我国巨灾保险市场失灵的经济学分析
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摘要
我国是地震、洪水等自然灾害的多发国家,巨灾风险分布地域广、种类多、发生频率高、损失重。特别是2008年以来,我国相继发生了南方雪灾和四川大地震等巨灾,对我国的经济发展和社会稳定构成了重大威胁,人们急需巨灾保险这种社会化的风险损失承担机制发挥作用。然而,由于巨灾保险产品的特殊属性,巨灾保险市场存在市场失灵,从而阻碍了巨灾保险市场的发展。为此对导致巨灾保险市场失灵的几个问题进行分析。
巨灾保险是一种介于公共物品与私人物品之间的具有利益外溢的准公共物品,利益外溢的存在使得巨灾保险具有正外部性的特点。巨灾保险在经营过程中,保险市场的主体间具有信息不对称,道德风险及逆向选择是保险市场信息不对称的两种主要表现形式,在不对称信息存在的情况下,投保人道德风险的均衡解只能是一个部分保险合同,即市场均衡的合同一定需要投保人自己也承担部分风险。只要是充分竞争的保险市场,投保人的逆向选择的存在,混同均衡是不存在的,只存在分离均衡,在此分离均衡下,高风险的投保人进行完全保险,低风险的投保人只能进行部分保险,完全保险的保险费率为高风险投保人发生事故的概率,部分保险的保险费率为低风险投保人发生事故的概率。
根据公共物品原理,我国应建立政策性的巨灾保险模式,根据巨灾保险的正外部性原理,政府应对居民巨灾保险进行补贴,建立政府对巨灾风险的合理分担。针对投保人的道德风险,规避道德风险的主要的、有效的策略是设计具有针对性的保险条款。针对投保人的逆向选择,首先要加强核保控制,其次是建立科学的理赔机制。
There are many natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods in our country. The catastrophic risks have a broad geographical distribution. All kinds of the catastrophic risks have high frequency and huge loss. Especially since 2008, the south snowstorm and the Sichuan earthquake had successively taken place in our country, greatly threaten the economic development and social stability. The people greatly need the catastrophic insurance to play an important role in undertaking the catastrophic risk. However, because of the special attributes of catastrophe insurance goods, there is market failure in catastrophe insurance market so as to hindering the development of catastrophe insurance market. For this reason, analyzing some problems which lead to market failure of catastrophe insurance.
Catastrophe insurance is a quasi-public goods has the benefits of spill-over between public goods and private goods, catastrophe insurance has positive externality characteristics because of the existence of spillover benefits. There is asymmetric information between the main body of the insurance market when catastrophe insurance in the course of business. The two main forms of information asymmetry in insurance market are moral hazard and adverse selection. In the circumstances of the existence of asymmetric information, the insured balance of moral hazard can only be a partial solution of the insurance contract, in other words, the contract market equilibrium that is required the insured must also bear part of risk. As long as they are fully competitive insurance market, the existence of adverse selection of the insured, there is separating equilibrium but pooling equilibrium. The high-risk insured select full insurance and the low-risk insured select partial insurance in the separating equilibrium. The premium rates of total insurance is the probability of the high-risk insured take place an accident, The premium rates of part insurance is the probability of the low-risk insured take place an accident.
According to the principle of public goods, China should establish a policy of catastrophe insurance model. According to the principle of positive externality of catastrophe insurance, the government should subsidize catastrophe insurance of residents, the establishment of the Government's reasonable share of catastrophic risk. In view of moral hazard of the insured, designing pertinence insurance clause is a primary and efficient strategy to avoid moral hazard. In view of adverse selection of the insured, the first is to strengthen insurance underwriting control, the second is to establish mechanism for scientific claims.
巨灾保险是一种介于公共物品与私人物品之间的具有利益外溢的准公共物品,利益外溢的存在使得巨灾保险具有正外部性的特点。巨灾保险在经营过程中,保险市场的主体间具有信息不对称,道德风险及逆向选择是保险市场信息不对称的两种主要表现形式,在不对称信息存在的情况下,投保人道德风险的均衡解只能是一个部分保险合同,即市场均衡的合同一定需要投保人自己也承担部分风险。只要是充分竞争的保险市场,投保人的逆向选择的存在,混同均衡是不存在的,只存在分离均衡,在此分离均衡下,高风险的投保人进行完全保险,低风险的投保人只能进行部分保险,完全保险的保险费率为高风险投保人发生事故的概率,部分保险的保险费率为低风险投保人发生事故的概率。
根据公共物品原理,我国应建立政策性的巨灾保险模式,根据巨灾保险的正外部性原理,政府应对居民巨灾保险进行补贴,建立政府对巨灾风险的合理分担。针对投保人的道德风险,规避道德风险的主要的、有效的策略是设计具有针对性的保险条款。针对投保人的逆向选择,首先要加强核保控制,其次是建立科学的理赔机制。
There are many natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods in our country. The catastrophic risks have a broad geographical distribution. All kinds of the catastrophic risks have high frequency and huge loss. Especially since 2008, the south snowstorm and the Sichuan earthquake had successively taken place in our country, greatly threaten the economic development and social stability. The people greatly need the catastrophic insurance to play an important role in undertaking the catastrophic risk. However, because of the special attributes of catastrophe insurance goods, there is market failure in catastrophe insurance market so as to hindering the development of catastrophe insurance market. For this reason, analyzing some problems which lead to market failure of catastrophe insurance.
Catastrophe insurance is a quasi-public goods has the benefits of spill-over between public goods and private goods, catastrophe insurance has positive externality characteristics because of the existence of spillover benefits. There is asymmetric information between the main body of the insurance market when catastrophe insurance in the course of business. The two main forms of information asymmetry in insurance market are moral hazard and adverse selection. In the circumstances of the existence of asymmetric information, the insured balance of moral hazard can only be a partial solution of the insurance contract, in other words, the contract market equilibrium that is required the insured must also bear part of risk. As long as they are fully competitive insurance market, the existence of adverse selection of the insured, there is separating equilibrium but pooling equilibrium. The high-risk insured select full insurance and the low-risk insured select partial insurance in the separating equilibrium. The premium rates of total insurance is the probability of the high-risk insured take place an accident, The premium rates of part insurance is the probability of the low-risk insured take place an accident.
According to the principle of public goods, China should establish a policy of catastrophe insurance model. According to the principle of positive externality of catastrophe insurance, the government should subsidize catastrophe insurance of residents, the establishment of the Government's reasonable share of catastrophic risk. In view of moral hazard of the insured, designing pertinence insurance clause is a primary and efficient strategy to avoid moral hazard. In view of adverse selection of the insured, the first is to strengthen insurance underwriting control, the second is to establish mechanism for scientific claims.
引文
[1]刘笑冬.中国急需建立巨灾保险制度[N]中国经营报,2006-8-20(3).
[2]王涛.中国巨灾保险严重缺位 雪灾赔款预计将超35亿[N].东方早报,2008-02-02(2).
[3]吴定富.科学规划保险业发展蓝图[N].中国金融,2006-01-21.
[4]挪威.卡尔·H.博尔奇.保险经济学[M].北京:商务印书馆,1999,156
[5]Wang,S.,Young,Y.R.,H.Panje.Axiomatic Characterization of Insurance Prices[J].Insurance Mathematics and Economics,1997,(12):173-183.
[6]Denuit,M.,Dhaene,J.&Van Wouve.The Economics of Insurance:A Review and Some Recent Developments.Bulletin of the Swiss Association of Actuaries,1999,(1):137-175.
[7]Luan,C.,Insurance Premium Calculations with Anticipated Utility Theory,ASTIN Bullentin,2001,(7):27-39.
[8]栾存存.巨灾风险的保险研究与应对策略综述[J].经济学动态,2003,(8):23-28.
[9]张晓琴.巨灾风险债券及其在我国的运用研究[D].四川:四川大学,2005.
[10]Arrow,K.J..The role of Securities in optimal Allocation of Risk-Bearing.Review of Economic Studies,1963,31:91-96.
[11]Holmstrom,B.Moral hazard and observability[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1979,10,74-91.
[12]Dionne,G.Moral hazard and state-dependent utility function[J].Journal of Risk and insurance,1982,49,405-423.
[13]Shavell,S.On moral hazard and insurance[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1986,93:541-562.
[14]Pauly,M.Over insurance and Public provision of insurance:The role of moral hazard And adverse selection[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1974,88,44-62.
[15]Wintef,R.A.Moral hazard and insurance contracts[J].In Contributions to Insurance Economics,G.Dionne(ed),Kluwer Academic Publishers,1992,61-96.
[16]Stewart,J.The welfare Implications of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance Markets[N].Economic Inquiry,32,No.2 April,193-208.
[17]Mookherjee,D.and I.Png.Optimal auditing,insurance and redistribution[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1989,104:205-228.
[18]Rothchild,M.and J.E.Stiglitz.Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets:The Economics of markets with imperfect information[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1976,90:629-650.
[19]Wilson,C.A model of insurance markets with incomplete information[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1977,12:167-207.
[20]Riley,J.G.Informational equilibrium[J].Econometrica.1979,47:331-359.
[21]Stiglitz,J.E.Monopoly,non-linear Pricing and imperfect information:The insurance market[J].Review of Economic Studies,1977,44:407-30.
[22]龙文军,张显峰.农业保险主体行为的博弈分析[J].中国农村经济,2003,(5).
[23]周志刚.风险可保性理论与巨灾保险的国家管理[D].上海:复旦大学,2005.
[24]冯文丽.我国农业保险市场失灵与制度供给[J].金融研究,2004,(4):124-129.
[25]张跃华,张宏.农业保险、市场失灵及县域保险的经济学分析[J].山东农业大学学报(社会科学版),2006,(3):17-21.
[26]杨惠,谢正强.保险市场失灵与保险市场的监管[J].财经理论与实践,2002,(5):26-28.
[27]胡新辉,王慧敏.洪水风险保险市场失灵研究[J].水利经济,2008,(3):26-29.
[28]李全庆,陈利根.巨灾保险:内涵、市场失灵、政府救济与现实选择[J].经济问题,2008,(9):42-45.
[29]张庆洪,葛良骥.巨灾风险转移机制的经济学分析——保险、资本市场创新和私人市场失灵[J].同济大学学报(社会科学版),2008,(4):101-107.
[30]黄正军,袁杰.中国农业保险市场失灵的成因探讨[J].社科纵横,2006,(4):61-63.
[31]徐策,张伟超.市场失灵的三大表现及其宏观调控对策[J].黑龙江社会,2004,(4):44-46.
[32]李军.论我国巨灾保险制度的建立与完善[D].四川:西南财经大学,2006.
[33]谢世清.对建立我国巨灾保险制度的思考[J].中国金融,2008,(15):52-54.
[34]刘正文.基于巨灾风险的保险模型及经营模式研究[D].湖南:湖南科技大学,2008.
[35]李晓杰.基于博弈分析的我国巨灾保险模式研究[D].湖南:湖南大学,2007.
[36]张宗军.基于公共性基础的巨灾保险制度研究[J].金融发展研究,2008,(7):64-67.
[37]杨凯,齐中英.我国发展巨灾保险所面临的供需不足分析及建议商业研究,2006,(6):91-96.
[38]孙蓉,兰虹.保险学原理[M].四川:西南财经大学出版社,2004.
[39]赵婕.我国农业保险制度研究[D].安微:安微大学,2007.
[40]石颖.我国巨灾保险发展现状[J].沿海企业与科技,2007,(4):38-40.
[41]胡代光,高鸿业.现代西方经济学辞典[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,1996,74.
[42]胡代光.西方经济学说的演变及其影响[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1998,580-583.
[43][美]曼昆.经济学原理[M].北京:生活、读书、新知三联书店.1997,230.
[44]费友海.对农业保险制度模式与运行机制的经济学分析[D].四川:西南财经大学,2006.
[45]谢欢.巨灾损失分担机制:理论研究与国际经验[D].山东:山东大学,2007.
[46]齐瑞宗译.当代风险管理与保险教程[M].清华大学出版社,2002.
[47]周晓敏.我国保险市场主体间信息不对称问题研究[D].北京:对外经济贸易大学,2006.
[48]程振源.保险市场若干非对称信息问题的博弈分析[D].厦门:厦门大学,2003.
[49]刘亮.基于博弈论的财产保险市场隐蔽信息问题研究[D].北京:中国科学技术大学.2006.
[50]Spence,M.,Job Market Signaling[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1973,87:355-374.
[51]杨美琴,龚日朝.保险市场基于保险信号的信号传递博弈模型分析[J].湖南科技大学学报(社会科学版),2008,11(6):100-103.
[52]叶德磊.中级微观经济学[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2005.
[53]祝向军.道德风险与保险商品价格形成的博弈分析[J].财经研究,2004,(3):40-48.
[54]邢莉.中国保险市场非对称信息问题研究[D].北京:首都经济贸易大学,2003.
[55]于维生,朴正爱.博弈论及其在经济管理中的应用[M].北京:清华大学出版社,2005.
[2]王涛.中国巨灾保险严重缺位 雪灾赔款预计将超35亿[N].东方早报,2008-02-02(2).
[3]吴定富.科学规划保险业发展蓝图[N].中国金融,2006-01-21.
[4]挪威.卡尔·H.博尔奇.保险经济学[M].北京:商务印书馆,1999,156
[5]Wang,S.,Young,Y.R.,H.Panje.Axiomatic Characterization of Insurance Prices[J].Insurance Mathematics and Economics,1997,(12):173-183.
[6]Denuit,M.,Dhaene,J.&Van Wouve.The Economics of Insurance:A Review and Some Recent Developments.Bulletin of the Swiss Association of Actuaries,1999,(1):137-175.
[7]Luan,C.,Insurance Premium Calculations with Anticipated Utility Theory,ASTIN Bullentin,2001,(7):27-39.
[8]栾存存.巨灾风险的保险研究与应对策略综述[J].经济学动态,2003,(8):23-28.
[9]张晓琴.巨灾风险债券及其在我国的运用研究[D].四川:四川大学,2005.
[10]Arrow,K.J..The role of Securities in optimal Allocation of Risk-Bearing.Review of Economic Studies,1963,31:91-96.
[11]Holmstrom,B.Moral hazard and observability[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1979,10,74-91.
[12]Dionne,G.Moral hazard and state-dependent utility function[J].Journal of Risk and insurance,1982,49,405-423.
[13]Shavell,S.On moral hazard and insurance[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1986,93:541-562.
[14]Pauly,M.Over insurance and Public provision of insurance:The role of moral hazard And adverse selection[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1974,88,44-62.
[15]Wintef,R.A.Moral hazard and insurance contracts[J].In Contributions to Insurance Economics,G.Dionne(ed),Kluwer Academic Publishers,1992,61-96.
[16]Stewart,J.The welfare Implications of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance Markets[N].Economic Inquiry,32,No.2 April,193-208.
[17]Mookherjee,D.and I.Png.Optimal auditing,insurance and redistribution[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1989,104:205-228.
[18]Rothchild,M.and J.E.Stiglitz.Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets:The Economics of markets with imperfect information[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1976,90:629-650.
[19]Wilson,C.A model of insurance markets with incomplete information[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1977,12:167-207.
[20]Riley,J.G.Informational equilibrium[J].Econometrica.1979,47:331-359.
[21]Stiglitz,J.E.Monopoly,non-linear Pricing and imperfect information:The insurance market[J].Review of Economic Studies,1977,44:407-30.
[22]龙文军,张显峰.农业保险主体行为的博弈分析[J].中国农村经济,2003,(5).
[23]周志刚.风险可保性理论与巨灾保险的国家管理[D].上海:复旦大学,2005.
[24]冯文丽.我国农业保险市场失灵与制度供给[J].金融研究,2004,(4):124-129.
[25]张跃华,张宏.农业保险、市场失灵及县域保险的经济学分析[J].山东农业大学学报(社会科学版),2006,(3):17-21.
[26]杨惠,谢正强.保险市场失灵与保险市场的监管[J].财经理论与实践,2002,(5):26-28.
[27]胡新辉,王慧敏.洪水风险保险市场失灵研究[J].水利经济,2008,(3):26-29.
[28]李全庆,陈利根.巨灾保险:内涵、市场失灵、政府救济与现实选择[J].经济问题,2008,(9):42-45.
[29]张庆洪,葛良骥.巨灾风险转移机制的经济学分析——保险、资本市场创新和私人市场失灵[J].同济大学学报(社会科学版),2008,(4):101-107.
[30]黄正军,袁杰.中国农业保险市场失灵的成因探讨[J].社科纵横,2006,(4):61-63.
[31]徐策,张伟超.市场失灵的三大表现及其宏观调控对策[J].黑龙江社会,2004,(4):44-46.
[32]李军.论我国巨灾保险制度的建立与完善[D].四川:西南财经大学,2006.
[33]谢世清.对建立我国巨灾保险制度的思考[J].中国金融,2008,(15):52-54.
[34]刘正文.基于巨灾风险的保险模型及经营模式研究[D].湖南:湖南科技大学,2008.
[35]李晓杰.基于博弈分析的我国巨灾保险模式研究[D].湖南:湖南大学,2007.
[36]张宗军.基于公共性基础的巨灾保险制度研究[J].金融发展研究,2008,(7):64-67.
[37]杨凯,齐中英.我国发展巨灾保险所面临的供需不足分析及建议商业研究,2006,(6):91-96.
[38]孙蓉,兰虹.保险学原理[M].四川:西南财经大学出版社,2004.
[39]赵婕.我国农业保险制度研究[D].安微:安微大学,2007.
[40]石颖.我国巨灾保险发展现状[J].沿海企业与科技,2007,(4):38-40.
[41]胡代光,高鸿业.现代西方经济学辞典[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,1996,74.
[42]胡代光.西方经济学说的演变及其影响[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1998,580-583.
[43][美]曼昆.经济学原理[M].北京:生活、读书、新知三联书店.1997,230.
[44]费友海.对农业保险制度模式与运行机制的经济学分析[D].四川:西南财经大学,2006.
[45]谢欢.巨灾损失分担机制:理论研究与国际经验[D].山东:山东大学,2007.
[46]齐瑞宗译.当代风险管理与保险教程[M].清华大学出版社,2002.
[47]周晓敏.我国保险市场主体间信息不对称问题研究[D].北京:对外经济贸易大学,2006.
[48]程振源.保险市场若干非对称信息问题的博弈分析[D].厦门:厦门大学,2003.
[49]刘亮.基于博弈论的财产保险市场隐蔽信息问题研究[D].北京:中国科学技术大学.2006.
[50]Spence,M.,Job Market Signaling[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1973,87:355-374.
[51]杨美琴,龚日朝.保险市场基于保险信号的信号传递博弈模型分析[J].湖南科技大学学报(社会科学版),2008,11(6):100-103.
[52]叶德磊.中级微观经济学[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2005.
[53]祝向军.道德风险与保险商品价格形成的博弈分析[J].财经研究,2004,(3):40-48.
[54]邢莉.中国保险市场非对称信息问题研究[D].北京:首都经济贸易大学,2003.
[55]于维生,朴正爱.博弈论及其在经济管理中的应用[M].北京:清华大学出版社,2005.