公交优先下政府最优补贴机制研究
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摘要
优先发展公交是解决日趋严重的城市交通拥堵问题的一个重要手段。然而,公交企业的运营受到多种因素的制约,公交服务质量的提高、公交系统的发展都会产生巨大的财政需求,单靠公交企业自身经营是很难是实现的,为此,许多国家都纷纷提出“公交优先”战略,并对公交给予了巨额补贴。但政府对公交的巨额补贴也导致公交企业开支增加、工作效率低下的弊端产生,政府对公交提供补贴是为了更好的提高公交服务质量和社会福利以便吸引更多乘客而达到稳定的财政收入和缓解城市交通拥挤以及解决因交通带来的环境污染问题,但这一目的很难达到。因此,探索政府对公交企业的规范性补贴机制,对缓解国家财政压力,激发公交企业的活力并促使其最终走向市场具有现实意义。
本文提出政府应对公交企业同时进行常规性补贴和激励性补贴。在常规性补贴中,从社会福利最大化和企业利润最大化两个角度,构建了补贴计量模型,为政府对企业补贴提供了一种计量方法。在激励性补贴中,政府对公交企业补贴由两部分组成:一个固定部分和一个变动部分。变动部分是为了激励企业努力提高服务水平和社会效益,本文构建了促进企业努力降低成本、提高效率、提高服务水平和社会效益的委托代理模型,进而实现政府追求的社会福利最大化和促进企业服务水平的提高,从理论上分析了激励补贴的可行性及有效性。
由于政府和公交企业之间存在信息不对称,对于公交企业是否真正努力降低成本、提高效率和服务水平,作为委托人的政府并不可能完全把握,需要政府的监督与管理,本文建立了基于监督和激励补贴的委托代理模型。通过分析模型解得出:在政府监管下,企业的努力水平有所提高,激励强度有所增强,政府追求的社会效益明显提高。最后考虑了单委托-多代理模型,认为当信息非对称时,通过代理人之间的竞争可以提高服务水平,且代理人的努力程度随着竞争程度提高也随之提升。
Public transport priority is an important means to solve the increasingly serious problem of urban traffic congestion. However, public transport enterprise’s operating is restrict to a variety of factors. Improving quality of service and developing public transport system need lots of money, it is hard to achieve only rely on their own businesses. So, huge the government is given by the government in many countries. But many defects such as high expenditure, low working efficiency are raised. The goal of the government the government is improving quality of service to attract more passengers, so that public transport enterprises can get stable revenue. On the other hand, Well-developed public transport can alleviate the traffic pressure and environmental pollution. However, it is difficult to achieve this purpose. So, researching government's public transport enterprises normative subsidy mechanism is of great significance.
We think the Government should give public transport enterprises conventional subsidies and incentive subsidies at the same time. In the conventional subsidies, we build the subsidy model through welfare and corporate profits max. The subsidy model provides a good measurement method. In the incentive subsidies, Government subsidies to public enterprises are composed of two parts: a fixed part and a part of change. The part of change is to motivate enterprises to improve service levels and social benefits. We build a principal-agent model to analyze the feasibility and effectiveness.
Because 0f the information asymmetry between government and public enterprises, the Government must establish a monitoring mechanism to supervise public transport enterprises. By analyzing the model, we have the following conclusions: Under the supervision of the government, the level of efforts and social benefits are improved obviously .At the end of the paper, we consider a single commission - multi-agent model, and come to the conclusion: when the information is asymmetric, through competition among agents can improve the service level. Furthermore, we find that the more intense the competition among agents, the higher level of effort.
本文提出政府应对公交企业同时进行常规性补贴和激励性补贴。在常规性补贴中,从社会福利最大化和企业利润最大化两个角度,构建了补贴计量模型,为政府对企业补贴提供了一种计量方法。在激励性补贴中,政府对公交企业补贴由两部分组成:一个固定部分和一个变动部分。变动部分是为了激励企业努力提高服务水平和社会效益,本文构建了促进企业努力降低成本、提高效率、提高服务水平和社会效益的委托代理模型,进而实现政府追求的社会福利最大化和促进企业服务水平的提高,从理论上分析了激励补贴的可行性及有效性。
由于政府和公交企业之间存在信息不对称,对于公交企业是否真正努力降低成本、提高效率和服务水平,作为委托人的政府并不可能完全把握,需要政府的监督与管理,本文建立了基于监督和激励补贴的委托代理模型。通过分析模型解得出:在政府监管下,企业的努力水平有所提高,激励强度有所增强,政府追求的社会效益明显提高。最后考虑了单委托-多代理模型,认为当信息非对称时,通过代理人之间的竞争可以提高服务水平,且代理人的努力程度随着竞争程度提高也随之提升。
Public transport priority is an important means to solve the increasingly serious problem of urban traffic congestion. However, public transport enterprise’s operating is restrict to a variety of factors. Improving quality of service and developing public transport system need lots of money, it is hard to achieve only rely on their own businesses. So, huge the government is given by the government in many countries. But many defects such as high expenditure, low working efficiency are raised. The goal of the government the government is improving quality of service to attract more passengers, so that public transport enterprises can get stable revenue. On the other hand, Well-developed public transport can alleviate the traffic pressure and environmental pollution. However, it is difficult to achieve this purpose. So, researching government's public transport enterprises normative subsidy mechanism is of great significance.
We think the Government should give public transport enterprises conventional subsidies and incentive subsidies at the same time. In the conventional subsidies, we build the subsidy model through welfare and corporate profits max. The subsidy model provides a good measurement method. In the incentive subsidies, Government subsidies to public enterprises are composed of two parts: a fixed part and a part of change. The part of change is to motivate enterprises to improve service levels and social benefits. We build a principal-agent model to analyze the feasibility and effectiveness.
Because 0f the information asymmetry between government and public enterprises, the Government must establish a monitoring mechanism to supervise public transport enterprises. By analyzing the model, we have the following conclusions: Under the supervision of the government, the level of efforts and social benefits are improved obviously .At the end of the paper, we consider a single commission - multi-agent model, and come to the conclusion: when the information is asymmetric, through competition among agents can improve the service level. Furthermore, we find that the more intense the competition among agents, the higher level of effort.
引文
[1]刘敬,建立公交补贴机制初探[J],城市公共交通,1996.3: 25-26
[2] Andrea Boitani, Carlo Cambini,Incentive Regulation of Local Public Transport: the subsidy cap mechanism[Z],Preliminary version,2002.3.
[3]David A. Hensher, John Stanley Performance-based quality contracts in bus service provision[J],Transportation Research Part A,37(2003): 519-538
[4] Victoria Transport Policy Institute. Transportation Cost and Benefit Analysis [EB/OL]. http://www.vtpi.org/tca/tca0502.pdf, 2004
[5] Jansson, k.. Optimal pricing and financing of rail passenger services [EB/OL]. http://www.its.usyd.edu.au/conferences/thredbo/thredbo_papers_8/Thredbo8_Jansson_K.pdf,2002.
[6] Kraus, M. Discomfort externalities and marginal cost transit fares[J]. Journal of Urban Economics, 1991, 29:249–259
[7] Oldfield, R. H. and Bly, P. H. An analytic investigation of optimal bus size [J]. Transportation Research B, 1988, 22:319–337
[8]平新乔微观经济十八讲[M]北京大学出版社2002-3 p43
[9]Jensen,M.,C., Meckling,W.,H., Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, P308, 1976.
[10]《新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典》第3卷,经济科学出版社1992年版P1035。
[11]Pratt, J. W., Zeckauser,R.,J., An Overview in Principles and Agents: The Structure of Business, Boston, 1985, P2.
[12]Arrow,K.,J,The Economics of Agency in Principles and Agents: The structure of Business, Boston, 1985, P37-P38.
[13]《公司制度分析》,中国财政经济出版社1997年版P202。
[14]《公司制度分析》,中国财政经济出版社1997年版P202-203。
[15]Arrow,K.,J,The Economics of Agency in Principles and Agents:The Structure of Business, Boston,1985,P37-38.
[16]Hart,O., Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implication, The Economic Journal, May, 1995.
[17]张维迎,《企业理论与中国企业改革》,北京大学出版社1999年版P105-106。
[18]张跃平、刘荆敏,《委托—代理激励理论实证研究综述》,《经济学动态》2003年6月
[19]Fama, E,Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy,1980,88 (2):288-307.
[20]Holmstrom,B.,Managerial Incentive Schemes:A Dynamic Perspective, in Essays in Economics and Management inHonour of Lars, 1982.
[21]Rosen,B., Jerdee, T., H., Middle and Late Career Problems:Causes, Consequences, and Research Needs, Human Resource Planning,1990, 13 (1):59-71.
[22]Lazear, E.,P., Moore, R,L., Incentives, Production and Labor Contracts, Quarterly .lourna) of Economics, 1984,99 (2):275-297.
[23]Kreps,D. , Corporate Culture and Economic Theory,1990, in J. Alt&K.Shepsle,eds.,PerspectivesonPositivePolitical Economy,Cambridge University Press.
[24]Kreps,D., M.&Milgrom,P.&Roberts,J.&Wilson, R., Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, Journal of Economic Theory,1982, 27 (2):215-253.
[25]张维迎,《公有制经济中的委托人—代理人关系:理论分析和政策含义》,《经济研究》1995 (4)
[26]陈冬华、陈信元、万华林,《国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费》,《经济研究》2005 (2)
[27]李军林,《声誉、控制权与博弈均衡—一个关于国有公司经营绩效的博弈分析》,《上海财经大学学报》2002 (4)
[28] Holmstrom B. Moral Hazard and Operability [J].Bell Journal of Economics (S0005-8556),1979.10(1):74-91
[29]让-雅克i拉丰大卫i马赫蒂摩激励理论委托-代理模型(第一卷)中国人民大学出版社2002
[30] Bergemann D,Valimaki J. Dynamic common agency[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 2003, 111(1): 23—48.
[31] Cristopher P. On the long run implications of repeated moral hazard[J]. Journalof Economic Theory, 1998, 79(2): 174—191.
[32] Ni Debing, Tang Xiaowo, Li Shiming. Study on relationships between manager’s behavior and managerial performance [J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2003, 6(3): 41—45.
[33] Bardsley P. Multi-task agency: A combinatorial model[J]. Journal ofEconomic Behavior and Organization, 2001, 44(2): 233—248.
[34] KhalilF, Lawarree J. Catching the agent on the wrong foot: Ex post choice of monitoring[J]. Journal of Public Economics, 2001, 82(3): 327—347
[35] Kim S K, Wang S S. Linear contracts and the double moral hazard[J]. Journalof Economic Theory, 1998, 82(3): 342—378.
[36] Agrawal P. Double moral hazard, Monitoring, and the nature of contracts[J]. Journal of Economics, 2002, 75(1): 33—61
[37] LiSH, ZhangW Y. Optimal assignment of principal ship in teams[J]. Journal ofEconomic Behavior and Organization, 2001, 44(1): 105—127.
[38] Srabana G, Richard E R. Monitoring the principal with multiple agents[J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 1998, 29(2): 233—248.
[39]让-雅克·拉丰,大卫·马赫蒂摩.激励理论(第一卷):委托-代理模型[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社, 2002.
[40] Holmstrom B, Milgrom P. Aggregation and linearity in the provision of inter temporal incentives[J]. Econometrica, 1987, 55: 303—328.
[41]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社, 1996. 431—440, 448—463. ZhangWeiying. Game Theory and Information Economics[M]. Shangha:i Shanghai People Press, 1996. 431—440, 448—463. ( in Chinese)
[42]刘兵,张士英.企业激励机制设计与代理成本分析[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2000, 20(6): 50—53. Liu Bing, Zhang Shiying. The incentive mechanism design of firms and the analysis of agency costs[J]. Theory and Practice of System Engineering, 2000, 20(6): 50—53. ( in Chinese)
[43]李贤平概率论基础第二版[M]。北京:高等教育出版社,1997(2006重印),ISBN 7-04-005921-5 122-123
[44]Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. Microeconomics(Third Edition) [M].Prentice一Hall International, Inc. 1996
[45]Joel sobel.Information Control in the Principle-Agent Problem[J]. International Economic Review,1993,34(2).
[46]Jacque Cremer and Fahad Kalil. Gathering Information before Signing a Contract[J].A.E.R,1992,82(3).
[2] Andrea Boitani, Carlo Cambini,Incentive Regulation of Local Public Transport: the subsidy cap mechanism[Z],Preliminary version,2002.3.
[3]David A. Hensher, John Stanley Performance-based quality contracts in bus service provision[J],Transportation Research Part A,37(2003): 519-538
[4] Victoria Transport Policy Institute. Transportation Cost and Benefit Analysis [EB/OL]. http://www.vtpi.org/tca/tca0502.pdf, 2004
[5] Jansson, k.. Optimal pricing and financing of rail passenger services [EB/OL]. http://www.its.usyd.edu.au/conferences/thredbo/thredbo_papers_8/Thredbo8_Jansson_K.pdf,2002.
[6] Kraus, M. Discomfort externalities and marginal cost transit fares[J]. Journal of Urban Economics, 1991, 29:249–259
[7] Oldfield, R. H. and Bly, P. H. An analytic investigation of optimal bus size [J]. Transportation Research B, 1988, 22:319–337
[8]平新乔微观经济十八讲[M]北京大学出版社2002-3 p43
[9]Jensen,M.,C., Meckling,W.,H., Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, P308, 1976.
[10]《新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典》第3卷,经济科学出版社1992年版P1035。
[11]Pratt, J. W., Zeckauser,R.,J., An Overview in Principles and Agents: The Structure of Business, Boston, 1985, P2.
[12]Arrow,K.,J,The Economics of Agency in Principles and Agents: The structure of Business, Boston, 1985, P37-P38.
[13]《公司制度分析》,中国财政经济出版社1997年版P202。
[14]《公司制度分析》,中国财政经济出版社1997年版P202-203。
[15]Arrow,K.,J,The Economics of Agency in Principles and Agents:The Structure of Business, Boston,1985,P37-38.
[16]Hart,O., Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implication, The Economic Journal, May, 1995.
[17]张维迎,《企业理论与中国企业改革》,北京大学出版社1999年版P105-106。
[18]张跃平、刘荆敏,《委托—代理激励理论实证研究综述》,《经济学动态》2003年6月
[19]Fama, E,Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy,1980,88 (2):288-307.
[20]Holmstrom,B.,Managerial Incentive Schemes:A Dynamic Perspective, in Essays in Economics and Management inHonour of Lars, 1982.
[21]Rosen,B., Jerdee, T., H., Middle and Late Career Problems:Causes, Consequences, and Research Needs, Human Resource Planning,1990, 13 (1):59-71.
[22]Lazear, E.,P., Moore, R,L., Incentives, Production and Labor Contracts, Quarterly .lourna) of Economics, 1984,99 (2):275-297.
[23]Kreps,D. , Corporate Culture and Economic Theory,1990, in J. Alt&K.Shepsle,eds.,PerspectivesonPositivePolitical Economy,Cambridge University Press.
[24]Kreps,D., M.&Milgrom,P.&Roberts,J.&Wilson, R., Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, Journal of Economic Theory,1982, 27 (2):215-253.
[25]张维迎,《公有制经济中的委托人—代理人关系:理论分析和政策含义》,《经济研究》1995 (4)
[26]陈冬华、陈信元、万华林,《国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费》,《经济研究》2005 (2)
[27]李军林,《声誉、控制权与博弈均衡—一个关于国有公司经营绩效的博弈分析》,《上海财经大学学报》2002 (4)
[28] Holmstrom B. Moral Hazard and Operability [J].Bell Journal of Economics (S0005-8556),1979.10(1):74-91
[29]让-雅克i拉丰大卫i马赫蒂摩激励理论委托-代理模型(第一卷)中国人民大学出版社2002
[30] Bergemann D,Valimaki J. Dynamic common agency[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 2003, 111(1): 23—48.
[31] Cristopher P. On the long run implications of repeated moral hazard[J]. Journalof Economic Theory, 1998, 79(2): 174—191.
[32] Ni Debing, Tang Xiaowo, Li Shiming. Study on relationships between manager’s behavior and managerial performance [J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2003, 6(3): 41—45.
[33] Bardsley P. Multi-task agency: A combinatorial model[J]. Journal ofEconomic Behavior and Organization, 2001, 44(2): 233—248.
[34] KhalilF, Lawarree J. Catching the agent on the wrong foot: Ex post choice of monitoring[J]. Journal of Public Economics, 2001, 82(3): 327—347
[35] Kim S K, Wang S S. Linear contracts and the double moral hazard[J]. Journalof Economic Theory, 1998, 82(3): 342—378.
[36] Agrawal P. Double moral hazard, Monitoring, and the nature of contracts[J]. Journal of Economics, 2002, 75(1): 33—61
[37] LiSH, ZhangW Y. Optimal assignment of principal ship in teams[J]. Journal ofEconomic Behavior and Organization, 2001, 44(1): 105—127.
[38] Srabana G, Richard E R. Monitoring the principal with multiple agents[J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 1998, 29(2): 233—248.
[39]让-雅克·拉丰,大卫·马赫蒂摩.激励理论(第一卷):委托-代理模型[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社, 2002.
[40] Holmstrom B, Milgrom P. Aggregation and linearity in the provision of inter temporal incentives[J]. Econometrica, 1987, 55: 303—328.
[41]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社, 1996. 431—440, 448—463. ZhangWeiying. Game Theory and Information Economics[M]. Shangha:i Shanghai People Press, 1996. 431—440, 448—463. ( in Chinese)
[42]刘兵,张士英.企业激励机制设计与代理成本分析[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2000, 20(6): 50—53. Liu Bing, Zhang Shiying. The incentive mechanism design of firms and the analysis of agency costs[J]. Theory and Practice of System Engineering, 2000, 20(6): 50—53. ( in Chinese)
[43]李贤平概率论基础第二版[M]。北京:高等教育出版社,1997(2006重印),ISBN 7-04-005921-5 122-123
[44]Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. Microeconomics(Third Edition) [M].Prentice一Hall International, Inc. 1996
[45]Joel sobel.Information Control in the Principle-Agent Problem[J]. International Economic Review,1993,34(2).
[46]Jacque Cremer and Fahad Kalil. Gathering Information before Signing a Contract[J].A.E.R,1992,82(3).