic Alliance[D]. Boston, MA:Harvard Business School PRESS,
Bengtsson.M., Kock. S. 1999.Cooperation and competition in relationships between competitors in business networks[J]. The Journal of Business & Industry Marketing. 14(3):178-191.
Bengtsson.M., Kock. S. 2000a."Coopetition" in business networks - to cooperate and compete simultaneously[J]. Industry Marketing Management. 29:411-426.
Bengtsson.M., Kock. S. 2000b. Tension in co-opetition, C&C[R], 1st International Conference on Cooperation & Competition. Vaxjo University, Vaxjo.
Dussauge P, Garrete B. 1999 Cooperative Strategy [J]. JOHN Wilez&Sons, , 1(33):34-38.
Das, T.K. Teng. B.S.1996.Risk types and inter-firm alliance structures[J]. Journal of International Business Studies. 26:91-116.
Das, T.K. Teng. B.S.1998.Between trust and control:Developing confidence in partner cooperation in alliances[J]. Academy of Management Review. 23:491-512.
Das, T.K. Teng. B.S.1999.Managing risks in strategic alliances[J]. The Academy of Management Executive. 13(4):50-62.
Das, T.K. Teng. B.S.2000.A resource-based theory of strategic alliances[J]. Journal of Management. 26(1):31-61.
Das, T.K. Teng. B.S.2001.A risk perception model of alliance structuring[J]. Journal of International Management. 7:1-29.
Gulati R. 1995. Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual choice in alliances. Academy of Management Journal 38(1):85–112.
Gulati R. 1998. Alliances and networks. Strategic Management Journal, April Special Issue 19:293–317.
Gulati R, Garguilo M. 1999. Where do interorganizational networks come from? American Journal of Sociology 104(5):1439–1493.
Gulati R, Lawrence PR, Puranam P. 2005. Adaptation in vertical relationships:beyond incentive conflict. Strategic Management Journal 26(5):415–440.
Gulati R, Singh H. 1998. The architecture of cooperation:managing coordination costs and appropriation concerns in strategic alliances. Administrative Science Quarterly 43(4):781–814.
Hoffmann WH. 2007. Strategies for managing a portfolio of alliances. Strategic Management Journal 28(8):827–856.
Joskow P. 1987. Contract duration and relationshipspecificinvestments:empirical evidence from coal markets. American Economic Review 77:168–185.
Joskow P. 1988. Asset specificity and the structure ofvertical relationships:empirical evidence. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 4:95–118.
Kale P, Dyer JH, Singh H. 2002. Alliance capability stock market response and long-term alliance success:the role of the alliance function. Strategic Management Journal 23(8):747–767.
Kale P, Singh H. 2007. Building firm capabilities through learning:the role of the alliance learning process in alliance capability and firm-level alliance success. Strategic Management Journal28(10):981–1000.
Kale P, Singh H, Perlmutter H. 2000. Learning and protection of proprietary assets in strategic alliances:building relational capital. Strategic Management Journal, March Special Issue 21:217–237.
Khanna T , Gulati R1998 , Nohria N. The dynamics of learning alliances :Competition, cooperation , and relative scope [ J ] . Strategic Management Journal , 9(3):193-210.
Lafontaine F. 1992. Agency theory and franchising:some empirical results. RAND Journal of Economics 23:263–283.
Macneil IR. 1978. Contracts:adjustments of long-termeconomic relations under classical, neoclassical, and relational contract law. Northwestern University Law Review 72:854–902.
Macneil IR. 1981. Economic analysis of contractual relations:its shortfalls and the need for a rich classificatory apparatus. Northwestern University Law Review 75:1018–1063.
Melanie Schreiner, Prashant Kale and Daniel Corsten.2009. What really is alliance management capability and how does it impact alliance outcomes and success? Strategic Management Journal. (30):1395–1419.
Mueller WF, Geithman FE. 1991. An empirical test of the free rider and market power hypotheses. Review of Economics and Statistics 73:301–308.
Soekijad, M. Andriessen. E. 2003.Conditions for knowledge sharing in competitive alliances[J]. European Management Journal. 21(5):578-587.
Nalebuff, B. Brandenburger. A. 1996. Co-opetition[M]. ISL Folag AB:Oskarshamn. Osborn RN, Denekamp JG, Duysters G, Baughn C.1998. Embedded patterns of international allianceformation. Organization Studies 19(4):617–638.
Poppo L, Zenger T. 2002. Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements? Strategic Management Journal 23(8):707–725.
Ryall MD, Sampson RC. 2003. Do prior alliances influencecontract structure? Evidence from technology alliance contracts. University of Maryland workingpaper.
Ryall MD, Sampson RC. 2003. Do prior alliances influence contract structure? Evidence from technology alliance contracts. University of Maryland workingpaper.
Simonin BL. 1997. The importance of collaborative know-how:an empirical test of the learning organization. Academy of Management Journal 40(5):1150–1175.
Tourneau. B. 2004. Co-opetition:An Alternative to Competition[J]. Journal of Healthcare Management. 49(2):81-83.
Williamson, O. E., 1993. Calculativeness, trust and economic organization. Journal of Law andEconomics, 36:221-270.
Zollo M, Reuer JJ, Singh H. 2002. Inter-organizationalroutines and performance in strategic alliances.Organization Science 13(6):701–713.
Zineldin. M. 2004.Co-opetition:the organization of the future[J]. Marketing Intelligence & Planning. 22(6/7):780-789.
韩智勇,高玲玲. 2004.基于交易费用理论的虚拟企业动力机制及效率边界分析[J].科研管理, (01).
和炳全,梅明君. 2004.企业“竞合”战略博弈[J].昆明理工大学学报(社会科学版). 4(3):36-38.
何晓群. 1999.多元统计分析[M].北京.中国财政经济出版社, 10.
江旭,高山行,李垣. 2009.战略联盟的范围、治理与稳定性间关系的实证研究.管理工程学报, (02):1-5.
李军锋. 2003.重庆市制造企业先进制造技术质量管理与企业绩效之实证研究[D].重庆大学硕士论文.
连建辉,孙焕民,钟惠波. 2005.金融企业集群:经济性质,效率边界与竞争优势[J].金融研究, (06).
沈磊,张民. 2008.企业间网络功能和效率边界的分析——对Williamson治理模式选择模型的修正[J].中央财经大学学报, (06):69-73.
龙勇,李薇. 2007.竞争性双寡头的联盟绩效研究[J].中国管理科学, 15(5):119-125.
龙勇,李薇. 2008.战略联盟中合作R&D效率的DEA分析[J].科研管理, 29(4):76-81.
Williamson. 2002.资本主义经济制度.商务印书馆, (6).
吴昊,杨梅英,陈良猷. 2003.超竞争环境下企业的纵向效率边界分析[J].北京航空航天大学学报(社会科学版), (02):32-36.
吴明隆. 2000. SPSS统计应用实务[M].北京:中国铁道出版社.
杨瑞龙,冯健. 2003.企业间网络的效率边界:经济组织逻辑的重新审视[J].中国工业经济, (11):5-13.
张彤玉,巨荣良. 2006.产业组织范式的演进:从竞争垄断到竞争合作[J].经济学家, 6:83-88.
Anand BN, Khanna T. 2000. Do firms learn to create value? The case of alliances. Strategic Management Journal, March Special Issue 21:295–315.
Badaracco J.L .1991..The knowledge Link:How Firm Compete Through Strategic Alliance[D]. Boston, MA:Harvard Business School PRESS,
Bengtsson.M., Kock. S. 1999.Cooperation and competition in relationships between competitors in business networks[J]. The Journal of Business & Industry Marketing. 14(3):178-191.
Bengtsson.M., Kock. S. 2000a."Coopetition" in business networks - to cooperate and compete simultaneously[J]. Industry Marketing Management. 29:411-426.
Bengtsson.M., Kock. S. 2000b. Tension in co-opetition, C&C[R], 1st International Conference on Cooperation & Competition. Vaxjo University, Vaxjo.
Dussauge P, Garrete B. 1999 Cooperative Strategy [J]. JOHN Wilez&Sons, , 1(33):34-38.
Das, T.K. Teng. B.S.1996.Risk types and inter-firm alliance structures[J]. Journal of International Business Studies. 26:91-116.
Das, T.K. Teng. B.S.1998.Between trust and control:Developing confidence in partner cooperation in alliances[J]. Academy of Management Review. 23:491-512.
Das, T.K. Teng. B.S.1999.Managing risks in strategic alliances[J]. The Academy of Management Executive. 13(4):50-62.
Das, T.K. Teng. B.S.2000.A resource-based theory of strategic alliances[J]. Journal of Management. 26(1):31-61.
Das, T.K. Teng. B.S.2001.A risk perception model of alliance structuring[J]. Journal of International Management. 7:1-29.
Gulati R. 1995. Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual choice in alliances. Academy of Management Journal 38(1):85–112.
Gulati R. 1998. Alliances and networks. Strategic Management Journal, April Special Issue 19:293–317.
Gulati R, Garguilo M. 1999. Where do interorganizational networks come from? American Journal of Sociology 104(5):1439–1493.
Gulati R, Lawrence PR, Puranam P. 2005. Adaptation in vertical relationships:beyond incentive conflict. Strategic Management Journal 26(5):415–440.
Gulati R, Singh H. 1998. The architecture of cooperation:managing coordination costs and appropriation concerns in strategic alliances. Administrative Science Quarterly 43(4):781–814.
Hoffmann WH. 2007. Strategies for managing a portfolio of alliances. Strategic Management Journal 28(8):827–856.
Joskow P. 1987. Contract duration and relationshipspecificinvestments:empirical evidence from coal markets. American Economic Review 77:168–185.
Joskow P. 1988. Asset specificity and the structure ofvertical relationships:empirical evidence. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 4:95–118.
Kale P, Dyer JH, Singh H. 2002. Alliance capability stock market response and long-term alliance success:the role of the alliance function. Strategic Management Journal 23(8):747–767.
Kale P, Singh H. 2007. Building firm capabilities through learning:the role of the alliance learning process in alliance capability and firm-level alliance success. Strategic Management Journal28(10):981–1000.
Kale P, Singh H, Perlmutter H. 2000. Learning and protection of proprietary assets in strategic alliances:building relational capital. Strategic Management Journal, March Special Issue 21:217–237.
Khanna T , Gulati R1998 , Nohria N. The dynamics of learning alliances :Competition, cooperation , and relative scope [ J ] . Strategic Management Journal , 9(3):193-210.
Lafontaine F. 1992. Agency theory and franchising:some empirical results. RAND Journal of Economics 23:263–283.
Macneil IR. 1978. Contracts:adjustments of long-termeconomic relations under classical, neoclassical, and relational contract law. Northwestern University Law Review 72:854–902.
Macneil IR. 1981. Economic analysis of contractual relations:its shortfalls and the need for a rich classificatory apparatus. Northwestern University Law Review 75:1018–1063.
Melanie Schreiner, Prashant Kale and Daniel Corsten.2009. What really is alliance management capability and how does it impact alliance outcomes and success? Strategic Management Journal. (30):1395–1419.
Mueller WF, Geithman FE. 1991. An empirical test of the free rider and market power hypotheses. Review of Economics and Statistics 73:301–308.
Soekijad, M. Andriessen. E. 2003.Conditions for knowledge sharing in competitive alliances[J]. European Management Journal. 21(5):578-587.
Nalebuff, B. Brandenburger. A. 1996. Co-opetition[M]. ISL Folag AB:Oskarshamn. Osborn RN, Denekamp JG, Duysters G, Baughn C.1998. Embedded patterns of international allianceformation. Organization Studies 19(4):617–638.
Poppo L, Zenger T. 2002. Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements? Strategic Management Journal 23(8):707–725.
Ryall MD, Sampson RC. 2003. Do prior alliances influencecontract structure? Evidence from technology alliance contracts. University of Maryland workingpaper.
Ryall MD, Sampson RC. 2003. Do prior alliances influence contract structure? Evidence from technology alliance contracts. University of Maryland workingpaper.
Simonin BL. 1997. The importance of collaborative know-how:an empirical test of the learning organization. Academy of Management Journal 40(5):1150–1175.
Tourneau. B. 2004. Co-opetition:An Alternative to Competition[J]. Journal of Healthcare Management. 49(2):81-83.
Williamson, O. E., 1993. Calculativeness, trust and economic organization. Journal of Law andEconomics, 36:221-270.
Zollo M, Reuer JJ, Singh H. 2002. Inter-organizationalroutines and performance in strategic alliances.Organization Science 13(6):701–713.
Zineldin. M. 2004.Co-opetition:the organization of the future[J]. Marketing Intelligence & Planning. 22(6/7):780-789.