论巴塞尔新资本协议对我国商业银行制度改革的推进
摘要
随着国际经济全球化和金融一体化步伐的加快,尤其是我国加入世界贸易组织后,对外资银行市场准入的各种限制逐渐取消,我国商业银行与国际商业银行在统一的国际规则下竞争已成为必然的发展趋势。当前中国金融的渐进式改革与外部规则的矛盾已经逐步显现出来,顺应客观发展的形势,及时实现既有商业银行制度体系的适应性转变已经成为当前必须予以高度关注的问题。
本文在借鉴发达国家商业银行制度的基础上,从制度经济学角度来探讨巴塞尔新资本协议是如何推进我国金融制度改革的。探讨针对我国商业银行这一特定主体在施加了巴塞尔新资本协议外部约束后,资本约束如何推进商业银行资木管理与风险控制制度改革,以及如何推动我国金融监管体制改革,推进我国商业银行信息披露,强化银行公司治理。
本文提出改革开放20多年来,中国商业银行制度变迁既来源于内部诱致性变迁与强制性变迁的非均衡性,又来源于外部经济全球化促进制度安排的借鉴与趋同。中国的商业银行制度变迁是内部规则与外部规则的不断冲突和协调的演化过程。竞争的客观现实要求中国的银行业接受和遵守以巴塞尔协议为核心的国际银行经营管理的统一规则,提高资本充足率,全面加强风险管理,实现发展战略的转型；同时通过完善内部控制机制,改进信息披露制度,强化公司治理,提高自身竞争能力,真正地建立起我国现代商业银行体制。与此同时银行业监管当局也应加强自身建设,提高监管能力,开展与监管机构的国际合作,以适应银行全面风险管理的转变,才能满足新资本协议的实施要求。
巴塞尔新资本协议的实施是我国商业银行制度面临的外部约束的重大变化,因此,应以制度改革创新消除阻碍商业银行发展的种种制约,引入“外部变量”,制度变迁的模式由强制性制度变迁逐步向诱致性变迁模式引导,改革产权制度,强化金融制度的实施机制,为商业银行的发展创造条件。
With the acceleration of economy globalization and finance unification, especially with China's being accepted into the WTO, China has been liberating its policies on foreign banks' entry into the Chinese markets. As a result, Chinese banks will have to operate under international standards as their foreign competitors do. However, the progressive pace of reform in China's banking systems has lagged behind the internationalization trend. Therefore, it is urged that attentions be paid to the timely transition of China's banking systems from national rules to international standards in order for the country to further develop its economy.
Following the review of banking policies in developed countries, this dissertation explores, from the standard point of institutional economics view, ways in which the New Basel Accord will stimulate reforms in China's banking policies. Specifically, it discusses how the New Basel Accord will speed up reforms in capital and risk management, information disclosure, and corporate governance with Chinese commercial banks. In addition, this dissertation reveals the influences the New Basel Accord will have on the banking regulatory systems.
This dissertation states that changes over the past 20 years in China's banking policy stem from two reasons. First is the disequilibrium with China's banking systems caused by internal induced changes and forced changes and second the efforts made by China of rearranging its policies to realize the globalization trends. In other words, changes in China's banking policies are on-going processes in which conflicts between internal rules and external standards continuously rise and resolve. Global-wide competitions demand Chinese commercial banks run businesses under international rules with a core of the New Basel Accord, raise capital adequacy ratios, enforce risk management, and change business strategies. It is believed that only China's modernized financial systems be established through completing Chinese banks internal control procedures, improving information disclosure processes, strengthening corporate governance, and enhancing core competence. Meanwhile, banking regulators must realize that to achieve the goal of complying with the New Basel Accord and totally controlling banking risks they must reinforce their regulating capacities and abilities by communicating and cooperating with their international peers.
As an external restrain, the implementation of the New Basel Accord is an extremely critical point of new change and challenge faced by China's banking systems. China has to recognize and seize the opportunity to dissolve all constrains preventing Chinese commercial banks from further development by reforming its financial policies and thus creating an appropriate environment.
本文在借鉴发达国家商业银行制度的基础上,从制度经济学角度来探讨巴塞尔新资本协议是如何推进我国金融制度改革的。探讨针对我国商业银行这一特定主体在施加了巴塞尔新资本协议外部约束后,资本约束如何推进商业银行资木管理与风险控制制度改革,以及如何推动我国金融监管体制改革,推进我国商业银行信息披露,强化银行公司治理。
本文提出改革开放20多年来,中国商业银行制度变迁既来源于内部诱致性变迁与强制性变迁的非均衡性,又来源于外部经济全球化促进制度安排的借鉴与趋同。中国的商业银行制度变迁是内部规则与外部规则的不断冲突和协调的演化过程。竞争的客观现实要求中国的银行业接受和遵守以巴塞尔协议为核心的国际银行经营管理的统一规则,提高资本充足率,全面加强风险管理,实现发展战略的转型；同时通过完善内部控制机制,改进信息披露制度,强化公司治理,提高自身竞争能力,真正地建立起我国现代商业银行体制。与此同时银行业监管当局也应加强自身建设,提高监管能力,开展与监管机构的国际合作,以适应银行全面风险管理的转变,才能满足新资本协议的实施要求。
巴塞尔新资本协议的实施是我国商业银行制度面临的外部约束的重大变化,因此,应以制度改革创新消除阻碍商业银行发展的种种制约,引入“外部变量”,制度变迁的模式由强制性制度变迁逐步向诱致性变迁模式引导,改革产权制度,强化金融制度的实施机制,为商业银行的发展创造条件。
With the acceleration of economy globalization and finance unification, especially with China's being accepted into the WTO, China has been liberating its policies on foreign banks' entry into the Chinese markets. As a result, Chinese banks will have to operate under international standards as their foreign competitors do. However, the progressive pace of reform in China's banking systems has lagged behind the internationalization trend. Therefore, it is urged that attentions be paid to the timely transition of China's banking systems from national rules to international standards in order for the country to further develop its economy.
Following the review of banking policies in developed countries, this dissertation explores, from the standard point of institutional economics view, ways in which the New Basel Accord will stimulate reforms in China's banking policies. Specifically, it discusses how the New Basel Accord will speed up reforms in capital and risk management, information disclosure, and corporate governance with Chinese commercial banks. In addition, this dissertation reveals the influences the New Basel Accord will have on the banking regulatory systems.
This dissertation states that changes over the past 20 years in China's banking policy stem from two reasons. First is the disequilibrium with China's banking systems caused by internal induced changes and forced changes and second the efforts made by China of rearranging its policies to realize the globalization trends. In other words, changes in China's banking policies are on-going processes in which conflicts between internal rules and external standards continuously rise and resolve. Global-wide competitions demand Chinese commercial banks run businesses under international rules with a core of the New Basel Accord, raise capital adequacy ratios, enforce risk management, and change business strategies. It is believed that only China's modernized financial systems be established through completing Chinese banks internal control procedures, improving information disclosure processes, strengthening corporate governance, and enhancing core competence. Meanwhile, banking regulators must realize that to achieve the goal of complying with the New Basel Accord and totally controlling banking risks they must reinforce their regulating capacities and abilities by communicating and cooperating with their international peers.
As an external restrain, the implementation of the New Basel Accord is an extremely critical point of new change and challenge faced by China's banking systems. China has to recognize and seize the opportunity to dissolve all constrains preventing Chinese commercial banks from further development by reforming its financial policies and thus creating an appropriate environment.
引文
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