企业权力机制、层次结构与贸易非均衡发展
|
摘要
当前,贸易理论研究已经从宏观领域深入到微观领域,从流通领域转向生产领域,探讨微观企业行为对贸易发展的影响意义深远。本文针对全球生产网络下南北贸易发展的非均衡现象,从全球生产组织视角,发展并运用一个国际生产与贸易中的企业权力理论及其分析框架,来解释当前发展中国家面临着贸易非均衡发展的不利态势,并为中国贸易发展中的现实困境问题提供新的解释和政策启示。
论文首先提出一个国际生产与贸易中的企业权力理论及其分析框架。按照全球生产网络下企业的本质及其组织形式,本文将企业权力界定为一个企业或企业集团凭借和利用组织内特定的资源和能力而形成的对其他主体的一种控制能力(力量)或特殊的影响力。然后,从无形资产、物质资产和组织资源三个层面构建企业权力体系,即通过融合Barney(1991)的基于资源的企业能力理论和Gereffi(1999)全球价值链理论,提出一个“链接权”(指因专业化分工和企业能力高低而体现在价值链条中所拥有的节点位势权力)理论,并与GHM产权理论(Grossman & Hart,1986;Hart & Moore,1990)及Rajan & Zingales(1998)的进入权理论相结合,将企业权力的具体形式依次称之为链接权、所有权、进入权;相应的权力机制依次为:能力控制、所有权或股权控制、组织机制控制。再后,将企业权力现象纳入到“权力机制—权力结构”的分析框架中考察,并尝试采用一种新的分析范式,即将国际生产与贸易活动视为一种市场导向下的企业权力约束行为,来寻求企业权力约束与市场机制的统一。
论文进一步运用这一理论及其分析框架,通过构建一组企业权力约束下的国际生产与贸易模型群,从机制层面分层论证企业权力行为影响贸易非均衡发展的内在机理。研究表明:①最终产品商对加工企业的所有权安排,是影响南北贸易结构失衡的微观组织根源。最终产品商利用企业所有权安排以及由此产生的对贸易组织结构的选择与控制,影响了南北贸易模式的不对称变化,一定条件下会导致北方国的贸易结构演变为资本和劳动都是净进口的国家,由此从新的视角解释了美中贸易逆差问题。②最终产品商对供应商的进入权组织控制,是影响各国贸易比较优势非均衡发展的重要机制。最终产品商通过限制进入、数量调整来激发供应商做出事前定制投资、事前转移投资和事后最优专用性投资。最终产品商行使这种企业权力行为过程中,事实上对供应商及其所在国家的贸易比较优势造成了不利影响,由此为我国贸易比较优势存在的困境问题提供了新的启示。③企业链接权的能力控制是影响各国贸易增长模式分化的组织根源。在不完全契约条件下,高端企业凭借其能力控制,不仅拥有对生产过程的分解权,而且也被赋予较高的讨价还价权力和相应抽取下级供应商租金分享的权力。由此强化的投入品要素报酬不均等条件,直接激励各国贸易增长模式产生分化。这为我国贸易增长方式的转变问题提供了新的理路。
最后,论文基于中、韩、美三国的经验分析,从结构层面揭示企业权力的层次结构是影响各国垂直专业化贸易非均衡发展的微观组织基础。论文指出:①按照企业权力大小和地理空间关系,全球生产与贸易中的企业权力体系可以划分为全球层次、跨国层次和国家层次等三个层级。②中、韩、美三国的垂直分离价值指数、份额指数和变化趋势均表明,三国的垂直专业化贸易呈现出分层发展趋势,并与其企业权力层次结构相对应。③中国垂直专业化低阶段成长已经完成,企业权力的低层次结构制约了我国产业升级、技术进步和外贸发展,中国不仅需要提升本国在全球生产网络中企业权力的层次,而且还需要选择并调整相应的经贸发展战略。本文的政策含义:一是要大力扶持和发展有为企业,二是要采取以提升企业权力结构层次为基准的“新开放型”经贸发展战略。由此,论文围绕如何实现这些新战略,从投、引资政策、贸易政策、产业政策等方面提出了相应的政策调整思路。
Researches on trade are shifting from macro field to micro study and from marketing to manufacturing. It is of far-reaching significance to study the effects of firm behavior on trade development. This dissertation, aiming at the disequilibrium of north-south trade development in global production network, tends to develop the theory of firm power and its analysis framework of international production and trade from the perspective of global production organizations, which the author applies to account for the disadvantages of developing countries in imbalanced trade development and offer new explanations for and policy enlightenments to the problems in China’s trade development.
Firstly, this dissertation develops the theory and analytic framework of firm power of international production and trade. Based on the nature and organizational form of firms in global production network, this dissertation defines firm power as control power or special influence which an enterprise or enterprise group exerts on others by means of its special resources and capability of system. The author holds that the system of firm powers should be built from material assets, organization mechanism, and intangible assets. Based on Barney’s(1991) theory of resource-based firm capability and Gereffi’s (1999) theory of global value chain, the concept of chain link power is put forward, which is defined as position power embodied in value chains according to specialization and capability difference. Combined with GHM theory(Grossman and Hart,1986;Hart and Moore,1990) and Rajan & Zingales’s(1998) access theory, firm power is in turn specified as chain link power, property ownership and access power, and the respective mechanisms are capability control, ownership control, and organization control. This dissertation studies the phenomenon of firm power within a unified framework of“power mechanism-power structure”, and attempts to employ a new analytic paradigm which takes the activities of global production and trade as a market-orientated restraint behavior of firm power, to pursue an integration of power restraints and market mechanism.
Then, this dissertation applies this theory and analytic framework to demonstrate the internal principles of firm power effects on disequilibrium of trade development from the perspective of power mechanism through building up a series of models of international production and trade under firm power restraints. The results go as follows:①The final good producer’s ownership arrangement to processing firms is the root of microeconomic organization exerting effects on the imbalance of North-South trade structure. The asymmetric changes of trade mode are influenced by the final good producer’s ownership arrangement, choice and control of trade organization structure. Under certain conditions, a northern country can be a net importer of both capital and labor. Therefore, the question of United States-China Trade deficit can be reasonably answered from a new perspective.②The final good producer’s organization control of access power is one of important mechanism to influence the disequilibrium development of country’s comparative advantage. By restricting access and adjusting numbers, the final good producer can incentive the supplier to provide more customized investment, transfer investment and optimal specialization investment. In fact, this process results in a negative influence over trade comparative advantages of suppliers and their countries. So this study provides new enlightenments to the paradox question of comparative advantages of China’s foreign trade.③The capability control of chain link power is the organization root of differentiation in trade growth pattern. Under incomplete contract, the capability control of the high chain firm enjoys power to decompose production process and high bargain and the corresponding power to extract rent share of subordinate supplier. The growing inequality of input factor reward strengthened directly incentives the differentiation of trade growth pattern. This study provides a new theoretical approach to the problem of China’s trade growth pattern transition.
Finally, this dissertation, based on an empirical analysis of China, Korean and the US, reveals that the hierarchy structure of firm power is the foundation of micro organization that influences the disequilibrium development of vertical specialization trade from the power structure perspective, and points out:①the system of firm power in global production and trade may be divided into three levels: the global level, the transnational level and the national level according to the size of firm power and geography spatial relations;②the value index, the share index and the change tendency of vertical specialization in China, Korean, and the US indicate that their vertical specialization trade comes to be a trend of division development, and corresponds with their hierarchy structure of firm power;③the low growth stage of Chinese vertical specialization has been completed. The low hierarchy structure of firm power restricts China’s industrial upgrading, technology advancement and trade development. It is necessary for China to promote its firm power level in global production network, choose and correspondingly adjust strategies for its economic and trade development. Therefore, the policy implications of this dissertation are as follows:①China should endeavor to provide support to the development of promising enterprises;②new open-type strategies for China’s economic and trade development should be adopted to enhance the level of firm power structure. Other relative policy suggestions on how to realize these new strategies are put forward.
论文首先提出一个国际生产与贸易中的企业权力理论及其分析框架。按照全球生产网络下企业的本质及其组织形式,本文将企业权力界定为一个企业或企业集团凭借和利用组织内特定的资源和能力而形成的对其他主体的一种控制能力(力量)或特殊的影响力。然后,从无形资产、物质资产和组织资源三个层面构建企业权力体系,即通过融合Barney(1991)的基于资源的企业能力理论和Gereffi(1999)全球价值链理论,提出一个“链接权”(指因专业化分工和企业能力高低而体现在价值链条中所拥有的节点位势权力)理论,并与GHM产权理论(Grossman & Hart,1986;Hart & Moore,1990)及Rajan & Zingales(1998)的进入权理论相结合,将企业权力的具体形式依次称之为链接权、所有权、进入权;相应的权力机制依次为:能力控制、所有权或股权控制、组织机制控制。再后,将企业权力现象纳入到“权力机制—权力结构”的分析框架中考察,并尝试采用一种新的分析范式,即将国际生产与贸易活动视为一种市场导向下的企业权力约束行为,来寻求企业权力约束与市场机制的统一。
论文进一步运用这一理论及其分析框架,通过构建一组企业权力约束下的国际生产与贸易模型群,从机制层面分层论证企业权力行为影响贸易非均衡发展的内在机理。研究表明:①最终产品商对加工企业的所有权安排,是影响南北贸易结构失衡的微观组织根源。最终产品商利用企业所有权安排以及由此产生的对贸易组织结构的选择与控制,影响了南北贸易模式的不对称变化,一定条件下会导致北方国的贸易结构演变为资本和劳动都是净进口的国家,由此从新的视角解释了美中贸易逆差问题。②最终产品商对供应商的进入权组织控制,是影响各国贸易比较优势非均衡发展的重要机制。最终产品商通过限制进入、数量调整来激发供应商做出事前定制投资、事前转移投资和事后最优专用性投资。最终产品商行使这种企业权力行为过程中,事实上对供应商及其所在国家的贸易比较优势造成了不利影响,由此为我国贸易比较优势存在的困境问题提供了新的启示。③企业链接权的能力控制是影响各国贸易增长模式分化的组织根源。在不完全契约条件下,高端企业凭借其能力控制,不仅拥有对生产过程的分解权,而且也被赋予较高的讨价还价权力和相应抽取下级供应商租金分享的权力。由此强化的投入品要素报酬不均等条件,直接激励各国贸易增长模式产生分化。这为我国贸易增长方式的转变问题提供了新的理路。
最后,论文基于中、韩、美三国的经验分析,从结构层面揭示企业权力的层次结构是影响各国垂直专业化贸易非均衡发展的微观组织基础。论文指出:①按照企业权力大小和地理空间关系,全球生产与贸易中的企业权力体系可以划分为全球层次、跨国层次和国家层次等三个层级。②中、韩、美三国的垂直分离价值指数、份额指数和变化趋势均表明,三国的垂直专业化贸易呈现出分层发展趋势,并与其企业权力层次结构相对应。③中国垂直专业化低阶段成长已经完成,企业权力的低层次结构制约了我国产业升级、技术进步和外贸发展,中国不仅需要提升本国在全球生产网络中企业权力的层次,而且还需要选择并调整相应的经贸发展战略。本文的政策含义:一是要大力扶持和发展有为企业,二是要采取以提升企业权力结构层次为基准的“新开放型”经贸发展战略。由此,论文围绕如何实现这些新战略,从投、引资政策、贸易政策、产业政策等方面提出了相应的政策调整思路。
Researches on trade are shifting from macro field to micro study and from marketing to manufacturing. It is of far-reaching significance to study the effects of firm behavior on trade development. This dissertation, aiming at the disequilibrium of north-south trade development in global production network, tends to develop the theory of firm power and its analysis framework of international production and trade from the perspective of global production organizations, which the author applies to account for the disadvantages of developing countries in imbalanced trade development and offer new explanations for and policy enlightenments to the problems in China’s trade development.
Firstly, this dissertation develops the theory and analytic framework of firm power of international production and trade. Based on the nature and organizational form of firms in global production network, this dissertation defines firm power as control power or special influence which an enterprise or enterprise group exerts on others by means of its special resources and capability of system. The author holds that the system of firm powers should be built from material assets, organization mechanism, and intangible assets. Based on Barney’s(1991) theory of resource-based firm capability and Gereffi’s (1999) theory of global value chain, the concept of chain link power is put forward, which is defined as position power embodied in value chains according to specialization and capability difference. Combined with GHM theory(Grossman and Hart,1986;Hart and Moore,1990) and Rajan & Zingales’s(1998) access theory, firm power is in turn specified as chain link power, property ownership and access power, and the respective mechanisms are capability control, ownership control, and organization control. This dissertation studies the phenomenon of firm power within a unified framework of“power mechanism-power structure”, and attempts to employ a new analytic paradigm which takes the activities of global production and trade as a market-orientated restraint behavior of firm power, to pursue an integration of power restraints and market mechanism.
Then, this dissertation applies this theory and analytic framework to demonstrate the internal principles of firm power effects on disequilibrium of trade development from the perspective of power mechanism through building up a series of models of international production and trade under firm power restraints. The results go as follows:①The final good producer’s ownership arrangement to processing firms is the root of microeconomic organization exerting effects on the imbalance of North-South trade structure. The asymmetric changes of trade mode are influenced by the final good producer’s ownership arrangement, choice and control of trade organization structure. Under certain conditions, a northern country can be a net importer of both capital and labor. Therefore, the question of United States-China Trade deficit can be reasonably answered from a new perspective.②The final good producer’s organization control of access power is one of important mechanism to influence the disequilibrium development of country’s comparative advantage. By restricting access and adjusting numbers, the final good producer can incentive the supplier to provide more customized investment, transfer investment and optimal specialization investment. In fact, this process results in a negative influence over trade comparative advantages of suppliers and their countries. So this study provides new enlightenments to the paradox question of comparative advantages of China’s foreign trade.③The capability control of chain link power is the organization root of differentiation in trade growth pattern. Under incomplete contract, the capability control of the high chain firm enjoys power to decompose production process and high bargain and the corresponding power to extract rent share of subordinate supplier. The growing inequality of input factor reward strengthened directly incentives the differentiation of trade growth pattern. This study provides a new theoretical approach to the problem of China’s trade growth pattern transition.
Finally, this dissertation, based on an empirical analysis of China, Korean and the US, reveals that the hierarchy structure of firm power is the foundation of micro organization that influences the disequilibrium development of vertical specialization trade from the power structure perspective, and points out:①the system of firm power in global production and trade may be divided into three levels: the global level, the transnational level and the national level according to the size of firm power and geography spatial relations;②the value index, the share index and the change tendency of vertical specialization in China, Korean, and the US indicate that their vertical specialization trade comes to be a trend of division development, and corresponds with their hierarchy structure of firm power;③the low growth stage of Chinese vertical specialization has been completed. The low hierarchy structure of firm power restricts China’s industrial upgrading, technology advancement and trade development. It is necessary for China to promote its firm power level in global production network, choose and correspondingly adjust strategies for its economic and trade development. Therefore, the policy implications of this dissertation are as follows:①China should endeavor to provide support to the development of promising enterprises;②new open-type strategies for China’s economic and trade development should be adopted to enhance the level of firm power structure. Other relative policy suggestions on how to realize these new strategies are put forward.
引文
[1] Yeats, Alexander J.Just How Big is Global Production Sharing?. in Arndt, Sven.W. and Henryk Kierzkowski, eds.,In Fragmentation: New Production Patterns in the World Economy [M](Oxford: Oxford University Press),2001
[2] Campa,J.and Goldberg,,L.S. The Evolving External Orientation of Manufacturing: a Profile of four Coumtries.FRBNK Economic Policy Review.1997,3(2),53-81
[3] Hummels,D.,Rapoport,D and Yi K-M.Vertical Specialization and Changing Nature of World Trade. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review,1998,Vol.4(2),79-99
[4] Hummels,Ishii and Yi. The Nature and Growth of Vertical Specialization in World Trade.Journal of International Economics. 2001.Vol.54,No.1,75-96
[5] Spencer,B.J, International Outsourcing and Incomplete Contracts.NBER Working Paper. 2005,No.11418
[6] Feenstra, Robert C. Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the Global Economy, Journal of Economic Perspectives .1998,12, pp. 31-50
[7] Borga, Maria and William J. Zeile. International Fragmentation of Production and Intrafirm Trade of U.S. Multinational Companies, Bureau of Economic Analysis Working Paper,2004,(02)
[8] Jones,R.,and Kierzkowski,H. The Role of Services in Production and International Trade:A Theoretical Framework,The Political Economy of International Trade,Oxford:Blackwell Publishing,1990
[9] Jones.R., Kierzkowski.H., and Chen L. What does Evidence Tell US about Fragmentation and Outsourcing? Prepared for a Special Issue of International Review of Economics and Finance, 2004,October
[10] Antràs, Pol .Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure.Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003,118 (4), pp. 1375-1418
[11] Antràs, Pol. Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle.American Economic Review.2005, 95:4, pp. 1054-1073
[12] Grossman, Gene M., Elhanan Helpman and Adam Szeidl. Complementarities between Outsourcing and Foreign Sourcing. American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings).2005,95:19-24
[13] 洪联英, 谢里, 罗能生. 基于I-O法则的中国制造业垂直分离测度研究. 统计研究, 2006,(10):40-44
[14] Helpman, E.Trade,FDI and the Organizations of Firm, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV ,2006, 589–630
[15] Barney,J.B. Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage, Journal of Management, 1991, (17) 1:99-120
[16] Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D. Hart.The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:a Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration.Journal of Political Economy,1986, 94(4):691-719
[17] Hart, Oliver and John Moore.Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm.Journal of Political Economy, 1990,98(6):1119-1158
[18] Rajan, Raghuram G. and Luigi Zingales .Power in a Theory of the Firm.The Quarterly Journal of Economics.1998,13(2):387-432
[19] Helpman, Elhanan, and Paul R. Krugman. Market Structure and Foreign Trade:Increasing Returns,Imperfect Competition,and the International Economy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,1985
[20] Berle and Means.The Modern Corporation and Private Property,MacMillan,New York.1932.(中译本)「美」伯利、米恩斯: 现代公司与私有则一产. 北京:商务印书馆, 2005
[21] Coase, Ronald H. The Nature of the Firm.Economica, 1937,4(16):386-405
[22] Rajan, Raghuram G. and Luigi Zingales.The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy:a Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001,116
[23] [美]R.科斯.论生产的制度结构. 北京:商务印书馆,1994
[24] [美]R.科斯, A.阿尔钦, D.诺斯等. 财产权利与制度变迁. 上海:上海三联书店, 上海人民出版社, 2003
[25] Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz. Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, American Economic Review, 1972,62(5): 777-795
[26] [美]O.哈特. 企业、合同与财务结构. 费方域译. 上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1998
[27] Hart, Oliver . Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1995
[28] Aghion, Philippe and Patrick Bolton. An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting.Review of Economic Studies, 1992,9(3):473-494
[29] Dewatripont,M &J.Tirole. A Theory of Debt and Equity:Diversity of Securities and Manager Shareholder Congruence, Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1994,109:1027-1054
[30] Aghion,Philippe and Jean Tirole.Formal and Real Authority in Organizations, Journal of Political Economy,1997,105(1):1-29
[31] Chiu,Y.S. Non-cooperativebargaining,Hostagea and Optimal Asset Ownership. The American Economic Review, 1998,88(4):882-901
[32] Cai,Hongbin. A Theory of Joint Asset Ownership,Rand Journal Economics. 2003,34(1):63-77
[33] Hart, Oliver D., and Moore, John. Foundations of incomplete contracts.Review of Economic Studies, 66, Special Issue: Contracts, 1999.115-138
[34] De Meza, David and Ben Lockwood.Does Asset Ownership always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm. QuarterlyJournal of Economics, 1998,113(2):361-386
[35] 詹姆斯.R.马库森. 跨国公司与国际贸易理论. 强永昌等译. 上海财经大学出版社,2005
[36] Markusen, James R.Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002
[37] Markusen, James R.Multinationals, Multi-plant Economies, and the Gains from Trade.Journal of International Economics .1984,(16): 205-226
[38] Helpman,E.A Simple Theory of International Trade with Multinational Corporations. Journal of Political Economy. 1984,92(23):451–472
[39] Horstmann, I. and Markusen, J.R. Strategic Investments and the Development of Multinationals.International Economic Review, 1987,28,(1):109-121
[40] Horstmann, I. and Markusen, J.R. Licensing versus Direct Investment: a Model of Internalization by the Multinational Enterprise,The Canadian Journal of Economics Revue- canadienne d'Economique, 1987,20(3):464-481
[41] Horstmann, I. and Markusen, J.R. Endogenous Market Structures in International Trade, Journal of International Economics. 1992, (20):225–247
[42] Markusen, James R., and Anthony J. Venables. Multinational Firms and the New Trade Theory, Journal of International Economics .1998,(46):183–203
[43] Markusen, James R., and Anthony J. Venables.The Theory of Endowment, Intra-industy and Multinational Trade, Journal of International Economics. 2000,52:209–234
[44] Markusen, James R.Foreign Investment, Vertical Integration and Local Equaity Requirements,Economica .1997,(4):219-238
[45] Markusen, James R. Factor Movements and Commodity Trade as Complements.Journal of International Economics. 1983, (14): 341-356
[46] Markusen, James R. Trade in Producer Services and in Other Specialized Intermediate Inputs. American Economic Review.1989,(79): 85-95
[47] Markusen, James R. The Boundaries of Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade.Journal of Economic Perspectives , 1995,(9): 169-189
[48] Markusen, James R. Contracts,Intellectual Property Rights, and Multinational Investment in Developing Countries,Journal of International Economics.2001, (53): 189-204
[49] Markusen ,James R. Modeling the Offshoring of White-collar Services: from Comparative Advantage to the New Theories of Trade and FDI,NBER,Working Paper,2005, 11827
[50] Ethier, Wifred. National and International Returns to Scale in the Modern Theory of International Trade. American Economic Review ,1982,72:389-405
[51] Ethier, Wilfred. The Multinational Firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics.1986,101: 805-833
[52] Ethier, Wilfred and James R. Markusen.Multinational Firms, Technology Diffusion and Trade.Journal of International Economics . 1996,41: 1-28
[53] Markusen, James R., and Anthony J. Venables. A Multi-country Approach to Factors Proportions Trade and Trade Costs. NBER Working Paper , 2005,11051
[54] Dunning, John H. Trade, Location of Economic Activity and MNE : A Search for an Eclectic Approach,in Ohlin, B., P. O. Hesselborn, and P.M. Wijkman (eds.). The International Allocation of Economic Activity. Macmillan,1977
[55] Carr, David L.,Markusen, J.R.and Maskus K,E. Estimating the Knowledge -Capital Model of the Multinational Enterprise,The American Economic Review, 2001,91(3): 693-708
[56] Brainard, S.Lael. An Empirical Assessment of the Proximity-Concentration Tradeoff between Multinational Sales and Trade.American Economic Review, 1997, 87: 520-544
[57] Feenstra, Robert C. and Barbara J. Spencer.Contractual versus Generic Outsourcing: the Role of Proximity.Mimeo, University of California, Davis,2005
[58] Antràs, Pol, Luis Garicano, and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg.Onshoring in a Knowledge Economy.Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2006,121 (1):31-77
[59] Garicano, Luis .Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production.Journal of Political Economy, 2000,108, (5):874-904
[60] Garicano, Luis and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg.Organization and Inequality in aKnowledge Economy.Working Paper, University of Chicago and Stanford University,2003
[61] Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman.Outsourcing versus FDI in Industry Equilibrium,Journal of the European Economic Association 1 (Papers and Proceedings), 2003, 317-327
[62] Hanson, Gordon H., Raymond J. Mataloni, J. and Matthew J. Slaughter.Expansion Strategies of U.S. Multinational Corporations,Brookings Trade Forum. 2001, 245-294
[63] Hanson, Gordon H., Raymond J. Mataloni, J. and Matthew J. Slaughter.Vertical Production Networks in Multinational Firms,Review of Economics and Statistics .2004,(forthcoming)
[64] Bernard, Andrew B. and J. Bradford Jensen. Exporters, Skill Upgrading, and the Wage Gap, Journal of International Economics .1997,42, (1-2):3-31
[65] Bernard, Andrew B. and J. Bradford Jensen. Exceptional Exporter Performance: Cause, Effect, or Both? Journal of International Economics.1999,47:1-25
[66] Clerides, S., S. Lach and J. Tybout. Is Learning by Exporting Important? Micro-Dynamic Evidence from Colombia, Mexico, and Morocco, Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1998,113(3): 903-947
[67] Pavcnik, N. Trade Liberalization, Exit, and Productivity Improvements:Evidence from Chilean Plants.The Review of Economic Studies. 2002,69:245-276
[68] Eaton,Jonathan, Samuel Kortum and Francis Kramarz. Dissecting Trade: Firms,Industries, and Export Destination. American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings).2004,94:150-154.
[69] Melitz, Marc J. The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity[.Econometrica . 2003,71:1695-1725
[70] Bernard, Andrew B., Jonathan Eaton, J. Bradford Jensen, and Samuel Kortum. Plants and Productivity in International Trade, American Economic Review. 2003, 93:1268-1290
[71] Bernard A., J. B. Jensen, and P. Schott. Falling Trade Costs, Heterogeneous Firms and Industry Dynamics. NBER Working Paper. 2003,9639
[72] Bernard, Andrew B., Stephen Redding, Peter K. Schott. Comparative Advantage and Heterogeneous Firms, NBER Working Paper . 2004, 10668
[73] Aw, B.Y., S. Chung and M.J. Roberts,Productivity and Turnover in the Export Market: Microlevel Evidence from the Republic of Korea and Taiwan(China).World Bank Economic Review, 2000, 14(1):65-90
[74] Chaney, Thomas.Distorted Gravity: Heterogeneous Firms,Market Structure and the Geography of International Trade. Mimeo University of Chicago, 2005
[75] Eaton, Jonathan, Samuel Kortum, and Francis Kramarz. An Anatomy of International Trade: Evidence from French Firms. Mimeo, NYU.2003
[76] Melitz, Marc J. and Gianmarco I.P Ottaviano.Market Size, Trade, and Productivity.NBER Working Paper 11393,2005
[77] Yeaple, Stephen R. The Complex Integration Strategies of Multinationals and Cross Country Dependencies in the Structure of Foreign Direct Investment. Journal of International Economics ,2003,60:293-314
[78] Bustos, Paula. Rising Wage Inequality in the Argentinean Manufacturing Sector:the Impact of Trade and Foreign Direct Investment on Technology and Skill Upgrading. Mimeo, Harvard University, 2005
[79] Hopenhayn,Hugo.Entry, Exit, and Firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium. Econometrica,1992,(60):1127-1150
[80] Helpman, Elhanan.International Trade in the Presence of Product Differentiation, Economies of Scale and Monopolistic Competition:a Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin Approach.Journal of International Economics.1981,11:305-340
[81] Helpman, Elhanan, Marc J. Melitz and Yona Rubinstein.Trading Partners and Trading Volumes.Mimeo, Harvard University, 2004
[82] Helpman, Elhanan, Marc J. Melitz and Stephen R. Yeaple. Export versus FDI with Heterogeneous Firms. American Economic Review. 2004,94:300-316
[83] Grossman, Gene M., Elhanan Helpman and Adam Szeidl. Optimal Integration Strategies for the Multinational Firm.Journal of International Economics (forthcoming), 2005b
[84] Grossman, Gene M., Elhanan Helpman and Adam Szeidl. Optimal Integration Strategies for the Multinational Firm. Journal of International Economics, 2006, 70, (1):216-238
[85] 洪联英,罗能生.出口、投资与企业生产率:西方贸易理论的微观新进展.国际贸易问题,, 2008,(7)
[86] Yeaple, Stephen R. A Simple Model of Firm Heterogeneity, International Trade, and Wages. Journal of International Economics. 2005,65:1-20
[87] Antràs,Pol.Advanced Topics in International Trade:Firms and International Trade, and Other Topics,Economics2535 (Graduate).Harvard University Department of Economics Lecture Notes,May 2006
[88] 洪联英, 罗能生. 西方贸易理论与现代企业理论的融合与拓展.经济学动态,2006,(9):62-65
[89] McLaren, John.Globalization and vertical structure,American Economic Review, 2000,(90):1239-1254
[90] Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman. Integration versus Outsourcing in Industry Equilibrium,Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002,117:85-120
[91] Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman.Outsourcing in a Global Economy. Review of Economic Studies, 2005, 72:135-159
[92] Antràs, Pol and Elhanan Helpman.Global Sourcing.Journal of Political Economy.2004,112(3):552-580
[93] Feenstra, Robert C. and Gordon H. Hanson. Ownership and Control in Outsourcing to China: Estimating the Property-Rights Theory of the Firm.NBER Working Paper, 2003,10198
[94] Feenstra, Robert C. and Gordon H. Hanson. Ownership and Control in Outsourcing to China: Estimating the Property-Rights Theory of the Firm, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2005,120:729-761
[95] Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman. Managerial Incentives and the International Organization of Production, Journal of International Economics, 2004,63:237-262
[96] Holmstr?m Bengt and Paul Milgrom.The Firm as an Incentive System. American Economic Review.1994,84(4):972-991
[97] Holmstr?m, Bengt and Paul Milgrom. Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives.Econometrica.1987,55(2):303-328
[98] Marin,D. &T. Verdier.Power Inside the Firm and the Market: a Equilibrium Approach.Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion , 2002,4358
[99] Marin, Dalia and Thierry Verdier. Corporate Hierarchies and International Trade. Mimeo,University of Munich,2005
[100] Marin,D. &T. Verdier.Globalization and the Empowerment of Talent.Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper, 2003,4358
[101] Puga.,Diego and Tre.er, Daniel. Knowledge Creation and Control in Organizations. NBER Working Paper. 2002,9121
[102] 王浦劬. 政治学基础. 北京:北京大学出版社, 1995
[103] [美〕丹尼斯·朗. 权力论. 陆震伦, 郑明哲译. 北京:中国社会科学出版社, 2001
[104] 李友梅. 组织社会学及其决策分析. 上海:上海大学出版社, 2003
[105] Richardson, G. B. The Organization of Industry, Economic Journal.1972.82:883-896
[106] Richard Makadok.Toward a Synthesis of the Resource-Based and Dynamic -Capability Views of Rent Creation,SMJ, 2001,22(4):387-401
[107] 范阳. 基于能力的企业边界研究,[复旦大学博士论文]. 上海:复旦大学, 2003
[108] [法]泰勒尔. 产业组织理论. 张维迎总校译.北京:中国人民大学出版社,1997
[109] Porter, M. E. Competitive Advantage, New York:The Free Press . (1985).竞争优势(中译本),北京:中国财政经济出版社,1988
[110] 侯若石.质疑现代企业制度. 开放导报, 2004,(3):46-53
[111] Hymer.S.H.The Efficiency Contradictions of Multinational Corporations. American Economic Review.1970,60: 441-448
[112] Prahalad, C. K. and Hamel,G. The Core Competence of the Corporation, Harvard Business Review. 1990, (Mav-Tune):79-91
[113] Penrose, E. T. The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, (2nded, 1980),1959
[114] 郁义鸿. 企业的性质:能力理论的解释. 经济科学, 2001,(6):88-95
[115] Gereffi,G. International Trade and Industrial Upgrading in the Apparel Commodity Chain. Journal of International Economics.1999,48:37-70
[116] Krugman,P.R. Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity1, 1995,327-337
[117] Williamson, Oliver E. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Free Press. 1985.Chapters 1-3.41(中译本,资本主义经济制度. 段毅才, 王伟译. 北京:商务印书馆, 2002
[118] Langlois, R.N., & Foss, N.J. Capabilities and Governance: the Rebirth of Production in the Theory of Economic Organization, Blackwell Synergy.1997.
[119] Landes,David. What do Bosses Really Do? Journal of Economic History. 1986:585-623
[120] Teece ,David.J.,Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen. Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management[J].SMJ.1997,18(6): 509-533
[121] Bolton, Patrick and Mathias Dewatripont. Contract Theory.Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005
[122] Fung ,K.C.and Lawrence,L.J. The China-United States Bilateral Trade Balances:How Big It Really? Pacific Economics Review.1998,3(1):33-47.
[123] Fung ,K.C.and Lawrence,L.J. Adjusted Estimates of United States-China Bilateral Trade Balances:1995-2002.Journal of Asian Economics, 2003,(14):489-496
[124] Feenstra,R.C,海闻,胡永泰,姚顺利. 美中贸易逆差:规模和决定因素. 北京大学中国经济研究中心论文,1998
[125] 姚枝仲. 美国贸易逆差问题. 世界经济, 2003,(3):12-15
[126] 沈国兵. 贸易统计差异与中美贸易平衡问题. 经济研究, 2005,(6):82-93
[127] 李稻葵, 李丹宁. 中美贸易顺差:根本原因在哪里?. 国际经济评论, 2006,(9-10):13-16
[128] 尹翔硕. 试论技术进步与贸易失衡. 世界经济研究, 2007,(2):23-28
[129] 邱斌, 唐保庆, 孙少勤. FDI、生产非一体化与美中贸易逆差. 世界经济, 2007,(5):33-43
[130] 陈志勇 , 刘威 . 美中贸易的“外资引致逆差”问题研究 . 世界经济 , 2006,(9):42-48
[131] 王怀民. 独占或分治:中国加工企业生产控制模式研究. 世界经济, 2006,(9):33-41
[132] Marshl.P. A Sharp Sense of the Limits to Outsourcing, The Financial Times, 2001,(10):31
[133] Spencer, Barbara J. and Larry D. Qiu, Keiretsu and Relationship -Specific Investments: Barrier to Trade? International Economic Review. 2001, (42):871-901
[134] 张明志,李春盛. 中国产品内贸易发展的国际地位与地理方向特征. 国际贸易问题, 2007,(7):16-23
[135] 林毅夫, 刘明兴. 经济发展战略与中国的工业化. 经济研究, 2004,(7):48-58
[136] 蔡舫, 林毅夫. 中国经济[M]. 北京:中国财政经济出版社, 2003
[137] Tempest, Rone. Barbie and the World Economy. Los Angeles Times (September22), 1996
[138] World Trade Organization.Annual Report 1998,Geneva:World Trade Organization, 1998
[139] Acemoglu, Daron, Pol Antràs and Elhanan Helpman.Contracts and Technology Adoption, Mimeo, Harvard University.February 6,2006, 1-34
[140] Benassy,Jean-Pascal.Is There always too Little Research in Endogenous Growth with Expanding Product Variety? European Economic Review, 1998, 42(1):61-69
[141] Shapley,Lloyd S. A Value for N-person Games in Contributions to the Theory of Games, Princeton University Press, Princeton,NJ, 1953,31-34
[142] Osborne,Martin and Ariel Rubinstein.A Course in Game Theory.MIT Press,Cambridge,MA, 1994
[143] Hummels,D, Ishii J. and Yi K-M.The Nature and Growth of VerticalSpecialization in World Trade,Journal of International Economics. 2001, 54,(1):75-96
[144] Vanek,Jaroslav.The Factor Proportions Theory,the N-factor Case.Kyklos, 1968,(24):749-756
[145] Brecher ,Richard E.,and Choudhri,Ehsan V.The Factor Content of International Trade without Factor Price Equalization. Journal of International Economics, 1982,(12):277-283
[146] 日本贸易振兴会. 2006年世界贸易、投资白皮书, 2006-9-8
[147] 洪联英, 罗能生. 全球生产与贸易新格局下企业国际化发展路径及策略选择. 世界经济研究, 2007,(12):55-61
[148] Jones,R.W and H. Kierzkowski.Globalization and the Consequences of International Fragmentation.Manuscript,University of Rochester and Graduate Institute of International Studier,Geneva,1997
[149] Arndt, S. and H. Kierzkowski, (eds.) in Fragmentation: New Production and Trade Patterns the World Economy.Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001
[150] Arndt, S.W. Globalization and the Open Economy.North American Journal of Economics and Finance,1997,(8):71-79
[151] Feenstra, Robert C. and Gordon H. Hanson.Globalization, Outsourcing, and Wage Inequality.American Economic Review, 1996,(86):240-245
[152] Feenstra,RC.and Hanson, G H. Productivity Measurement and the Impact of Trade and Technology on Wages: Estimates for the U.S.,1972-1990.NBER Working Paper No.6052.June 1997
[153] Chen,H., Kondratowicz, M. and Yi K-M.Vertical Specialization and three Facts about U.S. International Trade.North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 2005,(16):35-59
[154] 刘志彪, 吴福象. 贸易一体化与生产非一体化 ——基于经济全球化两个重要假说的实证研究. 中国社会科学, 2006,(2):80-92
[155] 北京大学中国经济研究中心课题组. 中国出口贸易中的垂直专门化与中美国贸易. 世界经济, 2006,(5):3-11
[156] 金芳. 世界生产体系变革的当代特征及其效应. 世界经济研究, 2007(,7):1-9
[157] 吕文栋, 张辉. 全球价值链下的地方产业集群战略研究. 中国软科学, 2005,(2):119-124
[158] Balassa,B. Trade Liberalization among IndustrialCountries.McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967
[159] 刘志彪, 刘晓昶. 垂直专业化:经济全球化中的贸易和生产模式. 经济理论与经济管理, 2001,(10):5-10
[160] Ishii,J., Yi,K-M. The Growth of World Trade.Federal Reserve Bank of New York Research Paper.1997,NO, 9718
[161] 刘志彪. 全球价值链中我国外向型经济战略的提升. 中国经济问题2007,(1):9-17
[162] 陈岩. 对克鲁格曼“东亚奇迹”虚幻的挑战. 世界经济与政治, 1997,(1):37-41
[163] Raul Prebisch.Commercial Policy in the Underdevelopment Countries. American Economic Review, 1959
[164] 樊纲, 关志雄, 姚枝仲. 国际贸易结构分析:贸易品的技术分布. 经济研究, 2006,(8):70-80
[165] 卢峰. 我国工资与劳动成本变动及国际比较(1978-2004).NO.C2006008,北京大学中国经济研究中心, 2006
[166] 刘向丽,王厚双. 日本对外贸易战略转变的时机选择及启示. 国际经贸探索,2006,(6):22-26
[167] [美] 保罗.克鲁格曼. 克鲁格曼国际贸易新理论. 黄胜强译. 北京:中国社会科学出版社, 2001
[168] Feenstra, Robert C. Advanced International Trade.Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003
[2] Campa,J.and Goldberg,,L.S. The Evolving External Orientation of Manufacturing: a Profile of four Coumtries.FRBNK Economic Policy Review.1997,3(2),53-81
[3] Hummels,D.,Rapoport,D and Yi K-M.Vertical Specialization and Changing Nature of World Trade. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review,1998,Vol.4(2),79-99
[4] Hummels,Ishii and Yi. The Nature and Growth of Vertical Specialization in World Trade.Journal of International Economics. 2001.Vol.54,No.1,75-96
[5] Spencer,B.J, International Outsourcing and Incomplete Contracts.NBER Working Paper. 2005,No.11418
[6] Feenstra, Robert C. Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the Global Economy, Journal of Economic Perspectives .1998,12, pp. 31-50
[7] Borga, Maria and William J. Zeile. International Fragmentation of Production and Intrafirm Trade of U.S. Multinational Companies, Bureau of Economic Analysis Working Paper,2004,(02)
[8] Jones,R.,and Kierzkowski,H. The Role of Services in Production and International Trade:A Theoretical Framework,The Political Economy of International Trade,Oxford:Blackwell Publishing,1990
[9] Jones.R., Kierzkowski.H., and Chen L. What does Evidence Tell US about Fragmentation and Outsourcing? Prepared for a Special Issue of International Review of Economics and Finance, 2004,October
[10] Antràs, Pol .Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure.Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003,118 (4), pp. 1375-1418
[11] Antràs, Pol. Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle.American Economic Review.2005, 95:4, pp. 1054-1073
[12] Grossman, Gene M., Elhanan Helpman and Adam Szeidl. Complementarities between Outsourcing and Foreign Sourcing. American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings).2005,95:19-24
[13] 洪联英, 谢里, 罗能生. 基于I-O法则的中国制造业垂直分离测度研究. 统计研究, 2006,(10):40-44
[14] Helpman, E.Trade,FDI and the Organizations of Firm, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV ,2006, 589–630
[15] Barney,J.B. Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage, Journal of Management, 1991, (17) 1:99-120
[16] Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D. Hart.The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:a Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration.Journal of Political Economy,1986, 94(4):691-719
[17] Hart, Oliver and John Moore.Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm.Journal of Political Economy, 1990,98(6):1119-1158
[18] Rajan, Raghuram G. and Luigi Zingales .Power in a Theory of the Firm.The Quarterly Journal of Economics.1998,13(2):387-432
[19] Helpman, Elhanan, and Paul R. Krugman. Market Structure and Foreign Trade:Increasing Returns,Imperfect Competition,and the International Economy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,1985
[20] Berle and Means.The Modern Corporation and Private Property,MacMillan,New York.1932.(中译本)「美」伯利、米恩斯: 现代公司与私有则一产. 北京:商务印书馆, 2005
[21] Coase, Ronald H. The Nature of the Firm.Economica, 1937,4(16):386-405
[22] Rajan, Raghuram G. and Luigi Zingales.The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy:a Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001,116
[23] [美]R.科斯.论生产的制度结构. 北京:商务印书馆,1994
[24] [美]R.科斯, A.阿尔钦, D.诺斯等. 财产权利与制度变迁. 上海:上海三联书店, 上海人民出版社, 2003
[25] Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz. Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, American Economic Review, 1972,62(5): 777-795
[26] [美]O.哈特. 企业、合同与财务结构. 费方域译. 上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1998
[27] Hart, Oliver . Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1995
[28] Aghion, Philippe and Patrick Bolton. An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting.Review of Economic Studies, 1992,9(3):473-494
[29] Dewatripont,M &J.Tirole. A Theory of Debt and Equity:Diversity of Securities and Manager Shareholder Congruence, Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1994,109:1027-1054
[30] Aghion,Philippe and Jean Tirole.Formal and Real Authority in Organizations, Journal of Political Economy,1997,105(1):1-29
[31] Chiu,Y.S. Non-cooperativebargaining,Hostagea and Optimal Asset Ownership. The American Economic Review, 1998,88(4):882-901
[32] Cai,Hongbin. A Theory of Joint Asset Ownership,Rand Journal Economics. 2003,34(1):63-77
[33] Hart, Oliver D., and Moore, John. Foundations of incomplete contracts.Review of Economic Studies, 66, Special Issue: Contracts, 1999.115-138
[34] De Meza, David and Ben Lockwood.Does Asset Ownership always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm. QuarterlyJournal of Economics, 1998,113(2):361-386
[35] 詹姆斯.R.马库森. 跨国公司与国际贸易理论. 强永昌等译. 上海财经大学出版社,2005
[36] Markusen, James R.Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002
[37] Markusen, James R.Multinationals, Multi-plant Economies, and the Gains from Trade.Journal of International Economics .1984,(16): 205-226
[38] Helpman,E.A Simple Theory of International Trade with Multinational Corporations. Journal of Political Economy. 1984,92(23):451–472
[39] Horstmann, I. and Markusen, J.R. Strategic Investments and the Development of Multinationals.International Economic Review, 1987,28,(1):109-121
[40] Horstmann, I. and Markusen, J.R. Licensing versus Direct Investment: a Model of Internalization by the Multinational Enterprise,The Canadian Journal of Economics Revue- canadienne d'Economique, 1987,20(3):464-481
[41] Horstmann, I. and Markusen, J.R. Endogenous Market Structures in International Trade, Journal of International Economics. 1992, (20):225–247
[42] Markusen, James R., and Anthony J. Venables. Multinational Firms and the New Trade Theory, Journal of International Economics .1998,(46):183–203
[43] Markusen, James R., and Anthony J. Venables.The Theory of Endowment, Intra-industy and Multinational Trade, Journal of International Economics. 2000,52:209–234
[44] Markusen, James R.Foreign Investment, Vertical Integration and Local Equaity Requirements,Economica .1997,(4):219-238
[45] Markusen, James R. Factor Movements and Commodity Trade as Complements.Journal of International Economics. 1983, (14): 341-356
[46] Markusen, James R. Trade in Producer Services and in Other Specialized Intermediate Inputs. American Economic Review.1989,(79): 85-95
[47] Markusen, James R. The Boundaries of Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade.Journal of Economic Perspectives , 1995,(9): 169-189
[48] Markusen, James R. Contracts,Intellectual Property Rights, and Multinational Investment in Developing Countries,Journal of International Economics.2001, (53): 189-204
[49] Markusen ,James R. Modeling the Offshoring of White-collar Services: from Comparative Advantage to the New Theories of Trade and FDI,NBER,Working Paper,2005, 11827
[50] Ethier, Wifred. National and International Returns to Scale in the Modern Theory of International Trade. American Economic Review ,1982,72:389-405
[51] Ethier, Wilfred. The Multinational Firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics.1986,101: 805-833
[52] Ethier, Wilfred and James R. Markusen.Multinational Firms, Technology Diffusion and Trade.Journal of International Economics . 1996,41: 1-28
[53] Markusen, James R., and Anthony J. Venables. A Multi-country Approach to Factors Proportions Trade and Trade Costs. NBER Working Paper , 2005,11051
[54] Dunning, John H. Trade, Location of Economic Activity and MNE : A Search for an Eclectic Approach,in Ohlin, B., P. O. Hesselborn, and P.M. Wijkman (eds.). The International Allocation of Economic Activity. Macmillan,1977
[55] Carr, David L.,Markusen, J.R.and Maskus K,E. Estimating the Knowledge -Capital Model of the Multinational Enterprise,The American Economic Review, 2001,91(3): 693-708
[56] Brainard, S.Lael. An Empirical Assessment of the Proximity-Concentration Tradeoff between Multinational Sales and Trade.American Economic Review, 1997, 87: 520-544
[57] Feenstra, Robert C. and Barbara J. Spencer.Contractual versus Generic Outsourcing: the Role of Proximity.Mimeo, University of California, Davis,2005
[58] Antràs, Pol, Luis Garicano, and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg.Onshoring in a Knowledge Economy.Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2006,121 (1):31-77
[59] Garicano, Luis .Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production.Journal of Political Economy, 2000,108, (5):874-904
[60] Garicano, Luis and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg.Organization and Inequality in aKnowledge Economy.Working Paper, University of Chicago and Stanford University,2003
[61] Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman.Outsourcing versus FDI in Industry Equilibrium,Journal of the European Economic Association 1 (Papers and Proceedings), 2003, 317-327
[62] Hanson, Gordon H., Raymond J. Mataloni, J. and Matthew J. Slaughter.Expansion Strategies of U.S. Multinational Corporations,Brookings Trade Forum. 2001, 245-294
[63] Hanson, Gordon H., Raymond J. Mataloni, J. and Matthew J. Slaughter.Vertical Production Networks in Multinational Firms,Review of Economics and Statistics .2004,(forthcoming)
[64] Bernard, Andrew B. and J. Bradford Jensen. Exporters, Skill Upgrading, and the Wage Gap, Journal of International Economics .1997,42, (1-2):3-31
[65] Bernard, Andrew B. and J. Bradford Jensen. Exceptional Exporter Performance: Cause, Effect, or Both? Journal of International Economics.1999,47:1-25
[66] Clerides, S., S. Lach and J. Tybout. Is Learning by Exporting Important? Micro-Dynamic Evidence from Colombia, Mexico, and Morocco, Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1998,113(3): 903-947
[67] Pavcnik, N. Trade Liberalization, Exit, and Productivity Improvements:Evidence from Chilean Plants.The Review of Economic Studies. 2002,69:245-276
[68] Eaton,Jonathan, Samuel Kortum and Francis Kramarz. Dissecting Trade: Firms,Industries, and Export Destination. American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings).2004,94:150-154.
[69] Melitz, Marc J. The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity[.Econometrica . 2003,71:1695-1725
[70] Bernard, Andrew B., Jonathan Eaton, J. Bradford Jensen, and Samuel Kortum. Plants and Productivity in International Trade, American Economic Review. 2003, 93:1268-1290
[71] Bernard A., J. B. Jensen, and P. Schott. Falling Trade Costs, Heterogeneous Firms and Industry Dynamics. NBER Working Paper. 2003,9639
[72] Bernard, Andrew B., Stephen Redding, Peter K. Schott. Comparative Advantage and Heterogeneous Firms, NBER Working Paper . 2004, 10668
[73] Aw, B.Y., S. Chung and M.J. Roberts,Productivity and Turnover in the Export Market: Microlevel Evidence from the Republic of Korea and Taiwan(China).World Bank Economic Review, 2000, 14(1):65-90
[74] Chaney, Thomas.Distorted Gravity: Heterogeneous Firms,Market Structure and the Geography of International Trade. Mimeo University of Chicago, 2005
[75] Eaton, Jonathan, Samuel Kortum, and Francis Kramarz. An Anatomy of International Trade: Evidence from French Firms. Mimeo, NYU.2003
[76] Melitz, Marc J. and Gianmarco I.P Ottaviano.Market Size, Trade, and Productivity.NBER Working Paper 11393,2005
[77] Yeaple, Stephen R. The Complex Integration Strategies of Multinationals and Cross Country Dependencies in the Structure of Foreign Direct Investment. Journal of International Economics ,2003,60:293-314
[78] Bustos, Paula. Rising Wage Inequality in the Argentinean Manufacturing Sector:the Impact of Trade and Foreign Direct Investment on Technology and Skill Upgrading. Mimeo, Harvard University, 2005
[79] Hopenhayn,Hugo.Entry, Exit, and Firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium. Econometrica,1992,(60):1127-1150
[80] Helpman, Elhanan.International Trade in the Presence of Product Differentiation, Economies of Scale and Monopolistic Competition:a Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin Approach.Journal of International Economics.1981,11:305-340
[81] Helpman, Elhanan, Marc J. Melitz and Yona Rubinstein.Trading Partners and Trading Volumes.Mimeo, Harvard University, 2004
[82] Helpman, Elhanan, Marc J. Melitz and Stephen R. Yeaple. Export versus FDI with Heterogeneous Firms. American Economic Review. 2004,94:300-316
[83] Grossman, Gene M., Elhanan Helpman and Adam Szeidl. Optimal Integration Strategies for the Multinational Firm.Journal of International Economics (forthcoming), 2005b
[84] Grossman, Gene M., Elhanan Helpman and Adam Szeidl. Optimal Integration Strategies for the Multinational Firm. Journal of International Economics, 2006, 70, (1):216-238
[85] 洪联英,罗能生.出口、投资与企业生产率:西方贸易理论的微观新进展.国际贸易问题,, 2008,(7)
[86] Yeaple, Stephen R. A Simple Model of Firm Heterogeneity, International Trade, and Wages. Journal of International Economics. 2005,65:1-20
[87] Antràs,Pol.Advanced Topics in International Trade:Firms and International Trade, and Other Topics,Economics2535 (Graduate).Harvard University Department of Economics Lecture Notes,May 2006
[88] 洪联英, 罗能生. 西方贸易理论与现代企业理论的融合与拓展.经济学动态,2006,(9):62-65
[89] McLaren, John.Globalization and vertical structure,American Economic Review, 2000,(90):1239-1254
[90] Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman. Integration versus Outsourcing in Industry Equilibrium,Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002,117:85-120
[91] Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman.Outsourcing in a Global Economy. Review of Economic Studies, 2005, 72:135-159
[92] Antràs, Pol and Elhanan Helpman.Global Sourcing.Journal of Political Economy.2004,112(3):552-580
[93] Feenstra, Robert C. and Gordon H. Hanson. Ownership and Control in Outsourcing to China: Estimating the Property-Rights Theory of the Firm.NBER Working Paper, 2003,10198
[94] Feenstra, Robert C. and Gordon H. Hanson. Ownership and Control in Outsourcing to China: Estimating the Property-Rights Theory of the Firm, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2005,120:729-761
[95] Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman. Managerial Incentives and the International Organization of Production, Journal of International Economics, 2004,63:237-262
[96] Holmstr?m Bengt and Paul Milgrom.The Firm as an Incentive System. American Economic Review.1994,84(4):972-991
[97] Holmstr?m, Bengt and Paul Milgrom. Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives.Econometrica.1987,55(2):303-328
[98] Marin,D. &T. Verdier.Power Inside the Firm and the Market: a Equilibrium Approach.Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion , 2002,4358
[99] Marin, Dalia and Thierry Verdier. Corporate Hierarchies and International Trade. Mimeo,University of Munich,2005
[100] Marin,D. &T. Verdier.Globalization and the Empowerment of Talent.Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper, 2003,4358
[101] Puga.,Diego and Tre.er, Daniel. Knowledge Creation and Control in Organizations. NBER Working Paper. 2002,9121
[102] 王浦劬. 政治学基础. 北京:北京大学出版社, 1995
[103] [美〕丹尼斯·朗. 权力论. 陆震伦, 郑明哲译. 北京:中国社会科学出版社, 2001
[104] 李友梅. 组织社会学及其决策分析. 上海:上海大学出版社, 2003
[105] Richardson, G. B. The Organization of Industry, Economic Journal.1972.82:883-896
[106] Richard Makadok.Toward a Synthesis of the Resource-Based and Dynamic -Capability Views of Rent Creation,SMJ, 2001,22(4):387-401
[107] 范阳. 基于能力的企业边界研究,[复旦大学博士论文]. 上海:复旦大学, 2003
[108] [法]泰勒尔. 产业组织理论. 张维迎总校译.北京:中国人民大学出版社,1997
[109] Porter, M. E. Competitive Advantage, New York:The Free Press . (1985).竞争优势(中译本),北京:中国财政经济出版社,1988
[110] 侯若石.质疑现代企业制度. 开放导报, 2004,(3):46-53
[111] Hymer.S.H.The Efficiency Contradictions of Multinational Corporations. American Economic Review.1970,60: 441-448
[112] Prahalad, C. K. and Hamel,G. The Core Competence of the Corporation, Harvard Business Review. 1990, (Mav-Tune):79-91
[113] Penrose, E. T. The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, (2nded, 1980),1959
[114] 郁义鸿. 企业的性质:能力理论的解释. 经济科学, 2001,(6):88-95
[115] Gereffi,G. International Trade and Industrial Upgrading in the Apparel Commodity Chain. Journal of International Economics.1999,48:37-70
[116] Krugman,P.R. Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity1, 1995,327-337
[117] Williamson, Oliver E. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Free Press. 1985.Chapters 1-3.41(中译本,资本主义经济制度. 段毅才, 王伟译. 北京:商务印书馆, 2002
[118] Langlois, R.N., & Foss, N.J. Capabilities and Governance: the Rebirth of Production in the Theory of Economic Organization, Blackwell Synergy.1997.
[119] Landes,David. What do Bosses Really Do? Journal of Economic History. 1986:585-623
[120] Teece ,David.J.,Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen. Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management[J].SMJ.1997,18(6): 509-533
[121] Bolton, Patrick and Mathias Dewatripont. Contract Theory.Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005
[122] Fung ,K.C.and Lawrence,L.J. The China-United States Bilateral Trade Balances:How Big It Really? Pacific Economics Review.1998,3(1):33-47.
[123] Fung ,K.C.and Lawrence,L.J. Adjusted Estimates of United States-China Bilateral Trade Balances:1995-2002.Journal of Asian Economics, 2003,(14):489-496
[124] Feenstra,R.C,海闻,胡永泰,姚顺利. 美中贸易逆差:规模和决定因素. 北京大学中国经济研究中心论文,1998
[125] 姚枝仲. 美国贸易逆差问题. 世界经济, 2003,(3):12-15
[126] 沈国兵. 贸易统计差异与中美贸易平衡问题. 经济研究, 2005,(6):82-93
[127] 李稻葵, 李丹宁. 中美贸易顺差:根本原因在哪里?. 国际经济评论, 2006,(9-10):13-16
[128] 尹翔硕. 试论技术进步与贸易失衡. 世界经济研究, 2007,(2):23-28
[129] 邱斌, 唐保庆, 孙少勤. FDI、生产非一体化与美中贸易逆差. 世界经济, 2007,(5):33-43
[130] 陈志勇 , 刘威 . 美中贸易的“外资引致逆差”问题研究 . 世界经济 , 2006,(9):42-48
[131] 王怀民. 独占或分治:中国加工企业生产控制模式研究. 世界经济, 2006,(9):33-41
[132] Marshl.P. A Sharp Sense of the Limits to Outsourcing, The Financial Times, 2001,(10):31
[133] Spencer, Barbara J. and Larry D. Qiu, Keiretsu and Relationship -Specific Investments: Barrier to Trade? International Economic Review. 2001, (42):871-901
[134] 张明志,李春盛. 中国产品内贸易发展的国际地位与地理方向特征. 国际贸易问题, 2007,(7):16-23
[135] 林毅夫, 刘明兴. 经济发展战略与中国的工业化. 经济研究, 2004,(7):48-58
[136] 蔡舫, 林毅夫. 中国经济[M]. 北京:中国财政经济出版社, 2003
[137] Tempest, Rone. Barbie and the World Economy. Los Angeles Times (September22), 1996
[138] World Trade Organization.Annual Report 1998,Geneva:World Trade Organization, 1998
[139] Acemoglu, Daron, Pol Antràs and Elhanan Helpman.Contracts and Technology Adoption, Mimeo, Harvard University.February 6,2006, 1-34
[140] Benassy,Jean-Pascal.Is There always too Little Research in Endogenous Growth with Expanding Product Variety? European Economic Review, 1998, 42(1):61-69
[141] Shapley,Lloyd S. A Value for N-person Games in Contributions to the Theory of Games, Princeton University Press, Princeton,NJ, 1953,31-34
[142] Osborne,Martin and Ariel Rubinstein.A Course in Game Theory.MIT Press,Cambridge,MA, 1994
[143] Hummels,D, Ishii J. and Yi K-M.The Nature and Growth of VerticalSpecialization in World Trade,Journal of International Economics. 2001, 54,(1):75-96
[144] Vanek,Jaroslav.The Factor Proportions Theory,the N-factor Case.Kyklos, 1968,(24):749-756
[145] Brecher ,Richard E.,and Choudhri,Ehsan V.The Factor Content of International Trade without Factor Price Equalization. Journal of International Economics, 1982,(12):277-283
[146] 日本贸易振兴会. 2006年世界贸易、投资白皮书, 2006-9-8
[147] 洪联英, 罗能生. 全球生产与贸易新格局下企业国际化发展路径及策略选择. 世界经济研究, 2007,(12):55-61
[148] Jones,R.W and H. Kierzkowski.Globalization and the Consequences of International Fragmentation.Manuscript,University of Rochester and Graduate Institute of International Studier,Geneva,1997
[149] Arndt, S. and H. Kierzkowski, (eds.) in Fragmentation: New Production and Trade Patterns the World Economy.Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001
[150] Arndt, S.W. Globalization and the Open Economy.North American Journal of Economics and Finance,1997,(8):71-79
[151] Feenstra, Robert C. and Gordon H. Hanson.Globalization, Outsourcing, and Wage Inequality.American Economic Review, 1996,(86):240-245
[152] Feenstra,RC.and Hanson, G H. Productivity Measurement and the Impact of Trade and Technology on Wages: Estimates for the U.S.,1972-1990.NBER Working Paper No.6052.June 1997
[153] Chen,H., Kondratowicz, M. and Yi K-M.Vertical Specialization and three Facts about U.S. International Trade.North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 2005,(16):35-59
[154] 刘志彪, 吴福象. 贸易一体化与生产非一体化 ——基于经济全球化两个重要假说的实证研究. 中国社会科学, 2006,(2):80-92
[155] 北京大学中国经济研究中心课题组. 中国出口贸易中的垂直专门化与中美国贸易. 世界经济, 2006,(5):3-11
[156] 金芳. 世界生产体系变革的当代特征及其效应. 世界经济研究, 2007(,7):1-9
[157] 吕文栋, 张辉. 全球价值链下的地方产业集群战略研究. 中国软科学, 2005,(2):119-124
[158] Balassa,B. Trade Liberalization among IndustrialCountries.McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967
[159] 刘志彪, 刘晓昶. 垂直专业化:经济全球化中的贸易和生产模式. 经济理论与经济管理, 2001,(10):5-10
[160] Ishii,J., Yi,K-M. The Growth of World Trade.Federal Reserve Bank of New York Research Paper.1997,NO, 9718
[161] 刘志彪. 全球价值链中我国外向型经济战略的提升. 中国经济问题2007,(1):9-17
[162] 陈岩. 对克鲁格曼“东亚奇迹”虚幻的挑战. 世界经济与政治, 1997,(1):37-41
[163] Raul Prebisch.Commercial Policy in the Underdevelopment Countries. American Economic Review, 1959
[164] 樊纲, 关志雄, 姚枝仲. 国际贸易结构分析:贸易品的技术分布. 经济研究, 2006,(8):70-80
[165] 卢峰. 我国工资与劳动成本变动及国际比较(1978-2004).NO.C2006008,北京大学中国经济研究中心, 2006
[166] 刘向丽,王厚双. 日本对外贸易战略转变的时机选择及启示. 国际经贸探索,2006,(6):22-26
[167] [美] 保罗.克鲁格曼. 克鲁格曼国际贸易新理论. 黄胜强译. 北京:中国社会科学出版社, 2001
[168] Feenstra, Robert C. Advanced International Trade.Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003