中国家族企业权力继任者选择模型研究
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摘要
家族企业在世界经济史中占有重要的一席之地，是最古老的企业组织形式之一。但是，家族企业问题研究成为独立的研究领域却是上世纪中后期开始发展的。自然人生命周期的有限单向性和企业周期无限循环性的矛盾导致所有企业主都不可避免地要面临控制权传递问题，但控制权传承是一个非常复杂的过程，它直接决定着家族企业能否平稳过渡、持久发展。因此，家族企业权力继任成为家族企业研究领域备中受关注的焦点问题之一。
学者们普遍认为，保证家族企业有效地进行权力继任的根本在于提早制定完善的继任计划。一个完整有效的继任计划至少应包括：选择和培训继任者、制定继任后的发展远景和战略、确定前任企业主的角色、与重要利益相关者讨论继任事项。由此可见，继任者选择是继任计划的基础和最重要的问题。
目前，中国大陆存在的家族企业基本都是改革开放后成立的，这些早期创建家族企业的创始人多数进入花甲之年。同时，其家族第二代甚至第三代已经进入企业，因此，创始人面临权杖交替问题。但财富转移和权力交接易引发企业震动，也正是企业最为脆弱的时刻，如何选择最合适的权力继任者就成为家族企业顺利转承的基础环节，而制定选择标准则是关键问题。国内外对这一问题的研究尚不普遍，尤其是针对中国家族企业权力继任者选择的研究相对更少。缺少对中国特定经济环境和文化氛围下的家族企业权力继任者选择规律的归纳和总结。
本论文从该点切入，立足于中国家族企业存在的特定环境和文化影响，以闽南地区家族企业为研究样本，通过实地调查研究与理论研究相结合的方法，研究中国家族企业权力继任者选择问题。
本文首先界定几个在本研究领域经常使用却含义模糊的概念，以便澄清后续研究的确切意思表达；同时规定了本文研究的几个重要假定条件，以此表明本研究的有限性。
在上述界定和假定条件的规定下，本文总览了中国家族企业的特征，尤其是家族企业产权特征和权力结构特征。通过研究发现，中国家族企业控制权可以进行分层，企业产权结构随着外部社会环境，尤其是法制环境的改变而调整，同时有不同的控制权配置。但是，控制权的“核”作为家族企业最终控制权的表现，总是保留在家族内部，由专门的家族成员拥有。据此本文认为，家族企业权力继任的核心是控制权的“核”的传承，因此研究家族企业权力继任者选择具有重要的现实和理论意义。
其后，本文以闽南家族企业为研究样本，在计划行为理论的指导下，通过问卷调查和访谈的方式研究中国家族企业权力继任者选择的影响因素。调查结果显示，中国家族利益共同体现象明显，企业利益是家族利益的组成部分；企业创始人是权力继任的主导者；家族和谐是继任的一个重要目标，传统文化发挥作用。
立足于会计利润和欣慰潜力是中国家族企业创始人选择继任者的两个最重要内容，本研究建立权力继任者选择模型。在该模型中，创始人根据个人要求，均衡会计利润和欣慰潜力带来的效用，选择可以获得效用最大化的候选人为企业权力继任者。
接下来，根据对闽南家族企业的分析，本研究确定了上述家族企业权力继任者选择模型中的两个参数值。基于这两个参数值，我们可以了解中国家族企业创始人对会计利润与欣慰潜力的权衡态度。同时，也为创始人有的放矢地培养潜在继任者提供依据。
最后，运用本研究建立的家族企业权力继任者选择模型对中国家族企业的典型案例进行分析。
Family enterprise, as an important part in world economic history and one of the oldest forms of enterprise, started to become an independent research field only since middle to late last century. All the family enterprise owners can not avoid the problem of power transfer because of the limitation of human life and the limitless of enterprise's life, but the way how to transfer the leadership is a complex process, which will directly affect the family enterprise whether they can pass the transition period smoothly and keep on expanding or not. Therefore, the succession became one of the focuses that caught highly attention from those family enterprise experts.
Generally, the scholars thought the basis of guarantying the family firm's succession effectively is drawing up the plan ahead of time. An effective plan of succession include at least: choice and train successor, formulate vision and strategy, determine the role's of predecessor and discuss the succession with benefit counterparts. On the face of it, choosing successor is the foundation and the most important thing of the successor plan.
The family firms in mainland of China were basically founded after reform and open. Most family firms' founders are over 60 years old and the family second or third -generations have entered the firms. So the founders have to face the succession. How to choose the most appropriate successor is the underlying link of the family firm's smooth extension. Furthermore, formulating the choice standard is the key point. The research was not still common in domestic and foreign, which specially aimed at the China family firm's choosing successor to be less and lacked to the induction and the summary about family firm's succession under the China specific economic environment and the cultural atmosphere.
Based on the specific environment and the cultural influence, the thesis studies the choosing successor through the on-the-spot investigation research and the fundamental research, which studies the family firm's sample at Minnan area. Firstly, the thesis defines some often used but fuzzy concepts and formulates some important assumed condition. The thesis summarizes the China family firm's characteristic, in particular property right characteristic and authority structure characteristic. It is found that the control power of China family firms could be layered. With the exterior social environment, special legal system environment changed, the property right structures have different control power configurations. However, the "core" of control power is still kept in family. Hereby, the key of family firm's succession is transferring the "core" of control power. The research on family firm's choosing successor has the important reality and the theory significance.
Secondly, sampled with family firms at Minnan area, the thesis studies the influence factors of choosing successor through questionnaire survey and interview. The result shows that the phenomenon of Chinese family benefit community is so obvious that the family benefit is composed of the enterprise benefit; the founder is the leadership of succession; the family's harmony is a profitable target of succession.
Based on the accountant profit and amenity potential being two most important contents of choosing successor, the research establish the choosing successor model. According to individual request, the founder chooses candidate who could gain effectiveness maximization to be the successor through balancing the effectiveness of the accountant profit and amenity potential.
Thirdly, the research determines two parameters in the above choosing successor model according to analysis family firms at Minnan area. Based on the two parameters, we may understand China family firm founders' balancing attitude for the accountant profit and amenity potential, which also provide the foundation for the founder training the latent successors with a clear goal.
Lastly, using the present model, the research analyzes the typical case in China.
学者们普遍认为，保证家族企业有效地进行权力继任的根本在于提早制定完善的继任计划。一个完整有效的继任计划至少应包括：选择和培训继任者、制定继任后的发展远景和战略、确定前任企业主的角色、与重要利益相关者讨论继任事项。由此可见，继任者选择是继任计划的基础和最重要的问题。
目前，中国大陆存在的家族企业基本都是改革开放后成立的，这些早期创建家族企业的创始人多数进入花甲之年。同时，其家族第二代甚至第三代已经进入企业，因此，创始人面临权杖交替问题。但财富转移和权力交接易引发企业震动，也正是企业最为脆弱的时刻，如何选择最合适的权力继任者就成为家族企业顺利转承的基础环节，而制定选择标准则是关键问题。国内外对这一问题的研究尚不普遍，尤其是针对中国家族企业权力继任者选择的研究相对更少。缺少对中国特定经济环境和文化氛围下的家族企业权力继任者选择规律的归纳和总结。
本论文从该点切入，立足于中国家族企业存在的特定环境和文化影响，以闽南地区家族企业为研究样本，通过实地调查研究与理论研究相结合的方法，研究中国家族企业权力继任者选择问题。
本文首先界定几个在本研究领域经常使用却含义模糊的概念，以便澄清后续研究的确切意思表达；同时规定了本文研究的几个重要假定条件，以此表明本研究的有限性。
在上述界定和假定条件的规定下，本文总览了中国家族企业的特征，尤其是家族企业产权特征和权力结构特征。通过研究发现，中国家族企业控制权可以进行分层，企业产权结构随着外部社会环境，尤其是法制环境的改变而调整，同时有不同的控制权配置。但是，控制权的“核”作为家族企业最终控制权的表现，总是保留在家族内部，由专门的家族成员拥有。据此本文认为，家族企业权力继任的核心是控制权的“核”的传承，因此研究家族企业权力继任者选择具有重要的现实和理论意义。
其后，本文以闽南家族企业为研究样本，在计划行为理论的指导下，通过问卷调查和访谈的方式研究中国家族企业权力继任者选择的影响因素。调查结果显示，中国家族利益共同体现象明显，企业利益是家族利益的组成部分；企业创始人是权力继任的主导者；家族和谐是继任的一个重要目标，传统文化发挥作用。
立足于会计利润和欣慰潜力是中国家族企业创始人选择继任者的两个最重要内容，本研究建立权力继任者选择模型。在该模型中，创始人根据个人要求，均衡会计利润和欣慰潜力带来的效用，选择可以获得效用最大化的候选人为企业权力继任者。
接下来，根据对闽南家族企业的分析，本研究确定了上述家族企业权力继任者选择模型中的两个参数值。基于这两个参数值，我们可以了解中国家族企业创始人对会计利润与欣慰潜力的权衡态度。同时，也为创始人有的放矢地培养潜在继任者提供依据。
最后，运用本研究建立的家族企业权力继任者选择模型对中国家族企业的典型案例进行分析。
Family enterprise, as an important part in world economic history and one of the oldest forms of enterprise, started to become an independent research field only since middle to late last century. All the family enterprise owners can not avoid the problem of power transfer because of the limitation of human life and the limitless of enterprise's life, but the way how to transfer the leadership is a complex process, which will directly affect the family enterprise whether they can pass the transition period smoothly and keep on expanding or not. Therefore, the succession became one of the focuses that caught highly attention from those family enterprise experts.
Generally, the scholars thought the basis of guarantying the family firm's succession effectively is drawing up the plan ahead of time. An effective plan of succession include at least: choice and train successor, formulate vision and strategy, determine the role's of predecessor and discuss the succession with benefit counterparts. On the face of it, choosing successor is the foundation and the most important thing of the successor plan.
The family firms in mainland of China were basically founded after reform and open. Most family firms' founders are over 60 years old and the family second or third -generations have entered the firms. So the founders have to face the succession. How to choose the most appropriate successor is the underlying link of the family firm's smooth extension. Furthermore, formulating the choice standard is the key point. The research was not still common in domestic and foreign, which specially aimed at the China family firm's choosing successor to be less and lacked to the induction and the summary about family firm's succession under the China specific economic environment and the cultural atmosphere.
Based on the specific environment and the cultural influence, the thesis studies the choosing successor through the on-the-spot investigation research and the fundamental research, which studies the family firm's sample at Minnan area. Firstly, the thesis defines some often used but fuzzy concepts and formulates some important assumed condition. The thesis summarizes the China family firm's characteristic, in particular property right characteristic and authority structure characteristic. It is found that the control power of China family firms could be layered. With the exterior social environment, special legal system environment changed, the property right structures have different control power configurations. However, the "core" of control power is still kept in family. Hereby, the key of family firm's succession is transferring the "core" of control power. The research on family firm's choosing successor has the important reality and the theory significance.
Secondly, sampled with family firms at Minnan area, the thesis studies the influence factors of choosing successor through questionnaire survey and interview. The result shows that the phenomenon of Chinese family benefit community is so obvious that the family benefit is composed of the enterprise benefit; the founder is the leadership of succession; the family's harmony is a profitable target of succession.
Based on the accountant profit and amenity potential being two most important contents of choosing successor, the research establish the choosing successor model. According to individual request, the founder chooses candidate who could gain effectiveness maximization to be the successor through balancing the effectiveness of the accountant profit and amenity potential.
Thirdly, the research determines two parameters in the above choosing successor model according to analysis family firms at Minnan area. Based on the two parameters, we may understand China family firm founders' balancing attitude for the accountant profit and amenity potential, which also provide the foundation for the founder training the latent successors with a clear goal.
Lastly, using the present model, the research analyzes the typical case in China.
引文
①转引自余立智博士论文《家族企业的成长机理及变迁路径》2004年3月，第7页。
②《中国经济信息》1999年19期，第15页。
③转引自甘德安《中国家族企业研究》，中国社会科学出版社2002年10月版，第2页。
①参见朗文出版公司编，朗文当代英语辞典(英文版)1995年最新版，p498，有关family的解释。外语教学与研究出版社，北京，1997．8
①参见董巍．家族企业定义困境．改革与战略，2007，1
①引自曹德骏(2002)：家族企业研究的几个理论问题
①参见卡洛克等著《家族企业战略计划》，第6页。
①引自曹德骏(2002)：家族企业研究的几个理论问题
②转引自郭跃进：《论家族企业家族化水平的测定原理与方法》，中国工业经济，2002，12
①科斯等著，《契约经济学》，第68-71页。
①中国改革与发展报告专家组：《非国有经济的发展问题研究》，上海远东出版社，2001，第126-128
①表3．1-表3．5根据张厚义主编的《走向成熟的中国民营企业家》整理而得
②转引自甘德安：《中国家族企业研究》，中国社会科学出版社，2002年，第245-263页
①[春秋]孔子：《论语》，辽宁民族出版社，“学而篇”，第3页
②[春秋]孔子：《论语》，辽宁民族出版社，“为政篇”，第19页
①徐翠兰、木公译注，《韩非子·内储说上七术·必罚明威》，山西古籍出版社，2003年，第120页
①商务印书馆辞书研究中心修订，《新华词典》，商务印书馆，2001年，修订第三版，第564页。
①参见董巍，王文萍．作为计划行为的家族企业权力继承：动力与障碍．生产力研究，录用到2008，3
①转引自甘德安：《中国家族企业研究》，第212页。
①参见董巍．中国家族企业权力继任的文化影响．特区经济，2007，2
①参见董巍、田焱．中国家族企业权力继任者选择模型研究．经济体制改革，2007，4
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①引自曹德骏(2002)：家族企业研究的几个理论问题
①参见卡洛克等著《家族企业战略计划》，第6页。
①引自曹德骏(2002)：家族企业研究的几个理论问题
②转引自郭跃进：《论家族企业家族化水平的测定原理与方法》，中国工业经济，2002，12
①科斯等著，《契约经济学》，第68-71页。
①中国改革与发展报告专家组：《非国有经济的发展问题研究》，上海远东出版社，2001，第126-128
①表3．1-表3．5根据张厚义主编的《走向成熟的中国民营企业家》整理而得
②转引自甘德安：《中国家族企业研究》，中国社会科学出版社，2002年，第245-263页
①[春秋]孔子：《论语》，辽宁民族出版社，“学而篇”，第3页
②[春秋]孔子：《论语》，辽宁民族出版社，“为政篇”，第19页
①徐翠兰、木公译注，《韩非子·内储说上七术·必罚明威》，山西古籍出版社，2003年，第120页
①商务印书馆辞书研究中心修订，《新华词典》，商务印书馆，2001年，修订第三版，第564页。
①参见董巍，王文萍．作为计划行为的家族企业权力继承：动力与障碍．生产力研究，录用到2008，3
①转引自甘德安：《中国家族企业研究》，第212页。
①参见董巍．中国家族企业权力继任的文化影响．特区经济，2007，2
①参见董巍、田焱．中国家族企业权力继任者选择模型研究．经济体制改革，2007，4
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