商业银行性质的再思考
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摘要
商业银行的存在,对于每一个健康运行的经济体来说,是必不可少的。作为最重要的一种金融中介机构,它改善了信息结构,吸纳和转换风险,提供流动性,从而为便利各种交易创造了条件。其次,在现代金融体系,银行之间的相互依存关系得到更进一步的加强。一家商业银行的倒闭、破产将会引起整个银行行业的“连锁”反应,并且最终会对整个经济的稳定运行造成毁灭性的打击。
虽然商业银行在经济运行中的地位如此重要,但是在传统的新古典经济学的分析框架中却被忽略掉了。商业银行存在的理由被简单的归结于为资金的需求方和供给方提供中介服务。问题是在没有交易成本的新古典经济学里面,既然“市场交易可以无成本地进行”,为什么会存在像商业银行这样的中介机构呢?这是新古典经济学无法解释的一个难题,于是商业银行“理所当然”地被“合理抽象”掉了,甚至干脆被描述成一个“被动消极”地接受中央银行指令的组织。
为了弥补理论界在这一领域的缺失,本文试图采用交易成本经济分析方法对商业银行的性质进行分析,从交易成本的角度来回答“商业银行为什么会存在?”这一问题,这将对于商业银行理论研究有着重大意义。
根据Lewsi(1991)的观点,目前有关商业银行的理论文献可以分为两类:第一类是早期的研究文献,关注解决“为什么存在银行”的这个问题,又称之为“金融媒介理论”。这类研究文献分析了借贷市场的交易成本(Bentson,smith,1976)、不对称信息以及在此之下产生的借款者的“逆选择”和“道德风险”行为和商业银行信息生产优势(Leland,Pyle,1977;Campbell, Kramcaw, 1980;Diamond,1984;Fama,1985)、流动性保险(Daimond,Dybvig,1983)等问题。最新的研究则关注以商业银行为主体的金融中介在消费者消费的跨期平滑中的角色(Merton,1993;Allen,Gale,1995,2000,2001),他们认为银行体系为消费者提供了一种纵向管理风险的工具,消费者拥有银行资产防止了资产价格的过分波动,从而避免了在生命周期内的消费波动。而与此相对应的通过金融市场建立的投资组合只能够解决横向的风险分担问题。
第二类研究文献关注“在商业银行存在的前提下,商业银行某个方面的行为分析”。这些行为包括风险管理、建立投资组合以及约束条件下银行的成本和产出优化等。Swakn(1996)对第二类研究文献做了一个很好的文献综述,并把这些“银行行为”理论分为四个类别的理论或模型:(1)银行风险管理理论;(2)银行投资组合理论;(3)银行的不完全市场模型;(4)银行的投入产出模型。有关银行准备金管理、资本决策、缺口管理、协议贷款、信贷配给理论是银行风险管理理论的主要内容。
虽然每个理论探讨的主要问题各不一致,但存在着一定的相互交叉重叠,就Kelin(1971)的银行不完全市场模型来说,他不但对准备金管理和贷款风险做了合理的假定,而且优化得出了银行“合理”的投资组合形式,所以Swakn(1986)认为以上理论或模型的界限并不是特别明显。
以上所有的这些文献虽然能够在某些方面对商业银行的性质进行一些描述,并在此基础上试图对商业银行为何存在这一问题进行回答。但是商业银行所具有的这些特点和作用,并不能作为对其为何存在这一问题的经济解释。本文试图解决各种难题,完成对这一问题的回答。
为此,本文分为四章组成。首先,第一章导论将提出本文所要解决的问题:为何借贷市场上除了债券合约还存在以商业银行作为中介的存贷款合约呢?指出传统新古典经济学缺少对这一问题的研究和分析。
随后,在第二章中阐述了交易成本经济分析范式与传统新古典经济学分析范式之间的差异,并且提出了作者的观点:如果在忽视交易成本存在的新古典经济学分析范式下,是无法解释商业银行演变的过程以及存在的原因。由于本文将要采用交易成本经济学的一些观点和方法,所以接下来文章进一步阐明交易成本经济学的基本要素,同时对传统新古典经济理论做了一般的批评。其中主要讨论了罗纳德·H·科斯的著作,并介绍其基本观点。作为本文的背景资料,在帮助理解交易成本经济学与新古典经济学的差异方面有着重要作用。
在本文的第三章,则阐释了目前经济学界用于解释商业银行存在的主要理论和模型,并指出这些理论和模型在解释商业银行为何存在这一问题上的不足和缺陷。尽管本文针锋相对的认为:如果忽视交易成本的存在,是无法解释商业银行产生、存在的原因的,但是,对金融媒介的相关理论的阐释和评析将不仅有助于我们对该篇论文主题的深入认识。同时由于在本文的分析中,我们将要采用“代理监督”模型中的一个重要概念,所以对“代理监督”模型的的讨论将有助于我们对本文分析的理解。在这章中分别依次介绍了Douglas W. Diamond和Philip H. Dybvig的DD模型、Leland和Pyle的市场“信号”成本模型、以及Douglas W. Diamond的“代理监督”模型;此章的最后则是对以上三种金融中介理论做的简要评析,并且分别指出了以上各个模型不能解释商业银行存在的原因。
而在论文的最后一章,第四章中,笔者将构建模型,试图在交易成本经济学的基础上对融资活动过程中所涉及到的两种方式——市场、银行,分别加以分析,并得出在一定规模的间接融资活动中,相对于债券合约的形式、商业银行的本质在于利用存贷款合约的形式将融资活动内在化(internalisation)的办法,同时实现了签订和执行合约活动成本的节约和收益的提高这一结论。首先主要是分别对市场和银行签订和执行融资合约所花费的交易成本进行分析。其后,则是从两者所获得的效益的角度展开分析。最后,论文将结合成本和效益来展开对问题的讨论,并解释商业银行的演变过程、以及市场与银行这两种配置资源的方式的效率。论文的最后部分作为结束语回到了这篇论文开篇提出的主题上,并阐发各章之间的相互联系。
通过本文的分析,主要得出以下三个结论:
1.商业银行的产生的原因在于利用存贷款合约的形式将融资活动内在化(internalisation)的办法,同时实现了签订和执行合约活动成本的节约和收益的提高。
2.随着组织的融资交易的增多,无论银行还是市场,其成本上升得越快、而收益增加得越慢。银行和市场的界限将依照下述条件确定:银行和市场都将在边际收益等于零点时停止扩大各自的规模。
3.可能存在多家银行,虽然每家银行所面临的成本收益曲线各不相同,但其共同特点是:成本曲线低于市场的交易成本线;同时收益曲线高于市场的收益线。并且每一家银行组织一笔额外的融资交易的收益与市场组织额外一笔交易的收益是一样的,都同时为零。
最后,本文的创新之处在于:
首先,选题比较新颖。在传统新古典经济学的分析框架中,并没有针对商业银行为何存在这一问题进行讨论。另外,本文的研究角度也比较新颖。本文从交易成本经济学的角度对银行产生问题进行分析;同样,本文的研究方法也较为新颖。在文章采用交易成本经济学的观点对商业银行进行分析时,放弃了交易成本经济学中不同管理方式效益相等的假设,允许不同组织融资交易的方式有着不同的收益。这是过去交易成本经济学中所没有的。由于新古典经济学对交易成本的忽视,过去交易成本经济学的分析重点主要放在对交易成本这一因素的考察,而忽视了不同交易成本下,收益可能不同的情况。这样做的结果将会导致其理论分析存在巨大缺陷。缺少对交易成本分析的新古典经济学固然有其缺陷,但是像交易成本经济学只把分析的重点放在交易成本上而忽视收益的做法,同样使其理论并不完整。就像本文第二章第二节所说的,新古典经济学与交易成本经济学其实并不相互冲突。本文所要做的是采取双方各自的优势,把它们统一在同一个分析框架之中,最后的结果证明这种方法是可行的并且是有用的。本文在采用这种方法的基础上得出上诉三个一般化的结论。
希望本文的研究角度和结论能够对商业银行的研究有所帮助,能够在一定程度上弥补传统经济学对商业银行研究理论上的缺失。
In order to keep healthy and sustainable development of the economic situation, the existence of the commercial bank is a necessary and essential factor. As a most important financial intermediate institution, the commercial bank can improve the structure of information, absorb and transfer the risk and provide the liquidity, so it can create some convenience to a variety of trades. Then the relationship among banks is getting more close than any before in the modern financial system. The bankruptcy of a commercial bank could give rise to the reaction of the whole banking system, and that would destroy the whole economic operation seriously and fatally in the end.
Although the commercial bank is so important, it was ignored in the traditional analytical framework of neoclassical economics. The reason for the existence of commercial banks has been summarized as a intermediate institution for the demand and supple of capital. But there is a problem. That is why commercial banks could exist in the background of non-cost dealing according to neoclassical economics. Thus, it is a difficulty problem which neoclassical economics cannot explain reasonably. Then the existence of commercial banks is neglected which seems logical and rational. As some time, commercial banks have been defined as a organization which accepted the order from central bank passively and negatively.
It would analyze the character of commercial banks by using the method of transaction cost. It would also answer the question of why commercial banks would exist from the angle of transaction cost, and that answer would have great and fundamental meaning to research commercial banks theories.
On the basis of Lewsi(1991)’s point, materials of manufacturer theory of commercial banks were divided into two categories. One was research literatures in the earlier period which paid more attention to deal with the reason of the existence of commercial banks. And those theories were also called as the theory of financial intermediate. Those kinds of literatures had analyzed the cost in the borrow and land markets(Bentson,smith,1976), asymmetric information ,adverse selection, moral hazard and the productive advantage of information of commercial banks which were triggered by asymmetric information(Leland,Pyle,1977;Campbell, Kramcaw, 1980;Diamond,1984;Fama,1985), and liquidity insurance(Daimond,Dybvig,1983),etc. The newest research had kept close watch on the role of financial intermediate of which commercial banks as the principal part in the cross-periods consumption of consumers(Merton,1993;Allen,Gale,1995,2000,2001). Those scholars believed that the system of commercial banks provided a kind of instrument to manage risks lengthways. Because consumers possessed assets of commercial banks, then that could avoid fluctuation of assets price acutely and seriously. And it also could turn the fluctuation of consumption in a life cycle away. At the same time, the investment portfolio which was based on financial market could merely figure out transverse participation of risks. Another kind of research literatures had paid more attention to some behavior research of commercial banks which based on the existence of commercial banks.
And those behaviors included risk management, making up of portfolio, commercial banks’cost with some kind of limitations and optimization of outputs. Swakn(1996) made a perfect literature summary about the second category of literatures , and those“commercial banks behaviors”theories were divided into four categories or models as follow. (1) The theory of risk management; (2) The theory of investment portfolio; (3) The model of incomplete market; (4) The model of input and output. The main content was composed by the reserve management, capital strategy, the gap management, the loan agreement and the credit allocation.
Although every theory has different point of view, they still have some intersection and overlapping for their contents. As for the incomplete market model of Kelin(1971), not only had he made reasonable hypothesis with the reserve management and the risk of loan, he also found the“logical”portfolio of commercial banks. Therefore Swakn(1986) believed that the models and theories mentioned before were not clear and explicit.
This thesis is composed by four chapters. At first, the introduction brings a question which this thesis is intent to deal with. And that question is why commercial banks would exist as an intermediate in the market of borrowing and loan market besides the bond contract. Then in the second chapter, it mainly introduces the difference between the research method of transaction cost and the traditional studying method of neoclassical economics. The author makes a point of view. And that is it cannot explain the transformation and the existence of commercial banks depended on the studying method of neoclassical economics which neglects the transaction cost.
The second chapter also illuminates the fundamental factors of transaction cost economics. At the mean time, it makes general criticisms about the traditional neoclassical economics theory. As the background of this thesis, it mainly discusses the literature of Coase.Ronald H., and introduces principal views. That background gives a hand in understanding the difference between the transaction cost and neoclassical economics.
In the third chapter, it mainly introduces a variety of theories regarding the reasons of the existence of commercial banks nowadays. It also introduces the DD model of Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig, the market signal cost model of Leland and Pyle and agent supervision model of Douglas W. Diamond. In the end of the third chapter, it comments on kinds of financial intermediate theories briefly and clearly. And it also points out that all of those theories mentioned before cannot explain the reason of the existence of commercial banks.
In the fourth chapter, it introduces and analyzes two financing ways of market and banking on the basis of the transaction cost economics. Compared with bond contract, it makes a conclusion that the essence of commercial banks is that it can utilizes borrowing and loan contracts to internalize financing activities in the indirect financing activities. At the same time, it reduces the cost and increases the profit in the process of underwriting and carrying out contracts.
In the beginning, it mainly analyzes the transaction cost of underwriting and carrying out contracts between market and commercial banks separately. Then it analyzes the profit of those two channels. At the last, combined with the cost and the profit, it explains the transformation of commercial banks. It also discusses the efficiency of those two resource allocation methods. The last chapter returns to the motif of this thesis, and it clarities the relationship of all the factors.
虽然商业银行在经济运行中的地位如此重要,但是在传统的新古典经济学的分析框架中却被忽略掉了。商业银行存在的理由被简单的归结于为资金的需求方和供给方提供中介服务。问题是在没有交易成本的新古典经济学里面,既然“市场交易可以无成本地进行”,为什么会存在像商业银行这样的中介机构呢?这是新古典经济学无法解释的一个难题,于是商业银行“理所当然”地被“合理抽象”掉了,甚至干脆被描述成一个“被动消极”地接受中央银行指令的组织。
为了弥补理论界在这一领域的缺失,本文试图采用交易成本经济分析方法对商业银行的性质进行分析,从交易成本的角度来回答“商业银行为什么会存在?”这一问题,这将对于商业银行理论研究有着重大意义。
根据Lewsi(1991)的观点,目前有关商业银行的理论文献可以分为两类:第一类是早期的研究文献,关注解决“为什么存在银行”的这个问题,又称之为“金融媒介理论”。这类研究文献分析了借贷市场的交易成本(Bentson,smith,1976)、不对称信息以及在此之下产生的借款者的“逆选择”和“道德风险”行为和商业银行信息生产优势(Leland,Pyle,1977;Campbell, Kramcaw, 1980;Diamond,1984;Fama,1985)、流动性保险(Daimond,Dybvig,1983)等问题。最新的研究则关注以商业银行为主体的金融中介在消费者消费的跨期平滑中的角色(Merton,1993;Allen,Gale,1995,2000,2001),他们认为银行体系为消费者提供了一种纵向管理风险的工具,消费者拥有银行资产防止了资产价格的过分波动,从而避免了在生命周期内的消费波动。而与此相对应的通过金融市场建立的投资组合只能够解决横向的风险分担问题。
第二类研究文献关注“在商业银行存在的前提下,商业银行某个方面的行为分析”。这些行为包括风险管理、建立投资组合以及约束条件下银行的成本和产出优化等。Swakn(1996)对第二类研究文献做了一个很好的文献综述,并把这些“银行行为”理论分为四个类别的理论或模型:(1)银行风险管理理论;(2)银行投资组合理论;(3)银行的不完全市场模型;(4)银行的投入产出模型。有关银行准备金管理、资本决策、缺口管理、协议贷款、信贷配给理论是银行风险管理理论的主要内容。
虽然每个理论探讨的主要问题各不一致,但存在着一定的相互交叉重叠,就Kelin(1971)的银行不完全市场模型来说,他不但对准备金管理和贷款风险做了合理的假定,而且优化得出了银行“合理”的投资组合形式,所以Swakn(1986)认为以上理论或模型的界限并不是特别明显。
以上所有的这些文献虽然能够在某些方面对商业银行的性质进行一些描述,并在此基础上试图对商业银行为何存在这一问题进行回答。但是商业银行所具有的这些特点和作用,并不能作为对其为何存在这一问题的经济解释。本文试图解决各种难题,完成对这一问题的回答。
为此,本文分为四章组成。首先,第一章导论将提出本文所要解决的问题:为何借贷市场上除了债券合约还存在以商业银行作为中介的存贷款合约呢?指出传统新古典经济学缺少对这一问题的研究和分析。
随后,在第二章中阐述了交易成本经济分析范式与传统新古典经济学分析范式之间的差异,并且提出了作者的观点:如果在忽视交易成本存在的新古典经济学分析范式下,是无法解释商业银行演变的过程以及存在的原因。由于本文将要采用交易成本经济学的一些观点和方法,所以接下来文章进一步阐明交易成本经济学的基本要素,同时对传统新古典经济理论做了一般的批评。其中主要讨论了罗纳德·H·科斯的著作,并介绍其基本观点。作为本文的背景资料,在帮助理解交易成本经济学与新古典经济学的差异方面有着重要作用。
在本文的第三章,则阐释了目前经济学界用于解释商业银行存在的主要理论和模型,并指出这些理论和模型在解释商业银行为何存在这一问题上的不足和缺陷。尽管本文针锋相对的认为:如果忽视交易成本的存在,是无法解释商业银行产生、存在的原因的,但是,对金融媒介的相关理论的阐释和评析将不仅有助于我们对该篇论文主题的深入认识。同时由于在本文的分析中,我们将要采用“代理监督”模型中的一个重要概念,所以对“代理监督”模型的的讨论将有助于我们对本文分析的理解。在这章中分别依次介绍了Douglas W. Diamond和Philip H. Dybvig的DD模型、Leland和Pyle的市场“信号”成本模型、以及Douglas W. Diamond的“代理监督”模型;此章的最后则是对以上三种金融中介理论做的简要评析,并且分别指出了以上各个模型不能解释商业银行存在的原因。
而在论文的最后一章,第四章中,笔者将构建模型,试图在交易成本经济学的基础上对融资活动过程中所涉及到的两种方式——市场、银行,分别加以分析,并得出在一定规模的间接融资活动中,相对于债券合约的形式、商业银行的本质在于利用存贷款合约的形式将融资活动内在化(internalisation)的办法,同时实现了签订和执行合约活动成本的节约和收益的提高这一结论。首先主要是分别对市场和银行签订和执行融资合约所花费的交易成本进行分析。其后,则是从两者所获得的效益的角度展开分析。最后,论文将结合成本和效益来展开对问题的讨论,并解释商业银行的演变过程、以及市场与银行这两种配置资源的方式的效率。论文的最后部分作为结束语回到了这篇论文开篇提出的主题上,并阐发各章之间的相互联系。
通过本文的分析,主要得出以下三个结论:
1.商业银行的产生的原因在于利用存贷款合约的形式将融资活动内在化(internalisation)的办法,同时实现了签订和执行合约活动成本的节约和收益的提高。
2.随着组织的融资交易的增多,无论银行还是市场,其成本上升得越快、而收益增加得越慢。银行和市场的界限将依照下述条件确定:银行和市场都将在边际收益等于零点时停止扩大各自的规模。
3.可能存在多家银行,虽然每家银行所面临的成本收益曲线各不相同,但其共同特点是:成本曲线低于市场的交易成本线;同时收益曲线高于市场的收益线。并且每一家银行组织一笔额外的融资交易的收益与市场组织额外一笔交易的收益是一样的,都同时为零。
最后,本文的创新之处在于:
首先,选题比较新颖。在传统新古典经济学的分析框架中,并没有针对商业银行为何存在这一问题进行讨论。另外,本文的研究角度也比较新颖。本文从交易成本经济学的角度对银行产生问题进行分析;同样,本文的研究方法也较为新颖。在文章采用交易成本经济学的观点对商业银行进行分析时,放弃了交易成本经济学中不同管理方式效益相等的假设,允许不同组织融资交易的方式有着不同的收益。这是过去交易成本经济学中所没有的。由于新古典经济学对交易成本的忽视,过去交易成本经济学的分析重点主要放在对交易成本这一因素的考察,而忽视了不同交易成本下,收益可能不同的情况。这样做的结果将会导致其理论分析存在巨大缺陷。缺少对交易成本分析的新古典经济学固然有其缺陷,但是像交易成本经济学只把分析的重点放在交易成本上而忽视收益的做法,同样使其理论并不完整。就像本文第二章第二节所说的,新古典经济学与交易成本经济学其实并不相互冲突。本文所要做的是采取双方各自的优势,把它们统一在同一个分析框架之中,最后的结果证明这种方法是可行的并且是有用的。本文在采用这种方法的基础上得出上诉三个一般化的结论。
希望本文的研究角度和结论能够对商业银行的研究有所帮助,能够在一定程度上弥补传统经济学对商业银行研究理论上的缺失。
In order to keep healthy and sustainable development of the economic situation, the existence of the commercial bank is a necessary and essential factor. As a most important financial intermediate institution, the commercial bank can improve the structure of information, absorb and transfer the risk and provide the liquidity, so it can create some convenience to a variety of trades. Then the relationship among banks is getting more close than any before in the modern financial system. The bankruptcy of a commercial bank could give rise to the reaction of the whole banking system, and that would destroy the whole economic operation seriously and fatally in the end.
Although the commercial bank is so important, it was ignored in the traditional analytical framework of neoclassical economics. The reason for the existence of commercial banks has been summarized as a intermediate institution for the demand and supple of capital. But there is a problem. That is why commercial banks could exist in the background of non-cost dealing according to neoclassical economics. Thus, it is a difficulty problem which neoclassical economics cannot explain reasonably. Then the existence of commercial banks is neglected which seems logical and rational. As some time, commercial banks have been defined as a organization which accepted the order from central bank passively and negatively.
It would analyze the character of commercial banks by using the method of transaction cost. It would also answer the question of why commercial banks would exist from the angle of transaction cost, and that answer would have great and fundamental meaning to research commercial banks theories.
On the basis of Lewsi(1991)’s point, materials of manufacturer theory of commercial banks were divided into two categories. One was research literatures in the earlier period which paid more attention to deal with the reason of the existence of commercial banks. And those theories were also called as the theory of financial intermediate. Those kinds of literatures had analyzed the cost in the borrow and land markets(Bentson,smith,1976), asymmetric information ,adverse selection, moral hazard and the productive advantage of information of commercial banks which were triggered by asymmetric information(Leland,Pyle,1977;Campbell, Kramcaw, 1980;Diamond,1984;Fama,1985), and liquidity insurance(Daimond,Dybvig,1983),etc. The newest research had kept close watch on the role of financial intermediate of which commercial banks as the principal part in the cross-periods consumption of consumers(Merton,1993;Allen,Gale,1995,2000,2001). Those scholars believed that the system of commercial banks provided a kind of instrument to manage risks lengthways. Because consumers possessed assets of commercial banks, then that could avoid fluctuation of assets price acutely and seriously. And it also could turn the fluctuation of consumption in a life cycle away. At the same time, the investment portfolio which was based on financial market could merely figure out transverse participation of risks. Another kind of research literatures had paid more attention to some behavior research of commercial banks which based on the existence of commercial banks.
And those behaviors included risk management, making up of portfolio, commercial banks’cost with some kind of limitations and optimization of outputs. Swakn(1996) made a perfect literature summary about the second category of literatures , and those“commercial banks behaviors”theories were divided into four categories or models as follow. (1) The theory of risk management; (2) The theory of investment portfolio; (3) The model of incomplete market; (4) The model of input and output. The main content was composed by the reserve management, capital strategy, the gap management, the loan agreement and the credit allocation.
Although every theory has different point of view, they still have some intersection and overlapping for their contents. As for the incomplete market model of Kelin(1971), not only had he made reasonable hypothesis with the reserve management and the risk of loan, he also found the“logical”portfolio of commercial banks. Therefore Swakn(1986) believed that the models and theories mentioned before were not clear and explicit.
This thesis is composed by four chapters. At first, the introduction brings a question which this thesis is intent to deal with. And that question is why commercial banks would exist as an intermediate in the market of borrowing and loan market besides the bond contract. Then in the second chapter, it mainly introduces the difference between the research method of transaction cost and the traditional studying method of neoclassical economics. The author makes a point of view. And that is it cannot explain the transformation and the existence of commercial banks depended on the studying method of neoclassical economics which neglects the transaction cost.
The second chapter also illuminates the fundamental factors of transaction cost economics. At the mean time, it makes general criticisms about the traditional neoclassical economics theory. As the background of this thesis, it mainly discusses the literature of Coase.Ronald H., and introduces principal views. That background gives a hand in understanding the difference between the transaction cost and neoclassical economics.
In the third chapter, it mainly introduces a variety of theories regarding the reasons of the existence of commercial banks nowadays. It also introduces the DD model of Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig, the market signal cost model of Leland and Pyle and agent supervision model of Douglas W. Diamond. In the end of the third chapter, it comments on kinds of financial intermediate theories briefly and clearly. And it also points out that all of those theories mentioned before cannot explain the reason of the existence of commercial banks.
In the fourth chapter, it introduces and analyzes two financing ways of market and banking on the basis of the transaction cost economics. Compared with bond contract, it makes a conclusion that the essence of commercial banks is that it can utilizes borrowing and loan contracts to internalize financing activities in the indirect financing activities. At the same time, it reduces the cost and increases the profit in the process of underwriting and carrying out contracts.
In the beginning, it mainly analyzes the transaction cost of underwriting and carrying out contracts between market and commercial banks separately. Then it analyzes the profit of those two channels. At the last, combined with the cost and the profit, it explains the transformation of commercial banks. It also discusses the efficiency of those two resource allocation methods. The last chapter returns to the motif of this thesis, and it clarities the relationship of all the factors.
引文
[1]阿尔弗雷德·马歇尔.经济学原理[M].商务印书馆,2005年版
[2]奥利弗·E·威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度[M].商务印书馆,2004年8月第一版
[3]哈特.企业、合同与财务结构[M].上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1998年版
[4]库恩, T. S.学革命的结构[M]. 1962年
[5]米尔顿·弗里德曼.价格理论[M]商务印书馆,1994年8月第一版
[6]欧文·费雪.利息理论[M]上海人民出版社,1999年12月第一版
[7]Alchian, Armen, H. Demsetz.. Production, information costs, and economic organization[M] American Economic Review, 1972(62 ) 777一795
[8]Akerlof, G. The market for lemons: Qualitative uncertainty and the market mechanism[M] Quarterly Journal of Economies, 1970(84), 488一500.
[9]Arrow, Kenneth. J. The organization of economic activity: Issues pertinent to the choice of market versus non-market allocation[J] In The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditure: The PPB System. Vol. 1. U. S. Joint Economic Committee, 1969,91st Congress, 1st Session. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, pp. 59一73
[10]Baumol, WIlliam.J. The transactions demand for cash: an inventory-theoretic approach[M] Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1966(86),326一351.
[11]Cerasi. V and S. Daltung. The optimal size of a bank: Cost and benefits of diversification[M] FMG discussion Paper. London School of Economics.London 1994(21):412一431.
[12]Coase, Ronald H. The nature of the firm[J] Economics 1937(3):112一121.
[13] Coase, Ronald H. The problem of social cost[J] Journal of Law and Economics, 1960(3) (October): 1-44.
[14] Coase, Ronald H. Industrial organization: A proposal for research[J]. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1972, 59一73
[15]Diamond.D. Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring[J] Review of Economic studies,1984(51),393一414.
[16]Diamond, D.Dybvig. P. H. Bank runs, deposit insurance and liquidity,[J] Journal Political Economy 1983(91),01一19
[17]Krasa.C.M., A. P.Villamil. Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a experience with universal banking before 1933[M] American Economic Review 1992(57),197一221.
[18]Leland, D.H.Pyle. Informational asymmetries,financial structure and financial intermediation[J] The Journal of Finance1977(32): 71一87
[19]North, D. C. Structure and Change in Economic History[J] New York, Norton 1987(7)
[20]Ramakrishman.R.T.S., A. V. Thakor. information reliability and a theory of financial intermediation[M] Review of Economic Studies 1984(51),415一432.
[21]Spence.M.A. Job market signalling[M] Quarterly Journal of Economics 1973(3):355一374.
[2]奥利弗·E·威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度[M].商务印书馆,2004年8月第一版
[3]哈特.企业、合同与财务结构[M].上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1998年版
[4]库恩, T. S.学革命的结构[M]. 1962年
[5]米尔顿·弗里德曼.价格理论[M]商务印书馆,1994年8月第一版
[6]欧文·费雪.利息理论[M]上海人民出版社,1999年12月第一版
[7]Alchian, Armen, H. Demsetz.. Production, information costs, and economic organization[M] American Economic Review, 1972(62 ) 777一795
[8]Akerlof, G. The market for lemons: Qualitative uncertainty and the market mechanism[M] Quarterly Journal of Economies, 1970(84), 488一500.
[9]Arrow, Kenneth. J. The organization of economic activity: Issues pertinent to the choice of market versus non-market allocation[J] In The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditure: The PPB System. Vol. 1. U. S. Joint Economic Committee, 1969,91st Congress, 1st Session. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, pp. 59一73
[10]Baumol, WIlliam.J. The transactions demand for cash: an inventory-theoretic approach[M] Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1966(86),326一351.
[11]Cerasi. V and S. Daltung. The optimal size of a bank: Cost and benefits of diversification[M] FMG discussion Paper. London School of Economics.London 1994(21):412一431.
[12]Coase, Ronald H. The nature of the firm[J] Economics 1937(3):112一121.
[13] Coase, Ronald H. The problem of social cost[J] Journal of Law and Economics, 1960(3) (October): 1-44.
[14] Coase, Ronald H. Industrial organization: A proposal for research[J]. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1972, 59一73
[15]Diamond.D. Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring[J] Review of Economic studies,1984(51),393一414.
[16]Diamond, D.Dybvig. P. H. Bank runs, deposit insurance and liquidity,[J] Journal Political Economy 1983(91),01一19
[17]Krasa.C.M., A. P.Villamil. Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a experience with universal banking before 1933[M] American Economic Review 1992(57),197一221.
[18]Leland, D.H.Pyle. Informational asymmetries,financial structure and financial intermediation[J] The Journal of Finance1977(32): 71一87
[19]North, D. C. Structure and Change in Economic History[J] New York, Norton 1987(7)
[20]Ramakrishman.R.T.S., A. V. Thakor. information reliability and a theory of financial intermediation[M] Review of Economic Studies 1984(51),415一432.
[21]Spence.M.A. Job market signalling[M] Quarterly Journal of Economics 1973(3):355一374.