中小企业板上市公司股权结构与再融资方式选择研究
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摘要
2004年中小企业板的设立是我国证券发展史上一个重要的里程碑，不仅为占全国企业总数99％的中小企业提供了更为广阔的融资平台，也给投资者提供了更多的投资机会，日益引起人们的关注。但由于中小板成立时间较短，学术界对该板块还缺乏深入的研究，尤其是中小板上市公司的股权结构和融资方式问题还是未知数。本文以中小板上市公司为对象对股权结构和再融资方式之间的关系进行了研究和实证分析，并提出优化股权结构和融资方式的对策。
文章在西方资本结构理论及我国学者研究的基础上，首先分析了当前国内中小板股权结构与融资结构的现状，并对二者的关系进行了理论分析。然后通过大量的上市公司数据，从股权集中度、股权制衡度、股权性质和股权流通性结构四个方面出发，分别研究了股权结构与企业长、短期负债和总体负债水平的关系，构建回归模型对中小板上市公司的融资行为进行了实证检验。研究结果表明：从短期看，各股权结构指标只与长期负债率线性相关，而与短期负债、企业总体负债水平线性关系不显著；从长期来看，股权结构指标与长短期负债、企业整体负债都呈现出一定程度的非线性关系，而并不像多数学者研究主板上市公司时得出的线性相关结论。中小板市场仍有相当数量的非流通股存在，抑制了流通股股东在证券市场中的作用；大股东偏好股权融资方式，导致大量分散的中小股东利益得不到保护；高管持股比例仍旧较低，在融资方式的选择上影响不大。
最后，文章在理论分析和实证检验的基础上，提出了改善中小板上市公司融资结构，优化其股权结构的政策建议：加快资本市场全流通的进程，加强对中小股东利益的保护，大力发展债券市场、促进融资方式的多元化，推进上市公司股权激励机制。
The establishment of Small and Medium Enterprise Board was an important milestone inChinese security development history in 2004. It doesn’t only provide minor enterpriseswhich accounts for 99％of all enterprises wide financing platform, but also make investorsmore opportunities. But because this board built too late, academic circles have no deeplyresearch at present, especially the problems about ownership structure and financial method.Based on small and medium-sized board listed companies, this paper did study and empiricalanalysis about the relationship between ownership structure and refinancing way, proposedmeasures which could optimize ownership structure and financial method.
Based on the classic capital structure theory and the current research of domesticacademics, this paper analyzed the current situation on ownership structure and financialstructure of Small and Medium Enterprise Board, and did a theoretical analysis about theirrelationship. Then it researched the ownership structure and short, long term liabilities andoverall debt levels from four aspects, concentration of ownership structure, ownershipbalancing, equity properties and ownership liquidity. The empirical research showed that eachownership structure index has linear correlation with long-debt in the short run but not totaldebt, short-term debt; ownership structure index has a certain degree of nonlinear relationshipwith the ratios of total debt, short-term debt and long-debt which was quite different from theresearch conclusions on A-shares. There are also many non-tradable shares in Small andMedium Enterprise Board, which restrain the role of tradable shares in securities market;strong stock holders prefers financing in the stock market, which result in benefits of smallshareholders out of protection; senior managers have little impact on the selection offinancing method, because of lower share holding.
At the end, we put forward some suggestions to improve the financial methods and ownership structure of the Small and Medium Enterprise Board listed companies. Themeasures include: accelerating the course of stock market’s complete circulation,strengthening the protection of small shareholders, vigorously developing the bond market topromote the financing way diversification, promoting the listed companies’equity incentivemechanism.
文章在西方资本结构理论及我国学者研究的基础上，首先分析了当前国内中小板股权结构与融资结构的现状，并对二者的关系进行了理论分析。然后通过大量的上市公司数据，从股权集中度、股权制衡度、股权性质和股权流通性结构四个方面出发，分别研究了股权结构与企业长、短期负债和总体负债水平的关系，构建回归模型对中小板上市公司的融资行为进行了实证检验。研究结果表明：从短期看，各股权结构指标只与长期负债率线性相关，而与短期负债、企业总体负债水平线性关系不显著；从长期来看，股权结构指标与长短期负债、企业整体负债都呈现出一定程度的非线性关系，而并不像多数学者研究主板上市公司时得出的线性相关结论。中小板市场仍有相当数量的非流通股存在，抑制了流通股股东在证券市场中的作用；大股东偏好股权融资方式，导致大量分散的中小股东利益得不到保护；高管持股比例仍旧较低，在融资方式的选择上影响不大。
最后，文章在理论分析和实证检验的基础上，提出了改善中小板上市公司融资结构，优化其股权结构的政策建议：加快资本市场全流通的进程，加强对中小股东利益的保护，大力发展债券市场、促进融资方式的多元化，推进上市公司股权激励机制。
The establishment of Small and Medium Enterprise Board was an important milestone inChinese security development history in 2004. It doesn’t only provide minor enterpriseswhich accounts for 99％of all enterprises wide financing platform, but also make investorsmore opportunities. But because this board built too late, academic circles have no deeplyresearch at present, especially the problems about ownership structure and financial method.Based on small and medium-sized board listed companies, this paper did study and empiricalanalysis about the relationship between ownership structure and refinancing way, proposedmeasures which could optimize ownership structure and financial method.
Based on the classic capital structure theory and the current research of domesticacademics, this paper analyzed the current situation on ownership structure and financialstructure of Small and Medium Enterprise Board, and did a theoretical analysis about theirrelationship. Then it researched the ownership structure and short, long term liabilities andoverall debt levels from four aspects, concentration of ownership structure, ownershipbalancing, equity properties and ownership liquidity. The empirical research showed that eachownership structure index has linear correlation with long-debt in the short run but not totaldebt, short-term debt; ownership structure index has a certain degree of nonlinear relationshipwith the ratios of total debt, short-term debt and long-debt which was quite different from theresearch conclusions on A-shares. There are also many non-tradable shares in Small andMedium Enterprise Board, which restrain the role of tradable shares in securities market;strong stock holders prefers financing in the stock market, which result in benefits of smallshareholders out of protection; senior managers have little impact on the selection offinancing method, because of lower share holding.
At the end, we put forward some suggestions to improve the financial methods and ownership structure of the Small and Medium Enterprise Board listed companies. Themeasures include: accelerating the course of stock market’s complete circulation,strengthening the protection of small shareholders, vigorously developing the bond market topromote the financing way diversification, promoting the listed companies’equity incentivemechanism.
引文
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[17]宋立,胡颖.上市公司股权结构与再融资行为研究[J].商业研究, 2004(18):133～136
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[19]王乔,章卫东.股权结构、股权再融资行为与绩效[J].会计研究, 2005(9):51～56
[20]林彬.三种再融资方式下两类股东收益率比较[J].经济理论与经济管理, 2005(1):31～34
[21]王泽填,程建伟,孙爱琳.股权结构与公司债务期限结构的关系研究[J].山西财经大学学报, 2008(9):47～53
[22]张亦春,孙君明.我国上市公司的股权结构、股利政策与公司治理研究综述——基于股权分置改革后股权结构变化的研究视角[J].当代财经, 2009(7)123～129
[23]毛洪安,李晶晶.代理成本、股权结构与公司债务期限结构[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2010(5)104～109
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[26] P. V. Viswanath. Strategic Considerations, the Pecking Order Hypothesis and MarketReactions to Equity Financing [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1993(28): 213～234.
[27]Bathala, C., Moon, K.P. and R.P.Rao. Managerial Ownership, Dept Policy and Impact ofInstitutional Shareholdings: An Agency Perspective[J]. Financial Management,1994(23):38～50.
[28] Berger, P.G., E.Ofek, andD.Yermack. Managerial Entrenchment and Capital StructureDecision [J]. Journal of Finance, 1997(52):1411～1437
[29]Firth, M.. The Impact of institutional Stockholders and Managerial Interests on theCapital Structure of Firms [J]. Managerial and Decision Economics, 1995(16):167～175.
[30]Chemmanur, T.J. and Fulghieri, P.. Reputation, Renegotiation and Choice between Bankloans and Publicly Traded Debt.[J]. The Review of financialStudies，1994(7):475～506
[31]吕长江,王克敏.上市公司资本结构、股利分配及管理股权比例相互作用机制研究[J].会计研究, 2002(3):39～48
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