地方政府行为外部性研究
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摘要
经济学者们通常识别市场过程中存在着的外部性并且要求政府精确地纠正这些外部性，但是他们很少认识到政府行为本身带来的外部性。政府行为外部性是政治过程的一种结果，是指政府通过确定或改变交易规则、产权控制等方式所引发的成本或收益的转移现象。与市场外部性比较，政府行为外部性通常具有更少的可预测性和更大的作用范围。一般的观点是，政府行为外部性的存在可能影响着配置、稳定、分配或增长。
本文的研究对象是地方政府政策行为的外部性问题。地方政府具有特定的目标函数和行为约束。当地方政府在制定与实施各项政策时，它通常会偏向于其职责范围之内的利益而忽视其职责范围之外的损害，通常会维护强势群体的利益而忽视弱势群体的呼声。地方政府这种内在的利益分配倾向制约了其干预市场的效率，使得政策结果远远偏离社会最优的状态。从这一观点出发，我们认为，地方政府的政策行为不仅会对辖区内的利益产生影响，而且也会对辖区外的利益产生影响；不仅会影响当代居民的福利，而且也会影响将来各代的福利。因此，在地方层次上，政府行为外部性具有特定内涵及表现形式，具体包括以下三类：一是地方政府对辖区内居民和市场主体产生的外部性；二是地方政府对辖区外行为主体产生的外部性；三是地方政府行为的代际外部性。本文在公共选择理论的基础上，对这些外部性进行了系统分析，并且提出了改革思路和政策建议。
Economists usually identify externalities in market process and call for governments to internalize the externalities exactly, but they hardly recognize externalities from governmental behaviors. Government behavior externality is the result of a political process. It is shift of costs or benefits as the results of establishment or change of transaction rules and property right's structures. Compared with market externality, government behavior externality is hardly anticipated and has a wider effect. As a general view, government behavior externality may affect allocation, stabilization, distribution, or growth.
The article studied externalities of local governments' policy behaviors. A local government has special object functions and behavior restrictions. Local governments usually prefer protecting interests of influential groups in their jurisdictions but neglect voice of uninfluential groups and the damages to people out of their jurisdictions when they make and implement some policies. The preference of benefit distribution in local governments reduces the efficiency of intervening markets and makes the result of policies far from social optimality. According to this view, I think, local governments will affect not only people in their jurisdictions but also people out of their jurisdictions and the next generations when they make and implement policies. Therefore, local government behavior externality has special meanings and forms. It includes three kinds of externalities: externalities inflicted on people in the jurisdiction, interjurisdictional and intergenerational externalities. On the basis of public choice theory, the article has an analysis on the externalities in detail and brings forward reform thoughts and policy advices.
本文的研究对象是地方政府政策行为的外部性问题。地方政府具有特定的目标函数和行为约束。当地方政府在制定与实施各项政策时，它通常会偏向于其职责范围之内的利益而忽视其职责范围之外的损害，通常会维护强势群体的利益而忽视弱势群体的呼声。地方政府这种内在的利益分配倾向制约了其干预市场的效率，使得政策结果远远偏离社会最优的状态。从这一观点出发，我们认为，地方政府的政策行为不仅会对辖区内的利益产生影响，而且也会对辖区外的利益产生影响；不仅会影响当代居民的福利，而且也会影响将来各代的福利。因此，在地方层次上，政府行为外部性具有特定内涵及表现形式，具体包括以下三类：一是地方政府对辖区内居民和市场主体产生的外部性；二是地方政府对辖区外行为主体产生的外部性；三是地方政府行为的代际外部性。本文在公共选择理论的基础上，对这些外部性进行了系统分析，并且提出了改革思路和政策建议。
Economists usually identify externalities in market process and call for governments to internalize the externalities exactly, but they hardly recognize externalities from governmental behaviors. Government behavior externality is the result of a political process. It is shift of costs or benefits as the results of establishment or change of transaction rules and property right's structures. Compared with market externality, government behavior externality is hardly anticipated and has a wider effect. As a general view, government behavior externality may affect allocation, stabilization, distribution, or growth.
The article studied externalities of local governments' policy behaviors. A local government has special object functions and behavior restrictions. Local governments usually prefer protecting interests of influential groups in their jurisdictions but neglect voice of uninfluential groups and the damages to people out of their jurisdictions when they make and implement some policies. The preference of benefit distribution in local governments reduces the efficiency of intervening markets and makes the result of policies far from social optimality. According to this view, I think, local governments will affect not only people in their jurisdictions but also people out of their jurisdictions and the next generations when they make and implement policies. Therefore, local government behavior externality has special meanings and forms. It includes three kinds of externalities: externalities inflicted on people in the jurisdiction, interjurisdictional and intergenerational externalities. On the basis of public choice theory, the article has an analysis on the externalities in detail and brings forward reform thoughts and policy advices.
引文
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