网络交易中定价方式的选择
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摘要
作为网络交易中主要的两种定价方式，网络拍卖和固定价格各有优势。网络拍卖是由买家自主定价的，它可以把商品配置给估价最高的消费者，并使买卖双方在拍卖过程中获得更多的信息。固定价格交易由卖方定价，其主要优势在于进一步节约了交易成本。
在网络交易广泛使用和交易网站迅速发展的潮流中，以eBay和淘宝为代表的平台网站占据了重要的地位。这类网站自身并不拥有商品，而只是促使在其平台上的众多买家和卖家达成交易，因此会涉及到各种交易方式的应用。而在这一方面，这两个最重要的平台网站呈现出了截然不同的局面：eBay初建时，所有商品都是通过拍卖交易的，但在2010年eBay的总成交额中，固定价格占比已经超过了55%；而曾经全部使用固定价格交易的淘宝网，近年来拍卖的使用频率不断上升，在某些类别商品中活跃程度甚至超过了固定价格交易。这种“相向而行”的趋势向我们提出了这样的问题：在网络交易中，网络拍卖和固定价格使用的分界何在？或者说，是什么因素决定了商品应该采用哪一种交易方式？
本文在现有网络拍卖理论的基础上，立足于卖方因素的考量，兼顾买方的行为特征，从商品的交易属性出发，采用拍卖理论、博弈论、产业组织理论与计量分析相结合的研究方法，对网络拍卖和固定价格两种交易方式进行对比，提出了商品适宜何种定价方式的判断依据。
本文的主要工作与研究成果归纳如下：
（1）以eBay和淘宝为代表，列举平台类网站上交易方式的使用情况，发掘其中存在的一些典型现象。比如存在大量同质商品固定价格交易或价格较为极端的商品都很少通过拍卖交易，而二手商品、瑕疵商品或消费者偏好有较大差异的商品往往存在活跃的拍卖交易等。根据这些现象，本文提出对卖家定价方式选择有重要影响的商品交易属性的假设，包括价格参照性、质量不确定性和价格水平，作为文章分析的基础。
（2）基于卖家的风险态度和交易成本，分别在卖家单独使用一种定价方式交易商品和同时存在两种定价方式销售同质商品的情况下，对比了网络拍卖和固定价格卖家的期望收益，以此判断卖家将选择哪一种定价方式。
不同的卖家风险态度下，考虑商品成功出售的概率时，风险中性的卖家会选择通过网络拍卖交易商品。消费者人数有限时，风险厌恶的卖家选择网络拍卖，风险偏好的卖家选择固定价格交易；但如果消费者人数足够多，所有卖家都将倾向于选择网络拍卖，只是对于风险厌恶的卖家来说，两种定价方式所带来的收益非常接近。在交易成本方面，文章考虑了卖家的时间成本和固定成本，这时卖家一般会选择固定价格交易。但当消费者人数较少时，随着卖家时间成本的升高，拍卖的收益会更接近固定价格。
而网站中同时存在两种交易方式销售同质商品时，无论交易商品的数量多少以及销售渠道的提供方是否一致，只要所有消费者知道同质商品的固定价格水平，卖家都会选择固定价格交易。
（3）将提炼出的三个关键商品交易属性——价格参照性、质量不确定性和价格水平，逐步引入上述模型，以分析不同属性的商品所适宜采用的交易方式。
价格参照性反映的是竞拍者在出价前搜索到同质或同类商品的固定价格信息作为参考的难度，价格参照性越高，搜索到的难度越小。文章在多物品拍卖的一般模型和单物品拍卖的特例下，分析了价格参照性的作用。商品的价格参照性越高，卖家越应该选择固定价格交易，网络拍卖只适合于低价格参照性的商品。此外，对于消费者来说，只有在商品价格参照性较低时，获得更多的信息才能增加其剩余。
而后文章放宽消费者明确知道商品质量的假设，来讨论由网络交易中较为严重的信息不对称问题所导致的质量不确定性的影响。首先，在消费者估价基于其私人偏好的条件下，文章构建了包含质量不确定性和价格水平影响的消费者效用函数，来对比使用不同定价方式下的卖家收益。结论是商品质量不确定性越高，卖家越应该选择拍卖交易，价格水平的上升会加剧质量不确定性的作用。而后讨论了存在同类商品作为参照的情况，这时商品的质量不确定性降低，高价商品由原先适合拍卖交易变为适合固定价格交易，低价商品由只能使用固定价格交易才有正利润变为可以使用拍卖交易。但若买家的估价完全取决于商品相对于同类参照商品的质量及其波动程度，则质量不确定性越高，固定价格交易就更为有利。
（4）通过eBay交易数据进行经验分析，以验证在商品交易属性方面的研究结论。
文章先以某种商品固定价格卖家数量占同种商品拍卖和固定价格卖家总数的比例来刻画商品的价格参照性，对eBay网上八大类主要商品的交易数据进行了整体回归，验证价格参照性的作用。其次，在服饰和珠宝这两类消费者估价主要基于私人偏好的商品中，以是否知名品牌来划分商品质量不确定性的高低，通过数据分析，比较不同商品质量不确定性下，网络拍卖和固定价格卖家的相对收益。然后在消费者估价基于商品相对同类参照商品质量波动程度的假设下，对数码科技类二手商品的交易数据进行了回归分析。三个部分的经验研究都证实了理论研究的结论。
本文的主要创新点如下：
（1）构建了基于卖家风险态度和交易成本的网络拍卖与固定价格交易比较模型。
现有网络拍卖的研究，侧重于买家的行为特征，而相对忽略了作为定价方式选择者的卖方因素的影响。本文除描述买家行为外，在模型中加入了卖家的风险态度和交易成本因素，来对比采用不同定价方式的卖家收益。在不考虑卖方因素时，如果单独使用一种定价方式交易商品，拍卖作为一种可以将商品售予估价最高的消费者的交易方式，一般会带给卖家更高的收益。而考虑卖家的交易成本和风险态度后，可以得到在不同的消费者数量下，不同风险态度的卖家面临不同的交易成本时，固定价格交易的期望收益可能超过拍卖的条件。其中卖家单位时间成本和风险厌恶程度对于固定价格和拍卖卖家相对收益的影响方向是一致的。与只侧重分析买方行为特征相比，这更全面地体现了卖家决策的依据，丰富了网络交易方式选择的理论研究，并且可作为商品交易属性相关研究的基础。
（2）网络交易中商品交易属性如何影响定价方式选择的理论研究。
现有对比网络拍卖和固定价格两种定价方式的文献，都不曾从商品交易属性的角度出发进行考虑，因而未能解答怎样的商品适宜网络拍卖，而这是比如何设置拍卖参数以提高拍卖收益更为基本的问题。本文根据对平台网站交易方式使用情况的观察，提炼出价格参照性、质量不确定性和价格水平三种商品交易属性，将其纳入拍卖和固定价格的模型中，进行量化分析，以说明它们对定价方式选择的影响。
价格参照性概念的引入，改变了目前研究中对于所有消费者已知固定价格水平的假设，使拍卖成交价低于固定价格不再成为此前提条件下的必然结果，从而得以分析不同商品之间，竞拍者搜索到固定价格信息的难度差异的影响，使研究能够涵盖更多商品类型。质量不确定性在现有网络交易文献中也很少涉及，文章通过将信息不对称条件下消费者的效用函数引入关联价值拍卖和固定价格定价模型，阐述了这一网络交易中特有的商品交易属性，是如何作用于卖家的定价方式选择，以及商品价格水平在其间所产生的影响。
（3）网络交易中商品交易属性对于定价方式选择影响的实证研究。
目前对比网络拍卖和固定价格的实证研究，一般是针对某一类商品进行的，交易数据来自于同质或同类物品，所以无法体现具备不同交易属性特征的商品之间的差异。本文先是使用eBay网上八个主要类别商品的固定价格和拍卖交易数据进行了回归分析，以观察价格参照性对于采用两种定价方式的卖家相对收益的影响；而后针对商品质量不确定性进行研究，根据模型的不同假设，选择相应的商品类别，使用其交易数据分别进行了回归或数据分析。这部分研究既验证了理论模型的结论，也给出了商品交易属性影响程度的定量分析。
（4）提出网络交易中商品适宜何种定价方式的判断依据
根据以上的理论和经验分析，提出卖家在定价方式选择上的判断依据。当商品价格参照性较高时，卖家无须使用拍卖；当商品价格参照性较低时，卖家考虑商品的质量不确定性与价格水平来选择交易方式。若买家对商品的估价主要基于私人偏好，对高价商品而言，质量不确定性较大时，卖家应选择拍卖；如质量不确定性较小，则应通过固定价格交易。交易低价商品时质量不确定性的影响减小，拍卖和固定价格的收益更为接近，出于对交易成本的考虑，更倾向于选择固定价格交易。而当买家的估价主要取决于标的商品相对同类商品质量的波动程度时，质量不确定性增大，卖家更倾向于选择固定价格交易，商品价格的升高同样会使这种趋势更为显著。此外，卖方因素的变化也会影响商品交易属性的作用：单位时间成本的下降，会使价格参照性的作用得到增强，而质量不确定性的影响则会减弱。
As the two major pricing modes in online trade, auction and fixed-price havetheir own advantages. Online auction is a pricing mode that consumers can decide theprice themselves, so the object is allocated to the consumer who has highest purchasewillingness. In addition, it can provide more information to buyers and sellers. Thefixed-price is determined by sellers, its main advantage is further transaction costsaving.
Along with the rapid development of online transactions, the platform websitesrepresented by eBay and Taobao, play a more and more important role. But on the useof pricing mode, these two platform websites had preached a different situation. Since1995, all goods in eBay were traded through auction, but now the ratio of usingfixed-price had already exceed50%. In the contrary, since the inception ofTaobao.com in2003, all goods were traded through fixed-price. But auction hasbecome more and more active now. This oncoming trend brings us such questions:what’s the boundary of online auction and fixed-price? And what are the key factorsdetermine that which trading mode should be chosen?
Therefore, based on the goods attribute and the characteristic of sellers, we willcomprehensively apply Auction Theory, Game Theory, the theory of industrialorganization and Econometric mode to compare online auction and fixed-price, andattempt to build an attributes index system to judge that whether the product issuitable for online auction.
The main work and conclusion of this paper are as follows:
(1) We enumerate the usage condition of online auction and fixed-price on eBayand Taobao, the typical representation of online shopping platforms. Based on thedifference and the variation trend of these two websites, we raise up the hypothesisthat what kinds of goods transaction attributes will significantly affect the choice ofsuitable trading mode for different goods. It’s also the foundation of the theoreticaland positive research below.
(2) Based on the risk attitude and transaction cost of sellers, we built the basicmodel to compare the profit of a seller who using auction or fixed-price to trade. Andthen we describe the competitive result of the two trading mode exist simultaneouslyin a platform，to judge which pricing mode will be chosen by sellers.
When the seller is risk neutral, considering the sale probability, the expect returnof fixed-price cannot catch up auction. Contrary, when the sellers aren't risk neutral, ifthe quantity of consumers is quite limited, risk aversion sellers prefer auction, riskpreference sellers prefer fixed-price. But when the numbers of consumers is highenough, no matter what kind of risk attitude that the seller has, auction can make themmore profitable. On the other hand, we consider the transaction cost, mainly thedifferent time cost and fixed cost of auction and fixed-price. Under this circumstance,sellers always choose fixed-price. But the raise of unit time cost will narrow the gapof the revenue of online auction and fixed-price when there are fewer customers.
To discuss the competitive result of auction and fixed-price when they existsimultaneously, we can find that when consumers know the fixed-price level ofhomogeneous goods clearly, auction cannot be as profitable as fixed-price.
(3) On the basis of the above model, we introduce the three key attributes intothe model gradually, including price reference, quality uncertainty and the value level,to judge the suitable trading mode for different kinds of products.
Price reference refers the difficulty that bidders can find the fixed-price ofhomogeneous goods as a reference before bidding. The higher the price reference is,the easier for bidders to find the fixed-price information. We analysis the impact onthe utility of consumers and the sellers’ profit by the different price reference undergeneral multi-product auction model and the special case of single-product auction.The study finds that lower price reference will enhance the profit of auction seller andreduce the profit of fixed-price seller. Hence, online auction is only suitable of theproducts that have low price reference.
Then we relax the assumption that consumers know the quality of the goods todiscuss the impact of quality uncertainty, which is caused by the serious informationasymmetry of online transaction. Based on the private preference of consumers, we rebuilt consumer utility function contains the quality uncertainty of goods. Thus wecan compare the profit of seller under affiliate auction and fixed-price tradingmechanism separately. It’s found that the higher quality uncertainty is, the moreprofitable for the seller to choose online auction. This trend is even more significantas the rise in the price level of goods. The existence of similar product will decreasethe quality uncertainty of the subject. Under this situation, the more profitabletransaction mode will become fixed-price when the goods are expensive, and cheapgoods can use online auction. But if the valuation depends on the relative quality tothe similar goods as reference, the higher the quality uncertainty is, the moreprofitable for the seller who uses auction.
(4) To verify the result of theoretical research, we use trading data of eBay to dothe regression tests and data analysis.
Firstly, we use the proportion of the fixed-price seller numbers in the totalamount of sellers who sell the same kind of goods to reflect price reference, and runseveral regressions based on the trading data of eight main kinds of goods on eBay toverify the effect of price reference attribute. On the other hand, we use the tradingdata of fashion and jewel category on eBay to do a data analysis and reveal the impactof quality uncertainty. We divide the quality uncertainty level into two levels, whichkind the goods belong to depends on whether it’s well-known brand. And then,assuming consumer valuation only depends on the relative quality of the object to itssimilar products, we use second hand trading data of Electric Commodity of eBay torun a regression. These three studies both confirm the results obtained by the abovetheoretical models.
The main innovation points of this paper are as follows:
(1) Building the basic model to compare the income of sellers who use onlineauction or fixed-price to trade.
The existing researches pay more attention on the characteristic of buyers, andneglect sellers, who can make the decision to choose which trading mode. So inaddition to description of buyers behavior, we add the risk attitude and transactioncost of sellers into above pricing models, to compare the income of the sellers usingdifferent pricing modes. Without regard to seller factors, the revenue of auction sellerswas higher, because auction can recognize the bidder who has highest valuation. Onceconsidering the risk attitude and transaction costs of sellers, we can get the conditionthat the revenue of fixed-price may exceed auction under different customer numbers,time cost and risk aversion. It provide more rounded criterion for sellers to choosepricing mode, and enrich the online transaction theory, also become the foundation offollowing researches on the transaction attributes of goods.
(2) The impact on the choice of pricing modes of goods transaction attributes:modeling.
There are barely any researches based on the goods transaction attributes in thenetwork transaction, hence the question that which kinds of goods are suitable foronline auction hasn’t been answered yet. Based on the observation of transactions oneBay and Taobao, we select three goods attributes: price reference, quality uncertaintyand price level, introduce them into the auction and fixed-price pricing models, inorder to illustrate their impact on the choice of pricing modes.
The introduction of price reference changes the hypothesis that all consumersknow about the fixed price of homogeneous goods, thus we can figure out that howthe differences of searching difficulty can affect the participation decision ofconsumers and the profit of sellers. Through this, the analysis can cover much morekinds of goods in online transaction. At the same time, the influence of qualityuncertainty which is caused by the serious information asymmetric in the onlinetransaction hadn’t been studied yet. So we introduce consumer utility functions withinformation asymmetric into affiliate value auction model, discuss how this specialtransaction attribute to affect sellers’ choice between online auction and fixed-price,and the impact of price level among this.
(3) The impact on the choice of pricing modes of goods transaction attributes:positive research.
The existing papers mostly run the regression through trading data of one or fewkinds of commodities, so it can’t describe the difference of the attributes betweendifferent commodities. In this paper, we use the trading data of all main class of goodson eBay.com to do positive tests, figure out the impact of price reference. And basedon the hypothesis raised in the theoretical model, we choose some kinds of goods tostudy the effect of quality uncertainty, through regression and data analysis. We bothverify the conclusions of theoretical models, and also give quantitative analysis of theimpact of the goods transaction attributes.
(4) Try to establish standards to judge whether the product is suitable for onlineauction.
According the above theoretical and positive analysis, we can preliminarily sumup the judgments of sellers’ choice between online auction and fixed-price.
Overall, with high price reference, the seller should choose fixed-price. On thecontrary, with lower price reference, sellers may consider other two factors, namely quality uncertainty and value level, to decide the proper transaction mode. Whenconsumers’ valuation depends on their private preference, it’s more profitable forsellers to choose auction when the quality uncertainty is higher. When consumers’valuation mainly depends on the relative quality and its fluctuation, sellers maychoose fixed-price when the quality uncertainty is higher. No matter under whichcondition, the increase of goods value will exacerbate the effect of quality uncertainty.In addition, the change of seller factor also can affect the impact of goods transactionattributes: the decrease of unit time cost of sellers will strengthen the impact of pricereference and weaken the impact of quality uncertainty.
在网络交易广泛使用和交易网站迅速发展的潮流中，以eBay和淘宝为代表的平台网站占据了重要的地位。这类网站自身并不拥有商品，而只是促使在其平台上的众多买家和卖家达成交易，因此会涉及到各种交易方式的应用。而在这一方面，这两个最重要的平台网站呈现出了截然不同的局面：eBay初建时，所有商品都是通过拍卖交易的，但在2010年eBay的总成交额中，固定价格占比已经超过了55%；而曾经全部使用固定价格交易的淘宝网，近年来拍卖的使用频率不断上升，在某些类别商品中活跃程度甚至超过了固定价格交易。这种“相向而行”的趋势向我们提出了这样的问题：在网络交易中，网络拍卖和固定价格使用的分界何在？或者说，是什么因素决定了商品应该采用哪一种交易方式？
本文在现有网络拍卖理论的基础上，立足于卖方因素的考量，兼顾买方的行为特征，从商品的交易属性出发，采用拍卖理论、博弈论、产业组织理论与计量分析相结合的研究方法，对网络拍卖和固定价格两种交易方式进行对比，提出了商品适宜何种定价方式的判断依据。
本文的主要工作与研究成果归纳如下：
（1）以eBay和淘宝为代表，列举平台类网站上交易方式的使用情况，发掘其中存在的一些典型现象。比如存在大量同质商品固定价格交易或价格较为极端的商品都很少通过拍卖交易，而二手商品、瑕疵商品或消费者偏好有较大差异的商品往往存在活跃的拍卖交易等。根据这些现象，本文提出对卖家定价方式选择有重要影响的商品交易属性的假设，包括价格参照性、质量不确定性和价格水平，作为文章分析的基础。
（2）基于卖家的风险态度和交易成本，分别在卖家单独使用一种定价方式交易商品和同时存在两种定价方式销售同质商品的情况下，对比了网络拍卖和固定价格卖家的期望收益，以此判断卖家将选择哪一种定价方式。
不同的卖家风险态度下，考虑商品成功出售的概率时，风险中性的卖家会选择通过网络拍卖交易商品。消费者人数有限时，风险厌恶的卖家选择网络拍卖，风险偏好的卖家选择固定价格交易；但如果消费者人数足够多，所有卖家都将倾向于选择网络拍卖，只是对于风险厌恶的卖家来说，两种定价方式所带来的收益非常接近。在交易成本方面，文章考虑了卖家的时间成本和固定成本，这时卖家一般会选择固定价格交易。但当消费者人数较少时，随着卖家时间成本的升高，拍卖的收益会更接近固定价格。
而网站中同时存在两种交易方式销售同质商品时，无论交易商品的数量多少以及销售渠道的提供方是否一致，只要所有消费者知道同质商品的固定价格水平，卖家都会选择固定价格交易。
（3）将提炼出的三个关键商品交易属性——价格参照性、质量不确定性和价格水平，逐步引入上述模型，以分析不同属性的商品所适宜采用的交易方式。
价格参照性反映的是竞拍者在出价前搜索到同质或同类商品的固定价格信息作为参考的难度，价格参照性越高，搜索到的难度越小。文章在多物品拍卖的一般模型和单物品拍卖的特例下，分析了价格参照性的作用。商品的价格参照性越高，卖家越应该选择固定价格交易，网络拍卖只适合于低价格参照性的商品。此外，对于消费者来说，只有在商品价格参照性较低时，获得更多的信息才能增加其剩余。
而后文章放宽消费者明确知道商品质量的假设，来讨论由网络交易中较为严重的信息不对称问题所导致的质量不确定性的影响。首先，在消费者估价基于其私人偏好的条件下，文章构建了包含质量不确定性和价格水平影响的消费者效用函数，来对比使用不同定价方式下的卖家收益。结论是商品质量不确定性越高，卖家越应该选择拍卖交易，价格水平的上升会加剧质量不确定性的作用。而后讨论了存在同类商品作为参照的情况，这时商品的质量不确定性降低，高价商品由原先适合拍卖交易变为适合固定价格交易，低价商品由只能使用固定价格交易才有正利润变为可以使用拍卖交易。但若买家的估价完全取决于商品相对于同类参照商品的质量及其波动程度，则质量不确定性越高，固定价格交易就更为有利。
（4）通过eBay交易数据进行经验分析，以验证在商品交易属性方面的研究结论。
文章先以某种商品固定价格卖家数量占同种商品拍卖和固定价格卖家总数的比例来刻画商品的价格参照性，对eBay网上八大类主要商品的交易数据进行了整体回归，验证价格参照性的作用。其次，在服饰和珠宝这两类消费者估价主要基于私人偏好的商品中，以是否知名品牌来划分商品质量不确定性的高低，通过数据分析，比较不同商品质量不确定性下，网络拍卖和固定价格卖家的相对收益。然后在消费者估价基于商品相对同类参照商品质量波动程度的假设下，对数码科技类二手商品的交易数据进行了回归分析。三个部分的经验研究都证实了理论研究的结论。
本文的主要创新点如下：
（1）构建了基于卖家风险态度和交易成本的网络拍卖与固定价格交易比较模型。
现有网络拍卖的研究，侧重于买家的行为特征，而相对忽略了作为定价方式选择者的卖方因素的影响。本文除描述买家行为外，在模型中加入了卖家的风险态度和交易成本因素，来对比采用不同定价方式的卖家收益。在不考虑卖方因素时，如果单独使用一种定价方式交易商品，拍卖作为一种可以将商品售予估价最高的消费者的交易方式，一般会带给卖家更高的收益。而考虑卖家的交易成本和风险态度后，可以得到在不同的消费者数量下，不同风险态度的卖家面临不同的交易成本时，固定价格交易的期望收益可能超过拍卖的条件。其中卖家单位时间成本和风险厌恶程度对于固定价格和拍卖卖家相对收益的影响方向是一致的。与只侧重分析买方行为特征相比，这更全面地体现了卖家决策的依据，丰富了网络交易方式选择的理论研究，并且可作为商品交易属性相关研究的基础。
（2）网络交易中商品交易属性如何影响定价方式选择的理论研究。
现有对比网络拍卖和固定价格两种定价方式的文献，都不曾从商品交易属性的角度出发进行考虑，因而未能解答怎样的商品适宜网络拍卖，而这是比如何设置拍卖参数以提高拍卖收益更为基本的问题。本文根据对平台网站交易方式使用情况的观察，提炼出价格参照性、质量不确定性和价格水平三种商品交易属性，将其纳入拍卖和固定价格的模型中，进行量化分析，以说明它们对定价方式选择的影响。
价格参照性概念的引入，改变了目前研究中对于所有消费者已知固定价格水平的假设，使拍卖成交价低于固定价格不再成为此前提条件下的必然结果，从而得以分析不同商品之间，竞拍者搜索到固定价格信息的难度差异的影响，使研究能够涵盖更多商品类型。质量不确定性在现有网络交易文献中也很少涉及，文章通过将信息不对称条件下消费者的效用函数引入关联价值拍卖和固定价格定价模型，阐述了这一网络交易中特有的商品交易属性，是如何作用于卖家的定价方式选择，以及商品价格水平在其间所产生的影响。
（3）网络交易中商品交易属性对于定价方式选择影响的实证研究。
目前对比网络拍卖和固定价格的实证研究，一般是针对某一类商品进行的，交易数据来自于同质或同类物品，所以无法体现具备不同交易属性特征的商品之间的差异。本文先是使用eBay网上八个主要类别商品的固定价格和拍卖交易数据进行了回归分析，以观察价格参照性对于采用两种定价方式的卖家相对收益的影响；而后针对商品质量不确定性进行研究，根据模型的不同假设，选择相应的商品类别，使用其交易数据分别进行了回归或数据分析。这部分研究既验证了理论模型的结论，也给出了商品交易属性影响程度的定量分析。
（4）提出网络交易中商品适宜何种定价方式的判断依据
根据以上的理论和经验分析，提出卖家在定价方式选择上的判断依据。当商品价格参照性较高时，卖家无须使用拍卖；当商品价格参照性较低时，卖家考虑商品的质量不确定性与价格水平来选择交易方式。若买家对商品的估价主要基于私人偏好，对高价商品而言，质量不确定性较大时，卖家应选择拍卖；如质量不确定性较小，则应通过固定价格交易。交易低价商品时质量不确定性的影响减小，拍卖和固定价格的收益更为接近，出于对交易成本的考虑，更倾向于选择固定价格交易。而当买家的估价主要取决于标的商品相对同类商品质量的波动程度时，质量不确定性增大，卖家更倾向于选择固定价格交易，商品价格的升高同样会使这种趋势更为显著。此外，卖方因素的变化也会影响商品交易属性的作用：单位时间成本的下降，会使价格参照性的作用得到增强，而质量不确定性的影响则会减弱。
As the two major pricing modes in online trade, auction and fixed-price havetheir own advantages. Online auction is a pricing mode that consumers can decide theprice themselves, so the object is allocated to the consumer who has highest purchasewillingness. In addition, it can provide more information to buyers and sellers. Thefixed-price is determined by sellers, its main advantage is further transaction costsaving.
Along with the rapid development of online transactions, the platform websitesrepresented by eBay and Taobao, play a more and more important role. But on the useof pricing mode, these two platform websites had preached a different situation. Since1995, all goods in eBay were traded through auction, but now the ratio of usingfixed-price had already exceed50%. In the contrary, since the inception ofTaobao.com in2003, all goods were traded through fixed-price. But auction hasbecome more and more active now. This oncoming trend brings us such questions:what’s the boundary of online auction and fixed-price? And what are the key factorsdetermine that which trading mode should be chosen?
Therefore, based on the goods attribute and the characteristic of sellers, we willcomprehensively apply Auction Theory, Game Theory, the theory of industrialorganization and Econometric mode to compare online auction and fixed-price, andattempt to build an attributes index system to judge that whether the product issuitable for online auction.
The main work and conclusion of this paper are as follows:
(1) We enumerate the usage condition of online auction and fixed-price on eBayand Taobao, the typical representation of online shopping platforms. Based on thedifference and the variation trend of these two websites, we raise up the hypothesisthat what kinds of goods transaction attributes will significantly affect the choice ofsuitable trading mode for different goods. It’s also the foundation of the theoreticaland positive research below.
(2) Based on the risk attitude and transaction cost of sellers, we built the basicmodel to compare the profit of a seller who using auction or fixed-price to trade. Andthen we describe the competitive result of the two trading mode exist simultaneouslyin a platform，to judge which pricing mode will be chosen by sellers.
When the seller is risk neutral, considering the sale probability, the expect returnof fixed-price cannot catch up auction. Contrary, when the sellers aren't risk neutral, ifthe quantity of consumers is quite limited, risk aversion sellers prefer auction, riskpreference sellers prefer fixed-price. But when the numbers of consumers is highenough, no matter what kind of risk attitude that the seller has, auction can make themmore profitable. On the other hand, we consider the transaction cost, mainly thedifferent time cost and fixed cost of auction and fixed-price. Under this circumstance,sellers always choose fixed-price. But the raise of unit time cost will narrow the gapof the revenue of online auction and fixed-price when there are fewer customers.
To discuss the competitive result of auction and fixed-price when they existsimultaneously, we can find that when consumers know the fixed-price level ofhomogeneous goods clearly, auction cannot be as profitable as fixed-price.
(3) On the basis of the above model, we introduce the three key attributes intothe model gradually, including price reference, quality uncertainty and the value level,to judge the suitable trading mode for different kinds of products.
Price reference refers the difficulty that bidders can find the fixed-price ofhomogeneous goods as a reference before bidding. The higher the price reference is,the easier for bidders to find the fixed-price information. We analysis the impact onthe utility of consumers and the sellers’ profit by the different price reference undergeneral multi-product auction model and the special case of single-product auction.The study finds that lower price reference will enhance the profit of auction seller andreduce the profit of fixed-price seller. Hence, online auction is only suitable of theproducts that have low price reference.
Then we relax the assumption that consumers know the quality of the goods todiscuss the impact of quality uncertainty, which is caused by the serious informationasymmetry of online transaction. Based on the private preference of consumers, we rebuilt consumer utility function contains the quality uncertainty of goods. Thus wecan compare the profit of seller under affiliate auction and fixed-price tradingmechanism separately. It’s found that the higher quality uncertainty is, the moreprofitable for the seller to choose online auction. This trend is even more significantas the rise in the price level of goods. The existence of similar product will decreasethe quality uncertainty of the subject. Under this situation, the more profitabletransaction mode will become fixed-price when the goods are expensive, and cheapgoods can use online auction. But if the valuation depends on the relative quality tothe similar goods as reference, the higher the quality uncertainty is, the moreprofitable for the seller who uses auction.
(4) To verify the result of theoretical research, we use trading data of eBay to dothe regression tests and data analysis.
Firstly, we use the proportion of the fixed-price seller numbers in the totalamount of sellers who sell the same kind of goods to reflect price reference, and runseveral regressions based on the trading data of eight main kinds of goods on eBay toverify the effect of price reference attribute. On the other hand, we use the tradingdata of fashion and jewel category on eBay to do a data analysis and reveal the impactof quality uncertainty. We divide the quality uncertainty level into two levels, whichkind the goods belong to depends on whether it’s well-known brand. And then,assuming consumer valuation only depends on the relative quality of the object to itssimilar products, we use second hand trading data of Electric Commodity of eBay torun a regression. These three studies both confirm the results obtained by the abovetheoretical models.
The main innovation points of this paper are as follows:
(1) Building the basic model to compare the income of sellers who use onlineauction or fixed-price to trade.
The existing researches pay more attention on the characteristic of buyers, andneglect sellers, who can make the decision to choose which trading mode. So inaddition to description of buyers behavior, we add the risk attitude and transactioncost of sellers into above pricing models, to compare the income of the sellers usingdifferent pricing modes. Without regard to seller factors, the revenue of auction sellerswas higher, because auction can recognize the bidder who has highest valuation. Onceconsidering the risk attitude and transaction costs of sellers, we can get the conditionthat the revenue of fixed-price may exceed auction under different customer numbers,time cost and risk aversion. It provide more rounded criterion for sellers to choosepricing mode, and enrich the online transaction theory, also become the foundation offollowing researches on the transaction attributes of goods.
(2) The impact on the choice of pricing modes of goods transaction attributes:modeling.
There are barely any researches based on the goods transaction attributes in thenetwork transaction, hence the question that which kinds of goods are suitable foronline auction hasn’t been answered yet. Based on the observation of transactions oneBay and Taobao, we select three goods attributes: price reference, quality uncertaintyand price level, introduce them into the auction and fixed-price pricing models, inorder to illustrate their impact on the choice of pricing modes.
The introduction of price reference changes the hypothesis that all consumersknow about the fixed price of homogeneous goods, thus we can figure out that howthe differences of searching difficulty can affect the participation decision ofconsumers and the profit of sellers. Through this, the analysis can cover much morekinds of goods in online transaction. At the same time, the influence of qualityuncertainty which is caused by the serious information asymmetric in the onlinetransaction hadn’t been studied yet. So we introduce consumer utility functions withinformation asymmetric into affiliate value auction model, discuss how this specialtransaction attribute to affect sellers’ choice between online auction and fixed-price,and the impact of price level among this.
(3) The impact on the choice of pricing modes of goods transaction attributes:positive research.
The existing papers mostly run the regression through trading data of one or fewkinds of commodities, so it can’t describe the difference of the attributes betweendifferent commodities. In this paper, we use the trading data of all main class of goodson eBay.com to do positive tests, figure out the impact of price reference. And basedon the hypothesis raised in the theoretical model, we choose some kinds of goods tostudy the effect of quality uncertainty, through regression and data analysis. We bothverify the conclusions of theoretical models, and also give quantitative analysis of theimpact of the goods transaction attributes.
(4) Try to establish standards to judge whether the product is suitable for onlineauction.
According the above theoretical and positive analysis, we can preliminarily sumup the judgments of sellers’ choice between online auction and fixed-price.
Overall, with high price reference, the seller should choose fixed-price. On thecontrary, with lower price reference, sellers may consider other two factors, namely quality uncertainty and value level, to decide the proper transaction mode. Whenconsumers’ valuation depends on their private preference, it’s more profitable forsellers to choose auction when the quality uncertainty is higher. When consumers’valuation mainly depends on the relative quality and its fluctuation, sellers maychoose fixed-price when the quality uncertainty is higher. No matter under whichcondition, the increase of goods value will exacerbate the effect of quality uncertainty.In addition, the change of seller factor also can affect the impact of goods transactionattributes: the decrease of unit time cost of sellers will strengthen the impact of pricereference and weaken the impact of quality uncertainty.
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