基金制公共养老保险基金管理研究
摘要
20世纪90年代，针对原有现收现付制养老保险制度的弊端和人口老龄化带来的养老压力，我国建立起了现收现付制与基金制相结合的部分积累制养老保险制度。本文提及的基金制养老保险基金在我国现行管理实践中包括：我国基本养老保险中的个人账户基金和作为国家储备基金的全国社会保障基金。经过近年来的发展，个人账户和全国社保基金的资金总量已经具有相当规模，基金制养老保险基金的地位日益显著。据相关部门统计，截至2005年底，我国个人账户基金结余已超过4000亿元人民币，而2006年底全国社会保障基金的资产规模按成本计算已经达到2828亿元人民币。管理好这些基金不仅关系到基金的保值增值，更关系到整个养老保险体系的健康发展。目前，个人账户基金由省级劳动和社会保障部门负责管理。按照规定，这部分基金只能投资于银行存款和国债，市场化运作程度很低，面临较大的保值压力，严重影响了未来退休人员的福利。加强基金制养老保险基金的科学管理，已是我们急需解决的重要问题之一。
基金制养老保险基金管理的核心问题是科学划分政府、个人和市场三者的关系。第一，政府在基金制养老保险基金投资管理中的地位问题。指的是养老基金资产应该交由政府部门管理，还是交给一个非政府部门的专门机构管理，还是由个人主动选择机构进行管理的问题。第二，基金制养老保险制度与经济发展的关系问题。指的是我们该如何正确运用积累的养老基金社会财富，实现基金的应有价值。其核心是养老保险基金与资本市场的关系，是养老保险基金如何进入资本市场的问题。第三，养老保险基金的保值增值。指的是养老基金管理机构的组织构建、运营模式、以及如何运用市场投资工具的问题。本文的研究目的在于较为客观准确地分析和回答这些问题。
本文运用了理论与实践相结合的方法、规范与实证相结合的方法、及比较借鉴等方法阐述了基金制养老保险制度的基本理论；分析了我国基本养老保险个人账户基金的管理现状；从个人账户基金的集中管理模式选择、受托人责任、养老基金管理机构的治理等方面阐释了建立国家社会保障基金理事会的设想；从养老基金资产的本质出发，探讨了养老基金进入资本市场的必要性；在分析西方国家先进经验的基础上，分析了养老基金管理机构如何参与上市公司治理以及养老基金资产配置策略与风险管理方法；并从养老基金特点出发，分析了养老基金管理机构的监管模式与监管方法。
目前，我国基金制养老保险基金由各省劳动和社会保障部门负责管理，这样，劳动和社会保障部门既是代表广大工作人员及退休人员的委托人，又是负责投资运营养老基金的受托人，这样的体制下受托人责任很难划清，具有严重的制度缺陷和弊端。另外，养老基金本身是储蓄的积累，是以金融资产形式存在的社会财富，并且养老基金积累的时间很长，需要投资于资本市场才能分享经济发展成果，才能实现保值增值。养老基金投资于资本市场需要市场化、专业的运作，显然政府部门的运作机制是同市场化相差很远的。因此，负责运作养老基金的机构应该是一个与政府部门相对独立的专门投资机构。这个专门养老基金管理机构是养老基金投资的受托人；劳动和社会保障部门代表政府和工作人员利益是委托人；退休人员是受益人。只有将委托人与受托人之间的信托关系明确，才能真正从制度上保证养老基金的安全，才能用受托人责任对基金管理机构进行约束，从根本上保证运营机构以维护退休人员的利益为首要目标，才能从机制上实现基金的保值增值。正是基于对受托人及其责任的分析，本文提出了建立完备的国家社会保障基金理事会，集中受托管理个人账户基金的设想。
养老基金管理机构的治理问题，也称为养老金治理问题，直接关系到基金管理机构的组织构建、基金的运营机制以及最终投资收益，是基金运营的核心问题。养老基金管理机构的理事会作为基金管理机构的最高决策部门，是养老金治理的主体。在系统分析西方养老基金管理机构成熟经验基础上，本文提出设立的国家社会保障基金理事会的理事组成应该代表各方利益相关人，需要由政府、企业、员工以及社会各界的代表组成；并有必要通过明确理事的个人权责，强化其个人的受托人责任，确保利益相关人的权利在养老基金的投资运作过程中可以得到实现。
养老基金需要投资于资本市场才能实现保值增值，这使得资本市场的发展同养老基金的投资运作紧密地联系到一起。虽然养老基金管理机构不能直接参与资本市场的监管与制度建设，但是作为重要的机构投资者，管理机构可以通过行使其股东权力，积极参与上市公司的治理，通过提高上市公司的治理水平推动资本市场的发展。本文在分析和总结西方国家经验的基础上，提出了养老基金管理机构参与我国上市公司治理的意见。资产配置是基金投资工作中最为重要的环节，本文还通过分析市场内在规律，提出了我国养老基金投资采取积极资产配置策略的建议；并借鉴国际经验，提出了投资工作中控制风险的重要性。最后，本文分析国际经验与我国实际情况，并比较了监管中“数量限制”规则与“谨慎人”规则的各自特点，提出在全国社保基金监管中试用“谨慎人”规则的建议及建立“特别养老基金监管部门”的设想。
本文分析了基金制养老保险制度的内在理论机制、养老基金管理机构的治理、养老基金与资本市场的关系、资产配置、以及监管等多方面问题，形成了一个比较系统、完整的体系，设计了基金制养老保险基金运营的基本理论框架。养老保险基金的运营是一项十分具体和复杂的工作，目前国内在相关方面的研究还刚刚起步，尚未形成一个公认的、明确的制度框架，因此，本文在研究过程中大量借鉴了国际成熟经验，并且结合我国实际情况，提出了自己的理论见解和框架建议。必须指出，本文虽然系统地提出了一个基金制养老保险基金运作的基本理论框架，但在很多具体问题上，比如养老保险基金资产配置和风险管理的技术策略，仍需要我们进一步深入研究。
In the 1990s, in order to solve the shortcomings of traditional pay-as-you-go old age pension system and deal with the pressure of population aging, China sets up a pay-as-you-go and funded incorporated old age pension system, also called partial-funded old age pension system. In the new system, funded old age pension funds, which include the basic old age insurance individual accounts and the national social security fund (as reserve fund), has a significant role. After recent development, the basic old age insurance individual accounts and national social security fund has accumulated huge amount of assets. According to statistics, by the end of 2005, the assets under individual accounts has reached over 400 billion RMB; by the end of 2006, total asset value of national social security fund calculated by cost method has reached 282.8 billion RMB. The proper management of these funds has a great impact on not only the value protection and improvement of funds, but also the development of the whole old age pension system. Currently, government Labor and Social Security agencies at provincial level are responsible for the management of basic old age insurance individual accounts. These funds of individual accounts are only allowed to be invested in bank deposits and government bonds, plus the management of these funds is lack of market rules, as the result, funds are facing great pressure to protect its value and therefore, jeopardizing future retirement population's welfare. Reinforce the scientific management of funded old age pension funds is one of the key issues that we need to solve urgently.
The scientific management of funded old age pension funds needs to solve the following core issue, which is to properly define the relationship among governments, individuals, and the market. In further details, first, what is the role of governments in the management of funded old age pension funds? In other words, should the funds to be managed by a government agency, or by a special institution that is independent of the government, or by any institution decided by individuals. Second, what is the relationship of funded old age pension funds and economic development? This question refers to how we properly use the accumulated social wealth under funded system, and to realize its intrinsic value. The key is to understand the relationship between old age pension funds and capital markets, and how should these funds enter the capital markets. Third, the value protection and improvement of funded old age pension funds. This refers to the structure of the institution responsible for managing the funds, the investment and management model, and how to use market investment tools. The purpose of this paper is to accurately and objectively analyze these questions and provide feasible solutions.
This paper uses the method of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis, standard analysis and practical analysis, comparative analysis and use for reference. This paper studies current situation of basic old age insurance individual accounts funds. By analyzing the centralized individual accounts management model, fiduciary responsibilities, and pension governance, this paper makes suggestions to construct a National Central Council for Social Security Funds. By analyzing the basic character of pension fund assets, this paper discusses the necessary reason for pension fund assets to enter capital markets. By analyzing advanced experiences from western countries, this paper demonstrates the method for pension fund management institute to participate in the governance of public trading companies, as well as pension fund asset allocation strategies and risk management techniques. By analyzing features of the funds, this paper studies the model of pension fund's supervisory body and supervising methods.
Currently, the basic old age insurance pension funds are under the management of the government Labor and Social Security agencies at provincial levels. The Labor and Social Security agencies are both the trustor (representing workers and retirees) and the trustee (responsible for managing the pension funds). Under this kind of arrangements, the fiduciary responsibility of trustee can not be clearly defined and therefore, it brings serious structural problems to the pension system. Moreover, the pension fund exists as financial assets and is the accumulations of savings. As the pension fund requires long period of time to be accumulated before withdrawn, pension fund assets need to be invested in the capital market to share the economic development outcome and realize its value protection and improvement. The investment of pension funds requires marketization and professional management, and it is obvious the operating mechanics of government is far away from these. As a result, the institution responsible for the management of pension funds should be a specialized institution which is independent for the government. This specialized pension fund management institution is the trustee, the government Labor and Social Security agencies are trustor representing government and workers, and retirees are beneficiaries. By clearly defining the relationship between the trustor and the trustee, we could build a structure to protect the safety of pension fund assets, control the pension fund management institute by using fiduciary responsibilities and ensure the main goal of the institution is to protect retirees' interests, construct a mechanics to realize the value protection and improvement of pension fund assets. Based on the analysis of fiduciary responsibilities, this paper makes suggestions to set up a National Central Council for Social Security Funds to be the centralized trustee responsible for the management of basic old age insurance individual accounts funds assets.
The pension governance is the key issue for the management of pension funds. It relates to the structure of the institution, mechanics of investment and operation, and investment outcomes. The board is the most superior body within the pension fund institution and therefore, it is governing body. Based on the analysis of mature western pension management experiences, this paper suggests the governing body should represent interests of all stakeholders. The board should consist of representatives from the government, enterprises, employees, and other members from the society. Governing body should also clearly define the personal duties and responsibilities of board members, reinforce their fiduciary responsibilities, and ensure the interested of all stakeholders are the primary goal of the pension fund investments.
Pension funds need to be invested in the capital markets in order to realize the value protection and improvement. Therefore, the development of capital markets and pension fund operation are closely related to each other. Although the pension fund management institution can not control directly the capital market, as one of the most important institutional investors, the pension fund management institution may use its rights as a shareholder and promote sound corporate governance for public traded companies and therefore, contribute to the development of capital markets. After analyzing experiences from western countries, this paper provide suggestions for how pension fund promotes corporate governance in China. Furthermore, asset allocation is the most important element in the investment of pension fund assets. By analyzing underlined rules of capital markets, this paper make suggestions for the active asset allocation strategy for pension fund investment in China and the importance of risk management. In the end, by analyzing international experiences and situations in China, this paper suggests setting up a special pension fund supervisory body, and after comparing the characters of "quantitative" and "prudent person" rules, this paper suggests using "prudent person" rules in the supervisor of National Council for Social Security Fund.
This paper systematically analyzes the theoretical fundamentals of funded old age pension funds, pension governance, relation between pension funds and capital markets, asset allocation strategy, and supervising models. The study in this paper is an integrated and structured system. This paper constructs the basic structure for managing the funded old age pension funds. The management of pension funds is a complex and detailed work, the related study in this field has just started and hasn't developed a clearly recognized structure in China. As for this reason, the study in this paper borrows huge amounts of international advanced experiences during the progress, and makes its own views. It should be noted that, although this paper constructs a basic structure for managing the funded old age pension funds, in many particular issues, such as the pension fund asset allocation and risk management strategies, still need further study.
基金制养老保险基金管理的核心问题是科学划分政府、个人和市场三者的关系。第一，政府在基金制养老保险基金投资管理中的地位问题。指的是养老基金资产应该交由政府部门管理，还是交给一个非政府部门的专门机构管理，还是由个人主动选择机构进行管理的问题。第二，基金制养老保险制度与经济发展的关系问题。指的是我们该如何正确运用积累的养老基金社会财富，实现基金的应有价值。其核心是养老保险基金与资本市场的关系，是养老保险基金如何进入资本市场的问题。第三，养老保险基金的保值增值。指的是养老基金管理机构的组织构建、运营模式、以及如何运用市场投资工具的问题。本文的研究目的在于较为客观准确地分析和回答这些问题。
本文运用了理论与实践相结合的方法、规范与实证相结合的方法、及比较借鉴等方法阐述了基金制养老保险制度的基本理论；分析了我国基本养老保险个人账户基金的管理现状；从个人账户基金的集中管理模式选择、受托人责任、养老基金管理机构的治理等方面阐释了建立国家社会保障基金理事会的设想；从养老基金资产的本质出发，探讨了养老基金进入资本市场的必要性；在分析西方国家先进经验的基础上，分析了养老基金管理机构如何参与上市公司治理以及养老基金资产配置策略与风险管理方法；并从养老基金特点出发，分析了养老基金管理机构的监管模式与监管方法。
目前，我国基金制养老保险基金由各省劳动和社会保障部门负责管理，这样，劳动和社会保障部门既是代表广大工作人员及退休人员的委托人，又是负责投资运营养老基金的受托人，这样的体制下受托人责任很难划清，具有严重的制度缺陷和弊端。另外，养老基金本身是储蓄的积累，是以金融资产形式存在的社会财富，并且养老基金积累的时间很长，需要投资于资本市场才能分享经济发展成果，才能实现保值增值。养老基金投资于资本市场需要市场化、专业的运作，显然政府部门的运作机制是同市场化相差很远的。因此，负责运作养老基金的机构应该是一个与政府部门相对独立的专门投资机构。这个专门养老基金管理机构是养老基金投资的受托人；劳动和社会保障部门代表政府和工作人员利益是委托人；退休人员是受益人。只有将委托人与受托人之间的信托关系明确，才能真正从制度上保证养老基金的安全，才能用受托人责任对基金管理机构进行约束，从根本上保证运营机构以维护退休人员的利益为首要目标，才能从机制上实现基金的保值增值。正是基于对受托人及其责任的分析，本文提出了建立完备的国家社会保障基金理事会，集中受托管理个人账户基金的设想。
养老基金管理机构的治理问题，也称为养老金治理问题，直接关系到基金管理机构的组织构建、基金的运营机制以及最终投资收益，是基金运营的核心问题。养老基金管理机构的理事会作为基金管理机构的最高决策部门，是养老金治理的主体。在系统分析西方养老基金管理机构成熟经验基础上，本文提出设立的国家社会保障基金理事会的理事组成应该代表各方利益相关人，需要由政府、企业、员工以及社会各界的代表组成；并有必要通过明确理事的个人权责，强化其个人的受托人责任，确保利益相关人的权利在养老基金的投资运作过程中可以得到实现。
养老基金需要投资于资本市场才能实现保值增值，这使得资本市场的发展同养老基金的投资运作紧密地联系到一起。虽然养老基金管理机构不能直接参与资本市场的监管与制度建设，但是作为重要的机构投资者，管理机构可以通过行使其股东权力，积极参与上市公司的治理，通过提高上市公司的治理水平推动资本市场的发展。本文在分析和总结西方国家经验的基础上，提出了养老基金管理机构参与我国上市公司治理的意见。资产配置是基金投资工作中最为重要的环节，本文还通过分析市场内在规律，提出了我国养老基金投资采取积极资产配置策略的建议；并借鉴国际经验，提出了投资工作中控制风险的重要性。最后，本文分析国际经验与我国实际情况，并比较了监管中“数量限制”规则与“谨慎人”规则的各自特点，提出在全国社保基金监管中试用“谨慎人”规则的建议及建立“特别养老基金监管部门”的设想。
本文分析了基金制养老保险制度的内在理论机制、养老基金管理机构的治理、养老基金与资本市场的关系、资产配置、以及监管等多方面问题，形成了一个比较系统、完整的体系，设计了基金制养老保险基金运营的基本理论框架。养老保险基金的运营是一项十分具体和复杂的工作，目前国内在相关方面的研究还刚刚起步，尚未形成一个公认的、明确的制度框架，因此，本文在研究过程中大量借鉴了国际成熟经验，并且结合我国实际情况，提出了自己的理论见解和框架建议。必须指出，本文虽然系统地提出了一个基金制养老保险基金运作的基本理论框架，但在很多具体问题上，比如养老保险基金资产配置和风险管理的技术策略，仍需要我们进一步深入研究。
In the 1990s, in order to solve the shortcomings of traditional pay-as-you-go old age pension system and deal with the pressure of population aging, China sets up a pay-as-you-go and funded incorporated old age pension system, also called partial-funded old age pension system. In the new system, funded old age pension funds, which include the basic old age insurance individual accounts and the national social security fund (as reserve fund), has a significant role. After recent development, the basic old age insurance individual accounts and national social security fund has accumulated huge amount of assets. According to statistics, by the end of 2005, the assets under individual accounts has reached over 400 billion RMB; by the end of 2006, total asset value of national social security fund calculated by cost method has reached 282.8 billion RMB. The proper management of these funds has a great impact on not only the value protection and improvement of funds, but also the development of the whole old age pension system. Currently, government Labor and Social Security agencies at provincial level are responsible for the management of basic old age insurance individual accounts. These funds of individual accounts are only allowed to be invested in bank deposits and government bonds, plus the management of these funds is lack of market rules, as the result, funds are facing great pressure to protect its value and therefore, jeopardizing future retirement population's welfare. Reinforce the scientific management of funded old age pension funds is one of the key issues that we need to solve urgently.
The scientific management of funded old age pension funds needs to solve the following core issue, which is to properly define the relationship among governments, individuals, and the market. In further details, first, what is the role of governments in the management of funded old age pension funds? In other words, should the funds to be managed by a government agency, or by a special institution that is independent of the government, or by any institution decided by individuals. Second, what is the relationship of funded old age pension funds and economic development? This question refers to how we properly use the accumulated social wealth under funded system, and to realize its intrinsic value. The key is to understand the relationship between old age pension funds and capital markets, and how should these funds enter the capital markets. Third, the value protection and improvement of funded old age pension funds. This refers to the structure of the institution responsible for managing the funds, the investment and management model, and how to use market investment tools. The purpose of this paper is to accurately and objectively analyze these questions and provide feasible solutions.
This paper uses the method of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis, standard analysis and practical analysis, comparative analysis and use for reference. This paper studies current situation of basic old age insurance individual accounts funds. By analyzing the centralized individual accounts management model, fiduciary responsibilities, and pension governance, this paper makes suggestions to construct a National Central Council for Social Security Funds. By analyzing the basic character of pension fund assets, this paper discusses the necessary reason for pension fund assets to enter capital markets. By analyzing advanced experiences from western countries, this paper demonstrates the method for pension fund management institute to participate in the governance of public trading companies, as well as pension fund asset allocation strategies and risk management techniques. By analyzing features of the funds, this paper studies the model of pension fund's supervisory body and supervising methods.
Currently, the basic old age insurance pension funds are under the management of the government Labor and Social Security agencies at provincial levels. The Labor and Social Security agencies are both the trustor (representing workers and retirees) and the trustee (responsible for managing the pension funds). Under this kind of arrangements, the fiduciary responsibility of trustee can not be clearly defined and therefore, it brings serious structural problems to the pension system. Moreover, the pension fund exists as financial assets and is the accumulations of savings. As the pension fund requires long period of time to be accumulated before withdrawn, pension fund assets need to be invested in the capital market to share the economic development outcome and realize its value protection and improvement. The investment of pension funds requires marketization and professional management, and it is obvious the operating mechanics of government is far away from these. As a result, the institution responsible for the management of pension funds should be a specialized institution which is independent for the government. This specialized pension fund management institution is the trustee, the government Labor and Social Security agencies are trustor representing government and workers, and retirees are beneficiaries. By clearly defining the relationship between the trustor and the trustee, we could build a structure to protect the safety of pension fund assets, control the pension fund management institute by using fiduciary responsibilities and ensure the main goal of the institution is to protect retirees' interests, construct a mechanics to realize the value protection and improvement of pension fund assets. Based on the analysis of fiduciary responsibilities, this paper makes suggestions to set up a National Central Council for Social Security Funds to be the centralized trustee responsible for the management of basic old age insurance individual accounts funds assets.
The pension governance is the key issue for the management of pension funds. It relates to the structure of the institution, mechanics of investment and operation, and investment outcomes. The board is the most superior body within the pension fund institution and therefore, it is governing body. Based on the analysis of mature western pension management experiences, this paper suggests the governing body should represent interests of all stakeholders. The board should consist of representatives from the government, enterprises, employees, and other members from the society. Governing body should also clearly define the personal duties and responsibilities of board members, reinforce their fiduciary responsibilities, and ensure the interested of all stakeholders are the primary goal of the pension fund investments.
Pension funds need to be invested in the capital markets in order to realize the value protection and improvement. Therefore, the development of capital markets and pension fund operation are closely related to each other. Although the pension fund management institution can not control directly the capital market, as one of the most important institutional investors, the pension fund management institution may use its rights as a shareholder and promote sound corporate governance for public traded companies and therefore, contribute to the development of capital markets. After analyzing experiences from western countries, this paper provide suggestions for how pension fund promotes corporate governance in China. Furthermore, asset allocation is the most important element in the investment of pension fund assets. By analyzing underlined rules of capital markets, this paper make suggestions for the active asset allocation strategy for pension fund investment in China and the importance of risk management. In the end, by analyzing international experiences and situations in China, this paper suggests setting up a special pension fund supervisory body, and after comparing the characters of "quantitative" and "prudent person" rules, this paper suggests using "prudent person" rules in the supervisor of National Council for Social Security Fund.
This paper systematically analyzes the theoretical fundamentals of funded old age pension funds, pension governance, relation between pension funds and capital markets, asset allocation strategy, and supervising models. The study in this paper is an integrated and structured system. This paper constructs the basic structure for managing the funded old age pension funds. The management of pension funds is a complex and detailed work, the related study in this field has just started and hasn't developed a clearly recognized structure in China. As for this reason, the study in this paper borrows huge amounts of international advanced experiences during the progress, and makes its own views. It should be noted that, although this paper constructs a basic structure for managing the funded old age pension funds, in many particular issues, such as the pension fund asset allocation and risk management strategies, still need further study.
引文
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5 参见 Robert Holzmann and Richard Hinz, 2005, "Old Age Income Support in the 21st Century, an international perspective on Pension Systems and Reform" [J], the world bank working paper
6 参见：李珍．《社会保障制度与经济发展》[M]．武汉大学出版社．1998
7 参见：林义．《社会保险基金管理》[M]．中国劳动和社会保障出版社．2001；杨燕绥．中国社会保障法律体系的构想[J]．《公共管理学报》．2004年01期。
8 参见：席恒．试论我国养老保险的准市场化运行[J]．《西北大学学报》 2003年4期
9 参见：杨燕绥．中国社会保障法律体系的构想[J]．《公共管理学报》．2004年01期。
10 参见：刘昌平．个人帐户养老基金有效投资的模式选择[J]．《金融与经济》．2001年2期
11 参见：李绍光．《养老金制度与资本市场》[M]．中国发展出版社．1998
12 参见: Gregorio lmpavido, 2002, "On the governance of Public Pension Fund Management" [J], World Bank working paper, 20 August, 2002
13 参见: David A. Robalino, 2005, "Pensions in the Middle East and North Africa, Time for Change" [J], the world bank orientations development series, 2005
14 参见: Brinson.G. P, Hood. and LR, Beebower. G. L, 1986, "Determinants of Portfolio Performance"[J], Financial Analysts Journal, Vol.42, No.4. 1986和Roger G. Ibbotson, Paul D. Kaplan, 2000, "Does Asset Allocation Policy Explain 40, 90, 100 Percent of Performance?" [J], Financial Analysts Journal, Jan/Feb 2000, Vol. 56, No. 1
15 参见: Strong, Steve and Petsch Melanie, 1996, "Asset Return and the Economic Environment" [J], Commodity Research, Goldman Sachs, 1996和revor Greetham, Michael Hartnett, 2004, "The investment clock" [J], Global Securities Research & Economics Group, Merrill Lynch, November 10, 2004
16 参见：李绍光．《深化社会保障改革的经济学分析》[M]．中国人民大学出版社．2006年11月
17 参见 Ando, A. and F. Modigliani, 1963, "the Life Cycle Hypothesis of Saving: Aggregate Implications and Tests" [J]. American Economic Review. 1963, 53, 55-84
18 参见 Diamond, P., 1965, "National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model" [J], American Economic Review 1965, 55, 1126-1150.和 Samuelson, P., 1958, "An Exact Consumption Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money" [J], Journal of Political Economy, 1958, 66, 467-482
24 参见 Murphy, P. L., and Musalem, Aberto R., 2004, "Pension Funds and National Saving" [J], World Bank working paper
25 参见 Robert Holzmann and Richard Hinz, 2005, "Old Age Income Support in the 21st Century, an international perspective on Pension Systems and Reform" [J], the world bank working paper
28 参见：李珍．《社会保障制度与经济发展》[M]．武汉大学出版社．1998
29 参见：林义．《社会保险基金管理》[M]．中国劳动和社会保障出版社．2001
30 参见：杨燕绥．中国社会保障法律体系的构想[J]．《公共管理学报》．2004年01期
31 参见：刘昌平．个人账户养老基金有效投资的模式选择[J]．《金融与经济》．2001年2期
32 参见：席恒．试论我国养老保险的准市场化运行[J]．《西北大学学报》．2003年4期
33 参见：杨燕绥．《劳动与社会保障立法国际比较研究》[M]．中国劳动社会保障出版社．2001年
34 摘自加拿大退休基金管理协会(Association of Canada Pension Management)网站,http://www.acpm-acarr.com。
35 参见 Gregorio Impavido, 2002, "On the governance of Public Pension Fund Management" [J], World Bank working paper, 20 August, 2002
39 参见 David A. Robalino, 2005, "Pensions in the Middle East and North Africa, Time for Change" [J], the World Bank orientations development series, 2005.
40 参见 Useem and Mitchell, 2000, "Holder of the Purse Strings: Governance and Performance of Public Retirement Systems" [J], SSRN working paper, March 2000
41 参见 Mitchell and Hsin, 1994, "Public Sector Pensions Governance and Performance" [J], SSRN working paper, 1994
42 参见 OECD, 2006, "Pension Markets in Focus", Oct.2006.
43 参见：加拿大养老基金投资协会(Pension Investment Association of Canada, PIAC)网站，www.piac.org.ca
45 参见: Brinson ,G. P, Hood. and LR, Beebower. G L, 1986, "Determinants of Portfolio Performance"[J], Financial Analysts Journal, Vol.42, No.4. 1986 和 Roger G. Ibbotson, Paul D. Kaplan, 2000, "Does Asset Allocation Policy Explain 40, 90, 100 Percent of Performance?" [J], Financial Analysts Journal, Jan/Feb 2000, Vol. 56, No. 1
46 参见 Shape William F., 1997, "Morning Star Performance Measures" [J], http://www.sharpe.stanfard.edu/star0/htm
47 参见 Markowitz, 1952, "Portfolio Selection" [J], Journal of Finance, March 1952
48 参见 William Sharpe, 1965, "Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk" [J], Journal of Finance, September, 1964, pp. 425-442.
49 参见 Lintner, 1965, "The valuation of risky assets and the selection of risky investments in stock portfolios and capital budgets" [J], Review of Economics and Statistics, 47, 13-37.
50 参见 Strong, Steve and Petsch Melanie, 1996, "Asset Return and the Economic Environment" [J], Commodity Research, Goldman Sachs, 1996
51 参见 Trevor Greetham, Michael Hartnett, 2004, "The investment clock" [J], Global Securities Research & Economics Group, Merrill Lynch, November 10, 2004
53 参见 G. Demarco and R. Rofman, 1998, "Supervising Mandatory Pension Funds: Issues and Chanllenges"[J], The World Bank, Social Protection Discussion Paper Series, No. 9817, December 1998
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