商业银行公司治理视角下的风险行为研究
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摘要
银行作为现代金融体系中的重要部门一直受到广泛的关注。特别是近年来,随着金融的创新和金融管制的放松,全球银行业竞争的加剧,各银行为了增加自己的市场份额,提高自己的利润,不断提高自己的经营管理水平。但与此同时,竞争侵蚀了市场力量和垄断利润,这样就可能增加银行的风险行为倾向,从而使银行乃至整个银行业面临更大的风险。银行风险的加大很可能导致银行的倒闭,倒闭不仅具有多米诺骨牌效应,一家银行倒闭可能引发其他银行的问题,或者使公众对整个银行系统失去信心,而且会冲击经济中的其他生产部门,引起经营萎缩。所以,研究银行的风险行为就显得很有必要。
近年来有大量金融学文献试图解释金融中介机构的风险行为并为之定性,由于控制银行业风险行为直接关系储蓄者及整个金融体系的安全,更重要地是,银行股东与储蓄者利益明显有冲突,前者期望由高风险来增加股票价值,其代价就是储蓄者的利益受损,因此,研究这一主题具有重要的经济、金融意义。
本文从公司治理视角研究银行的风险行为。国外学者研究银行风险行为从很早就开始了,而我国是近年才开始研究商业银行公司治理的问题,而研究银行风险行为的更少。本文便试图从公司治理视角来探索商业银行风险行为的深层原理,找出适合我国商业银行风险监管的治理机制。第一部分研究商业银行公司治理与银行风险行为的理论基础,第二、三部分是论文主体,研究商业银行公司治理结构及模式与银行风险行为的关系,其中第二部分主要介绍商业银行公司治理结构与银行风险行为的关系,商业银行公司治理结构包括股权结构与债权结构,本文分别讨论了两者与银行风险行为的关系,公司治理结构如何影响银行决策者承担风险的行为。首先,商业银行多元投资的所有者,即那些个人财富的大部分并未投资于银行的投资者,相较于债权人与非持股经理人,他们倾向于更高的银行风险。正如在有限责任公司中一样,多元投资所有者在从债权人与储户募集资金之后,有增加银行风险的激励(Galai与Masulis,1976; Esty,1998)。同时,那些具有银行业人力资本专业技能与个人控制权益的银行经理人比没有这些技能与个人利益的股东更倾向于较少的风险承担(Jensen与Meckling,1976; Demesetz与Lehn, 1985; Kane,1985).从这个角度说,如果银行所有权结构赋予分散化所有者权利,那么该银行会冒更大风险,而所有者的治理作用较受约束的银行的冒险行为较少。
第二,理论认为监管对多元投资所有者风险行为的激励的影响不同于对债权人与非股东经理人的影响。例如,储蓄保险会增强股东冒险的能力与激励(Merton,1977; Keeley,1990).储蓄保险对所有者的这种冒更大风险的激励,并不一定对非股东经理人起作用。再如资本监管,资本监管的目的之一是通过要求所有者以更多个人财富承担银行风险来达到减少冒险动机(Kim与Santomero,1994)。然而,资本监管并不需要减少控股股东的冒险激励。确切地说,虽然资本监管可能会促使银行提高资本金,但并不需要控股股东投资更多个人财富。事实上,资本监管可能会增加风险行为。所有者可以通过选择更高风险的投资组合来弥补严格资本要求的效益损失(Koehn与Santomero,1980; Buser等人,1981),结果是加剧所有者与经理人对银行风险承担的矛盾。许多国家试图通过限制银行从事非借贷活动,比如证券与保险承销,来减少银行冒险行为(Boyd等人,1998)。然而由于资本监管的要求,这些限制可能减少银行给股东的回报,更加剧了所有者的冒险激励。因此,监管对风险的影响取决于各家银行治理结构中所有者的相对权利。
第三,公司治理理论表明所有者结构与股东保护法规对所有者影响银行风险行为的能力起作用(Jensen与Meckling,1976)。Shleifer与Vishny(1986)则认为,相比小股东来说,有较大投票权与现金流权的股东相应地具有较大权利与决定公司行为的激励。股东保护法规也影响股东调整银行风险的能力。除了赋予股权所有者权利外,有效的股东保护法规会减少需要大股东消除代理问题的需求(Shleifer与Wolfenzon,2002 John等人,2000;Castro等人,2004)。根据这种理论,有了有效的股东保护法规,在决定公司经济行为的过程中,大股东的作用便不那么重要。
第三部分主要介绍商业银行公司治理模式,及其与银行风险行为的关系。拥有较大现金流权的大股东偏好增加银行风险,但是所有者结构与风险行为的关系取决于大股东对企业的管理,投资者保护,以及监管的作用；对小股东有效的法律保护可以减轻所有权集中对银行风险的影响；当大股东也是具备丰富人力资本与私人控制利益,且与银行效益紧密相联的管理者时,银行的风险会有所下降。因此,内部治理模式是可行的。
第四部分主要阐释当前我国商业银行公司治理面对的问题,针对此问题,提出合理建议,最后是对全文的总结。
商业银行风险行为时一个内涵广泛的课题,本文所做的研究仅仅是从公司治理角度进行初步的、探索性的研究。而且受资料、时间和研究能力的限制,一些观点可能并不完善,甚至可能有偏差,但无论如何,本文的研究对目前我国商业银行风险行为的理论体系的完善,仍具有诸多理论与实践意义。
As one of the important sectors of modern financial system, bank has been given widespread attention. Especially in recent years, as the financial innovation and deregulation, increased competition in the global banking industry, banks continue to improve their management level to increase their market share and profit. At the same time, competition erodes market power and monopoly profits, so banks may more tend to the risk taking, banks and the whole banking sector face greater risk. Increasing the risk of banks is likely to lead to closure of a bank failure not only have a domino effect. Bank failure may lead to other banking problems, or make the public lose confidence in the entire banking system, and will impact on other productive sectors in the economy, causing shrinkage of operations. Therefore, the study risk taking of banks becomes necessary.
Recent years, a large number of finance literature trying to explain the taking of financial intermediaries and to whom the risk of qualitative control of the banking sector due to the direct relationship between risk taking and depositors the security of the entire financial system and, more importantly, the interest of shareholders and the depositors clearly conflict, the former expected to increase by a high-risk value of the stock, its price is jeopardize the interests of depositors, therefore, to study this subject has important economic and financial sense.
This article is from the perspective of corporate governance to study bank risk taking. While foreign scholars studied the bank risk taking from the very early beginning, our country in recent years begun to explore the commercial banks, corporate governance issues, and researches of bank risk taking are more less. This paper attempt to explore from the perspective of corporate governance, commercial banks, the underlying principles of risk taking, identify the risk for China's commercial banks regulatory governance. The first part of the study of commercial banks, corporate governance and bank risk taking theoretical basis, the second and third part is the main thesis to study the commercial banks, corporate governance structure and mode of the relationship with the bank risk taking. The second describes some of the major commercial banks, corporate governance structure and the relationship between bank risk taking, commercial banks corporate governance structure, including ownership structure and debt structure, and this paper, the discussion of both the relationship with the bank risk taking, corporate governance structure, how they affect the decision-making which determines the banks risk taking.
Part three focuses on commercial banks, corporate governance model, and its relationship with the bank risk taking. Have a larger cash flow preference shareholders the right to increase bank risk, but the ownership structure and risk taking depends on the relationship between the major shareholder of the enterprise management, investor protection, and regulatory role; right to effective legal protection of minority shareholders can be reduced concentration of ownership on bank risks; when the largest shareholder is also a wealth of human capital and the interests of private control, and efficiency are closely linked with the bank manager, the bank's risk will decline. Therefore, the internal governance model is feasible.
The fourth part are about some of the major problems of our country commercial banks such as corporate governance. How to tackle this problem, put forward reasonable proposals, the last is the summary of full text.
Commercial bank risk taking is a connotation of a wide range of topics, this study has done just from the perspective of corporate governance preliminary, exploratory study. By the data, time and research capacity constraints, some views may not be perfect, and even there may be bias, but in any case, this paper studies on the current risk takings of China's commercial banks to the improvement of the theoretical system still has many theoretical and practical significance.
近年来有大量金融学文献试图解释金融中介机构的风险行为并为之定性,由于控制银行业风险行为直接关系储蓄者及整个金融体系的安全,更重要地是,银行股东与储蓄者利益明显有冲突,前者期望由高风险来增加股票价值,其代价就是储蓄者的利益受损,因此,研究这一主题具有重要的经济、金融意义。
本文从公司治理视角研究银行的风险行为。国外学者研究银行风险行为从很早就开始了,而我国是近年才开始研究商业银行公司治理的问题,而研究银行风险行为的更少。本文便试图从公司治理视角来探索商业银行风险行为的深层原理,找出适合我国商业银行风险监管的治理机制。第一部分研究商业银行公司治理与银行风险行为的理论基础,第二、三部分是论文主体,研究商业银行公司治理结构及模式与银行风险行为的关系,其中第二部分主要介绍商业银行公司治理结构与银行风险行为的关系,商业银行公司治理结构包括股权结构与债权结构,本文分别讨论了两者与银行风险行为的关系,公司治理结构如何影响银行决策者承担风险的行为。首先,商业银行多元投资的所有者,即那些个人财富的大部分并未投资于银行的投资者,相较于债权人与非持股经理人,他们倾向于更高的银行风险。正如在有限责任公司中一样,多元投资所有者在从债权人与储户募集资金之后,有增加银行风险的激励(Galai与Masulis,1976; Esty,1998)。同时,那些具有银行业人力资本专业技能与个人控制权益的银行经理人比没有这些技能与个人利益的股东更倾向于较少的风险承担(Jensen与Meckling,1976; Demesetz与Lehn, 1985; Kane,1985).从这个角度说,如果银行所有权结构赋予分散化所有者权利,那么该银行会冒更大风险,而所有者的治理作用较受约束的银行的冒险行为较少。
第二,理论认为监管对多元投资所有者风险行为的激励的影响不同于对债权人与非股东经理人的影响。例如,储蓄保险会增强股东冒险的能力与激励(Merton,1977; Keeley,1990).储蓄保险对所有者的这种冒更大风险的激励,并不一定对非股东经理人起作用。再如资本监管,资本监管的目的之一是通过要求所有者以更多个人财富承担银行风险来达到减少冒险动机(Kim与Santomero,1994)。然而,资本监管并不需要减少控股股东的冒险激励。确切地说,虽然资本监管可能会促使银行提高资本金,但并不需要控股股东投资更多个人财富。事实上,资本监管可能会增加风险行为。所有者可以通过选择更高风险的投资组合来弥补严格资本要求的效益损失(Koehn与Santomero,1980; Buser等人,1981),结果是加剧所有者与经理人对银行风险承担的矛盾。许多国家试图通过限制银行从事非借贷活动,比如证券与保险承销,来减少银行冒险行为(Boyd等人,1998)。然而由于资本监管的要求,这些限制可能减少银行给股东的回报,更加剧了所有者的冒险激励。因此,监管对风险的影响取决于各家银行治理结构中所有者的相对权利。
第三,公司治理理论表明所有者结构与股东保护法规对所有者影响银行风险行为的能力起作用(Jensen与Meckling,1976)。Shleifer与Vishny(1986)则认为,相比小股东来说,有较大投票权与现金流权的股东相应地具有较大权利与决定公司行为的激励。股东保护法规也影响股东调整银行风险的能力。除了赋予股权所有者权利外,有效的股东保护法规会减少需要大股东消除代理问题的需求(Shleifer与Wolfenzon,2002 John等人,2000;Castro等人,2004)。根据这种理论,有了有效的股东保护法规,在决定公司经济行为的过程中,大股东的作用便不那么重要。
第三部分主要介绍商业银行公司治理模式,及其与银行风险行为的关系。拥有较大现金流权的大股东偏好增加银行风险,但是所有者结构与风险行为的关系取决于大股东对企业的管理,投资者保护,以及监管的作用；对小股东有效的法律保护可以减轻所有权集中对银行风险的影响；当大股东也是具备丰富人力资本与私人控制利益,且与银行效益紧密相联的管理者时,银行的风险会有所下降。因此,内部治理模式是可行的。
第四部分主要阐释当前我国商业银行公司治理面对的问题,针对此问题,提出合理建议,最后是对全文的总结。
商业银行风险行为时一个内涵广泛的课题,本文所做的研究仅仅是从公司治理角度进行初步的、探索性的研究。而且受资料、时间和研究能力的限制,一些观点可能并不完善,甚至可能有偏差,但无论如何,本文的研究对目前我国商业银行风险行为的理论体系的完善,仍具有诸多理论与实践意义。
As one of the important sectors of modern financial system, bank has been given widespread attention. Especially in recent years, as the financial innovation and deregulation, increased competition in the global banking industry, banks continue to improve their management level to increase their market share and profit. At the same time, competition erodes market power and monopoly profits, so banks may more tend to the risk taking, banks and the whole banking sector face greater risk. Increasing the risk of banks is likely to lead to closure of a bank failure not only have a domino effect. Bank failure may lead to other banking problems, or make the public lose confidence in the entire banking system, and will impact on other productive sectors in the economy, causing shrinkage of operations. Therefore, the study risk taking of banks becomes necessary.
Recent years, a large number of finance literature trying to explain the taking of financial intermediaries and to whom the risk of qualitative control of the banking sector due to the direct relationship between risk taking and depositors the security of the entire financial system and, more importantly, the interest of shareholders and the depositors clearly conflict, the former expected to increase by a high-risk value of the stock, its price is jeopardize the interests of depositors, therefore, to study this subject has important economic and financial sense.
This article is from the perspective of corporate governance to study bank risk taking. While foreign scholars studied the bank risk taking from the very early beginning, our country in recent years begun to explore the commercial banks, corporate governance issues, and researches of bank risk taking are more less. This paper attempt to explore from the perspective of corporate governance, commercial banks, the underlying principles of risk taking, identify the risk for China's commercial banks regulatory governance. The first part of the study of commercial banks, corporate governance and bank risk taking theoretical basis, the second and third part is the main thesis to study the commercial banks, corporate governance structure and mode of the relationship with the bank risk taking. The second describes some of the major commercial banks, corporate governance structure and the relationship between bank risk taking, commercial banks corporate governance structure, including ownership structure and debt structure, and this paper, the discussion of both the relationship with the bank risk taking, corporate governance structure, how they affect the decision-making which determines the banks risk taking.
Part three focuses on commercial banks, corporate governance model, and its relationship with the bank risk taking. Have a larger cash flow preference shareholders the right to increase bank risk, but the ownership structure and risk taking depends on the relationship between the major shareholder of the enterprise management, investor protection, and regulatory role; right to effective legal protection of minority shareholders can be reduced concentration of ownership on bank risks; when the largest shareholder is also a wealth of human capital and the interests of private control, and efficiency are closely linked with the bank manager, the bank's risk will decline. Therefore, the internal governance model is feasible.
The fourth part are about some of the major problems of our country commercial banks such as corporate governance. How to tackle this problem, put forward reasonable proposals, the last is the summary of full text.
Commercial bank risk taking is a connotation of a wide range of topics, this study has done just from the perspective of corporate governance preliminary, exploratory study. By the data, time and research capacity constraints, some views may not be perfect, and even there may be bias, but in any case, this paper studies on the current risk takings of China's commercial banks to the improvement of the theoretical system still has many theoretical and practical significance.
引文
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30 Crespi, R., M.A. Garcia-Cestona,& V. Salas,2004, Governance machanisms in Spanish banks:Does ownership matter?, Journal of Banking and Finance.
31 Gorton, G.& R. Rosen,1995, Corporate Control, Portfolio Choice, and the Decline of Banking, Journal of Finance.
32 Houston, J. F.& C. James,1995, CEO Compensation and Bank Risk Is Compensation in Banking Structured to Promote Risk Taking? Journal of Monetary Economics.
33 Kane, E.J.1988, The S&L Insurance Mess:How Did It Happen?Washington, D.C.:The Urban Institute Press.
34 Prowse, S. D.1995, Alternative Methods of Corporate Control in Commercial Banks, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Review.
35 Saunders, A., E. Strock,& N. G. Travlos,1990, Ownership Structure, Deregulation, and Bank Risk Taking, Journal of Finance.
36 Boyd, J. et al., "Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited:New Theory and New Evidence", IMF RWP No.297, Washington D.C.,2006.
37 Gruben, W.C. et al., "Financial Liberalization, Market Discipline and Bank Risk", RWP FRB Dallas,2005,
38 Hirtle, B., "Public Disclosure, Risk, and Performance at Bank Holding Companies", FRB New York, Staff Report No.23, July 2007,
39 T.F.Hellmann, K.C.Murdock, J.E.Stiglitz, Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudenticl Regulation:Are Capital Requirements Enough? American Economic Review,2000.
40 D.W. Diamond, R. Rajan, A Theory of Bank Capital, Journal of Finance, 2000
41 Black, F., M. H. Miller and R. A. Posner, An Approach to the Regulation of Bank Holding Companies, Journal of Business,1978.
42 Kohen, M. and A. M. Santomero, Regulation of Bank Capital and Portfolio Risk, Journal of Finance,1980.
43 Sharpe, W. F.. Bank Capital Adequacy, Deposit Insurance and Security Values, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1978.
44 Kim, D. and A. M. Santomero, Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation, Journal of Finance,1988.
45 Furlong, F. T. and M. C. Keeley, Capital Regulation and Bank Risk-Taking:a Note, Journal of Banking and Finance,1989.
46 Keeley, M. C. and F. T. Furlong, A Reexamination of Mean-Variance Analysis of Bank Capital Regulation, Journal of Banking & Finance,1990.
47 Shrieves, R. and D. Dahl, The Relationship between Risk and Capital in Commercial Banks, Journal of Banking and Finance,1992.
48 Jacques, K. and P. Nigro, Risk-Based Capital, Portfolio Risk, and Bank Capital:a Simultaneous Equations Approach, Journal of Economics and Business,1997.
49 Konishi, M. and Y. Yasuda,Factors Affecting Bank Risk Taking:Evidence from Japan, Journal of Banking and Finance,2004.
50 Ennis, H. M. and H. S. Malek,Bank Risk of Failure and the Too-Big-To-Fail Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quaterly,2005.
51 Anthony Saunders, Elizabeth Strock, Nickolaosg Travos,ownership structure, deregulation, and bank risk-taking[J] Journal of Finance,1990.
52 Ronald C. Anderson, Donald R. Fraser, Corporate control, bank risk taking, and the health of the banking industry[J]. Journal of Banking& Finance, 2000.
53 Chen, C., Steiner, T., Whyte, A., Risk-taking behavior and management ownership in depositors institutions [J]. Journal of Financial Research,1998.
54吴俊,等,中国经济转型期商业银行资本与风险行为研究[J].财经研究,2008.
55 李维安、曹廷求：《股权结构、治理机制与城市银行绩效——来自山东、河南两省的调查证据》,《经济研究》2004年第12期.
56 Galai, D. and R. Masulis, The Option Pricing Model and the Risk Factor of Stock, Journal of Financial Economics,1976.
57 Esty, B., The Impact of Contingent Liability on Commercial Bank Risk Taking, Journal of Financial Economics,1998.
58 Jensen, M. and W. Meckling. Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics,1976.
59 Demsetz, H. and K. Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, Journal of Political Economy,1985.
60Kane, E., The Gathering Crisis in Federal Deposit Insurance, Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press,1985.
61 Keeley, M., Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking, American Economic Review,1990.
62 Kim, D. and A. Santomero,Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation, Journal of Finance,1994.
63 Koehn, M. and A. Santomero, Regulation of Bank Capital and Portfolio Risk, Journal of Finance,1980.
64 Merton, R., An Analytical Derivation of the Cost of Deposit Insurance and Loan Guarantees:An Application of Modern Option Pricing Theory, Journal of Banking and Finance,1977.
65 Buser, S., A. Chen, and E. Kane, Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Policy, and Optimal Bank Capital, Journal of Finance,1981.
66 Boyd, J., C. Chang, and B.D. Smith, Moral Hazard under Commercial and Universal Banking, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,1998.
67 Castro, R., G. Clementi, G. MacDonald, Investor Protection, Optimal Incentives, and Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics,2004.
68 Jensen, M. and W. Meckling. Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics,1976.
69 Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy,1986.
70 Shleifer, A. and D. Wolfenzon, Investor Protection and Equity Markets, Journal of Financial Economics,2002.
71 John, K., A. Saunders, and L.W. Senbet, A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation, Review of Financial Studies,2000.
72 Berle and Means现代公司与私有财产,1933
73 何玉长,国有公司产权结构与治理结构,上海：上海财经出版社,1997.
74 Allen,F., and D. Gale,Understanding Financial Crises, Oxford University Press,2007.
75 Allen, F., and D. Gale, Asset price bubbles and monetary policy,in Global Governance and Financial Crises ed. by M. Desai and Y. Said,2004.
76 Adrian, T. and H. Shin,Money. Liquidity and Monetary Policy, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, forthcoming,2009.
77 Brunnermeier, M., A. Crockett, C. Goodhart, A. Persaud and H.Shin, The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation,Geneva Report 11,2009.
78 Shin, H., Risk and liquidity, the 2008 Clarendon Lectures in Finance, forthcoming, Oxford University Press,2009.
2潘敏：《商业银行公司治理：一个基于银行业特征的理论分析》《金融研究》2006(3)
3夏秋、黄荣冬：《商业银行公司治理的特殊性及其政策含义》,《社会经济体制比较》2005(1)
4吴俊,康继军,张宗益：《中国经济转型期商业银行资本与风险行为研究——兼论巴塞尔协议在我国的实施效果》,《财经研究》2008
5张维,王志强：《商业银行治理与贷款选择行为》,《天津师范大学学报》2007
7 J. P. Niinimaki, Does collateral fuel moral hazard in banking? Journal of Banking & Finance,2009
6 Giuliano Iannotta,Giacomo Nocera,Andrea Siron.i Ownership structure, risk and performance in the European banking industry. Journal of Banking& Finance,2007.
11 Furlong, Keely. Capital regulation and bank risk-taking:a note. Journal of Banking and Finance,1989
10 Vicente Salasa, Jesus Saurina. Deregulation, market power and risk behaviour in Spanish banks.European Economic Review,2003
8 Teresa Garcia-Marcoa,M.Dolores RoblesFernandez. Risk-taking behaviour and ownership in the banking industry:The Spanish evidence. Journal of Economics and Business,2007.
9 Masaru Konishi Yukihiro Yasuda, Factors affecting bank risk- taking: Evidence from Japan. Journal of Banking & Finance,2004
12 Anthony Saunders, Elizabeth Strock, Nickolaosg. Travlos, Ownership structure, deregulation, and bank risk-taking. Journal of Finance.1990
13 Barth. J. R., G. Caprio, R Levine. Bank regulation and supervision:What works best? Journal of Financial Intermediation,2004.
14 Sharpe. Bank capital adequacy, deposit insurance and security values. Journal of Finance and QuantitativeAnalysis,1978
15 Berle Adolf and Gardiner Means.The Modern Corporation and Private Property[J]. MacMillan,1932
16 林松：《论国有商业银行公司治理的模式选择》,《南方金融》,2009
17 吴治成：《股份制商业银行公司治理结构存在的问题和完善措施研究》,《当代经济》,2007
18 王玉香,王海星：《关于完善股份制商业银行公司治理及其风险防范的研究》,《中国商界》,2009
19谢志华：《内部控制、公司治理、风险管理：关系与整合》,《会计研究》2007
20蒋建华、陆桂琴：《我国国有股份制商业银行公司治理机制探究》,《南京社会科学》2007年
21 李斌,李淼：《国有商业银行公司治理与内部控制研究》,《财会通讯》,2009
22 张立君：《论企业利益相关者共同治理》,上海财经大学出版社,2008
23 袁宜：《商业银行的公司治理——特殊性与治理安排》,社会科学文献出版社,2008
24 叶雪飞：《基于利益相关者理论的商业银行公司治理研究》,《科技经济市场》,2009
25 Adams, R.& H. Mehran,2003, Is corporate governance different for bank holding companies?, Economic Policy Review.
26 Allen,L.& A.S.Cebenoyan,1991, Bank Acquisition and Ownership Structure; Theory and Evidence. Journal of Banking and Finance
27 Barth, J.R.1991, The Great Savings and Loan Debate, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press.
28 Caprio,G.& R. Levine,2002, Corporate Governance in Finance; Concepts and Internantional Observations.
29 Crawford,A.J.. J.R.Ezzel,& J.A. Miles,1995, Bank CEO pay-performance relations and the effects of deregulation, Journal of Business.
30 Crespi, R., M.A. Garcia-Cestona,& V. Salas,2004, Governance machanisms in Spanish banks:Does ownership matter?, Journal of Banking and Finance.
31 Gorton, G.& R. Rosen,1995, Corporate Control, Portfolio Choice, and the Decline of Banking, Journal of Finance.
32 Houston, J. F.& C. James,1995, CEO Compensation and Bank Risk Is Compensation in Banking Structured to Promote Risk Taking? Journal of Monetary Economics.
33 Kane, E.J.1988, The S&L Insurance Mess:How Did It Happen?Washington, D.C.:The Urban Institute Press.
34 Prowse, S. D.1995, Alternative Methods of Corporate Control in Commercial Banks, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Review.
35 Saunders, A., E. Strock,& N. G. Travlos,1990, Ownership Structure, Deregulation, and Bank Risk Taking, Journal of Finance.
36 Boyd, J. et al., "Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited:New Theory and New Evidence", IMF RWP No.297, Washington D.C.,2006.
37 Gruben, W.C. et al., "Financial Liberalization, Market Discipline and Bank Risk", RWP FRB Dallas,2005,
38 Hirtle, B., "Public Disclosure, Risk, and Performance at Bank Holding Companies", FRB New York, Staff Report No.23, July 2007,
39 T.F.Hellmann, K.C.Murdock, J.E.Stiglitz, Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudenticl Regulation:Are Capital Requirements Enough? American Economic Review,2000.
40 D.W. Diamond, R. Rajan, A Theory of Bank Capital, Journal of Finance, 2000
41 Black, F., M. H. Miller and R. A. Posner, An Approach to the Regulation of Bank Holding Companies, Journal of Business,1978.
42 Kohen, M. and A. M. Santomero, Regulation of Bank Capital and Portfolio Risk, Journal of Finance,1980.
43 Sharpe, W. F.. Bank Capital Adequacy, Deposit Insurance and Security Values, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1978.
44 Kim, D. and A. M. Santomero, Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation, Journal of Finance,1988.
45 Furlong, F. T. and M. C. Keeley, Capital Regulation and Bank Risk-Taking:a Note, Journal of Banking and Finance,1989.
46 Keeley, M. C. and F. T. Furlong, A Reexamination of Mean-Variance Analysis of Bank Capital Regulation, Journal of Banking & Finance,1990.
47 Shrieves, R. and D. Dahl, The Relationship between Risk and Capital in Commercial Banks, Journal of Banking and Finance,1992.
48 Jacques, K. and P. Nigro, Risk-Based Capital, Portfolio Risk, and Bank Capital:a Simultaneous Equations Approach, Journal of Economics and Business,1997.
49 Konishi, M. and Y. Yasuda,Factors Affecting Bank Risk Taking:Evidence from Japan, Journal of Banking and Finance,2004.
50 Ennis, H. M. and H. S. Malek,Bank Risk of Failure and the Too-Big-To-Fail Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quaterly,2005.
51 Anthony Saunders, Elizabeth Strock, Nickolaosg Travos,ownership structure, deregulation, and bank risk-taking[J] Journal of Finance,1990.
52 Ronald C. Anderson, Donald R. Fraser, Corporate control, bank risk taking, and the health of the banking industry[J]. Journal of Banking& Finance, 2000.
53 Chen, C., Steiner, T., Whyte, A., Risk-taking behavior and management ownership in depositors institutions [J]. Journal of Financial Research,1998.
54吴俊,等,中国经济转型期商业银行资本与风险行为研究[J].财经研究,2008.
55 李维安、曹廷求：《股权结构、治理机制与城市银行绩效——来自山东、河南两省的调查证据》,《经济研究》2004年第12期.
56 Galai, D. and R. Masulis, The Option Pricing Model and the Risk Factor of Stock, Journal of Financial Economics,1976.
57 Esty, B., The Impact of Contingent Liability on Commercial Bank Risk Taking, Journal of Financial Economics,1998.
58 Jensen, M. and W. Meckling. Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics,1976.
59 Demsetz, H. and K. Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, Journal of Political Economy,1985.
60Kane, E., The Gathering Crisis in Federal Deposit Insurance, Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press,1985.
61 Keeley, M., Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking, American Economic Review,1990.
62 Kim, D. and A. Santomero,Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation, Journal of Finance,1994.
63 Koehn, M. and A. Santomero, Regulation of Bank Capital and Portfolio Risk, Journal of Finance,1980.
64 Merton, R., An Analytical Derivation of the Cost of Deposit Insurance and Loan Guarantees:An Application of Modern Option Pricing Theory, Journal of Banking and Finance,1977.
65 Buser, S., A. Chen, and E. Kane, Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Policy, and Optimal Bank Capital, Journal of Finance,1981.
66 Boyd, J., C. Chang, and B.D. Smith, Moral Hazard under Commercial and Universal Banking, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,1998.
67 Castro, R., G. Clementi, G. MacDonald, Investor Protection, Optimal Incentives, and Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics,2004.
68 Jensen, M. and W. Meckling. Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics,1976.
69 Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy,1986.
70 Shleifer, A. and D. Wolfenzon, Investor Protection and Equity Markets, Journal of Financial Economics,2002.
71 John, K., A. Saunders, and L.W. Senbet, A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation, Review of Financial Studies,2000.
72 Berle and Means现代公司与私有财产,1933
73 何玉长,国有公司产权结构与治理结构,上海：上海财经出版社,1997.
74 Allen,F., and D. Gale,Understanding Financial Crises, Oxford University Press,2007.
75 Allen, F., and D. Gale, Asset price bubbles and monetary policy,in Global Governance and Financial Crises ed. by M. Desai and Y. Said,2004.
76 Adrian, T. and H. Shin,Money. Liquidity and Monetary Policy, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, forthcoming,2009.
77 Brunnermeier, M., A. Crockett, C. Goodhart, A. Persaud and H.Shin, The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation,Geneva Report 11,2009.
78 Shin, H., Risk and liquidity, the 2008 Clarendon Lectures in Finance, forthcoming, Oxford University Press,2009.