质量因素影响下的双边市场平台均衡分析
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摘要
双边市场理论是近年来西方产业组织理论领域兴起的一个新的课题。其研究的主要内容是针对具有网络外部性的两个消费者群体的中介平台以及两边消费者的各种经济行为。但是,双边市场的研究在我国还正处于起步阶段,因此,对于双边市场的研究具有重要的理论和实践意义。
本文从平台企业的角度出发,研究不同平台企业在不同市场形态下,企业应该做出如何的决策使得利润最大化。首先本文对国内外相关的文献分别从市场创造型、受众创造型和需求协调型三种类型进行综述。接着对双边市场的理论基础进行了仔细的梳理,包括平台不同的定价方式、网络外部性、归属性、转移成本、平台排他行为以及产品差异化。以往针对双边市场的研究都会涉及到这些理论知识。然而,本文在前人的基础上主要是讨论平台企业对于平台质量水平的选择问题,因此,更多涉及到纵向差异化以及静态博弈模型。为此,我们也对其做了详细的介绍。
本文的重点放在平台企业如何在垄断和竞争两种市场形态下决策。在垄断模型部分,本文通过性价比形式引入质量指数,建立考虑平台质量的垄断模型,求解出平台利润最大化条件下最优质量水平和价格结构。并且在双边不同的需求参数、网络外部性参数、成本参数的前提下,推导平台的最优质量选择和定价,同时通过计算机模拟,分析平台最优质量和价格与相关上述参数间的变化趋势。结果发现:对于平台初始需求以及网络外部性变化的平台企业,应该选择降低平台质量水平;对于性价比系数、平台固定成本以及双边用户边际成本变化的平台企业,提高平台质量水平是明智的选择。在竞争模型中,本文借鉴泰勒纵向差异化模型,引入网络外部性的假设建立双寡头双边市场模型,运用伯川德价格竞争确定平台价格,建立完全信息静态博弈,以此来确定选择高或者低质量平台。研究发现:当双边用户均受到正的网络外部性时,平台企业都应该选择高质量水平;当双边用户均受到对方的负的网络外部性时,一个平台选择高质量,另一个选择低质量;当受到网络外部性较大一边为正的网络外部性,受到网络外部性较小一边为负的网络外部性时,平台企业都应该选择高质量水平为最优策略;相反,一个平台选择高质量,另一个选择低质量。接着,本文选择电视媒体平台进行了实证分析和说明,并且得到相同的结论。
Two-sided markets theory is a new subject which rises at the area of industrial organization theory in recent years. It mainly focuses on the economic behaviors of two-sided consumers and platform which faces two groups of customers with network externalities between them. Research of two-sided markets is now at its beginning phase. Generally speaking, research of two-sided markets has important theoretical and practical meaning.
This paper, from the angle of two-sided market enterprises, researches how enterprises should make decisions to maximize the profits in the different markets on different platforms form. First, this paper review the relevant literature at home and abroad from three types of two-sided markets which including market-makers,audience-makers, demand coordinator. Then the theoretical foundation has been carefully combed, including the different pricing, network externalities, attribution, transfer costs, exclusive behavior and product differentiation. Previous researches on two-sided markets always involve these theoretical foundations. However, this paper focuses on the enterprises’choice of quality level of the platform on the basis of our predecessors. And therefore, it is more related to vertical differentiation, as well as the static game model. We have also made a detailed presentation of them.
This paper focuses on how platform enterprise should make decisions under monopoly and competitive market. In the part of monopoly model, this paper attempts to build a monopoly model and work out the optimal level of quality and price structure under the condition of profit maximization in two-sided markets by introducing the quality index in form of price verse performance ratio. On the premise of two-sided different parameters of demand, network externalities and cost, this article also deduces the optimal level of quality and price structure, and analyses the variation tendency of those parameters through computer simulation. The results showed that: for the variation of original demand and the network externalities, we should choose to lower quality level of platform; for the variation of cost-effective coefficient, fixed costs and marginal cost , improve the quality level of platform is a wise choice. In the part of competition model, this paper uses Taylor’s vertical differentiation model for reference, and introduces the hypothesis of network externalities to establish a bilateral duopoly market model. We use Bertrand price competition to determine price, establish complete information static game, in order to determine the choice of high or low quality of platform. The study finds out: when the network externalities is positive, both of the two enterprises should choose a high level quality of platform; when the network externalities is negative, an enterprise chooses high-quality, and another chooses low-quality; when the larger network externalities is positive, the smaller is negative, the enterprise should choose a high quality level as the optimal strategy; on the contrary, an enterprise chooses high-quality, and another chooses low-quality. In the end, this paper selects television media platform as an example, and gets the same conclusion.
本文从平台企业的角度出发,研究不同平台企业在不同市场形态下,企业应该做出如何的决策使得利润最大化。首先本文对国内外相关的文献分别从市场创造型、受众创造型和需求协调型三种类型进行综述。接着对双边市场的理论基础进行了仔细的梳理,包括平台不同的定价方式、网络外部性、归属性、转移成本、平台排他行为以及产品差异化。以往针对双边市场的研究都会涉及到这些理论知识。然而,本文在前人的基础上主要是讨论平台企业对于平台质量水平的选择问题,因此,更多涉及到纵向差异化以及静态博弈模型。为此,我们也对其做了详细的介绍。
本文的重点放在平台企业如何在垄断和竞争两种市场形态下决策。在垄断模型部分,本文通过性价比形式引入质量指数,建立考虑平台质量的垄断模型,求解出平台利润最大化条件下最优质量水平和价格结构。并且在双边不同的需求参数、网络外部性参数、成本参数的前提下,推导平台的最优质量选择和定价,同时通过计算机模拟,分析平台最优质量和价格与相关上述参数间的变化趋势。结果发现:对于平台初始需求以及网络外部性变化的平台企业,应该选择降低平台质量水平;对于性价比系数、平台固定成本以及双边用户边际成本变化的平台企业,提高平台质量水平是明智的选择。在竞争模型中,本文借鉴泰勒纵向差异化模型,引入网络外部性的假设建立双寡头双边市场模型,运用伯川德价格竞争确定平台价格,建立完全信息静态博弈,以此来确定选择高或者低质量平台。研究发现:当双边用户均受到正的网络外部性时,平台企业都应该选择高质量水平;当双边用户均受到对方的负的网络外部性时,一个平台选择高质量,另一个选择低质量;当受到网络外部性较大一边为正的网络外部性,受到网络外部性较小一边为负的网络外部性时,平台企业都应该选择高质量水平为最优策略;相反,一个平台选择高质量,另一个选择低质量。接着,本文选择电视媒体平台进行了实证分析和说明,并且得到相同的结论。
Two-sided markets theory is a new subject which rises at the area of industrial organization theory in recent years. It mainly focuses on the economic behaviors of two-sided consumers and platform which faces two groups of customers with network externalities between them. Research of two-sided markets is now at its beginning phase. Generally speaking, research of two-sided markets has important theoretical and practical meaning.
This paper, from the angle of two-sided market enterprises, researches how enterprises should make decisions to maximize the profits in the different markets on different platforms form. First, this paper review the relevant literature at home and abroad from three types of two-sided markets which including market-makers,audience-makers, demand coordinator. Then the theoretical foundation has been carefully combed, including the different pricing, network externalities, attribution, transfer costs, exclusive behavior and product differentiation. Previous researches on two-sided markets always involve these theoretical foundations. However, this paper focuses on the enterprises’choice of quality level of the platform on the basis of our predecessors. And therefore, it is more related to vertical differentiation, as well as the static game model. We have also made a detailed presentation of them.
This paper focuses on how platform enterprise should make decisions under monopoly and competitive market. In the part of monopoly model, this paper attempts to build a monopoly model and work out the optimal level of quality and price structure under the condition of profit maximization in two-sided markets by introducing the quality index in form of price verse performance ratio. On the premise of two-sided different parameters of demand, network externalities and cost, this article also deduces the optimal level of quality and price structure, and analyses the variation tendency of those parameters through computer simulation. The results showed that: for the variation of original demand and the network externalities, we should choose to lower quality level of platform; for the variation of cost-effective coefficient, fixed costs and marginal cost , improve the quality level of platform is a wise choice. In the part of competition model, this paper uses Taylor’s vertical differentiation model for reference, and introduces the hypothesis of network externalities to establish a bilateral duopoly market model. We use Bertrand price competition to determine price, establish complete information static game, in order to determine the choice of high or low quality of platform. The study finds out: when the network externalities is positive, both of the two enterprises should choose a high level quality of platform; when the network externalities is negative, an enterprise chooses high-quality, and another chooses low-quality; when the larger network externalities is positive, the smaller is negative, the enterprise should choose a high quality level as the optimal strategy; on the contrary, an enterprise chooses high-quality, and another chooses low-quality. In the end, this paper selects television media platform as an example, and gets the same conclusion.
引文
[1] Evans, D. S. Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-sided Platform Industries. Review of Network Economics, 2003a, 2(3):191-209.
[2]林勇汉.科技中介基本业务运作问题研究[D] .上海:上海交通大学管理学院,2003.
[3] Armstrong M. Competition in Two-Sided Markets [EB]. IDEI, 2004.
[4] Caillaud B. and B. Jullien. Chicken & egg: competition among intermediation service providers [J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 2002, 24:309-328.
[5]纪汉霖.服务质量差异化条件下的双边市场定价策略研究[J].产业经济研究,2007.
[6]罗钢,黄丽华.网络外部性条件下电子商务平台双边定价策略[J].企业经济.2007,4.
[7]龚亮.第三方B2B电子商务平台定价研究——基于双边市场理论[J].市场营销,2008.
[8]岳中刚.转移成本、锁定效应与定价策略研究——以银行卡产业为例[J].河北经贸大学学报,2008,3.
[9]帅旭,陈宏民.转移成本、网络外部性与企业竞争战略研究[J].系统工程学报.2003,10.
[10] Gabszewicz J. and X. Y. Wauthy. Two-Sided markets and price competition with multihoming [EB]. IDEI, 2004.
[11] Anderson S P and S. Coate. Market Provision of Broadcasting: A Welfare Analysis [Z].Working Paper, University of Virginia, 2003.
[12] Wright J. and U. Kaiser. Price Structure in Two-Sided Markets: Evidence from the Magazine Industry [EB]. IDEI, 2004.
[13] Wilbur and Kenneth C. Modeling the Effects of Advertisement Avoidance Technology on Advertisement Supported Media: the Case of Digital Video Recorders. Unpublished manuscript, University of Virginia, 2004.
[14]刘海霞,孙振球,胡德华,刘双阳.开放存取期刊质量的双边市场模型研究[J].情报杂志,2007,6.
[15]程贵孙,陈宏民.基于双边市场的传媒产业政府规制[J].上海交通大学学报,2008,9.
[16] Rochet J. C., Tirole. J. Cooperation among Competitors: The Economics of Payment Card Associations. Rand Journal of Economics, 2002, 33:549-570.
[17] Wright J. One-Sided Logic in Two-Sided Markets [J]. Review of Network Economics, 2004a, 3(1):44-64.
[18] Rochet J. C., Tirole. J. Tying in two-sided markets and the honor all cards rule [J].International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2008.
[19]岳中刚.转移成本、锁定效应与定价策略研究——以银行卡产业为例[J].河北经贸大学学报,2008,3.
[20]武云亮,岳中刚.银行卡产业交易定价的理论与实证研究[J].经济管理,2008,12.
[21]李泉,陈宏民.基于双边市场框架的软件产业效率与福利分析[J].系统管理学报,2008,8.
[22]卢强.操作系统双边平台交叉网络效应实证分析[J].求索,2008,5.
[23]王希凤,王国才.网络外部性、纵向差异与企业竞争策略研究[J].现代管理科学. 2008.3.
[24] Katz, M. C. and C. Shapiro. Two-sided markets and electronic intermediaries[R].CESifo Working Paper 1345,2004.
[25] Evans, D. S. The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets[J]. Yale Journal on Regulation, 2003b, 20:325-381.
[26] Shapiro C, Varian H. Information rules: a strategic guide to the network economy[M]. Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1998.
[27] Economides, Flyer F. Technical Standards Coalitions for Network Goods [M] .1998.
[28] Farrell J, Klemperer P. Coordination and lock-in: competition with switching costs and network effects [J]. Competition Policy Center, 2006.
[29] Klemperer P. Markets with consumer switching costs[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987, (102): 375-394.
[30]苏素.产品定价的理论与方法研究[D].重庆:重庆大学,2001.
[31]蒲勇健,赵耀华.博弈论与经济模型[M].重庆:重庆大学出版社,2007.
[32]胥悦红,徐二明.锁定对网络经济下企业信息化的战略影响[J].科学管理研究, 2004, (5) .
[33] Armstrong M. and J. Wright. Two-sided markets, competitive bottlenecks and exclusive contracts [J]. Economic Theory. 2007,32:353-380.
[34] Rysman M. An Empirical Analysis of Payment Card Usage. Mimeo, 2004.
[35] Rysman M. Competition between Networks: A Study of the Market for Yellow Pages [EB]. Review of Economic Studies, Mimeo, Boston University, 2002.
[36] Hotelling H. Stability in Competition [J]. Economic Journal, 1929:41-57.
[37] Katz M. and C. Shapiro. Systems Competition and Network Effects [J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1994, 8:93-115.
[38] Schmalensee R. Payment Systems and Interchange Fees [J].Journal of Industrial Economics, 2002, 50: 103- 122.
[39] Schmalensee R. A Note on the Theory of Vertical Integration [J]. The Journal of Political Economy,1973,81(2):441-449.
[40] Hagiu A. Two-Sided Platforms: Pricing and Social Efficiency [EB/OL]. IDEI , 2005.
[41] Hagiu A. Optimal Pricing and Commitment in Two-Sided Markets [EB]. IDEI, 2004.
[2]林勇汉.科技中介基本业务运作问题研究[D] .上海:上海交通大学管理学院,2003.
[3] Armstrong M. Competition in Two-Sided Markets [EB]. IDEI, 2004.
[4] Caillaud B. and B. Jullien. Chicken & egg: competition among intermediation service providers [J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 2002, 24:309-328.
[5]纪汉霖.服务质量差异化条件下的双边市场定价策略研究[J].产业经济研究,2007.
[6]罗钢,黄丽华.网络外部性条件下电子商务平台双边定价策略[J].企业经济.2007,4.
[7]龚亮.第三方B2B电子商务平台定价研究——基于双边市场理论[J].市场营销,2008.
[8]岳中刚.转移成本、锁定效应与定价策略研究——以银行卡产业为例[J].河北经贸大学学报,2008,3.
[9]帅旭,陈宏民.转移成本、网络外部性与企业竞争战略研究[J].系统工程学报.2003,10.
[10] Gabszewicz J. and X. Y. Wauthy. Two-Sided markets and price competition with multihoming [EB]. IDEI, 2004.
[11] Anderson S P and S. Coate. Market Provision of Broadcasting: A Welfare Analysis [Z].Working Paper, University of Virginia, 2003.
[12] Wright J. and U. Kaiser. Price Structure in Two-Sided Markets: Evidence from the Magazine Industry [EB]. IDEI, 2004.
[13] Wilbur and Kenneth C. Modeling the Effects of Advertisement Avoidance Technology on Advertisement Supported Media: the Case of Digital Video Recorders. Unpublished manuscript, University of Virginia, 2004.
[14]刘海霞,孙振球,胡德华,刘双阳.开放存取期刊质量的双边市场模型研究[J].情报杂志,2007,6.
[15]程贵孙,陈宏民.基于双边市场的传媒产业政府规制[J].上海交通大学学报,2008,9.
[16] Rochet J. C., Tirole. J. Cooperation among Competitors: The Economics of Payment Card Associations. Rand Journal of Economics, 2002, 33:549-570.
[17] Wright J. One-Sided Logic in Two-Sided Markets [J]. Review of Network Economics, 2004a, 3(1):44-64.
[18] Rochet J. C., Tirole. J. Tying in two-sided markets and the honor all cards rule [J].International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2008.
[19]岳中刚.转移成本、锁定效应与定价策略研究——以银行卡产业为例[J].河北经贸大学学报,2008,3.
[20]武云亮,岳中刚.银行卡产业交易定价的理论与实证研究[J].经济管理,2008,12.
[21]李泉,陈宏民.基于双边市场框架的软件产业效率与福利分析[J].系统管理学报,2008,8.
[22]卢强.操作系统双边平台交叉网络效应实证分析[J].求索,2008,5.
[23]王希凤,王国才.网络外部性、纵向差异与企业竞争策略研究[J].现代管理科学. 2008.3.
[24] Katz, M. C. and C. Shapiro. Two-sided markets and electronic intermediaries[R].CESifo Working Paper 1345,2004.
[25] Evans, D. S. The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets[J]. Yale Journal on Regulation, 2003b, 20:325-381.
[26] Shapiro C, Varian H. Information rules: a strategic guide to the network economy[M]. Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1998.
[27] Economides, Flyer F. Technical Standards Coalitions for Network Goods [M] .1998.
[28] Farrell J, Klemperer P. Coordination and lock-in: competition with switching costs and network effects [J]. Competition Policy Center, 2006.
[29] Klemperer P. Markets with consumer switching costs[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987, (102): 375-394.
[30]苏素.产品定价的理论与方法研究[D].重庆:重庆大学,2001.
[31]蒲勇健,赵耀华.博弈论与经济模型[M].重庆:重庆大学出版社,2007.
[32]胥悦红,徐二明.锁定对网络经济下企业信息化的战略影响[J].科学管理研究, 2004, (5) .
[33] Armstrong M. and J. Wright. Two-sided markets, competitive bottlenecks and exclusive contracts [J]. Economic Theory. 2007,32:353-380.
[34] Rysman M. An Empirical Analysis of Payment Card Usage. Mimeo, 2004.
[35] Rysman M. Competition between Networks: A Study of the Market for Yellow Pages [EB]. Review of Economic Studies, Mimeo, Boston University, 2002.
[36] Hotelling H. Stability in Competition [J]. Economic Journal, 1929:41-57.
[37] Katz M. and C. Shapiro. Systems Competition and Network Effects [J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1994, 8:93-115.
[38] Schmalensee R. Payment Systems and Interchange Fees [J].Journal of Industrial Economics, 2002, 50: 103- 122.
[39] Schmalensee R. A Note on the Theory of Vertical Integration [J]. The Journal of Political Economy,1973,81(2):441-449.
[40] Hagiu A. Two-Sided Platforms: Pricing and Social Efficiency [EB/OL]. IDEI , 2005.
[41] Hagiu A. Optimal Pricing and Commitment in Two-Sided Markets [EB]. IDEI, 2004.