WTO下非政府组织参与权研究
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摘要
非政府组织在WTO下的参与权研究可以说是个新颖并且挑战传统学说的一个法律问题。乌拉圭回合之前,GATT被严格定义为“成员方驱动”的临时协定,非政府组织本身并无参与权。WTO成立之后,《马拉喀什协定》规定可与非政府组织进行咨询,从而为非政府组织的参与提供了一定的法律依据。自多哈回合以来,伴随市民社会的壮大,非政府组织对于推崇贸易利益至上的WTO日益感到不满,她们以保护公共利益和弱势群体为己任,积极争取在WTO中的意见表述权。如果说非政府组织的抗议是推动WTO改革的外部动力,那么WTO体制可持续发展的需求则构成WTO透明度和参与性改革的内因。当WTO规则成为分配各国人民在贸易、投资、知识产权、环境保护、竞争政策等领域中利益的法律依据时,以“俱乐部”模式运作的WTO所体现出来的“民主缺失”问题昭然若揭。非政府组织参与权问题正是在这样的背景下产生,成为涉及到WTO体制正当性和民主性的重要因素。这个问题的解决,将决定WTO未来发展的可持续性。
基于这样的认识,论文围绕着非政府组织是否应该享有WTO体制下的参与权,参与的路径以及参与的正当性进行了详尽的分析。
论文分为六章,约24万字。第一章和第二章提出问题,何为非政府组织在WTO下参与权;非政府组织参与的必然性和必要性是什么?第三章到第五章论证了非政府组织在WTO下参与权的构成和正当性。第六章是本文的结论,作者根据全文的理论和实证分析,并结合中国的国情,提出增进非政府组织在WTO下参与的若干建议。
第一章是全文的基础,主要介绍非政府组织的概念、地位以及参与权的内涵和外延。论文在进入正式理论分析之前,先对国际公约和文件中非政府组织的定义进行了对比,以确定非政府组织为国际社会所普遍承认的条件和特征,并比较了非政府组织与类似概念如跨国市民社会之间的区别。而参与权也并非一个明晰的概念,晚近参与权在国际关系学中的发展,摆脱了人权或政治权利的单一属性,而被赋予了民主权利属性。更重要的是,90年代后环境法领域一些公约的通过,拓宽了参与权的外延,使其从决策层面的投票权延伸至立法、执行、司法领域的全方位参加权。第一章还介绍了本文的研究背景,即晚近国际形势最新发展对非政府组织参与的促进。首先,WTO管辖领地从传统的贸易领域向社会价值领域扩张,客观上要求WTO听取代表社会价值的市民团体的意见;其次,市民社会的兴起和壮大,为政府、私人之外的第三部门参与国际立法、执法和司法提供了物质基础;再次,社会法从公法、私法二分模式中独立出来,形成公法-私法-社会法三足鼎力的局面,为市民社会参与跨国社会问题的立法和执行提供新的场合;最后WTO面临的民主缺失也需要市民团体的参与以增强民主投入。
第二章着重分析了非政府组织参与WTO的必要性。从利益分析的角度来看,非政府组织参与WTO的必要性实际上反映为她们对增进国际法的有效性和正当性所提供的福祉和利益。非政府组织对全球贸易规则有效性的促进体现为大量新的具有约束力的贸易规则在非政府组织的积极参与下而产生,弥补了政府间组织进行贸易立法的滞后和不足,满足国际贸易立法增量的需求;并且她们还协助政府间组织解释现有的贸易规则,澄清异议,填补空白,为促进贸易有序、高效地发展而贡献卓越;再有就是她们作为“法庭之友”,向国际争端解决机构提供专家意见,协助国际司法程序的顺利开展。除此之外,非政府组织对于国际贸易规则民主正当性的促进也是深远的。她们的介入,使得国际贸易规则在执行过程中“去政治化”,得以民主、正当地执行;她们代表非贸易团体,为贸易利益相关人争取WTO下的利益,以纠正WTO内在的偏向资本优势团体的利益歧视性。
论文的第三章首先对非政府组织在WTO下立法参与权进行研究。作者首先分析了WTO协定中有关非政府组织参与的若干条文。然后介绍了目前非政府组织在WTO中立法参与的形式。WTO协定中直接涉及非政府组织参与的条文寥寥可数,但其各分项协定下有若干条文间接指向了非政府组织的参与。秘书处作为连接WTO与非政府组织的纽带,自多哈回合,在每次部长级会议召开之前吸收符合资格的非政府组织参与到部长级会议中来。会议期间,秘书处提供便利为非政府组织召开专项研讨会,提供简报会等,与非政府组织进行沟通。多数成员方对于非政府组织的参与充满戒心,理论届也是针锋相对。反对派强调国际法的国家主义,认为WTO是个俱乐部式的组织,任何非成员方均不应介入WTO,否则非政府组织构成在国内层面和国际层面两次民主参与。因此,WTO应秉承个人的“民主参与权国内用尽”原则,不接受任何形式下非政府组织的介入。赞成派则持个人主义的观点,针对WTO体制的民主缺失进行抨击,认为WTO规则距离民众过远,其规则的产生不具有正当性,并不符合WTO追求透明度的原则。因此,本章将比较国家主义下管制自由论和个人主义下有效市场论以及贸易利益相关者理论,根据三种理论产生的时代背景以及WTO的性质,考量WTO在未来的发展中应采取的理论模式。
第四章是对非政府组织在WTO下司法参与权的研究。争端解决机制一直被学者们认同为WTO的核心价值。作为WTO实质上的司法机构,非政府组织在其下的参与也同样影响WTO主体构成。非政府组织当前在争端解决程序的介入以法庭之友的身份。自海虾-海龟案后,上诉机构在争端决程序中逐步发展出一套非政府组织主动向其提交意见书的程序,引发了成员方争论。因此,本章立足于案例研究,通过对海虾-海龟案、英国钢铁案、欧共体石棉案,以及新近的巴西翻新轮胎案等的研读,对上诉机构处理非政府组织在WTO下司法参与的正当性进行分析。分析以DSU中涉及非政府组织司法参与的条文作为依据,借助于《维也纳条约法公约》的条约解释原则,然后得出结论:加强非政府组织在WTO下的司法参与本身并非不当,但上诉机构运用司法能动主义的模式篡夺了政治机构的立法权限,违背社会价值引入WTO的正当模式,并且在处理非政府组织提交意见书的方式上也违反了司法的正当程序。
非政府组织在整个国际法领域下的参与并非WTO体制下的独特现象。鉴于政府间组织在管辖领地上存在着潜在的竞争,市民社会在游说参与权的过程中也试图以“体制转移”的策略在较为友善的政府间组织中推行相关的社会价值。因此,第五章通过体制的比较分析,借助于对其他政府间国际组织,如联合国、世界银行、OECD以及区域性贸易组织下非政府组织参与权的研究,以期对WTO下相关制度建设提供借鉴。所有的国际组织同WTO一样,面临着相同的民主缺失问题,并承受着外部市民社会的压力。但不同的国际组织给与非政府组织参与权的程度是不同的,获得的成效也不同。本章的分析分为两部分:首先是非政府组织在其他政府间组织中决策参与的状况以及政府间组织对于非政府组织的行为规范;其次是非政府组织在其他政府间组织下司法或执行参与状况及其评价。需要注意的是,即便是类似的贸易组织,参与的路径和参与的程度也不能照搬。例如,欧盟体制下非政府组织不仅具有非争端方的司法参与权,还享有争端方的诉讼提起权。对于后者,WTO尚且不具备授予的条件。私人诉权在WTO体制下的推行,需要具备几个因素:WTO下各成员方经济、文化、社会等因素的进一步趋同和整合;WTO体制要真正演变为类似于欧盟的新法律秩序,以及WTO法对成员方国民有直接适用的效力。
最后,通过上述五章的分析,第六章得出加强非政府组织在WTO下参与权的若干建议。首先,应完善WTO下非政府组织参与的规定,为增进非政府组织的参与权提供条约基础或法律依据;其次,争端解决机构在进行有关非政府组织司法参与约文的解释上,应司法克制,慎防司法立法行为;再次,鉴于非政府组织地域分布的不均衡,在构建非政府组织参与权时,要注意非政府组织的代表性、公正性、专业性等因素,并扶植南方国家非政府组织的发展,给与南方市民社会意见优先的考虑;另外,WTO应借鉴其他国际组织下非政府组织参与的方式和行为规范,合理地构建WTO体制下非政府组织参与权;最后,中国作为WTO的成员,并且是最富有影响力的发展中成员方之一,应看清非政府组织在全球治理中参与的实质和趋势,并积极扶持本国非政府组织的成长和壮大,促进市民社会在中国的形成和成熟,从而更充分地发挥中国非政府组织在全球治理中代表中国民众的作用。
总之,非政府组织将持续在国际法领域中发挥作用并争取参与权。她们对WTO封闭性的抵制和抗议不利于WTO新议题的谈判,也使得WTO逐渐丧失民心。鉴于非政府组织参与已经成为一种不可逆转的趋势,WTO也无从逃避。只有顺应形势,并且摸索出一套系统的、合理的与非政府组织咨询路径,才能改善其民主正当性,保障体制的可持续发展。
The Participation Right of NGOs in the WTO is a new but challenging legal issue. Before Uruguay Round, GATT, the predecessor of the WTO is firmly defined as“member driven”agreements, which deny the participation right of NGOs completely. Only after establishment of the WTO, does Marrakech Agreement allow the WTO consult with NGOs, which provides the legal basis for the participation of NGOs. As the civil society becomes stronger, NGOs are increasingly unsatisfied with the superiority of trade value pursued by the WTO. They stand for public interests and minority interests, aggressively fight for the“Voice Right”in the WTO. If the protests held by NGOs are outward force pushing forward the reform of the WTO, the need for sustainable development is the inner cause for transparence and participation reform. When WTO rules have been treated as the legal basis to allocate the interests of different peoples around the world in fields of trade, investment, intellectual property, environmental protection, competition and so on, the“democratic deficiency”of the WTO, which is operated on“club model”, has been clearly unveiled. The issue of NGO’s participation right comes to light right in this situation, and constitutes a critical element in deciding the legitimacy and democracy of the institution. If solved properly, the sustainable development of the WTO will be ensured.
Therefore, the thesis makes a detailed analysis on whether NGOs should have participation right in the WTO, the route of participation and the legitimacy of participation.
The thesis is divided into six chapters, which adds up to 240,000 words. The first two chapters raise the questions, what is NGOs’participation right in the WTO, and what are the necessities for their participation. Then, the constituency and legitimacy of NGOs’participation are analyzed in Chapter 3, 4 and 5. Chapter 6 draws a conclusion after theoretical and empirical studies in former chapters.
Chapter 1 is the cornerstone of the thesis, which introduces the definition, status of NGOs and scope of participation right. This chapter first compares definitions of NGOs in different international conventions and legal documents, and summarized the requirements and characteristics of NGOs as commonly recognized by international community. The differences between NGO and transnational civil society is defined here as well. Participation Right is another controversial legal term. The recent evolvement of participation right in international relations, breaking the limits of human right or political right nature, but entrusted it with a democratic entitle. And more importantly, the ratification of certain conventions on environmental protection enlarges the scope of participation right, which extends its range from policy-making to legislation, execution and litigation. Chapter 1 also describes the impacts of recent development of international policies on NGOs’participation, which constitutes the background of the research. First, the jurisdiction of WTO is enlarged from trade area to social value area, which requires the WTO listen to civil society’s opinions, who stands for social value. Secondly, the rapid development of civil society provides material basis for the“third department”to participate in legislation, execution and enforcement of international rules. Thirdly, social law is separated from public law and private law, provides new arena to solve the transnational social problems. And the last but not the least, the democratic deficit encountered by the WTO also requires more democratic input through participation of civil organizations.
Chapter 2 focuses on the necessity of NGOs’participation in WTO. From the perspective of cost-benefit, NGOs’participation will enhance the efficiency and legitimacy of international law. Numerous binding trade rules are adopted with the assistance of NGOs, which rectifies the deficiency of trade rules drafted by the International Governmental Organizations. NGOs also help interpret existing trade rules, clarify ambiguities, and fill the gaps, so as to promote the international trade. Furthermore, as“friends of courts”, NGOs can provide expert opinions to international courts, and assist in the running of international judicial procedures. Apart from these, NGOs may enhance the democracy of international trade rules as well. The involvement of NGOs in execution can make the rules de-politicalized. And they represent non-trade organizations, fight for the interests of trade stakeholders, which changes the potential discriminatory nature of the WTO.
Chapter 3 researches on NGOs’participation in policy-making process of the WTO. Several relevant provisions are analyzed first, followed by the introduction of participation manner of NGOs. Actually, the articles directly relating to NGOs’participation are rare, but several provisions under sub-agreements indirectly refer to their participation. As the collecting bond between NGOs and the WTO, the Secretariat allows qualified NGOs attend each Ministerial Meeting from Doha Round. During the Ministerial Meeting, the Secretariat also offers assistance to convene symposia and provides daily briefs for NGOs. Most of the members oppose to give more participation to NGOs. And theories relating to NGOs’participation disagree with each other. Scholars against NGOs’participation emphasize the statism of international law, and treat the WTO as a Club-Model organization. Any non-member shall not be invited into the WTO; otherwise, NGOs will participate twice in domestic and international affairs. So the WTO shall insist on the principle of“exhaustion of democratic right domestically”, denies any types of participation by NGOs. While scholars with individualism opinions impugn on the WTO’s democratic deficit as the WTO is too far away from ordinary people, which makes the rules lack of legitimacy. So this Chapter will compare Regulatory Freedom Theory under statism with Efficient Market Theory and Trade Stakeholder Theory under individualism, and considers which theory shall be adopted by the WTO for future development.
Chapter 4 analyzes NGOs’participation in dispute resolution process of the WTO. The Dispute Resolution Mechanism has been applauded as the“pearls in the crown”. As the de facto juridical branch of the WTO, the participation in DSB also relates to the constituency of subjects of the WTO. Currently, NGOs enter into the judicial procedure of the WTO through“Amicus Curiae”. The Appellate Body have established a series of procedures allowing NGOs submit their opinions without solicitation since Shrimp-Turtle case, which arouse arguments of members. Chapter 4 mainly engages in case studies, through the reading of Shrimp-Turtle case, UK Steel case, EU Asbestos case and the recent Brazil Retreated Tyre case, the legitimacy of Appellate Body’s handling manner on unsolicited Amicus Curiae Briefs is analyzed. After interpreting relevant articles of DSU through the customary method of treaty interpretation adopted by Vienna Convention, the thesis opined as:More judicial participation of NGOs in WTO is free from impunity, but the Appellate Body errs in usurping political organ’s legislative power through judicial activism, incorporating social value into the WTO with illegitimate manner, and violating due process principle when handling NGOs’briefs.
NGOs’participation in international community is not a unique phenomenon for the WTO. As potential competitions for more fields and authorities among different IGOs exist, and civil society tries to using the“regime shifting”strategy to sell their social value to NGO-friendly IGOs, therefore, Chapter 5 takes a comparative study on NGOs’participation in different IGOs, such as UN, World Bank, OECD or regional trade organizations, expecting to give some advices to the WTO. These IGOs all encounter the same“democratic deficit”problem as the WTO, and most survive the pressure from civil society. As different IGOs entitle different participation to NGOs, they are paid off differently. Chapter 5 first studies NGOs’participation in other IGOs’policy making and how these IGOs regulate NGOs behaviors, then continues to study NGOs’participation in judicial process or enforcement mechanism. It’s worthy mentioned that the participatory route shall not be copied directly even from similar trade organizations. For example, the judicial participation right under EU regime includes participation rights both as non-disputing party and disputing party. But the latter shall not be introduced into the WTO. To adopt the individual litigation right in the WTO, certain conditions shall be met: the economy, culture, and social values of the member states shall be converged and integrated further; the WTO shall become a new legal order as the EU, and the WTO rules shall have direct applicability to the nationals of the member states.
After analysis of above five chapters, Chapter 6 summarized as follows. First, the rules relating to consultation with NGOs under WTO shall be further completed, so as to provide legal basis for NGOs’participation. Secondly, the Panel and Appellate Body shall maintain judicial constraint, avoid judicial legislation. Thirdly, the imbalance of distribution of NGOs shall be noticed, and the elements of representation, fairness and professionness shall be taken into account. More resources and opportunities shall be distributed to southern NGOs. Fourthly, the WTO may follow other IGOs’experiences on regulating the behavior of NGOs. The last but not the least, China as the most influential developing country under the WTO, shall respect the tendency of NGOs’participation in global governance. Chinese government shall assist in developing the local NGOs, allowing local NGOs to play positive role in global trade governance.
To sum up, NGOs will continue to function and push for more participation in international law. The resistance and protests by NGOs to the close nature of the WTO have seriously hampered the negotiation of new issues, and taken away people’s confidence and faith on WTO. As their participation has been an unavoidable trend, WTO shall conform to the trend, and find a systematic and reasonable way to consult with NGOs to enhance its democratic legitimacy and ensure a sustainable regime development.
基于这样的认识,论文围绕着非政府组织是否应该享有WTO体制下的参与权,参与的路径以及参与的正当性进行了详尽的分析。
论文分为六章,约24万字。第一章和第二章提出问题,何为非政府组织在WTO下参与权;非政府组织参与的必然性和必要性是什么?第三章到第五章论证了非政府组织在WTO下参与权的构成和正当性。第六章是本文的结论,作者根据全文的理论和实证分析,并结合中国的国情,提出增进非政府组织在WTO下参与的若干建议。
第一章是全文的基础,主要介绍非政府组织的概念、地位以及参与权的内涵和外延。论文在进入正式理论分析之前,先对国际公约和文件中非政府组织的定义进行了对比,以确定非政府组织为国际社会所普遍承认的条件和特征,并比较了非政府组织与类似概念如跨国市民社会之间的区别。而参与权也并非一个明晰的概念,晚近参与权在国际关系学中的发展,摆脱了人权或政治权利的单一属性,而被赋予了民主权利属性。更重要的是,90年代后环境法领域一些公约的通过,拓宽了参与权的外延,使其从决策层面的投票权延伸至立法、执行、司法领域的全方位参加权。第一章还介绍了本文的研究背景,即晚近国际形势最新发展对非政府组织参与的促进。首先,WTO管辖领地从传统的贸易领域向社会价值领域扩张,客观上要求WTO听取代表社会价值的市民团体的意见;其次,市民社会的兴起和壮大,为政府、私人之外的第三部门参与国际立法、执法和司法提供了物质基础;再次,社会法从公法、私法二分模式中独立出来,形成公法-私法-社会法三足鼎力的局面,为市民社会参与跨国社会问题的立法和执行提供新的场合;最后WTO面临的民主缺失也需要市民团体的参与以增强民主投入。
第二章着重分析了非政府组织参与WTO的必要性。从利益分析的角度来看,非政府组织参与WTO的必要性实际上反映为她们对增进国际法的有效性和正当性所提供的福祉和利益。非政府组织对全球贸易规则有效性的促进体现为大量新的具有约束力的贸易规则在非政府组织的积极参与下而产生,弥补了政府间组织进行贸易立法的滞后和不足,满足国际贸易立法增量的需求;并且她们还协助政府间组织解释现有的贸易规则,澄清异议,填补空白,为促进贸易有序、高效地发展而贡献卓越;再有就是她们作为“法庭之友”,向国际争端解决机构提供专家意见,协助国际司法程序的顺利开展。除此之外,非政府组织对于国际贸易规则民主正当性的促进也是深远的。她们的介入,使得国际贸易规则在执行过程中“去政治化”,得以民主、正当地执行;她们代表非贸易团体,为贸易利益相关人争取WTO下的利益,以纠正WTO内在的偏向资本优势团体的利益歧视性。
论文的第三章首先对非政府组织在WTO下立法参与权进行研究。作者首先分析了WTO协定中有关非政府组织参与的若干条文。然后介绍了目前非政府组织在WTO中立法参与的形式。WTO协定中直接涉及非政府组织参与的条文寥寥可数,但其各分项协定下有若干条文间接指向了非政府组织的参与。秘书处作为连接WTO与非政府组织的纽带,自多哈回合,在每次部长级会议召开之前吸收符合资格的非政府组织参与到部长级会议中来。会议期间,秘书处提供便利为非政府组织召开专项研讨会,提供简报会等,与非政府组织进行沟通。多数成员方对于非政府组织的参与充满戒心,理论届也是针锋相对。反对派强调国际法的国家主义,认为WTO是个俱乐部式的组织,任何非成员方均不应介入WTO,否则非政府组织构成在国内层面和国际层面两次民主参与。因此,WTO应秉承个人的“民主参与权国内用尽”原则,不接受任何形式下非政府组织的介入。赞成派则持个人主义的观点,针对WTO体制的民主缺失进行抨击,认为WTO规则距离民众过远,其规则的产生不具有正当性,并不符合WTO追求透明度的原则。因此,本章将比较国家主义下管制自由论和个人主义下有效市场论以及贸易利益相关者理论,根据三种理论产生的时代背景以及WTO的性质,考量WTO在未来的发展中应采取的理论模式。
第四章是对非政府组织在WTO下司法参与权的研究。争端解决机制一直被学者们认同为WTO的核心价值。作为WTO实质上的司法机构,非政府组织在其下的参与也同样影响WTO主体构成。非政府组织当前在争端解决程序的介入以法庭之友的身份。自海虾-海龟案后,上诉机构在争端决程序中逐步发展出一套非政府组织主动向其提交意见书的程序,引发了成员方争论。因此,本章立足于案例研究,通过对海虾-海龟案、英国钢铁案、欧共体石棉案,以及新近的巴西翻新轮胎案等的研读,对上诉机构处理非政府组织在WTO下司法参与的正当性进行分析。分析以DSU中涉及非政府组织司法参与的条文作为依据,借助于《维也纳条约法公约》的条约解释原则,然后得出结论:加强非政府组织在WTO下的司法参与本身并非不当,但上诉机构运用司法能动主义的模式篡夺了政治机构的立法权限,违背社会价值引入WTO的正当模式,并且在处理非政府组织提交意见书的方式上也违反了司法的正当程序。
非政府组织在整个国际法领域下的参与并非WTO体制下的独特现象。鉴于政府间组织在管辖领地上存在着潜在的竞争,市民社会在游说参与权的过程中也试图以“体制转移”的策略在较为友善的政府间组织中推行相关的社会价值。因此,第五章通过体制的比较分析,借助于对其他政府间国际组织,如联合国、世界银行、OECD以及区域性贸易组织下非政府组织参与权的研究,以期对WTO下相关制度建设提供借鉴。所有的国际组织同WTO一样,面临着相同的民主缺失问题,并承受着外部市民社会的压力。但不同的国际组织给与非政府组织参与权的程度是不同的,获得的成效也不同。本章的分析分为两部分:首先是非政府组织在其他政府间组织中决策参与的状况以及政府间组织对于非政府组织的行为规范;其次是非政府组织在其他政府间组织下司法或执行参与状况及其评价。需要注意的是,即便是类似的贸易组织,参与的路径和参与的程度也不能照搬。例如,欧盟体制下非政府组织不仅具有非争端方的司法参与权,还享有争端方的诉讼提起权。对于后者,WTO尚且不具备授予的条件。私人诉权在WTO体制下的推行,需要具备几个因素:WTO下各成员方经济、文化、社会等因素的进一步趋同和整合;WTO体制要真正演变为类似于欧盟的新法律秩序,以及WTO法对成员方国民有直接适用的效力。
最后,通过上述五章的分析,第六章得出加强非政府组织在WTO下参与权的若干建议。首先,应完善WTO下非政府组织参与的规定,为增进非政府组织的参与权提供条约基础或法律依据;其次,争端解决机构在进行有关非政府组织司法参与约文的解释上,应司法克制,慎防司法立法行为;再次,鉴于非政府组织地域分布的不均衡,在构建非政府组织参与权时,要注意非政府组织的代表性、公正性、专业性等因素,并扶植南方国家非政府组织的发展,给与南方市民社会意见优先的考虑;另外,WTO应借鉴其他国际组织下非政府组织参与的方式和行为规范,合理地构建WTO体制下非政府组织参与权;最后,中国作为WTO的成员,并且是最富有影响力的发展中成员方之一,应看清非政府组织在全球治理中参与的实质和趋势,并积极扶持本国非政府组织的成长和壮大,促进市民社会在中国的形成和成熟,从而更充分地发挥中国非政府组织在全球治理中代表中国民众的作用。
总之,非政府组织将持续在国际法领域中发挥作用并争取参与权。她们对WTO封闭性的抵制和抗议不利于WTO新议题的谈判,也使得WTO逐渐丧失民心。鉴于非政府组织参与已经成为一种不可逆转的趋势,WTO也无从逃避。只有顺应形势,并且摸索出一套系统的、合理的与非政府组织咨询路径,才能改善其民主正当性,保障体制的可持续发展。
The Participation Right of NGOs in the WTO is a new but challenging legal issue. Before Uruguay Round, GATT, the predecessor of the WTO is firmly defined as“member driven”agreements, which deny the participation right of NGOs completely. Only after establishment of the WTO, does Marrakech Agreement allow the WTO consult with NGOs, which provides the legal basis for the participation of NGOs. As the civil society becomes stronger, NGOs are increasingly unsatisfied with the superiority of trade value pursued by the WTO. They stand for public interests and minority interests, aggressively fight for the“Voice Right”in the WTO. If the protests held by NGOs are outward force pushing forward the reform of the WTO, the need for sustainable development is the inner cause for transparence and participation reform. When WTO rules have been treated as the legal basis to allocate the interests of different peoples around the world in fields of trade, investment, intellectual property, environmental protection, competition and so on, the“democratic deficiency”of the WTO, which is operated on“club model”, has been clearly unveiled. The issue of NGO’s participation right comes to light right in this situation, and constitutes a critical element in deciding the legitimacy and democracy of the institution. If solved properly, the sustainable development of the WTO will be ensured.
Therefore, the thesis makes a detailed analysis on whether NGOs should have participation right in the WTO, the route of participation and the legitimacy of participation.
The thesis is divided into six chapters, which adds up to 240,000 words. The first two chapters raise the questions, what is NGOs’participation right in the WTO, and what are the necessities for their participation. Then, the constituency and legitimacy of NGOs’participation are analyzed in Chapter 3, 4 and 5. Chapter 6 draws a conclusion after theoretical and empirical studies in former chapters.
Chapter 1 is the cornerstone of the thesis, which introduces the definition, status of NGOs and scope of participation right. This chapter first compares definitions of NGOs in different international conventions and legal documents, and summarized the requirements and characteristics of NGOs as commonly recognized by international community. The differences between NGO and transnational civil society is defined here as well. Participation Right is another controversial legal term. The recent evolvement of participation right in international relations, breaking the limits of human right or political right nature, but entrusted it with a democratic entitle. And more importantly, the ratification of certain conventions on environmental protection enlarges the scope of participation right, which extends its range from policy-making to legislation, execution and litigation. Chapter 1 also describes the impacts of recent development of international policies on NGOs’participation, which constitutes the background of the research. First, the jurisdiction of WTO is enlarged from trade area to social value area, which requires the WTO listen to civil society’s opinions, who stands for social value. Secondly, the rapid development of civil society provides material basis for the“third department”to participate in legislation, execution and enforcement of international rules. Thirdly, social law is separated from public law and private law, provides new arena to solve the transnational social problems. And the last but not the least, the democratic deficit encountered by the WTO also requires more democratic input through participation of civil organizations.
Chapter 2 focuses on the necessity of NGOs’participation in WTO. From the perspective of cost-benefit, NGOs’participation will enhance the efficiency and legitimacy of international law. Numerous binding trade rules are adopted with the assistance of NGOs, which rectifies the deficiency of trade rules drafted by the International Governmental Organizations. NGOs also help interpret existing trade rules, clarify ambiguities, and fill the gaps, so as to promote the international trade. Furthermore, as“friends of courts”, NGOs can provide expert opinions to international courts, and assist in the running of international judicial procedures. Apart from these, NGOs may enhance the democracy of international trade rules as well. The involvement of NGOs in execution can make the rules de-politicalized. And they represent non-trade organizations, fight for the interests of trade stakeholders, which changes the potential discriminatory nature of the WTO.
Chapter 3 researches on NGOs’participation in policy-making process of the WTO. Several relevant provisions are analyzed first, followed by the introduction of participation manner of NGOs. Actually, the articles directly relating to NGOs’participation are rare, but several provisions under sub-agreements indirectly refer to their participation. As the collecting bond between NGOs and the WTO, the Secretariat allows qualified NGOs attend each Ministerial Meeting from Doha Round. During the Ministerial Meeting, the Secretariat also offers assistance to convene symposia and provides daily briefs for NGOs. Most of the members oppose to give more participation to NGOs. And theories relating to NGOs’participation disagree with each other. Scholars against NGOs’participation emphasize the statism of international law, and treat the WTO as a Club-Model organization. Any non-member shall not be invited into the WTO; otherwise, NGOs will participate twice in domestic and international affairs. So the WTO shall insist on the principle of“exhaustion of democratic right domestically”, denies any types of participation by NGOs. While scholars with individualism opinions impugn on the WTO’s democratic deficit as the WTO is too far away from ordinary people, which makes the rules lack of legitimacy. So this Chapter will compare Regulatory Freedom Theory under statism with Efficient Market Theory and Trade Stakeholder Theory under individualism, and considers which theory shall be adopted by the WTO for future development.
Chapter 4 analyzes NGOs’participation in dispute resolution process of the WTO. The Dispute Resolution Mechanism has been applauded as the“pearls in the crown”. As the de facto juridical branch of the WTO, the participation in DSB also relates to the constituency of subjects of the WTO. Currently, NGOs enter into the judicial procedure of the WTO through“Amicus Curiae”. The Appellate Body have established a series of procedures allowing NGOs submit their opinions without solicitation since Shrimp-Turtle case, which arouse arguments of members. Chapter 4 mainly engages in case studies, through the reading of Shrimp-Turtle case, UK Steel case, EU Asbestos case and the recent Brazil Retreated Tyre case, the legitimacy of Appellate Body’s handling manner on unsolicited Amicus Curiae Briefs is analyzed. After interpreting relevant articles of DSU through the customary method of treaty interpretation adopted by Vienna Convention, the thesis opined as:More judicial participation of NGOs in WTO is free from impunity, but the Appellate Body errs in usurping political organ’s legislative power through judicial activism, incorporating social value into the WTO with illegitimate manner, and violating due process principle when handling NGOs’briefs.
NGOs’participation in international community is not a unique phenomenon for the WTO. As potential competitions for more fields and authorities among different IGOs exist, and civil society tries to using the“regime shifting”strategy to sell their social value to NGO-friendly IGOs, therefore, Chapter 5 takes a comparative study on NGOs’participation in different IGOs, such as UN, World Bank, OECD or regional trade organizations, expecting to give some advices to the WTO. These IGOs all encounter the same“democratic deficit”problem as the WTO, and most survive the pressure from civil society. As different IGOs entitle different participation to NGOs, they are paid off differently. Chapter 5 first studies NGOs’participation in other IGOs’policy making and how these IGOs regulate NGOs behaviors, then continues to study NGOs’participation in judicial process or enforcement mechanism. It’s worthy mentioned that the participatory route shall not be copied directly even from similar trade organizations. For example, the judicial participation right under EU regime includes participation rights both as non-disputing party and disputing party. But the latter shall not be introduced into the WTO. To adopt the individual litigation right in the WTO, certain conditions shall be met: the economy, culture, and social values of the member states shall be converged and integrated further; the WTO shall become a new legal order as the EU, and the WTO rules shall have direct applicability to the nationals of the member states.
After analysis of above five chapters, Chapter 6 summarized as follows. First, the rules relating to consultation with NGOs under WTO shall be further completed, so as to provide legal basis for NGOs’participation. Secondly, the Panel and Appellate Body shall maintain judicial constraint, avoid judicial legislation. Thirdly, the imbalance of distribution of NGOs shall be noticed, and the elements of representation, fairness and professionness shall be taken into account. More resources and opportunities shall be distributed to southern NGOs. Fourthly, the WTO may follow other IGOs’experiences on regulating the behavior of NGOs. The last but not the least, China as the most influential developing country under the WTO, shall respect the tendency of NGOs’participation in global governance. Chinese government shall assist in developing the local NGOs, allowing local NGOs to play positive role in global trade governance.
To sum up, NGOs will continue to function and push for more participation in international law. The resistance and protests by NGOs to the close nature of the WTO have seriously hampered the negotiation of new issues, and taken away people’s confidence and faith on WTO. As their participation has been an unavoidable trend, WTO shall conform to the trend, and find a systematic and reasonable way to consult with NGOs to enhance its democratic legitimacy and ensure a sustainable regime development.
引文
1 WTO 的民主缺失(democracy deficiency)指的是 WTO 规则的制定掌握在各成员方外交代表或商务部部门手中,不能直接向普通民众问责,缺乏足够的民主参与和普遍同意。参见 Robert Howse, “How to Begin to Think About the ‘Democratic Deficit’ at the WTO”, In Stefan Griller (ed.), International Economic Governance And Non-Economic Concerns: New Challenge For The International Legal Order. Wien:Springer. 2002.
2 例如杰克逊教授、彼得斯曼教授、顿那夫教授、沙瓦诺兹教授等. 他们的观点可见 John. H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2006. Steve Charnovitz, “Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law”, American Journal of International Law,Vol.100, 2006. Steve Charnovitz , “Open Democratic Participation Scheme For The World Trade Organization: Transparency and Participation in the World Trade Organization”, Rutgers L. Rev. Vol.56 p.936. Jeffrey L. Dunoff , “The WTO's Legitimacy Crisis: Reflections on the Law and Politics of WTO Dispute Resolution”, Am. Rev. Int'l Arb, Vol. 4(1), 2002. p.202. E.U. Petersmann, Reforming the World Trade System: Legitimacy, Efficiency and Democratic Governance, Oxford University Press, 2005.
3 如威勒教授、谢尔教授、尼古拉斯教授。他们的观点可见 J.H.H. Weiler, “The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement”, The American Review of International Arbitration, Vol.13(2), 2002. p177. G. Richard Shell, “Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization”, Duke L.J. Vol.44, 1995, p.829; Philip M. Nichols, “Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to Nongovernmental Parties”, U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. Vol. 17, 1996, p.295.
4 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr.: “The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy”, in Roger B. Porter, Pierre Sauve (eds.), Efficiency, Equity, Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, Brookings, 2001. p.272.
6 关于争端解决机构的性质,学者们有不同的意见。多数学者认同 GATT 体制下争端解决机制是个准司法机构,而 WTO 争端解决机制是一个司法机构。见左海聪:《国际经济法理论与实践》,武汉大学出版社 2003年版,第 116-125 页。
7 刘页晔:《国际政治领域中的非政府组织——一种互动关系的分析》,天津人民出版社 2005 年版,第 75页。
8 饶戈平:《关于国际组织与国际组织法的几个问题》,载于《国际法律问题研究》,中国政法大学出版社1999 年版,第 194 页。
9 Union of International Associations, Year Book of International Organizations 2002-2003: Guide to Global and Civil Society Network, 39th edition, p.1853. 转引自 Anna-Karin Lindblom: Non-Governmental Organizations in International Law. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005. p.19.
10 例如莱斯特·塞拉蒙在《全球公民社会:非营利部门的向度》一书中将全球市民社会和非政府组织的特征概括为 7 点,分别为民间性、非营利性、自治性、自愿性、有组织性、非政治性和非宗教性。美国学者 杰克勒·斯克杰勒斯贝克对非政府间国际组织作了广泛的界定,认为一个组织只要其成员来自两个不同的国家,且至少有一个成员不是政府官员,这样的组织即可称为非政府间国际组织。转引自刘传春:《国际政治中的国际性非政府间组织》,载于《国际论坛》1999 年第 6 期第 3 页。《国际关系词典》认为由不同国家的社会团体或个人组成的组织是非政府组织。它与政府间的国际组织相对。这类组织是其成员根据共同的愿望和要求,为解决国际间非政治性的问题或发展某一事业而组成的。一般建有常设工作机构。这种组织的活动,对促进各国人民之间的友好往来、增进人民之间的相互了解和友谊,对促进某些国际事务的解决,对国际关系的发展,具有一定的影响和推动作用。这种组织,是国际间交往的一种形式。这种形式在特殊情况下,可以解决政府间国际组织难以解决的问题,如国际红十字会等。政治学对非政府组织、市民社会的定义如康德、哈贝马斯、爱德华·希尔斯等的观点见后文。
11 Steve Charnovitz , “Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law”, American Journal of International Law,Vol.100, 2006. p350. 根据作者的论述,最早使用“非政府组织”名称的学者除了德怀特·摩洛之外,还有索菲·桑格(Sophy Sanger),他于 1920 年在论证一些组织未能参加 1906 年《劳工条约》第一次多边谈判的原因时,也使用了非政府组织一词。
12 跨国市民社会或国际市民社会是较为广泛为学者们引述作为“非政府组织”代名词的一个用语。除此之外,也有学者称非政府组织为“第三部门”,如莱斯特·塞拉蒙,意指处于个人和政府之间的调整公共产品分配的非营利组织。
13 汪信砚、夏昌奇:《论黑格尔市民社会概念》,载于《武汉大学学报(人文科学版)》2007 年第 3 期,第288 页。
14 [德]黑格尔:《法哲学原理》,范扬,张企泰译,商务印书馆 1961 年版,第 197 页。
15 马克思:《马克思恩格斯全集》第 1 卷,人民出版社 1956 年版,第 252 页。
16 [美]爱德华·希尔斯:《市民社会的美德》,李强译,载邓正来、J.C. 亚历山大编:《国家与市民社会——一种社会理论的研究途径》,中央编译出版社,1999 年版,第 33 页,
17 二分法和三分法两种理论在现代理论中均有自己的支持者。柯亨、哈贝马斯、阿拉托等主流学者所主张的三分法比较符合现代西方社会市民阶层发展的实践,但按照《布莱克维尔政治学百科全书》的解释,市民社会是“表示国家控制之外的社会和经济安排、规则、制度”,是指“当代社会秩序中的非政治领域”。市民社会强调的是对与国家的对立,即《布莱克维尔政治学百科全书》采取了二分法的学说。
18 E/RES288(X), Review of Consultative Arrangements with Non-governmental Organizations, 27 February 1950, para. 8.
19 General Review of Arrangements for Consultations with Non-governmental Organizations: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Agenda Item 3, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/AC.70/1994/5 (1994).
20 E/RES/1996/31, Consultative Arrangements Between the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations, 25 July 1996, para. 12.
21 E/RES/1996/31, Consultative Arrangements Between the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations, 25 July 1996, para. 2, 9-12.
22 Draft World Bank Handbook on Good Practices Relating to Non-Governmental Organizations, p.19.
23 Fundamental Principles on the Status of Non-Governmental Organizations in Europe and Explanatory Memorandum, p.18.
24 AG/RES.57(I-O/71), Standards on Cooperative Relations Between the Organization of American States and the United Nations, its Specialized Agencies, and Other National and International Organizations, 23 April 1971.
25 决议全文可见 http://www.uia.org/legal/app48.php
26 Union of International Associations, Year Book of International Organizations 1996/1997, 33rd edition, vol. 1, pp.1684-1685.
27 UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 22.
29 Steve Charnovitz, “Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 100(1), 2006, p308.
30 王世红:《非政府组织法律地位的考察》,载于《河南师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》,2007 年第 34卷,第 2 期,第 59 页。
31 Sean D. Murphy, “Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Governments in Democratic Governance and International Law”, International. and Comparative Law Quarterly, 48 (1),1999, pp. 545–581.当然有效统治的标准也有其优点。它促成了国际法中一些重要基本原则的形成,如不干涉原则。并且有效统治并不完全违背被统治者的同意,毕竟有效的统治也意味着在国内政治上获得一定程度上的同意。
32 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 10. U.N. GAOR, 47 Sess., Annex 1.
33 Agenda 21, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Annex 2, para. 27.4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/4 (1992).
34 Gregory H. Fox, “The right to Political Participation in International Law”, in Gregory H. Fox and Brad E. Roth(eds), Democratic Governance and International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2000. p.89.
35 第一个此类决议为 UN GA Res. 43/157 (18 Dec. 1988), 转引自苏珊·马克思:《宪政之谜——国际法民主和意识形态批判》,上海世纪出版集团 2005 年版,第 45 页。
36 Thomas M. Franck, “Legitimacy and the Democratic Entitlement” in Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth(eds), Democratic Governance and International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2000. p. 27.
37 Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, Kehl am. Rhein: Engel, 2005 p.387.
38 Anna-Karin Lindblom, Non-Governmental Organizations in International Law. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005. p.514.
39 截至到 2007 年 9 月 18 日止,《奥胡斯法案》共有 41 个成员方,包括欧盟以及欧盟境内各国。
40 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, U.N. Doc.ECE/CEP/43.
41 一战结束后,但泽(现格但斯克)脱离德国,成为国际联盟管理的自由市。根据《凡尔赛和约》第 104条规定,由波兰管理和控制但泽的全部铁路运输系统。1921 年 10 月 22 日,波兰和但泽签订一项关于但泽铁路员工转为波兰铁路局服务的协定。部分但泽铁路员工根据该协定在但泽市法院提起诉讼,要求波兰铁路局为他们遭受到的损失提供金钱补偿。虽然但泽法院认为有权审理本案,但波兰否认但泽法院的管辖权。1926 年 1 月,波兰通知国际联盟驻但泽高级专员,波兰不参加此次诉讼。应但泽方面要求,高级专业于 1927 年 4 月 8 日作出决定,认为转为波兰铁路局工作的但泽铁路员工的金钱赔偿请求,可以构成向多年则法院起诉的理由。但,1921 年双方达成的协定不能作为民事诉讼的依据……,根据公认的法律规则,国际条约只是将权利赋予有关政府,并不直接给予个人。但泽不服,该问题提交国际常设法院。法院认为,按照一项已经权利的国际法原则,国际协定不能直接对个人产生权利和义务。但缔约国可以依照自己的意图采取一些特殊规则,对个人创设权利和义务,并由国内法院强制履行。本案中,缔约国对有关人员创设权利义务的意图可以从但泽与波兰的协定的措辞以及有关当局后来行为中推断出来。见朱文奇主编:《国际法学原理及案例教程》,中国人民大学出版社 2006 年版,第 47 页。
42 1982 年 1 月 7 日,德国籍拉格兰德兄弟因涉嫌抢劫银行和谋杀,被美国亚利桑那州警方逮捕,1984 年12 月 14 日被判处死刑。引起美德两国争议的问题出现在告知环节上,亚利桑那州司法部门在逮捕拉格兰德兄弟时,未告知他们根据《维也纳领事关系公约》所应享有的与本国领事联系并获取帮助的权利,也未就此事项通知德国驻美的有关领事。因此,德国于 1999 年 3 月 2 日,向国际法院提起针对美国的诉讼。法院 2001 年作出的判决,其中针对德国请求解答了《维也纳领事关系公约》第 36 条是否为个人创设权利 的问题。法院认为:公约第 36 条第 1 款(b)项构成了接收国对派遣国及其被拘禁的国民的义务,其中的措辞(略)意思明确,没有什么异议。基于此种考虑,法院确认第 36 条第 1 款的确是创设了个人权利。见邵沙平主编:《国际法院新近案例研究》,商务印书馆 2006 年版,第 426、432 页。
43 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law. 7th ed. London:Routledge, 1997. p.100.
44 William Diebold, Jr. ed., “The End of the ITO, in Essays in International Finance” International Finance Section of the Department of Economics and Social Institutions in Princeton University, vol.16, Oct. 1952.
45 Robert F. Housman, “Democratizing International Trade Decision-making”, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol.27, 1994. p673.
46 Stephan Hobb, “Global Challenges to Statehood: The Increasingly Important Role of Non-Government Organizations”, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol.5,1997, p.276.
47 ICITO/EC.2/11, 15 July, 1948. 秘书建议,转引自 Pederson: “World Trade Organization and Non-governmental Organization”. p.3. see http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/1998-sept/pedersen.pdf , 2007 年 5 月 22日访问。
48 Serdar Altay, “Ideas, Private Sectors and Regime Creation After US Hegemony: The Case of General Agreement on Trade in Service”, 见 http://www.bisa.ac.uk/2006/pps/altay.pdf 2007 年 8 月访问。
49 Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, The WTO as a Mechanism for Securing Market Access Property Rights: Implications for Global Labor and Environmental Issues, J. Econ. Perspectives, Vol.15(3), 2001, at 69, 72, 77-78.
50 GATT, Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice 1043 (6th ed. 1994). 转引自 Maura Blue Jeffords, “Turning the Protester into a Partner for Development: The Need for Effective Consultation Between the WTO and NGO”, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol.28, 2003. p.942. 51 Ibid.
52 John H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT, Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1969. pp.444-457.
53 John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System, Geneva: WTO, 1995, p.276. 原文为“GATT-astrophe”,模仿“cat-astrophe”的英语单词合成模式,构成灾难的意思,指 GATT 背叛了人们的利益,成为跨国公司扩张利润的工具。
54 Thomas A. Wathen, A Guide to Trade and the Environment. New York : Environmental Grantmakers Association, 1992. p.25.
55 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Trade and Sustainable Development Principles 30-31 (1994).see http://www.iisd.org/sd/principle.asp
56 王燕:《WTO 框架下非贸易价值理念研究》,载于《国际经贸探索》2007 年第 7 期,第 44 页到 45 页。
57 I.M. Destler & Peter J. Balint, The New Politics of American Trade: Trade, Labor, and the Environment , Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1999, p.1-3.
58 Andrew T. Guzman, “Global Governance and the WTO”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol.45, 2004. p303-323. 古兹曼教授认为可在 WTO 下划分不同子部门,由各子部门协商各个议题。
59 David W. Leebron, “The Boundaries of WTO: Linkages”, Am J Intl L R., Vol. 96, 2002 p.5, 12.
60 Jagdish Bhagwati, “What Really Happened in Seattle”, see http://www.Columbia.edu/jb38/really.pdf 2006年 12 月访问。
61 Frieder Roessler, “Domestic Policy Objectives and the Multilateral Trade Order: Lessons from the Past”, in Anne O. Krueger ed., The WTO as an International Institution, University of Chicago Press, 1998.p.213.
62 Jeffrey L. Dunoff, “Global Trade Issues In The New Millennium: The WTO In Transition: Of Constituents, Competence And Coherence”, Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. Vol.33, 2001. p.985.
63 Andrew T. Guzman, “Global Governance and the WTO”, p.303.
64 Claude E. Barfield, “Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization”, Chi. J. Int'l L.Vol.2, 2001, pp.404-405.
65 John S. Odell, “ The Seattle Impasse and Its Implications for the World Trade Organization” in Daniel L. M. Kennedy and James D(eds), The Political Economy of International Trade Law, Cambridge University Press, 2002. p.400.
66 Michael Edward, “Civil Society and Global Governance”. p. 1-2. http://www.unu.edu/millennium/edwards.pdf, 2007 年 8 月 31 日访问。
67 余劲松:《经济全球化与国际经济法》载于《法学家》,2003 年第 3 期。 转引自人大国际法网http://www.rucil.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=258,2007 年 1 月 2 日访问。
68 [美] 莱斯特·萨拉蒙:《非盈利部门的崛起》,谭静译,载于《全球化与公民社会》,李惠斌主编,广西师范大学出版社 2003 年版,第 173 页。
69 Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, II, The Power of Identity, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, p.243, and III, End of Millennium, 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, p.377.
70 西方学者对国际法进行实证分析时,为了规避给予个人以国际法主体的称呼,多以行为体或活动主体加以称呼。按照传统观点,国际法主体应能独立参与国际立法或国际法的执行,而行为体(actor)主要从实证分析的角度,参与国际事务,并对国际法产生影响的个体。
71 陈立虎、茆晓燕:《反全球化对国际经济法发展的影响》,载于《苏州大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》,2005年第 4 期,第 25 页。
72 Philippe J. Sands, “The Environment, Community and International Law”, Harv. Int'l L.J. Vol.30, 1989, p.393, 412.
73 John. H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law. Cambridge University Press, 2006. p.131.
74 Jeffery Atik, “Democratizing the WTO”, George Washington International Law Review, 2001. Vol.33. p451.
75 Claire R. Kelly, “Power, Linkage and Accommodation: The WTO as an International Actor and Its Influence on Other Actors and Regimes”, Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, 2006.p.79.
76 譬如,斯劳特在《真正的世界秩序》一文中反对国内政府意义正在减弱,也不赞成国际机构、亚国家权威、非政府主体的重要性正在提高的观点。她认为,国际治理正发生着深刻的变迁,但这两种分析都没有捕捉到真正的变化,因为它们都专注于错误的领域。观察的中心应该放在跨政府互动的变化。实际上,她提倡不要以纯粹的博弈论,通过对国际领域行为体力量消长来考察国际治理的发展趋势,而更因关注政府间行为的方式。她认为,并非主权或国家不再重要,而是主权正在解体,国家发挥作用的形式改变了。具体而言,她指出:国家……正解体为相互分离、功能各异的各个部门。这些部分——法院、监管机构行政,甚至立法——正各自与它们对等的海外机构进行沟通,创造着一个慎密的关系网,这种关系网构成了一个新的跨政府秩序。今天的国际问题,包括恐怖主义、犯罪组织、环境恶化、洗钱、银行倒闭和证券欺诈,创造并维系了这种关系。斯劳特将其定义为“跨政府主义”,并认为跨政府网络是国际法将成为全球治理的操作载体。以巴塞尔银行监管委员会为例,这一委员会不是国家间协议的产物,而是十二位中央银行行长的决定。尽管改委员会缺乏正式的或法律上的能力,但它还是发挥着相当大的影响力:“华尔街更关注巴塞尔委员会,而非世界银行。”斯劳特的观点详见 A.-M. Slaughter: “The Real New World Order”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.76(5),1997, pp.185-188. 笔者认为,斯劳特的实证分析看似颇具有说服力,但她对其他学者的批评也言过其实了。国家发挥作用方式的改变,政府部门的分离本身也体现为国家控制能力的减弱,并且没有任何国际法实践可以否认非政府组织力量的崛起。重要的是,很多学者都否认“跨政府主义”能够实现斯劳特所描述的政府之间的监督和民主理念的传播。事实上,跨政府主义倒似乎可以被看成是在往相反的方向推进。例如,苏珊·马克思详尽分析了斯劳特的观点后,提出“即使公民能让他们自己的政府对其跨政府行为负责,民主合法性还是要求这一责任夸大到面向所有那些受影响的人”,即跨政府主义不能满足民众民主合法性要求。跨政府主义终究不能体现为一种善法之治。任何民众都无法接受将他国政府的政策和意志强加到本国人民的身上。苏珊·马克思的观点可见:苏珊·马克思:《宪政之谜——国际法、民主和意识形态批判》,上海世纪出版集团 2005 年版,第 111 页。
77 张文显主编:《法理学(第二版)》,高等教育出版社 2003 年版,第 82 页。
78 可见吕世伦、任岳鹏:《根本法、市民法、公民法和社会法》,载于《求是学刊》,2005 年第 5 期,第 73页。董保华、郑少华:《社会法-对第三法域的探索》,载于《法学论坛》1999 年第 1 期,第 31-32 页。董保华:《社会法原论》,中国政法大学出版社 2001 年版。王保树、邱本:《经济法与社会公共性论纲》,载《法律科学》2000 年第 3 期,第 63-64 页。张长利:《论政策性银行法的性质》,载于《学术论坛》2000年第 2 期,第 41 页。
79 社会法是公法和私法在融合过程中产生的,是国家为了保障社会利益,通过加强对社会生活干预而产生的一种立法。社会立法最早在西方资本主义国家产生,是垄断资本主义社会各种矛盾积累的结果。资本 主义积极国家论和福利国家论的展开,市民法原理的形式性适用带来了越来越多的实质性不平等。例如,在契约自由的前提下,处于劣势地位的劳动者被强迫在低工资和超时间的条件下工作;在自由放任的竞争中获胜的企业,形成垄断体,开始控制价格和费用,操纵市场;自由放任社会的景气变动和恐慌,使人们、特别是老人和病人陷入贫困,等等。这些矛盾使国家不得不关注劳动、福利、教育等方面的问题,并运用政治和法律手段予以调整。而传统经济立法旨在市场失灵时,由国家干预,有效配置资源,追求效率为主要原则,无法适应新问题的解决。因此,劳动法、社会保障法等应运而生,他们从缓和社会矛盾,人文关怀的角度出发,扶助弱势群体,注重经济发展中非既得利益者的保护,与传统的经济立法不同。
80 徐崇利:《经济全球化与国际法中“社会立法”的勃兴》,载于《中国法学》,2004 年第 1 期,第 142 页。
81 徐崇利:《经济全球化与国际法中“社会立法”的勃兴》,载于《中国法学》,2004 年第 1 期,第 142-143页。
82 Helfer, “Regime shifting, The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking”, Yale J. Int'l L. Vol.29, 2004, p.5.
83 [美]罗伯特·基欧汉:《霸权之后:世界政治经济中的合作与纷争》,苏长河译,上海人民出版社 2001年版,第 111 页。
84 Kal. Raustiala, “Sovereignty and Multilateralism”, Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, No.2, 2000.p.412.
85 Frank Emmert, “Labor, Environmental Standards and World Trade Law”, U.C. Davis Journal of International Law & Policy, Vol. 10(3), 2003, p.85-86.
86 Sylvia Ostry, “The WTO and International Governance”, in Klaus Gunter Deutsch & Bernhard Speyer (eds), The World Trade Organization Millennium Round, London: Routledge, 2001. p.285.
87 Pawleyn, “The Sutherland Report: A Missed Opportunity for Genuine Debate on Trade, Globalization and Reforming the WTO”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.8(2), 2005, pp. 329-346.
88 Jeffery Atik, “Democratizing the WTO”, George Washington International Law Review, Vol.33. 2001, p452.
89 Kal. Raustiala, “ Sovereignty and Multilateralism”, Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol.1, No.2, 2000, p.410.
90 Sylvia Ostry. “External Transparency: The Policy Process at the National Level of the Two-level Game” in Mike Moor(ed.), Doha and Beyond: The Future of the Multilateral Trading System, Cambridge University Press, 2004. p.94. 总的来说,内部透明度涉及的是 WTO 程序和文件对 WTO 成员方,主要是发展中国家的成员方是否透明的问题,如绿屋谈判;而外部透明度指的是 WTO 对成员方以外的组织和机构是否透明的问题。
91 Sylvia Ostry, “Doha and After”. Speech in From Doha to Kananskis Conference. March, 2002.
92 Frieder Roessler, “The Institutional Balance Between the Judicial and Political Organs of the WTO”, Presentation to the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June 2000.
93 Peter Sutherland, “Is Free Trade Fair? Has it Gone Too Far?”, Harvard University Center for International Affairs, August 2000. See http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/fellows/papers/1999-00/sutherland.pdf 2007 年 5 月 1 日访问。
94 United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, “Remarks on Trade and Environment at the Global Legislators Organization for a Balanced Environment”(Feb. 28, 1994). 转引自 Steve Charnovitz, “Opening The WTO to Nongovernmental Interests”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 24. p175.
95 Jeffrey L. Dunoff, “Global Trade Issues In The New Millennium: The WTO In Transition: Of Constituents, Competence And Coherence” , Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. Vol.33, 2001, p.979.
96 [美]戴维·布朗等:《全球化、非政府组织和多部门关系》,载李惠斌主编:《全球化与公民社会》,广西师范大学出版社 2003 年版,第 146 页。
97 Pierre Kazansky, “Theorie de l'administration internationale”, RGDIP, Vol.9, 1902, p.353, 354, 357.
98 Alvarez, Jose, International Organizations As Law-makers, Oxford University Press, 2005. p.611.
99 Philip C. Jessup, Adolf Lande, & Oliver J. Lissitzyn, International Regulation Of Economic And Social Questions, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,1955, p.33.
100 [日]松井芳郎等著:《国际法(第四版)》,辛崇阳译,中国政法大学出版社 2004 年版,第 56 页。
101 Robert O’Brien, “Global Civil Society and Global Governance” in Alice D. Ba and Mathew J. Hoffmann(eds.), Contending Perspectives on Global Governance, London: Routledge, 2005. p.224.
102 樊勇明:《全球化与国际关系行为主体的多元化》,载于范丽珠主编:《全球化下的社会变迁与非政府组织》,上海人民出版社 2003 年版,第 95 页。
103 赵秀文:《国际商事仲裁法》,中国人民大学出版社 2004 年版,第 354 页。
104 姚莉:《非政府组织与国际贸易》,载于《西北师范大学学报(社会科学版)》,2007 年第 1 期,第 126页。
105 王秀梅:《国际非政府组织与国际法之“跨国立法”》,载于《河南政法管理干部学院学报》,2006 年第4 期,第 205 页。
106 该原则除再次重申《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》中规定的权利不可克减以外,而且说明:在任何情况下,即使是宣称为了维持国家生命的目的,这些权利都不可克减。
107 United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, (98-000) P 129,168 (Oct. 12, 1998)
108 Harold Koh, “Why do Nations Bringing International Law Home”, Houston L. Rev. Vol.35, 1998. p.623.
109 Jan Art Scholte, “The Globalization of World Politics,” in John Baylis and steve Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics, Oxford University Press, 2001. p.21-22.
110 Bryan A. Garner(ed.), Black’s Law Dictionary. 7th ed. p.83.
111 Bryan A. Garner:《牛津现代法律用语辞典》,法律出版社,第 51-52 页。
112 赵海峰、高立忠:《论国际司法程序中的法庭之友制度》,载于《比较法研究》,2007 年第 3 期,第 68页。
113 我国苏州市中级人民法院民事审判第三庭在处理涉外案件中也引入了“法庭之友”制度。在隐名股东、加工纠纷案中的事实查明问题上,由于投资和货物流转过程中的审查环节比较多,专业性较强,加之相关当事人存在规避法律的现象,给法官审理隐名股东、加工纠纷案带来不少难度。为此,法院从苏州外经委、海关、工商局、报关公司等单位聘请 28 名专业或技术领域的专家为“法庭之友”。合议庭根据案件类型、争议问题,可从 28 名“法庭之友”中邀请 3 至 6 名旁听庭审。在休庭时间内,合议庭充分听取“法庭之友” 就争议的专业或技术问题发表意见。“法庭之友”审案方式弥补了法官专业知识的不足,保证了办案质量。四年来,利用该方式审结的涉外商事案件当事人均未上诉,取得了较好的效果。见环球商业评论网:中国从事涉外审判的法官及他们所面对的难题http://www.cngbr.com/wim/cngbr/article.jsp?rId=D6416548DE54146E42662D10497E1441 2006 年 11 月 24 日刊登。也可见中国商务部网页。
114 Pannel Report on Brazil-Measures on Affecting Imports of Retreated Tyres. WT/DS332/R, June 12, 2007.
115 Joyeeta Gupta, “Non-State Actors In International Governance And Law: A Challenge Or A Blessing”, Journal of International & Comparative Law, Vol.11.2005. p450.
116 SC Res. 771, para. 5 (Aug. 13, 1992). 转引自 Steve Charnovitz , “Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law”, American Journal of International Law,Vol.100, 2006.p.353.
117 SC Res. 1470, para. 8 (Mar. 28, 2003). 转引自 Steve Charnovitz , “Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law”, American Journal of International Law,Vol.100, 2006. p.353.
118 刘贞晔:《国际政治领域中的非政府组织——一种互动关系的分析》,天津人民出版社 2005 年版,第72 页。
119 莫纪宏:《论人权的司法最终救济性》,载于《法学家》,2001 年第 3 期,第 16 页。
120 如萨切曼和莫热门教授的观点,见 Joel P. Trachtman and Philip M. Moremen, “Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Whose Right Is It Anyway?”, Harv. Int'l L.J, Vol. 44, 2003, p.222. 另可见 David Livshiz , “Public Participation In Disputes Under Regional Trade Agreements: How Much Is Too Much--The Case For A Limited Right Of Intervention”, N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. Vol.61, 2005. pp.534-550.
121 Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, Res. 2000/7, U.N. Sub-Comm’n. on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 52nd Sess., preamble. 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7. 根据决议,冲突体现为:(1)对发展中国家技术转让;(2)植物栽培者权利和转基因生物专利者的权利;(3)生物剽窃;(4)本地社群自然资源和文化的控制;(5)专利药物获取限制对健康权的影响。
122 Laurence R. Helfer: Regime Shifting:The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, YALE J.INT’L L. 1, Vol.29, 2004. pp.23-47. 同样观点可见 Laurence R. Helfer, “Nesting and Complexity in the International Intellectual Property Regime”, available at http://www.princeton.edu/~smeunier/Helfer%20memo.pdf 以及 “Human rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence? “Available at http://mipr.umn.edu/archive/v5n1/Helfer.pdf , 2007 年 6 月 7 日访问。
123 Laurence R. Helfer, “Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflicts or Coexistence?”, Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. Vol. 47(5), 2003. p.60.
124 详细内容可见 IGC’s work and supporting documents, http://www.wipo.org/globalissues/index.html. 2007 年 12 月 12 日访问。
125 Laurence Helfer, “Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking”, Yale J. Int'l L., Vol.29(1), 2004. Helfer 教授所说的体制(regime),含义为某个特定的国际组织。他的文章分析了非政府组织在知识产权领域进行体制转移的原因、本质及成本等。实际上体制转移并非非政府组织开创,美国、欧共体为了更有效的保护本国知识产权,将对知识产权的谈判从 WIPO转移到 GATT 体制下,最终促使 WTO 下 TRIPS 协议的达成,这也是体制的转移。在非政府组织和发展中国家的努力下,体制转移的效应已经体现在四个领域中知识产权立法的激增。它们分别是:生物多样性、植物基因资源、公共健康以及人权。体制转移的效果是试图以国际软法规则代替或干扰硬法规则的实施。Helfer 教授所指的“体制转移”是指通过有意图的举动将立法举动从一个国际场合转移到另一个国际场合。Dunoff 教授将这种行为类比为当事人在民事诉讼中“挑选法院”(forum shopping)的举动。
126 Claire R. Kelly, “Power, Linkage and Accommodation: The WTO as an International Actor and Its Influence on Other Actors and Regimes”, Berkeley J. Int'l L. Vol.24, 2006, p.110.
127 李振纲:《WTO 与非政府组织关系初探》,载于《法学评论》,2003 年第 3 期,第 91 页。
128 August Reinisch and Christina Irgel, The participation of NGOs in the WTO dispute system, Nonstate Actors and International Law 1, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2001, p.130.
129 Anna-Karin Lindblom, Non-Governmental Organizations in International Law. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005. p.28.无论是国内法,还是国际法,作为一种治理的工具,都应具有正当性。法的正当性体现着法对资源分配的正义。但对于国际法而言,有效性,即效率也是非常重要的价值。国际法是国家之间的协议意志的体现,国际贸易规则的价值也取决于国家之间能否有效率的达成贸易规则。
130 王秀梅:《国际非政府组织与国际法之“跨国立法”》,载于《 河南政法管理干部学院学报》,2006 年第 4 期,第 205 页。
131 肖元恺:《全球新坐标:国际载体与权利转移》,国际文化出版公司 2003 年版,第 106 页。
132 Joost Pauwelyn, “The Transformation of World Trade”, Mich. L. Rev. Vol.104, 2005, p.5.
133 此处的立法参与主要是指非政府组织在 WTO 规则形成和制定过程中的参与权,即 WTO 在进行国际立法时非政府组织的参与权。鉴于 WTO 成员方制定规则时也是行使其决策权的表现,因此,也有学者将立法参与称为决策参与。本文中立法参与和决策参与是互换的概念,没有本质区别。
134 路特维勒小组的组成人员是: 瑞士国家银行以及国际清算银行主席 Fritz Leutwiler, Getulio Vargas 基金以及巴西前财务部部长的 Simonsen,美国议员以及议会财务委员会的成员 Bill Bradley,伦敦政治经济学院董事以及印度储备银行主管 I.G. Patel, 国际法院副主席 Guy Ladreit de Lacharriere,印度尼西亚前贸易工业部及财务部部长 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo ,和 AB 沃尔沃公司总裁 Pehr Gyllenhammar。 该项目由私人非营利来源的资金资助,主要是福特基金。 报告英文原名为“Trade Policy for a Better Future”。
135 Bill Bradley and Fritz Leutwiler, Trade Policies for a Better Future: Proposals for Action, Gen Agreement Tariffs Trade, 1985. p.36.
136 Pedersen, “The World Trade Organization and Non-governmental Organizations”, p.8. http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/1998-sept/pedersen.pdf
137 G. Sampson, “Overview” in G. Sampson(ed.), The Role of the World Trade Organization in Global Governance, United Nations University Press, 2001. p.11.
138 General Council, Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations, WT/L/162, dated 23 July 1996.
139 Steve Charnovitz, “Open Democratic Participation Scheme for the World Trade Organization: Transparency and Participation in the Would Trade Organization”, Rutgers L. Rev. Vol.56, 2000. p.179. 作者这里唯一主体并非指国家是国际法的唯一主体,而指处理国际关系的唯一相关主体。政府间组织也是国家为了处理国际关系而设立的。
140 见 World Trade Organization, “WTO Secretariat activities with NGOs”, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min01e/mi n01ngoactive.htm (last visited May 31, 2003).
141 World Trade Organization, “Registration for Non-Governmental Organizations”, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min03e/ng oacce.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2003).
142 观察员来自于联合国的实践,后被政府间国际组织所广泛采纳。观察员不具有表决权,但能出席国际组织的有关会议,并对派出国汇报。WTO 下的观察员制度主要针对政府以及政府间组织设置的。根据《政府间国际组织在 WTO 享受观察员地位的指南》,被授予观察员资格的政府间国际组织可获取 WTO 的主要文件,可以被邀请在某一会议上发言。
143 Daniel C. Esty, “We the People: Civil Society and World Trade Organization”, in Marco Bronckers andReinhard Quick(eds), New Directions in International Economic Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000, p.90.
144 Pedersen, “The World Trade Organization and Non-governmental Organizations”. p.8. http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/1998-sept/pedersen.pdf
145 非政府组织放弃最终与会的机会主要原因是派代表到日内瓦参加会议的费用。
146 Pedersen, “The World Trade Organization and Non-governmental Organizations”. p.12. http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/1998-sept/pedersen.pdf
147 WTO news, Press/240, 13 August 2001. see http://www.wto.org/English/news_e/pres01_e/pr240_e.htm
148 Joint Ngo Statement On Trips And Public Health WTO Deal On Medicines: A "Gift" Bound In Red Tape,September 10, 2003, http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/ngos09102003.html . 意指 WTO 最终达成了一项向穷人提供药品的协定,但非政府组织认为这项送给穷人的礼物也有很多限制,如同被胶布裹住了一样。非政府组织认为《公共健康宣言》权利授予部分仅 52 字,但另外规定 3200 字的内容限制权利的适用。联名的
14 个非政府组织包括行动巴黎、消费者技术工程、国际消费者、 基本行动、欧洲艾滋病治疗小组、国际健康行动、全球健康准入工程、国际人民健康理事会、无国界医师组织、国际牛津救济委员会、人类健康运动,SEATINT, 第三世界网络,妇女发展组织等。
149 Memorandum on the Need to Improve Internal Transparency and Participation in the WTO. http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/par/MEMORANDUM_ON_THE_NEED_TO_IMPROVE_IT_Final_version.doc 该《备忘录》由第三世界网络、国际乐施会、国际公共服务、世界自然基金会、国际环境法中心、关注全球南方、农业和贸易政策学会、非洲贸易网络、国际性别和贸易网络、特波提巴国际土著居民权利中心等十个非政府组织联名提交。
150 Civil Society Calls On Rich Countries To Stop Imposing Extreme Demands At The WTO Sixth Ministerial Conference. 16th December, 2005. See http://www.twnside.org.sg/announcement/NGO_STATEMENT_ON_Hong_Kong_Ministerial_final.doc
151 Submission from United States, “General Council Informal Consultations on External Transparency”, WT/GC/W/413/Rev.1, dated 13 October 2000.
152 Discussion Paper from the European Community to the WTO General Council on ‘Improving the Functioning of the WTO System’, WT/GC/W412, dated 6 October 2000.
153 Submission from Hong Kong, ‘General Council Informal Consultations on External Transparency’, WT/GC/W418, dated 31 October 2000, para.9.
154 M.Moore, “How Trade Liberalization Impacts on Employment, Speech to the International Labor Organization”, 18 March 2002, http://www.wto.org/french/news_f/spmm_f/spmm80_f.htm
155 Peter Van den Bossche, “NGO Involvement in the WTO: A Lawyer’s Perspective on a Glass of Half-full or Half-empty?” p.13. http://www.unimaas.nl/bestand.asp?id=6981 2007 年 7 月访问。
156 The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Legal Texts, pp. 469-71.
157 专题研讨会和年会区分并不绝对,年会的主题也可能比较专向性,与专题研讨会交叉。例如后文所提到的 2002 年年会“多哈回合议程及超越”主要论及贸易与发展问题,也可划入专题研讨会。
158 Steve Charnovitz, “Opening The WTO to Nongovernmental Interests”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 24, 2000, p176-178.
159 NGO Response to Revised Draft Text: From Bad to Worse! September 13, 2003. http://www.igtn.org/pdfs/224_NGOstmtCancun.pdf 该声明由国际性别和贸易网路、关怀中心、女性发展协会(加拿大)、女性发展(欧洲)、亚太食物主权网络、伯尔尼宣言等九个非政府组织联名发表。
160 Peter Van Den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, Cambridge University Press, 2005. p.159.
161 各次研讨会的信息可见 WTO 网页与非政府组织相关信息 http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngo_e.htm#activities
162 见 WTO 网站 First series of Issue-specific dialogues with Civil Society organized by the WTO Secretariat The Development Component of the DDA,http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngo_dialogue_e.htm published on 27 April, 2007.
163 相关信息可见 WTO 网站新闻,WTO Director-General , Pascal Lamy, Briefed NGOs on the State of Play of Doha Round Negotiations, http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngo_briefing_e.htm published on 27 March, 2007.
164 Open Letter on Institutional Reform, WTO Activist, October 2001, at wto-activist@iatp.org.
165 Peter Van Den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, Cambridge University Press, 2005. p.133.
166 Pedersen, “World Trade Organization and Non-governmental Organization”, p.22.
167 Black law dictionary, Bryan A. Garner(ed.), 7th edition, p.912.
168 高岚君:《国际法的价值论》,武汉大学出版社 2006 年版,第 19 页。
169 白桂梅:《国际法》,北京大学出版社 2006 年版,第 110-111 页。
170 [澳] 约瑟夫·A·凯米莱里、吉米·福尔克:《主权的终结——日趋“缩小”和“碎片化”的世界政治》,李东燕译,浙江人民出版社 2001 年版,第 281 页。
171 [美]路易斯·亨金:《国际法:政治与价值》,张乃根、马忠法等译,中国政法大学出版社 2004 年版,第 36 页。
172 Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, 2nd ed, Boston: Little Brown, 1863. p.132. 作者将国家形容为道德个体,或道德共同体(moral beings),意在强调国家作为个人集合的道德属性。
173 Gregory H. Fox, “The Right to Political Participation in International Law” in Democratic Governance and International Law, p.51.
174 John H. Jackson, “Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept”, American Journal of International Law, Vol.97, 2003. p.783.
175 刘贞晔:《国际政治领域中的非政府组织——一种互动关系的分析》,天津人民出版社 2005 年版,第 190 页。
176 高岚君:《国际法的价值论》,武汉大学出版社 2006 年版,第 87 页。
177 [美]约翰·罗尔斯:《正义论》,何怀宏、何包钢、廖申白译,中国社会科学出版社 1988 年版,第 3 页。
178 Thomas M. Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, A.J.I.L.,Vol.86, 1992, pp46-91.
179 Thomas M. Franck, “Democracy as a Human Right” in Henkin, L., & Hargrove, J.L.(eds.), Human Rights: An Agenda for the Next Century, Washington D.C.: American Society of International Law, 1994, p.75. 弗兰克认为正当性存在两个单独的问题,一是国内政府的正当性,二是治理的国际合法化。他认为,最终治理的正当性有一天将依据国际规则和国际程序来证实。
180 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, Oxford University Press, 1990. p29.
181 Thomas M. Franck, The Principle of Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Oxford: Clarendon, 1995, p.83.
182 Thomas M. Franck, “Legitimacy and Democratic Entitlement”, in Gregory H. Fox and Brd R. Roth (eds.), Democratic Governance and International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2000. p.31.
183 Thomas M. Franck, “Legitimacy And the Democratic Entitlement” in Democratic Governance and International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2000. p.25.
184 [英]苏珊·马克思:《宪政之谜——国际法、民主和意识形态批判》,上海世纪出版集团 2005 年版,第74 页至 82 页。
185 Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 233.
186 Allen Buchanan, Jutice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law. Oxford University Press, 2004. p. 323, 315.
187 Michelle Ratton Sanchez, “Brief Observations On The Mechanisms For NGO Participation In The WTO”, Sur, International Journal on Human Rights, issue.4, 2006, p.104.
188 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, p. 145.
189 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, p. 147.
190 [英] 约翰·霍夫曼:《主权》,陆斌译,吉林人民出版社 2005 年版,第 83 页。
191 [英]苏珊·马克思:《宪政之秘——国际法、民主和意识形态批判》,第 112-115 页。
192 Anna-Karin Lindblom, Non-Governmental Organizations in International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005.p. 28.
193 何鸣:《从马克思到哈贝马斯》,载于《理论与改革》,2004 年第 2 期,第 13 页。
194 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, MIT Press, 1996, pp.107-110. 另可见哈贝马斯:《民主的三种规范模式》,曹卫东译,http://19720605.fyfz.cn/blog/19720605/index.aspx?blogid=276969 ,2007 年 9 月 22 日访问。哈贝马斯所支持的民主规范模式是话语政治(deliberative Politik),即协商式民主。
195 Thomas M. Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, p.90.
196 Daniel Bodansky, “The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93(4),1999, p.596.
197 Gregory. Fox, “The Political Participation in International Law”, in Gregory H. Fox and Brad E. Roth(eds.), Democratic Governance and International Law,. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. p.50. 原文讲述的是市民大众是主权最终的 reciprocitory.
198 Anna-Karin Lindblom, Non-governmental Organizations in International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005.p28.
199 Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, II , 1997, p.268.
195 Thomas M. Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, p.90.
196 Daniel Bodansky, “The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93(4),1999, p.596.
197 Gregory. Fox, “The Political Participation in International Law”, in Gregory H. Fox and Brad E. Roth(eds.), Democratic Governance and International Law,. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. p.50. 原文讲述的是市民大众是主权最终的 reciprocitory.
198 Anna-Karin Lindblom, Non-governmental Organizations in International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005.p28.
199 Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, II , 1997, p.268.
203 Steve Charnovitz, “The WTO and Cosmopolitics” in E.U. Petersmann(ed.), Reforming the World Trading System: Legitimacy, Efficiency, and Democratic Governance, Oxford University Press, 2005, p.438.
204 Daniel C. Esty, “We the People: Civil Society and World Trade Organization”, in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick(eds.), New Directions in International Economic Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000. p.90. “we the people”, “我们即人民”,这源自美国宪法的开篇语,它表明谁持有最终的政治权力。
205 多数赞成非政府组织参与权的学者均是持话语权,非投票权的立场。如 Charnovitz 认为非政府组织在WTO 下的参与的价值并非要提高 WTO 的代表性,而是为 WTO 的商议提供新的能量、概念以及价值。因此,他把正当性分为两种,一是投入的正当性,即内部正当性,即政府或者国际组织是否代表人们;二是产出的正当性,即外部正当性,政府或者国际组织的决策是否为了人们。他认为非政府组织对于 WTO 的贡献主要是在产出的正当性方面的贡献。Steve Charnovitz : The WTO and Cosmopolitics, in E.U. Petersmann(ed.), Reforming the World Trading System: Legitimacy, Efficiency, and Democratic Governance, Oxford University Press, 2005. p.442.
206 公司法下代理成本问题主要是指现代公司由于所有权和经营权分离,股东作为所有者控制经营管理层的权限越来越小,因此掌握公司控制权的经营管理层的经营决策时常不反映股东的利益,从而产生代理成本的问题。
207 蔡从燕:《市民社会、协商民主与国际法的范式转换》,载于《厦门大学法律评论》第 9 辑,第 257 页。
208 Lori Wallach, “The FP Interview: Lori’s War”, Foreign Pol’y, 2000, p.118 and K. Danaher and R. Burbach (eds), Globalize This! The Battle Against the WTO and Corporate Rule, Common Courage Press , 2000, p.124-128.
209 UN/SG/SM/7318. Press release. 29 February 2000. 转引自鄂晓梅:《国际非政府组织对国际法的影响》,载于《政府论坛》2001 年第 3 期,第 123-124 页。
210 Annan Hails Civil Society Organizations, Crediting Their Support For His Achievements, UN News Centre, see http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?newsid=19777&cr=civil&cr1=society 2006 年 9 月 8 日刊登。
211 Lending Hands, : Civil Society, Philanthropy, and International Investing in Poor Countries, see http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/66ByDocName/LendingHandsCivilSocietyPhilanthropyandInternationalInvestinginPoorCountriesPresentationbyJeffThindwaMay2002/$FILE/UCLAPresentation.pdf , 2006 年12 月访问。
212 OMC (Renato Ruggiero). 1998. The WTO and civil society. Comments by the Director-General to US NGOs. http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngospe_e.htm 2007 年 8 月访问。
213 OMC (Mike Moore). 2002. Globalization: the impact of the Doha Development Agenda on the free marketprocess. http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm77_e.htm 2007 年 8 月访问。
214 René Audet and Rapha?l Canet, “WTO,Global Governance and Civil Society: Image Cleaning or Real Dialogue?” http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/ieim/IMG/pdf/Conference-Canet-Audet-decembre-2005.pdf , 2007 年 8月访问。
215 OMC (Pascal Lamy). 2005 (21 oct.). Vers une gouvernance mondiale? http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl_e.htm 2007 年 8 月访问。
216 James Thuo Gathii, “Open Democratic Participation Scheme For The World Trade Organization: Process and Substance In WTO Reform”, Rutgers L. Rev., Vol. 56, 2004, p.895. 但该报告本身就深受学者的质疑,学者们称其为“内部人”所作出的报告。桑德兰本人曾是石油公司的首席执行官,其他研究成员也均为对 WTO规则产生重要影响的内部人,没有来自贸易与公平运动的代表,甚至没有任何来自市民社会的代表又如robert howse 在全球贸易体制中市民参与的论坛中发言也认为《桑德兰报告》本身没有市民社会的代表,对 WTO 未来改革的言论也不能真正体现市民社会的意见。
217 Peter Sutherland: The Future Scope of WTO,see http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.htm Chapter V, p.41-48. 这个高层建议委员会是在总干事素帕猜·巴尼巴滴任职期间任命的,由彼得·桑德兰主持。总干事要求该建议委员会完全独立,不受秘书处的限制。委员会的任务是对 WTO 体制改革提出建议,而不是对 WTO 讨论的实体问题作出建议。后建议委员会于 2005 年 1 月发表了该报告。有关《桑德兰报告》的背景可见杰克逊教授对报告的介绍和评论:John H. Jackson: The Future Scope of WTO: Issues as Seen in Sutherland Report, see http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/bbl/06032301.html published on March 23, 2006.
218 Harold Koh, “Transnational Public Law Litigation”, Yale L.J. Vol.100, 1990, p.2347.; Steve Charnovitz, “WTO Cosmopolitics”, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol.34, Winter 2002., p.299.
219 Claire R. Kelly, “Power, Linkage and Accommodation: The WTO as an International Actor and Its Influence on Other Actors and Regimes”, Berkeley J. Int'l L., 2006. Vol.24. p.85.
220 G. Richard Shell, “Participation of Nongovernmental Parties in the World Trade Organization: the Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization”, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 17(1), 1996, p.359. 囚徒困境(prisoner dilemma)是博弈论上的术语,来源于一个比喻:两个嫌疑犯(A和B)作案后被警察抓住,隔离审讯;警方的政策是“坦白从宽,抗拒从严”,如果两人都坦白则各判 8 年;如果一人坦白另一人不坦白,坦白的放出去,不坦白的判 10 年;如果都不坦白则因证据不足各判 1 年。囚徒困境反映为个人理性和集体理性的矛盾。在国际贸易领域,个人理性,即个别国家的理性选择不能总体上增进全体国家的利益,即个别国家的本国利益最大化原则得不到全体国家利益的总和最大。因此,国际组织将处于博弈的各个国家集合起来,通过可靠的承诺(公约的方式),使得全体利益最大化。
221 Herbert A. Simon, The Science of the Artificial, 3rd ed. MIT Press, 1996, pp.197-207.
222 Robert O.Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation” in Roger B. Porter, Pierre Sauve (eds.),Efficiency, Equity, and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System in Millennium, Brookings, 2001. p.266.
223 很多学者都认为俱乐部式的治理模式并不意味政府能够代表本国人民的总体利益。国际组织下执行国际立法职能的往往是政府的某个职能部门。如前文所指的斯劳特,这里所提到的基欧汉和奈,以及顿那夫教授、豪斯教授等都提出俱乐部模式不能再证实国际政策的正当性。
224 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations”, 27 World Pol. Vol.27, 1974, p.39, 43.
225 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, “The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy”, in Roger B. Porter, Pierre Sauve (eds.), Efficiency, Equity, Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, Brookings, 2001.p. 267.
226 Dunoff, “Public Participation in the Trade Regime: of Litigation, Frustration, Agitation and Legitimation”, Rutgers L. Rev. Vol.56, 2004, 967.
227 Americo Beviglia Zampetti, “A Rough Map of Challenges to the Multilateral Trading System” in Roger B. Porter(ed.), Efficiency, Equity and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, p.42.
228 Dunoff, “Public Participation in the Trade Regime: of Litigation, Frustration, Agitation and Legitimation”p.967.
229 Robert Howse, “Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law” in J. H. H. Weiler(ed.), The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade? Oxford University Press, 2000 , p.40.
230 刘志云:《现代国际关系理论视野下的国际法》,法律出版社 2006 年版,第 308 页。
231 [美]罗伯特·基欧汉、约瑟夫·奈:《权力与相互依赖》,北京大学出版社 2002 年版,第 227 页。
232 刘志云:《现代国际关系理论视野下的国际法》,法律出版社 2006 年版,第 338 页。
233 David Held. “Democracy and the New International Order”, in Daniele Archibugi and David Held(eds.), Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order, Cambridge University Press, 1995.p.96-99.
234 Daniel C. Esty, “We The People: Civil Society in the WTO in New Directions” in International Economic Law, in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick(eds), New Directions in International Economic Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000. p.89.
235 Ibid.
236 Ibid.
237 John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Economic Law, Cambridge University Press, 2006. p.203.
238 刘志云:《现代国际关系理论视野下的国际法》,法律出版社 2006 年版,第 338-339 页。
239 Philip M. Nichols, “No Two Snowflakes Are Alike: Assumptions Made In The Debate Over Standing Before World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Boards”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol.24, 2000, pp.427-432. Nichols 认为没有两个国际组织是相同的,将 WTO 和其他国际组织下市民参与情况进行比较不合适。
240 Joel P. Trachtman and Philip M. Moremen, “Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Whose Right Is It Anyway?”, Harv. Int'l L.J, Vol.44, 2003, pp.221-251.
241 Steve Charnovitz, “Opening The WTO to Nongovernmental Interests”, Rutgers L. Rev. Vol.56, 2000. p.176.
242 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration Law for Global Integration Law, Jean Monnet Working Paper No 7/01, 2002, pp.34-44. see http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/02/021201.html , 2006 年 11 月访问。
243 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “Constitutionalism and WTO Law: From a State-centered Approach Towards Human Rights Approach in International Law” in The Political Economy of International Trade Law, p. 33.
244 信义义务在公司法上也被翻译为授信义务,在大陆法公司法下比较接近的说法是诚信义务(duty of fidelity)。股东根据资本多数决的原则选出董事,董事作为代理人,对委托人的利益最大化服务。信义义务构成公司法制度的基石,这对于所有权和控制权分离的公司体制下约束掌握控制权的董事及高级管理人员的行为是行之有效的。公司法下的利益相关者理论实际上并非要颠覆现行制度,而是对董事的信义义务加以补充,认为公司不能仅关注投资者利益,而也要注意到公司的社会责任。公司在获取利润的同时,应增进社会其他受影响群体,如消费者、雇用员工、供应商、下游销售商,甚至是公司所在社群环境的利益。公司法下利益相关者理论被批判的主要原因是它将公司追求利润的目标多元化,可能会削弱公司法对投资者投资保护的功能,并且会使得董事会和高级管理人员在面临公司股东利益和利益相关者利益冲突时无所 适从。
245 例如,德国 1976 年《共同决策法》规定在在超过 500 名职工的中型公司中,监事会成员三分之一以上须由职工代表构成;而在超过 2000 职工的大型公司中,监事会的成员半数以上须由职工代表构成。欧盟 2004 年通过的公司法第 13 号指令,也确立收购时董事会决策的利益相关人主义,要求董事会须披露对员工将来的安排。英国《1989 年公司法》中也有若干涉及其他利害关系人的条款,如该法规定董事须每年提交一份董事报告,该报告内容须包括公司雇员的健康、安全和福利;雇员对公司经营、决策、管理的参与等状况。在判例法中,英国法院更是日益接受:一旦公司成立,它不仅作为一独立于成员的实体而存在,并且在行使表决权时,公司成员须考虑到除他们之外的利益。这种趋势在多个涉及到信贷者的判例中尤为明显。即便在美国,利益相关人的利益在涉及并购的法规中有所体现。例如,《威廉姆斯法》规定在收购时董事会的行为必须遵守各州的“其他利益相关人法规”。中国《公司法》第五条规定的“公司从事经营活动,必须遵守法律、行政法规,遵守社会公德、商业道德,诚实守信,接受政府和社会公众的监督,承担社会责任”的要求以及“监事会中公司职工代表的比例不得少于三分之一”的要求均被学界视为公司对利益相关者承担责任的体现。
246 Chris Tollefson, “Games Without Frontiers: Investor Claims and Citizen Submissions Under the NAFTA Regime”, Yale J. Int'l L., Vol.27, 2002, p.141, 165.
247 国家主义,又称为国家中心主义。在此可以被理解为一种理论构建范式,意指在理论构建上排斥非国家行为体分享国际事务直接参与权的理论分析模式。国家主义体现为国家对于国际政治事务的垄断权,包括对国际法制定、执行和实施过程中的垄断权。国家主义曾为历史所证实,因为自 1648 年威斯特伐利亚和约签订以来到 20 世纪中前期,主权国家在很长的历史时期内的确是国际政治中唯一主导力量,国际事
248 Alan Oxley, “Poor Environmental Policy: The Fundamental Problem in the ‘Trade and Environment’ Debate”, in Jagdish Bhagwati (ed.), The Next Trade Negotiating Round: Examining the Agenda for Seattle, proceeding of Conference in Columbia University, 1999, p.63, 69.
249 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, “The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and the WTO: Problems of Democratic Legitimacy”, in Roger B. Porter, Pierre Sauve (eds.), Efficiency, Equity, Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, Brookings, 2001.p.280.
250 August Reinisch & Christina Irgel, “The Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations In The WTO Dispute Settlement System”, in Non-State Actors And International Law Vol.1 Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2001, p.131.
251 作者所述四次危机是指福利国家危机:福利国家社会福利开支过重,从而排挤私人投资。而政府官僚机构根据政治的需要,需扩大政府服务,超出了公众支付相应款项的意愿。发展危机是指 70 年代石油危机和 80 年代早期经济萧条使得撒和拉疑难的非洲、西亚和拉丁美洲部分地区,人均收入开始下降。环境危机是指发展重国家的持续贫困致使穷人为了生存而破坏他们周围的环境,同时有钱人则持挥霍浪费的做法和漫不经心的态度,导致严重的环境退化。社会主义危机是指社会主义的承诺收到人们怀疑,人民需要寻找新的方式来满足自己先前没有得到满足的社会和经济需要。两次革命性变化是指发生在 20 世纪 70 至80 年代的通讯革命,使得全球通讯体系开放,人类受教育水平和识字率显著提高。第二次革命是 60 年代到 70 年代中产阶级革命。经济的增长不仅带来物质改善,还使民众产生了新的期望。中产阶级兴起对领导结社革命起到了重要作用。
252 [美]莱斯特·萨拉蒙:《非营利部门的崛起》,载于谭静编译:《全球化与公民社会》,广西师范大学出版社 2003 年版,第 178-180 页。
253 高岚君:《国际法的价值论》,武汉大学出版社 2006 年版,第 102 页。
254 [德]G·拉德布鲁赫:《法哲学》,王朴译,法律出版社 2005 年版,第 195 页。
255 [德]N·霍恩:《法律科学与法哲学导论》,罗莉译,法律出版社 2005 年版,第 316 页。
256 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “Constitutionalism and WTO Law: From a State-Centered Approach Towards a Human Rights Approach in International Economic Law”, in The Political Economy of International Trade Law, p.34, 60-64. 彼得斯曼教授认为贸易权属性上是人权,但与传统的政治人权、文化人权不同,是经济人权,属于《公民权利和政治权利公约》中未能涵盖的内容。
257 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “Human Rights and International Economic Law in the 21st Century: the Need to Clarify Their Interrelationships”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.4(1), 2001, p.33.
258 Raj Bhala, International Law: Theory and Practic, New York, 2001, 2nd edition, p.610.
259 Daniel C. Esty, “Nongovernmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion”, J. Int'l Econ. L. Vol.1, 1998, p.123, 136-137.
260 李先波:《主权、人权、国际组织》,法律出版社 2005 年版,第 221 页。
261 A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order: Government Networks and the Disaggregated State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. 她所提出的“Disaggregated Sovereignty”(主权解体)概念指国家丧失对政府部门的控制,政府各部门与国外相应部门联系,制定和形成国际影响的决策。
262 例如 Philip Nichols 教授指出非民主国家国内层面上利益群体决策参与的欠缺造成了国际法层面上该利益群体参与的欠缺。
263 John H. Jackson, Sovereignty the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2006. p.207.
264 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order:From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, Police Press, 1995., p.147.
265 Daniel C. Esty, “Why the World Trade Organization Needs Environmental NGOs?” Published by the International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development. Available at http://www.ictsd.org/English/esty.pdf 2007 年 3 月 2 日访问。
266 蔡从燕:《市民社会、协商民主和国际法范式的转换》,载于《厦门大学法律评论》第九辑,2005 年,第 264-265 页。
267 Daniel C. Esty, “Why the World Trade Organization Needs Environmental NGOs?” Published by the International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development. See http://www.ictsd.org/English/esty.pdf Daniel支持非政府组织参与的主要理由就是非政府组织可以作为信息提供者,成为智力竞争者(intellectual competitor)。
268 R. Falk, On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, p.125.
269 西方一些学者认为《奥胡斯公约》的通过,已经体现了环境权在相当国家被作为一种人权而提升到国际法的领域中加以保护。
270 [加]威尔·金里卡:《当代政治哲学》,刘萃译,上海三联出版社 2004 年版,第 522-523 页。
271 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy”, in Roger B. Porter, Pierre Sauve (eds.), Efficiency, Equity, Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, Brookings, 2001.p.275.
272 Simon Retallack, “After Seattle: Where Next for the WTO?”, Ecologist, Issue.30, 2000, p.30, 31.
273 Joost Pauwelyn, “The Sutherland Report: A Missed Opportunity for Genuine Debate on Trade, Globalization and Reforming the WTO”. Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.8(2), 2005. pp. 329-346.
274 Douglas Kysar, “Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice Preferences for Processes”, Harvard Law Review, Vol.118, 2004, p.525.
275 蔡从燕:《市民社会、协商民主与国际法的范式转换》,载于《厦门大学法律评论》第 9 辑,2005 年,第 261 页。
276 John. H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2006. p.120.
277 Joost Pawleyn , “The Sutherland Report: A Missed Opportunity for Genuine Debate on Trade, Globalization and Reforming the WTO”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.8(2), 2005, pp. 329-346.
278 UN Press Release SG/SM/7318, Partnership with Civil Society Necessity in Addressing Global Agenda, Says Secretary-General in Wellington, New Zealand Remarks (Feb. 29, 2000).
279 Julio A. Lacarte, “Transparency, Public Debate, and Participation by NGOs in the WTO: a WTO Perspective” Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.7, Issue 3, 2004. p.683-686.
280 [美]耐革尔·伍兹,安瑞塔·纳利卡:《治理和责任的限度:世贸组织、国际货币基金组织与世界银行》,载国际社会科学杂志,2002 年第 4 期。水平式责任机制主要指权力分立状态下,立法对司法和行政权力的制约,或司法对立法、行政的制约。这种权力制约需要以信息透明、参与性为前提。
281 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy”, in Roger B. Porter, Pierre Sauve (eds.), Efficiency, Equity, Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, Brookings, 2001. p.283.
282 United States - Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS24/AB/R, at 21 (adopted Feb. 25, 1997), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/distab_e.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004)
283 John H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT, Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1969.p.87.
284 WTO 成员需公布有效实施的、新型的贸易政策法规包括:(1)海关法规。(2)进出口管理的有关法规和行政规章制度;(3)有关进出口商品征收的国内税、法规和规章;(4)进出口商品检验、检疫的有关法规和规章;(5)有关进出口货物及其支付方面的外汇管理和对外汇管理的一般法规和规章;(8)有关出口加工区、自由贸易区、边境贸易区、经济特区的法规和规章;(9)有关服务贸易的法规和规章;(10)有关仲裁的裁决规定;(11)成员国政府及其机构所签订的有关影响贸易政策的现行双边或多边协定、协议;(12)其他有关影响贸易行为的国内立法或行政规章。引自何志鹏:《全球化经济的法律调控》,清华大学出版社 2006 年版,第 200-201 页。
285 Steve Charnovitz, “The WTO and Cosmopolitics”, in E.U. Petersmann(ed.), Reforming the World Trading System: Legitimacy, Efficiency, and Democratic Governance, Oxford University Press, 2005. p.440.
286 Steve Charnovitz , “Open Democratic Participation Scheme For The World Trade Organization: Transparency and Participation in the World Trade Organization”, Rutgers L. Rev. Vol.56, 2004, p.936.
287 Robert E. Hudec, “The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years”, Minnesota Journal of Global Trade, Vol.8, No.1, 1999, p.45.
288 WT/L/160/Rev.1 (1996), Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction of WTO Documents – Decision adopted by the General Council on 18 July 1996 – Revision, 26 July and WT/L/452 (2002), Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction of WTO Documents – Decision of 14 May 2002, 16 May
289 Robert O. Keohane and Josep S. Nye JR, “The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy”, in Roger B. Porter, Pierre Sauve (eds.), Efficiency, Equity, Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, Brookings, 2001. p. 291.
290 Daniel C. Esty, “Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.1, Issue.1, 1998. p.123.
291 Daniel D. Bradlow, “Global Trade Issues In The New Millennium: The Times They Are A-Changin:Some Preliminary Thoughts On Developing Countries, NGOs And The Reform Of The WTO”, Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. Vol.33, p.504.
292 姚莉:《非政府组织与国际贸易》,载于《西北师范大学学报(社会科学版)》,2007 年第 1 期,第 127页。
293 冯洁菡:《公共健康危机与 WTO 知识产权制度的改革——以 TRIPS 协议为中心》,武汉大学出版社 2005年版,第 75 页。
294 详细信息可见国际健康行动组织网页:http://www.haiweb.org/01_about_c.htm 2007 年 12 月 2 日访问。
295 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1999, 2. 转引自严海:TRIPS 协议与公共健康议题谈判的成果与展望——评多哈宣言第六段的执行协议,见法律论文资料库 http://www.law-lib.com/lw/lw_view.asp?no=7621 2007 年 10 月 25 日访问
296 Neil D. Hamilton, Who Owns Dinner: Evolving Legal Mechanisms for Ownership of Plant Genetic Resources, 28 Tulsa L.J. 587, 600-01 (1993). 转引自 Helfer:Regime Shifting:The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, Yale J.Int’L L. Vol.29(1), 2004. pp.23-47.
297 WEED,全称为“World Economy, Ecology & Development”,1990 年成立,总部设在德国。WEED 多次举办南北方非政府组织共同峰会。最近一个出版物便是《欧盟与非洲峰会前夜——创造一个真实并公平的合作关系?》。见 WEED on line:http://www.weed-online.org/themen/english.html ,2008 年 1 月 15 日访问。
298 G92,全称为“丹麦可持续发展论坛的 92 小组”,由地处丹麦的 20 多个分政府组织共同构成,成立于1991 年,初衷是协调丹麦境内各环境非政府组织意见以便在 1992 联合国“里昂宣言”的准备工作中共同游说。后 G92 将非政府组织合作渠道从国内拓宽到国际层面,包括与南方国家相应组织对话和合作,成为南北方非政府组织就环境问题展开合作的一个平台。
299 Report of the First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, U.N. Environment Programme, Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, para. 98, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/1/17 (Feb. 28, 1995)
300 Access and Benefit Sharing as Related to Genetic Resources, Decision VI/24, in Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity
301 Civil Society Calls On Rich Countries To Stop Imposing Extreme Demands At The WTO Sixth Ministerial Conference. 16th December, 2005. See http://www.twnside.org.sg/announcement/NGO_STATEMENT_ON_Hong_Kong_Ministerial_final.doc , 2007年 8 月 15 日访问。
302 Maki Tanaka, “Bridging the Gap Between Northern NGOs and Southern Sovereigns in the Trade-Environment Debate: The Pursuit of Democratic Dispute Settlements in the WTO Under the Rio Principles”, Ecology Law Quarterly. Vol.30,2003, p.130-135.
303 Alan J., “Rethinking Sovereignty” in Kofman E, Youngs G.(ed.), Globalization: Theory and Practice, New York: Wellington House, 1986. p.112.
304 程琥:《全球化与国家主权——比较分析》,清华大学出版社 2003 年版,第 27 页到 28 页。
305 李先波:《主权、人权、国际组织》,法律出版社 2005 年版,第 215 页。
306 [美]迈克尔·爱德华兹:《公民社会与全球治理》,载于王玉强、陈家刚译:《全球化与公民社会》,广西师范大学出版社 2003 年版,第 166 页。
307 Michelle Ratton Sanchez, “Brief Observations On The Mechanisms For NGO Participation In The WTO”, International Journal Of Human Rights. No. 4, 2006. p.121.
308 Daniel C. Esty, “We the People: Civil Society and the World Trade Organization”, in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick(eds), New Directions in International Economic Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, ,2000.p.99.
309 Michael Edwards, “Civil Society and Global Governance”. p.3. see http://www.unu.edu/millennium/edwards.pdf , 2007 年 4 月 20 日访问。
310 本文中将非政府组织在争端解决程序中的参与称为“司法参与”。在学术界,对于 WTO 争端解决机制性质的观点,主要有两种,一是认为争端解决机构是个“准司法”机构,因为,争端解决机制中专家组和上诉机构的成员并非称为法官,报告也不称为裁决,尤其是专家组成员并非该领域内的法律专家。与国内司法程序相比,专家组程序和上诉程序与国内一审、二审程序还存在区别。该观点为我国一些学者和西方少数学者所支持。另一种观点认为争端解决机构是个“司法”机构,西方多数学者持有这样的观点。因为即便专家组和上诉机构成员以及报告的名称都不同于国内司法程序,但争端解决机制对于成员方而言,具有事实上的强制管辖权,并且,报告根据“反向协商一致”原则,实际上具有自动通过的效力。专家组和上诉机构程序在演绎和推理中,都非常类似于普通法法院的传统。本文无意于争辩 WTO 争端解决程序的性质,作者更赞同将 WTO 争端解决机制看作“司法”机构,故称为“司法参与”。
311 Padideh Ala'I, “Judicial Lobbying At The WTO: The Debate Over The Use Of Amicus Curiae Briefs AndThe U.S. Experience”, Fordham Int'l L.J., Vol.24, 2000, p.69.
312 U.S.-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 1998 年印度等诉美国-禁止进口特定虾和虾制品案,其案情是:美国 1973 年濒危物种法案(ESA)将美国领水中的 5 种海龟列为处于危险或受威胁的物种,并禁止在美国领海和公害上捕捞这些海龟。根据该法案,美国要求美国虾拖网捕捞船在海龟经常触摸的海域捕鱼时,要在其捕鱼网上适用“海龟排除装置”(TEDs)。美国 1989 年生效的公共法 101-102 第 609 章规定美国不能进口用可能上海特定海龟的方式大规模捕捞的虾,除非被证实捕捞国有一项与美国保护海龟项类似的相关法规,和与美国国内捕捞相当的无意捕捞率,或捕捞国的特殊渔业环境不会构成对海龟的威胁。实践中,如果某国想得到出口虾到美国的证书,实际上就是要承担与美国补虾人相当的责任,需适用 TEDs。印度、马来西亚、巴基斯坦和泰国向 WTO 争端解决机构申诉,诉由是美国实施的对特定虾和虾制品的进口禁止与 GATT 第 1 条,第 3 条和第 11 条不符。1998 年 5 月 5 日,专家组作出报告。专家组认为美国的相关措施与 GATT 第 11 条不符,并不能根据第 20 条证明其正当,因为它构成了相同条件国家间无端的其实。1998 年 10 月 2 日,上诉机构作出报告,上诉机构认为,相关措施符合第 20条(g)项,但补不能满足第 20 条序言的要求,因此,第 20 条不能证明其正当。案情摘自陈卫东:《WTO例外条款解读》,对外经济贸易大学出版社 2002 年版,第 320-321 页。
313 WT/DS58/AB/R, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body, 12 Octoer 1998, para.102.
314 WT/DS58/R, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report 0f the Panel, 15 May 1998, p.280.
315 WT/DS58/AB/R, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body, 12 Octoer 1998, para.101. 此处第三方指根据 DSU,WTO 争端方以外的成员方认为在争议事项中具有重大厉害关系,可以以第三方的身份向专家组提交意见。
316 WT/DS58/AB/R, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body, para.107-108.
317 刘成伟:《专家组的信息寻求权》,见北大法律信息网 http://article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID=20504 , 2007 年 7 月 20 日访问。
318 WT/DS58/AB/R, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body., para.108.
319 1992 年 5 月,美国商务部开始对产自英国的热轧铅与铋碳钢产品(以下简称“铅与钢产品”)进行反补贴调查,并于 1993 年 1 月最后裁定一家名为 United Engineering Steels Limited (简称为 UES)的英国公司出口的铅与钢产品存在 12.69%的补贴率。同时,美国国际贸易委员会也作出了补贴造成国内产业损害的认定,因此,美国对该公司的产品从 1993 年起开始按上述税率征收反补贴税。但是问题在于,美国所认定的补贴并不是英国政府直接给予 UES 公司的,这里面经历了一个复杂的变化过程:英国政府在 1977至 1986 年间将多笔资金注入到国有企业“英国钢铁公司”(British Steel Corporation,简称 BSC),1986年 BSC 与另一家名为 GKN 的私营公司建立了合资企业 UES 公司。后来,随着私有化的浪潮,英国政府采取一定步骤将 BSC 私有化:首先,组建一家名为 British Steel Public Limited Company 的公司(简称BSPLC),并在 1988 年 9 月让 BSPLC 承担 BSC 的债权债务(包括 BSC 公司在 UES 中的股份),然后在同年 12 月份将 BSPLC 的股份在证券市场公开出售以达到私有化的目的。1995 年 3 月,BSPLC 公司又收购了 GKN 公司在 UES 中的股份,全资拥有 UES 并将其改名为 British Steel Engineering Steels (简称为BSES)。在这一复杂的企业私有化改革当中,美国商务部认为英国政府的补贴从 BSC 流转到 UES,并最后转到 BSES,因此,美国有权将 BSC 得到的补贴分摊到 UES 和 BSES 的产品中,并对其征收反补贴税。征税后美国共进行了六次年度复查(annual review) ,虽然每次确定的反补贴税率高低有所不同,但它坚持认为补贴仍然存在。这种做法引起了欧盟的不满 ,因此,对于 1995、1996、1997 三次年度复查的结果 ,欧盟诉至 DSB 要求专家组进行审查。案情转引自李本:WTO《补贴与反补贴协议》对内国经济法的约束与影响,http://www.bloglegal.com/blog/cac/350002735.htm# 2007 年 12 月 20 日。
320 See Panel Report on US-Steel Report, WT/DS138/R and Appellate Body Report, para 42.
321 1998 年 8 月 3 日,印度根据 WTO《争端解决谅解》DSU(Dispute Settlement Understand)第 4 条,GATT94第 23 条,《反倾销协定》第 17 条,要求对欧委会 1997 年 11 月 28 日颁布的对从印度进口的棉纺床上用品征收最终反倾销税的 2398/97 号裁决书与欧盟进行磋商。1998 年 9 月 18 日～1999 年 4 月 15 日,印度和
323 WT/DS135/9, Communication from the Appellate Body with attachment AB-2000-11, Additional Procedure Adopted Under Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review.
324 General Council, Minutes of Meeting, WT/GC/MM60, 23 January 2001. paras.4-6.
325 James Cameron & Jacob Werksman, “Supplementary Amicus Brief Submitted by WFN/FIELD”, para. 2.5 (2001) (要求 WTO 在接受或不接受法庭之友意见书问题上采取明确的程序规则), see http://www.field.org.uk/papers/pdf/asbestosamicus.pdf; 2007 年 5 月访问。
326 世界最大产糖国巴西以及泰国和澳大利亚去年 7 月联合向世贸组织起诉,认为欧盟内部糖价、生产成本远高于国际市场水平,能以低价出口的糖肯定都得到了政府补贴。世贸组织专家小组认为,欧盟无法证明超出规定数量的部分没有得到补贴,因此,它建议欧盟调整有关行为使之符合世贸规则。据报道,欧盟对裁决报告不满,表示将提起上诉。欧盟前身欧共体 1968 年开始在各成员国之间实行糖生产配额,并以保护价进行收购,对配额内过剩糖给予出口补贴,以弥补区内市场和国际市场间的差价。此外,欧共体还对进口糖征收高额关税,把廉价糖挡在门外。欧盟委员会预计,欧盟今年用于糖业的预算将达 17 亿欧元,其中出口补贴近 13 亿欧元。这一体制造成欧洲单一市场的食糖价格高出国际市场 3 倍多,同时各成员国低价倾销过剩食糖加剧了国际市场糖价的下跌。欧盟自己也在准备改革这一体制,并于 2003 年 7 月公布了改革方案。
327 巴西曾指责欧盟试图在巴市场上倾销旧轮胎,从而增加了当地居民感染热带病以及环境遭到广泛破坏的风险。专家小组在判决书中称,巴西有权以环境和健康为由限制某些商品的贸易,但这些理由不应当成为贸易歧视和贸易保护的借口。世贸组织根据欧盟提出的磋商请求,要求巴西政府取消有关翻新轮胎进口限制措施。2005年 6 月,欧盟向世贸组织指责巴西“采取了一系列措施禁止旧轮胎的进口,但有时却用这些措施来阻止翻新轮胎的进口,而不顾翻新轮胎不是旧轮胎的事实;另外,巴西豁免了对来自南方共同市场国家的翻新轮胎的进口禁止和罚金征收,而对其他进口(尤其是来自欧共体的进口)维持了上述措施,要求巴西政府取消有关限制”。世贸组织接受了欧盟的请求。
328 Panel Report On Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports Of Retreated Tyres. WT/DS332/R. Paras. 1.8, 1.9, 12 June, 2007.
329 Panel Report On Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports Of Retreated Tyres. WT/DS332/R. Paras. 1.8, 1.9, 12 June, 2007. Para. 97.
330 支持非政府组织在 WTO 体制中增进参与的学者,如 John Jackson, Steve Charvovitz, Robert Howse, Kalypso Nicolaidi, Dunoff 等均认为非政府组织的参与应该限于话语权,而并非表决权。
331 Jeffrey L. Dunoff , “The WTO's Legitimacy Crisis: Reflections on the Law and Politics of WTO Dispute Resolution”, The American Review of International Arbitration, Vol. 13, 2002, p.202.
332 United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, (98-000) P 187 (Oct. 12, 1998)
333 Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Global Trade Issues In The New Millennium: The WTO In Transition: Of Constituents, Competence And Coherence. Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. Vol.33, 2001, p.986.
334 Jacqueline Peel, “Giving the Public a Voice in the Protection of the Global Environment: Avenues for Participation by NGOs in Dispute Resolution at the European Court of Justice and World Trade Organization”, Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y, Vol.12, 2001. p.63.
335 Michelle Ratton Sanchez, “Brief observations on the mechanisms for NGO participation in the WTO”, Social Science, Vol.1, No.4, 2006. pp.103-126.
336 David Livshiz, “Public Participation In Disputes Under Regional Trade Agreements: How Much Is Too Much--The Case For A Limited Right Of Intervention”, New York University Annual Survey of American Law,. Vol. 61, 2005, p.533.
337 David Livshiz, “Public Participation in Disputes Under Regional Trade Agreements: How Much Is Too Much--The Case For A Limited Right Of Intervention”, N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. Vol.61, 2005. p.530.
338 Georg C. Umbricht, “An Amicus Curiae Briefs Before The WTO”. Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.4, 2001. p.774.
339 Robert Howse, “The Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization” in Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veio Heikanen(eds), The legitimacy of International Institutions, New York: United Nation University Press, 2001. p381-383. 转引自程红星:《WTO 司法哲学的能动主义之维》,法律出版社 2005 年版,第 166-167 页。豪斯教授认为司法程序的正当性和政治机关的正当性评价标准不同,司法程序的正当性在于对自然正义的实现,而不是反映选举者的利益。在他看来司法程序正当性的评价标准包括三个:公正的程序、条约解释的
一贯性和整体性以及体制的敏感性。而根据上诉机构的司法实践,基本符合了这三个要求。See Robert Howse, “Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law” in J. H. H. Weiler(ed.), The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade? Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 35-69.
340 J.H.H. Weiler, “The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement”, The American Review of International Arbitration, Issue 13, 2002. p177.
341 Jeffrey L. Dunoff , “The WTO's Legitimacy Crisis: Reflections on the Law and Politics of WTO Dispute Resolution”, The American Review of International Arbitration, Vol. 13, 2002, p.201.
342 Maki Tanaka , “Bridging the Gap Between Northern NGOs and Southern Sovereigns in the Trade-Environment Debate: The Pursuit of Democratic Dispute Settlements in the WTO Under the Rio Principles”, Ecology Law Quarterly, Vol.30, 2003, p.113.
343 Claude E. Barfield, “Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization”, Chi. J. Int’l L. Vol.2, 2001, p. 403, 413.
344 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995. p272.
345 譬如,在国内法下,私人向立法机关表述自己的意见,选出自己的代表,这是立法参与;当规则制定出来后,私人权益受损,向司法机关提起诉讼或参与到影响自己权益的他人诉讼中去,不构成民主代表权的两次参与。
346 Philip M. Moremen, “International Private Rights of Action: A Cost-Benefit Framework”, San Diego Int'l L.J., Vol.8, 2006, p.10.
347 效益违约是英美合同法中的概念。合同当时方作为理性的个人,会衡量合同执行和违约各自的成本。倘若在一个价格不断上涨的市场上,卖方采取违约,支付违约金并以更高价格出售货物,只要违约金数额小于市场价和原合同价之间的价差,则是有效率的。
348 Philip M. Moremen, “International Private Rights of Action: A Cost-Benefit Framework”, San Diego Int'l L.J., Vol.8, 2006, p.13.
349 彼得斯曼教授提出 WTO 的宗旨具有正义性,并且可分为正义第一性原则和第二性原则,即资源第一次分配的正义和第二次分配的正义。见 Petersmann, “Theories of Justice, Human Rights and the Constitution of International Markets in Symposium: The Emerging Transnational Constitution”, Loyola Law Review, 2003, pp.407-460.
350 例如谢尔教授持有该观点。G. Richard Shell, “Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization”, Duke L.J. Vol.44, 1995, p.829.
351 Steve Charnovitz, “Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law”, American Journal of International Law,Vol.100, 2006. p.348.
352 David Wilson and Lynn Starchuk, “Judicial Activism in the WTO– Implications for the Doha Negotiations”, Manuscript, 13 September 2003; http://www.johnstonbuchan.com/pubs/trade/Judicial%20Activism%20in%20the%20WTO.pdf , 2007 年 1 月 15日访问, p.13.
353 Lars Biederstedt, “EU – US Economic Relations – The Trade Dispute about US Steel”, 4 July 2003.
354 徐崇利:《世贸组织协定的解释制度评析(一)》,载于《对外经济贸易大学学报》2002 年第 1 期,第34 页。
355 John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2006.p.183.
356 张东平:《WTO 司法解释论》,厦门大学出版社 2003 年版,第 7 页。
357 张东平:《WTO 司法解释论》,厦门大学出版社 2003 年版,第 15 页。
358 张东平:《WTO 司法解释论》,厦门大学出版社 2003 年版,第 16 页。
359 万鄂湘、石磊、杨成铭、邓洪武:《国际条约法》, 武汉大学出版社 1998 版,第 464-465 页。
360 Richard H. Steinberg, “Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints”, American Journal of International Law, Vol.98, April of 2004. p.261.
361 转引自 John H. Jackson: Sovereignty, The WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law. Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 187.
362 WT/GC/M/60, para.39.
363 United States—Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, paras. 106, 110.
364 United States—Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted 7 June 2000, paras. 39, 42.
365 WT/GC/M/60, para 24-25.
366 Minutes of Meeting Held on 22 November 2000, supra note 113, para. 39; DSU arts. 16.3, 16.4, 17.14.
367 Konrad Von Moltke, “Trade and Sustainable Development” in Mike Moore(ed.), Doha and Beyond: The Future of the Multilateral Trading System, p.16.
368 Appellate Body Report on US-Shrimp, para. 153.
369 Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001, para.6.
370 see also WSSD Plan of Implementation, para. 133 at http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/documents/summit docs/2309 planfinal.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2003).
371 Report on the Eighth Session, U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development, 8th Sess., ch. 3, para. 6, U.N. Doc. E/2000/29 & E/CN.17/2000/20 (2000) (statement by then Director-General Michael Moore), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/docs/2000/e2000-29.htm;
372 John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2006. pp.191-192.
373 Montesquieu, The Spirit Of Laws , David Wallace Carrithers (ed.,) (Book XI, Chapter 6, Paragraphs 5, 6). 1977, p.202.
374 E·博登海默:《法理学、法律哲学与法律方法》,邓正来译,中国政法大学出版社 2004 年版,第 83页。
375 Robert Howse, “Back to Court After Shrimp-Turtle: India’s Challenge to Labor and Environmental Linkages in the EC Generalized System of Preferences”, Am. U. Int'l L. Rev., Vol.18(1), p.1341.
376 Sally Razeen, Whither the WTO? A Progress Report on the Doha Round, CATO Institute, 3 March 2003, p.7.
377 Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints. American Journal of International Law, Vol.98, April of 2004. p.260. 虽然上诉机构的成员由争端解决机构成员一致同意选出,但在上诉机构人员的推荐中,美国和欧盟享有反对其不同意人员被推荐的特权。也就是美国和欧盟实质上在上诉机构专家人员的安排上享有否决权。只有在美国和欧盟行使否决权后,才由选举委员会在推荐名单中选出适当的候选人,提交给争端解决机构批准。例如,美国贸易部总顾问以及贸易部部长助理通过仔细阅读每个候选人过去所作出的司法判决(如果有),召集其在华盛顿或日内瓦会面,仔细进行筛选。
378 John H. Jackson, “International Economic Law in Times That Are Interesting”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.3, 2000. p.3.
379 Jeffrey L. Dunoff , “The WTO's Legitimacy Crisis: Reflections on the Law and Politics of WTO Dispute Resolution”, The American Review of International Arbitration, Vol. 13, 2002, pp.197-210. 西方国际贸易法学者对 GATT 和 WTO 应该选择政治性还是法律性的立场大多经历了三个过程。对早期 GATT 体制过于政治化进行批判,然后对 DSU 通过,争端解决机制的自动性和法律性进行褒扬,再到对上诉机构过度司法立法进行反思的三个过程。多数学者认为 WTO 应该在政治性和法律性之间寻求平衡,从而在成员方的拥护下制定和执行有约束力的贸易规则。
380 换言之,顿那夫教授认为应该区分 WTO 下不同机构的政治和法律属性。总理事会和部长级会议是政治性机构,应致力于新规则的产生,新成员的加入等政治性问题的解决。争端解决机构是法律性机构。倘若由争端解决机构来处理成员方之间的价值争议,则会将政治因素重新纳入争端解决机制,削弱其法律性。
381 Joel P. Trachtman, Institutional Linkage: Transcending "Trade and. . .", 96 Am J Intl L 77, 2002
382 Andrew T. Guzman, “Global Governance and the WTO. Boalt Working Papers in Public Law”, 2001. p. 71. see http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1085&context=boaltwp 2006 年 12 月访问。
383 Claus-Dieter Ehlerman, “Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the WTO”, Policy Paper, RSC No.02/9(European University Institute, 2002.) p.14.
384 Gabrielle Marceau, “WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights”, Eur J Intl L, Vol.13, 2002, p.753, 767.
385 Padideh Ala'i, “Judicial Lobbying At The WTO: The Debate Over The Use Of Amicus Curiae Briefs And The U.S. Experience”, Fordham Int'l L.J., 2000, Vol.24, p.65. 注:大使意见作出时 WTO 成员方为 139 个。
386 Ibid.
387 Proposal by the African Group, TN/DS/W/15, dated 15 September 2002, 5; Proposal on DSU by Intia et al., TN/DS/2/18, dated 7 October 2002, 2.
388 Communication from the European Communities, TN/DS/2/1, dated 13 March 2002, 11.
389 Dilip K. Das, Global Trading System at the Crossroads, London: Routledge, 2001. p49.
390 Deborah Z. Cass, “The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade”, European Journal Of International Law, Vol.12, 2001, p.39, 44.
391 Richard H. Steinberg, “Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints”, American Journal of International Law, Vol.98, April of 2004. p.251.
392 David Wilson and Lynn Starchun, “Judicial Activism in WTO-Implications for the Doha Negotiations”, see http://www.johnstonbuchan.com/pubs/trade/Judicial%20Activism%20in%20the%20WTO.pdf, 2007年1月访问。
393 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “Human Rights and International Economic Law in the 21st Century: the Need to Clarify Their Interrelationships”, J. Int'l Econ L. Vol.4,2001, p.35.
394 J. Patrick Kelly, “Judicial Activism at the World Trade Organization: Developing Principles of Self-Restraint”, NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS., Vol. 22, 2002, p.356.
395 WTO Appellate Body Report on Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, AB-1996-2, WTO DS 8/AB/R at 15 (Oct. 4, 1996).
396 David Wilson and Lynn Starchuk, “Judicial Activism in the WTO– Implications for the Doha Negotiations”, Manuscript, 13 September 2003; http://www.johnstonbuchan.com/pubs/trade/Judicial%20Activism%20in%20the%20WTO.pdf , 2007 年 1 月 15日访问, p.51.
397 见 Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1 (August 30, 2000), para. 76, 见http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/Metalclad/MetalcladFinalAward.pdf ,以及 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (July 31, 2001), B, 见http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-Interpr-en.asp 本案涉及对 NAFTA 第 1105 条款中“公平和公正待遇”的解释。仲裁庭认为“公平和公正待遇”为了第 11 章的目的,应包括透明度的要求,但委员会推翻了这个法律解释,认为这个含义只能根据条约所规定的国际习惯法规则来确立。
398 Frieder Roessler, “Are the Judicial Organs of the World Trade Organization Overburdened?” In Efficiency, Equity, and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium. Washington Brookings Institution, 2001. p.309. 关于 Chevron 准则,WTO 规则中也有类似条款,如反倾销协定第 17.6 条要求 GATT/WTO 专家组或上诉机构应该尊重一成员方对模糊协定约文的解释,只要该解释是可允许的。
399 Richard H. Steinberg, “Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints”, American Journal of International Law, Vol.98, April of 2004. pp.269-272.
400 J. Patrick Kelly, “Judicial Activism at the World Trade Organization: Developing Principles of Self-Restraint”, NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS., Vol. 22, 2002, p.357.
401 Patrick M. Norton, “A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation”, American Journal of International Law, Vol.85, 1991, p 474, 505.
402 张文显主编:《法理学(第二版)》,高等教育出版社 2003 年版,第 156 页-158 页。
403 陈立虎:《法庭之友陈述在 WTO 争端解决机制的可接受性》,载于《法学家》,2004 年第 3 期,第 155页。
404 Josh Robbins, “False Friends: Amicus Curiae and Procedural Discretion in WTO Appeals under the Hot-Rolled Lead / Asbestos Doctrine”, Harv. Int'l L.J.,Vol. 44 (4), 2003, p.319-321.
405 因此,有学者指出上诉机构之所以对第三方参与的问题态度谨慎,而对非政府组织提交信息态度宽松,是因为在争端中申请成为第三方的主要是发展中国家,而在争端中提交信息的法庭之友却主要来自于发达国家。
406 Josh Robbins, “False Friends: Amicus Curiae and Procedural Discretion in WTO Appeals under the Hot-Rolled Lead / Asbestos Doctrine”, p.328.
407 John P. Gaffney, “Due Process in the World Trade Organization: The Need for Procedural Justice in the Dispute Settlement System”, Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. Vol.14, 1999, p.1173-1183.
408 根据西方学者的调查和分析,律师在争端解决程序中的工作计费以 250 美元/小时至 1000 美元/小时,保守的估计,即便是一起非常简单的争端至少需支付 700 小时的法律顾问和咨询费用。对于欠发达地区,这笔费用相对来说比较高昂。
409 Daniel D. Bradlow, “Global Trade Issues In The New Millennium: The Times They Are A-Changin: Some Preliminary Thoughts On Developing Countries, NGOs And The Reform Of The WTO”, Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. Vol. 33, p.504-505.
410 Panel Report on Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreated Tyres, WT/DS332/R, 12 June 2007.
411 Maki Tanaka, “Bridging the Gap Between Northern NGOs and Southern Sovereigns in the Trade-Environment Debate: The Pursuit of Democratic Dispute Settlements in the WTO Under the Rio Principles”, Ecology Law Quarterly. Vol.30,2003, p.118.
412 Ibid, p.130-135.
413 王彦志,郝秀辉:《非政府组织与世界贸易组织争端解决程序》,载于《法制与社会发展》,2003 年第 6期,第 139 页。
414 David Livshiz , “Public Participation In Disputes Under Regional Trade Agreements: How Much Is Too Much--The Case For A Limited Right Of Intervention”, N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. Vol.61, 2005. p.529
415 Kevin R.Gray, “Civil Society and World Trade Organization”, see http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/graycivilsociety.pdf, 2007 年 2 月 4 日访问。
416 J. Patrick Kelly, “Judicial Activism at the World Trade Organization: Developing Principles of Self-Restraint”, NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS., Vol. 22, 2002, p.360.
417 程红星:《WTO 司法哲学的能动主义之维》,北京大学 2006 年版,第 224 页。
418 E/RES/1996/31, Consultative Relationship between the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations, 25 Juy 1996, Part VII, para 41.
419 Maura Blue Jeffords, “Turning the Protester into a Partner for Development: The Need for Effective Consultation Between the WTO and NGO”, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol.28, 2003, p937.
420 市民社会组织指为推广其利益、观点和意识形态而自愿组成的市民团体。他们是非营利的,不属于公共范畴。精英小组此处提到的市民社会组织和非政府组织两者之间存在交叉。市民社会组织包括大众组织,如农民组织、女性组织、贸易组织、宗教组织、学术组织等。
421 “We the People: Civil Society, the United Nations and Global Governance”, A/58/817, 11 June 2004.
422 Antti Pentik?inen, Creating Global Governance: The Role of Non-governmental Organizations in United Nations., Helsinki: Finnish UN Association, 2000. p.88.
423 Fergus MacKay, “Universal Rights or a Universe unto Itself? Indigenous Peoples' Human Rights and the World Bank's Draft Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples”, Am. U. Int'l L. Rev., Vol.17(1), 2002, p.533.
424 有关专门研究市民社会在世行中参与的学者指出,这六个阶段中,项目准备以及项目执行主要为借方责任,项目的选择是世行和借方共同的责任,项目的评估和评价是世行的责任。由于世行要求借方确保项目涉及领域内最终受益人的参与,因此项目的准备和执行阶段为项目所在地当地市民社会组织介入的主要场合。见 Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, “The Impact of Inter-national Civil Society on the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO”, ILSA J Int'l & Comp L , Vol.7(1), 2001, pp. 403-404.
425 Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, “The Impact of Inter-national Civil Society on the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO”, ILSA J Int'l & Comp L. , Vol.7(1), p.406.
426 Consensus Conclusions of the WB/NGO Committee Meeting, Santo Domingo.
427 Seamus Cleary, “The World Bank and NGOs” in Petr Willetts (ed.), The Conscience of the World : The Influence of Non-Governmental Organizations in the UN System, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1996. p.78.
428 World Bank, Annual Report 1993, p.95.
429 Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, “The Impact of Inter-national Civil Society on the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO”, ILSA J Int'l & Comp L , Vol.7(1), 2001, p. 411.
430 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, The OECD In Brief 17; Decision of the Council on Relations with International Non-Governmental Organizations, OECD Doc. C/M(62)7(Final), Item 59 (a), (b), and (c) - Doc. No. C(62)45 (Mar. 13, 1962)
431 John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Economic Law, Cambridge University Press, 2006. p.203.
432 Resolution (51) 30 F, Relations with International Organizations, both Intergovernmental and Non-Governmental, 3 may 1951, para.4.
433 Relations between the Council of Europe and International Non-governmental Organizations, may 1976.
434 Anna-Karine Lindblom, Non-governmental organization in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2005. p.417.
435 The Commisson and Non-Governmental Organizations, Discussion paper presented by President Prodi and Vice-President Kinnock to the Commission, adopted on 18 January 2000.
436 COM(2001), European Governance: A White Paper, 27 July 2001. p.14.
437 COM(2002)277, Towards a Reinforced Culture of /consultation and Dialogue-Proposal for General Principles and Minimum Standards for consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission, 5 June 2002.
438 COM(2002)704, Communication from the Commission, 11 December 2002. pp.19-22.
439 可见 http://europa.eu.int/comm/civil-society/coneccs/index.htm
440 COM(2002) 704, Communication from the Commission, 11 December 2002. pp.5-6.
441 E/2000/88, Report of he Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, 13 July 2000. paras.99-105.
442 Committee of Ministers, Resolution(203)8, Participatory Status for International Non-Governmental Organizations with the Council of Europe, adopted on 19 November 2003, appendix, para.9.
443 Michael Edwards, “Civil Society and Global Governance”, p.3. see http://www.unu.edu/millennium/edwards.pdf, 2007 年 7 月访问。
444 [美]迈克尔·爱德华兹:《公民社会与全球治理》,载于王玉强、陈家刚译:《全球化与公民社会》,广西师范大学出版社 2003 年版,第 169 页。
445 Peter Sutherland, “The Future Scope of WTO”, see http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.htm , p. 39, 79. 2007 年 10 月 20 日访问。
446 Third Annual Report of the PCIJ, 1927 PCIJ Series E, No. 3, p.227. 这 10 个组织包括:国际农业委员会、IFTU、国际劳工组织、国际工人法律保护组织、国际农业工会联盟、国际雇佣者组织、国际人权学会、国际农业工人联合会、国际农业工人基督教工会联合会和国际基督教工会联合会。
447 Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), 1949-1950, Judgments on the merits delivered on 20 November 1950. 转引自 Anna-Lindblom, Non-governmental Organizations in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2005. p.304.
448 Daniel Schacht and Lori Pottinger, “Devastating the Danube and drive with Dams”, World rivers Review, January 1996. 转引自 Anna-Lindblom, Non-governmental Organizations in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2005. p.304.
449 International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 ICJ Pleadings, II, pp.324-327.
450 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia Notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276(1970), 1972 ICJ Pleadings, II, p. 639, 678.
451 International Court of Justice, Practice Directions, as at 30 July 2004, Practice Direction XII.
452 西方学者认为世行的提请调查权在性质上并非司法救济权。司法救济权所依据的“有损害,即有救济”的原则不反映在世行提请调查权中。实际上监察小组的设立是基于外部对于世行内部以及外部透明度和问责性的要求,尤其是对世行有争议性的项目进行独立的审查,以确保世行项目的质量。相关文章可见, Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, “The Impact of Inter-national Civil Society on the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO”, ILSA J Int'l & Comp L , Vol.7(1), 2001.p. 403, 或 Kristine J. Dunkerton, “The World Bank Inspection Panel and Its Affect on Lending Accountability to Citizens of Borrowing Nations”. U. Balt. J. Envtl. L. Vol.5, 1995. p.226.
453 IBRD Resolution No. 93-10, The World Bank Inspection Panel. IDA Resolution No. 93-96.
454 Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, “The Impact of Inter-national Civil Society on the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO”, ILSA J Int'l & Comp L , Vol.7(1), 2001. p.407.
455 案情来自于北京大学法学院人权研究中心http://www.hrol.org/hrfile/manual/Cn_ESC_CaseStudy_WorldBank.html ,2007 年 7 月 4 日访问。
456 The World Bank Inspection Panel, Report No. 21870, Investigation Report on Ecuador Mining Development and Environmental Control Technical Assistance Project, 23 February 2001, paras. 92-107.
457 Case 26-62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen 1963 E.C.R.1, 29.
458 Case 25/62, Plaumann v. Commission, 1963 E.C.R. 95, 107.
459 Case C-321/95 P, Greenpeace Int'l v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R. I-1651
460 European Court of Justice, Case C-321/95 P, Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) and Others v. Commission, Judgment of 2 April 1998.
461 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, U.N. Doc.ECE/CEP/43.
462 Jacqueline Peel, “Giving the Public a Voice in the Protection of the Global Environment Avenues for Participation by NGOs in Dispute Resolution at the European Court of Justice and World Trade Organization”, Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y, Vol.12, 2001, p.56.
463 Philip M. Moremen, “International Private Rights of Action: A Cost-Benefit Framework”, San Diego International Law Journal, Vol.8, 2006, p.6.
464 可见 Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice annexed to the Treaty on European Union.
465 Société anonyme Générale Sucrière and others v Commission of the European Communities. Joined cases 41-73, 43 to 48-73, 50-73, 111-73, 113-73, 114-73.
466 Ludwigshafener Walzmühle Erling KG v European Economic Community. Joined cases 197 to 200/80, 243, 245 and 247/80.
467 David Livshiz, “Public Participation In Disputes Under Regional Trade Agreements: How Much Is Too Much--The Case For A Limited Right Of Intervention”, N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. Vol.61, 2005. p.529.
468 Andrea K.Schneider, “Individual Rights in International Trade Organizations”, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 19, 1998, p.589.
469 Joel P. Trachtman and Philip M. Moremen, “Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Whose Right Is It Anyway?”, Harv. Int'l L.J, Vol. 44, 2003, p.222. 国际法下国内诉权即以国际条约为依据在国内法下提起诉讼的权利。
470 David Livshiz, “Public Participation In Disputes Under Regional Trade Agreements: How Much Is Too Much--The Case For A Limited Right Of Intervention”, N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. Vol.61, 2005. p.535.
471 Jeffery Atik, “Democratizing the WTO”, George Washington International Law Review, Vol.33, 2001, p.453.
472 Case 26/92, N.V. Algemene Transp. and Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, [1963] E.C.R. 1, 12. 该案例中认为新法律秩序的客体不仅是欧盟各成员国,而且还包括成员国下的国民。
473 J.H.H. Weiler, “The Transformation of Europe”, Yale Law Journal, Vol.100, 1991. p.221.
474 United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, Report of the Panel, 1999, para. 7.72. 专家组在这段中,还专门作了一个脚注,解释在有些情况下,对其他成员方有效执行 WTO 义务可以通过在国内法律体制中确立私人法院执行权利来实现。这里个人享有的这种权利,并非源自自治的 WTO 法律秩序的直接关系,而仅仅是为了实现条约遵守所进行的介入。
475 John H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO, Cambridge University Press, 2000. pp.330-335.
476 Deborah Z. Cass, “The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade”, European Journal Of International Law, Vol.12, 2001, p.52.
477 Robert Howse and Kalypso Nicolaidis, “Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why Constitutionalizing the WTO Is a Step Too Far”, in Efficiency, Equity, and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, Brooking Institution, 2001.p.227.
478 Jeffery Atik, “Democratizing the WTO”, George Washington International Law Review, 2001. p.458.
479 John A. Ragosta, “Unmasking the WTO: Access to the DSB System: Can the WTO DSB Live Up to the Moniker ‘World Trade Court’?”, Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus, Vol.31(1), 2000, p.9.
480 J. H. Weiler, The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Law? Oxford University Press, 2000. p.230.
481 Philip M. Nichols, “No Two Snowflakes Are Alike: Assumptions Made In The Debate Over Standing Before World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Boards”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol.24, 2000, pp.427-432.
482 Thomas Opperman and Jose Christian Cascante, “Dispute Settlement in the EC: Lessons for the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System?” in Erns-Ulrich Petersmann(ed.), International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, London: Kluwer Law International, p.486.
483 Sungjoon Cho, “Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving beyond the Entropic Dilemma”, Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol.5, 2005. p.628.
484 Kevin R. Gray. Civil Society and the World Trade Organization. http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/graycivilsociety.pdf 2007年3月2日访问。
485 John H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT and WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations, Cambridge University Press, 2000. pp. 183-184.
486 Robert E. Baldwin, “Key Challenges Facing the WTO” in Mike Moor(ed.), Doha and Beyond: The Future of the Multilateral Trading System, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 63-66.
487 Maura Blue Jeffords, “Turning The Protester Into A Partner For Development: The Need For Effective Consultation Between The WTO & NGOs”, Brooklyn J. Int'l L., Vol.28, p.953.
488 例如上文提到谢尔教授主张 WTO 争端解决机制对所有利益相关者开放,无论是否成员国政府。贸易利益相关者,如个人或非政府组织可以对成员方违反 WTO 规则的事项向 DSB 提起争端。尼古拉斯教授虽不赞成在决策过程中采取贸易利益相关者模式,但赞同在司法程序中给予非政府组织和个人一定的参与权。以及利夫施兹教授、撒切曼教授、莫热门教授等均主张开放司法参与权。
489 David Livshiz, “Public Participation In Disputes Under Regional Trade Agreements: How Much Is Too Much--The Case For A Limited Right Of Intervention”, N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. Vol.61, 2005. p.529
490 Maki Tanaka, “Bridging the Gap Between Northern NGOs and Southern Sovereigns in the Trade-Environment Debate: The Pursuit of Democratic Dispute Settlements in the WTO Under the Rio Principles”, Ecology Law Quarterly. Vol.30, 2003, p.135. 作者主要分析了环境领域非政府组织在 WTO 下司法参与的问题。认为北方非政府组织和南方政府之间存在利益冲突,如果在 WTO 下构建公众参与,要注意南北代表平衡的问题,要意识到南北国家在环境保护领域“共同的但有区分”的义务。即在争端解决程序中给予发展中国家特殊的优惠的待遇。
491 Sylvia Ostry, “External Transparency: The Policy Process at the National Level of the Two-level Game”, in Mike Moor(ed.), Doha and Beyond: The Future of the Multilateral Trading System, Cambridge University Press, 2004. pp.112-114.
492 Sylvia Ostry, “Doha and After. Report presented at ‘From Doha to Kananaskis Conference’, York University and University of Toronto”, March of 2002. see http://www.utoronto.ca/cis/ostry/docs_pdf/Doha_Kananaskis.doc
493 John.H. Jackson, “Dispute Settlement and the WTO: Emerging Problems”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.1(3), 1998, pp.329-351.
494 Joost Pauwelyn, “The Transformation Of World Trade”, Mich. L. Rev. Vol.104, 2005, p.1.
495 Maura Blue Jeffords, “Turning The Protester Into A Partner For Development: The Need For Effective Consultation Between The WTO & NGOs”, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol.28, 2003. p.954.
496 Robert E. Baldwin, “Key Challenges Facing the WTO” in Mike Moor(ed.), Doha and Beyond: The Future of the Multilateral Trading System, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.57.
497 Mike Moore(ed.), Doha and Beyond: The Future of the Multilateral Trading System, Cambridge University Press, 2004. p. vii.
499 Gregory C. Shaffer , “The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO's Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters”, Harvard International Law Review, Vol. 25, Winter 2001, p.3.
500 Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001, para.2.
501 Joost Pauwelyn, “The Transformation of World Trade”, Mich. L. Rev. Vol.104(2), 2005, p.30.
502 Maki Tanaka, “Bridging the Gap Between Northern NGOs and Southern Sovereigns in the Trade-Environment Debate: The Pursuit of Democratic Dispute Settlements in the WTO Under the Rio Principles”, Ecology Law Quarterly., Vol..30, 2003. p.138,
503 Maki Tanaka, “Bridging the Gap Between Northern NGOs and Southern Sovereigns in the Trade-Environment Debate: The Pursuit of Democratic Dispute Settlements in the WTO Under the Rio Principles”, Ecology Law Quarterly., Vol.30, 2003, p.142.
504 John. H. Jackson, “Dispute Settlement and the WTO: Emerging Problems”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.1(3), 1998, pp.329-351.
505 Sylvia Ostry, “External Transparency: The Policy Process at the National Level of the Two-level Game” in Mike Moor(ed.), Doha and Beyond: The Future of the Multilateral Trading System, Cambridge University Press, 2004. p.107. 奥斯特雷也意识到任何正式的、立法的方式将非政府组织参与纳入 WTO 规则是非常困难的,但通过司法途径更不正当。她最终建议通过贸易政策评审机制增进非政府组织的参与。
506 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “Constitutionalism and WTO Law: From a State-centered Approach Towards a Human Rights Approach in International Economic Law”, in Daniel L.M. Kennedy and James D. Southwick (eds.), The Political Economy of International Trade Law, Cambridge University Press, 2002. p.64.
507 Dunoff, “Citizen Participation in the Global Trading System: Panel I: Open Democratic Participation Scheme For The World Trade Organization”, Rutgers L. Rev. Vol.56, 2004, p.966. 另见Laurence R. Helfer, “Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking”, Yale J. Int’l L. Vol.29(1), 2004, p.14.
508 Laurence R. Helfer, “Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking”, Yale J. Int’l L. Vol.29(1), 2004, p.14.
509 Peter Van den Bossche, “The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization”, Cambridge University Press, 2005. p.135. 很多学者均批评 WTO 秘书处的配备过于精简,认为如此小的秘书处是令人疑惑的。譬如,世界粮农组织 1997 年一次性削减了罗马总部 560 个以上的工作人员,该削减人数都已与 WTO 秘书处人数相当。另可见 B.Hoekman and M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, 2001, p.55.
510 例如,2004 年 7 月 12 日,中国非政府组织参加了在曼谷举办的第十五届世界艾滋病大会。中国相关政府代表,如卫生部副部长也参加了论坛,并进行发言。
511 数据来源于世界银行网站新闻,见世界银行与中国的民间组织http://www.worldbank.org.cn/Chinese/Resources/Resources_ngooverview.htm 2004 年 12 月更新。
512 见 2007 年 1 月 7 日中央电视台新闻胡锦涛总书记的发言。
513 王名主编:《中国非政府公共部门》,清华大学出版社 2003 年版,第 72 到 73 页。
514 姚莉:《非政府组织与国际贸易》,载于《西北师范大学学报(社会科学版)》,2007 年第 1 期,第 128页。
515 王名主编:《中国非政府公共部门》,清华大学出版社 2003 年版,第 74 页。
516 王名主编:《中国非政府公共部门》,清华大学出版社 2003 年版,第 75-76 页。
517 Daniel D. Bradlow , “Global Trade Issues In The New Millennium: The Times They Are At Changing :Some Preliminary Thoughts On Developing Countries, NGOs And The Reform Of The WTO”, Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 33(1), p.506.
518 Laurence R. Helfer, “Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking”, Yale J. Int’l L. Vol.29(1), 2004, pp. 23-47.
519 “Civil Society Calls On Rich Countries To Stop Imposing Extreme Demands At The WTO Sixth Ministerial Conference”, Joint Civil Society Statement 16th December 2005 该联合声明由参与香港部长级会议的 86 个非政府组织签名发表。包括第三世界网络、非洲贸易网络、全球反贫穷行动、阿拉伯发展非政府组织网络、国际牛津救济委员会、英国贸易正义运动、加拿大国际合作委员会等等。
520 Daniel C. Esty, “We the People: Civil Society in the WTO”, in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick(eds), New Directions in International Economic Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000. p.99.
521 E.U. Petersmann, Reforming the World Trade System: Legitimacy, Efficiency and Democratic Governance, Oxford University Press, 2005. p.29.
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19. William J. Davey. WTO Dispute Settlement: Segregating the Useful Political Aspects and Avoiding Over-legalization. M. Bronckers and R. Quick. (ed.) New Directions in International Economic Law. U.K: Kluwer Law International, 2000.
20. Frieder Roessler, Are the WTO’s Judicial Organs Overburdened, in Efficiency, Equity, And Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading Systme At The Millennium. Edited by Roger B. Porter. Washington: Harward Unversity Brookings Institution Press, 2001.
21. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and Mark A. Pollack. Transatlantic economic disputes : the EU, the US, and the WTO / Oxford ; New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2003..
22. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann. Reforming the world trading system : legitimacy, efficiency, and democratic governance. Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2005.
23. Lowenfeld, Andreas F. International economic law. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2002.
24. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann.International Trade Law And The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System. Kluwer Law International, 1997.
25. Sustainability, Civil Society And International Governance : Local, North American And Global Perspectives. Edited By John J. Kirton, Peter I. Hajnal. Aldershot, Hampshire : Ashgate, 2006.
26. James Cameron & Karen Campbel. Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization. London: Cameron, 1998.
27. Collier, John G. The Settlement Of Disputes In International Law : Institutions And Procedures New York : Oxford University Press, 1999.
28. J. H. H. Weiler(Ed.). The EU, The WTO And The NAFTA : Towards A Common Law Of International Trade. Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2000.
29. Robert Howse (Ed.). The World Trading System : Critical Perspectives On The World Economy. London : Routledge, 1998.
30. Trebilcock, Michael J. The Regulation Of International Trade. London ; New York :Routledge, 1999.
31. Roger B. Porter, Pierre Sauve, Arvind Subramanian, And Americo Beviglia Zampetti (Ed.). Efficiency, Equity, And Legitimacy : The Multilateral Trading System At The Millennium. Washington, DC : Brookings Institution Press, 2001.
32. Randall D. Germain And Michael Kenny(Ed.).The Idea Of Global Civil Society : Politics And Ethics In A Globalizing Era. London ; New York : Routledge, 2005.
33. Rupert Taylor (Ed.). Creating A Better World : Interpreting Global Civil Society. Bloomfield, CT : Kumarian Press, 2004.
34. Lindblom, Anna-Karin Non-Governmental Organisations In International Law. Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2005.
35. Transformations In Global Governance : Implications For Multinationals And Other Stakeholders / edited by Sushil Vachani. Cheltenham ; Northampton, MA : Edward Elgar, 2006.
36. Bernard, Hoeman. The Political Economy of World Trading System. Oxford: Oxford university press, 2001.
37. Bagwell. The Economics of the World Trading System. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2002.
1. Claire R. Kelly, Power, Linkage and Accommodation: The WTO as an International Actor and Its Influence on Other Actors and Regimes. Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 24(1), 2006.
2. Kal. Raustiala. Sovereignty and Multilateralism. Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, No.2, 2000.
3. Steve Charnovitz . Open Democratic Participation Scheme For The World Trade Organization: Transparency and Participation in the World Trade Organization. Rutgers Law Review. Vol 54, 2004.
4. Jeffrey L. Dunoff .Civil Society At The WTO: The Illusion Of Inclusion? ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law. Vol 7, 2001.
5. Georg C. Umbricht. An Amicus Curiae Briefs Before The WTO. Journal ofInternational Economic Law, Vol.4, 2001.
6. Frank Emmert. Labor, Environmental Standards and World Trade Law. U.C. Davis Journal of International Law & Policy, U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y. Vol.10, 2003.
7. Padideh Ala'i. Judicial Lobbying at the WTO: The Debate Over the Use of Amicus Curiae Briefs And The U.S. Experience. Fordham International Law Journal, November / December, 2000.
8. Jeffrey L. Dunoff. The WTO's Legitimacy Crisis: Reflections on the Law and Politics of WTO Dispute Resolution. The American Review of International Arbitration. Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. Vol.13. 2002.
9. Joost Pauwely. The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?. The American Journal of International Law, vol. 95, 2001.
10. Steve Charnovitz, Edited by Jose E. Alvarez. Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO: Triangulating the World Trade Organization. American Journal of International Law, Vol 96, 2002.
11. G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, Duke L.J. Vol. 44,1995.
12. Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. Vol.17, 1996.
13. Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization, U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. Vol.17. 1996.
14. Gabrielle Marceau & Peter N. Pedersen, Is the WTO Open and Transparent?, J. World Trade, Feb. 1999.
15. Jonathan Fried, Globalization and International Law - Some Thoughts for States and Citizens, Queen's L.J. Vol. 23, 1997.
16. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Misguided Debate Over NGO Participation at the WTO, J. Int'l Econ. L. Vol.1, 1998.
17. Jeffrey L. Dunoff. Global Trade Issues In The New Millennium: The Wto In Transition: Of Constituents, Competence And Coherence. Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. Vol.33,2001.
18. Daniel C. Esty, Nongovernmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization:Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion, J. Int'l Econ. L. Vol 1, 1998.
19. Claire R. Kelly, Realist Theory and Real Constraints, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol 44, No.2, 2004.
20. Robert Howse. The Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization. Edited by Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veio Heikanen. The legitimacy of International Institutions, New York: United Nation University Press, 2001.
21. Ragosta. Unmasking the WTO, acess to DSB System, Journal of Law and Policy in International Business. Vol. 31 ,2000.
22. J.H.H. Weiler,The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement. The American Review of International Arbitration,. Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. Vol. 23, 2002.
23. Richard H. Steinberg. Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints. 98 A.J.I.L. 247, 2004.
24. Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and the 'Unregulated' Marketplace, Cardozo L. Rev, Vol.18.1996.
25. Daniel C. Esty, Linkage and Governance: NGOs at the World Trade Organization. U. Pa, J. Int'l Econ. L. Vol.19. 1998.
26. Robert E. Hudec. Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 89, No. 3 , 1995.
27. Joel P. Trachtman and Philip M. Moremen. Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Whose Right Is It Anyway? Harvard International Law Journal. Vol. 44, 2003.
2 例如杰克逊教授、彼得斯曼教授、顿那夫教授、沙瓦诺兹教授等. 他们的观点可见 John. H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2006. Steve Charnovitz, “Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law”, American Journal of International Law,Vol.100, 2006. Steve Charnovitz , “Open Democratic Participation Scheme For The World Trade Organization: Transparency and Participation in the World Trade Organization”, Rutgers L. Rev. Vol.56 p.936. Jeffrey L. Dunoff , “The WTO's Legitimacy Crisis: Reflections on the Law and Politics of WTO Dispute Resolution”, Am. Rev. Int'l Arb, Vol. 4(1), 2002. p.202. E.U. Petersmann, Reforming the World Trade System: Legitimacy, Efficiency and Democratic Governance, Oxford University Press, 2005.
3 如威勒教授、谢尔教授、尼古拉斯教授。他们的观点可见 J.H.H. Weiler, “The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement”, The American Review of International Arbitration, Vol.13(2), 2002. p177. G. Richard Shell, “Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization”, Duke L.J. Vol.44, 1995, p.829; Philip M. Nichols, “Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to Nongovernmental Parties”, U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. Vol. 17, 1996, p.295.
4 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr.: “The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy”, in Roger B. Porter, Pierre Sauve (eds.), Efficiency, Equity, Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, Brookings, 2001. p.272.
6 关于争端解决机构的性质,学者们有不同的意见。多数学者认同 GATT 体制下争端解决机制是个准司法机构,而 WTO 争端解决机制是一个司法机构。见左海聪:《国际经济法理论与实践》,武汉大学出版社 2003年版,第 116-125 页。
7 刘页晔:《国际政治领域中的非政府组织——一种互动关系的分析》,天津人民出版社 2005 年版,第 75页。
8 饶戈平:《关于国际组织与国际组织法的几个问题》,载于《国际法律问题研究》,中国政法大学出版社1999 年版,第 194 页。
9 Union of International Associations, Year Book of International Organizations 2002-2003: Guide to Global and Civil Society Network, 39th edition, p.1853. 转引自 Anna-Karin Lindblom: Non-Governmental Organizations in International Law. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005. p.19.
10 例如莱斯特·塞拉蒙在《全球公民社会:非营利部门的向度》一书中将全球市民社会和非政府组织的特征概括为 7 点,分别为民间性、非营利性、自治性、自愿性、有组织性、非政治性和非宗教性。美国学者 杰克勒·斯克杰勒斯贝克对非政府间国际组织作了广泛的界定,认为一个组织只要其成员来自两个不同的国家,且至少有一个成员不是政府官员,这样的组织即可称为非政府间国际组织。转引自刘传春:《国际政治中的国际性非政府间组织》,载于《国际论坛》1999 年第 6 期第 3 页。《国际关系词典》认为由不同国家的社会团体或个人组成的组织是非政府组织。它与政府间的国际组织相对。这类组织是其成员根据共同的愿望和要求,为解决国际间非政治性的问题或发展某一事业而组成的。一般建有常设工作机构。这种组织的活动,对促进各国人民之间的友好往来、增进人民之间的相互了解和友谊,对促进某些国际事务的解决,对国际关系的发展,具有一定的影响和推动作用。这种组织,是国际间交往的一种形式。这种形式在特殊情况下,可以解决政府间国际组织难以解决的问题,如国际红十字会等。政治学对非政府组织、市民社会的定义如康德、哈贝马斯、爱德华·希尔斯等的观点见后文。
11 Steve Charnovitz , “Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law”, American Journal of International Law,Vol.100, 2006. p350. 根据作者的论述,最早使用“非政府组织”名称的学者除了德怀特·摩洛之外,还有索菲·桑格(Sophy Sanger),他于 1920 年在论证一些组织未能参加 1906 年《劳工条约》第一次多边谈判的原因时,也使用了非政府组织一词。
12 跨国市民社会或国际市民社会是较为广泛为学者们引述作为“非政府组织”代名词的一个用语。除此之外,也有学者称非政府组织为“第三部门”,如莱斯特·塞拉蒙,意指处于个人和政府之间的调整公共产品分配的非营利组织。
13 汪信砚、夏昌奇:《论黑格尔市民社会概念》,载于《武汉大学学报(人文科学版)》2007 年第 3 期,第288 页。
14 [德]黑格尔:《法哲学原理》,范扬,张企泰译,商务印书馆 1961 年版,第 197 页。
15 马克思:《马克思恩格斯全集》第 1 卷,人民出版社 1956 年版,第 252 页。
16 [美]爱德华·希尔斯:《市民社会的美德》,李强译,载邓正来、J.C. 亚历山大编:《国家与市民社会——一种社会理论的研究途径》,中央编译出版社,1999 年版,第 33 页,
17 二分法和三分法两种理论在现代理论中均有自己的支持者。柯亨、哈贝马斯、阿拉托等主流学者所主张的三分法比较符合现代西方社会市民阶层发展的实践,但按照《布莱克维尔政治学百科全书》的解释,市民社会是“表示国家控制之外的社会和经济安排、规则、制度”,是指“当代社会秩序中的非政治领域”。市民社会强调的是对与国家的对立,即《布莱克维尔政治学百科全书》采取了二分法的学说。
18 E/RES288(X), Review of Consultative Arrangements with Non-governmental Organizations, 27 February 1950, para. 8.
19 General Review of Arrangements for Consultations with Non-governmental Organizations: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Agenda Item 3, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/AC.70/1994/5 (1994).
20 E/RES/1996/31, Consultative Arrangements Between the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations, 25 July 1996, para. 12.
21 E/RES/1996/31, Consultative Arrangements Between the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations, 25 July 1996, para. 2, 9-12.
22 Draft World Bank Handbook on Good Practices Relating to Non-Governmental Organizations, p.19.
23 Fundamental Principles on the Status of Non-Governmental Organizations in Europe and Explanatory Memorandum, p.18.
24 AG/RES.57(I-O/71), Standards on Cooperative Relations Between the Organization of American States and the United Nations, its Specialized Agencies, and Other National and International Organizations, 23 April 1971.
25 决议全文可见 http://www.uia.org/legal/app48.php
26 Union of International Associations, Year Book of International Organizations 1996/1997, 33rd edition, vol. 1, pp.1684-1685.
27 UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 22.
29 Steve Charnovitz, “Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 100(1), 2006, p308.
30 王世红:《非政府组织法律地位的考察》,载于《河南师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》,2007 年第 34卷,第 2 期,第 59 页。
31 Sean D. Murphy, “Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Governments in Democratic Governance and International Law”, International. and Comparative Law Quarterly, 48 (1),1999, pp. 545–581.当然有效统治的标准也有其优点。它促成了国际法中一些重要基本原则的形成,如不干涉原则。并且有效统治并不完全违背被统治者的同意,毕竟有效的统治也意味着在国内政治上获得一定程度上的同意。
32 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 10. U.N. GAOR, 47 Sess., Annex 1.
33 Agenda 21, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Annex 2, para. 27.4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/4 (1992).
34 Gregory H. Fox, “The right to Political Participation in International Law”, in Gregory H. Fox and Brad E. Roth(eds), Democratic Governance and International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2000. p.89.
35 第一个此类决议为 UN GA Res. 43/157 (18 Dec. 1988), 转引自苏珊·马克思:《宪政之谜——国际法民主和意识形态批判》,上海世纪出版集团 2005 年版,第 45 页。
36 Thomas M. Franck, “Legitimacy and the Democratic Entitlement” in Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth(eds), Democratic Governance and International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2000. p. 27.
37 Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, Kehl am. Rhein: Engel, 2005 p.387.
38 Anna-Karin Lindblom, Non-Governmental Organizations in International Law. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005. p.514.
39 截至到 2007 年 9 月 18 日止,《奥胡斯法案》共有 41 个成员方,包括欧盟以及欧盟境内各国。
40 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, U.N. Doc.ECE/CEP/43.
41 一战结束后,但泽(现格但斯克)脱离德国,成为国际联盟管理的自由市。根据《凡尔赛和约》第 104条规定,由波兰管理和控制但泽的全部铁路运输系统。1921 年 10 月 22 日,波兰和但泽签订一项关于但泽铁路员工转为波兰铁路局服务的协定。部分但泽铁路员工根据该协定在但泽市法院提起诉讼,要求波兰铁路局为他们遭受到的损失提供金钱补偿。虽然但泽法院认为有权审理本案,但波兰否认但泽法院的管辖权。1926 年 1 月,波兰通知国际联盟驻但泽高级专员,波兰不参加此次诉讼。应但泽方面要求,高级专业于 1927 年 4 月 8 日作出决定,认为转为波兰铁路局工作的但泽铁路员工的金钱赔偿请求,可以构成向多年则法院起诉的理由。但,1921 年双方达成的协定不能作为民事诉讼的依据……,根据公认的法律规则,国际条约只是将权利赋予有关政府,并不直接给予个人。但泽不服,该问题提交国际常设法院。法院认为,按照一项已经权利的国际法原则,国际协定不能直接对个人产生权利和义务。但缔约国可以依照自己的意图采取一些特殊规则,对个人创设权利和义务,并由国内法院强制履行。本案中,缔约国对有关人员创设权利义务的意图可以从但泽与波兰的协定的措辞以及有关当局后来行为中推断出来。见朱文奇主编:《国际法学原理及案例教程》,中国人民大学出版社 2006 年版,第 47 页。
42 1982 年 1 月 7 日,德国籍拉格兰德兄弟因涉嫌抢劫银行和谋杀,被美国亚利桑那州警方逮捕,1984 年12 月 14 日被判处死刑。引起美德两国争议的问题出现在告知环节上,亚利桑那州司法部门在逮捕拉格兰德兄弟时,未告知他们根据《维也纳领事关系公约》所应享有的与本国领事联系并获取帮助的权利,也未就此事项通知德国驻美的有关领事。因此,德国于 1999 年 3 月 2 日,向国际法院提起针对美国的诉讼。法院 2001 年作出的判决,其中针对德国请求解答了《维也纳领事关系公约》第 36 条是否为个人创设权利 的问题。法院认为:公约第 36 条第 1 款(b)项构成了接收国对派遣国及其被拘禁的国民的义务,其中的措辞(略)意思明确,没有什么异议。基于此种考虑,法院确认第 36 条第 1 款的确是创设了个人权利。见邵沙平主编:《国际法院新近案例研究》,商务印书馆 2006 年版,第 426、432 页。
43 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law. 7th ed. London:Routledge, 1997. p.100.
44 William Diebold, Jr. ed., “The End of the ITO, in Essays in International Finance” International Finance Section of the Department of Economics and Social Institutions in Princeton University, vol.16, Oct. 1952.
45 Robert F. Housman, “Democratizing International Trade Decision-making”, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol.27, 1994. p673.
46 Stephan Hobb, “Global Challenges to Statehood: The Increasingly Important Role of Non-Government Organizations”, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol.5,1997, p.276.
47 ICITO/EC.2/11, 15 July, 1948. 秘书建议,转引自 Pederson: “World Trade Organization and Non-governmental Organization”. p.3. see http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/1998-sept/pedersen.pdf , 2007 年 5 月 22日访问。
48 Serdar Altay, “Ideas, Private Sectors and Regime Creation After US Hegemony: The Case of General Agreement on Trade in Service”, 见 http://www.bisa.ac.uk/2006/pps/altay.pdf 2007 年 8 月访问。
49 Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, The WTO as a Mechanism for Securing Market Access Property Rights: Implications for Global Labor and Environmental Issues, J. Econ. Perspectives, Vol.15(3), 2001, at 69, 72, 77-78.
50 GATT, Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice 1043 (6th ed. 1994). 转引自 Maura Blue Jeffords, “Turning the Protester into a Partner for Development: The Need for Effective Consultation Between the WTO and NGO”, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol.28, 2003. p.942. 51 Ibid.
52 John H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT, Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1969. pp.444-457.
53 John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System, Geneva: WTO, 1995, p.276. 原文为“GATT-astrophe”,模仿“cat-astrophe”的英语单词合成模式,构成灾难的意思,指 GATT 背叛了人们的利益,成为跨国公司扩张利润的工具。
54 Thomas A. Wathen, A Guide to Trade and the Environment. New York : Environmental Grantmakers Association, 1992. p.25.
55 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Trade and Sustainable Development Principles 30-31 (1994).see http://www.iisd.org/sd/principle.asp
56 王燕:《WTO 框架下非贸易价值理念研究》,载于《国际经贸探索》2007 年第 7 期,第 44 页到 45 页。
57 I.M. Destler & Peter J. Balint, The New Politics of American Trade: Trade, Labor, and the Environment , Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1999, p.1-3.
58 Andrew T. Guzman, “Global Governance and the WTO”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol.45, 2004. p303-323. 古兹曼教授认为可在 WTO 下划分不同子部门,由各子部门协商各个议题。
59 David W. Leebron, “The Boundaries of WTO: Linkages”, Am J Intl L R., Vol. 96, 2002 p.5, 12.
60 Jagdish Bhagwati, “What Really Happened in Seattle”, see http://www.Columbia.edu/jb38/really.pdf 2006年 12 月访问。
61 Frieder Roessler, “Domestic Policy Objectives and the Multilateral Trade Order: Lessons from the Past”, in Anne O. Krueger ed., The WTO as an International Institution, University of Chicago Press, 1998.p.213.
62 Jeffrey L. Dunoff, “Global Trade Issues In The New Millennium: The WTO In Transition: Of Constituents, Competence And Coherence”, Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. Vol.33, 2001. p.985.
63 Andrew T. Guzman, “Global Governance and the WTO”, p.303.
64 Claude E. Barfield, “Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization”, Chi. J. Int'l L.Vol.2, 2001, pp.404-405.
65 John S. Odell, “ The Seattle Impasse and Its Implications for the World Trade Organization” in Daniel L. M. Kennedy and James D(eds), The Political Economy of International Trade Law, Cambridge University Press, 2002. p.400.
66 Michael Edward, “Civil Society and Global Governance”. p. 1-2. http://www.unu.edu/millennium/edwards.pdf, 2007 年 8 月 31 日访问。
67 余劲松:《经济全球化与国际经济法》载于《法学家》,2003 年第 3 期。 转引自人大国际法网http://www.rucil.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=258,2007 年 1 月 2 日访问。
68 [美] 莱斯特·萨拉蒙:《非盈利部门的崛起》,谭静译,载于《全球化与公民社会》,李惠斌主编,广西师范大学出版社 2003 年版,第 173 页。
69 Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, II, The Power of Identity, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, p.243, and III, End of Millennium, 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, p.377.
70 西方学者对国际法进行实证分析时,为了规避给予个人以国际法主体的称呼,多以行为体或活动主体加以称呼。按照传统观点,国际法主体应能独立参与国际立法或国际法的执行,而行为体(actor)主要从实证分析的角度,参与国际事务,并对国际法产生影响的个体。
71 陈立虎、茆晓燕:《反全球化对国际经济法发展的影响》,载于《苏州大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》,2005年第 4 期,第 25 页。
72 Philippe J. Sands, “The Environment, Community and International Law”, Harv. Int'l L.J. Vol.30, 1989, p.393, 412.
73 John. H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law. Cambridge University Press, 2006. p.131.
74 Jeffery Atik, “Democratizing the WTO”, George Washington International Law Review, 2001. Vol.33. p451.
75 Claire R. Kelly, “Power, Linkage and Accommodation: The WTO as an International Actor and Its Influence on Other Actors and Regimes”, Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, 2006.p.79.
76 譬如,斯劳特在《真正的世界秩序》一文中反对国内政府意义正在减弱,也不赞成国际机构、亚国家权威、非政府主体的重要性正在提高的观点。她认为,国际治理正发生着深刻的变迁,但这两种分析都没有捕捉到真正的变化,因为它们都专注于错误的领域。观察的中心应该放在跨政府互动的变化。实际上,她提倡不要以纯粹的博弈论,通过对国际领域行为体力量消长来考察国际治理的发展趋势,而更因关注政府间行为的方式。她认为,并非主权或国家不再重要,而是主权正在解体,国家发挥作用的形式改变了。具体而言,她指出:国家……正解体为相互分离、功能各异的各个部门。这些部分——法院、监管机构行政,甚至立法——正各自与它们对等的海外机构进行沟通,创造着一个慎密的关系网,这种关系网构成了一个新的跨政府秩序。今天的国际问题,包括恐怖主义、犯罪组织、环境恶化、洗钱、银行倒闭和证券欺诈,创造并维系了这种关系。斯劳特将其定义为“跨政府主义”,并认为跨政府网络是国际法将成为全球治理的操作载体。以巴塞尔银行监管委员会为例,这一委员会不是国家间协议的产物,而是十二位中央银行行长的决定。尽管改委员会缺乏正式的或法律上的能力,但它还是发挥着相当大的影响力:“华尔街更关注巴塞尔委员会,而非世界银行。”斯劳特的观点详见 A.-M. Slaughter: “The Real New World Order”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.76(5),1997, pp.185-188. 笔者认为,斯劳特的实证分析看似颇具有说服力,但她对其他学者的批评也言过其实了。国家发挥作用方式的改变,政府部门的分离本身也体现为国家控制能力的减弱,并且没有任何国际法实践可以否认非政府组织力量的崛起。重要的是,很多学者都否认“跨政府主义”能够实现斯劳特所描述的政府之间的监督和民主理念的传播。事实上,跨政府主义倒似乎可以被看成是在往相反的方向推进。例如,苏珊·马克思详尽分析了斯劳特的观点后,提出“即使公民能让他们自己的政府对其跨政府行为负责,民主合法性还是要求这一责任夸大到面向所有那些受影响的人”,即跨政府主义不能满足民众民主合法性要求。跨政府主义终究不能体现为一种善法之治。任何民众都无法接受将他国政府的政策和意志强加到本国人民的身上。苏珊·马克思的观点可见:苏珊·马克思:《宪政之谜——国际法、民主和意识形态批判》,上海世纪出版集团 2005 年版,第 111 页。
77 张文显主编:《法理学(第二版)》,高等教育出版社 2003 年版,第 82 页。
78 可见吕世伦、任岳鹏:《根本法、市民法、公民法和社会法》,载于《求是学刊》,2005 年第 5 期,第 73页。董保华、郑少华:《社会法-对第三法域的探索》,载于《法学论坛》1999 年第 1 期,第 31-32 页。董保华:《社会法原论》,中国政法大学出版社 2001 年版。王保树、邱本:《经济法与社会公共性论纲》,载《法律科学》2000 年第 3 期,第 63-64 页。张长利:《论政策性银行法的性质》,载于《学术论坛》2000年第 2 期,第 41 页。
79 社会法是公法和私法在融合过程中产生的,是国家为了保障社会利益,通过加强对社会生活干预而产生的一种立法。社会立法最早在西方资本主义国家产生,是垄断资本主义社会各种矛盾积累的结果。资本 主义积极国家论和福利国家论的展开,市民法原理的形式性适用带来了越来越多的实质性不平等。例如,在契约自由的前提下,处于劣势地位的劳动者被强迫在低工资和超时间的条件下工作;在自由放任的竞争中获胜的企业,形成垄断体,开始控制价格和费用,操纵市场;自由放任社会的景气变动和恐慌,使人们、特别是老人和病人陷入贫困,等等。这些矛盾使国家不得不关注劳动、福利、教育等方面的问题,并运用政治和法律手段予以调整。而传统经济立法旨在市场失灵时,由国家干预,有效配置资源,追求效率为主要原则,无法适应新问题的解决。因此,劳动法、社会保障法等应运而生,他们从缓和社会矛盾,人文关怀的角度出发,扶助弱势群体,注重经济发展中非既得利益者的保护,与传统的经济立法不同。
80 徐崇利:《经济全球化与国际法中“社会立法”的勃兴》,载于《中国法学》,2004 年第 1 期,第 142 页。
81 徐崇利:《经济全球化与国际法中“社会立法”的勃兴》,载于《中国法学》,2004 年第 1 期,第 142-143页。
82 Helfer, “Regime shifting, The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking”, Yale J. Int'l L. Vol.29, 2004, p.5.
83 [美]罗伯特·基欧汉:《霸权之后:世界政治经济中的合作与纷争》,苏长河译,上海人民出版社 2001年版,第 111 页。
84 Kal. Raustiala, “Sovereignty and Multilateralism”, Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, No.2, 2000.p.412.
85 Frank Emmert, “Labor, Environmental Standards and World Trade Law”, U.C. Davis Journal of International Law & Policy, Vol. 10(3), 2003, p.85-86.
86 Sylvia Ostry, “The WTO and International Governance”, in Klaus Gunter Deutsch & Bernhard Speyer (eds), The World Trade Organization Millennium Round, London: Routledge, 2001. p.285.
87 Pawleyn, “The Sutherland Report: A Missed Opportunity for Genuine Debate on Trade, Globalization and Reforming the WTO”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.8(2), 2005, pp. 329-346.
88 Jeffery Atik, “Democratizing the WTO”, George Washington International Law Review, Vol.33. 2001, p452.
89 Kal. Raustiala, “ Sovereignty and Multilateralism”, Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol.1, No.2, 2000, p.410.
90 Sylvia Ostry. “External Transparency: The Policy Process at the National Level of the Two-level Game” in Mike Moor(ed.), Doha and Beyond: The Future of the Multilateral Trading System, Cambridge University Press, 2004. p.94. 总的来说,内部透明度涉及的是 WTO 程序和文件对 WTO 成员方,主要是发展中国家的成员方是否透明的问题,如绿屋谈判;而外部透明度指的是 WTO 对成员方以外的组织和机构是否透明的问题。
91 Sylvia Ostry, “Doha and After”. Speech in From Doha to Kananskis Conference. March, 2002.
92 Frieder Roessler, “The Institutional Balance Between the Judicial and Political Organs of the WTO”, Presentation to the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June 2000.
93 Peter Sutherland, “Is Free Trade Fair? Has it Gone Too Far?”, Harvard University Center for International Affairs, August 2000. See http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/fellows/papers/1999-00/sutherland.pdf 2007 年 5 月 1 日访问。
94 United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, “Remarks on Trade and Environment at the Global Legislators Organization for a Balanced Environment”(Feb. 28, 1994). 转引自 Steve Charnovitz, “Opening The WTO to Nongovernmental Interests”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 24. p175.
95 Jeffrey L. Dunoff, “Global Trade Issues In The New Millennium: The WTO In Transition: Of Constituents, Competence And Coherence” , Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. Vol.33, 2001, p.979.
96 [美]戴维·布朗等:《全球化、非政府组织和多部门关系》,载李惠斌主编:《全球化与公民社会》,广西师范大学出版社 2003 年版,第 146 页。
97 Pierre Kazansky, “Theorie de l'administration internationale”, RGDIP, Vol.9, 1902, p.353, 354, 357.
98 Alvarez, Jose, International Organizations As Law-makers, Oxford University Press, 2005. p.611.
99 Philip C. Jessup, Adolf Lande, & Oliver J. Lissitzyn, International Regulation Of Economic And Social Questions, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,1955, p.33.
100 [日]松井芳郎等著:《国际法(第四版)》,辛崇阳译,中国政法大学出版社 2004 年版,第 56 页。
101 Robert O’Brien, “Global Civil Society and Global Governance” in Alice D. Ba and Mathew J. Hoffmann(eds.), Contending Perspectives on Global Governance, London: Routledge, 2005. p.224.
102 樊勇明:《全球化与国际关系行为主体的多元化》,载于范丽珠主编:《全球化下的社会变迁与非政府组织》,上海人民出版社 2003 年版,第 95 页。
103 赵秀文:《国际商事仲裁法》,中国人民大学出版社 2004 年版,第 354 页。
104 姚莉:《非政府组织与国际贸易》,载于《西北师范大学学报(社会科学版)》,2007 年第 1 期,第 126页。
105 王秀梅:《国际非政府组织与国际法之“跨国立法”》,载于《河南政法管理干部学院学报》,2006 年第4 期,第 205 页。
106 该原则除再次重申《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》中规定的权利不可克减以外,而且说明:在任何情况下,即使是宣称为了维持国家生命的目的,这些权利都不可克减。
107 United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, (98-000) P 129,168 (Oct. 12, 1998)
108 Harold Koh, “Why do Nations Bringing International Law Home”, Houston L. Rev. Vol.35, 1998. p.623.
109 Jan Art Scholte, “The Globalization of World Politics,” in John Baylis and steve Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics, Oxford University Press, 2001. p.21-22.
110 Bryan A. Garner(ed.), Black’s Law Dictionary. 7th ed. p.83.
111 Bryan A. Garner:《牛津现代法律用语辞典》,法律出版社,第 51-52 页。
112 赵海峰、高立忠:《论国际司法程序中的法庭之友制度》,载于《比较法研究》,2007 年第 3 期,第 68页。
113 我国苏州市中级人民法院民事审判第三庭在处理涉外案件中也引入了“法庭之友”制度。在隐名股东、加工纠纷案中的事实查明问题上,由于投资和货物流转过程中的审查环节比较多,专业性较强,加之相关当事人存在规避法律的现象,给法官审理隐名股东、加工纠纷案带来不少难度。为此,法院从苏州外经委、海关、工商局、报关公司等单位聘请 28 名专业或技术领域的专家为“法庭之友”。合议庭根据案件类型、争议问题,可从 28 名“法庭之友”中邀请 3 至 6 名旁听庭审。在休庭时间内,合议庭充分听取“法庭之友” 就争议的专业或技术问题发表意见。“法庭之友”审案方式弥补了法官专业知识的不足,保证了办案质量。四年来,利用该方式审结的涉外商事案件当事人均未上诉,取得了较好的效果。见环球商业评论网:中国从事涉外审判的法官及他们所面对的难题http://www.cngbr.com/wim/cngbr/article.jsp?rId=D6416548DE54146E42662D10497E1441 2006 年 11 月 24 日刊登。也可见中国商务部网页。
114 Pannel Report on Brazil-Measures on Affecting Imports of Retreated Tyres. WT/DS332/R, June 12, 2007.
115 Joyeeta Gupta, “Non-State Actors In International Governance And Law: A Challenge Or A Blessing”, Journal of International & Comparative Law, Vol.11.2005. p450.
116 SC Res. 771, para. 5 (Aug. 13, 1992). 转引自 Steve Charnovitz , “Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law”, American Journal of International Law,Vol.100, 2006.p.353.
117 SC Res. 1470, para. 8 (Mar. 28, 2003). 转引自 Steve Charnovitz , “Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law”, American Journal of International Law,Vol.100, 2006. p.353.
118 刘贞晔:《国际政治领域中的非政府组织——一种互动关系的分析》,天津人民出版社 2005 年版,第72 页。
119 莫纪宏:《论人权的司法最终救济性》,载于《法学家》,2001 年第 3 期,第 16 页。
120 如萨切曼和莫热门教授的观点,见 Joel P. Trachtman and Philip M. Moremen, “Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Whose Right Is It Anyway?”, Harv. Int'l L.J, Vol. 44, 2003, p.222. 另可见 David Livshiz , “Public Participation In Disputes Under Regional Trade Agreements: How Much Is Too Much--The Case For A Limited Right Of Intervention”, N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. Vol.61, 2005. pp.534-550.
121 Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, Res. 2000/7, U.N. Sub-Comm’n. on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 52nd Sess., preamble. 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7. 根据决议,冲突体现为:(1)对发展中国家技术转让;(2)植物栽培者权利和转基因生物专利者的权利;(3)生物剽窃;(4)本地社群自然资源和文化的控制;(5)专利药物获取限制对健康权的影响。
122 Laurence R. Helfer: Regime Shifting:The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, YALE J.INT’L L. 1, Vol.29, 2004. pp.23-47. 同样观点可见 Laurence R. Helfer, “Nesting and Complexity in the International Intellectual Property Regime”, available at http://www.princeton.edu/~smeunier/Helfer%20memo.pdf 以及 “Human rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence? “Available at http://mipr.umn.edu/archive/v5n1/Helfer.pdf , 2007 年 6 月 7 日访问。
123 Laurence R. Helfer, “Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflicts or Coexistence?”, Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. Vol. 47(5), 2003. p.60.
124 详细内容可见 IGC’s work and supporting documents, http://www.wipo.org/globalissues/index.html. 2007 年 12 月 12 日访问。
125 Laurence Helfer, “Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking”, Yale J. Int'l L., Vol.29(1), 2004. Helfer 教授所说的体制(regime),含义为某个特定的国际组织。他的文章分析了非政府组织在知识产权领域进行体制转移的原因、本质及成本等。实际上体制转移并非非政府组织开创,美国、欧共体为了更有效的保护本国知识产权,将对知识产权的谈判从 WIPO转移到 GATT 体制下,最终促使 WTO 下 TRIPS 协议的达成,这也是体制的转移。在非政府组织和发展中国家的努力下,体制转移的效应已经体现在四个领域中知识产权立法的激增。它们分别是:生物多样性、植物基因资源、公共健康以及人权。体制转移的效果是试图以国际软法规则代替或干扰硬法规则的实施。Helfer 教授所指的“体制转移”是指通过有意图的举动将立法举动从一个国际场合转移到另一个国际场合。Dunoff 教授将这种行为类比为当事人在民事诉讼中“挑选法院”(forum shopping)的举动。
126 Claire R. Kelly, “Power, Linkage and Accommodation: The WTO as an International Actor and Its Influence on Other Actors and Regimes”, Berkeley J. Int'l L. Vol.24, 2006, p.110.
127 李振纲:《WTO 与非政府组织关系初探》,载于《法学评论》,2003 年第 3 期,第 91 页。
128 August Reinisch and Christina Irgel, The participation of NGOs in the WTO dispute system, Nonstate Actors and International Law 1, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2001, p.130.
129 Anna-Karin Lindblom, Non-Governmental Organizations in International Law. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005. p.28.无论是国内法,还是国际法,作为一种治理的工具,都应具有正当性。法的正当性体现着法对资源分配的正义。但对于国际法而言,有效性,即效率也是非常重要的价值。国际法是国家之间的协议意志的体现,国际贸易规则的价值也取决于国家之间能否有效率的达成贸易规则。
130 王秀梅:《国际非政府组织与国际法之“跨国立法”》,载于《 河南政法管理干部学院学报》,2006 年第 4 期,第 205 页。
131 肖元恺:《全球新坐标:国际载体与权利转移》,国际文化出版公司 2003 年版,第 106 页。
132 Joost Pauwelyn, “The Transformation of World Trade”, Mich. L. Rev. Vol.104, 2005, p.5.
133 此处的立法参与主要是指非政府组织在 WTO 规则形成和制定过程中的参与权,即 WTO 在进行国际立法时非政府组织的参与权。鉴于 WTO 成员方制定规则时也是行使其决策权的表现,因此,也有学者将立法参与称为决策参与。本文中立法参与和决策参与是互换的概念,没有本质区别。
134 路特维勒小组的组成人员是: 瑞士国家银行以及国际清算银行主席 Fritz Leutwiler, Getulio Vargas 基金以及巴西前财务部部长的 Simonsen,美国议员以及议会财务委员会的成员 Bill Bradley,伦敦政治经济学院董事以及印度储备银行主管 I.G. Patel, 国际法院副主席 Guy Ladreit de Lacharriere,印度尼西亚前贸易工业部及财务部部长 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo ,和 AB 沃尔沃公司总裁 Pehr Gyllenhammar。 该项目由私人非营利来源的资金资助,主要是福特基金。 报告英文原名为“Trade Policy for a Better Future”。
135 Bill Bradley and Fritz Leutwiler, Trade Policies for a Better Future: Proposals for Action, Gen Agreement Tariffs Trade, 1985. p.36.
136 Pedersen, “The World Trade Organization and Non-governmental Organizations”, p.8. http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/1998-sept/pedersen.pdf
137 G. Sampson, “Overview” in G. Sampson(ed.), The Role of the World Trade Organization in Global Governance, United Nations University Press, 2001. p.11.
138 General Council, Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations, WT/L/162, dated 23 July 1996.
139 Steve Charnovitz, “Open Democratic Participation Scheme for the World Trade Organization: Transparency and Participation in the Would Trade Organization”, Rutgers L. Rev. Vol.56, 2000. p.179. 作者这里唯一主体并非指国家是国际法的唯一主体,而指处理国际关系的唯一相关主体。政府间组织也是国家为了处理国际关系而设立的。
140 见 World Trade Organization, “WTO Secretariat activities with NGOs”, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min01e/mi n01ngoactive.htm (last visited May 31, 2003).
141 World Trade Organization, “Registration for Non-Governmental Organizations”, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min03e/ng oacce.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2003).
142 观察员来自于联合国的实践,后被政府间国际组织所广泛采纳。观察员不具有表决权,但能出席国际组织的有关会议,并对派出国汇报。WTO 下的观察员制度主要针对政府以及政府间组织设置的。根据《政府间国际组织在 WTO 享受观察员地位的指南》,被授予观察员资格的政府间国际组织可获取 WTO 的主要文件,可以被邀请在某一会议上发言。
143 Daniel C. Esty, “We the People: Civil Society and World Trade Organization”, in Marco Bronckers andReinhard Quick(eds), New Directions in International Economic Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000, p.90.
144 Pedersen, “The World Trade Organization and Non-governmental Organizations”. p.8. http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/1998-sept/pedersen.pdf
145 非政府组织放弃最终与会的机会主要原因是派代表到日内瓦参加会议的费用。
146 Pedersen, “The World Trade Organization and Non-governmental Organizations”. p.12. http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/1998-sept/pedersen.pdf
147 WTO news, Press/240, 13 August 2001. see http://www.wto.org/English/news_e/pres01_e/pr240_e.htm
148 Joint Ngo Statement On Trips And Public Health WTO Deal On Medicines: A "Gift" Bound In Red Tape,September 10, 2003, http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/ngos09102003.html . 意指 WTO 最终达成了一项向穷人提供药品的协定,但非政府组织认为这项送给穷人的礼物也有很多限制,如同被胶布裹住了一样。非政府组织认为《公共健康宣言》权利授予部分仅 52 字,但另外规定 3200 字的内容限制权利的适用。联名的
14 个非政府组织包括行动巴黎、消费者技术工程、国际消费者、 基本行动、欧洲艾滋病治疗小组、国际健康行动、全球健康准入工程、国际人民健康理事会、无国界医师组织、国际牛津救济委员会、人类健康运动,SEATINT, 第三世界网络,妇女发展组织等。
149 Memorandum on the Need to Improve Internal Transparency and Participation in the WTO. http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/par/MEMORANDUM_ON_THE_NEED_TO_IMPROVE_IT_Final_version.doc 该《备忘录》由第三世界网络、国际乐施会、国际公共服务、世界自然基金会、国际环境法中心、关注全球南方、农业和贸易政策学会、非洲贸易网络、国际性别和贸易网络、特波提巴国际土著居民权利中心等十个非政府组织联名提交。
150 Civil Society Calls On Rich Countries To Stop Imposing Extreme Demands At The WTO Sixth Ministerial Conference. 16th December, 2005. See http://www.twnside.org.sg/announcement/NGO_STATEMENT_ON_Hong_Kong_Ministerial_final.doc
151 Submission from United States, “General Council Informal Consultations on External Transparency”, WT/GC/W/413/Rev.1, dated 13 October 2000.
152 Discussion Paper from the European Community to the WTO General Council on ‘Improving the Functioning of the WTO System’, WT/GC/W412, dated 6 October 2000.
153 Submission from Hong Kong, ‘General Council Informal Consultations on External Transparency’, WT/GC/W418, dated 31 October 2000, para.9.
154 M.Moore, “How Trade Liberalization Impacts on Employment, Speech to the International Labor Organization”, 18 March 2002, http://www.wto.org/french/news_f/spmm_f/spmm80_f.htm
155 Peter Van den Bossche, “NGO Involvement in the WTO: A Lawyer’s Perspective on a Glass of Half-full or Half-empty?” p.13. http://www.unimaas.nl/bestand.asp?id=6981 2007 年 7 月访问。
156 The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Legal Texts, pp. 469-71.
157 专题研讨会和年会区分并不绝对,年会的主题也可能比较专向性,与专题研讨会交叉。例如后文所提到的 2002 年年会“多哈回合议程及超越”主要论及贸易与发展问题,也可划入专题研讨会。
158 Steve Charnovitz, “Opening The WTO to Nongovernmental Interests”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 24, 2000, p176-178.
159 NGO Response to Revised Draft Text: From Bad to Worse! September 13, 2003. http://www.igtn.org/pdfs/224_NGOstmtCancun.pdf 该声明由国际性别和贸易网路、关怀中心、女性发展协会(加拿大)、女性发展(欧洲)、亚太食物主权网络、伯尔尼宣言等九个非政府组织联名发表。
160 Peter Van Den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, Cambridge University Press, 2005. p.159.
161 各次研讨会的信息可见 WTO 网页与非政府组织相关信息 http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngo_e.htm#activities
162 见 WTO 网站 First series of Issue-specific dialogues with Civil Society organized by the WTO Secretariat The Development Component of the DDA,http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngo_dialogue_e.htm published on 27 April, 2007.
163 相关信息可见 WTO 网站新闻,WTO Director-General , Pascal Lamy, Briefed NGOs on the State of Play of Doha Round Negotiations, http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngo_briefing_e.htm published on 27 March, 2007.
164 Open Letter on Institutional Reform, WTO Activist, October 2001, at wto-activist@iatp.org.
165 Peter Van Den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, Cambridge University Press, 2005. p.133.
166 Pedersen, “World Trade Organization and Non-governmental Organization”, p.22.
167 Black law dictionary, Bryan A. Garner(ed.), 7th edition, p.912.
168 高岚君:《国际法的价值论》,武汉大学出版社 2006 年版,第 19 页。
169 白桂梅:《国际法》,北京大学出版社 2006 年版,第 110-111 页。
170 [澳] 约瑟夫·A·凯米莱里、吉米·福尔克:《主权的终结——日趋“缩小”和“碎片化”的世界政治》,李东燕译,浙江人民出版社 2001 年版,第 281 页。
171 [美]路易斯·亨金:《国际法:政治与价值》,张乃根、马忠法等译,中国政法大学出版社 2004 年版,第 36 页。
172 Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, 2nd ed, Boston: Little Brown, 1863. p.132. 作者将国家形容为道德个体,或道德共同体(moral beings),意在强调国家作为个人集合的道德属性。
173 Gregory H. Fox, “The Right to Political Participation in International Law” in Democratic Governance and International Law, p.51.
174 John H. Jackson, “Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept”, American Journal of International Law, Vol.97, 2003. p.783.
175 刘贞晔:《国际政治领域中的非政府组织——一种互动关系的分析》,天津人民出版社 2005 年版,第 190 页。
176 高岚君:《国际法的价值论》,武汉大学出版社 2006 年版,第 87 页。
177 [美]约翰·罗尔斯:《正义论》,何怀宏、何包钢、廖申白译,中国社会科学出版社 1988 年版,第 3 页。
178 Thomas M. Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, A.J.I.L.,Vol.86, 1992, pp46-91.
179 Thomas M. Franck, “Democracy as a Human Right” in Henkin, L., & Hargrove, J.L.(eds.), Human Rights: An Agenda for the Next Century, Washington D.C.: American Society of International Law, 1994, p.75. 弗兰克认为正当性存在两个单独的问题,一是国内政府的正当性,二是治理的国际合法化。他认为,最终治理的正当性有一天将依据国际规则和国际程序来证实。
180 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, Oxford University Press, 1990. p29.
181 Thomas M. Franck, The Principle of Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Oxford: Clarendon, 1995, p.83.
182 Thomas M. Franck, “Legitimacy and Democratic Entitlement”, in Gregory H. Fox and Brd R. Roth (eds.), Democratic Governance and International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2000. p.31.
183 Thomas M. Franck, “Legitimacy And the Democratic Entitlement” in Democratic Governance and International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2000. p.25.
184 [英]苏珊·马克思:《宪政之谜——国际法、民主和意识形态批判》,上海世纪出版集团 2005 年版,第74 页至 82 页。
185 Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 233.
186 Allen Buchanan, Jutice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law. Oxford University Press, 2004. p. 323, 315.
187 Michelle Ratton Sanchez, “Brief Observations On The Mechanisms For NGO Participation In The WTO”, Sur, International Journal on Human Rights, issue.4, 2006, p.104.
188 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, p. 145.
189 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, p. 147.
190 [英] 约翰·霍夫曼:《主权》,陆斌译,吉林人民出版社 2005 年版,第 83 页。
191 [英]苏珊·马克思:《宪政之秘——国际法、民主和意识形态批判》,第 112-115 页。
192 Anna-Karin Lindblom, Non-Governmental Organizations in International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005.p. 28.
193 何鸣:《从马克思到哈贝马斯》,载于《理论与改革》,2004 年第 2 期,第 13 页。
194 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, MIT Press, 1996, pp.107-110. 另可见哈贝马斯:《民主的三种规范模式》,曹卫东译,http://19720605.fyfz.cn/blog/19720605/index.aspx?blogid=276969 ,2007 年 9 月 22 日访问。哈贝马斯所支持的民主规范模式是话语政治(deliberative Politik),即协商式民主。
195 Thomas M. Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, p.90.
196 Daniel Bodansky, “The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93(4),1999, p.596.
197 Gregory. Fox, “The Political Participation in International Law”, in Gregory H. Fox and Brad E. Roth(eds.), Democratic Governance and International Law,. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. p.50. 原文讲述的是市民大众是主权最终的 reciprocitory.
198 Anna-Karin Lindblom, Non-governmental Organizations in International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005.p28.
199 Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, II , 1997, p.268.
195 Thomas M. Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, p.90.
196 Daniel Bodansky, “The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93(4),1999, p.596.
197 Gregory. Fox, “The Political Participation in International Law”, in Gregory H. Fox and Brad E. Roth(eds.), Democratic Governance and International Law,. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. p.50. 原文讲述的是市民大众是主权最终的 reciprocitory.
198 Anna-Karin Lindblom, Non-governmental Organizations in International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005.p28.
199 Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, II , 1997, p.268.
203 Steve Charnovitz, “The WTO and Cosmopolitics” in E.U. Petersmann(ed.), Reforming the World Trading System: Legitimacy, Efficiency, and Democratic Governance, Oxford University Press, 2005, p.438.
204 Daniel C. Esty, “We the People: Civil Society and World Trade Organization”, in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick(eds.), New Directions in International Economic Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000. p.90. “we the people”, “我们即人民”,这源自美国宪法的开篇语,它表明谁持有最终的政治权力。
205 多数赞成非政府组织参与权的学者均是持话语权,非投票权的立场。如 Charnovitz 认为非政府组织在WTO 下的参与的价值并非要提高 WTO 的代表性,而是为 WTO 的商议提供新的能量、概念以及价值。因此,他把正当性分为两种,一是投入的正当性,即内部正当性,即政府或者国际组织是否代表人们;二是产出的正当性,即外部正当性,政府或者国际组织的决策是否为了人们。他认为非政府组织对于 WTO 的贡献主要是在产出的正当性方面的贡献。Steve Charnovitz : The WTO and Cosmopolitics, in E.U. Petersmann(ed.), Reforming the World Trading System: Legitimacy, Efficiency, and Democratic Governance, Oxford University Press, 2005. p.442.
206 公司法下代理成本问题主要是指现代公司由于所有权和经营权分离,股东作为所有者控制经营管理层的权限越来越小,因此掌握公司控制权的经营管理层的经营决策时常不反映股东的利益,从而产生代理成本的问题。
207 蔡从燕:《市民社会、协商民主与国际法的范式转换》,载于《厦门大学法律评论》第 9 辑,第 257 页。
208 Lori Wallach, “The FP Interview: Lori’s War”, Foreign Pol’y, 2000, p.118 and K. Danaher and R. Burbach (eds), Globalize This! The Battle Against the WTO and Corporate Rule, Common Courage Press , 2000, p.124-128.
209 UN/SG/SM/7318. Press release. 29 February 2000. 转引自鄂晓梅:《国际非政府组织对国际法的影响》,载于《政府论坛》2001 年第 3 期,第 123-124 页。
210 Annan Hails Civil Society Organizations, Crediting Their Support For His Achievements, UN News Centre, see http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?newsid=19777&cr=civil&cr1=society 2006 年 9 月 8 日刊登。
211 Lending Hands, : Civil Society, Philanthropy, and International Investing in Poor Countries, see http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/66ByDocName/LendingHandsCivilSocietyPhilanthropyandInternationalInvestinginPoorCountriesPresentationbyJeffThindwaMay2002/$FILE/UCLAPresentation.pdf , 2006 年12 月访问。
212 OMC (Renato Ruggiero). 1998. The WTO and civil society. Comments by the Director-General to US NGOs. http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngospe_e.htm 2007 年 8 月访问。
213 OMC (Mike Moore). 2002. Globalization: the impact of the Doha Development Agenda on the free marketprocess. http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm77_e.htm 2007 年 8 月访问。
214 René Audet and Rapha?l Canet, “WTO,Global Governance and Civil Society: Image Cleaning or Real Dialogue?” http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/ieim/IMG/pdf/Conference-Canet-Audet-decembre-2005.pdf , 2007 年 8月访问。
215 OMC (Pascal Lamy). 2005 (21 oct.). Vers une gouvernance mondiale? http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl_e.htm 2007 年 8 月访问。
216 James Thuo Gathii, “Open Democratic Participation Scheme For The World Trade Organization: Process and Substance In WTO Reform”, Rutgers L. Rev., Vol. 56, 2004, p.895. 但该报告本身就深受学者的质疑,学者们称其为“内部人”所作出的报告。桑德兰本人曾是石油公司的首席执行官,其他研究成员也均为对 WTO规则产生重要影响的内部人,没有来自贸易与公平运动的代表,甚至没有任何来自市民社会的代表又如robert howse 在全球贸易体制中市民参与的论坛中发言也认为《桑德兰报告》本身没有市民社会的代表,对 WTO 未来改革的言论也不能真正体现市民社会的意见。
217 Peter Sutherland: The Future Scope of WTO,see http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.htm Chapter V, p.41-48. 这个高层建议委员会是在总干事素帕猜·巴尼巴滴任职期间任命的,由彼得·桑德兰主持。总干事要求该建议委员会完全独立,不受秘书处的限制。委员会的任务是对 WTO 体制改革提出建议,而不是对 WTO 讨论的实体问题作出建议。后建议委员会于 2005 年 1 月发表了该报告。有关《桑德兰报告》的背景可见杰克逊教授对报告的介绍和评论:John H. Jackson: The Future Scope of WTO: Issues as Seen in Sutherland Report, see http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/bbl/06032301.html published on March 23, 2006.
218 Harold Koh, “Transnational Public Law Litigation”, Yale L.J. Vol.100, 1990, p.2347.; Steve Charnovitz, “WTO Cosmopolitics”, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol.34, Winter 2002., p.299.
219 Claire R. Kelly, “Power, Linkage and Accommodation: The WTO as an International Actor and Its Influence on Other Actors and Regimes”, Berkeley J. Int'l L., 2006. Vol.24. p.85.
220 G. Richard Shell, “Participation of Nongovernmental Parties in the World Trade Organization: the Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization”, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 17(1), 1996, p.359. 囚徒困境(prisoner dilemma)是博弈论上的术语,来源于一个比喻:两个嫌疑犯(A和B)作案后被警察抓住,隔离审讯;警方的政策是“坦白从宽,抗拒从严”,如果两人都坦白则各判 8 年;如果一人坦白另一人不坦白,坦白的放出去,不坦白的判 10 年;如果都不坦白则因证据不足各判 1 年。囚徒困境反映为个人理性和集体理性的矛盾。在国际贸易领域,个人理性,即个别国家的理性选择不能总体上增进全体国家的利益,即个别国家的本国利益最大化原则得不到全体国家利益的总和最大。因此,国际组织将处于博弈的各个国家集合起来,通过可靠的承诺(公约的方式),使得全体利益最大化。
221 Herbert A. Simon, The Science of the Artificial, 3rd ed. MIT Press, 1996, pp.197-207.
222 Robert O.Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation” in Roger B. Porter, Pierre Sauve (eds.),Efficiency, Equity, and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System in Millennium, Brookings, 2001. p.266.
223 很多学者都认为俱乐部式的治理模式并不意味政府能够代表本国人民的总体利益。国际组织下执行国际立法职能的往往是政府的某个职能部门。如前文所指的斯劳特,这里所提到的基欧汉和奈,以及顿那夫教授、豪斯教授等都提出俱乐部模式不能再证实国际政策的正当性。
224 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations”, 27 World Pol. Vol.27, 1974, p.39, 43.
225 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, “The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy”, in Roger B. Porter, Pierre Sauve (eds.), Efficiency, Equity, Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, Brookings, 2001.p. 267.
226 Dunoff, “Public Participation in the Trade Regime: of Litigation, Frustration, Agitation and Legitimation”, Rutgers L. Rev. Vol.56, 2004, 967.
227 Americo Beviglia Zampetti, “A Rough Map of Challenges to the Multilateral Trading System” in Roger B. Porter(ed.), Efficiency, Equity and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, p.42.
228 Dunoff, “Public Participation in the Trade Regime: of Litigation, Frustration, Agitation and Legitimation”p.967.
229 Robert Howse, “Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law” in J. H. H. Weiler(ed.), The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade? Oxford University Press, 2000 , p.40.
230 刘志云:《现代国际关系理论视野下的国际法》,法律出版社 2006 年版,第 308 页。
231 [美]罗伯特·基欧汉、约瑟夫·奈:《权力与相互依赖》,北京大学出版社 2002 年版,第 227 页。
232 刘志云:《现代国际关系理论视野下的国际法》,法律出版社 2006 年版,第 338 页。
233 David Held. “Democracy and the New International Order”, in Daniele Archibugi and David Held(eds.), Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order, Cambridge University Press, 1995.p.96-99.
234 Daniel C. Esty, “We The People: Civil Society in the WTO in New Directions” in International Economic Law, in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick(eds), New Directions in International Economic Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000. p.89.
235 Ibid.
236 Ibid.
237 John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Economic Law, Cambridge University Press, 2006. p.203.
238 刘志云:《现代国际关系理论视野下的国际法》,法律出版社 2006 年版,第 338-339 页。
239 Philip M. Nichols, “No Two Snowflakes Are Alike: Assumptions Made In The Debate Over Standing Before World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Boards”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol.24, 2000, pp.427-432. Nichols 认为没有两个国际组织是相同的,将 WTO 和其他国际组织下市民参与情况进行比较不合适。
240 Joel P. Trachtman and Philip M. Moremen, “Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Whose Right Is It Anyway?”, Harv. Int'l L.J, Vol.44, 2003, pp.221-251.
241 Steve Charnovitz, “Opening The WTO to Nongovernmental Interests”, Rutgers L. Rev. Vol.56, 2000. p.176.
242 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration Law for Global Integration Law, Jean Monnet Working Paper No 7/01, 2002, pp.34-44. see http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/02/021201.html , 2006 年 11 月访问。
243 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “Constitutionalism and WTO Law: From a State-centered Approach Towards Human Rights Approach in International Law” in The Political Economy of International Trade Law, p. 33.
244 信义义务在公司法上也被翻译为授信义务,在大陆法公司法下比较接近的说法是诚信义务(duty of fidelity)。股东根据资本多数决的原则选出董事,董事作为代理人,对委托人的利益最大化服务。信义义务构成公司法制度的基石,这对于所有权和控制权分离的公司体制下约束掌握控制权的董事及高级管理人员的行为是行之有效的。公司法下的利益相关者理论实际上并非要颠覆现行制度,而是对董事的信义义务加以补充,认为公司不能仅关注投资者利益,而也要注意到公司的社会责任。公司在获取利润的同时,应增进社会其他受影响群体,如消费者、雇用员工、供应商、下游销售商,甚至是公司所在社群环境的利益。公司法下利益相关者理论被批判的主要原因是它将公司追求利润的目标多元化,可能会削弱公司法对投资者投资保护的功能,并且会使得董事会和高级管理人员在面临公司股东利益和利益相关者利益冲突时无所 适从。
245 例如,德国 1976 年《共同决策法》规定在在超过 500 名职工的中型公司中,监事会成员三分之一以上须由职工代表构成;而在超过 2000 职工的大型公司中,监事会的成员半数以上须由职工代表构成。欧盟 2004 年通过的公司法第 13 号指令,也确立收购时董事会决策的利益相关人主义,要求董事会须披露对员工将来的安排。英国《1989 年公司法》中也有若干涉及其他利害关系人的条款,如该法规定董事须每年提交一份董事报告,该报告内容须包括公司雇员的健康、安全和福利;雇员对公司经营、决策、管理的参与等状况。在判例法中,英国法院更是日益接受:一旦公司成立,它不仅作为一独立于成员的实体而存在,并且在行使表决权时,公司成员须考虑到除他们之外的利益。这种趋势在多个涉及到信贷者的判例中尤为明显。即便在美国,利益相关人的利益在涉及并购的法规中有所体现。例如,《威廉姆斯法》规定在收购时董事会的行为必须遵守各州的“其他利益相关人法规”。中国《公司法》第五条规定的“公司从事经营活动,必须遵守法律、行政法规,遵守社会公德、商业道德,诚实守信,接受政府和社会公众的监督,承担社会责任”的要求以及“监事会中公司职工代表的比例不得少于三分之一”的要求均被学界视为公司对利益相关者承担责任的体现。
246 Chris Tollefson, “Games Without Frontiers: Investor Claims and Citizen Submissions Under the NAFTA Regime”, Yale J. Int'l L., Vol.27, 2002, p.141, 165.
247 国家主义,又称为国家中心主义。在此可以被理解为一种理论构建范式,意指在理论构建上排斥非国家行为体分享国际事务直接参与权的理论分析模式。国家主义体现为国家对于国际政治事务的垄断权,包括对国际法制定、执行和实施过程中的垄断权。国家主义曾为历史所证实,因为自 1648 年威斯特伐利亚和约签订以来到 20 世纪中前期,主权国家在很长的历史时期内的确是国际政治中唯一主导力量,国际事
248 Alan Oxley, “Poor Environmental Policy: The Fundamental Problem in the ‘Trade and Environment’ Debate”, in Jagdish Bhagwati (ed.), The Next Trade Negotiating Round: Examining the Agenda for Seattle, proceeding of Conference in Columbia University, 1999, p.63, 69.
249 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, “The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and the WTO: Problems of Democratic Legitimacy”, in Roger B. Porter, Pierre Sauve (eds.), Efficiency, Equity, Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, Brookings, 2001.p.280.
250 August Reinisch & Christina Irgel, “The Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations In The WTO Dispute Settlement System”, in Non-State Actors And International Law Vol.1 Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2001, p.131.
251 作者所述四次危机是指福利国家危机:福利国家社会福利开支过重,从而排挤私人投资。而政府官僚机构根据政治的需要,需扩大政府服务,超出了公众支付相应款项的意愿。发展危机是指 70 年代石油危机和 80 年代早期经济萧条使得撒和拉疑难的非洲、西亚和拉丁美洲部分地区,人均收入开始下降。环境危机是指发展重国家的持续贫困致使穷人为了生存而破坏他们周围的环境,同时有钱人则持挥霍浪费的做法和漫不经心的态度,导致严重的环境退化。社会主义危机是指社会主义的承诺收到人们怀疑,人民需要寻找新的方式来满足自己先前没有得到满足的社会和经济需要。两次革命性变化是指发生在 20 世纪 70 至80 年代的通讯革命,使得全球通讯体系开放,人类受教育水平和识字率显著提高。第二次革命是 60 年代到 70 年代中产阶级革命。经济的增长不仅带来物质改善,还使民众产生了新的期望。中产阶级兴起对领导结社革命起到了重要作用。
252 [美]莱斯特·萨拉蒙:《非营利部门的崛起》,载于谭静编译:《全球化与公民社会》,广西师范大学出版社 2003 年版,第 178-180 页。
253 高岚君:《国际法的价值论》,武汉大学出版社 2006 年版,第 102 页。
254 [德]G·拉德布鲁赫:《法哲学》,王朴译,法律出版社 2005 年版,第 195 页。
255 [德]N·霍恩:《法律科学与法哲学导论》,罗莉译,法律出版社 2005 年版,第 316 页。
256 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “Constitutionalism and WTO Law: From a State-Centered Approach Towards a Human Rights Approach in International Economic Law”, in The Political Economy of International Trade Law, p.34, 60-64. 彼得斯曼教授认为贸易权属性上是人权,但与传统的政治人权、文化人权不同,是经济人权,属于《公民权利和政治权利公约》中未能涵盖的内容。
257 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “Human Rights and International Economic Law in the 21st Century: the Need to Clarify Their Interrelationships”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.4(1), 2001, p.33.
258 Raj Bhala, International Law: Theory and Practic, New York, 2001, 2nd edition, p.610.
259 Daniel C. Esty, “Nongovernmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion”, J. Int'l Econ. L. Vol.1, 1998, p.123, 136-137.
260 李先波:《主权、人权、国际组织》,法律出版社 2005 年版,第 221 页。
261 A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order: Government Networks and the Disaggregated State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. 她所提出的“Disaggregated Sovereignty”(主权解体)概念指国家丧失对政府部门的控制,政府各部门与国外相应部门联系,制定和形成国际影响的决策。
262 例如 Philip Nichols 教授指出非民主国家国内层面上利益群体决策参与的欠缺造成了国际法层面上该利益群体参与的欠缺。
263 John H. Jackson, Sovereignty the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2006. p.207.
264 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order:From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, Police Press, 1995., p.147.
265 Daniel C. Esty, “Why the World Trade Organization Needs Environmental NGOs?” Published by the International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development. Available at http://www.ictsd.org/English/esty.pdf 2007 年 3 月 2 日访问。
266 蔡从燕:《市民社会、协商民主和国际法范式的转换》,载于《厦门大学法律评论》第九辑,2005 年,第 264-265 页。
267 Daniel C. Esty, “Why the World Trade Organization Needs Environmental NGOs?” Published by the International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development. See http://www.ictsd.org/English/esty.pdf Daniel支持非政府组织参与的主要理由就是非政府组织可以作为信息提供者,成为智力竞争者(intellectual competitor)。
268 R. Falk, On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, p.125.
269 西方一些学者认为《奥胡斯公约》的通过,已经体现了环境权在相当国家被作为一种人权而提升到国际法的领域中加以保护。
270 [加]威尔·金里卡:《当代政治哲学》,刘萃译,上海三联出版社 2004 年版,第 522-523 页。
271 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy”, in Roger B. Porter, Pierre Sauve (eds.), Efficiency, Equity, Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, Brookings, 2001.p.275.
272 Simon Retallack, “After Seattle: Where Next for the WTO?”, Ecologist, Issue.30, 2000, p.30, 31.
273 Joost Pauwelyn, “The Sutherland Report: A Missed Opportunity for Genuine Debate on Trade, Globalization and Reforming the WTO”. Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.8(2), 2005. pp. 329-346.
274 Douglas Kysar, “Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice Preferences for Processes”, Harvard Law Review, Vol.118, 2004, p.525.
275 蔡从燕:《市民社会、协商民主与国际法的范式转换》,载于《厦门大学法律评论》第 9 辑,2005 年,第 261 页。
276 John. H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2006. p.120.
277 Joost Pawleyn , “The Sutherland Report: A Missed Opportunity for Genuine Debate on Trade, Globalization and Reforming the WTO”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.8(2), 2005, pp. 329-346.
278 UN Press Release SG/SM/7318, Partnership with Civil Society Necessity in Addressing Global Agenda, Says Secretary-General in Wellington, New Zealand Remarks (Feb. 29, 2000).
279 Julio A. Lacarte, “Transparency, Public Debate, and Participation by NGOs in the WTO: a WTO Perspective” Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.7, Issue 3, 2004. p.683-686.
280 [美]耐革尔·伍兹,安瑞塔·纳利卡:《治理和责任的限度:世贸组织、国际货币基金组织与世界银行》,载国际社会科学杂志,2002 年第 4 期。水平式责任机制主要指权力分立状态下,立法对司法和行政权力的制约,或司法对立法、行政的制约。这种权力制约需要以信息透明、参与性为前提。
281 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy”, in Roger B. Porter, Pierre Sauve (eds.), Efficiency, Equity, Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, Brookings, 2001. p.283.
282 United States - Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS24/AB/R, at 21 (adopted Feb. 25, 1997), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/distab_e.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004)
283 John H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT, Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1969.p.87.
284 WTO 成员需公布有效实施的、新型的贸易政策法规包括:(1)海关法规。(2)进出口管理的有关法规和行政规章制度;(3)有关进出口商品征收的国内税、法规和规章;(4)进出口商品检验、检疫的有关法规和规章;(5)有关进出口货物及其支付方面的外汇管理和对外汇管理的一般法规和规章;(8)有关出口加工区、自由贸易区、边境贸易区、经济特区的法规和规章;(9)有关服务贸易的法规和规章;(10)有关仲裁的裁决规定;(11)成员国政府及其机构所签订的有关影响贸易政策的现行双边或多边协定、协议;(12)其他有关影响贸易行为的国内立法或行政规章。引自何志鹏:《全球化经济的法律调控》,清华大学出版社 2006 年版,第 200-201 页。
285 Steve Charnovitz, “The WTO and Cosmopolitics”, in E.U. Petersmann(ed.), Reforming the World Trading System: Legitimacy, Efficiency, and Democratic Governance, Oxford University Press, 2005. p.440.
286 Steve Charnovitz , “Open Democratic Participation Scheme For The World Trade Organization: Transparency and Participation in the World Trade Organization”, Rutgers L. Rev. Vol.56, 2004, p.936.
287 Robert E. Hudec, “The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years”, Minnesota Journal of Global Trade, Vol.8, No.1, 1999, p.45.
288 WT/L/160/Rev.1 (1996), Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction of WTO Documents – Decision adopted by the General Council on 18 July 1996 – Revision, 26 July and WT/L/452 (2002), Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction of WTO Documents – Decision of 14 May 2002, 16 May
289 Robert O. Keohane and Josep S. Nye JR, “The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy”, in Roger B. Porter, Pierre Sauve (eds.), Efficiency, Equity, Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, Brookings, 2001. p. 291.
290 Daniel C. Esty, “Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.1, Issue.1, 1998. p.123.
291 Daniel D. Bradlow, “Global Trade Issues In The New Millennium: The Times They Are A-Changin:Some Preliminary Thoughts On Developing Countries, NGOs And The Reform Of The WTO”, Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. Vol.33, p.504.
292 姚莉:《非政府组织与国际贸易》,载于《西北师范大学学报(社会科学版)》,2007 年第 1 期,第 127页。
293 冯洁菡:《公共健康危机与 WTO 知识产权制度的改革——以 TRIPS 协议为中心》,武汉大学出版社 2005年版,第 75 页。
294 详细信息可见国际健康行动组织网页:http://www.haiweb.org/01_about_c.htm 2007 年 12 月 2 日访问。
295 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1999, 2. 转引自严海:TRIPS 协议与公共健康议题谈判的成果与展望——评多哈宣言第六段的执行协议,见法律论文资料库 http://www.law-lib.com/lw/lw_view.asp?no=7621 2007 年 10 月 25 日访问
296 Neil D. Hamilton, Who Owns Dinner: Evolving Legal Mechanisms for Ownership of Plant Genetic Resources, 28 Tulsa L.J. 587, 600-01 (1993). 转引自 Helfer:Regime Shifting:The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, Yale J.Int’L L. Vol.29(1), 2004. pp.23-47.
297 WEED,全称为“World Economy, Ecology & Development”,1990 年成立,总部设在德国。WEED 多次举办南北方非政府组织共同峰会。最近一个出版物便是《欧盟与非洲峰会前夜——创造一个真实并公平的合作关系?》。见 WEED on line:http://www.weed-online.org/themen/english.html ,2008 年 1 月 15 日访问。
298 G92,全称为“丹麦可持续发展论坛的 92 小组”,由地处丹麦的 20 多个分政府组织共同构成,成立于1991 年,初衷是协调丹麦境内各环境非政府组织意见以便在 1992 联合国“里昂宣言”的准备工作中共同游说。后 G92 将非政府组织合作渠道从国内拓宽到国际层面,包括与南方国家相应组织对话和合作,成为南北方非政府组织就环境问题展开合作的一个平台。
299 Report of the First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, U.N. Environment Programme, Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, para. 98, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/1/17 (Feb. 28, 1995)
300 Access and Benefit Sharing as Related to Genetic Resources, Decision VI/24, in Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity
301 Civil Society Calls On Rich Countries To Stop Imposing Extreme Demands At The WTO Sixth Ministerial Conference. 16th December, 2005. See http://www.twnside.org.sg/announcement/NGO_STATEMENT_ON_Hong_Kong_Ministerial_final.doc , 2007年 8 月 15 日访问。
302 Maki Tanaka, “Bridging the Gap Between Northern NGOs and Southern Sovereigns in the Trade-Environment Debate: The Pursuit of Democratic Dispute Settlements in the WTO Under the Rio Principles”, Ecology Law Quarterly. Vol.30,2003, p.130-135.
303 Alan J., “Rethinking Sovereignty” in Kofman E, Youngs G.(ed.), Globalization: Theory and Practice, New York: Wellington House, 1986. p.112.
304 程琥:《全球化与国家主权——比较分析》,清华大学出版社 2003 年版,第 27 页到 28 页。
305 李先波:《主权、人权、国际组织》,法律出版社 2005 年版,第 215 页。
306 [美]迈克尔·爱德华兹:《公民社会与全球治理》,载于王玉强、陈家刚译:《全球化与公民社会》,广西师范大学出版社 2003 年版,第 166 页。
307 Michelle Ratton Sanchez, “Brief Observations On The Mechanisms For NGO Participation In The WTO”, International Journal Of Human Rights. No. 4, 2006. p.121.
308 Daniel C. Esty, “We the People: Civil Society and the World Trade Organization”, in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick(eds), New Directions in International Economic Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, ,2000.p.99.
309 Michael Edwards, “Civil Society and Global Governance”. p.3. see http://www.unu.edu/millennium/edwards.pdf , 2007 年 4 月 20 日访问。
310 本文中将非政府组织在争端解决程序中的参与称为“司法参与”。在学术界,对于 WTO 争端解决机制性质的观点,主要有两种,一是认为争端解决机构是个“准司法”机构,因为,争端解决机制中专家组和上诉机构的成员并非称为法官,报告也不称为裁决,尤其是专家组成员并非该领域内的法律专家。与国内司法程序相比,专家组程序和上诉程序与国内一审、二审程序还存在区别。该观点为我国一些学者和西方少数学者所支持。另一种观点认为争端解决机构是个“司法”机构,西方多数学者持有这样的观点。因为即便专家组和上诉机构成员以及报告的名称都不同于国内司法程序,但争端解决机制对于成员方而言,具有事实上的强制管辖权,并且,报告根据“反向协商一致”原则,实际上具有自动通过的效力。专家组和上诉机构程序在演绎和推理中,都非常类似于普通法法院的传统。本文无意于争辩 WTO 争端解决程序的性质,作者更赞同将 WTO 争端解决机制看作“司法”机构,故称为“司法参与”。
311 Padideh Ala'I, “Judicial Lobbying At The WTO: The Debate Over The Use Of Amicus Curiae Briefs AndThe U.S. Experience”, Fordham Int'l L.J., Vol.24, 2000, p.69.
312 U.S.-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 1998 年印度等诉美国-禁止进口特定虾和虾制品案,其案情是:美国 1973 年濒危物种法案(ESA)将美国领水中的 5 种海龟列为处于危险或受威胁的物种,并禁止在美国领海和公害上捕捞这些海龟。根据该法案,美国要求美国虾拖网捕捞船在海龟经常触摸的海域捕鱼时,要在其捕鱼网上适用“海龟排除装置”(TEDs)。美国 1989 年生效的公共法 101-102 第 609 章规定美国不能进口用可能上海特定海龟的方式大规模捕捞的虾,除非被证实捕捞国有一项与美国保护海龟项类似的相关法规,和与美国国内捕捞相当的无意捕捞率,或捕捞国的特殊渔业环境不会构成对海龟的威胁。实践中,如果某国想得到出口虾到美国的证书,实际上就是要承担与美国补虾人相当的责任,需适用 TEDs。印度、马来西亚、巴基斯坦和泰国向 WTO 争端解决机构申诉,诉由是美国实施的对特定虾和虾制品的进口禁止与 GATT 第 1 条,第 3 条和第 11 条不符。1998 年 5 月 5 日,专家组作出报告。专家组认为美国的相关措施与 GATT 第 11 条不符,并不能根据第 20 条证明其正当,因为它构成了相同条件国家间无端的其实。1998 年 10 月 2 日,上诉机构作出报告,上诉机构认为,相关措施符合第 20条(g)项,但补不能满足第 20 条序言的要求,因此,第 20 条不能证明其正当。案情摘自陈卫东:《WTO例外条款解读》,对外经济贸易大学出版社 2002 年版,第 320-321 页。
313 WT/DS58/AB/R, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body, 12 Octoer 1998, para.102.
314 WT/DS58/R, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report 0f the Panel, 15 May 1998, p.280.
315 WT/DS58/AB/R, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body, 12 Octoer 1998, para.101. 此处第三方指根据 DSU,WTO 争端方以外的成员方认为在争议事项中具有重大厉害关系,可以以第三方的身份向专家组提交意见。
316 WT/DS58/AB/R, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body, para.107-108.
317 刘成伟:《专家组的信息寻求权》,见北大法律信息网 http://article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID=20504 , 2007 年 7 月 20 日访问。
318 WT/DS58/AB/R, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body., para.108.
319 1992 年 5 月,美国商务部开始对产自英国的热轧铅与铋碳钢产品(以下简称“铅与钢产品”)进行反补贴调查,并于 1993 年 1 月最后裁定一家名为 United Engineering Steels Limited (简称为 UES)的英国公司出口的铅与钢产品存在 12.69%的补贴率。同时,美国国际贸易委员会也作出了补贴造成国内产业损害的认定,因此,美国对该公司的产品从 1993 年起开始按上述税率征收反补贴税。但是问题在于,美国所认定的补贴并不是英国政府直接给予 UES 公司的,这里面经历了一个复杂的变化过程:英国政府在 1977至 1986 年间将多笔资金注入到国有企业“英国钢铁公司”(British Steel Corporation,简称 BSC),1986年 BSC 与另一家名为 GKN 的私营公司建立了合资企业 UES 公司。后来,随着私有化的浪潮,英国政府采取一定步骤将 BSC 私有化:首先,组建一家名为 British Steel Public Limited Company 的公司(简称BSPLC),并在 1988 年 9 月让 BSPLC 承担 BSC 的债权债务(包括 BSC 公司在 UES 中的股份),然后在同年 12 月份将 BSPLC 的股份在证券市场公开出售以达到私有化的目的。1995 年 3 月,BSPLC 公司又收购了 GKN 公司在 UES 中的股份,全资拥有 UES 并将其改名为 British Steel Engineering Steels (简称为BSES)。在这一复杂的企业私有化改革当中,美国商务部认为英国政府的补贴从 BSC 流转到 UES,并最后转到 BSES,因此,美国有权将 BSC 得到的补贴分摊到 UES 和 BSES 的产品中,并对其征收反补贴税。征税后美国共进行了六次年度复查(annual review) ,虽然每次确定的反补贴税率高低有所不同,但它坚持认为补贴仍然存在。这种做法引起了欧盟的不满 ,因此,对于 1995、1996、1997 三次年度复查的结果 ,欧盟诉至 DSB 要求专家组进行审查。案情转引自李本:WTO《补贴与反补贴协议》对内国经济法的约束与影响,http://www.bloglegal.com/blog/cac/350002735.htm# 2007 年 12 月 20 日。
320 See Panel Report on US-Steel Report, WT/DS138/R and Appellate Body Report, para 42.
321 1998 年 8 月 3 日,印度根据 WTO《争端解决谅解》DSU(Dispute Settlement Understand)第 4 条,GATT94第 23 条,《反倾销协定》第 17 条,要求对欧委会 1997 年 11 月 28 日颁布的对从印度进口的棉纺床上用品征收最终反倾销税的 2398/97 号裁决书与欧盟进行磋商。1998 年 9 月 18 日～1999 年 4 月 15 日,印度和
323 WT/DS135/9, Communication from the Appellate Body with attachment AB-2000-11, Additional Procedure Adopted Under Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review.
324 General Council, Minutes of Meeting, WT/GC/MM60, 23 January 2001. paras.4-6.
325 James Cameron & Jacob Werksman, “Supplementary Amicus Brief Submitted by WFN/FIELD”, para. 2.5 (2001) (要求 WTO 在接受或不接受法庭之友意见书问题上采取明确的程序规则), see http://www.field.org.uk/papers/pdf/asbestosamicus.pdf; 2007 年 5 月访问。
326 世界最大产糖国巴西以及泰国和澳大利亚去年 7 月联合向世贸组织起诉,认为欧盟内部糖价、生产成本远高于国际市场水平,能以低价出口的糖肯定都得到了政府补贴。世贸组织专家小组认为,欧盟无法证明超出规定数量的部分没有得到补贴,因此,它建议欧盟调整有关行为使之符合世贸规则。据报道,欧盟对裁决报告不满,表示将提起上诉。欧盟前身欧共体 1968 年开始在各成员国之间实行糖生产配额,并以保护价进行收购,对配额内过剩糖给予出口补贴,以弥补区内市场和国际市场间的差价。此外,欧共体还对进口糖征收高额关税,把廉价糖挡在门外。欧盟委员会预计,欧盟今年用于糖业的预算将达 17 亿欧元,其中出口补贴近 13 亿欧元。这一体制造成欧洲单一市场的食糖价格高出国际市场 3 倍多,同时各成员国低价倾销过剩食糖加剧了国际市场糖价的下跌。欧盟自己也在准备改革这一体制,并于 2003 年 7 月公布了改革方案。
327 巴西曾指责欧盟试图在巴市场上倾销旧轮胎,从而增加了当地居民感染热带病以及环境遭到广泛破坏的风险。专家小组在判决书中称,巴西有权以环境和健康为由限制某些商品的贸易,但这些理由不应当成为贸易歧视和贸易保护的借口。世贸组织根据欧盟提出的磋商请求,要求巴西政府取消有关翻新轮胎进口限制措施。2005年 6 月,欧盟向世贸组织指责巴西“采取了一系列措施禁止旧轮胎的进口,但有时却用这些措施来阻止翻新轮胎的进口,而不顾翻新轮胎不是旧轮胎的事实;另外,巴西豁免了对来自南方共同市场国家的翻新轮胎的进口禁止和罚金征收,而对其他进口(尤其是来自欧共体的进口)维持了上述措施,要求巴西政府取消有关限制”。世贸组织接受了欧盟的请求。
328 Panel Report On Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports Of Retreated Tyres. WT/DS332/R. Paras. 1.8, 1.9, 12 June, 2007.
329 Panel Report On Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports Of Retreated Tyres. WT/DS332/R. Paras. 1.8, 1.9, 12 June, 2007. Para. 97.
330 支持非政府组织在 WTO 体制中增进参与的学者,如 John Jackson, Steve Charvovitz, Robert Howse, Kalypso Nicolaidi, Dunoff 等均认为非政府组织的参与应该限于话语权,而并非表决权。
331 Jeffrey L. Dunoff , “The WTO's Legitimacy Crisis: Reflections on the Law and Politics of WTO Dispute Resolution”, The American Review of International Arbitration, Vol. 13, 2002, p.202.
332 United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, (98-000) P 187 (Oct. 12, 1998)
333 Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Global Trade Issues In The New Millennium: The WTO In Transition: Of Constituents, Competence And Coherence. Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. Vol.33, 2001, p.986.
334 Jacqueline Peel, “Giving the Public a Voice in the Protection of the Global Environment: Avenues for Participation by NGOs in Dispute Resolution at the European Court of Justice and World Trade Organization”, Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y, Vol.12, 2001. p.63.
335 Michelle Ratton Sanchez, “Brief observations on the mechanisms for NGO participation in the WTO”, Social Science, Vol.1, No.4, 2006. pp.103-126.
336 David Livshiz, “Public Participation In Disputes Under Regional Trade Agreements: How Much Is Too Much--The Case For A Limited Right Of Intervention”, New York University Annual Survey of American Law,. Vol. 61, 2005, p.533.
337 David Livshiz, “Public Participation in Disputes Under Regional Trade Agreements: How Much Is Too Much--The Case For A Limited Right Of Intervention”, N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. Vol.61, 2005. p.530.
338 Georg C. Umbricht, “An Amicus Curiae Briefs Before The WTO”. Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.4, 2001. p.774.
339 Robert Howse, “The Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization” in Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veio Heikanen(eds), The legitimacy of International Institutions, New York: United Nation University Press, 2001. p381-383. 转引自程红星:《WTO 司法哲学的能动主义之维》,法律出版社 2005 年版,第 166-167 页。豪斯教授认为司法程序的正当性和政治机关的正当性评价标准不同,司法程序的正当性在于对自然正义的实现,而不是反映选举者的利益。在他看来司法程序正当性的评价标准包括三个:公正的程序、条约解释的
一贯性和整体性以及体制的敏感性。而根据上诉机构的司法实践,基本符合了这三个要求。See Robert Howse, “Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law” in J. H. H. Weiler(ed.), The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade? Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 35-69.
340 J.H.H. Weiler, “The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement”, The American Review of International Arbitration, Issue 13, 2002. p177.
341 Jeffrey L. Dunoff , “The WTO's Legitimacy Crisis: Reflections on the Law and Politics of WTO Dispute Resolution”, The American Review of International Arbitration, Vol. 13, 2002, p.201.
342 Maki Tanaka , “Bridging the Gap Between Northern NGOs and Southern Sovereigns in the Trade-Environment Debate: The Pursuit of Democratic Dispute Settlements in the WTO Under the Rio Principles”, Ecology Law Quarterly, Vol.30, 2003, p.113.
343 Claude E. Barfield, “Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization”, Chi. J. Int’l L. Vol.2, 2001, p. 403, 413.
344 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995. p272.
345 譬如,在国内法下,私人向立法机关表述自己的意见,选出自己的代表,这是立法参与;当规则制定出来后,私人权益受损,向司法机关提起诉讼或参与到影响自己权益的他人诉讼中去,不构成民主代表权的两次参与。
346 Philip M. Moremen, “International Private Rights of Action: A Cost-Benefit Framework”, San Diego Int'l L.J., Vol.8, 2006, p.10.
347 效益违约是英美合同法中的概念。合同当时方作为理性的个人,会衡量合同执行和违约各自的成本。倘若在一个价格不断上涨的市场上,卖方采取违约,支付违约金并以更高价格出售货物,只要违约金数额小于市场价和原合同价之间的价差,则是有效率的。
348 Philip M. Moremen, “International Private Rights of Action: A Cost-Benefit Framework”, San Diego Int'l L.J., Vol.8, 2006, p.13.
349 彼得斯曼教授提出 WTO 的宗旨具有正义性,并且可分为正义第一性原则和第二性原则,即资源第一次分配的正义和第二次分配的正义。见 Petersmann, “Theories of Justice, Human Rights and the Constitution of International Markets in Symposium: The Emerging Transnational Constitution”, Loyola Law Review, 2003, pp.407-460.
350 例如谢尔教授持有该观点。G. Richard Shell, “Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization”, Duke L.J. Vol.44, 1995, p.829.
351 Steve Charnovitz, “Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law”, American Journal of International Law,Vol.100, 2006. p.348.
352 David Wilson and Lynn Starchuk, “Judicial Activism in the WTO– Implications for the Doha Negotiations”, Manuscript, 13 September 2003; http://www.johnstonbuchan.com/pubs/trade/Judicial%20Activism%20in%20the%20WTO.pdf , 2007 年 1 月 15日访问, p.13.
353 Lars Biederstedt, “EU – US Economic Relations – The Trade Dispute about US Steel”, 4 July 2003.
354 徐崇利:《世贸组织协定的解释制度评析(一)》,载于《对外经济贸易大学学报》2002 年第 1 期,第34 页。
355 John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2006.p.183.
356 张东平:《WTO 司法解释论》,厦门大学出版社 2003 年版,第 7 页。
357 张东平:《WTO 司法解释论》,厦门大学出版社 2003 年版,第 15 页。
358 张东平:《WTO 司法解释论》,厦门大学出版社 2003 年版,第 16 页。
359 万鄂湘、石磊、杨成铭、邓洪武:《国际条约法》, 武汉大学出版社 1998 版,第 464-465 页。
360 Richard H. Steinberg, “Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints”, American Journal of International Law, Vol.98, April of 2004. p.261.
361 转引自 John H. Jackson: Sovereignty, The WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law. Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 187.
362 WT/GC/M/60, para.39.
363 United States—Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, paras. 106, 110.
364 United States—Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted 7 June 2000, paras. 39, 42.
365 WT/GC/M/60, para 24-25.
366 Minutes of Meeting Held on 22 November 2000, supra note 113, para. 39; DSU arts. 16.3, 16.4, 17.14.
367 Konrad Von Moltke, “Trade and Sustainable Development” in Mike Moore(ed.), Doha and Beyond: The Future of the Multilateral Trading System, p.16.
368 Appellate Body Report on US-Shrimp, para. 153.
369 Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001, para.6.
370 see also WSSD Plan of Implementation, para. 133 at http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/documents/summit docs/2309 planfinal.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2003).
371 Report on the Eighth Session, U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development, 8th Sess., ch. 3, para. 6, U.N. Doc. E/2000/29 & E/CN.17/2000/20 (2000) (statement by then Director-General Michael Moore), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/docs/2000/e2000-29.htm;
372 John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2006. pp.191-192.
373 Montesquieu, The Spirit Of Laws , David Wallace Carrithers (ed.,) (Book XI, Chapter 6, Paragraphs 5, 6). 1977, p.202.
374 E·博登海默:《法理学、法律哲学与法律方法》,邓正来译,中国政法大学出版社 2004 年版,第 83页。
375 Robert Howse, “Back to Court After Shrimp-Turtle: India’s Challenge to Labor and Environmental Linkages in the EC Generalized System of Preferences”, Am. U. Int'l L. Rev., Vol.18(1), p.1341.
376 Sally Razeen, Whither the WTO? A Progress Report on the Doha Round, CATO Institute, 3 March 2003, p.7.
377 Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints. American Journal of International Law, Vol.98, April of 2004. p.260. 虽然上诉机构的成员由争端解决机构成员一致同意选出,但在上诉机构人员的推荐中,美国和欧盟享有反对其不同意人员被推荐的特权。也就是美国和欧盟实质上在上诉机构专家人员的安排上享有否决权。只有在美国和欧盟行使否决权后,才由选举委员会在推荐名单中选出适当的候选人,提交给争端解决机构批准。例如,美国贸易部总顾问以及贸易部部长助理通过仔细阅读每个候选人过去所作出的司法判决(如果有),召集其在华盛顿或日内瓦会面,仔细进行筛选。
378 John H. Jackson, “International Economic Law in Times That Are Interesting”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.3, 2000. p.3.
379 Jeffrey L. Dunoff , “The WTO's Legitimacy Crisis: Reflections on the Law and Politics of WTO Dispute Resolution”, The American Review of International Arbitration, Vol. 13, 2002, pp.197-210. 西方国际贸易法学者对 GATT 和 WTO 应该选择政治性还是法律性的立场大多经历了三个过程。对早期 GATT 体制过于政治化进行批判,然后对 DSU 通过,争端解决机制的自动性和法律性进行褒扬,再到对上诉机构过度司法立法进行反思的三个过程。多数学者认为 WTO 应该在政治性和法律性之间寻求平衡,从而在成员方的拥护下制定和执行有约束力的贸易规则。
380 换言之,顿那夫教授认为应该区分 WTO 下不同机构的政治和法律属性。总理事会和部长级会议是政治性机构,应致力于新规则的产生,新成员的加入等政治性问题的解决。争端解决机构是法律性机构。倘若由争端解决机构来处理成员方之间的价值争议,则会将政治因素重新纳入争端解决机制,削弱其法律性。
381 Joel P. Trachtman, Institutional Linkage: Transcending "Trade and. . .", 96 Am J Intl L 77, 2002
382 Andrew T. Guzman, “Global Governance and the WTO. Boalt Working Papers in Public Law”, 2001. p. 71. see http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1085&context=boaltwp 2006 年 12 月访问。
383 Claus-Dieter Ehlerman, “Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the WTO”, Policy Paper, RSC No.02/9(European University Institute, 2002.) p.14.
384 Gabrielle Marceau, “WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights”, Eur J Intl L, Vol.13, 2002, p.753, 767.
385 Padideh Ala'i, “Judicial Lobbying At The WTO: The Debate Over The Use Of Amicus Curiae Briefs And The U.S. Experience”, Fordham Int'l L.J., 2000, Vol.24, p.65. 注:大使意见作出时 WTO 成员方为 139 个。
386 Ibid.
387 Proposal by the African Group, TN/DS/W/15, dated 15 September 2002, 5; Proposal on DSU by Intia et al., TN/DS/2/18, dated 7 October 2002, 2.
388 Communication from the European Communities, TN/DS/2/1, dated 13 March 2002, 11.
389 Dilip K. Das, Global Trading System at the Crossroads, London: Routledge, 2001. p49.
390 Deborah Z. Cass, “The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade”, European Journal Of International Law, Vol.12, 2001, p.39, 44.
391 Richard H. Steinberg, “Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints”, American Journal of International Law, Vol.98, April of 2004. p.251.
392 David Wilson and Lynn Starchun, “Judicial Activism in WTO-Implications for the Doha Negotiations”, see http://www.johnstonbuchan.com/pubs/trade/Judicial%20Activism%20in%20the%20WTO.pdf, 2007年1月访问。
393 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “Human Rights and International Economic Law in the 21st Century: the Need to Clarify Their Interrelationships”, J. Int'l Econ L. Vol.4,2001, p.35.
394 J. Patrick Kelly, “Judicial Activism at the World Trade Organization: Developing Principles of Self-Restraint”, NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS., Vol. 22, 2002, p.356.
395 WTO Appellate Body Report on Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, AB-1996-2, WTO DS 8/AB/R at 15 (Oct. 4, 1996).
396 David Wilson and Lynn Starchuk, “Judicial Activism in the WTO– Implications for the Doha Negotiations”, Manuscript, 13 September 2003; http://www.johnstonbuchan.com/pubs/trade/Judicial%20Activism%20in%20the%20WTO.pdf , 2007 年 1 月 15日访问, p.51.
397 见 Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1 (August 30, 2000), para. 76, 见http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/Metalclad/MetalcladFinalAward.pdf ,以及 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (July 31, 2001), B, 见http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-Interpr-en.asp 本案涉及对 NAFTA 第 1105 条款中“公平和公正待遇”的解释。仲裁庭认为“公平和公正待遇”为了第 11 章的目的,应包括透明度的要求,但委员会推翻了这个法律解释,认为这个含义只能根据条约所规定的国际习惯法规则来确立。
398 Frieder Roessler, “Are the Judicial Organs of the World Trade Organization Overburdened?” In Efficiency, Equity, and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium. Washington Brookings Institution, 2001. p.309. 关于 Chevron 准则,WTO 规则中也有类似条款,如反倾销协定第 17.6 条要求 GATT/WTO 专家组或上诉机构应该尊重一成员方对模糊协定约文的解释,只要该解释是可允许的。
399 Richard H. Steinberg, “Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints”, American Journal of International Law, Vol.98, April of 2004. pp.269-272.
400 J. Patrick Kelly, “Judicial Activism at the World Trade Organization: Developing Principles of Self-Restraint”, NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS., Vol. 22, 2002, p.357.
401 Patrick M. Norton, “A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation”, American Journal of International Law, Vol.85, 1991, p 474, 505.
402 张文显主编:《法理学(第二版)》,高等教育出版社 2003 年版,第 156 页-158 页。
403 陈立虎:《法庭之友陈述在 WTO 争端解决机制的可接受性》,载于《法学家》,2004 年第 3 期,第 155页。
404 Josh Robbins, “False Friends: Amicus Curiae and Procedural Discretion in WTO Appeals under the Hot-Rolled Lead / Asbestos Doctrine”, Harv. Int'l L.J.,Vol. 44 (4), 2003, p.319-321.
405 因此,有学者指出上诉机构之所以对第三方参与的问题态度谨慎,而对非政府组织提交信息态度宽松,是因为在争端中申请成为第三方的主要是发展中国家,而在争端中提交信息的法庭之友却主要来自于发达国家。
406 Josh Robbins, “False Friends: Amicus Curiae and Procedural Discretion in WTO Appeals under the Hot-Rolled Lead / Asbestos Doctrine”, p.328.
407 John P. Gaffney, “Due Process in the World Trade Organization: The Need for Procedural Justice in the Dispute Settlement System”, Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. Vol.14, 1999, p.1173-1183.
408 根据西方学者的调查和分析,律师在争端解决程序中的工作计费以 250 美元/小时至 1000 美元/小时,保守的估计,即便是一起非常简单的争端至少需支付 700 小时的法律顾问和咨询费用。对于欠发达地区,这笔费用相对来说比较高昂。
409 Daniel D. Bradlow, “Global Trade Issues In The New Millennium: The Times They Are A-Changin: Some Preliminary Thoughts On Developing Countries, NGOs And The Reform Of The WTO”, Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. Vol. 33, p.504-505.
410 Panel Report on Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreated Tyres, WT/DS332/R, 12 June 2007.
411 Maki Tanaka, “Bridging the Gap Between Northern NGOs and Southern Sovereigns in the Trade-Environment Debate: The Pursuit of Democratic Dispute Settlements in the WTO Under the Rio Principles”, Ecology Law Quarterly. Vol.30,2003, p.118.
412 Ibid, p.130-135.
413 王彦志,郝秀辉:《非政府组织与世界贸易组织争端解决程序》,载于《法制与社会发展》,2003 年第 6期,第 139 页。
414 David Livshiz , “Public Participation In Disputes Under Regional Trade Agreements: How Much Is Too Much--The Case For A Limited Right Of Intervention”, N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. Vol.61, 2005. p.529
415 Kevin R.Gray, “Civil Society and World Trade Organization”, see http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/graycivilsociety.pdf, 2007 年 2 月 4 日访问。
416 J. Patrick Kelly, “Judicial Activism at the World Trade Organization: Developing Principles of Self-Restraint”, NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS., Vol. 22, 2002, p.360.
417 程红星:《WTO 司法哲学的能动主义之维》,北京大学 2006 年版,第 224 页。
418 E/RES/1996/31, Consultative Relationship between the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations, 25 Juy 1996, Part VII, para 41.
419 Maura Blue Jeffords, “Turning the Protester into a Partner for Development: The Need for Effective Consultation Between the WTO and NGO”, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol.28, 2003, p937.
420 市民社会组织指为推广其利益、观点和意识形态而自愿组成的市民团体。他们是非营利的,不属于公共范畴。精英小组此处提到的市民社会组织和非政府组织两者之间存在交叉。市民社会组织包括大众组织,如农民组织、女性组织、贸易组织、宗教组织、学术组织等。
421 “We the People: Civil Society, the United Nations and Global Governance”, A/58/817, 11 June 2004.
422 Antti Pentik?inen, Creating Global Governance: The Role of Non-governmental Organizations in United Nations., Helsinki: Finnish UN Association, 2000. p.88.
423 Fergus MacKay, “Universal Rights or a Universe unto Itself? Indigenous Peoples' Human Rights and the World Bank's Draft Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples”, Am. U. Int'l L. Rev., Vol.17(1), 2002, p.533.
424 有关专门研究市民社会在世行中参与的学者指出,这六个阶段中,项目准备以及项目执行主要为借方责任,项目的选择是世行和借方共同的责任,项目的评估和评价是世行的责任。由于世行要求借方确保项目涉及领域内最终受益人的参与,因此项目的准备和执行阶段为项目所在地当地市民社会组织介入的主要场合。见 Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, “The Impact of Inter-national Civil Society on the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO”, ILSA J Int'l & Comp L , Vol.7(1), 2001, pp. 403-404.
425 Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, “The Impact of Inter-national Civil Society on the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO”, ILSA J Int'l & Comp L. , Vol.7(1), p.406.
426 Consensus Conclusions of the WB/NGO Committee Meeting, Santo Domingo.
427 Seamus Cleary, “The World Bank and NGOs” in Petr Willetts (ed.), The Conscience of the World : The Influence of Non-Governmental Organizations in the UN System, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1996. p.78.
428 World Bank, Annual Report 1993, p.95.
429 Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, “The Impact of Inter-national Civil Society on the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO”, ILSA J Int'l & Comp L , Vol.7(1), 2001, p. 411.
430 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, The OECD In Brief 17; Decision of the Council on Relations with International Non-Governmental Organizations, OECD Doc. C/M(62)7(Final), Item 59 (a), (b), and (c) - Doc. No. C(62)45 (Mar. 13, 1962)
431 John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Economic Law, Cambridge University Press, 2006. p.203.
432 Resolution (51) 30 F, Relations with International Organizations, both Intergovernmental and Non-Governmental, 3 may 1951, para.4.
433 Relations between the Council of Europe and International Non-governmental Organizations, may 1976.
434 Anna-Karine Lindblom, Non-governmental organization in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2005. p.417.
435 The Commisson and Non-Governmental Organizations, Discussion paper presented by President Prodi and Vice-President Kinnock to the Commission, adopted on 18 January 2000.
436 COM(2001), European Governance: A White Paper, 27 July 2001. p.14.
437 COM(2002)277, Towards a Reinforced Culture of /consultation and Dialogue-Proposal for General Principles and Minimum Standards for consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission, 5 June 2002.
438 COM(2002)704, Communication from the Commission, 11 December 2002. pp.19-22.
439 可见 http://europa.eu.int/comm/civil-society/coneccs/index.htm
440 COM(2002) 704, Communication from the Commission, 11 December 2002. pp.5-6.
441 E/2000/88, Report of he Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, 13 July 2000. paras.99-105.
442 Committee of Ministers, Resolution(203)8, Participatory Status for International Non-Governmental Organizations with the Council of Europe, adopted on 19 November 2003, appendix, para.9.
443 Michael Edwards, “Civil Society and Global Governance”, p.3. see http://www.unu.edu/millennium/edwards.pdf, 2007 年 7 月访问。
444 [美]迈克尔·爱德华兹:《公民社会与全球治理》,载于王玉强、陈家刚译:《全球化与公民社会》,广西师范大学出版社 2003 年版,第 169 页。
445 Peter Sutherland, “The Future Scope of WTO”, see http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.htm , p. 39, 79. 2007 年 10 月 20 日访问。
446 Third Annual Report of the PCIJ, 1927 PCIJ Series E, No. 3, p.227. 这 10 个组织包括:国际农业委员会、IFTU、国际劳工组织、国际工人法律保护组织、国际农业工会联盟、国际雇佣者组织、国际人权学会、国际农业工人联合会、国际农业工人基督教工会联合会和国际基督教工会联合会。
447 Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), 1949-1950, Judgments on the merits delivered on 20 November 1950. 转引自 Anna-Lindblom, Non-governmental Organizations in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2005. p.304.
448 Daniel Schacht and Lori Pottinger, “Devastating the Danube and drive with Dams”, World rivers Review, January 1996. 转引自 Anna-Lindblom, Non-governmental Organizations in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2005. p.304.
449 International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 ICJ Pleadings, II, pp.324-327.
450 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia Notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276(1970), 1972 ICJ Pleadings, II, p. 639, 678.
451 International Court of Justice, Practice Directions, as at 30 July 2004, Practice Direction XII.
452 西方学者认为世行的提请调查权在性质上并非司法救济权。司法救济权所依据的“有损害,即有救济”的原则不反映在世行提请调查权中。实际上监察小组的设立是基于外部对于世行内部以及外部透明度和问责性的要求,尤其是对世行有争议性的项目进行独立的审查,以确保世行项目的质量。相关文章可见, Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, “The Impact of Inter-national Civil Society on the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO”, ILSA J Int'l & Comp L , Vol.7(1), 2001.p. 403, 或 Kristine J. Dunkerton, “The World Bank Inspection Panel and Its Affect on Lending Accountability to Citizens of Borrowing Nations”. U. Balt. J. Envtl. L. Vol.5, 1995. p.226.
453 IBRD Resolution No. 93-10, The World Bank Inspection Panel. IDA Resolution No. 93-96.
454 Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, “The Impact of Inter-national Civil Society on the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO”, ILSA J Int'l & Comp L , Vol.7(1), 2001. p.407.
455 案情来自于北京大学法学院人权研究中心http://www.hrol.org/hrfile/manual/Cn_ESC_CaseStudy_WorldBank.html ,2007 年 7 月 4 日访问。
456 The World Bank Inspection Panel, Report No. 21870, Investigation Report on Ecuador Mining Development and Environmental Control Technical Assistance Project, 23 February 2001, paras. 92-107.
457 Case 26-62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen 1963 E.C.R.1, 29.
458 Case 25/62, Plaumann v. Commission, 1963 E.C.R. 95, 107.
459 Case C-321/95 P, Greenpeace Int'l v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R. I-1651
460 European Court of Justice, Case C-321/95 P, Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) and Others v. Commission, Judgment of 2 April 1998.
461 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, U.N. Doc.ECE/CEP/43.
462 Jacqueline Peel, “Giving the Public a Voice in the Protection of the Global Environment Avenues for Participation by NGOs in Dispute Resolution at the European Court of Justice and World Trade Organization”, Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y, Vol.12, 2001, p.56.
463 Philip M. Moremen, “International Private Rights of Action: A Cost-Benefit Framework”, San Diego International Law Journal, Vol.8, 2006, p.6.
464 可见 Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice annexed to the Treaty on European Union.
465 Société anonyme Générale Sucrière and others v Commission of the European Communities. Joined cases 41-73, 43 to 48-73, 50-73, 111-73, 113-73, 114-73.
466 Ludwigshafener Walzmühle Erling KG v European Economic Community. Joined cases 197 to 200/80, 243, 245 and 247/80.
467 David Livshiz, “Public Participation In Disputes Under Regional Trade Agreements: How Much Is Too Much--The Case For A Limited Right Of Intervention”, N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. Vol.61, 2005. p.529.
468 Andrea K.Schneider, “Individual Rights in International Trade Organizations”, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 19, 1998, p.589.
469 Joel P. Trachtman and Philip M. Moremen, “Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Whose Right Is It Anyway?”, Harv. Int'l L.J, Vol. 44, 2003, p.222. 国际法下国内诉权即以国际条约为依据在国内法下提起诉讼的权利。
470 David Livshiz, “Public Participation In Disputes Under Regional Trade Agreements: How Much Is Too Much--The Case For A Limited Right Of Intervention”, N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. Vol.61, 2005. p.535.
471 Jeffery Atik, “Democratizing the WTO”, George Washington International Law Review, Vol.33, 2001, p.453.
472 Case 26/92, N.V. Algemene Transp. and Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, [1963] E.C.R. 1, 12. 该案例中认为新法律秩序的客体不仅是欧盟各成员国,而且还包括成员国下的国民。
473 J.H.H. Weiler, “The Transformation of Europe”, Yale Law Journal, Vol.100, 1991. p.221.
474 United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, Report of the Panel, 1999, para. 7.72. 专家组在这段中,还专门作了一个脚注,解释在有些情况下,对其他成员方有效执行 WTO 义务可以通过在国内法律体制中确立私人法院执行权利来实现。这里个人享有的这种权利,并非源自自治的 WTO 法律秩序的直接关系,而仅仅是为了实现条约遵守所进行的介入。
475 John H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO, Cambridge University Press, 2000. pp.330-335.
476 Deborah Z. Cass, “The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade”, European Journal Of International Law, Vol.12, 2001, p.52.
477 Robert Howse and Kalypso Nicolaidis, “Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why Constitutionalizing the WTO Is a Step Too Far”, in Efficiency, Equity, and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, Brooking Institution, 2001.p.227.
478 Jeffery Atik, “Democratizing the WTO”, George Washington International Law Review, 2001. p.458.
479 John A. Ragosta, “Unmasking the WTO: Access to the DSB System: Can the WTO DSB Live Up to the Moniker ‘World Trade Court’?”, Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus, Vol.31(1), 2000, p.9.
480 J. H. Weiler, The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Law? Oxford University Press, 2000. p.230.
481 Philip M. Nichols, “No Two Snowflakes Are Alike: Assumptions Made In The Debate Over Standing Before World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Boards”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol.24, 2000, pp.427-432.
482 Thomas Opperman and Jose Christian Cascante, “Dispute Settlement in the EC: Lessons for the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System?” in Erns-Ulrich Petersmann(ed.), International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, London: Kluwer Law International, p.486.
483 Sungjoon Cho, “Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving beyond the Entropic Dilemma”, Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol.5, 2005. p.628.
484 Kevin R. Gray. Civil Society and the World Trade Organization. http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/graycivilsociety.pdf 2007年3月2日访问。
485 John H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT and WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations, Cambridge University Press, 2000. pp. 183-184.
486 Robert E. Baldwin, “Key Challenges Facing the WTO” in Mike Moor(ed.), Doha and Beyond: The Future of the Multilateral Trading System, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 63-66.
487 Maura Blue Jeffords, “Turning The Protester Into A Partner For Development: The Need For Effective Consultation Between The WTO & NGOs”, Brooklyn J. Int'l L., Vol.28, p.953.
488 例如上文提到谢尔教授主张 WTO 争端解决机制对所有利益相关者开放,无论是否成员国政府。贸易利益相关者,如个人或非政府组织可以对成员方违反 WTO 规则的事项向 DSB 提起争端。尼古拉斯教授虽不赞成在决策过程中采取贸易利益相关者模式,但赞同在司法程序中给予非政府组织和个人一定的参与权。以及利夫施兹教授、撒切曼教授、莫热门教授等均主张开放司法参与权。
489 David Livshiz, “Public Participation In Disputes Under Regional Trade Agreements: How Much Is Too Much--The Case For A Limited Right Of Intervention”, N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. Vol.61, 2005. p.529
490 Maki Tanaka, “Bridging the Gap Between Northern NGOs and Southern Sovereigns in the Trade-Environment Debate: The Pursuit of Democratic Dispute Settlements in the WTO Under the Rio Principles”, Ecology Law Quarterly. Vol.30, 2003, p.135. 作者主要分析了环境领域非政府组织在 WTO 下司法参与的问题。认为北方非政府组织和南方政府之间存在利益冲突,如果在 WTO 下构建公众参与,要注意南北代表平衡的问题,要意识到南北国家在环境保护领域“共同的但有区分”的义务。即在争端解决程序中给予发展中国家特殊的优惠的待遇。
491 Sylvia Ostry, “External Transparency: The Policy Process at the National Level of the Two-level Game”, in Mike Moor(ed.), Doha and Beyond: The Future of the Multilateral Trading System, Cambridge University Press, 2004. pp.112-114.
492 Sylvia Ostry, “Doha and After. Report presented at ‘From Doha to Kananaskis Conference’, York University and University of Toronto”, March of 2002. see http://www.utoronto.ca/cis/ostry/docs_pdf/Doha_Kananaskis.doc
493 John.H. Jackson, “Dispute Settlement and the WTO: Emerging Problems”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.1(3), 1998, pp.329-351.
494 Joost Pauwelyn, “The Transformation Of World Trade”, Mich. L. Rev. Vol.104, 2005, p.1.
495 Maura Blue Jeffords, “Turning The Protester Into A Partner For Development: The Need For Effective Consultation Between The WTO & NGOs”, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol.28, 2003. p.954.
496 Robert E. Baldwin, “Key Challenges Facing the WTO” in Mike Moor(ed.), Doha and Beyond: The Future of the Multilateral Trading System, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.57.
497 Mike Moore(ed.), Doha and Beyond: The Future of the Multilateral Trading System, Cambridge University Press, 2004. p. vii.
499 Gregory C. Shaffer , “The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO's Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters”, Harvard International Law Review, Vol. 25, Winter 2001, p.3.
500 Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001, para.2.
501 Joost Pauwelyn, “The Transformation of World Trade”, Mich. L. Rev. Vol.104(2), 2005, p.30.
502 Maki Tanaka, “Bridging the Gap Between Northern NGOs and Southern Sovereigns in the Trade-Environment Debate: The Pursuit of Democratic Dispute Settlements in the WTO Under the Rio Principles”, Ecology Law Quarterly., Vol..30, 2003. p.138,
503 Maki Tanaka, “Bridging the Gap Between Northern NGOs and Southern Sovereigns in the Trade-Environment Debate: The Pursuit of Democratic Dispute Settlements in the WTO Under the Rio Principles”, Ecology Law Quarterly., Vol.30, 2003, p.142.
504 John. H. Jackson, “Dispute Settlement and the WTO: Emerging Problems”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.1(3), 1998, pp.329-351.
505 Sylvia Ostry, “External Transparency: The Policy Process at the National Level of the Two-level Game” in Mike Moor(ed.), Doha and Beyond: The Future of the Multilateral Trading System, Cambridge University Press, 2004. p.107. 奥斯特雷也意识到任何正式的、立法的方式将非政府组织参与纳入 WTO 规则是非常困难的,但通过司法途径更不正当。她最终建议通过贸易政策评审机制增进非政府组织的参与。
506 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “Constitutionalism and WTO Law: From a State-centered Approach Towards a Human Rights Approach in International Economic Law”, in Daniel L.M. Kennedy and James D. Southwick (eds.), The Political Economy of International Trade Law, Cambridge University Press, 2002. p.64.
507 Dunoff, “Citizen Participation in the Global Trading System: Panel I: Open Democratic Participation Scheme For The World Trade Organization”, Rutgers L. Rev. Vol.56, 2004, p.966. 另见Laurence R. Helfer, “Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking”, Yale J. Int’l L. Vol.29(1), 2004, p.14.
508 Laurence R. Helfer, “Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking”, Yale J. Int’l L. Vol.29(1), 2004, p.14.
509 Peter Van den Bossche, “The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization”, Cambridge University Press, 2005. p.135. 很多学者均批评 WTO 秘书处的配备过于精简,认为如此小的秘书处是令人疑惑的。譬如,世界粮农组织 1997 年一次性削减了罗马总部 560 个以上的工作人员,该削减人数都已与 WTO 秘书处人数相当。另可见 B.Hoekman and M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, 2001, p.55.
510 例如,2004 年 7 月 12 日,中国非政府组织参加了在曼谷举办的第十五届世界艾滋病大会。中国相关政府代表,如卫生部副部长也参加了论坛,并进行发言。
511 数据来源于世界银行网站新闻,见世界银行与中国的民间组织http://www.worldbank.org.cn/Chinese/Resources/Resources_ngooverview.htm 2004 年 12 月更新。
512 见 2007 年 1 月 7 日中央电视台新闻胡锦涛总书记的发言。
513 王名主编:《中国非政府公共部门》,清华大学出版社 2003 年版,第 72 到 73 页。
514 姚莉:《非政府组织与国际贸易》,载于《西北师范大学学报(社会科学版)》,2007 年第 1 期,第 128页。
515 王名主编:《中国非政府公共部门》,清华大学出版社 2003 年版,第 74 页。
516 王名主编:《中国非政府公共部门》,清华大学出版社 2003 年版,第 75-76 页。
517 Daniel D. Bradlow , “Global Trade Issues In The New Millennium: The Times They Are At Changing :Some Preliminary Thoughts On Developing Countries, NGOs And The Reform Of The WTO”, Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 33(1), p.506.
518 Laurence R. Helfer, “Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking”, Yale J. Int’l L. Vol.29(1), 2004, pp. 23-47.
519 “Civil Society Calls On Rich Countries To Stop Imposing Extreme Demands At The WTO Sixth Ministerial Conference”, Joint Civil Society Statement 16th December 2005 该联合声明由参与香港部长级会议的 86 个非政府组织签名发表。包括第三世界网络、非洲贸易网络、全球反贫穷行动、阿拉伯发展非政府组织网络、国际牛津救济委员会、英国贸易正义运动、加拿大国际合作委员会等等。
520 Daniel C. Esty, “We the People: Civil Society in the WTO”, in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick(eds), New Directions in International Economic Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000. p.99.
521 E.U. Petersmann, Reforming the World Trade System: Legitimacy, Efficiency and Democratic Governance, Oxford University Press, 2005. p.29.
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