经济欠发达地区农户信贷约束研究
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摘要
在我国农村,农户贷款难问题长期以来并未得到根本解决。由于农业生产通常规模小、经营分散,农业产值相对不高且受到自然因素的影响较大,这使得单个农户的经济实力较小,日常资金来源具有一定的不稳定性,资金积累能力差,信贷资金对农民的生产生活有着重要作用,而农户信贷需求的特性,难以符合以利润最大化为经营目标的农村正规金融机构防范信贷风险的要求,许多农户因此难以从正规金融机构获得信贷支持,无法完全满足其信贷意愿,形成了农户信贷约束。
为了加大正规金融机构信贷支农的力度,缓解农户从正规金融机构贷款难的问题,自2000年以来,以农村信用社为代表的农村正规金融机构逐步开展了小额贷款,通过信用评级等方法对农户发放小额信用贷款和农户联保贷款。那么在信用社实行了小额信贷后,农户信贷约束的现状如何?影响农户信贷约束的因素有哪些?针对这些问题,本文从理论和实证两个方面进行了分析。
本文第一章简介研究背景并提出研究问题后,第二章从信贷配给理论视角分析了信用社不愿放贷给农户的内在原因,认为信用社与农户之间的信息不对称是农户信贷约束的根源,抵押担保和信用评级是克服信息不对称的有效途径。当前信用社开展的小额信贷模式可以解决我国农村缺乏有效抵押的问题,有助于缓解农户信贷约束。
之后以江苏省睢宁县为例,在实地调查该县3个乡镇10个村近350户农户2007年期间生产、生活和信贷活动的大量数据基础上,实证分析了样本地区农户信贷约束的现状,以及影响农户信贷约束的因素。第三章对样本地区农户信贷约束的现状进行考察。在初步了解样本地区农户信贷活动特征的基础上,运用直接调查方法,统计分析了样本地区受到信贷约束的农户比例、信贷约束的类型和特征。发现在信用社实施了小额信用贷款和联保贷款之后,申请贷款的农户的信贷满足程度很高,但仍存在大量主动放弃申请信用社贷款的农户,即受到了“事前信贷约束”,他们放弃的原因主要是信用社的利率高,以及抵押担保要求形成了较高的相关交易成本；在各种信贷约束类型中,低收入农户均占了较大比例,说明样本地区小额贷款的实施能够满足大多数农户的信贷需求,但低收入农户依然是受到信贷约束的主要人群。
第四章分析农户信贷约束的影响因素。首先运用Heckman广义三阶段回归方程,初步分析了影响农户信贷约束发生概率的影响因素；之后在此基础上,估计了样本农户信贷需求缺口,量化了其信贷约束的程度；最后运用农户信贷需求缺口,回归分析了小额信贷对缓解农户信贷需求缺口的作用,发现与信用等级评定相关的反映农户还款能力的因素,以及信用社担保人要求因素对缓解农户信贷约束有着显著的正向作用,说明小额信贷的实施显著缓解了农户信贷约束。但低收入农户的信贷需求缺口仍然比其他收入水平农户的信贷需求缺口更大,小额信贷无法实现对最低收入农户的信贷支持,这与正规金融机构的商业化经营目标有关。
最后一章得出研究结论：信息不对称是导致农户信贷约束的根本原因,小额信贷可以在一定程度上缓解农户的信贷约束,但难以满足低收入农户的信贷需求。对此提出对策建议：拓展农户抵押担保的形式,成立农村信贷保险,加快完善民间金融组织的发展。
In China's rural areas, farmers'difficulties in accessing credit have not been solved for a long time. As a result of agricultural production is usually small in scale, decentralized operation, agricultural output is not high relative to natural factors, which makes credit funds play an important role in farmers' production and living because the source of funds have a certain instability and lack of capital accumulation for individual small farmers. However, the characteristics of farmers' demand for credit is difficult to comply with formal rural financial institutions'requirements on controlling credit risk, which is used to maximize profits for their business objective. Thus many farmers are difficult to obtain credit from formal rural financial institutions to fully meet their credit demand, then form credit constrained.
Since 2000, rural credit cooperatives, one of formal rural financial institutions to carry out microcredit, through the credit rating to ease the farmers' difficult in accessing credit from the formal financial institutions. How the status of farmers' credit constriction in China after carrying out microcredit? What are the factors affect farmers' credit constriction? To solve these problems, this paper based on credit rationing theory, theoretical analysis why the credit cooperatives do not want to supply the farmers loans first. And then take Sui-ning County, Jiangsu Province for example, gave an empirical analysis of the samples region's credit constriction status, as well as the impact of factors on credit constriction by investigating a large amount of data about production, life and lending activities in 2007 from nearly 350 households in 10 of villages in three countries.
Chapter I Introduce this paper studies and research background, then second chapter based on the perspective of credit rationing theory, analysis of why the credit cooperatives not have willing to lend to farmers, found that the inherent causes is the asymmetry information between the credit cooperatives and farmers, collateral and credit rating can overcome the information asymmetry, that is an effective tool to alleviate the credit constriction.
Chapter III inspected the credit constriction in samples region. Based on the use of direct survey methods, statistics through the questionnaire the proportion of households credit constrained, found that low-income households in the sample area is bound by the credit of the main crowd, and mostly take the initiative to give up bound to apply loans, high interest rates and high transaction costs is the main reason.
Chapter IV analyzes the impact factors of rural households' credit constriction. First of all, use of a broad three-stage Heckman regression equation, made a preliminary analysis of the impact of the credit constrained farmers probability of influencing factors; later on this basis, it is estimated that a sample of credit demand gap of farmers to quantify the extent of credit constraints; finally use of the gap of credit needs of farmers, analysis the impact of rural households credit constraint factors and found that the repayment ability of farmers and credit factors on collateral to ease credit constraints farmers have a significant positive role.
Came to the conclusion that the conclusions of the study:collateral help to overcome the information asymmetry between credit cooperatives and farmers and ease the credit constriction. Suggestions put forward last:to expand collateral modus and to speed up the development of private financial organizations.
为了加大正规金融机构信贷支农的力度,缓解农户从正规金融机构贷款难的问题,自2000年以来,以农村信用社为代表的农村正规金融机构逐步开展了小额贷款,通过信用评级等方法对农户发放小额信用贷款和农户联保贷款。那么在信用社实行了小额信贷后,农户信贷约束的现状如何?影响农户信贷约束的因素有哪些?针对这些问题,本文从理论和实证两个方面进行了分析。
本文第一章简介研究背景并提出研究问题后,第二章从信贷配给理论视角分析了信用社不愿放贷给农户的内在原因,认为信用社与农户之间的信息不对称是农户信贷约束的根源,抵押担保和信用评级是克服信息不对称的有效途径。当前信用社开展的小额信贷模式可以解决我国农村缺乏有效抵押的问题,有助于缓解农户信贷约束。
之后以江苏省睢宁县为例,在实地调查该县3个乡镇10个村近350户农户2007年期间生产、生活和信贷活动的大量数据基础上,实证分析了样本地区农户信贷约束的现状,以及影响农户信贷约束的因素。第三章对样本地区农户信贷约束的现状进行考察。在初步了解样本地区农户信贷活动特征的基础上,运用直接调查方法,统计分析了样本地区受到信贷约束的农户比例、信贷约束的类型和特征。发现在信用社实施了小额信用贷款和联保贷款之后,申请贷款的农户的信贷满足程度很高,但仍存在大量主动放弃申请信用社贷款的农户,即受到了“事前信贷约束”,他们放弃的原因主要是信用社的利率高,以及抵押担保要求形成了较高的相关交易成本；在各种信贷约束类型中,低收入农户均占了较大比例,说明样本地区小额贷款的实施能够满足大多数农户的信贷需求,但低收入农户依然是受到信贷约束的主要人群。
第四章分析农户信贷约束的影响因素。首先运用Heckman广义三阶段回归方程,初步分析了影响农户信贷约束发生概率的影响因素；之后在此基础上,估计了样本农户信贷需求缺口,量化了其信贷约束的程度；最后运用农户信贷需求缺口,回归分析了小额信贷对缓解农户信贷需求缺口的作用,发现与信用等级评定相关的反映农户还款能力的因素,以及信用社担保人要求因素对缓解农户信贷约束有着显著的正向作用,说明小额信贷的实施显著缓解了农户信贷约束。但低收入农户的信贷需求缺口仍然比其他收入水平农户的信贷需求缺口更大,小额信贷无法实现对最低收入农户的信贷支持,这与正规金融机构的商业化经营目标有关。
最后一章得出研究结论：信息不对称是导致农户信贷约束的根本原因,小额信贷可以在一定程度上缓解农户的信贷约束,但难以满足低收入农户的信贷需求。对此提出对策建议：拓展农户抵押担保的形式,成立农村信贷保险,加快完善民间金融组织的发展。
In China's rural areas, farmers'difficulties in accessing credit have not been solved for a long time. As a result of agricultural production is usually small in scale, decentralized operation, agricultural output is not high relative to natural factors, which makes credit funds play an important role in farmers' production and living because the source of funds have a certain instability and lack of capital accumulation for individual small farmers. However, the characteristics of farmers' demand for credit is difficult to comply with formal rural financial institutions'requirements on controlling credit risk, which is used to maximize profits for their business objective. Thus many farmers are difficult to obtain credit from formal rural financial institutions to fully meet their credit demand, then form credit constrained.
Since 2000, rural credit cooperatives, one of formal rural financial institutions to carry out microcredit, through the credit rating to ease the farmers' difficult in accessing credit from the formal financial institutions. How the status of farmers' credit constriction in China after carrying out microcredit? What are the factors affect farmers' credit constriction? To solve these problems, this paper based on credit rationing theory, theoretical analysis why the credit cooperatives do not want to supply the farmers loans first. And then take Sui-ning County, Jiangsu Province for example, gave an empirical analysis of the samples region's credit constriction status, as well as the impact of factors on credit constriction by investigating a large amount of data about production, life and lending activities in 2007 from nearly 350 households in 10 of villages in three countries.
Chapter I Introduce this paper studies and research background, then second chapter based on the perspective of credit rationing theory, analysis of why the credit cooperatives not have willing to lend to farmers, found that the inherent causes is the asymmetry information between the credit cooperatives and farmers, collateral and credit rating can overcome the information asymmetry, that is an effective tool to alleviate the credit constriction.
Chapter III inspected the credit constriction in samples region. Based on the use of direct survey methods, statistics through the questionnaire the proportion of households credit constrained, found that low-income households in the sample area is bound by the credit of the main crowd, and mostly take the initiative to give up bound to apply loans, high interest rates and high transaction costs is the main reason.
Chapter IV analyzes the impact factors of rural households' credit constriction. First of all, use of a broad three-stage Heckman regression equation, made a preliminary analysis of the impact of the credit constrained farmers probability of influencing factors; later on this basis, it is estimated that a sample of credit demand gap of farmers to quantify the extent of credit constraints; finally use of the gap of credit needs of farmers, analysis the impact of rural households credit constraint factors and found that the repayment ability of farmers and credit factors on collateral to ease credit constraints farmers have a significant positive role.
Came to the conclusion that the conclusions of the study:collateral help to overcome the information asymmetry between credit cooperatives and farmers and ease the credit constriction. Suggestions put forward last:to expand collateral modus and to speed up the development of private financial organizations.
引文
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