农地使用权流转研究
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摘要
近年来，伴随着经济全球一体化进程，我国工业化、城市化和信息化的进程明显加快，农村社会面临着与世界其他国家工业化时期同样的发展滞后问题，尤其是在支撑农业发展的土地、资本及劳动力各要素的流动呈现出结构性扭曲：稀缺的土地与资本要素快速外流、众多的农业人口及劳动力要素缓慢外流。这种结构性扭曲现象表明我国人地紧张关系的基本国情不仅没有通过持续稳定的国民经济增长得到缓解，反而有进一步恶化的态势。这种负面效应提示我们：必须在坚持土地公有权和稳定土地承包权的前提下，推动农户土地使用权流转，从而催生中国农村土地产权制度的又一基本内容：“搞活土地使用权”，促进农地使用权的合理流转在现代中国有着十分重要的意义。
全文的主体框架由三部分组成：第一部分为导论部分，包括导言和第一章，第二部分为农地内部流转，包括第二、第三、第四、第五和第六章，第三部分为农地外部流转，包括第七章。
第一章，农地使用权流转相关文献回顾。制度作为影响经济发展的一个根本性变量被引起注意并被用于经济学的分析，是在哈耶克(1974)、布坎南(1986)、科斯(1991)、诺斯(1993)、维克里(1994)等一批非主流派经济学或新制度经济学家获取诺贝尔经济学奖之后。他们指出有效率的制度及其供给能够促进经济与社会的稳定发展，促进资源的合理配置。产权制度的出现和产权的界定决定了资源的配置效率。产权是一组权利束，是由使用权、收益权和处置权构成的。不同的产权交易及其分割，反映出不同的权利组合，从而使交易费用和预期收益产生巨大的差异。因此，明晰产权、完善权能是现代产权经济学必须解决的一个难题。在上述理论基础上，对国内外农地使用权流转研究进行了系统的归纳、总结和梳理。因此，本章是全文分析的理论支点。
第二章，农地使用权流转的背景分析。以调查研究资料和典型案例为基础，从四个方面分析了我国农地流转发生的背景，阐明了我国农地流转发生的必然性和必要性。一是从改革开放以来我国的改革历程说明了农地流转发生的基本制度背景。二是从我国农户的农地经营现状说明了农地流转制度建设的必要性。三是从我国农户的家庭基本情况说明了农地流转是农民的自我选择的结果。四是从农村经济发展情况说明了农地流转发生的经济背景。
第三章，农地使用权流转的形式、条件和特点。通过对我国农地使用权流转的主体形式、原则、条件和特点等的系统分析，说明农地流转的前提条件是，只有非农产业高度发达，非农收入成为农民收入的主要来源，并通过流转获得更多的收益或者至少放弃土地不危及生存时，使转出土地和转入土地者的福利至少没有降低，从而形成帕累托改进时，才能够推动土地流转的健康有序发展。并归纳出农地使用权流转的五大特点。
第四章，影响农地使用权流转因素的定性分析。本章在对大量调查资料进行筛选、归纳、计算和总结的基础上，着重以具有代表三大经济地带的东部浙江省、中部湖北省和西部四川省样本户的情况作为研究对象，通过样本户参与农地使用权流转的表象，总结出相应的定理并得出相应的推论。
农地使用权流转不畅是受多种因素共同作用的结果，农户的收入水平及其来源是影响农地使用权流转的决定因素。它包括不同收入水平对农地流转的影响、农业收入水平对农地流转的影响和非农收入水平对农地流转的影响。由此得出两个定理和一个推论：定理1．农户从农业获得的收入水平越高，越有意愿转入土地；农户从农业获得的收入水平越低，越有意愿转出土地。定理2．农户从非农产业获得的收入水平越高，越有意愿转出土地；农户从非农产业获得的收入水平越低，越有意愿转入土地。推理1．农户的投资行为并不完全取决于他从农业或非农产业获得收入水平的高低，他的优势能力、投资偏好和过去的经验等对农户的投资行为也产生一定的影响。当农户从农业和非农业所获得的收入水平都很高时，从农业获得的收入越容易，农户越有意愿转入土地；从非农业获得的收入越容易，农户越有意愿转出土地。
本文将农户的长期投资划分为“与特定地块不相连的长期投资”和“与特定地块相连的长期投资”两类，并分别考察了影响这两类长期投资的决定因素，发现他们的影响作用是不同的。土地的小调整对于这两类长期投资的影响明显不同：“减人减地”使减地农户的长期投资大幅度下降，但对农户的农家肥使用量并没有什么影响；而“增人增地”对于增地农户的任何长期投资都没有什么影响。
农地产权制度残缺是影响农地流转的因素之一，但是仅仅认识到这一点是不全面的，“产权主体的确定要符合客体的技术和经济特征，资本所有权的清晰是决定(企业)效率的前提条件，而不是充分必要条件，充分必要条件是企业所有权的合理的制度安排”。即便有了明晰的农地产权，受到经济发展水平所限，我们也不能期望在仍然主要是农业大国的现代中国农地流转达到很高的水平，政府应消除阻碍农地流转的制度障碍而非设计一套制度安排。
乡土中国农民对于土地的执著感情和乡村社会固有的社会文化意识形态使农村土地流转市场呈现明显的封闭性，这种封闭性以及经济发展水平的限制使农地流转市场是一个信息不畅、充满风险、买方有限的市场，也决定了农地流转在经济相对落后地区不可能达到较高的程度和水平。
第五章，影响农地使用权流转因素的定量分析。本章主要采用SPSS和Excel两种统计分析软件，对大量的农户问卷调查资料进行统计处理，对一些已有的统计数据进行整理，借助于统计资料，采用主成分分析方法，对影响农地流转的多种因素进行筛选，以提取主要影响因素；运用灰关联分析方法，研究各主要影响因素对农地流转影响的程度大小，揭示农地流转中的主要矛盾。
第六章，促进农地使用权流转的思路的建议。本章针对影响农地使用权流转的因素，提出如下促进农地使用权流转的思路和建议：①建立有利于农村劳动力转移的长效机制。②健全农地流转的宏观调控机制。③健全农地流转的微观调节机制。④健全农地流转的中介机构。⑤搞好农地流转的配套改革和社会化服务。
第七章，农地向非农地流转。中国现行的土地征用制度的典型特征是政府垄断：政府禁止土地所有权市场、垄断土地一级市场，土地征用成为国家获得非农建设用地的主要手段。这一制度安排在短期内确保了政府作为土地征用者的利益。通过分析笔者认为，只要有政府对经济关系介入的强制性存在，社会福利损失和社会成本增加是必然存在的，所以如果要保护集体土地所有者及使用者的经济福利，就必须使政府失去“经济人”和“行政人”的双重身份，即政府对集体土地所有者与土地需求者之间的交易行为“只管理，不介入”，这样才能使市场的资源配置作用达到最佳，社会福利达到最优。目前，我国的市场机制和政府干预关系是“市场从属于干预”，而治理寻租也“不必削弱政府对经济的干预为前提”。所以，在对待集体土地市场方面，我们应该认识到政府管理是必须的，但是不能介入经济关系，并且应该引入竞争机制。使得这种制度性寻租的租金在竞争条件下得以消散。
近些年来，为了破解“三农”难题，国家竭尽了各种办法来增加农民收入，但令人不解的是以解决“三农”问题为出发点的城镇化，在征用土地过程中却以牺牲农民利益为代价，在使部分农民增收的同时，却又无端地“制造”了新的贫困群体——失地农民。这些失地农民作为一个利益群体，虽然人数众多，但谈判能力较弱，农民组织化程度较低，组织资源的极度缺乏使我国农民在与各利益集团的博弈中处于弱势地位，当农民土地权利受到侵害时，他们不仅无法与政府进行有效的谈判，而且被排除在土地征用政策制定、执行过程之外，取消农民的话语权。
Recently, with the globalization of the world economy, the industrialization, urbanization, and information technology are speeding up their paces. While at the same time, the rural society is encountered with stagnation in development, the same problem as other countries met during their industrialization course. Factors like land, capital and labor, which support the development of the rural area, are taking on a structural twist in their circulation: the scarce land and capital are flowing out rapidly, comparing to the slow outflow of the large agricultural population and labor. This structural twist reflects the fact that the tense relationship between population and land is not relieved through continuous and steady development in domestic economy, but in contrast, has a deteriorating tendency. The negative effects reminds us that we must promote the circulation of agricultural land use rights, while sticking to the public ownership of land and steadiness of land tenure, which may help develop another fundamental of rural land property right system in China—to enliven the use right of land. It has great significance to improve the proper circulation of use right of agricultural land.
There are three parts in the whole frame of this paper: the first part is the introduction, including the foreword and Chapter 1; the second part, covering Chapter 2 to Chapter 6, analyzes the internal circulation of rural land; and the third part, Chapter 7, focuses on the external circulation of rural land.
Chapter 1 is a review to relevant references of rural land use rights circulation. After the Nobel Prizes in Economics go to a group of non-mainstream or new institutional economists, such as Hayek (1974), Buchanan (1986), Coase (1991), North (1993) and Vickrey (1994), institution drew people's attention and was taken into the analysis frame of economics. They pointed out that an efficient institution and its supply can improve the steady development of economy and the society, and optimize the resource allocation. The emergence of property rights system and its confinement decide the efficiency of resource allocation. Property right is actually a group of rights, including right to use, right to benefit and right of disposal. Different property rights transaction and division reflect different combination of rights and thus make great differences in transaction cost and expected returns. Therefore, clarification and perfection of property rights is a challenge facing up to modern property rights economics.
Chapter 2 provides the background of circulation of rural land use rights. Based on investigations and typical cases, this chapter analyzes the background of rural land circulation in our country and explained its certainty and necessity, in the following four aspects: first, the reform course of China since the reform and opening up gives the basic institutional background; second, the operation of rural land the necessity of establishing a rural land circulation system; third, the basic condition of the rural families explains that rural land circulation is the choice of farmers themselves; Finally, the development of rural economy gives the economic background.
Chapter 3 elaborates the form, condition, and features of the circulation of rural land use rights. A systematic analysis to the main form, principle, condition and features of the circulation shows its prerequisite: Land circulation can develop healthily and in good order only when the nonagricultural industries are highly developed and grow to be a main source of farmers' income, and when Pareto Improvement happens, that is, the circulation can lead to increasing returns or at least it will not damage the welfare of fanners involved in the circulation, ensuring their survival when the land is given up. This chapter also concludes five features with circulation of rural land use rights.
Chapter 4 is a Qualitative analysis to the factors influencing the circulation of rural land use rights. Based on screening, induction, calculation and conclusion to massive survey results, this chapter focuses on the samples of three typical economic areas in China, including Zhejiang Province in the east, Hubei Province in the middle, and Sichuan Province in the west, analyzes their participation into the circulation of rural land use right and finally concludes correspondent theorem and its deduction.
The impediment in circulation of rural land use rights is the result of various factors, among which farmers' income and its source is the determinant, including influence of different income level, influences of agricultural income and non-agricultural income. Thus two theorems and one deduction: Theorem 1, the higher income farmers can get from agriculture, the more willingly they are to increase land; the lower income they can get from agriculture, the more willingly they are to decrease land. Theorem 2, the higher income farmers can get from nonagricultural industries, the more willingly they are to decrease land; the lower income they can get from nonagricultural industries, the more willingly they are to increase land. Deduction 1, farmers' investing behavior does not totally depend on the income they get from agriculture or nonagricultural industries. His advantage, investment preference and past experiences may also affect their investment decision. If the income level of both agriculture and nonagricultural industries are high, the easier it is to earn from agriculture, the more willingly they are to increase land; the easier it is to earn from nonagricultural industries, the more willingly they are to decrease land.
This paper divides the long-term investment of farmers into two categories: land-attached and not-land-attached, studies separately the determinants influencing the two types' long-term investment, and found it different. Small land adjustments obviously have different effects on different type of investment: reduction of people and land will significantly decrease the long-term investment of those farmers, with little influence on the use of manures; while the increase of people and land has little effects on either long-term investment of farmers with increased lands.
One of the factors influencing the rural land circulation is the insufficiency of rural land property rights system. However, it's only one side of the corn. "The determination of property rights body should comply with the technical and economic characteristics of the object. Clarification of capital ownership is a prerequisite of determination of enterprise efficiency, but not a necessary and sufficient condition, which actually is the proper institutional arrangement to enterprise ownership. Even with clear property rights division in rural land, we cannot yet expect a high level of circulation in China, which is still a large agricultural country. The government shall eliminate the institutional obstacle blocking the circulation of rural lands instead of designing a new institutional arrangement.
The deep feeling of traditional Chinese farmers towards land and the inherent culture and ideology of the rural society result in an obviously closed circulation market of rural land, which, together with the limitations in economic development, leads to a rural land circulation market with information impediment, big risk and limited buyers. It also decides that the circulation cannot reach a comparatively high level in underdeveloped areas.
Chapter 5 is a quantitative analysis to factors influencing the circulation of rural land use rights. Two statistical analyzing software, SPSS and Excel, are used here to deal with the survey results of questionnaires to a number of farmers, and the existed statistics. Based on the statistical materials, this paper adopted "principal component analysis (PCA)" to screen the most significant ones from various factors influencing the circulation of rural land. It also adopted the "grey relation analysis (GRA)" to study the magnitude of influence with each main factor, and reveal the main contradiction in rural land circulation.
Chapter 6 gives some suggestions to promote the circulation of rural land use rights. According to the factors influencing the circulation, this chapter suggests that, in order to promote the circulation, we shall, establish a long-term mechanism in favor of labor transfer of rural area, perfect the macro regulative mechanism, micro adjusting mechanism, as well as the intermediary organizations, and improve coordinated reform and social services.
Chapter 7 talks about circulation of rural land to non-rural land. The current land requisition system of China highlights the feature of government monopoly, that is, the government forbids the land ownership market, monopoly the primary land market, and take land requisition as the chief measure to get nonagricultural construction land. This institutional arrangement ensures the profit of government as the operator of land requisition in a short period of time. Through the analysis, the author states that, as long as the government compulsively interferes into the economic relationships, it will definitely lead to loss in social welfare and increase in social cost. Therefore, in order to protect the economic welfare of public land owners and users, the government must stop its dual identification as both "economic body" and "administrative body", so that the market can allocate resources most efficiently and maximize social welfare. We shall realize that, in respect of public land market, governmental management is essential, but the government cannot interfere into economic relations. Besides, comparative mechanism shall be introduced into the market, so as to eliminate the institutional rent-seeking.
In recent years, to find a solution to the "agricultural, rural and farmers' issues", our country made great efforts to increase farmers' income. However, the result turns out confusing—the urbanization, originally targeted at the "agricultural, rural and fanners' issues", increase some farmers' income at the expense of other farmers' profits during the process, and created a new group of poverty, farmers without lands. As a interest group, these farmers has a large population, but a weak negotiating ability and low level of organization, which put the farmers of our country at a disadvantage in the game against all the other interest groups. When their land rights are violated, the farmers cannot carry out an efficient negotiation with the government. What's more, being excluded from the making and implementation of land requisition policies, the farmers are actually deprived of the right of speech.
全文的主体框架由三部分组成：第一部分为导论部分，包括导言和第一章，第二部分为农地内部流转，包括第二、第三、第四、第五和第六章，第三部分为农地外部流转，包括第七章。
第一章，农地使用权流转相关文献回顾。制度作为影响经济发展的一个根本性变量被引起注意并被用于经济学的分析，是在哈耶克(1974)、布坎南(1986)、科斯(1991)、诺斯(1993)、维克里(1994)等一批非主流派经济学或新制度经济学家获取诺贝尔经济学奖之后。他们指出有效率的制度及其供给能够促进经济与社会的稳定发展，促进资源的合理配置。产权制度的出现和产权的界定决定了资源的配置效率。产权是一组权利束，是由使用权、收益权和处置权构成的。不同的产权交易及其分割，反映出不同的权利组合，从而使交易费用和预期收益产生巨大的差异。因此，明晰产权、完善权能是现代产权经济学必须解决的一个难题。在上述理论基础上，对国内外农地使用权流转研究进行了系统的归纳、总结和梳理。因此，本章是全文分析的理论支点。
第二章，农地使用权流转的背景分析。以调查研究资料和典型案例为基础，从四个方面分析了我国农地流转发生的背景，阐明了我国农地流转发生的必然性和必要性。一是从改革开放以来我国的改革历程说明了农地流转发生的基本制度背景。二是从我国农户的农地经营现状说明了农地流转制度建设的必要性。三是从我国农户的家庭基本情况说明了农地流转是农民的自我选择的结果。四是从农村经济发展情况说明了农地流转发生的经济背景。
第三章，农地使用权流转的形式、条件和特点。通过对我国农地使用权流转的主体形式、原则、条件和特点等的系统分析，说明农地流转的前提条件是，只有非农产业高度发达，非农收入成为农民收入的主要来源，并通过流转获得更多的收益或者至少放弃土地不危及生存时，使转出土地和转入土地者的福利至少没有降低，从而形成帕累托改进时，才能够推动土地流转的健康有序发展。并归纳出农地使用权流转的五大特点。
第四章，影响农地使用权流转因素的定性分析。本章在对大量调查资料进行筛选、归纳、计算和总结的基础上，着重以具有代表三大经济地带的东部浙江省、中部湖北省和西部四川省样本户的情况作为研究对象，通过样本户参与农地使用权流转的表象，总结出相应的定理并得出相应的推论。
农地使用权流转不畅是受多种因素共同作用的结果，农户的收入水平及其来源是影响农地使用权流转的决定因素。它包括不同收入水平对农地流转的影响、农业收入水平对农地流转的影响和非农收入水平对农地流转的影响。由此得出两个定理和一个推论：定理1．农户从农业获得的收入水平越高，越有意愿转入土地；农户从农业获得的收入水平越低，越有意愿转出土地。定理2．农户从非农产业获得的收入水平越高，越有意愿转出土地；农户从非农产业获得的收入水平越低，越有意愿转入土地。推理1．农户的投资行为并不完全取决于他从农业或非农产业获得收入水平的高低，他的优势能力、投资偏好和过去的经验等对农户的投资行为也产生一定的影响。当农户从农业和非农业所获得的收入水平都很高时，从农业获得的收入越容易，农户越有意愿转入土地；从非农业获得的收入越容易，农户越有意愿转出土地。
本文将农户的长期投资划分为“与特定地块不相连的长期投资”和“与特定地块相连的长期投资”两类，并分别考察了影响这两类长期投资的决定因素，发现他们的影响作用是不同的。土地的小调整对于这两类长期投资的影响明显不同：“减人减地”使减地农户的长期投资大幅度下降，但对农户的农家肥使用量并没有什么影响；而“增人增地”对于增地农户的任何长期投资都没有什么影响。
农地产权制度残缺是影响农地流转的因素之一，但是仅仅认识到这一点是不全面的，“产权主体的确定要符合客体的技术和经济特征，资本所有权的清晰是决定(企业)效率的前提条件，而不是充分必要条件，充分必要条件是企业所有权的合理的制度安排”。即便有了明晰的农地产权，受到经济发展水平所限，我们也不能期望在仍然主要是农业大国的现代中国农地流转达到很高的水平，政府应消除阻碍农地流转的制度障碍而非设计一套制度安排。
乡土中国农民对于土地的执著感情和乡村社会固有的社会文化意识形态使农村土地流转市场呈现明显的封闭性，这种封闭性以及经济发展水平的限制使农地流转市场是一个信息不畅、充满风险、买方有限的市场，也决定了农地流转在经济相对落后地区不可能达到较高的程度和水平。
第五章，影响农地使用权流转因素的定量分析。本章主要采用SPSS和Excel两种统计分析软件，对大量的农户问卷调查资料进行统计处理，对一些已有的统计数据进行整理，借助于统计资料，采用主成分分析方法，对影响农地流转的多种因素进行筛选，以提取主要影响因素；运用灰关联分析方法，研究各主要影响因素对农地流转影响的程度大小，揭示农地流转中的主要矛盾。
第六章，促进农地使用权流转的思路的建议。本章针对影响农地使用权流转的因素，提出如下促进农地使用权流转的思路和建议：①建立有利于农村劳动力转移的长效机制。②健全农地流转的宏观调控机制。③健全农地流转的微观调节机制。④健全农地流转的中介机构。⑤搞好农地流转的配套改革和社会化服务。
第七章，农地向非农地流转。中国现行的土地征用制度的典型特征是政府垄断：政府禁止土地所有权市场、垄断土地一级市场，土地征用成为国家获得非农建设用地的主要手段。这一制度安排在短期内确保了政府作为土地征用者的利益。通过分析笔者认为，只要有政府对经济关系介入的强制性存在，社会福利损失和社会成本增加是必然存在的，所以如果要保护集体土地所有者及使用者的经济福利，就必须使政府失去“经济人”和“行政人”的双重身份，即政府对集体土地所有者与土地需求者之间的交易行为“只管理，不介入”，这样才能使市场的资源配置作用达到最佳，社会福利达到最优。目前，我国的市场机制和政府干预关系是“市场从属于干预”，而治理寻租也“不必削弱政府对经济的干预为前提”。所以，在对待集体土地市场方面，我们应该认识到政府管理是必须的，但是不能介入经济关系，并且应该引入竞争机制。使得这种制度性寻租的租金在竞争条件下得以消散。
近些年来，为了破解“三农”难题，国家竭尽了各种办法来增加农民收入，但令人不解的是以解决“三农”问题为出发点的城镇化，在征用土地过程中却以牺牲农民利益为代价，在使部分农民增收的同时，却又无端地“制造”了新的贫困群体——失地农民。这些失地农民作为一个利益群体，虽然人数众多，但谈判能力较弱，农民组织化程度较低，组织资源的极度缺乏使我国农民在与各利益集团的博弈中处于弱势地位，当农民土地权利受到侵害时，他们不仅无法与政府进行有效的谈判，而且被排除在土地征用政策制定、执行过程之外，取消农民的话语权。
Recently, with the globalization of the world economy, the industrialization, urbanization, and information technology are speeding up their paces. While at the same time, the rural society is encountered with stagnation in development, the same problem as other countries met during their industrialization course. Factors like land, capital and labor, which support the development of the rural area, are taking on a structural twist in their circulation: the scarce land and capital are flowing out rapidly, comparing to the slow outflow of the large agricultural population and labor. This structural twist reflects the fact that the tense relationship between population and land is not relieved through continuous and steady development in domestic economy, but in contrast, has a deteriorating tendency. The negative effects reminds us that we must promote the circulation of agricultural land use rights, while sticking to the public ownership of land and steadiness of land tenure, which may help develop another fundamental of rural land property right system in China—to enliven the use right of land. It has great significance to improve the proper circulation of use right of agricultural land.
There are three parts in the whole frame of this paper: the first part is the introduction, including the foreword and Chapter 1; the second part, covering Chapter 2 to Chapter 6, analyzes the internal circulation of rural land; and the third part, Chapter 7, focuses on the external circulation of rural land.
Chapter 1 is a review to relevant references of rural land use rights circulation. After the Nobel Prizes in Economics go to a group of non-mainstream or new institutional economists, such as Hayek (1974), Buchanan (1986), Coase (1991), North (1993) and Vickrey (1994), institution drew people's attention and was taken into the analysis frame of economics. They pointed out that an efficient institution and its supply can improve the steady development of economy and the society, and optimize the resource allocation. The emergence of property rights system and its confinement decide the efficiency of resource allocation. Property right is actually a group of rights, including right to use, right to benefit and right of disposal. Different property rights transaction and division reflect different combination of rights and thus make great differences in transaction cost and expected returns. Therefore, clarification and perfection of property rights is a challenge facing up to modern property rights economics.
Chapter 2 provides the background of circulation of rural land use rights. Based on investigations and typical cases, this chapter analyzes the background of rural land circulation in our country and explained its certainty and necessity, in the following four aspects: first, the reform course of China since the reform and opening up gives the basic institutional background; second, the operation of rural land the necessity of establishing a rural land circulation system; third, the basic condition of the rural families explains that rural land circulation is the choice of farmers themselves; Finally, the development of rural economy gives the economic background.
Chapter 3 elaborates the form, condition, and features of the circulation of rural land use rights. A systematic analysis to the main form, principle, condition and features of the circulation shows its prerequisite: Land circulation can develop healthily and in good order only when the nonagricultural industries are highly developed and grow to be a main source of farmers' income, and when Pareto Improvement happens, that is, the circulation can lead to increasing returns or at least it will not damage the welfare of fanners involved in the circulation, ensuring their survival when the land is given up. This chapter also concludes five features with circulation of rural land use rights.
Chapter 4 is a Qualitative analysis to the factors influencing the circulation of rural land use rights. Based on screening, induction, calculation and conclusion to massive survey results, this chapter focuses on the samples of three typical economic areas in China, including Zhejiang Province in the east, Hubei Province in the middle, and Sichuan Province in the west, analyzes their participation into the circulation of rural land use right and finally concludes correspondent theorem and its deduction.
The impediment in circulation of rural land use rights is the result of various factors, among which farmers' income and its source is the determinant, including influence of different income level, influences of agricultural income and non-agricultural income. Thus two theorems and one deduction: Theorem 1, the higher income farmers can get from agriculture, the more willingly they are to increase land; the lower income they can get from agriculture, the more willingly they are to decrease land. Theorem 2, the higher income farmers can get from nonagricultural industries, the more willingly they are to decrease land; the lower income they can get from nonagricultural industries, the more willingly they are to increase land. Deduction 1, farmers' investing behavior does not totally depend on the income they get from agriculture or nonagricultural industries. His advantage, investment preference and past experiences may also affect their investment decision. If the income level of both agriculture and nonagricultural industries are high, the easier it is to earn from agriculture, the more willingly they are to increase land; the easier it is to earn from nonagricultural industries, the more willingly they are to decrease land.
This paper divides the long-term investment of farmers into two categories: land-attached and not-land-attached, studies separately the determinants influencing the two types' long-term investment, and found it different. Small land adjustments obviously have different effects on different type of investment: reduction of people and land will significantly decrease the long-term investment of those farmers, with little influence on the use of manures; while the increase of people and land has little effects on either long-term investment of farmers with increased lands.
One of the factors influencing the rural land circulation is the insufficiency of rural land property rights system. However, it's only one side of the corn. "The determination of property rights body should comply with the technical and economic characteristics of the object. Clarification of capital ownership is a prerequisite of determination of enterprise efficiency, but not a necessary and sufficient condition, which actually is the proper institutional arrangement to enterprise ownership. Even with clear property rights division in rural land, we cannot yet expect a high level of circulation in China, which is still a large agricultural country. The government shall eliminate the institutional obstacle blocking the circulation of rural lands instead of designing a new institutional arrangement.
The deep feeling of traditional Chinese farmers towards land and the inherent culture and ideology of the rural society result in an obviously closed circulation market of rural land, which, together with the limitations in economic development, leads to a rural land circulation market with information impediment, big risk and limited buyers. It also decides that the circulation cannot reach a comparatively high level in underdeveloped areas.
Chapter 5 is a quantitative analysis to factors influencing the circulation of rural land use rights. Two statistical analyzing software, SPSS and Excel, are used here to deal with the survey results of questionnaires to a number of farmers, and the existed statistics. Based on the statistical materials, this paper adopted "principal component analysis (PCA)" to screen the most significant ones from various factors influencing the circulation of rural land. It also adopted the "grey relation analysis (GRA)" to study the magnitude of influence with each main factor, and reveal the main contradiction in rural land circulation.
Chapter 6 gives some suggestions to promote the circulation of rural land use rights. According to the factors influencing the circulation, this chapter suggests that, in order to promote the circulation, we shall, establish a long-term mechanism in favor of labor transfer of rural area, perfect the macro regulative mechanism, micro adjusting mechanism, as well as the intermediary organizations, and improve coordinated reform and social services.
Chapter 7 talks about circulation of rural land to non-rural land. The current land requisition system of China highlights the feature of government monopoly, that is, the government forbids the land ownership market, monopoly the primary land market, and take land requisition as the chief measure to get nonagricultural construction land. This institutional arrangement ensures the profit of government as the operator of land requisition in a short period of time. Through the analysis, the author states that, as long as the government compulsively interferes into the economic relationships, it will definitely lead to loss in social welfare and increase in social cost. Therefore, in order to protect the economic welfare of public land owners and users, the government must stop its dual identification as both "economic body" and "administrative body", so that the market can allocate resources most efficiently and maximize social welfare. We shall realize that, in respect of public land market, governmental management is essential, but the government cannot interfere into economic relations. Besides, comparative mechanism shall be introduced into the market, so as to eliminate the institutional rent-seeking.
In recent years, to find a solution to the "agricultural, rural and farmers' issues", our country made great efforts to increase farmers' income. However, the result turns out confusing—the urbanization, originally targeted at the "agricultural, rural and fanners' issues", increase some farmers' income at the expense of other farmers' profits during the process, and created a new group of poverty, farmers without lands. As a interest group, these farmers has a large population, but a weak negotiating ability and low level of organization, which put the farmers of our country at a disadvantage in the game against all the other interest groups. When their land rights are violated, the farmers cannot carry out an efficient negotiation with the government. What's more, being excluded from the making and implementation of land requisition policies, the farmers are actually deprived of the right of speech.
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