美国联邦政府拨款制度研究
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摘要
拨款是美国联邦政府公共财政支出决策的重要环节,关乎联邦政府各个行政部门能否获得维持基本运行和实施政策的充分财政支持。美国联邦政府财政拨款的参与者众多,包括总统及其管理与预算办公室等白宫办事机构、国会及其拨款委员会等各委员会等等,其中以国会在拨款决策中发挥的作用最为关键。国会掌握的控制联邦政府收入与支出的“钱袋权”,是其权力的来源与基础。而本文所讨论的拨款,被称为“钱袋的拉链”
美国联邦政府拨款过程中的核心机构是国会两院的拨款委员会。这种制度安排在大多数国家的代议机构中可谓罕见。事实上,专门的拨款委员会并非始于首届国会,而是随着国家财政规模的扩大,国会必须更为专业而严格地控制支出,又加之府会关系、党派利益等政治因素的交互影响,拨款委员会才应运而生。在美国相对稳定发展的时期,国会及其拨款委员会量入为出,保证了联邦财政的平稳；而一旦国家面临战乱或经济危机,国会及其拨款委员会则无力有效管理支出,致使赤字频现。自19世纪末期成立以来,因财政状况变化和党争政治等因素影响,拨款委员会的管辖权几经拆分与整合,并曾与授权委员会分享拨款权力。这种混乱造成了严重的财政后果,支出过度致使在稳定发展期间出现赤字。本文指出,这一历史时期内,拨款委员会往往通过削减授权委员会的拨款要求来维持其权势,倾向于“守财”。随着20世纪40、50年代冷战军备和社会福利项目等引发的大量支出,联邦财政状况堪忧,赤字常态化。1974年,国会两院设立预算委员会以对财政收支实现整体管理。由于预算委员会的建立,以及强制性项目交由授权委员会管辖等变化,拨款委员会失去了原有的影响力,被要求在预算委员会制定的预算决议案框架下展开立法。为维持权势,拨款委员会出现改变甚至增加支出、塞入专项拨款项目等倾向,形成“散财”动机。基于历史梳理,本文认为拨款委员会在制度安排与立法风格上的变迁具有明显的历史路径依赖。同时,拨款委员会的变化也折射出200多年来美国府会间的宪政关系、国会内部党团、委员会等权力结构的变迁。
从政府过程的角度看,当今美国联邦拨款过程充分诠释着分权与制衡的精神。宪政层次上,总统与国会之间存在着明显的权力分享与制约关系。立法权力结构上,国会内部各委员会之间也呈现出分权化趋势。两院中的预算委员会确定各个政策项目的支出限制,为拨款委员会划定拨款立法的范围；授权委员会与拨款委员会之间形成“先授权后拨款”规则的同时,还掌握着大量强制性项目的拨款权。拨款委员会领导将支出限制再次细化分配到各分委员会,限制着各分委员会的拨款范围。本文认为,这些参与者拨款目标之间的差异性是分权制衡得以形成的必要条件,但分立的府会关系、对峙的两院、极化的国会党团等可能在这种分权制衡的某一层次上制造僵局,降低拨款立法的效率,甚至最终导致拨款立法的夭折。
通过对第108至110届国会两院拨款委员会构成的量化统计分析,本文验证了拨款委员会已失去了“守财者”的合作角色。就众议院而言,在基本尊重区域分布平衡的同时,党团基本控制了拨款委员会成员组成,议员与本党党团领袖的政治立场一致度、领袖对议员的信任度、议员与领袖具有共同利益甚至私人关系等,都是普通议员能否成为拨款委员会成员的影响因素,资历几乎不起作用。在参议院中,虽然党团控制加强,但资历仍旧最为关键。与此同时,国会两院拨款委员会及其分委员会的领导人选仍旧以资历为前提。
本文指出,从财政效果的整体上看,联邦政府拨款保持相对审慎的决策风格。国会的拨款立法既稳定地满足行政部门的财政需要,又在前一财年的拨款水平上略有增幅。从财政效果的细节上看,合同项目分布较为广泛但数额较小与国会政治基本无关；援助项目数额更大但分布相对有限,更多倾向于经济相对落后的地区。援助项目的分布与其选区议员是否为国会多数党有关,与拨款委员会成员无关。作为一种特殊拨款的专项拨款项目,与拨款委员会明显相关。具体而言,参议院拨款委员会成员更多来自经济落后州,更容易给本州实现更多专项拨款。当参议员以诉求和资历而进入拨款委员会后,通过专项拨款形成一个“自我强化”的循环,一定程度上促进着财政资源均等化。与此同时,众议院拨款委员会普通成员并非以选区专项拨款为首要目标,而是遵循党团领导,推动符合本党团立场的拨款,以实现更大的政策影响。众议院拨款委员会及其各分委员会领导的专项拨款行为空间较大。由于众议院拨款委员会成员与其选区的经济情况没有关联,拨款委员会及其分委员会领导的专项拨款行为往往无助于财政资源的均等化,更多为私人利益服务,导致财政的浪费和腐败的滋生。
The U.S. federal appropriation is one of the most important policy processes of the federal spending, which influence the normal operation of the U.S. federal government. During the appropriations process, many political actors involve, such as the President and his OMB, the Congress and its appropriations committees. With the highest legislative power granted by the Constitution, the U.S. Congress and its appropriations committees play a key role in U.S. federal appropriations. As a representative body, Congress holds the legislative power in charge of the federal revenue and expenditure policy making, which is called "power of the purse", and considered as the source and foundation of the power held by Congress. This dissertation focused on the politics of Congressional appropriations politics, which directly affects the federal expenditures and normal operation of the federal government, known as the "zipper of the purse"
Nowadays both chambers of the U.S. Congress respectively set up specialized standing committees for appropriations, which are considered as the key agenda in U.S. federal appropriations system. Compared with the composition of representative institutions in most other countries, such institutional arrangements are exceptional. To explain this exception, the paper traces the historical evolution of the U.S. Congressional funding legislative system. In fact, the First Congress did have no committee for appropriations. With the expansion of federal governmental financial scale, Congress should be more specific and strict to control expenditures. Because of this aim and other factors such as more partisan interests, harder work intensity and the system of checks and balances, the Appropriations Committees came into being. During the relatively stable development period of the United States, Congress and its Appropriations Committees kept the stability of federal financial situation successfully. Once war or economic crisis sweeping the country, Congress and its Appropriations Committees had no capacity for effectively controlling the federal spending, causing the frequent federal deficit. Since established in the late 19th century, because of the changing financial situation and other political reasons, the Appropriations Committees'funding jurisdiction has been split and integrated for several times, even once been shared with other authorizing committees, which caused great confusion with serious financial waste and deficit during the stable development period. The dissertation points out that, in order to maintain their power, the Appropriations Committees often cut funding request from authorizing committees, tending to "save" the money. Sine 1940 and 1950, with large spending caused by the Cold War and social welfare entitlements, the federal government financial situation fell into lasting deficit again. After 1974, the House and Senate Budget Committees were established for macrobudgeting management of the revenue and expenditure. The dissertation finds that, since the establishment of the Budget Committees and the jurisdiction of entitlements split and transferred to relative authorizing committees, the Appropriations Committees lost original legislative influence, instead they must take in charge of funding legislation under the budgetary framework in the Budget Resolution passed by the Budget Committees. To maintain influence, the Appropriations Committees appeared to change or increase spending, by creating more earmark projects, and then the committees tended to "spend" the money. Through the historical analysis, the dissertation suggests that the institutional arrangements and legislative styles of the Appropriations Committees changed with very strong historical path dependence. It is also noted that changing legislative style of the Appropriations Committees reflects the changing history of constitutional relations between President and Congress, and the changing history of the power structures of party causes and committees on Capitol Hill during more than 200 years.
With the governmental process analysis, today's U.S. federal appropriations process fully shows the spirit of checks and balances. At the Constitutional level, there is a clear power-sharing arrangement between the President and Congress. Within the legislative power structures, the various committees in Congress shared powers. The Budget Committees in both chambers establish the baseline and other limits of federal spending to set up the scope of the Appropriations Committee legislation; the relations between authorizing committees and the Appropriations Committees follow the rule "no appropriations without authorizations", then the authorizing committees also hold a great deal of entitlements funding appropriations. Leaders of the Appropriations Committees allocate the spending ceilings with various subcommittees, limiting the scope of the funding legislation of all subcommittees. This dissertation argues that different goals of actors involved in the appropriations process set up the necessary conditions for the checks and balances among separative powers, but also created barriers for legislative efficiency. The political deadlock such as the divided government, the separation between two chambers and the polarization of Congress reduced the efficiency of the appropriations legislation and even caused to collapse of the federal appropriations.
Through the empirical data-statistical analysis of the assignments of the Appropriations Committees in both chambers during the 108th to 110th U.S. Congress, the dissertation finds that the Appropriations Committees have gradually lost their cooperative "saver" role. In the House of Representatives, on the basic respect for the regional distribution of balance, party caucuses control the assignments of the Appropriations Committee. For rank-and-file members, the consistency with their parties, the trust with party leaders, the interests shared with party leaders and even the personal relations with party leaders determine whether they could take part in the Appropriations Committee or not. The seniority almost does not work. In the Senate, although the party control strengthens, the seniority is still considered as the most crucial qualification for the Appropriations Committee. However, the seniority plays a basic and the most important role in process of choosing leaders of the Appropriations Committees and its subcommittees for both parties in both chambers.
The dissertation finds that, taking the overall financial effect as the point of view, U.S. federal appropriations relatively keep prudent financial principles. While stably meeting the financial needs of the executive branch, Congressional appropriations also increase slightly above the baseline of the previous fiscal year's spending. Among kinds of spending projects, the contract projects are distributed more widely, but have a small amount, which Congress has little political impact on. The assistance projects have greater amount but limited coverage, which are relatively distributed into many poorer areas. The distribution of assistance projects depends on majority party in Congress, but has no connection with membership of the Appropriations Committees. As a special kind of funding projects, earmark projects have strong links to the Appropriations Committees, partly because they are easily taken place during the appropriations process. In particular, members of the Senate Appropriations Committee seem more likely to represent for the poor states and more easily achieve more earmarks for their states. When Senators get seats in the Appropriations Committee with application and seniority, they will launch a "self-reinforcing" cycle by earmark projects, to some extent have help to the equalization of the federal financial resources. Relatively, the main goal of members of the House Appropriations Committee is not focused on earmarks for their constituencies. Instead they should follow the party leadership and be consistent with funding legislation policy position of their party, in order to achieve greater impact on policy-making. Leaders of the House Appropriations Committee and its subcommittees have larger spaces and chances for earmarks. As there is no clear connection between the House Appropriations Committee membership and the economic conditions of their constituencies, the earmark behaviors of leaders of the House Appropriations Committee and its subcommittees often have no help to the equalization of the federal financial resources, but serve for more private interests and cause federal financial wastes and corruptions.
美国联邦政府拨款过程中的核心机构是国会两院的拨款委员会。这种制度安排在大多数国家的代议机构中可谓罕见。事实上,专门的拨款委员会并非始于首届国会,而是随着国家财政规模的扩大,国会必须更为专业而严格地控制支出,又加之府会关系、党派利益等政治因素的交互影响,拨款委员会才应运而生。在美国相对稳定发展的时期,国会及其拨款委员会量入为出,保证了联邦财政的平稳；而一旦国家面临战乱或经济危机,国会及其拨款委员会则无力有效管理支出,致使赤字频现。自19世纪末期成立以来,因财政状况变化和党争政治等因素影响,拨款委员会的管辖权几经拆分与整合,并曾与授权委员会分享拨款权力。这种混乱造成了严重的财政后果,支出过度致使在稳定发展期间出现赤字。本文指出,这一历史时期内,拨款委员会往往通过削减授权委员会的拨款要求来维持其权势,倾向于“守财”。随着20世纪40、50年代冷战军备和社会福利项目等引发的大量支出,联邦财政状况堪忧,赤字常态化。1974年,国会两院设立预算委员会以对财政收支实现整体管理。由于预算委员会的建立,以及强制性项目交由授权委员会管辖等变化,拨款委员会失去了原有的影响力,被要求在预算委员会制定的预算决议案框架下展开立法。为维持权势,拨款委员会出现改变甚至增加支出、塞入专项拨款项目等倾向,形成“散财”动机。基于历史梳理,本文认为拨款委员会在制度安排与立法风格上的变迁具有明显的历史路径依赖。同时,拨款委员会的变化也折射出200多年来美国府会间的宪政关系、国会内部党团、委员会等权力结构的变迁。
从政府过程的角度看,当今美国联邦拨款过程充分诠释着分权与制衡的精神。宪政层次上,总统与国会之间存在着明显的权力分享与制约关系。立法权力结构上,国会内部各委员会之间也呈现出分权化趋势。两院中的预算委员会确定各个政策项目的支出限制,为拨款委员会划定拨款立法的范围；授权委员会与拨款委员会之间形成“先授权后拨款”规则的同时,还掌握着大量强制性项目的拨款权。拨款委员会领导将支出限制再次细化分配到各分委员会,限制着各分委员会的拨款范围。本文认为,这些参与者拨款目标之间的差异性是分权制衡得以形成的必要条件,但分立的府会关系、对峙的两院、极化的国会党团等可能在这种分权制衡的某一层次上制造僵局,降低拨款立法的效率,甚至最终导致拨款立法的夭折。
通过对第108至110届国会两院拨款委员会构成的量化统计分析,本文验证了拨款委员会已失去了“守财者”的合作角色。就众议院而言,在基本尊重区域分布平衡的同时,党团基本控制了拨款委员会成员组成,议员与本党党团领袖的政治立场一致度、领袖对议员的信任度、议员与领袖具有共同利益甚至私人关系等,都是普通议员能否成为拨款委员会成员的影响因素,资历几乎不起作用。在参议院中,虽然党团控制加强,但资历仍旧最为关键。与此同时,国会两院拨款委员会及其分委员会的领导人选仍旧以资历为前提。
本文指出,从财政效果的整体上看,联邦政府拨款保持相对审慎的决策风格。国会的拨款立法既稳定地满足行政部门的财政需要,又在前一财年的拨款水平上略有增幅。从财政效果的细节上看,合同项目分布较为广泛但数额较小与国会政治基本无关；援助项目数额更大但分布相对有限,更多倾向于经济相对落后的地区。援助项目的分布与其选区议员是否为国会多数党有关,与拨款委员会成员无关。作为一种特殊拨款的专项拨款项目,与拨款委员会明显相关。具体而言,参议院拨款委员会成员更多来自经济落后州,更容易给本州实现更多专项拨款。当参议员以诉求和资历而进入拨款委员会后,通过专项拨款形成一个“自我强化”的循环,一定程度上促进着财政资源均等化。与此同时,众议院拨款委员会普通成员并非以选区专项拨款为首要目标,而是遵循党团领导,推动符合本党团立场的拨款,以实现更大的政策影响。众议院拨款委员会及其各分委员会领导的专项拨款行为空间较大。由于众议院拨款委员会成员与其选区的经济情况没有关联,拨款委员会及其分委员会领导的专项拨款行为往往无助于财政资源的均等化,更多为私人利益服务,导致财政的浪费和腐败的滋生。
The U.S. federal appropriation is one of the most important policy processes of the federal spending, which influence the normal operation of the U.S. federal government. During the appropriations process, many political actors involve, such as the President and his OMB, the Congress and its appropriations committees. With the highest legislative power granted by the Constitution, the U.S. Congress and its appropriations committees play a key role in U.S. federal appropriations. As a representative body, Congress holds the legislative power in charge of the federal revenue and expenditure policy making, which is called "power of the purse", and considered as the source and foundation of the power held by Congress. This dissertation focused on the politics of Congressional appropriations politics, which directly affects the federal expenditures and normal operation of the federal government, known as the "zipper of the purse"
Nowadays both chambers of the U.S. Congress respectively set up specialized standing committees for appropriations, which are considered as the key agenda in U.S. federal appropriations system. Compared with the composition of representative institutions in most other countries, such institutional arrangements are exceptional. To explain this exception, the paper traces the historical evolution of the U.S. Congressional funding legislative system. In fact, the First Congress did have no committee for appropriations. With the expansion of federal governmental financial scale, Congress should be more specific and strict to control expenditures. Because of this aim and other factors such as more partisan interests, harder work intensity and the system of checks and balances, the Appropriations Committees came into being. During the relatively stable development period of the United States, Congress and its Appropriations Committees kept the stability of federal financial situation successfully. Once war or economic crisis sweeping the country, Congress and its Appropriations Committees had no capacity for effectively controlling the federal spending, causing the frequent federal deficit. Since established in the late 19th century, because of the changing financial situation and other political reasons, the Appropriations Committees'funding jurisdiction has been split and integrated for several times, even once been shared with other authorizing committees, which caused great confusion with serious financial waste and deficit during the stable development period. The dissertation points out that, in order to maintain their power, the Appropriations Committees often cut funding request from authorizing committees, tending to "save" the money. Sine 1940 and 1950, with large spending caused by the Cold War and social welfare entitlements, the federal government financial situation fell into lasting deficit again. After 1974, the House and Senate Budget Committees were established for macrobudgeting management of the revenue and expenditure. The dissertation finds that, since the establishment of the Budget Committees and the jurisdiction of entitlements split and transferred to relative authorizing committees, the Appropriations Committees lost original legislative influence, instead they must take in charge of funding legislation under the budgetary framework in the Budget Resolution passed by the Budget Committees. To maintain influence, the Appropriations Committees appeared to change or increase spending, by creating more earmark projects, and then the committees tended to "spend" the money. Through the historical analysis, the dissertation suggests that the institutional arrangements and legislative styles of the Appropriations Committees changed with very strong historical path dependence. It is also noted that changing legislative style of the Appropriations Committees reflects the changing history of constitutional relations between President and Congress, and the changing history of the power structures of party causes and committees on Capitol Hill during more than 200 years.
With the governmental process analysis, today's U.S. federal appropriations process fully shows the spirit of checks and balances. At the Constitutional level, there is a clear power-sharing arrangement between the President and Congress. Within the legislative power structures, the various committees in Congress shared powers. The Budget Committees in both chambers establish the baseline and other limits of federal spending to set up the scope of the Appropriations Committee legislation; the relations between authorizing committees and the Appropriations Committees follow the rule "no appropriations without authorizations", then the authorizing committees also hold a great deal of entitlements funding appropriations. Leaders of the Appropriations Committees allocate the spending ceilings with various subcommittees, limiting the scope of the funding legislation of all subcommittees. This dissertation argues that different goals of actors involved in the appropriations process set up the necessary conditions for the checks and balances among separative powers, but also created barriers for legislative efficiency. The political deadlock such as the divided government, the separation between two chambers and the polarization of Congress reduced the efficiency of the appropriations legislation and even caused to collapse of the federal appropriations.
Through the empirical data-statistical analysis of the assignments of the Appropriations Committees in both chambers during the 108th to 110th U.S. Congress, the dissertation finds that the Appropriations Committees have gradually lost their cooperative "saver" role. In the House of Representatives, on the basic respect for the regional distribution of balance, party caucuses control the assignments of the Appropriations Committee. For rank-and-file members, the consistency with their parties, the trust with party leaders, the interests shared with party leaders and even the personal relations with party leaders determine whether they could take part in the Appropriations Committee or not. The seniority almost does not work. In the Senate, although the party control strengthens, the seniority is still considered as the most crucial qualification for the Appropriations Committee. However, the seniority plays a basic and the most important role in process of choosing leaders of the Appropriations Committees and its subcommittees for both parties in both chambers.
The dissertation finds that, taking the overall financial effect as the point of view, U.S. federal appropriations relatively keep prudent financial principles. While stably meeting the financial needs of the executive branch, Congressional appropriations also increase slightly above the baseline of the previous fiscal year's spending. Among kinds of spending projects, the contract projects are distributed more widely, but have a small amount, which Congress has little political impact on. The assistance projects have greater amount but limited coverage, which are relatively distributed into many poorer areas. The distribution of assistance projects depends on majority party in Congress, but has no connection with membership of the Appropriations Committees. As a special kind of funding projects, earmark projects have strong links to the Appropriations Committees, partly because they are easily taken place during the appropriations process. In particular, members of the Senate Appropriations Committee seem more likely to represent for the poor states and more easily achieve more earmarks for their states. When Senators get seats in the Appropriations Committee with application and seniority, they will launch a "self-reinforcing" cycle by earmark projects, to some extent have help to the equalization of the federal financial resources. Relatively, the main goal of members of the House Appropriations Committee is not focused on earmarks for their constituencies. Instead they should follow the party leadership and be consistent with funding legislation policy position of their party, in order to achieve greater impact on policy-making. Leaders of the House Appropriations Committee and its subcommittees have larger spaces and chances for earmarks. As there is no clear connection between the House Appropriations Committee membership and the economic conditions of their constituencies, the earmark behaviors of leaders of the House Appropriations Committee and its subcommittees often have no help to the equalization of the federal financial resources, but serve for more private interests and cause federal financial wastes and corruptions.
引文
① Tip O'Neill and Gary Hymel, All Politics Is Local and Other Rules of the Game, NY:Times Books,1994, p.95.
①此类法案用于立法改变现行收支预算,与预算决议案(budget resolution)不同,此类法案需经总统签署、生效。
② Allen Schick, The Federal Budget:Politics, Policy, Process,3rd ed., Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution Press,2007, pp.228-230.
①参见世界银行官方网站提供的数据,http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf,2010年04月08日访问。
②王绍光、马骏：《走向“预算国家”——财政转型与国家建设》,《公共行政评论》,2008年第1期,第1-37页。
③马骏著：《中国公共预算改革：理性化与民主化》,北京：中央编译出版社,2005年版,第46页。
④同上,第48页。
①《中国公共预算改革：理性化与民主化》,第50-51页。
②卢洪友主编：《政府预算学》,武汉：武汉大学出版社,2006年版,第249-250页。
③王伟：《关于加强我国财政民主建设的探讨》,《中国党政干部论坛》,2006年第8期,第39-41页。
@刘剑文著：《民主视野下的财政法治》,北京：北京大学出版社,2006年版,第192页。
⑤同上,第191页。
⑥马骏、牛美丽：“译丛总序”,[美]乔纳森·卡恩著：《预算民主：美国的国家建设和公民权》,叶娟丽译,上海：格致出版社/上海人民出版社,2008年版,第2页。
⑦沈亚平著：《行政学》(第二版),天津：南开大学出版社,2003年版,第205-206页。 Rundquist等人的《国会与国防支出：军事采购的分配政治》(Congress and Defense Spending: The Distributive Politics of Military Procurement,2002)等。
①[美]威尔逊著：《国会政体：美国政治研究》,熊希龄、吕德本泽,北京：商务印书馆,1986年3月版,第1页。
②同上,第81页。
③同上,第76页。
①[美]阿伦·威尔达沃斯基：《预算：比较理论》,苟燕楠译,上海：上海财经大学出版社,2009年版,第25页。
①同上,第39页。
②即《预算过程的新政治学》。威尔达沃斯基的《预算过程的政治学》1964年出版,其后几次修订,直到威氏1993年去世。现在的《新政治学》则是在原书的基础上由其合作者内奥米·凯顿(Naomi Caiden)完成的修订版本。
③[美]阿伦·威尔达沃斯基、内奥米·凯顿：《预算过程中的新政治学》,邓淑莲、魏陆译,上海：上海财经大学出版社,2006年版,第12页。
④同上,第15页。
⑤同上,第67页。
①[美]爱伦·鲁宾：《公共预算中的政治：收入与支出,借贷与平衡》(第四版),叶娟丽、马骏等译,北京：中国人民大学出版社,2001年版,第5页。
②Louis Fisher, The Politics of Shared Power:Congress and the Executive,4th. College Station, TX:Texas A&M University Press,1998, pp.20-21.
③Ibid., pp.250-251.
①Louis Fisher,Congeressional Abdication on War & Spending,College Station,TX:Texas A&M University Press,2000,p.179.
②Ibid.,pp.179-180.
③Allen Schick,Congress and Money:Budgeting Spending and Taxing,Washington,D.C.:Urban Institute Press,1980,pp.10-11.
①Ibid.,p.415.
②Allen Schick,Congress and Money:Budgeting Spending and Taxing,pp.569-572.
③Ibid.,p.573.
④lbid.,p.575.
⑤Ibid.,p.574.
⑥Ibid.,p.576.
①Allen Schick, The Federal Budget:Politics, Policy, Process,3rd ed., p.5.
②Allen Schick, The Federal Budget:Politics, Policy,Process, pp.10-22.
③Ibid., pp.244-249.
① Richard Fenno, Jr, The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress, Boston:Little, Brown and Co.,1966, p.ⅹⅲ.
② Richard Fenno, Jr, "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System", The American Political Science Review, Vol.56, No.2 (Jun.,1962), pp.310-324.
③ Richard Fenno, Jr, The Power of the Purse:Appropriations Politics in Congress, pp.167-180.
④ Ibid., pp.684-688.
⑤ Ibid., pp.503-504.
⑥ Ibid., pp.677-678.
① Ibid.,p.164.
② Richard Fenno, Jr, Congressmen in Congress, Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,1973, pp.2-3.
③ Richard Fenno, Jr, Congressmen in Congress, pp.15-26.
④ Ibid., pp.47-48.
⑤ Ibid., pp.142-143.
⑥ Ibid., p.160.
⑦ Joseph White, The Function and Power of the House Appropriations Committee, Ph.D dissertation, U.C.Berkeley,1989.
① D.Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation:Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process, Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1991, chapter 3 & 4.
② David C. Knapp, "Congressional Control of Agricultural Conservation Policy: A Case of the Appropriations Process", Political Science Quarterly, Vol.71, No.2 (Jun.,1956), pp.257-281.
③ John R. Gist, "Appropriations Politics and Expenditure", The Journal of Politics, Vol.40, No.1 (Feb.,1978), pp.163-178同时讨论在拨款过程中拨款委员会及其分委员会的主要论文还包括：Sarah K. Handy and Randall Strahan, "Staff Politics in the Republican House:The Case of the Appropriations Committee", Congress & The Presidency, Vol.31, No.1.Spring 2004,pp.1-19.;James D. Savage, "Saints and Cardinals in Appropriations Committee and the Fight against Distributive Politics", Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.16., No.3(Aug.,1991).,pp.329-347.; Herbert W. Stephens, "The Role of the Legislative Committees in the Appropriations Process:A Study Focused on the Armed Services Committees", The Western Political Quarterly, Vol.24, No.1,(Mar.,1971), pp.146-162.; Shirley M. Geiger, "The House Appropriations Committee, FY1963-82:A Micro-Budgetary Perspective", Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.19..No.3(Aug.,1994),pp.397-416.; Ira Sharkansky, "An Appropriations Subcommittee and Its Client Agencies:A Comparative Study of Supervision and Control' The American Political Science Review, Vol.59., No.3(Sep.,1965),pp.622-628.
① D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, "Appropriations Decisions as a Bilateral Bargain Game between President and Congress", Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.10.No.2 (May,1985), pp.181-201.
② Ira Sharkansky, "Four Agencies and an Appropriations Subcommittee: A Comparative Study of Budget Strategies", Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol.9, No.3 (Aug.,1965), pp.254-281同时讨论立法和行政机构在拨款过程中互动关系的典型论文还包括：Lance T. LeLoup, "Appropriations Politics in Congress:The House Appropriations Committee and the Executive Agencies", Public Budgeting & Finance, Winter 1984, pp.78-98.; D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, "Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions", American Journal of Political Science, Vol.32., No.3(Aug,1988),pp.713-736.
① John H. Aldrich and David W. Rhode, "The Republican Revolution and the House Appropriations Committee", The Journal of Politics, Vol.62, No.1 (Feb.,2000), pp.1-33.
② Bryan W. Marshall, Brandon C. Prins and David W. Rohde, "Fighting Fire With Water: Partisan Procedural Strategies and the Senate Appropriations Committee", Congress and The Presidency, Vol.26, No.2 (Fall.1999), pp.113-132同时讨论拨款过程中政党政治影响典型论文还包括：Eric Schickler and John Sides, "Intergenerational Warfare:The Senate Decentralizes Appropriations", Legislative Studies Quarterly,Vol.25,No.4,(Nov.,2000),pp.551-575.; Barry Bozeman, "The Effect of Economic and Partisan Change on Federal Appropriations", The Western Political Quarterly, Vol.30., No.1 (Mar.,1977),pp.112-124.
③ D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, "Congressional Appropriations and the Electoral Connection", The Journal of Politics, Vol.47., No.1 (Feb.,1985), pp.59-82.
④ E. Scott Adler "Constituency Characteristics and the'Guardian'Model of Appropriations Subcommittees,1959-1998", American Journal of Political Science, Vol.44., No.1. (Jan., 2000), pp.104-114.
⑤ James A. Thurber, "Congressional Budget Reform:Impact on the Appropriations Committees", Public Budgeting & Finance, Fall 1997, pp.62-73.
⑥ John R. Gist, "'Increment'and'Base'in the Congressional Appropriations Process", American Journal of Political Science, Vol.21., No.2 (May,1977), pp.341-352其他涉及拨款政治的典型文献包括：Elias Huzar, "American Government and Politics:Congress and the Army: Appropriations", The American Political Review, Vol.37.,No.4 (Aug.,1943), pp.661-676.; Christopher Wlezien, "The Political Economy of Supplemental Appropriations", Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.18, No.1. (Feb.,1993), pp.51-76.; Dalmas H. Nelson, "The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950", The Journal of Politics, Vol.15., No.2.(May., 1953),pp.274-288.;John R. Gist, "The Impact of Annual Authorizations on Military Appropriations in the U.S. Congress", Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.6., No.3(Aug., 1981),pp.439-454.; Elias Huzar, "Military Appropriations,1933-1942", Military Affairs, Vol.7, No.3(Autumn,1943),pp.141-150.; Gerald Auten, Barry Bozeman and Robert Cline, "A Sequential Model of Congressional Appropriations", American Journal of Political Science,
①《民主视野下的财政法治》,第182页。
②同上,第206-207页。
③周刚志著：《论公共财政与宪政国家——作为财政宪法学的一种理论前言》,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第129页。
④同上,第129页。
①李炜光：《建立公共财政体制之理论探源》,《现代财经》,2001年第2期,第3-9页；井明：《民主财政论——公共财政本质的深层思考》,《财政研究》,2003年第1期,第2,0-22页；王怡：《立宪政体中的赋税问题》,《法学研究》,2004年第5期,第14-24页；张涛：《析纳税人的权利》,《涉外税务》,2004年第4期,第19-23页。
②张馨：《论政府预算的法治性》,《财经问题研究》,1998年第11期,第17-22页：尹中卿：《当代美国国会的财政监督程序》，《人大研究》,2002年第3期,第43-44页；唐皇凤：《美国预算管理过程与制度的分析》,《上海行政学院学报》,2002年第4期,第85-91页；张丽华：《西方国家财政预算审计纵览》,《理财杂志》,2004年第12期,第17-19页；马蔡琛：《政府预算管理中的“寻租”活动分析》,《财贸经济》,2004年第11期,第50-54页；李炜光：《宪政：现代税制之纲》,《现代财经》,2005年第1期,第3-13页。
③马骏,林慕华：《现代议会的预算修正权力》,《中国改革》,2007年第6期,第27-29页。
④徐虹：《从马克思的财政理论到西方财政政治学的兴起——议会财政权理论的历史性梳理》,《中国行政管理》,2008年第8期,第111-115页。
①徐虹：《财政掌权与财政民主——英美议会财政权的政治学分析》(中外政治制度专业博士论文),复旦大学,2006年。
②袁星侯：《中西政府预算比较研究》(财政学专业博士论文),厦门大学,2002年。
①王淑杰：《政府预算的立法监督模式研究》(财政学专业博士论文),中央财经大学,2008年。
②章伟：《预算、权力与民主：美国预算史中的权力结构变迁》(行政管理专业博士论文),复旦大学,2005年。
③相关著作如孙哲著：《左右未来：美国国会的制度创新和决策行为》,上海：复旦大学出版社,2001年版；孙哲著：《美国国会与中美关系：案例与分析》,北京：时事出版社,2004年版；孙哲著：《崛起与扩张：美国政治与中美关系》,北京：法律出版社,2004年版;孙哲等著：《美国国会研究Ⅰ》,上海：复旦大学出版社,2002年版;孙哲等著：《美国国会研究Ⅱ》,上海：复旦大学出版社,2003年版；赵可金著：《营造未来：美国国会游说的制度解读》,上海：复旦大学出版社,2005年版;信强著：《“半自主”国会与台湾问题：美国国会外交行为模式》,上海：复旦大学出版社,2005年版;蒋晓燕、信强著：《美国国会与美国对华安全决策》,北京：时事出版社,2005年版；倪峰著：《国 会与冷战后的美国安全政策》,中国社会科学出版社,2004年；周琪：《国会与美国外交政策》,上海：上海社会科学院出版社,2006年版；张光、刁大明主编：《美国国会研究手册(2007-2008)》,上海：复旦大学出版社,2008年版；等。
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④张光、刁大明主编：《美国国会研究手册(2007-2008)》,上海：复旦大学出版社,2008年版,第16-17页。
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②喻中：《从“法律-制度范式”到“行为-过程范式”——试论权力制约理论研究中的范式转换》,《中共中央党校学报》,2006年第2期,第83-86页。
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②《政府过程：政治利益与公共舆论》,中文译序,第11页。
③喻中：《从“法律-制度范式”到“行为-过程范式”——试论权力制约理论研究中的范式转换》。
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① Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration, Washington, D.C:The Brookings Institution,1964, p.64.
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① Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development", The American Political Science Review, Vol.87, No.3, Sep.,1993, pp.567-576.
②[美]菲利浦·T·霍夫曼、凯瑟琳·诺伯格编著：《财政危机、自由和代议制政府(1450-1789)》,储建国泽,上海：格致出版社/上海人民出版社,2008年版,第341页。
③[美]詹姆斯·布坎南著：《民主财政论》,穆怀朋译,北京：商务印书馆,1993年版,第14-15页。
④[澳]布伦南、[美]布坎南著：《宪政经济学》,冯克利等译,北京：中国社会料字出版社,2004年版,第14-15页。
①[美]托马斯·潘恩著,马清槐等译：《潘恩选集》,北京：商务印书馆,1981年版,第86页。
②[英]约翰·密尔著：《代议制政府》,汪瑄译,北京：商务印书馆,1982年版,第68页。
③同上,第70页。
①[英]洛克著：《政府论》下册,叶启芳、瞿菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1983年版,第83页。
②[英]M.J.C.维尔著：《宪政与分权》,苏力译,北京：三联出版社,1997年版,第61页。
③同上,第89页。
④中共中央马恩列斯著作编译局编：《列宁选集》第三卷,北京：人民出版社,1972年版,211页。
⑤中共中央马恩列斯著作编译局编： 《马克思恩格斯全集》第六卷,北京：人民出版社,1961年版,第303-304页。
①Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development", pp.567-576.
②张凤阳等著：《政治哲学关键词》,南京：凤凰出版集团/江苏人民出版社,2006年版,第158页。
③《代议制政府》,第171-174页。
④[英]安德鲁·海伍德著：《政治学》(第二版),张立鹏译,欧阳景根校,：北京：中国人民大学出版社,2006年版,第268-273页。
①[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如、在汉、舒逊译,北京：商务印书馆,1980年版,第41页。
②同上,第253页。
③同上,第264页。
④王绍光、马骏：《走向“预算国家”——财政转型与国家建设》,《公共行政评论》,2008年第1期,第1-37页。
①[美]查尔斯·A·比尔德著：《美国宪法的经济观》,何希齐译,北京：商务印书馆,1984年版,第130页。
②[美]威廉姆·A·尼斯坎南著：《官僚制与公共经济学》,王浦劬等译,北京中国青年出版社,2004年版,第37-42页。
①方福前著：《公共选择理论：政治的经济学》,北京：中国人民大学出版社,2000年版,第151页。
②政党政治意义上的“府会关系”体现为两种情况,即当总统与国会两院多数为同一政党时,被称为“一致政府”；而当总统与国会至少某一院的多数党分属两党时,被称为“分立政府”。同时,“分立政府”中,总统属一党,国会两院多数党属另一党,则为“强分立”;总统属一党,国会两院中某一院多数党为另一党,则为“弱分立”
③ Nelson W. Polsby, Congress and the Presidency,4th ed., NJ:Prentice-Hall,1986, p.206.
④ James L. Sundquist, "Needed:A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States," Political Science Quarterly, Vol.103, No.4 (1988) p.614. ⑤V.O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups,5th ed., New York:Crowell,1964, p.688.
③相关研究参见[美]David R. Mayhew著：《分立政府：1946-1990年期间之政党控制、立法与调查》,吴重礼译,台北：五南图书出版公司,1992年版。
①[美]David R. Mayhew著：《分立政府》,第258页。
② Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government, NY:MacMillan Publishing Co.,1992, p.14-18.
③ Roger Davidson, and Walter Oleszek, Congress and Its Members,9th ed., Washington DC Congressional Quarterly,2004, p.193.
① Ibid., p.130.
② Barry R. Weingast, "Regulation, Reregulation and Deregulation:The Political Foundations of Agency Clientele Relationship", Law and Contemporary Problems,44(Winter),1981, pp.147-177.
③《公共选择理论：政治的经济学》,第163-164页。
④ Kiewiet and McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process, pp.27-34.
① Tim Groseclose, and Charles Stewart Ⅲ, "The Value of Committee Seats in the House, 1947-1991," American Political Science Review,42,1998, p.463以及Charles Stewart Ⅲ, and Tim Groseclose, "The Value of Committee Seats in the United States Senate,1947-1991," American Journal of Political Science,43 (3),1999,967.
② Weingast and William J. Marshall, "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets", The Journal of Political Economy, 1988, vol.96, no.1;Barry Weingast, "A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms," American Journal of Political Science,32,1979, pp.245-62; Kenneth Shepsle, and Barry Weingast, "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power," American Political Science Review,81 (1),1987, pp.85-104.
① Weingast, and Marshall, "The Industrial Organization of Congress," p.144.
② Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization, Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1994.pp.105-150.
③ Ibid., pp.105-150.
①《官僚制与公共经济学》,第132页。
② Richard Fenno, Jr, Congressmen in Congress, pp.47-48.
③ John H. Aldrich, "A Model of a Legislature with Two Parties and a Committee System,' Legislative Studies Quarterly, No.14,1994, pp.313-339.
① John H. Aldrich, "A Model of a Legislature with Two Parties and a Committee System," pp. 313-339.
② Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House, Berkeley: University of California Press,1993; Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins, "Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties:Party Government in the House," Legislative Studies Quarterly,19,1994, pp.215-31.
③ Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan, p.278.
④ Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan以及David Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,1991.
① Cox and McCubbins, "Bonding," p.222.
②Richard Fenno, Jr, Congressmen in Committees,1973, p.1.
③[美]David R. Mayhew著：《事关选举：美国国会的政治解读》,蒋昌建译,上海：复旦大学出版社,2001年版,第9页。
① Candice J. Nelson, "The Effect of Incumbency on Voting in Congressional Elections, 1964-1974", Political Science Quarterly, Vol.93, No.4. Winter,1978-1979, pp.665-678.
② Charles Stewart Ⅲ, Budget Reform Politics: The Design of the Appropriations Process in the House of Representatives,1865-1921, NY: Cambridge University Press,1989,p.19
③ Michael J. Sodaro, Comparative Politics:A Global Introduction,2nd ed., Boston:McGraw Hill, 2004, p.242.
① John Mark Hansen, Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby,1919-1981, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1991, p.5.
② Richard Hall and Frank Wayman, "Buying Time:Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committee," American Political Science Review,33,1990, p.815.
③ Jeffery M. Berry, The Interest Group Society,2nd ed., Glenview,Ⅲ, Scotland:Foresman,1989, p.72 & p.195.
④Robert M. Stein and Kenneth N. Bickers, Perpetuating the Pork Barrel: Policy Subsystems and American Democracy, NY: Cambridge University Press,1995.,p.30.
① Herbert M. Kritzer, "Ideology and American Political Elites," The Public Opinion Quarterly, 42(2),1978:485. pp.484-502.
② Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, "The Structure of Foreign Policy Beliefs Among American Opinion Leaders-After the Cold War," Millennium,22,Summer 1993, p.248.
③ James McCormick and Neil Mitchell, "Commitments, Transnational Interests, and Congress: Who Joins the Congressional Human Rights Caucus?" Political Research Quarterly,60 (4), 2007, pp.579-592.
① D. Robert Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, "Appropriations Decisions as a Bilateral Bargaining Game between President and Congress", Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.10, No.2,May,1985, pp.181-201.
① Allen Schick, The Federal budget: Politics, Policy, Process,3rd ed., pp.8-9.
① James L. Roark etc, The American Promise: A History of The United States, Vol.1, Boston: Bedford Books,1998, p.A-48.
②刘绪贻、杨生茂主编：《美国通史》(第二卷),人民出版社,2001年版,第5页。
③ James L. Roark etc, The American Promise: A History of The United States, Vol.1, p. A-52.
① Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, The Vital Statistics on American Politics 2007-2008, Washington, D.C:CQ Press,2008, p.272.
② James L. Roark etc, The American Promise: A History of The United States, Vol.1, p. A-49
① Joseph A. Pika & Richard A. Watson, The Presidential Contest,5th ed., Washington, D.C.:CQ Press,1996. p.3.
② Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration, p.48.
③ Julian E. Zelizer, The American Congress: The Building of Democracy, New York:Houghton Mifflin Company,,2004, pp.29-30.
④ George B. Galloway, History of the House of Representatives, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company,1969, pp.13-14.
⑤ Richard Spohn and Charles McCollum, The Revenue Committees, New York: Viking Press, 1975. p. 218.
① Allen Schick, The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process,3rd ed, p.10.
② Thad Hall, Authorizing Policy, Columbus:Ohio State University Press,2004, p.38.
③参见http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Gallatin,2009年8月20日访问。
④参见http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Hamilton,2009年8月20日访问。
①王希：《原则与妥协：美国宪法的精神与实践》,北京：北京大学出版社,2000年版,第142-143页。
② Lucius Wilmerding, The Spending Power:A History of The Efforts of Congress to Control Expenditures, New Haven:Yale University Press,1946, p.39.
③ Ibid., p.48.
①[美]西德尼·M·米尔奇斯、迈克尔·尼尔森：《美国总统制：起源与发展》,朱全红译,上海：华东师范大学出版社,2008年版,第94页。
② Spohn and McCollum, The Revenue Committees, p.220.
③ Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration, p.50.
① Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration, p.51.
② Steven S. Smith and Christopher J. Deering, Committee in Congress,2nd ed., Washington, D.C: CQ Press,1990, p.28.
③ Robert E. Dewhirst and John David Rausch, Jr., ed., The Encyclopedia of The United States Congress, New York:Facts on File Inc,2007, p.212.
①Spohn and McCollum,The Revenue Committees,p.220.
②Spohn and McCollum,The Revenue Committees,pp.220-221.
① Charles Stewart Ⅲ, Budget Reform Politics:The Design of the Appropriations Process in the House of Representatives, pp.82-83.
② Robert V. Renimi, The House: The History of the House of Representatives, New York: HarperColins,2006, pp.85-111.
⑨蒋劲松：《美国国会史》,第102-103页。
④ Dewhirst and Rausch,Jr., ed., The Encyclopedia of The United States Congress, p.16.
① Thad Hall, Authorizing Policy, p.38.
② Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration, p.51.
③ Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication on War and Spending, p.23.
① Charles Stewart Ⅲ, Budget Reform Politics: The Design of the Appropriations Process in the House of Representatives, pp.237-238.
② Charles Stewart Ⅲ, "Does Structure Matter? The Effects of Structural Change on Spending Decisions in the House,1871-1922", American Journal of Political Science, Vol.31, No.3, Aug.,1987, pp.584-605.
① Richard B. Cheney and Lynne V. Cheney, Kings of the Hill: Power and Personality in the House of Representatives, NY: Touchstone Book,1996, pp.102-103.
② Charles Stewart Ⅲ, Budget Reform Politics: The Design of the Appropriations Process in the House of Representatives, pp.133-171.
③ David Brady and Mark A. Morgan, "Reforming the Structure of the House Appropriations Process:The Effects of the 1885 and 1919-20 Refoms on Money Decisions", in McCubbins and Sullivan eds., Congress: Structure and Politics, New York: Cambridge Press,1987, p.235.
① Allen Schick, The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process,3rd ed, p.14.
②刘绪怡、杨生茂主编： 《美国通史》(第四卷),北京：人民出版社,2001年版,第203页。
③ Jun Ma and Yilin Hou, "Budgeting for Accountability:A Comparative Study of Budget Reforms in the United States during the Progressive Era and in Contemporary China", Public Administration Review, Vol.69, Issue sl, Oct.2009, pp.53-59.
①参见[美]乔纳森·卡恩：《预算民主：美国的国家建设和公民权(1890-1928)》,2008年版。
② Jun Ma and Yilin Hou, "Budgeting for Accountability:A Comparative Study of Budget Reforms in the United States during the Progressive Era and in Contemporary China", pp. 53-59.
②[美]候一麟： 《预算平衡规范的兴衰：探究美国联邦赤字背后的预算逻辑》,张光、刁大明译, 《公共行政评论》,2008年第2期,第1-37页。
① E.E. Naylor, The Federal Budget System in Operation, Washington, D.C:Columbus University Press,1941, pp.17-19.
②张光、刁大明主编：《美国国会研究手册(2007-2008)》,第16-17页。
③ John Marini, The Politics of Budget Control: Congress, The Presidency and the Growth of the Administrative State, Washington, D.C:Crane Russak,1992, p.62.
① Louis Fisher, The Politics of Shared Power: Congress and the Executive, p.223.
② E.E. Naylor, The Federal Budget System in Operation, pp.26-27.
③ Government Accountability Office, "About GAO", http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html,2009年08月31日访问。
①1939年预算局被重新设置到总统办事机构体系之中。
② John Marini, The Politics of Budget Control: Congress, The Presidency and the Growth of the Administrative State, pp.64-75.
③ E.E. Naylor, The Federal Budget System in Operation, p.33.
① Committee on House Rules, History of the United Stales House of Representatives,1789-1994, House Document No.103-324,1994, p.222.
② History of the United Stales House of Representatives,1789-1994, p.222
① James V. Saturno, "Appropriations Subcommittee Structure:History of Changes from 1920-2007", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL31572, January 31,2007.
② Richard Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees, p.95.
① Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives", The American Political Science Review, Vol.62, No.1. (Mar.,1968), pp.144-168.
② Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration, p.70.
③ Allen Schick, "The Three-Ring Budget Process:The Appropriations, Tax, and Budget Committees in Congress", in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, The New Congress, Washington, D.C:American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,1981, p.297.
④ Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration, p.70.
⑤ Allen Schick, "The Three-Ring Budget Process:The Appropriations, Tax, and Budget Committees in Congress", p.300.
① Robert V. Remini, The House:The Histoiy of the House of Representatives, pp.272-275
② Ronald M. Peters, Jr., The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Perspective,2nd ed., Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press,1997, p.92
③ Smith and Deering, Committees in Congress,2nd ed., p.45.
④ Nelson W. Polsby; Miriam Gallaher; Barry Spencer Rundquist, "The Growth of the Seniority System in the U. S. House of Representatives", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, No.3. (Sep.,1969), pp.787-807.
⑤ Richard Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees, pp.2-5.
⑥ Allen Schick, "The Three-Ring Budget Process:The Appropriations, Tax, and Budge Committees in Congress", p.296.
① Richard Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees, p.48.
② Richard Fenno, Jr., The Power of the Purse:Appropriations Politics in Congress, p.72.
③ Richard Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees, p.143.
④ Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration, pp.71-72.
⑤ Lance T. LeLoup, The Fiscal Congress:Legislative Control of the Budget, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,1980, p.122.
① Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin, Vital Statistics on Congress, Washington, D.C:Brookings Institute Press,2008, pp.113-114.
① Lewis H. Kimmel, Federal Budget and Fiscal Policy,1789-1958, Washington, D.C:Brookings Institute,1959, p.320.
① Louis Fisher, The Politics of Shared Power:Congress and the Executive, pp.225-226.
①刘绪贻、杨生茂主编：《美国通史》(第六卷上),北京：人民出版社,2001年版,第2-4页。
① Roger H. Davidson, Walter J. Oleszek and Frances E. Lee, Congress and Its Members,12th ed., Washington, D.C:CQ Press,2009, p.433.
①[美]阿伦·威尔达夫斯基：《预算：比较理论》,第37-38页。
② James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress, Washington, D.C:Brookings Institute Press,1981, p.201.
③ James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress, p.204.
④ Howard E. Shuman, Politics and the Budget:The Struggle between the President and the Congress,3rd ed., Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice Hall,1992, pp.223-226.
⑤ James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress, p.6.
① Aaron Wildavsky and Naomi Caiden, The New Politics of the Budgetary Process,5th ed., Beijing: Peking University Press,2004, p.90.
① Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and The Policy Process,6th ed., Washington, D.C: CQ Press,2004,pp.60-61.
②Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts between Congress and the President,5th ed., Lawrence, KS:University Press of Kansas,2007, p.205.
③ Lance T. LeLoup, "Appropriations Politics in Congress:The House Appropriations Committee and the Executive Agencies", Public Budgeting & Finance, Winter 1984, pp.78-98.
④ Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and The Policy Process,6th ed.,p.57.
⑤ Dennis S. Ippolito, "The Power of the Purse:Congressional Participation", in Albert C. Hyde, ed., Government Budgeting: Theory, Process, and Politics,3rd ed., Beijing:Peking University Press,2002, p.165.
① Committee on House Rules, History of the United States House of Representatives,1789-1994, House Document No.103-324,1994,p.228.
② Daniel P. Franklin, Making Ends Meets: Congressional Budgeting in the Age of Deficits, Washington, D.C:CQ Press,1993, pp.46-47.
③ Smith and Deering, Committees in Congress,2nd ed., p.51.
① Sean M. Theriault, Party Polarization in Congress, NY: Cambridge University,2008, pp.23-28.
② Smith and Deering, Committees in Congress,2nd ed., p.51.
③ Allen Schick, "The Three-Ring Budget Process:The Appropriations, Tax, and Budget Committees in Congress", p.299.
④ Allen Schick, Congress and Money: Budgeting, Spending and Taxing, p.434.
⑤ Diana Evans, "Appropriations in the Republican Era", Extensions, Spring 2007, pp.1-7
⑥ Allen Schick, "The Three-Ring Budget Process:The Appropriations, Tax, and Budget Committees in Congress", pp.300-301.
① Allen Schick, Congress and Money:Budgeting, Spending and Taxing, p.429.
② Lance T. LeLoup, "Appropriations Politics in Congress:The House Appropriations Committee and the Executive Agencies", pp.78-98.
③ Allen Schick, Congress and Money:Budgeting, Spending and Taxing, p.411.
④ Lance T. LeLoup ed., "Appropriations Politics in Congress:The House Appropriations Committee and the Executive Agencies", pp.78-98.
⑤ Allen Schick, The Federal Budget:Politics, Policy, Process,3rd ed., pp.236-237.
① Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin, Vital Statistics on Congress, pp.113-114.
② James V. Saturno, "Appropriations Subcommittee Structure:History of Changes from 1920-2007", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL31572, January 31,2007.
③ John H. Makin and Norman J. Ornstein, Debt and Taxes: How America Got into Its Budget Mess and What to Do About It, NY: Times Books,1994, pp.12-13.
④[美]约瑟夫·E·斯蒂格利茨著：《公共部门经济学》(第三版),郭庆旺等译,北京：中国人民大学出版社,2005年版,第333页。
⑤ Louis Fisher, The Politics of Shared Power: Congress and the Executive, p.229.
① Lance T. LeLoup, Barbara Luck Graham, and Stacey Barwick, "Deficit Politics and Constitutional Government: The Impact of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings", in Albert C. Hyde, ed., Government Budgeting: Theory, Process, and Politics,3rd ed., Beijing: Peking University Press, 2002,pp.198-200.
② Committee on House Rules, History of the United States House of Representatives,1789-1994, House Document No.103-324,1994,p.229.
③ James A. Thurber, "Congressional Budget Reform:Impact on the Appropriations Committees", Public Budgeting & Finance, Fall 1997, pp.62-73.
④ Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek, Congress and Its Members,10th ed., Washington,D.C:CQ Press,2005, p.444.
① Charles Stewart Ⅲ, "Budget Reform as Strategic Legislative Action:An Exploration", The Journal of Politics, Vol.50, No.2, May,1988, pp.292-321.
① Osbin L. Ervin, "Appropriating Vs. Budgeting: A Comparison of Municipal Fiscal Process". Public Budgeting & Finance, Winter 1988, pp.45-53.
① Bill Heniff, Jr., "The Spending Pipeline:Stages of Federal Spending", CRS Report for Congress, June 17,2008.
② Sandy Streeter, "The Congressional Appropriations Process:An Introduction", CRS Report for Congress, February 22,2008.
① Robert Keith, "Introduction to the Federal Budget Process", CRS Report for Congress, November 20,2008.
②参见总统管理与预算办公室官方网站http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization_office/,2009年11月10日访问。
③[美]雪莉·琳内·汤姆金著：《透视美国管理与预算局：总统预算局内的政治与过程》,苟燕楠译,上海财经大学出版社,2009年版,第110-112页。
① Allen Schick, The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process, p.94.
② Robert Keith, "Introduction to the Federal Budget Process", CRS Report for Congress, November 20,2008.
㈢参见FY2010 Budget, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/,2009年12月01日访问。
①参见国会预算办公室网站,http://www.cbo.gov/aboutcbo/factslieet.shtml,2009年11月10日访问。
② Robert Keith, "Introduction to the Federal Budget Process", CRS Report for Congress, November 20,2008.
①H.Con.Res.85,http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c111:1:./temp/～c111lyP8Cp::,2009年11月10日访问。
① Robert Keith, "The'Deeming Resolution':A Budget Enforcement Tool", CRS Report for Congress, November 14,2008.
② Bill Heniff, Jr, "Budget Resolution Enforcement", CRS Report for Congress, August 12,2008.
③ Bill Heniff, Jr, "Functional Categories of the Federal Budget", CRS Report for Congress, August 19,2008.
① Philip G. Joyce, "Congressional Budget Reform:The Unanticipated Implications for Federal Making", Public Administration Review, Vol.56,No.4, July.-Aug.,1996, pp.317-325.
② Davidson and Oleszek, Congress and Its Members,10th ed., p.444.
①Bill Heniff, Jr, "Budget Resolution Legislation:Development and Consideration", CRS Report for Congress, August 12,2008.
① Robert Keith.,"The Budget Reconciliation Process:The Senate's'Byrd Rule'", CRS Report for Congress, April 7,2005.
① Bill Heniff, Jr., "Overview of the Authorization-Appropriations Process", CRS Report for Congress, June 17,2008.
① D.Andrew Austin and Mindy R. Levit, "Trends in Discretionary Spending", CRS Report for Congress, December 23,2008.
① Walter Kravitz, American Congressional Dictionary,3rd ed., Washington, D.C.:Congressional Quarterly Press,2001, pp.15-16.
① Bill Heniff, Jr, "Allocation and Subdivisions in the Congressional Budget Process", CRS Report for Congress, June 17,2008.
①Walter Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process,6th ed., p.125
②参见国会图书馆立法记录,http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR02997:@@@L&summ2=m&,2009年11月10日访问。
① James V. Saturno, "Points of Order in the Congressional Budget Process", CRS Report for Congress, June 1,2009.
① Walter Kravitz, American Congressional Dictionary,3rd, p.206.
②参见国会图书馆立法记录,http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR02997:@@@L&summ2=m&,2009年1]月10日访问。
③参见国会图书馆立法记录,http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:SN01406:@@@L&summ2=m&,2009年11月10日访问。
①参见国会图书馆立法记录,http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR02997:@@@L&summ2=m&,2009年11月10日访问。
②所谓转用即将预算授权从一个账目更改为另一个账目的做法。例如,一个机构将“工资与开支”账目的预算授权转移到“建设”项目上,即转移使用。如果没有法定授权,行政机构禁止使用这种跨账目的转用方式。相反,行政机构通常可以在没有法定授权的情况下在同一账目内将某一事务的开支转而用于其他事务。这种账目内的“转用”也被称为“重新规划”(reprogramming)。两院拨款分委员会在各自的政策领域内为规范行政机构的重新规划行为,而制定了申报制度以及其他监管程序。
③ Sandy Streeter, "The Congressional Appropriations Process:An Introduction", CRS Report for Congress, December 2,2008.
① Michael H. Crespin, Charles J. Finocchiaro, and Emily O. Wanless, "Perception and Reality in Congressional Earmarks", The Forum, Vol.7, Issue 2,2009, Article 1,
① CRS Appropriations Team, "Earmarks in Appropriation Acts:FY1994, FY1996, FY1998, FY2000, FY 2002, FY2004, FY2005", CRS Report for Congress, January 26,2006.
① Robert Keith, "Federal Budget Process Reform in the 110th Congress:A Brief Overview", CRS Report for Congress, November 20,2008.
① "Pelosi, Hoyer and Obey Announce Further Earmark Reforms", http://appropriations.house.gov/pdf/EarmarkAnnouncement3-11-09.pdf,2009年11月10日访问。
② Robert Keith, "Introduction to the Federal Budget Process", CRS Report for Congress, November 20,2008.
① Sandy Streeter, "The Congressional Appropriations Process:An Introduction", CRS Report for Congress, December 2,2008.
② Robert Keith, "Introduction to the Federal Budget Process", CRS Report for Congress, November 20,2008.
① D. Robert Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, "Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decision", American Journal of Political Science, Vol.32, No.3, Aug.,1988, pp.731-736.
② Ed Gillespie and Bob Schellhas, ed., Contract With America:The Bold Plan By Rep. Newt Gingrich, Rep. Dick Armey, And The House Republicans To Change The Nation, NY:Times Books,1994,p.23.
③ Robert Keith, "Introduction to the Federal Budget Process", CRS Report for Congress, November 20,2008.
④ Ibid.
① Allen Schick, Congress and Money: Budgeting Spending and Taxing, p.6.
① Davidson. Oleszek and Lee, Congress and Its Members,12th ed., p.64.
② Ibid., p.215
① How Congress Works,4th ed., Congressional Quarterly Press,2008, p.171.
① How Congress Works,4th ed.,pp.174.175.
②另外一名参与预算委员会的共和党议员由共和党领袖指派。
③ How Congress Works,4th ed.,p.174.
① Davidson, Oleszek and Lee, Congress and Its Members,12th ed., p.213
② How Congress Works,4th ed., p.175.
① Richard Fenno, Jr, "The House Appropriations Committees as a Political System:The Problem of Integration", The American Political Science Review, Vol.56, No.2, Jun.,1962, pp.310-324.
② Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees, pp.15-16.
③ Ibid., p.84.
① Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees, p.1.
② Ibid., p.139.
③ David Rohde and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Democratic Committee Assignment in the House of Representatives:Strategic Aspects of a Social Choice Process", American Political Science Review, No.67,1973, p.905.
④ Edward I. Sidlow, Freshman Orientation: House Style and Home Style, Washington.D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press,2007,pp.60-63.
⑤ Smith and Deering, Committees in Congress,2nd ed., p.97.
① D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, "Congressional Appropriations and the Electoral Connection", The Journal of Politics, Vol.47. No.1 (Feb.,1985), pp.59-82.
② Smith and Deering, Committees in Congress,2nd ed., p.67.
① Hook, "The Influence Committees:Money and Issues", Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, January 3,1987, p.22.
② Diana Granat, "House Appropriations Panel Doles Out Cold Federal Cash, Chafes at Budget Procedures", Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, June 18,1983, p.1209.
③ Smith and Deering, Committees in Congress,2nd ed., pp.84-85.
④ Kenneth A. Shepsle, The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle: Democratic Committee Assignment in the Modern House, Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1978, p.238.
① Smith and Deering, Committees in Congress,2nd ed., p.73.
① Smith and Deering, Committees in Congress,2nd ed., p.106.
② Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House, pp.174-175.
① Scott A. Frisch and Sean Q. Kelly, Committee Assignment Politics in the U.S. House of Representatives, Norman, OK:University of Oklahoma Press,2005, pp.87-88.
② Bryan W. Marshal, Brandon C. Prins, and David W. Rohde, "Fighting Fire With Water: Partisan Procedural Strategies and the Senate Appropriations Committees", Congress and The Presidency, Vol.26, No.2, Fall 1999, pp.113-132.
③ Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees, p.84.
① Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting, New York: Oxford University Press,1997.
②数据来自www.voteview.com,目前可查找使用的数据为第1届至第110届国会。
①张光、刁大明主编：《美国国会研究手册(2007-2008)》,第144页。
② http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steny_Hoyer,2009年12月8日访问。
① http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carrie_Meek,2009年12月8日访问。
② http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tom_Delay,2009年12月8日访问。
③张光、刁大明主编：《美国国会研究手册(2007-2008)》,第455页。
④ Michael Barone and Richard E. Cohen, The Almanac of American Politics 2008, Washington, D.C.:National Journal Group,2007, p.468.
⑤ Barone and Cohen, The Almanac of American Politics 2008, p.134.
① Barone and Cohen,The Almanac of American Politics 2008,p.426.
② Ibid.,p.526.
③ Ibid.,pp.1560.1561.
④ Ibid.,p.566.
⑤ Ibid.,pp.400-401.
⑥张光、刁大明主编：《美国国会研究手册(2007-2008)》,第685页。
①张光、刁大明主编：《美国国会研究手册(2007-2008)》,第441-442页。
① Barone and Cohen, The Almanac of American Politics 2008, pp.729-730.
② Damon M. Cann, Sharing the Wealth: Member Contributions and the Exchange Theory of Party Influence in the U.S. House of Representatives, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,2008, p.80.
① Barone and Cohen, The Almanac of American Politics 2008, p.191& p.206.
②穆萨于2010年2月8日去世。
③Barone and Cohen, The Almanac of American Politics 2008, p.1320.
④ Ibid., p.768.
⑤ Ibid., pp.438-439.
⑥ Ibid., p.1137.
⑦ Ibid.., p.700.
⑧ Ibid., pp.1600-1601.
① Barone and Cohen, The Almanac of American Politics 2008, p.1055.
①张光、刁大明主编：《美国国会研究手册(2007-2008)》,第618-619页。
② http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jon_Tester,2009年12月9日访问。
① Steven D. Levitt and James M. Snyder Jr., "Political Parties and the Distribution of Federal Outlays", American Journal of Political Science, Vol.39, No.4, Nov,1995, pp.958-980.
② Robert M. Stein and Kenneth N. Bickers, "Congressional Elections and the Pork Barrel", The Journal of Politics, Vol.56, No.2, May,1994, pp.377-399.
③ Robert M. Stein and Kenneth N. Bickers, "The Electoral Dynamics of the Federal Pork Barrel" American Journal of Political Science, Vol.40, No.4, Nov,1996, pp.1300-1332.
① Martin L. Wattenberg, The Rise of Candidate Centered Politics, Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press,1991.
② Assar Lindbeck and Jorgen W. Weibull, "Balanced-Budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition", Public Choice, Vol.52, No.3,1987, pp.273-297.以及 Avinash Dixit and John Londregan, "Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency", The American Political Science Review, Vol.89, No.4,Dec.1995, pp.856-866.
③ Kenneth N. Bickers and Robert M. Stein, "The Congressional Pork Barrel in a Republican Era", The Journal of Politics,Vol.62, No.4, Nov,2000, pp.1070-1086.
① John A. Ferejohn, Pork Barrel Politics: Rivers and Harbors Legislation,1947-1968, Stanford, CA:Stanford University Press,1974, pp.49-51.
② Diana Evans, Greasing the Wheels: Using Pork Barrel Projects to Build Majority Coalitions in Congress, NY: Cambridge University Press,2004.
③ Steven D. Levitt and James M. Poterba, "Congressional Distributive Politics and State Economic Performance", Public Choice, No.1/2,1999, pp.185-216.
④ William R. Hauk, Jr., and Romain Wacziarg, "Small States, Big Pork", Quarterly Journal of Political Science, No.2,2007, pp.95-106.
①Brian Kelly, Adventures in Porkland:How Washington Wastes Your Money and Why They Won't Stop, NY:Times Books,1993, p.ⅹⅱ.
①Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees, pp.2-4.
②John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde, "The Republican Revolution and the House Appropriations Committee", The Journal of Politics, Vol.62, No.1(Feb.,2000), pp.1-33.
① Barone and Cohen, The Almanac of American Politics 2010, p.1291.
② http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johnstowmn, Pennsylvania,2010年2月10曰访问。
③ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Murtha_Johnstown-Cambria_County_Airport,2010年2月10日访问。
④ Jim Acosta and Janet Rodriguez, "Remote Murtha airport lands big bucks from Washington", http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/23/murtha.airport/?iref=mpstoryview,20]0年2月10日访问。
①Carol D. Leonnig, "Murtha's Earmarks Keep Airport Aloft", Washington Post, April 19,2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/18/AR2009041802128.html?sid=ST2009041 8021462010年2月10日访问。
② Barone and Cohen, The Almanac of American Politics 2010, pp.1292-1293.
① Barone and Cohen, The Almanac of American Politics 2010, p.1293.
②资料来自约翰·穆萨的国会众议院官方网站www.murtha.house.gov,2010年2月9日访问,2010年2月10日关闭。
① John M. Carey, "Legislative Organization", in R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder and Bert A. Rockman, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006, p.431.
①刘剑文：《宪政与中国财政民主》,《税务研究》,2008年第4期,第3-8页。
②林尚立：《民主集中制的财政基础——对中国国家建设的一种分析》,《社会科学》,2006年第11期,第29-42页。
①蒋洪等著：《公共财政决策与监督制度研究》,北京：中国财政经济出版社,2008年10月,第142页。
②陈仪：《强化人大预算审议权的路径选择》,《法学》,2009年第9期,第73-84页。
①《公共财政决策与监督制度研究》,第143页。
②同上,第143页。
③卢洪友主编：《政府预算学》,第250页。
④张晓明：《我国人大预算监督制度存在问题及完善对策——借鉴美国国会预算监督制度的经验》,《人大研究》,2009年第8期,第17-21页。
①孙哲：《全国人大制度研究(1979-2000)》,北京：法律出版社,2004年12月,第204页。
①陈仪：《强化人大预算审议权的路径选择》,第73-84页。
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13.唐皇凤：《美国预算管理过程与制度的分析》,《上海行政学院学报》,2002年第4期,第85-91页。
14.王绍光、马骏：《走向“预算国家”——财政转型与国家建设》,《公共行政评论》,2008年第1期,第1-37页。
15.王淑杰：《政府预算的立法监督模式研究》(财政学专业博士论文),中央财经大学,2008年。
16.王伟：《关于加强我国财政民主建设的探讨》,《中国党政干部论坛》,2006年第8期,第39-41页。
17.王怡：《立宪政体中的赋税问题》,《法学研究》,2004年第5期,第14-24页。
18.徐虹：《财政掌权与财政民主——英美议会财政权的政治学分析》(中外政治制度专业博十论文),复旦大学,2006年。
19.尹中卿：《当代美国国会的财政监督程序》,《人大研究》,2002年第3期,第43-44页。
20.喻中：《从“法律-制度范式”到“行为-过程范式”——试论权力制约理论研究中的范式转换》,《中共中央党校学报》,2006年第2期,第83-86页。
21.袁星侯：《中西政府预算比较研究》(财政学专业博士论文),厦门大学,2002年。
22.张丽华：《西方国家财政预算审计纵览》,《理财杂志》,2004年第12期,第17-19页。
23.张涛：《析纳税人的权利》,《涉外税务》,2004年第4期,第19-23页。
24.张晓明：《我国人大预算监督制度存在问题及完善对策——借鉴美国国会预算监督制度的经验》,《人大研究》,2009年第8期,第17-21页。
25.张馨：《论政府预算的法治性》,《财经问题研究》,1998年第11期,第17-22页。
26.章伟：《预算、权力与民主：美国预算史中的权力结构变迁》(行政管理专业博士论文),复旦大学,2005年。
27.赵可金：《美国学界对国会政治研究的范式转换》，《国际政治研究》,2008年第4期,第54-74页。
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01.美国国会参议院官方网站：http://www.senate.gov
02.美国国会众议院官方网站：http://www.house.gov
03.美国国会众议院书记处官方网站：http://clerk.house.gov
04.美国国会预算办公室(CBO)官方网站：http://www.cbo.gov
05.美国国会图书馆国会立法记录官方网站：http://thomas.loc.gov/
06.美国国会议员基本信息官方网站：http://bioguide.congress.gov
07.美国白宫管理与预算办公室(OMB)官方网站：http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb
08.美国白宫管理与预算办公室联邦财政支出公开网站：http://www.fedspending.org
09.美国总审计署官方网站：http://www. gao. gov
10.美国人口普查局官方网站：http://www.census.gov
11.美国政府印务办公室官方网站：http://www.gpoaccess.gov
12.美国《华盛顿邮报》国会议员数据库网站：http://projects.washingtonpost.com/congress
13.美国“公民反对政府浪费”组织网站：http://www.cagw. org
14.美国“全美纳税人联盟”组织网站：http://www.ntu.org
15.世界银行官方网站：http://www. worldbank.org/
16. Keith Poole教授提供DW指数的个人网站：www. votevi ew. com
17. Charles Stewart Ⅲ教授提供委员会组成数据的个人网站http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html
18.“维基百科”网站英文版：http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page
①此类法案用于立法改变现行收支预算,与预算决议案(budget resolution)不同,此类法案需经总统签署、生效。
② Allen Schick, The Federal Budget:Politics, Policy, Process,3rd ed., Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution Press,2007, pp.228-230.
①参见世界银行官方网站提供的数据,http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf,2010年04月08日访问。
②王绍光、马骏：《走向“预算国家”——财政转型与国家建设》,《公共行政评论》,2008年第1期,第1-37页。
③马骏著：《中国公共预算改革：理性化与民主化》,北京：中央编译出版社,2005年版,第46页。
④同上,第48页。
①《中国公共预算改革：理性化与民主化》,第50-51页。
②卢洪友主编：《政府预算学》,武汉：武汉大学出版社,2006年版,第249-250页。
③王伟：《关于加强我国财政民主建设的探讨》,《中国党政干部论坛》,2006年第8期,第39-41页。
@刘剑文著：《民主视野下的财政法治》,北京：北京大学出版社,2006年版,第192页。
⑤同上,第191页。
⑥马骏、牛美丽：“译丛总序”,[美]乔纳森·卡恩著：《预算民主：美国的国家建设和公民权》,叶娟丽译,上海：格致出版社/上海人民出版社,2008年版,第2页。
⑦沈亚平著：《行政学》(第二版),天津：南开大学出版社,2003年版,第205-206页。 Rundquist等人的《国会与国防支出：军事采购的分配政治》(Congress and Defense Spending: The Distributive Politics of Military Procurement,2002)等。
①[美]威尔逊著：《国会政体：美国政治研究》,熊希龄、吕德本泽,北京：商务印书馆,1986年3月版,第1页。
②同上,第81页。
③同上,第76页。
①[美]阿伦·威尔达沃斯基：《预算：比较理论》,苟燕楠译,上海：上海财经大学出版社,2009年版,第25页。
①同上,第39页。
②即《预算过程的新政治学》。威尔达沃斯基的《预算过程的政治学》1964年出版,其后几次修订,直到威氏1993年去世。现在的《新政治学》则是在原书的基础上由其合作者内奥米·凯顿(Naomi Caiden)完成的修订版本。
③[美]阿伦·威尔达沃斯基、内奥米·凯顿：《预算过程中的新政治学》,邓淑莲、魏陆译,上海：上海财经大学出版社,2006年版,第12页。
④同上,第15页。
⑤同上,第67页。
①[美]爱伦·鲁宾：《公共预算中的政治：收入与支出,借贷与平衡》(第四版),叶娟丽、马骏等译,北京：中国人民大学出版社,2001年版,第5页。
②Louis Fisher, The Politics of Shared Power:Congress and the Executive,4th. College Station, TX:Texas A&M University Press,1998, pp.20-21.
③Ibid., pp.250-251.
①Louis Fisher,Congeressional Abdication on War & Spending,College Station,TX:Texas A&M University Press,2000,p.179.
②Ibid.,pp.179-180.
③Allen Schick,Congress and Money:Budgeting Spending and Taxing,Washington,D.C.:Urban Institute Press,1980,pp.10-11.
①Ibid.,p.415.
②Allen Schick,Congress and Money:Budgeting Spending and Taxing,pp.569-572.
③Ibid.,p.573.
④lbid.,p.575.
⑤Ibid.,p.574.
⑥Ibid.,p.576.
①Allen Schick, The Federal Budget:Politics, Policy, Process,3rd ed., p.5.
②Allen Schick, The Federal Budget:Politics, Policy,Process, pp.10-22.
③Ibid., pp.244-249.
① Richard Fenno, Jr, The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress, Boston:Little, Brown and Co.,1966, p.ⅹⅲ.
② Richard Fenno, Jr, "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System", The American Political Science Review, Vol.56, No.2 (Jun.,1962), pp.310-324.
③ Richard Fenno, Jr, The Power of the Purse:Appropriations Politics in Congress, pp.167-180.
④ Ibid., pp.684-688.
⑤ Ibid., pp.503-504.
⑥ Ibid., pp.677-678.
① Ibid.,p.164.
② Richard Fenno, Jr, Congressmen in Congress, Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,1973, pp.2-3.
③ Richard Fenno, Jr, Congressmen in Congress, pp.15-26.
④ Ibid., pp.47-48.
⑤ Ibid., pp.142-143.
⑥ Ibid., p.160.
⑦ Joseph White, The Function and Power of the House Appropriations Committee, Ph.D dissertation, U.C.Berkeley,1989.
① D.Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation:Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process, Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1991, chapter 3 & 4.
② David C. Knapp, "Congressional Control of Agricultural Conservation Policy: A Case of the Appropriations Process", Political Science Quarterly, Vol.71, No.2 (Jun.,1956), pp.257-281.
③ John R. Gist, "Appropriations Politics and Expenditure", The Journal of Politics, Vol.40, No.1 (Feb.,1978), pp.163-178同时讨论在拨款过程中拨款委员会及其分委员会的主要论文还包括：Sarah K. Handy and Randall Strahan, "Staff Politics in the Republican House:The Case of the Appropriations Committee", Congress & The Presidency, Vol.31, No.1.Spring 2004,pp.1-19.;James D. Savage, "Saints and Cardinals in Appropriations Committee and the Fight against Distributive Politics", Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.16., No.3(Aug.,1991).,pp.329-347.; Herbert W. Stephens, "The Role of the Legislative Committees in the Appropriations Process:A Study Focused on the Armed Services Committees", The Western Political Quarterly, Vol.24, No.1,(Mar.,1971), pp.146-162.; Shirley M. Geiger, "The House Appropriations Committee, FY1963-82:A Micro-Budgetary Perspective", Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.19..No.3(Aug.,1994),pp.397-416.; Ira Sharkansky, "An Appropriations Subcommittee and Its Client Agencies:A Comparative Study of Supervision and Control' The American Political Science Review, Vol.59., No.3(Sep.,1965),pp.622-628.
① D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, "Appropriations Decisions as a Bilateral Bargain Game between President and Congress", Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.10.No.2 (May,1985), pp.181-201.
② Ira Sharkansky, "Four Agencies and an Appropriations Subcommittee: A Comparative Study of Budget Strategies", Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol.9, No.3 (Aug.,1965), pp.254-281同时讨论立法和行政机构在拨款过程中互动关系的典型论文还包括：Lance T. LeLoup, "Appropriations Politics in Congress:The House Appropriations Committee and the Executive Agencies", Public Budgeting & Finance, Winter 1984, pp.78-98.; D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, "Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions", American Journal of Political Science, Vol.32., No.3(Aug,1988),pp.713-736.
① John H. Aldrich and David W. Rhode, "The Republican Revolution and the House Appropriations Committee", The Journal of Politics, Vol.62, No.1 (Feb.,2000), pp.1-33.
② Bryan W. Marshall, Brandon C. Prins and David W. Rohde, "Fighting Fire With Water: Partisan Procedural Strategies and the Senate Appropriations Committee", Congress and The Presidency, Vol.26, No.2 (Fall.1999), pp.113-132同时讨论拨款过程中政党政治影响典型论文还包括：Eric Schickler and John Sides, "Intergenerational Warfare:The Senate Decentralizes Appropriations", Legislative Studies Quarterly,Vol.25,No.4,(Nov.,2000),pp.551-575.; Barry Bozeman, "The Effect of Economic and Partisan Change on Federal Appropriations", The Western Political Quarterly, Vol.30., No.1 (Mar.,1977),pp.112-124.
③ D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, "Congressional Appropriations and the Electoral Connection", The Journal of Politics, Vol.47., No.1 (Feb.,1985), pp.59-82.
④ E. Scott Adler "Constituency Characteristics and the'Guardian'Model of Appropriations Subcommittees,1959-1998", American Journal of Political Science, Vol.44., No.1. (Jan., 2000), pp.104-114.
⑤ James A. Thurber, "Congressional Budget Reform:Impact on the Appropriations Committees", Public Budgeting & Finance, Fall 1997, pp.62-73.
⑥ John R. Gist, "'Increment'and'Base'in the Congressional Appropriations Process", American Journal of Political Science, Vol.21., No.2 (May,1977), pp.341-352其他涉及拨款政治的典型文献包括：Elias Huzar, "American Government and Politics:Congress and the Army: Appropriations", The American Political Review, Vol.37.,No.4 (Aug.,1943), pp.661-676.; Christopher Wlezien, "The Political Economy of Supplemental Appropriations", Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.18, No.1. (Feb.,1993), pp.51-76.; Dalmas H. Nelson, "The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950", The Journal of Politics, Vol.15., No.2.(May., 1953),pp.274-288.;John R. Gist, "The Impact of Annual Authorizations on Military Appropriations in the U.S. Congress", Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.6., No.3(Aug., 1981),pp.439-454.; Elias Huzar, "Military Appropriations,1933-1942", Military Affairs, Vol.7, No.3(Autumn,1943),pp.141-150.; Gerald Auten, Barry Bozeman and Robert Cline, "A Sequential Model of Congressional Appropriations", American Journal of Political Science,
①《民主视野下的财政法治》,第182页。
②同上,第206-207页。
③周刚志著：《论公共财政与宪政国家——作为财政宪法学的一种理论前言》,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第129页。
④同上,第129页。
①李炜光：《建立公共财政体制之理论探源》,《现代财经》,2001年第2期,第3-9页；井明：《民主财政论——公共财政本质的深层思考》,《财政研究》,2003年第1期,第2,0-22页；王怡：《立宪政体中的赋税问题》,《法学研究》,2004年第5期,第14-24页；张涛：《析纳税人的权利》,《涉外税务》,2004年第4期,第19-23页。
②张馨：《论政府预算的法治性》,《财经问题研究》,1998年第11期,第17-22页：尹中卿：《当代美国国会的财政监督程序》，《人大研究》,2002年第3期,第43-44页；唐皇凤：《美国预算管理过程与制度的分析》,《上海行政学院学报》,2002年第4期,第85-91页；张丽华：《西方国家财政预算审计纵览》,《理财杂志》,2004年第12期,第17-19页；马蔡琛：《政府预算管理中的“寻租”活动分析》,《财贸经济》,2004年第11期,第50-54页；李炜光：《宪政：现代税制之纲》,《现代财经》,2005年第1期,第3-13页。
③马骏,林慕华：《现代议会的预算修正权力》,《中国改革》,2007年第6期,第27-29页。
④徐虹：《从马克思的财政理论到西方财政政治学的兴起——议会财政权理论的历史性梳理》,《中国行政管理》,2008年第8期,第111-115页。
①徐虹：《财政掌权与财政民主——英美议会财政权的政治学分析》(中外政治制度专业博士论文),复旦大学,2006年。
②袁星侯：《中西政府预算比较研究》(财政学专业博士论文),厦门大学,2002年。
①王淑杰：《政府预算的立法监督模式研究》(财政学专业博士论文),中央财经大学,2008年。
②章伟：《预算、权力与民主：美国预算史中的权力结构变迁》(行政管理专业博士论文),复旦大学,2005年。
③相关著作如孙哲著：《左右未来：美国国会的制度创新和决策行为》,上海：复旦大学出版社,2001年版；孙哲著：《美国国会与中美关系：案例与分析》,北京：时事出版社,2004年版；孙哲著：《崛起与扩张：美国政治与中美关系》,北京：法律出版社,2004年版;孙哲等著：《美国国会研究Ⅰ》,上海：复旦大学出版社,2002年版;孙哲等著：《美国国会研究Ⅱ》,上海：复旦大学出版社,2003年版；赵可金著：《营造未来：美国国会游说的制度解读》,上海：复旦大学出版社,2005年版;信强著：《“半自主”国会与台湾问题：美国国会外交行为模式》,上海：复旦大学出版社,2005年版;蒋晓燕、信强著：《美国国会与美国对华安全决策》,北京：时事出版社,2005年版；倪峰著：《国 会与冷战后的美国安全政策》,中国社会科学出版社,2004年；周琪：《国会与美国外交政策》,上海：上海社会科学院出版社,2006年版；张光、刁大明主编：《美国国会研究手册(2007-2008)》,上海：复旦大学出版社,2008年版；等。
①蒋劲松著：《美国国会史》,三亚：海南出版社,1992年版,第461页。
②与非著：《美国国会》,北京：中国民主法制出版社,2001年版,第88-10l页。
③谭融著：《权力的分配与权力的角逐：美国分权体制研究》,天津：天津大学出版社,1994年版,第135-137页。
④张光、刁大明主编：《美国国会研究手册(2007-2008)》,上海：复旦大学出版社,2008年版,第16-17页。
⑤赵可金：《美国学界对国会政治研究的范式转换》,《国际政治研究》,2008年第4期,第54-74页。
①[美]罗伯特·K·殷著：《案例研究方法的应用》(第二版),周海涛译,重庆：重庆出版社,2009年版,第9页。
①中共中央马恩列斯著作编泽局编：《列宁选集》第四卷,人民出版社,1995年版,第26页。
②[美]James Mahoney,[美]Celso M. Villegas:《历史分析与比较政治》,《浙江社会科学》,2008年第3期,第12-19页。
①刘圣中：《时间中的政治——历史制度主义的制度里似乎分析》,《甘肃行政学院学报》,2009年第2期,第108-116页。
②喻中：《从“法律-制度范式”到“行为-过程范式”——试论权力制约理论研究中的范式转换》,《中共中央党校学报》,2006年第2期,第83-86页。
③[美]D·B·杜鲁门著：《政府过程：政治利益与公共舆论》,陈尧译,天津：天津人民出版社,2005年版,中文译序,第9页。
①陈雷：《戴维·比克奈尔·杜鲁门：<政府过程：政治利益与公共舆论>》,《公共管理评论》,2007年第1期,总第六卷,第199-205页。
②《政府过程：政治利益与公共舆论》,中文译序,第11页。
③喻中：《从“法律-制度范式”到“行为-过程范式”——试论权力制约理论研究中的范式转换》。
①人民代表大会制度研究所编著：《与人大代表谈西方议会制度》,北京：人民出版社,2004年版,第178页。
②杨逢春主编：《中外政治制度大辞典》,北京：人民日报出版社,1994年版,第29页。
① Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration, Washington, D.C:The Brookings Institution,1964, p.64.
②[美]詹姆斯·M·布坎南、理查德·A·马斯格雷夫著：《公共财政与公共选择：两种截然不同的国家观》,类承耀译,北京：中国财政经济出版社,2000年版,第24页。
① Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development", The American Political Science Review, Vol.87, No.3, Sep.,1993, pp.567-576.
②[美]菲利浦·T·霍夫曼、凯瑟琳·诺伯格编著：《财政危机、自由和代议制政府(1450-1789)》,储建国泽,上海：格致出版社/上海人民出版社,2008年版,第341页。
③[美]詹姆斯·布坎南著：《民主财政论》,穆怀朋译,北京：商务印书馆,1993年版,第14-15页。
④[澳]布伦南、[美]布坎南著：《宪政经济学》,冯克利等译,北京：中国社会料字出版社,2004年版,第14-15页。
①[美]托马斯·潘恩著,马清槐等译：《潘恩选集》,北京：商务印书馆,1981年版,第86页。
②[英]约翰·密尔著：《代议制政府》,汪瑄译,北京：商务印书馆,1982年版,第68页。
③同上,第70页。
①[英]洛克著：《政府论》下册,叶启芳、瞿菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1983年版,第83页。
②[英]M.J.C.维尔著：《宪政与分权》,苏力译,北京：三联出版社,1997年版,第61页。
③同上,第89页。
④中共中央马恩列斯著作编译局编：《列宁选集》第三卷,北京：人民出版社,1972年版,211页。
⑤中共中央马恩列斯著作编译局编： 《马克思恩格斯全集》第六卷,北京：人民出版社,1961年版,第303-304页。
①Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development", pp.567-576.
②张凤阳等著：《政治哲学关键词》,南京：凤凰出版集团/江苏人民出版社,2006年版,第158页。
③《代议制政府》,第171-174页。
④[英]安德鲁·海伍德著：《政治学》(第二版),张立鹏译,欧阳景根校,：北京：中国人民大学出版社,2006年版,第268-273页。
①[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如、在汉、舒逊译,北京：商务印书馆,1980年版,第41页。
②同上,第253页。
③同上,第264页。
④王绍光、马骏：《走向“预算国家”——财政转型与国家建设》,《公共行政评论》,2008年第1期,第1-37页。
①[美]查尔斯·A·比尔德著：《美国宪法的经济观》,何希齐译,北京：商务印书馆,1984年版,第130页。
②[美]威廉姆·A·尼斯坎南著：《官僚制与公共经济学》,王浦劬等译,北京中国青年出版社,2004年版,第37-42页。
①方福前著：《公共选择理论：政治的经济学》,北京：中国人民大学出版社,2000年版,第151页。
②政党政治意义上的“府会关系”体现为两种情况,即当总统与国会两院多数为同一政党时,被称为“一致政府”；而当总统与国会至少某一院的多数党分属两党时,被称为“分立政府”。同时,“分立政府”中,总统属一党,国会两院多数党属另一党,则为“强分立”;总统属一党,国会两院中某一院多数党为另一党,则为“弱分立”
③ Nelson W. Polsby, Congress and the Presidency,4th ed., NJ:Prentice-Hall,1986, p.206.
④ James L. Sundquist, "Needed:A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States," Political Science Quarterly, Vol.103, No.4 (1988) p.614. ⑤V.O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups,5th ed., New York:Crowell,1964, p.688.
③相关研究参见[美]David R. Mayhew著：《分立政府：1946-1990年期间之政党控制、立法与调查》,吴重礼译,台北：五南图书出版公司,1992年版。
①[美]David R. Mayhew著：《分立政府》,第258页。
② Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government, NY:MacMillan Publishing Co.,1992, p.14-18.
③ Roger Davidson, and Walter Oleszek, Congress and Its Members,9th ed., Washington DC Congressional Quarterly,2004, p.193.
① Ibid., p.130.
② Barry R. Weingast, "Regulation, Reregulation and Deregulation:The Political Foundations of Agency Clientele Relationship", Law and Contemporary Problems,44(Winter),1981, pp.147-177.
③《公共选择理论：政治的经济学》,第163-164页。
④ Kiewiet and McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process, pp.27-34.
① Tim Groseclose, and Charles Stewart Ⅲ, "The Value of Committee Seats in the House, 1947-1991," American Political Science Review,42,1998, p.463以及Charles Stewart Ⅲ, and Tim Groseclose, "The Value of Committee Seats in the United States Senate,1947-1991," American Journal of Political Science,43 (3),1999,967.
② Weingast and William J. Marshall, "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets", The Journal of Political Economy, 1988, vol.96, no.1;Barry Weingast, "A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms," American Journal of Political Science,32,1979, pp.245-62; Kenneth Shepsle, and Barry Weingast, "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power," American Political Science Review,81 (1),1987, pp.85-104.
① Weingast, and Marshall, "The Industrial Organization of Congress," p.144.
② Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization, Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1994.pp.105-150.
③ Ibid., pp.105-150.
①《官僚制与公共经济学》,第132页。
② Richard Fenno, Jr, Congressmen in Congress, pp.47-48.
③ John H. Aldrich, "A Model of a Legislature with Two Parties and a Committee System,' Legislative Studies Quarterly, No.14,1994, pp.313-339.
① John H. Aldrich, "A Model of a Legislature with Two Parties and a Committee System," pp. 313-339.
② Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House, Berkeley: University of California Press,1993; Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins, "Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties:Party Government in the House," Legislative Studies Quarterly,19,1994, pp.215-31.
③ Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan, p.278.
④ Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan以及David Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,1991.
① Cox and McCubbins, "Bonding," p.222.
②Richard Fenno, Jr, Congressmen in Committees,1973, p.1.
③[美]David R. Mayhew著：《事关选举：美国国会的政治解读》,蒋昌建译,上海：复旦大学出版社,2001年版,第9页。
① Candice J. Nelson, "The Effect of Incumbency on Voting in Congressional Elections, 1964-1974", Political Science Quarterly, Vol.93, No.4. Winter,1978-1979, pp.665-678.
② Charles Stewart Ⅲ, Budget Reform Politics: The Design of the Appropriations Process in the House of Representatives,1865-1921, NY: Cambridge University Press,1989,p.19
③ Michael J. Sodaro, Comparative Politics:A Global Introduction,2nd ed., Boston:McGraw Hill, 2004, p.242.
① John Mark Hansen, Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby,1919-1981, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1991, p.5.
② Richard Hall and Frank Wayman, "Buying Time:Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committee," American Political Science Review,33,1990, p.815.
③ Jeffery M. Berry, The Interest Group Society,2nd ed., Glenview,Ⅲ, Scotland:Foresman,1989, p.72 & p.195.
④Robert M. Stein and Kenneth N. Bickers, Perpetuating the Pork Barrel: Policy Subsystems and American Democracy, NY: Cambridge University Press,1995.,p.30.
① Herbert M. Kritzer, "Ideology and American Political Elites," The Public Opinion Quarterly, 42(2),1978:485. pp.484-502.
② Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, "The Structure of Foreign Policy Beliefs Among American Opinion Leaders-After the Cold War," Millennium,22,Summer 1993, p.248.
③ James McCormick and Neil Mitchell, "Commitments, Transnational Interests, and Congress: Who Joins the Congressional Human Rights Caucus?" Political Research Quarterly,60 (4), 2007, pp.579-592.
① D. Robert Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, "Appropriations Decisions as a Bilateral Bargaining Game between President and Congress", Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.10, No.2,May,1985, pp.181-201.
① Allen Schick, The Federal budget: Politics, Policy, Process,3rd ed., pp.8-9.
① James L. Roark etc, The American Promise: A History of The United States, Vol.1, Boston: Bedford Books,1998, p.A-48.
②刘绪贻、杨生茂主编：《美国通史》(第二卷),人民出版社,2001年版,第5页。
③ James L. Roark etc, The American Promise: A History of The United States, Vol.1, p. A-52.
① Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, The Vital Statistics on American Politics 2007-2008, Washington, D.C:CQ Press,2008, p.272.
② James L. Roark etc, The American Promise: A History of The United States, Vol.1, p. A-49
① Joseph A. Pika & Richard A. Watson, The Presidential Contest,5th ed., Washington, D.C.:CQ Press,1996. p.3.
② Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration, p.48.
③ Julian E. Zelizer, The American Congress: The Building of Democracy, New York:Houghton Mifflin Company,,2004, pp.29-30.
④ George B. Galloway, History of the House of Representatives, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company,1969, pp.13-14.
⑤ Richard Spohn and Charles McCollum, The Revenue Committees, New York: Viking Press, 1975. p. 218.
① Allen Schick, The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process,3rd ed, p.10.
② Thad Hall, Authorizing Policy, Columbus:Ohio State University Press,2004, p.38.
③参见http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Gallatin,2009年8月20日访问。
④参见http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Hamilton,2009年8月20日访问。
①王希：《原则与妥协：美国宪法的精神与实践》,北京：北京大学出版社,2000年版,第142-143页。
② Lucius Wilmerding, The Spending Power:A History of The Efforts of Congress to Control Expenditures, New Haven:Yale University Press,1946, p.39.
③ Ibid., p.48.
①[美]西德尼·M·米尔奇斯、迈克尔·尼尔森：《美国总统制：起源与发展》,朱全红译,上海：华东师范大学出版社,2008年版,第94页。
② Spohn and McCollum, The Revenue Committees, p.220.
③ Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration, p.50.
① Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration, p.51.
② Steven S. Smith and Christopher J. Deering, Committee in Congress,2nd ed., Washington, D.C: CQ Press,1990, p.28.
③ Robert E. Dewhirst and John David Rausch, Jr., ed., The Encyclopedia of The United States Congress, New York:Facts on File Inc,2007, p.212.
①Spohn and McCollum,The Revenue Committees,p.220.
②Spohn and McCollum,The Revenue Committees,pp.220-221.
① Charles Stewart Ⅲ, Budget Reform Politics:The Design of the Appropriations Process in the House of Representatives, pp.82-83.
② Robert V. Renimi, The House: The History of the House of Representatives, New York: HarperColins,2006, pp.85-111.
⑨蒋劲松：《美国国会史》,第102-103页。
④ Dewhirst and Rausch,Jr., ed., The Encyclopedia of The United States Congress, p.16.
① Thad Hall, Authorizing Policy, p.38.
② Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration, p.51.
③ Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication on War and Spending, p.23.
① Charles Stewart Ⅲ, Budget Reform Politics: The Design of the Appropriations Process in the House of Representatives, pp.237-238.
② Charles Stewart Ⅲ, "Does Structure Matter? The Effects of Structural Change on Spending Decisions in the House,1871-1922", American Journal of Political Science, Vol.31, No.3, Aug.,1987, pp.584-605.
① Richard B. Cheney and Lynne V. Cheney, Kings of the Hill: Power and Personality in the House of Representatives, NY: Touchstone Book,1996, pp.102-103.
② Charles Stewart Ⅲ, Budget Reform Politics: The Design of the Appropriations Process in the House of Representatives, pp.133-171.
③ David Brady and Mark A. Morgan, "Reforming the Structure of the House Appropriations Process:The Effects of the 1885 and 1919-20 Refoms on Money Decisions", in McCubbins and Sullivan eds., Congress: Structure and Politics, New York: Cambridge Press,1987, p.235.
① Allen Schick, The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process,3rd ed, p.14.
②刘绪怡、杨生茂主编： 《美国通史》(第四卷),北京：人民出版社,2001年版,第203页。
③ Jun Ma and Yilin Hou, "Budgeting for Accountability:A Comparative Study of Budget Reforms in the United States during the Progressive Era and in Contemporary China", Public Administration Review, Vol.69, Issue sl, Oct.2009, pp.53-59.
①参见[美]乔纳森·卡恩：《预算民主：美国的国家建设和公民权(1890-1928)》,2008年版。
② Jun Ma and Yilin Hou, "Budgeting for Accountability:A Comparative Study of Budget Reforms in the United States during the Progressive Era and in Contemporary China", pp. 53-59.
②[美]候一麟： 《预算平衡规范的兴衰：探究美国联邦赤字背后的预算逻辑》,张光、刁大明译, 《公共行政评论》,2008年第2期,第1-37页。
① E.E. Naylor, The Federal Budget System in Operation, Washington, D.C:Columbus University Press,1941, pp.17-19.
②张光、刁大明主编：《美国国会研究手册(2007-2008)》,第16-17页。
③ John Marini, The Politics of Budget Control: Congress, The Presidency and the Growth of the Administrative State, Washington, D.C:Crane Russak,1992, p.62.
① Louis Fisher, The Politics of Shared Power: Congress and the Executive, p.223.
② E.E. Naylor, The Federal Budget System in Operation, pp.26-27.
③ Government Accountability Office, "About GAO", http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html,2009年08月31日访问。
①1939年预算局被重新设置到总统办事机构体系之中。
② John Marini, The Politics of Budget Control: Congress, The Presidency and the Growth of the Administrative State, pp.64-75.
③ E.E. Naylor, The Federal Budget System in Operation, p.33.
① Committee on House Rules, History of the United Stales House of Representatives,1789-1994, House Document No.103-324,1994, p.222.
② History of the United Stales House of Representatives,1789-1994, p.222
① James V. Saturno, "Appropriations Subcommittee Structure:History of Changes from 1920-2007", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL31572, January 31,2007.
② Richard Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees, p.95.
① Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives", The American Political Science Review, Vol.62, No.1. (Mar.,1968), pp.144-168.
② Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration, p.70.
③ Allen Schick, "The Three-Ring Budget Process:The Appropriations, Tax, and Budget Committees in Congress", in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, The New Congress, Washington, D.C:American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,1981, p.297.
④ Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration, p.70.
⑤ Allen Schick, "The Three-Ring Budget Process:The Appropriations, Tax, and Budget Committees in Congress", p.300.
① Robert V. Remini, The House:The Histoiy of the House of Representatives, pp.272-275
② Ronald M. Peters, Jr., The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Perspective,2nd ed., Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press,1997, p.92
③ Smith and Deering, Committees in Congress,2nd ed., p.45.
④ Nelson W. Polsby; Miriam Gallaher; Barry Spencer Rundquist, "The Growth of the Seniority System in the U. S. House of Representatives", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, No.3. (Sep.,1969), pp.787-807.
⑤ Richard Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees, pp.2-5.
⑥ Allen Schick, "The Three-Ring Budget Process:The Appropriations, Tax, and Budge Committees in Congress", p.296.
① Richard Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees, p.48.
② Richard Fenno, Jr., The Power of the Purse:Appropriations Politics in Congress, p.72.
③ Richard Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees, p.143.
④ Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration, pp.71-72.
⑤ Lance T. LeLoup, The Fiscal Congress:Legislative Control of the Budget, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,1980, p.122.
① Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin, Vital Statistics on Congress, Washington, D.C:Brookings Institute Press,2008, pp.113-114.
① Lewis H. Kimmel, Federal Budget and Fiscal Policy,1789-1958, Washington, D.C:Brookings Institute,1959, p.320.
① Louis Fisher, The Politics of Shared Power:Congress and the Executive, pp.225-226.
①刘绪贻、杨生茂主编：《美国通史》(第六卷上),北京：人民出版社,2001年版,第2-4页。
① Roger H. Davidson, Walter J. Oleszek and Frances E. Lee, Congress and Its Members,12th ed., Washington, D.C:CQ Press,2009, p.433.
①[美]阿伦·威尔达夫斯基：《预算：比较理论》,第37-38页。
② James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress, Washington, D.C:Brookings Institute Press,1981, p.201.
③ James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress, p.204.
④ Howard E. Shuman, Politics and the Budget:The Struggle between the President and the Congress,3rd ed., Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice Hall,1992, pp.223-226.
⑤ James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress, p.6.
① Aaron Wildavsky and Naomi Caiden, The New Politics of the Budgetary Process,5th ed., Beijing: Peking University Press,2004, p.90.
① Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and The Policy Process,6th ed., Washington, D.C: CQ Press,2004,pp.60-61.
②Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts between Congress and the President,5th ed., Lawrence, KS:University Press of Kansas,2007, p.205.
③ Lance T. LeLoup, "Appropriations Politics in Congress:The House Appropriations Committee and the Executive Agencies", Public Budgeting & Finance, Winter 1984, pp.78-98.
④ Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and The Policy Process,6th ed.,p.57.
⑤ Dennis S. Ippolito, "The Power of the Purse:Congressional Participation", in Albert C. Hyde, ed., Government Budgeting: Theory, Process, and Politics,3rd ed., Beijing:Peking University Press,2002, p.165.
① Committee on House Rules, History of the United States House of Representatives,1789-1994, House Document No.103-324,1994,p.228.
② Daniel P. Franklin, Making Ends Meets: Congressional Budgeting in the Age of Deficits, Washington, D.C:CQ Press,1993, pp.46-47.
③ Smith and Deering, Committees in Congress,2nd ed., p.51.
① Sean M. Theriault, Party Polarization in Congress, NY: Cambridge University,2008, pp.23-28.
② Smith and Deering, Committees in Congress,2nd ed., p.51.
③ Allen Schick, "The Three-Ring Budget Process:The Appropriations, Tax, and Budget Committees in Congress", p.299.
④ Allen Schick, Congress and Money: Budgeting, Spending and Taxing, p.434.
⑤ Diana Evans, "Appropriations in the Republican Era", Extensions, Spring 2007, pp.1-7
⑥ Allen Schick, "The Three-Ring Budget Process:The Appropriations, Tax, and Budget Committees in Congress", pp.300-301.
① Allen Schick, Congress and Money:Budgeting, Spending and Taxing, p.429.
② Lance T. LeLoup, "Appropriations Politics in Congress:The House Appropriations Committee and the Executive Agencies", pp.78-98.
③ Allen Schick, Congress and Money:Budgeting, Spending and Taxing, p.411.
④ Lance T. LeLoup ed., "Appropriations Politics in Congress:The House Appropriations Committee and the Executive Agencies", pp.78-98.
⑤ Allen Schick, The Federal Budget:Politics, Policy, Process,3rd ed., pp.236-237.
① Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin, Vital Statistics on Congress, pp.113-114.
② James V. Saturno, "Appropriations Subcommittee Structure:History of Changes from 1920-2007", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL31572, January 31,2007.
③ John H. Makin and Norman J. Ornstein, Debt and Taxes: How America Got into Its Budget Mess and What to Do About It, NY: Times Books,1994, pp.12-13.
④[美]约瑟夫·E·斯蒂格利茨著：《公共部门经济学》(第三版),郭庆旺等译,北京：中国人民大学出版社,2005年版,第333页。
⑤ Louis Fisher, The Politics of Shared Power: Congress and the Executive, p.229.
① Lance T. LeLoup, Barbara Luck Graham, and Stacey Barwick, "Deficit Politics and Constitutional Government: The Impact of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings", in Albert C. Hyde, ed., Government Budgeting: Theory, Process, and Politics,3rd ed., Beijing: Peking University Press, 2002,pp.198-200.
② Committee on House Rules, History of the United States House of Representatives,1789-1994, House Document No.103-324,1994,p.229.
③ James A. Thurber, "Congressional Budget Reform:Impact on the Appropriations Committees", Public Budgeting & Finance, Fall 1997, pp.62-73.
④ Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek, Congress and Its Members,10th ed., Washington,D.C:CQ Press,2005, p.444.
① Charles Stewart Ⅲ, "Budget Reform as Strategic Legislative Action:An Exploration", The Journal of Politics, Vol.50, No.2, May,1988, pp.292-321.
① Osbin L. Ervin, "Appropriating Vs. Budgeting: A Comparison of Municipal Fiscal Process". Public Budgeting & Finance, Winter 1988, pp.45-53.
① Bill Heniff, Jr., "The Spending Pipeline:Stages of Federal Spending", CRS Report for Congress, June 17,2008.
② Sandy Streeter, "The Congressional Appropriations Process:An Introduction", CRS Report for Congress, February 22,2008.
① Robert Keith, "Introduction to the Federal Budget Process", CRS Report for Congress, November 20,2008.
②参见总统管理与预算办公室官方网站http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization_office/,2009年11月10日访问。
③[美]雪莉·琳内·汤姆金著：《透视美国管理与预算局：总统预算局内的政治与过程》,苟燕楠译,上海财经大学出版社,2009年版,第110-112页。
① Allen Schick, The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process, p.94.
② Robert Keith, "Introduction to the Federal Budget Process", CRS Report for Congress, November 20,2008.
㈢参见FY2010 Budget, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/,2009年12月01日访问。
①参见国会预算办公室网站,http://www.cbo.gov/aboutcbo/factslieet.shtml,2009年11月10日访问。
② Robert Keith, "Introduction to the Federal Budget Process", CRS Report for Congress, November 20,2008.
①H.Con.Res.85,http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c111:1:./temp/～c111lyP8Cp::,2009年11月10日访问。
① Robert Keith, "The'Deeming Resolution':A Budget Enforcement Tool", CRS Report for Congress, November 14,2008.
② Bill Heniff, Jr, "Budget Resolution Enforcement", CRS Report for Congress, August 12,2008.
③ Bill Heniff, Jr, "Functional Categories of the Federal Budget", CRS Report for Congress, August 19,2008.
① Philip G. Joyce, "Congressional Budget Reform:The Unanticipated Implications for Federal Making", Public Administration Review, Vol.56,No.4, July.-Aug.,1996, pp.317-325.
② Davidson and Oleszek, Congress and Its Members,10th ed., p.444.
①Bill Heniff, Jr, "Budget Resolution Legislation:Development and Consideration", CRS Report for Congress, August 12,2008.
① Robert Keith.,"The Budget Reconciliation Process:The Senate's'Byrd Rule'", CRS Report for Congress, April 7,2005.
① Bill Heniff, Jr., "Overview of the Authorization-Appropriations Process", CRS Report for Congress, June 17,2008.
① D.Andrew Austin and Mindy R. Levit, "Trends in Discretionary Spending", CRS Report for Congress, December 23,2008.
① Walter Kravitz, American Congressional Dictionary,3rd ed., Washington, D.C.:Congressional Quarterly Press,2001, pp.15-16.
① Bill Heniff, Jr, "Allocation and Subdivisions in the Congressional Budget Process", CRS Report for Congress, June 17,2008.
①Walter Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process,6th ed., p.125
②参见国会图书馆立法记录,http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR02997:@@@L&summ2=m&,2009年11月10日访问。
① James V. Saturno, "Points of Order in the Congressional Budget Process", CRS Report for Congress, June 1,2009.
① Walter Kravitz, American Congressional Dictionary,3rd, p.206.
②参见国会图书馆立法记录,http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR02997:@@@L&summ2=m&,2009年1]月10日访问。
③参见国会图书馆立法记录,http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:SN01406:@@@L&summ2=m&,2009年11月10日访问。
①参见国会图书馆立法记录,http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR02997:@@@L&summ2=m&,2009年11月10日访问。
②所谓转用即将预算授权从一个账目更改为另一个账目的做法。例如,一个机构将“工资与开支”账目的预算授权转移到“建设”项目上,即转移使用。如果没有法定授权,行政机构禁止使用这种跨账目的转用方式。相反,行政机构通常可以在没有法定授权的情况下在同一账目内将某一事务的开支转而用于其他事务。这种账目内的“转用”也被称为“重新规划”(reprogramming)。两院拨款分委员会在各自的政策领域内为规范行政机构的重新规划行为,而制定了申报制度以及其他监管程序。
③ Sandy Streeter, "The Congressional Appropriations Process:An Introduction", CRS Report for Congress, December 2,2008.
① Michael H. Crespin, Charles J. Finocchiaro, and Emily O. Wanless, "Perception and Reality in Congressional Earmarks", The Forum, Vol.7, Issue 2,2009, Article 1,
① CRS Appropriations Team, "Earmarks in Appropriation Acts:FY1994, FY1996, FY1998, FY2000, FY 2002, FY2004, FY2005", CRS Report for Congress, January 26,2006.
① Robert Keith, "Federal Budget Process Reform in the 110th Congress:A Brief Overview", CRS Report for Congress, November 20,2008.
① "Pelosi, Hoyer and Obey Announce Further Earmark Reforms", http://appropriations.house.gov/pdf/EarmarkAnnouncement3-11-09.pdf,2009年11月10日访问。
② Robert Keith, "Introduction to the Federal Budget Process", CRS Report for Congress, November 20,2008.
① Sandy Streeter, "The Congressional Appropriations Process:An Introduction", CRS Report for Congress, December 2,2008.
② Robert Keith, "Introduction to the Federal Budget Process", CRS Report for Congress, November 20,2008.
① D. Robert Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, "Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decision", American Journal of Political Science, Vol.32, No.3, Aug.,1988, pp.731-736.
② Ed Gillespie and Bob Schellhas, ed., Contract With America:The Bold Plan By Rep. Newt Gingrich, Rep. Dick Armey, And The House Republicans To Change The Nation, NY:Times Books,1994,p.23.
③ Robert Keith, "Introduction to the Federal Budget Process", CRS Report for Congress, November 20,2008.
④ Ibid.
① Allen Schick, Congress and Money: Budgeting Spending and Taxing, p.6.
① Davidson. Oleszek and Lee, Congress and Its Members,12th ed., p.64.
② Ibid., p.215
① How Congress Works,4th ed., Congressional Quarterly Press,2008, p.171.
① How Congress Works,4th ed.,pp.174.175.
②另外一名参与预算委员会的共和党议员由共和党领袖指派。
③ How Congress Works,4th ed.,p.174.
① Davidson, Oleszek and Lee, Congress and Its Members,12th ed., p.213
② How Congress Works,4th ed., p.175.
① Richard Fenno, Jr, "The House Appropriations Committees as a Political System:The Problem of Integration", The American Political Science Review, Vol.56, No.2, Jun.,1962, pp.310-324.
② Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees, pp.15-16.
③ Ibid., p.84.
① Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees, p.1.
② Ibid., p.139.
③ David Rohde and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Democratic Committee Assignment in the House of Representatives:Strategic Aspects of a Social Choice Process", American Political Science Review, No.67,1973, p.905.
④ Edward I. Sidlow, Freshman Orientation: House Style and Home Style, Washington.D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press,2007,pp.60-63.
⑤ Smith and Deering, Committees in Congress,2nd ed., p.97.
① D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, "Congressional Appropriations and the Electoral Connection", The Journal of Politics, Vol.47. No.1 (Feb.,1985), pp.59-82.
② Smith and Deering, Committees in Congress,2nd ed., p.67.
① Hook, "The Influence Committees:Money and Issues", Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, January 3,1987, p.22.
② Diana Granat, "House Appropriations Panel Doles Out Cold Federal Cash, Chafes at Budget Procedures", Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, June 18,1983, p.1209.
③ Smith and Deering, Committees in Congress,2nd ed., pp.84-85.
④ Kenneth A. Shepsle, The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle: Democratic Committee Assignment in the Modern House, Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1978, p.238.
① Smith and Deering, Committees in Congress,2nd ed., p.73.
① Smith and Deering, Committees in Congress,2nd ed., p.106.
② Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House, pp.174-175.
① Scott A. Frisch and Sean Q. Kelly, Committee Assignment Politics in the U.S. House of Representatives, Norman, OK:University of Oklahoma Press,2005, pp.87-88.
② Bryan W. Marshal, Brandon C. Prins, and David W. Rohde, "Fighting Fire With Water: Partisan Procedural Strategies and the Senate Appropriations Committees", Congress and The Presidency, Vol.26, No.2, Fall 1999, pp.113-132.
③ Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees, p.84.
① Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting, New York: Oxford University Press,1997.
②数据来自www.voteview.com,目前可查找使用的数据为第1届至第110届国会。
①张光、刁大明主编：《美国国会研究手册(2007-2008)》,第144页。
② http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steny_Hoyer,2009年12月8日访问。
① http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carrie_Meek,2009年12月8日访问。
② http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tom_Delay,2009年12月8日访问。
③张光、刁大明主编：《美国国会研究手册(2007-2008)》,第455页。
④ Michael Barone and Richard E. Cohen, The Almanac of American Politics 2008, Washington, D.C.:National Journal Group,2007, p.468.
⑤ Barone and Cohen, The Almanac of American Politics 2008, p.134.
① Barone and Cohen,The Almanac of American Politics 2008,p.426.
② Ibid.,p.526.
③ Ibid.,pp.1560.1561.
④ Ibid.,p.566.
⑤ Ibid.,pp.400-401.
⑥张光、刁大明主编：《美国国会研究手册(2007-2008)》,第685页。
①张光、刁大明主编：《美国国会研究手册(2007-2008)》,第441-442页。
① Barone and Cohen, The Almanac of American Politics 2008, pp.729-730.
② Damon M. Cann, Sharing the Wealth: Member Contributions and the Exchange Theory of Party Influence in the U.S. House of Representatives, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,2008, p.80.
① Barone and Cohen, The Almanac of American Politics 2008, p.191& p.206.
②穆萨于2010年2月8日去世。
③Barone and Cohen, The Almanac of American Politics 2008, p.1320.
④ Ibid., p.768.
⑤ Ibid., pp.438-439.
⑥ Ibid., p.1137.
⑦ Ibid.., p.700.
⑧ Ibid., pp.1600-1601.
① Barone and Cohen, The Almanac of American Politics 2008, p.1055.
①张光、刁大明主编：《美国国会研究手册(2007-2008)》,第618-619页。
② http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jon_Tester,2009年12月9日访问。
① Steven D. Levitt and James M. Snyder Jr., "Political Parties and the Distribution of Federal Outlays", American Journal of Political Science, Vol.39, No.4, Nov,1995, pp.958-980.
② Robert M. Stein and Kenneth N. Bickers, "Congressional Elections and the Pork Barrel", The Journal of Politics, Vol.56, No.2, May,1994, pp.377-399.
③ Robert M. Stein and Kenneth N. Bickers, "The Electoral Dynamics of the Federal Pork Barrel" American Journal of Political Science, Vol.40, No.4, Nov,1996, pp.1300-1332.
① Martin L. Wattenberg, The Rise of Candidate Centered Politics, Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press,1991.
② Assar Lindbeck and Jorgen W. Weibull, "Balanced-Budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition", Public Choice, Vol.52, No.3,1987, pp.273-297.以及 Avinash Dixit and John Londregan, "Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency", The American Political Science Review, Vol.89, No.4,Dec.1995, pp.856-866.
③ Kenneth N. Bickers and Robert M. Stein, "The Congressional Pork Barrel in a Republican Era", The Journal of Politics,Vol.62, No.4, Nov,2000, pp.1070-1086.
① John A. Ferejohn, Pork Barrel Politics: Rivers and Harbors Legislation,1947-1968, Stanford, CA:Stanford University Press,1974, pp.49-51.
② Diana Evans, Greasing the Wheels: Using Pork Barrel Projects to Build Majority Coalitions in Congress, NY: Cambridge University Press,2004.
③ Steven D. Levitt and James M. Poterba, "Congressional Distributive Politics and State Economic Performance", Public Choice, No.1/2,1999, pp.185-216.
④ William R. Hauk, Jr., and Romain Wacziarg, "Small States, Big Pork", Quarterly Journal of Political Science, No.2,2007, pp.95-106.
①Brian Kelly, Adventures in Porkland:How Washington Wastes Your Money and Why They Won't Stop, NY:Times Books,1993, p.ⅹⅱ.
①Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees, pp.2-4.
②John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde, "The Republican Revolution and the House Appropriations Committee", The Journal of Politics, Vol.62, No.1(Feb.,2000), pp.1-33.
① Barone and Cohen, The Almanac of American Politics 2010, p.1291.
② http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johnstowmn, Pennsylvania,2010年2月10曰访问。
③ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Murtha_Johnstown-Cambria_County_Airport,2010年2月10日访问。
④ Jim Acosta and Janet Rodriguez, "Remote Murtha airport lands big bucks from Washington", http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/23/murtha.airport/?iref=mpstoryview,20]0年2月10日访问。
①Carol D. Leonnig, "Murtha's Earmarks Keep Airport Aloft", Washington Post, April 19,2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/18/AR2009041802128.html?sid=ST2009041 8021462010年2月10日访问。
② Barone and Cohen, The Almanac of American Politics 2010, pp.1292-1293.
① Barone and Cohen, The Almanac of American Politics 2010, p.1293.
②资料来自约翰·穆萨的国会众议院官方网站www.murtha.house.gov,2010年2月9日访问,2010年2月10日关闭。
① John M. Carey, "Legislative Organization", in R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder and Bert A. Rockman, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006, p.431.
①刘剑文：《宪政与中国财政民主》,《税务研究》,2008年第4期,第3-8页。
②林尚立：《民主集中制的财政基础——对中国国家建设的一种分析》,《社会科学》,2006年第11期,第29-42页。
①蒋洪等著：《公共财政决策与监督制度研究》,北京：中国财政经济出版社,2008年10月,第142页。
②陈仪：《强化人大预算审议权的路径选择》,《法学》,2009年第9期,第73-84页。
①《公共财政决策与监督制度研究》,第143页。
②同上,第143页。
③卢洪友主编：《政府预算学》,第250页。
④张晓明：《我国人大预算监督制度存在问题及完善对策——借鉴美国国会预算监督制度的经验》,《人大研究》,2009年第8期,第17-21页。
①孙哲：《全国人大制度研究(1979-2000)》,北京：法律出版社,2004年12月,第204页。
①陈仪：《强化人大预算审议权的路径选择》,第73-84页。
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19.尹中卿：《当代美国国会的财政监督程序》,《人大研究》,2002年第3期,第43-44页。
20.喻中：《从“法律-制度范式”到“行为-过程范式”——试论权力制约理论研究中的范式转换》,《中共中央党校学报》,2006年第2期,第83-86页。
21.袁星侯：《中西政府预算比较研究》(财政学专业博士论文),厦门大学,2002年。
22.张丽华：《西方国家财政预算审计纵览》,《理财杂志》,2004年第12期,第17-19页。
23.张涛：《析纳税人的权利》,《涉外税务》,2004年第4期,第19-23页。
24.张晓明：《我国人大预算监督制度存在问题及完善对策——借鉴美国国会预算监督制度的经验》,《人大研究》,2009年第8期,第17-21页。
25.张馨：《论政府预算的法治性》,《财经问题研究》,1998年第11期,第17-22页。
26.章伟：《预算、权力与民主：美国预算史中的权力结构变迁》(行政管理专业博士论文),复旦大学,2005年。
27.赵可金：《美国学界对国会政治研究的范式转换》，《国际政治研究》,2008年第4期,第54-74页。
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01.美国国会参议院官方网站：http://www.senate.gov
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09.美国总审计署官方网站：http://www. gao. gov
10.美国人口普查局官方网站：http://www.census.gov
11.美国政府印务办公室官方网站：http://www.gpoaccess.gov
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15.世界银行官方网站：http://www. worldbank.org/
16. Keith Poole教授提供DW指数的个人网站：www. votevi ew. com
17. Charles Stewart Ⅲ教授提供委员会组成数据的个人网站http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html
18.“维基百科”网站英文版：http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page