考虑质量提升的供应链质量成本分担博弈分析
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摘要
随着经济全球化的发展,供应链管理已经成为现代企业的重要管理模式,也成为管理学界的研究热点。质量是产品的灵魂,也是企业的竞争力。提升质量能保证企业在竞争中立于不败之地。
传统的理论研究大多停留在考虑质量提升的供应链管理研究的理论层面,量化方面分析的相关文献相对较少。所以,本文综合考虑质量提升和供应链质量成本分担这两大问题,运用量化分析,从供应链系统整体最优角度出发,运用文[58]的质量提升量化方法和国内关于质量风险的供应链博弈分析理论,分别对考虑质量提升的质量分担的两种供应链模型进行了Nash博弈分析和非合作情况下的Stackelberg博弈分析。在非合作博弈时,通过求解均衡得到在三种信息不对称情况(即供应商次品率隐匿,制造商检验水平可观测;制造商检验水平隐匿,供应商次品率可观测;供应商和制造商双方皆隐匿三种情况)下的质量成本分担方案。这些方案可在供应链运行的实际中提供部分参考意义。
本文总共五章,第一章系统地阐述了供应链管理、质量管理和供应链合同的相关定义,研究现状等。第二章回顾了供应链协调,考虑质量提升的供应链管理和不对称信息下的供应链协调现状三个方面的理论。第三章在第二章的基础上,研究在理性的制造商和供应商组成的二级供应链中,构建了考虑质量提升的供应商和制造商质量成本分担模型,并进行了Nash博弈分析。第四章则是在供应商和制造商都对次品率和检验水平改进有投入时,考虑非合作的情况,所得结论帮助我们解决了在质量风险和提高质量水平情况下怎样达到最优的供应链质量成本分担方案。考虑了三种信息不对称情况下(同上)的Stackelberg博弈分析,结论得出在各种情况下,质量分担参数(ΔθS,λ)如何取值使得供求双方的行动同信息对称情况下的供应链最优解一致。第五章则是对全文的总结和对未来研究的展望。
Supply chain management has been an important management model of modern enterprises, with the development of economic globalization. Quality is the soul of product, but also the competitiveness of enterprises. Quality improvement ensures enterprises an invincible position in the competition.
Most of the traditional theoretical research just stayed in the theoretical study of the supply chain management considering quality improvement, there’s a relatively small number of related literatures of quantitative analysis. While, this article considers both of the two major issues, quality improvement and the quality cost sharing by quantitative analysis. We set the model by the mean of modeling at the direction of the literature [58]’s methods and the theories about quality risk, then use Nash and Stackelberg game to solve the problem quality cost sharing considering quality improvement. When in the non-cooperative game, it concludes with the quality cost-sharing program in three information asymmetry (i.e. Suppliers’information can be concealed and manufacturers’can be observed, the manufacturers’can be concealed and suppliers’information can be observed, the two sides have both concealed information.) by solving the balance. The final conclusion can be adopt in the current supply chain and provide part of the actual value.
This paper totally consists of five chapters. The first chapter systematically expresses the definition and current research level of the supply chain management, quality management and supply chain contracts. In chapter II, there’s a literature review in the area of the supply chain coordination, supply chain management considering quality improvement and the current research level of supply chain coordination under asymmetric information after a lot of literature I read. Chapter III is based on the second chapter, studies the supply chain with only a manufacturer and a suppler, set the model in the condition of quality improvement and use Nash game to solve it. Chapter IV studies the model when the quality risks and improvement are both considered by two sides at the same time, how to achieve optimal supply chain quality cost-sharing case in the Non-cooperative situation. In the analysis of Stackelberg game, we consider three Asymmetric Information moral risks, as well as in their respective condition, how we calculate the quality improvement’s value (ΔθS,λ) in order to achieve the same optimal solution. Chapter V is the summary of the full text and the outlook for future research.
传统的理论研究大多停留在考虑质量提升的供应链管理研究的理论层面,量化方面分析的相关文献相对较少。所以,本文综合考虑质量提升和供应链质量成本分担这两大问题,运用量化分析,从供应链系统整体最优角度出发,运用文[58]的质量提升量化方法和国内关于质量风险的供应链博弈分析理论,分别对考虑质量提升的质量分担的两种供应链模型进行了Nash博弈分析和非合作情况下的Stackelberg博弈分析。在非合作博弈时,通过求解均衡得到在三种信息不对称情况(即供应商次品率隐匿,制造商检验水平可观测;制造商检验水平隐匿,供应商次品率可观测;供应商和制造商双方皆隐匿三种情况)下的质量成本分担方案。这些方案可在供应链运行的实际中提供部分参考意义。
本文总共五章,第一章系统地阐述了供应链管理、质量管理和供应链合同的相关定义,研究现状等。第二章回顾了供应链协调,考虑质量提升的供应链管理和不对称信息下的供应链协调现状三个方面的理论。第三章在第二章的基础上,研究在理性的制造商和供应商组成的二级供应链中,构建了考虑质量提升的供应商和制造商质量成本分担模型,并进行了Nash博弈分析。第四章则是在供应商和制造商都对次品率和检验水平改进有投入时,考虑非合作的情况,所得结论帮助我们解决了在质量风险和提高质量水平情况下怎样达到最优的供应链质量成本分担方案。考虑了三种信息不对称情况下(同上)的Stackelberg博弈分析,结论得出在各种情况下,质量分担参数(ΔθS,λ)如何取值使得供求双方的行动同信息对称情况下的供应链最优解一致。第五章则是对全文的总结和对未来研究的展望。
Supply chain management has been an important management model of modern enterprises, with the development of economic globalization. Quality is the soul of product, but also the competitiveness of enterprises. Quality improvement ensures enterprises an invincible position in the competition.
Most of the traditional theoretical research just stayed in the theoretical study of the supply chain management considering quality improvement, there’s a relatively small number of related literatures of quantitative analysis. While, this article considers both of the two major issues, quality improvement and the quality cost sharing by quantitative analysis. We set the model by the mean of modeling at the direction of the literature [58]’s methods and the theories about quality risk, then use Nash and Stackelberg game to solve the problem quality cost sharing considering quality improvement. When in the non-cooperative game, it concludes with the quality cost-sharing program in three information asymmetry (i.e. Suppliers’information can be concealed and manufacturers’can be observed, the manufacturers’can be concealed and suppliers’information can be observed, the two sides have both concealed information.) by solving the balance. The final conclusion can be adopt in the current supply chain and provide part of the actual value.
This paper totally consists of five chapters. The first chapter systematically expresses the definition and current research level of the supply chain management, quality management and supply chain contracts. In chapter II, there’s a literature review in the area of the supply chain coordination, supply chain management considering quality improvement and the current research level of supply chain coordination under asymmetric information after a lot of literature I read. Chapter III is based on the second chapter, studies the supply chain with only a manufacturer and a suppler, set the model in the condition of quality improvement and use Nash game to solve it. Chapter IV studies the model when the quality risks and improvement are both considered by two sides at the same time, how to achieve optimal supply chain quality cost-sharing case in the Non-cooperative situation. In the analysis of Stackelberg game, we consider three Asymmetric Information moral risks, as well as in their respective condition, how we calculate the quality improvement’s value (ΔθS,λ) in order to achieve the same optimal solution. Chapter V is the summary of the full text and the outlook for future research.
引文
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[29] Kaijie Zhu, Rachel Q. Zhang,Fugee Tsung. Pushing Quality Improvement Along Supply Chains[J]. Management Science, 2007,53(3): 421-436.
[30]李良.供应链合同当议[J].西南民族大学学报(人文社科版), 2005,26(3): 201-202.
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[2]王春喜,查建中,李建勇.供应链性能评价的研究现状和发展趋势[J].管理工程学报, 2003,17(3): 27-30.
[3]马士华,林勇,陈志祥.供应链管理[M].北京:机械工业出版社, 2000: 40-41.
[4] Stadtler H. Supply chain management and advanced planning--basics, overview and challenges [J].European Journal of Operational Research, 163(2005): 575-588.
[5] Lee H, Padmanabhan P, Whang S. Information distortion in a supply chain: the bullwhip effect [J].Management Sciences, 1997, 43(4): 546-558.
[6] Chen F,Drezner Z, Ryan J K,et al. Quantifying the bullwhip effect in a simple supply chain: the impact of forecasting, lead times, and information [J].Management Sciences, 2000, 46(3): 436-431.
[7] Cachon G,Lariviere M. Supply chain coordination with revenue sharing: Strengths and Limitations [J].Management Science, 2005,51(1): 30-44.
[8]刘春林,何建敏,施建军.供应链的协作供应问题研究[J].管理科学学报, 2004,5(2): 29-33.
[9]达庆利,张钦,沈厚才.供应链中牛鞭效应问题研究[J].管理科学学报, 2003,6(3): 86-93.
[10]李刚,汪寿阳,于刚等.牛鞭效应与生产平滑模型有效性问题[J].管理科学学报, 2004,7(1): 1-18.
[11] Otto A, Kotzab H. How supply chain management contributes to the management of supply chains—preliminary thoughts on an unpopular question [A]. In: Larsson E, Paulsson U(Ed),Building New Bridges in Logistics[C].Lund University,Lund, 1999: 213-236.
[12] Copacino W C. Supply chain management—the basics and beyond [M]. Boston: The St Lucie Press, 1997: 1-15.
[13] http: //www.supply-chain.org/Supply Chain Council homepage[ED/OL] .
[14]刘丽文.供应链管理思想及其理论与方法的发展过程[J].管理科学学报, 2003,6(2): 81-88.
[15] Lambert D M, Cooper M C. Issues in supply chain management [J].Industrial Marketing Management, 2000,29: 65-83.
[16] Bowersox D, Closs D,Cooper M. Supply chain Logistics Management [M].北京:机械工业出版社, 2002:297-310.
[17] Cooper M C, Lambert D M,Pagh J D. Supply chain management: implementation issues and research opportunities [J].The International Journal of Logistics Management,1998, 9(2): 1-19.
[18]方娜,黄磊.供应链管理概念研究综述[J].当代经济, 2008,9(2): 146-147.
[19]王迎军.供应链管理实用建模方法及数据挖掘[M].北京:清华大学出版社, 2001.
[20]张丽丽.供应链合作伙伴关系及供应链合同的研究[M].浙江:浙江工业大学硕士学位论文, 2003,12: 49-50.
[21] Gorbet C,Groote X. A supplier’s optimal quantity discount, policy under asymmetric information[J]. Management Science, 2003,46(3): 445-450.
[22] Barucci E, gozz F, Swiech A.Incentive compatibility constraints and dynamic programming in continuous time[J]. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2000,34(4): 471-508.
[23] Qi X T, Bard J F,Yu G. Supply chain coordination with demand disruptions[J]. Omega, 2004,32(4): 301-312.
[24]赵泉午,熊中楷,林娅等.基于电子市场的易逝品两级供应链供需博弈分析[J].中国管理科学, 2004,12(3): 9l-96.
[25] Romano P. Coordination and integration mechanisms to manage logistics processes across supply networks[J]. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 2003,9(3): 119-134.
[26]张斌,华中生.供应链质量管理中抽样检验决策的非合作博弈分析[J].中国管理科学, 2006,6(3): 27-31.
[27]曹柬,杨春节.考虑质量失误的供应链博弈模型研究[J].中国管理科学,2006,14(1): 25-29.
[28]周明,张异,李勇,但斌.供应链质量管理中的最优合同设计[J].管理工程学报, 2006,3: 120-122.
[29] Kaijie Zhu, Rachel Q. Zhang,Fugee Tsung. Pushing Quality Improvement Along Supply Chains[J]. Management Science, 2007,53(3): 421-436.
[30]李良.供应链合同当议[J].西南民族大学学报(人文社科版), 2005,26(3): 201-202.
[31] Tsay. A,Lovejoy. W. S. Quantity Flexibility Contracts and Supply Chain Performance [J].Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, 1999,1(2): 118-149.
[32] Spengler, J.Vertical Integration and Anti一trust Policy[J].Joumal of Politieal Economy, 1950,58.
[33] Tirole,J. The theory of industrial organization. MIT press, Cambridge,MA, 1988.
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