行政垄断型行业与竞争性行业收入分配差距与合理化问题研究
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摘要
行业收入分配差距问题是当前收入分配研究领域中的一个热点,本文为了解决行政垄断型行业与竞争性行业之间的不合理收入分配差距问题,在进一步厘清两种类型行业间收入差距的基础上,深入细致地对比分析了行业内部收入差距和非工资性收入差距问题,分别建立了测度两种类型行业间收入差距根源问题的计量模型；之后设计出测度典型竞争性行业收入大小的明瑟回归模型并将之用于估计行政垄断型行业的“理论收入”,进而推算得到了两种类型行业间“合理收入差距”与“不合理收入差距”的大小,那么,后者就是行业间收入分配差距合理化改革的目标；最后,本文认为行政垄断是造成两种类型行业间收入巨大不合理差距的制度性根源,针对于此,提出了具体系统的中观层面和微观层面的政策建议。其主要内容和创新点如下：
首先,厘清了产生行业收入分配差距的政策渊源和政策推力作用过程,认为当前的收入分配差距严重失衡正是改革开放之后中国刺激经济增长的收入调控政策标准不明确、尺度失范、力度失控所致。
中国收入分配不合理差距产生的政策根源就是在改革开放之初,为打破平均主义、大锅饭,推动和刺激经济增长,政府在收入分配领域采取的适当拉开收入分配差距的多种政策措施,“效率优先,兼顾公平”就是该时期制定收入分配政策的原则和依据。在收入分配政策具体的制定和执行过程中,由于没有现成的可供参考的合理化标准,“兼顾公平”往往流于形式,仅过分注重了“效率优先”,尤其是在转轨经济条件下市场经济体制不健全、相关配套法规不完善的背景下,各种利益主体都努力追求自身利益的最大化,占据重要资源领域的行政垄断行业更是借助于行政垄断谋取的巨额利润之便利,无限制的扩大了自身领导和职工的工资和福利,甚至不断曝出奢侈腐化、贪污浪费,乃至违法犯罪的现象和行为,最终导致了行业乃至全国收入分配的严重失衡现象。
其次,区分了“行政垄断行业”与“行政垄断因素”对行业收入分配差距的贡献度,将极值法、离差法和泰尔指数(Theil index)相结合,测度出了“行政垄断行业”对全部行业之间收入分配差距的贡献度。
本文将全部97个行业按照经济属性分为4个行业组,采用年均工资收入数据,先分别将行业组内各行业与参照对象的收入差距(离差)取绝对值并加总,得到各行业组收入差距；然后再将全部行业分别与参照对象的收入差距(离差)加总,得到收入总差距；那么,二者的比值就是各行业组对收入总差距的贡献度；参照对象分别取收入最低行业和全国平均收入行业,所得的测算结果分别作为行政垄断行业对全部行业收入差距贡献度的上限和下限；之后,再使用泰尔指数法进行测度以验证对比。第一种方法的测算结果表明,中国各行业之间存在着较大的收入差距,并且有逐年扩大的迹象；11个“行政垄断行业”对总差距的贡献度在18.38%-19.35%之间,与行业总量的比重相比,明显偏高。第二种方法测算的泰尔指数表明这主要是由行业组内的差距不断扩大所致,行业组间的贡献度较小；而行业总泰尔指数呈现出先扩大后缩小的迹象和趋势。就行业组间差距贡献度而言,行政垄断行业的行业组间泰尔指数为0.0425,是4个组别中最高的,而且呈现出先缩小后扩大的迹象和趋势,整体趋势是扩大的,显然,这意味着行政垄断行业的收入扩大了与其他行业之间的差距。
第三,通过计量分析,确定了两种类型行业内部收入差距与各影响因素之间的量化关系,并将之作为评价行业内部收入差距合理与否的数量标准。
本文抽样采用相关上市公司年报第一手数据,对比分析了典型代表性行政垄断行业与竞争性行业各自内部以及它们之间的收入差距情况,发现各自内部的收入差距情况是：电信业内部的收入差距是最大的,“高管平均收入”高出员工17.56倍；其次是银行业8.99倍；航空运输业最小,仅有2.75倍；石油、电力、银行、电信四个行业尽管员工的报酬总额与高管相比仍有较大甚至很大的差距,但是职工收入的年增长率均超过了高管年收入的年增长率；形成鲜明对比的是,两个竞争性行业的职工在较低的收入增长基数之上其增长速度远低于高管收入的增长速度。之后发现两种类型行业间收入差距的情况是：无论是相同层次的高管之间还是员工之间,行政垄断行业都比竞争性行业拥有绝对优势；不同层次的行业高管与员工之间的收入差距更是触目惊心：银行业高管平均收入高出交通运输设备制造业员工44.69倍,高出纺织业员工68.39倍,电信业分别高出二者43.33和66.34倍,铁路运输业相对最低,但也分别高出二者5.34和8.62倍。
依据竞赛理论和行为理论进行的计量检验发现,本文的研究结论是支持竞赛理论而不是行为理论的；同时发现,总资产收益率对绝对收入差距和相对收入差距的影响都是最大的；更为重要的是,行业类型因素对绝对收入差距的影响都是正向的,而对相对收入差距的影响都是负向的,这说明行政垄断因素会导致绝对收入差距加大,而相对收入差距缩小,这一结论也得到了进一步邹(Chow)检验的支持。
此外,本文还明确提出判断行政垄断行业收入分配是否合理的参照对象是由市场经济优胜劣汰条件产生的竞争性行业中的民营“上市公司”,详细设定了选取参照对象的合理化标准。
第四,本文对比测算了行政垄断型行业的非工资性收入优势情况,它对两种类型行业间总收入差距的贡献度介于36.34%至38.78%之间,对非工资性收入方程的影响程度在75%左右,同样是行业收入差距存在和扩大的重要影响因素。
2007-2012年,代表性行政垄断型行业银行、航空运输、电力、石油和天然气开采、电信和铁路运输业的平均非工资性收入分别高出最低收入水平行业代表纺织业8.28、7.06、5.20、4.36、4.20、2.49倍,分别高出平均收入水平行业代表交通运输设备制造业6.53、5.54、4.03、3.35、3.22、1.83倍,差距非常明显；而且,非工资性收入在行政垄断型行业总收入中所占的比例远远大于竞争性行业相应的比例,6年平均分别高出纺织业14.63、6.37、17.25、11.84、12.34和12.22个百分点,高出交运设备制造业15.65、7.40、18.27、12.87、13.36和13.25个百分点。进一步研究发现,这种差距首先是源自于其提取基数即工资性收入,其次是源于其提取比例,行政垄断行业在这两方面都具有显著的优势,这又最终导致了两种类型行业间总收入的巨大差距。
借助于明瑟方程和邹检验的计量分析结果证明,行政垄断是导致两种类型行业之间非工资性收入巨大差距的深层次原因。
第五,尝试界定了典型行政垄断型行业与参照系行业收入分配的合理化差距,设计出了可以量化的参照标准。行政垄断型行业与其自身、交运设备制造业、纺织业和41个竞争性行业均值的“合理化”差距分别为42.71%、118.6%、155.97%和87.58%,对应的“不合理差距”分别为57.29%、157.7%、203.05%和117.2%。
本文总结分析了国内外相关学者对于行业收入差距合理化研究的相关成果,采用中国上市公司中41个竞争性行业具体的微观面板数据,设计出了适合于本研究的明瑟回归方程,从而估计出了竞争性行业职工收入决定因素的方程,然后将行政垄断型行业的相关数据代入进行测算,推算得到了在现有条件下行政垄断型行业“应该”获得的职工“理论收入”,并将之分别与其自身、与交运设备制造业、与纺织业以及与41个竞争性行业平均的实际职工年均收入进行了详细的对比分析。总的结论是,行政垄断型行业的“理论收入”仅应占其实际收入的42.71%,实际收入明显超发了,不合理差距为57.29%；行政垄断型行业的“理论收入”与交运设备制造业和纺织业实际收入的比值分别是118.6%和155.97%,也就是说,前者确实“应该”高出后者,但是,两种类型行业的实际收入之比却分别是276.3%和359.02%,显然,高出的过多,“不合理差距”分别为157.7%和203.5%；行政垄断型行业的“理论收入”与41个竞争性行业实际收入的比值是87.58%,也就是说前者“应该”低于后者,但是,其对应实际收入之比却是204.77%,明显过高,不合理差距为117.2%,矛盾很突出。
It's a hot topic that the gap of income distribution among industries now. In order to solve the unreasonable gap between administrative monopoly industries and competitive industries this thesis compared and analyzed the inner gap and the un-wage income gap of industries in a meticulous and deep going way and established measurement models to explore the origin of that gap which was based on further clarifying that gap. The writer schemed out a Mincer regression model to measure the income of competitive industries which was used to estimate the "theoretical income" of administrative monopoly industries and then estimated the "reasonable gap" and the "unreasonable gap" of income distribution between the two kinds of industries in that way the latter was just the rationalized target of this study. After that, this thesis extracted the obstacle and resistance of the labor transferring between the two kinds of industries from the game model. Lastly, this thesis regarded the administrative monopoly as the origin of the great unreasonable income distribution gap between the two kinds of industries and for this the paper proposed specifically systematic policy suggestion around the middle level and the micro level. The main point and innovation point followed:
Firstly, this thesis clarified the policy parentage and the mechanism of policy pushing and thought that the current serious out-of-balance of income distribute was due to the ambiguity of standard, the anomie of scale and potency dimension out of control of income distribute policy.
The policy parentage of unreasonable Chinese income distribute gap was just the kinds of policy of widening the income gap in order to break the egalitarianism and stimulate the economy, the principle and gist of which was "Priority to efficiency and Due consideration to fairness" at that time.
Because there was no ready-made reference standard of rationalization, in the process of income distribution policy formulation and implementation "Priority to efficiency" was overemphasized and "Due consideration to fairness" often became a mere formality. Especially in the background of transition economy condition that the market economy system and related laws and regulations were all incomplete and imperfect, all sorts of stakeholders were'striving for the maximization of self-interest. In that tide the administrative monopoly industries which recurred to fat profit attaining from administrative monopoly unconfined enlarged their staff's salary and welfare and even luxurious putrefy, corrupt, waste and even break the law which were constantly exposed to the public, which at last gave rise to serious out-of-balance of income distribution among industries and even the country.
Secondly, this thesis distinguished the contribution degree from "administrative monopoly industries" with "administrative monopoly factors", combined extremum method and deviation method with the Theil index method and measures the contribution of administrative monopoly industries to the total gap.
It divided all97industries into four industry groups according to their economic property and made use of the average annual labor reward data after eliminating annual inflation, and then, summed all the income gap (dispersion) in absolute value of every industry in the group with the reference object respectively which was the industry group income gap, after that, summed all the gap (dispersion) of all of the industries with the reference object respectively which is the total income gap. In that way the specific value of the industry group income gap with the total income gap was just the contribution degree of the group to the total income. The reference objects were lowest income industry and average income industry respectively and the consequence of income gap contribution degree were the ceiling and floor respectively of administrative monopoly industries to all national industry. The results according to the first method showed that there was a large income gap between various industries in China and there were signs of expansion year after year. The contribution of11administrative monopoly industries group to the total gap was between18.38%-19.35%which was obviously higher than proper criterion.Theil index showed that it was mainly caused by intra-group and less of inter-group. The total Theil Index showed that the total income gap was enlarged firstly and then shrunkened. For the sake of contribution degree of inter-group gap, the Theil index of administrative monopoly industries was0.0425which was the biggest of the4group. It obviously meant that the administrative monopoly industries enlarged the gap with other groups.
Thirdly, this thesis ascertained the quantitative relationship between the internal income gap of industries and various influencing factors through econometric analysis and took it as the quantity standards to evaluation that the internal income gap of industries was reasonable or not.
The writer took samples from the annual report of listed companies and compared the internal income gap of representative administrative monopoly industries and competitive industries respectively as well as the gap between them. The result of internal income gap respectively was that the biggest inside income gap belonged to telecommunications industry that the income of executives was17.56times larger than its employees; then the second belonged to the banking industry with8.99times as well; the smallest was air transport industry with2.75times only; the growth rate of employees' annual income was bigger than the executives' nonetheless the total income of the employees' of petroleum, electricity, banking and telecommunications industry was much less than their executives' and in sharp contrast the growth rate of employees' annual income in a low cardinal number of the two competitive industries was far below their executives'. Then the gap of inter-industry was that administrative monopoly industries had the absolute advantage than competitive industries whether it was between executives or between employees in the same level; the gap between different level executives' and employees' was especially shocking by the sight-the executives' average income of banking industry was44.69times larger than the employees' of transportation equipment manufacturing industry and68.39times larger than the textile industry, the same comparison of telecommunications industry was43.33and66.34times respectively and the comparison of railway transport industry being the lowest but also was5.34and8.62times respectively.
We tested and verified that the conclusion stood by the tournament theory instead of behavioral theory and the Chow's test found that administrative monopoly was the structural origin of the inner gap of inter-industry. At the same time the thesis found that the influence of return on total assets to the absolute income gap and the relative income gap was the biggest than all other factors. What was more important was that the type of industries affected the absolute income in a positive going way whereas in a negative-going way to the relative income gap which told us that the factor of administrative monopoly wound enlarge the absolute income gap while shrink the relative income gap.
Besides, this thesis also clearly proposed that the reasonable reference objects that whether the industries income distribution of administrative monopoly was reasonable or not were those privately operated "listed companies" in competitive industries which was created by the market economy conditions and set up the rationalization standard to select such reference objects.
Fourthly, this thesis found that the contribution degree of the non-wage income superiority of administrative monopoly industries was between36.34percent and38.78percent which made the same great influence on the existing and enlarging of income gap among industries with other factors. The degree of its impact on the non-wage income equation was about75%.
From the year of2007to2012the non-wage income of typical administrative monopoly industries such as banking, air transportation, electricity, petroleum and natural gas and railway transport industries were8.28,7.06,5.20,4.36,4.20and2.49times higher than textile industry which was representative of the lowest income industry and were6.53,5.54,4.03,3.35,3.22and1.83times higher than transportation equipment manufacturing industry which was the representative of the average level income industry. Furthermore the ratio of the non-wage income to the total income in the administrative industries was much lager than that of competitive industries and it was higher than textile industry14.63,6.37,17.25,11.84,12.34and12.22percent and higher than transportation equipment manufacturing industry15.65,7.40,18.27,12.87,13.36and13.25percent. Such a gap was original from its extracting cardinal number firstly and from its extracting proportion secondly which resulted in the great total income gap between the two types of industries at last.
The quantitative analysis proved that administrative monopoly was the root cause of the great non-wage income gap between the two types industries.
Fifthly, this thesis tried to demarcate the rationalization of gap of income distribution between representative administrative industries and competitive industries and gives out quantized reference standard. The rationalization of gap between administrative industries and itself actual, transportation equipment manufacturing industry, textile industry and the41competitive industries was42.71、118.6、155.97and87.58percent respectively. The unreasonable gap between them was57.29,157.7,203.05and117.2percent respectively.
This paper analyzed and summarized related research results of suitability for industry income gap made by related scholars at home and abroad, made use of micro panel data of China's listed companies from41competitive industries and schemed out a suitable Mincer regression equation. And then, it got the income factor equation of competitive industries by which it calculated the "theoretical income" of administrative industries under the existing condition. Compared with themselves, transportation equipment manufacturing industry, textile industry and the41competitive industries, the results were that "theoretical income" of administrative industries should only be42.71percent of their actual income which meant that they got too much more income than they should; the specific value of the "theoretical income" to the actual income of transportation equipment manufacturing industry and textile industry should be1.19and1.56respectively but the specific values of the two types industries'actual income were2.76and3.59respectively which also meant that the administrative industries got much more than they should; the specific value of the "theoretical income" to the actual income of the41competitive industries was0.88but the specific value of the two types actual income was2.05which meant that the income of the administrative industries should be much less than the41competitive industries but the actual ratio was just the reverse. The contradiction highlighted greatly.
首先,厘清了产生行业收入分配差距的政策渊源和政策推力作用过程,认为当前的收入分配差距严重失衡正是改革开放之后中国刺激经济增长的收入调控政策标准不明确、尺度失范、力度失控所致。
中国收入分配不合理差距产生的政策根源就是在改革开放之初,为打破平均主义、大锅饭,推动和刺激经济增长,政府在收入分配领域采取的适当拉开收入分配差距的多种政策措施,“效率优先,兼顾公平”就是该时期制定收入分配政策的原则和依据。在收入分配政策具体的制定和执行过程中,由于没有现成的可供参考的合理化标准,“兼顾公平”往往流于形式,仅过分注重了“效率优先”,尤其是在转轨经济条件下市场经济体制不健全、相关配套法规不完善的背景下,各种利益主体都努力追求自身利益的最大化,占据重要资源领域的行政垄断行业更是借助于行政垄断谋取的巨额利润之便利,无限制的扩大了自身领导和职工的工资和福利,甚至不断曝出奢侈腐化、贪污浪费,乃至违法犯罪的现象和行为,最终导致了行业乃至全国收入分配的严重失衡现象。
其次,区分了“行政垄断行业”与“行政垄断因素”对行业收入分配差距的贡献度,将极值法、离差法和泰尔指数(Theil index)相结合,测度出了“行政垄断行业”对全部行业之间收入分配差距的贡献度。
本文将全部97个行业按照经济属性分为4个行业组,采用年均工资收入数据,先分别将行业组内各行业与参照对象的收入差距(离差)取绝对值并加总,得到各行业组收入差距；然后再将全部行业分别与参照对象的收入差距(离差)加总,得到收入总差距；那么,二者的比值就是各行业组对收入总差距的贡献度；参照对象分别取收入最低行业和全国平均收入行业,所得的测算结果分别作为行政垄断行业对全部行业收入差距贡献度的上限和下限；之后,再使用泰尔指数法进行测度以验证对比。第一种方法的测算结果表明,中国各行业之间存在着较大的收入差距,并且有逐年扩大的迹象；11个“行政垄断行业”对总差距的贡献度在18.38%-19.35%之间,与行业总量的比重相比,明显偏高。第二种方法测算的泰尔指数表明这主要是由行业组内的差距不断扩大所致,行业组间的贡献度较小；而行业总泰尔指数呈现出先扩大后缩小的迹象和趋势。就行业组间差距贡献度而言,行政垄断行业的行业组间泰尔指数为0.0425,是4个组别中最高的,而且呈现出先缩小后扩大的迹象和趋势,整体趋势是扩大的,显然,这意味着行政垄断行业的收入扩大了与其他行业之间的差距。
第三,通过计量分析,确定了两种类型行业内部收入差距与各影响因素之间的量化关系,并将之作为评价行业内部收入差距合理与否的数量标准。
本文抽样采用相关上市公司年报第一手数据,对比分析了典型代表性行政垄断行业与竞争性行业各自内部以及它们之间的收入差距情况,发现各自内部的收入差距情况是：电信业内部的收入差距是最大的,“高管平均收入”高出员工17.56倍；其次是银行业8.99倍；航空运输业最小,仅有2.75倍；石油、电力、银行、电信四个行业尽管员工的报酬总额与高管相比仍有较大甚至很大的差距,但是职工收入的年增长率均超过了高管年收入的年增长率；形成鲜明对比的是,两个竞争性行业的职工在较低的收入增长基数之上其增长速度远低于高管收入的增长速度。之后发现两种类型行业间收入差距的情况是：无论是相同层次的高管之间还是员工之间,行政垄断行业都比竞争性行业拥有绝对优势；不同层次的行业高管与员工之间的收入差距更是触目惊心：银行业高管平均收入高出交通运输设备制造业员工44.69倍,高出纺织业员工68.39倍,电信业分别高出二者43.33和66.34倍,铁路运输业相对最低,但也分别高出二者5.34和8.62倍。
依据竞赛理论和行为理论进行的计量检验发现,本文的研究结论是支持竞赛理论而不是行为理论的；同时发现,总资产收益率对绝对收入差距和相对收入差距的影响都是最大的；更为重要的是,行业类型因素对绝对收入差距的影响都是正向的,而对相对收入差距的影响都是负向的,这说明行政垄断因素会导致绝对收入差距加大,而相对收入差距缩小,这一结论也得到了进一步邹(Chow)检验的支持。
此外,本文还明确提出判断行政垄断行业收入分配是否合理的参照对象是由市场经济优胜劣汰条件产生的竞争性行业中的民营“上市公司”,详细设定了选取参照对象的合理化标准。
第四,本文对比测算了行政垄断型行业的非工资性收入优势情况,它对两种类型行业间总收入差距的贡献度介于36.34%至38.78%之间,对非工资性收入方程的影响程度在75%左右,同样是行业收入差距存在和扩大的重要影响因素。
2007-2012年,代表性行政垄断型行业银行、航空运输、电力、石油和天然气开采、电信和铁路运输业的平均非工资性收入分别高出最低收入水平行业代表纺织业8.28、7.06、5.20、4.36、4.20、2.49倍,分别高出平均收入水平行业代表交通运输设备制造业6.53、5.54、4.03、3.35、3.22、1.83倍,差距非常明显；而且,非工资性收入在行政垄断型行业总收入中所占的比例远远大于竞争性行业相应的比例,6年平均分别高出纺织业14.63、6.37、17.25、11.84、12.34和12.22个百分点,高出交运设备制造业15.65、7.40、18.27、12.87、13.36和13.25个百分点。进一步研究发现,这种差距首先是源自于其提取基数即工资性收入,其次是源于其提取比例,行政垄断行业在这两方面都具有显著的优势,这又最终导致了两种类型行业间总收入的巨大差距。
借助于明瑟方程和邹检验的计量分析结果证明,行政垄断是导致两种类型行业之间非工资性收入巨大差距的深层次原因。
第五,尝试界定了典型行政垄断型行业与参照系行业收入分配的合理化差距,设计出了可以量化的参照标准。行政垄断型行业与其自身、交运设备制造业、纺织业和41个竞争性行业均值的“合理化”差距分别为42.71%、118.6%、155.97%和87.58%,对应的“不合理差距”分别为57.29%、157.7%、203.05%和117.2%。
本文总结分析了国内外相关学者对于行业收入差距合理化研究的相关成果,采用中国上市公司中41个竞争性行业具体的微观面板数据,设计出了适合于本研究的明瑟回归方程,从而估计出了竞争性行业职工收入决定因素的方程,然后将行政垄断型行业的相关数据代入进行测算,推算得到了在现有条件下行政垄断型行业“应该”获得的职工“理论收入”,并将之分别与其自身、与交运设备制造业、与纺织业以及与41个竞争性行业平均的实际职工年均收入进行了详细的对比分析。总的结论是,行政垄断型行业的“理论收入”仅应占其实际收入的42.71%,实际收入明显超发了,不合理差距为57.29%；行政垄断型行业的“理论收入”与交运设备制造业和纺织业实际收入的比值分别是118.6%和155.97%,也就是说,前者确实“应该”高出后者,但是,两种类型行业的实际收入之比却分别是276.3%和359.02%,显然,高出的过多,“不合理差距”分别为157.7%和203.5%；行政垄断型行业的“理论收入”与41个竞争性行业实际收入的比值是87.58%,也就是说前者“应该”低于后者,但是,其对应实际收入之比却是204.77%,明显过高,不合理差距为117.2%,矛盾很突出。
It's a hot topic that the gap of income distribution among industries now. In order to solve the unreasonable gap between administrative monopoly industries and competitive industries this thesis compared and analyzed the inner gap and the un-wage income gap of industries in a meticulous and deep going way and established measurement models to explore the origin of that gap which was based on further clarifying that gap. The writer schemed out a Mincer regression model to measure the income of competitive industries which was used to estimate the "theoretical income" of administrative monopoly industries and then estimated the "reasonable gap" and the "unreasonable gap" of income distribution between the two kinds of industries in that way the latter was just the rationalized target of this study. After that, this thesis extracted the obstacle and resistance of the labor transferring between the two kinds of industries from the game model. Lastly, this thesis regarded the administrative monopoly as the origin of the great unreasonable income distribution gap between the two kinds of industries and for this the paper proposed specifically systematic policy suggestion around the middle level and the micro level. The main point and innovation point followed:
Firstly, this thesis clarified the policy parentage and the mechanism of policy pushing and thought that the current serious out-of-balance of income distribute was due to the ambiguity of standard, the anomie of scale and potency dimension out of control of income distribute policy.
The policy parentage of unreasonable Chinese income distribute gap was just the kinds of policy of widening the income gap in order to break the egalitarianism and stimulate the economy, the principle and gist of which was "Priority to efficiency and Due consideration to fairness" at that time.
Because there was no ready-made reference standard of rationalization, in the process of income distribution policy formulation and implementation "Priority to efficiency" was overemphasized and "Due consideration to fairness" often became a mere formality. Especially in the background of transition economy condition that the market economy system and related laws and regulations were all incomplete and imperfect, all sorts of stakeholders were'striving for the maximization of self-interest. In that tide the administrative monopoly industries which recurred to fat profit attaining from administrative monopoly unconfined enlarged their staff's salary and welfare and even luxurious putrefy, corrupt, waste and even break the law which were constantly exposed to the public, which at last gave rise to serious out-of-balance of income distribution among industries and even the country.
Secondly, this thesis distinguished the contribution degree from "administrative monopoly industries" with "administrative monopoly factors", combined extremum method and deviation method with the Theil index method and measures the contribution of administrative monopoly industries to the total gap.
It divided all97industries into four industry groups according to their economic property and made use of the average annual labor reward data after eliminating annual inflation, and then, summed all the income gap (dispersion) in absolute value of every industry in the group with the reference object respectively which was the industry group income gap, after that, summed all the gap (dispersion) of all of the industries with the reference object respectively which is the total income gap. In that way the specific value of the industry group income gap with the total income gap was just the contribution degree of the group to the total income. The reference objects were lowest income industry and average income industry respectively and the consequence of income gap contribution degree were the ceiling and floor respectively of administrative monopoly industries to all national industry. The results according to the first method showed that there was a large income gap between various industries in China and there were signs of expansion year after year. The contribution of11administrative monopoly industries group to the total gap was between18.38%-19.35%which was obviously higher than proper criterion.Theil index showed that it was mainly caused by intra-group and less of inter-group. The total Theil Index showed that the total income gap was enlarged firstly and then shrunkened. For the sake of contribution degree of inter-group gap, the Theil index of administrative monopoly industries was0.0425which was the biggest of the4group. It obviously meant that the administrative monopoly industries enlarged the gap with other groups.
Thirdly, this thesis ascertained the quantitative relationship between the internal income gap of industries and various influencing factors through econometric analysis and took it as the quantity standards to evaluation that the internal income gap of industries was reasonable or not.
The writer took samples from the annual report of listed companies and compared the internal income gap of representative administrative monopoly industries and competitive industries respectively as well as the gap between them. The result of internal income gap respectively was that the biggest inside income gap belonged to telecommunications industry that the income of executives was17.56times larger than its employees; then the second belonged to the banking industry with8.99times as well; the smallest was air transport industry with2.75times only; the growth rate of employees' annual income was bigger than the executives' nonetheless the total income of the employees' of petroleum, electricity, banking and telecommunications industry was much less than their executives' and in sharp contrast the growth rate of employees' annual income in a low cardinal number of the two competitive industries was far below their executives'. Then the gap of inter-industry was that administrative monopoly industries had the absolute advantage than competitive industries whether it was between executives or between employees in the same level; the gap between different level executives' and employees' was especially shocking by the sight-the executives' average income of banking industry was44.69times larger than the employees' of transportation equipment manufacturing industry and68.39times larger than the textile industry, the same comparison of telecommunications industry was43.33and66.34times respectively and the comparison of railway transport industry being the lowest but also was5.34and8.62times respectively.
We tested and verified that the conclusion stood by the tournament theory instead of behavioral theory and the Chow's test found that administrative monopoly was the structural origin of the inner gap of inter-industry. At the same time the thesis found that the influence of return on total assets to the absolute income gap and the relative income gap was the biggest than all other factors. What was more important was that the type of industries affected the absolute income in a positive going way whereas in a negative-going way to the relative income gap which told us that the factor of administrative monopoly wound enlarge the absolute income gap while shrink the relative income gap.
Besides, this thesis also clearly proposed that the reasonable reference objects that whether the industries income distribution of administrative monopoly was reasonable or not were those privately operated "listed companies" in competitive industries which was created by the market economy conditions and set up the rationalization standard to select such reference objects.
Fourthly, this thesis found that the contribution degree of the non-wage income superiority of administrative monopoly industries was between36.34percent and38.78percent which made the same great influence on the existing and enlarging of income gap among industries with other factors. The degree of its impact on the non-wage income equation was about75%.
From the year of2007to2012the non-wage income of typical administrative monopoly industries such as banking, air transportation, electricity, petroleum and natural gas and railway transport industries were8.28,7.06,5.20,4.36,4.20and2.49times higher than textile industry which was representative of the lowest income industry and were6.53,5.54,4.03,3.35,3.22and1.83times higher than transportation equipment manufacturing industry which was the representative of the average level income industry. Furthermore the ratio of the non-wage income to the total income in the administrative industries was much lager than that of competitive industries and it was higher than textile industry14.63,6.37,17.25,11.84,12.34and12.22percent and higher than transportation equipment manufacturing industry15.65,7.40,18.27,12.87,13.36and13.25percent. Such a gap was original from its extracting cardinal number firstly and from its extracting proportion secondly which resulted in the great total income gap between the two types of industries at last.
The quantitative analysis proved that administrative monopoly was the root cause of the great non-wage income gap between the two types industries.
Fifthly, this thesis tried to demarcate the rationalization of gap of income distribution between representative administrative industries and competitive industries and gives out quantized reference standard. The rationalization of gap between administrative industries and itself actual, transportation equipment manufacturing industry, textile industry and the41competitive industries was42.71、118.6、155.97and87.58percent respectively. The unreasonable gap between them was57.29,157.7,203.05and117.2percent respectively.
This paper analyzed and summarized related research results of suitability for industry income gap made by related scholars at home and abroad, made use of micro panel data of China's listed companies from41competitive industries and schemed out a suitable Mincer regression equation. And then, it got the income factor equation of competitive industries by which it calculated the "theoretical income" of administrative industries under the existing condition. Compared with themselves, transportation equipment manufacturing industry, textile industry and the41competitive industries, the results were that "theoretical income" of administrative industries should only be42.71percent of their actual income which meant that they got too much more income than they should; the specific value of the "theoretical income" to the actual income of transportation equipment manufacturing industry and textile industry should be1.19and1.56respectively but the specific values of the two types industries'actual income were2.76and3.59respectively which also meant that the administrative industries got much more than they should; the specific value of the "theoretical income" to the actual income of the41competitive industries was0.88but the specific value of the two types actual income was2.05which meant that the income of the administrative industries should be much less than the41competitive industries but the actual ratio was just the reverse. The contradiction highlighted greatly.
引文
① 由于统计口径的差异,相关上市公司年报公布的收入数据远远高出《中国劳动统计年鉴》或《中国统计年鉴》公布的收入数据,本文第1和第3章使用的是统汁年鉴公布的数据,第4、5和6章使用的是上市公司年报公布的数据。
① 商业银行主要监管指标情况表。中国银监会网站[EB/OL],http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docView/7E1679F277BC4161982E2BCF068E5DDA.html
② 李丽辉.龙年掂掂钱袋子：高管与员工薪酬“两重天”?[EB/OL],http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2012-04/16/c_122984344.htm?prolongation=1
① 如诞生于1930年代的全美汽车工人联合会(UAW)是美国最大的工会,拥有政治和经济势力,它拥有9亿美元的罢工基金,能够承担得起一场持续两个多月的罢工。1998年通用汽车工人罢工,仅其两个零部件厂罢工54天就带来22亿美金的损失。2007年9月24日,通用汽车7.3万员工发动全国性罢工,最后通用汽车只得签署昂贵的劳资协议,包括建立医保信托基金、保证在美国投资等。此时美国汽车工人每小时55美元(含福利)的收入比在美国南部设厂的日本汽车企业高出 25美元,而生产同样车型的中国雇工则只能获得每小时1.5美元,差距35.67倍。[EB/OL], http://baike.baidu.com/view/13759.htm
① 杨仲民,垄断行业高利润大多转为高工资福利[N],2009年11月04日,扬子晚报.转引自新浪网,[EB/OL],http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20091104/12016922156.shtml
② 《邓小平文选》第二卷,[EB/OL], http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64185/66611/4488668.html
① 《关于工资总额组成的规定》,一九八九年九月三十日国务院批准,一九九○年一月一日国家统计局令第一号发布。http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfg/xzfg/t20020702_24265.htm
① 温家宝.收入分配不公问题严重存在,将从三方面解决,中国政府网,[EB/OL], http://www.gov.cn/zlft2011/content_1811864.htm
② 以下资料均来自中国共产党历次全国代表大会数据库,[EB/OL], http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/index.html
① 参见大秦铁路2012年年度报告：“总经理年薪不超过公司年度职工平均工资的12倍,副总经理、财务负责人、董事会秘书等高级管理人员年薪不超过公司年度职工平均工资的10倍。”
② 参见广深铁路2012年年度报告：“基本工资包括岗位工资、技能工资以及按照规定在应付工资项目下列支的各项津贴、补贴,绩效工资是指与经济效益、社会效益挂钩考核的工资,或按工作量几件考核的计件工资,或与员工岗位业绩挂钩考核的绩效工资等,而福利计划包括按照政策规定缴交的各项社会保险、住房公积金等。”
③ 参见广深铁路2012年年度报告：“在员工薪酬的分配过程中,公司一贯坚持按劳分配和效率优先、兼顾公平的原则,即员工薪酬分配以宏观调控为前提、以岗位劳动评价为基础、以员工绩效考核为依据,充分发挥分配制度在公司激励机制中的重要作用,调动广大员工的积极性。”
① 傅成玉明确表态：央企是半任命制的人事结构,我们完全听政府的。[EB/OL],http://wvw.chinadaily.com.cn/hqpl/zggc/2013-03-08/content_8447314.html
① 本部分的精简版参加了2013年12月24日在首都经济贸易大学主办的第四届“哈博·高校(经管)博士学术论坛”并获优秀论文奖,感谢劳动经济学分论坛点评专家中国人民大学劳动人事学院仇雨临教授、姚裕群教授和首都经济贸易大学牟俊霖副教授的宝贵批评指导意见,当然,文责自负。
② 施发启：也评王小鲁博士的《灰色收入与国民收入分配》,[EB/OL]http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/grgd/t20100825_402667408.htm
① 蒋洁敏官场沉浮记,人民网,[EB/OL], http://renwu.people.com.cn/GB/357675/369141/index.html
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① 商业银行主要监管指标情况表。中国银监会网站[EB/OL],http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docView/7E1679F277BC4161982E2BCF068E5DDA.html
② 李丽辉.龙年掂掂钱袋子：高管与员工薪酬“两重天”?[EB/OL],http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2012-04/16/c_122984344.htm?prolongation=1
① 如诞生于1930年代的全美汽车工人联合会(UAW)是美国最大的工会,拥有政治和经济势力,它拥有9亿美元的罢工基金,能够承担得起一场持续两个多月的罢工。1998年通用汽车工人罢工,仅其两个零部件厂罢工54天就带来22亿美金的损失。2007年9月24日,通用汽车7.3万员工发动全国性罢工,最后通用汽车只得签署昂贵的劳资协议,包括建立医保信托基金、保证在美国投资等。此时美国汽车工人每小时55美元(含福利)的收入比在美国南部设厂的日本汽车企业高出 25美元,而生产同样车型的中国雇工则只能获得每小时1.5美元,差距35.67倍。[EB/OL], http://baike.baidu.com/view/13759.htm
① 杨仲民,垄断行业高利润大多转为高工资福利[N],2009年11月04日,扬子晚报.转引自新浪网,[EB/OL],http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20091104/12016922156.shtml
② 《邓小平文选》第二卷,[EB/OL], http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64185/66611/4488668.html
① 《关于工资总额组成的规定》,一九八九年九月三十日国务院批准,一九九○年一月一日国家统计局令第一号发布。http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfg/xzfg/t20020702_24265.htm
① 温家宝.收入分配不公问题严重存在,将从三方面解决,中国政府网,[EB/OL], http://www.gov.cn/zlft2011/content_1811864.htm
② 以下资料均来自中国共产党历次全国代表大会数据库,[EB/OL], http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/index.html
① 参见大秦铁路2012年年度报告：“总经理年薪不超过公司年度职工平均工资的12倍,副总经理、财务负责人、董事会秘书等高级管理人员年薪不超过公司年度职工平均工资的10倍。”
② 参见广深铁路2012年年度报告：“基本工资包括岗位工资、技能工资以及按照规定在应付工资项目下列支的各项津贴、补贴,绩效工资是指与经济效益、社会效益挂钩考核的工资,或按工作量几件考核的计件工资,或与员工岗位业绩挂钩考核的绩效工资等,而福利计划包括按照政策规定缴交的各项社会保险、住房公积金等。”
③ 参见广深铁路2012年年度报告：“在员工薪酬的分配过程中,公司一贯坚持按劳分配和效率优先、兼顾公平的原则,即员工薪酬分配以宏观调控为前提、以岗位劳动评价为基础、以员工绩效考核为依据,充分发挥分配制度在公司激励机制中的重要作用,调动广大员工的积极性。”
① 傅成玉明确表态：央企是半任命制的人事结构,我们完全听政府的。[EB/OL],http://wvw.chinadaily.com.cn/hqpl/zggc/2013-03-08/content_8447314.html
① 本部分的精简版参加了2013年12月24日在首都经济贸易大学主办的第四届“哈博·高校(经管)博士学术论坛”并获优秀论文奖,感谢劳动经济学分论坛点评专家中国人民大学劳动人事学院仇雨临教授、姚裕群教授和首都经济贸易大学牟俊霖副教授的宝贵批评指导意见,当然,文责自负。
② 施发启：也评王小鲁博士的《灰色收入与国民收入分配》,[EB/OL]http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/grgd/t20100825_402667408.htm
① 蒋洁敏官场沉浮记,人民网,[EB/OL], http://renwu.people.com.cn/GB/357675/369141/index.html
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