基于微观主体行为的认证有效性研究
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摘要
认证认可起源于为促进商业社会中当事人之间的交易顺利进行的需要。认证的最大贡献在于提供了质量和服务的信任度,从而降低了交易当事人的信息风险,并节约了交易成本,使经济资源能够得到有效配置。在市场经济逐步完善并全球化的今天和未来,基于第三方的认证制度是必不可少的制度安排,对确保生命安全和健康、环境的可持续发展、资源的节约利用及有效配置都发挥着重要的作用。然而,认证在缓解信息不对称的同时,自身也存在着严重的信息不对称,如果认证不能提供独立公允的鉴证,将会加剧交易当事人的信息风险,此时的认证便是无效的。无效的制度导致“医不如病”。
认证有效性是认证的生命线,认证有效性不高是目前认证面临的主要矛盾和问题。目前咨询机构控制企业,要挟认证机构,搞咨询认证一条龙。企业认证目的不明确,为认证而认证,个别花钱买证。在自愿性认证领域,一些认证机构用低价竞争,取得合同后,就弄虚作假降低成本,牺牲了认证的有效性和认证行业的整体形象和信誉度。所有这些问题都涉及到认证制度的创新和完善,而制度的创新和完善必须以微观主体的行为及其行为背后的机理和影响因素为基础。
本文基于信息经济学的分析框架,在中国的认证认可制度背景下,将微观主体的市场行为置于分析的中心,利用大样本调查数据和深度访谈案例对三类主要的微观主体——消费者、企业和认证机构的行为进行了深入分析,着重探讨了消费者的态度、支付行为和支付意愿、企业自愿参与认证的动机、认证机构的市场结构和价格竞争行为,最后在进一步探讨不同微观主体互动的基础上提出了一些监管思路和建议。论文的主要内容及结论如下:
(1)在认证涉及国民经济的方方面面,认证产品覆盖率已经较高的今天,论文基于大样本数据的研究表明:社会公众对认证的认知度仍然相当低,而且具有不同社会经济特征和人口特征的消费者对认证的认知度基本上没有表现出系统差异性,这意味着对认证的宣传还处在一个需要全民普及的阶段。研究也表明,认证认知度的提升有助于提升消费者对认证必要性的肯定,媒体在促进社会公众提升认证必要性方面发挥了重要作用。信任认证,关注商品生产过程,接触媒体多和收入高的群体具有更高的支付意愿,这些结论意味着政府有必要将对认证的宣传和对公众的认证知识教育普及列入日程,通过与电视等媒体的合作,提升消费者的认知水平:通过对消费者态度和信任程度的定期调查,检讨监管工作的着力点;提升消费者的信任度、鼓励壮大具有现代消费意识的群体,带动认证事业发展。
(2)论文基于利益相关者理论框架,分析了企业的认证动机问题。尽管目前中国企业的认证获证总量已经跃居世界第一位,但已认证企业仅占企业总数的比例远远低于欧州,中国的认证发展空间仍然很大。理论分析表明,从整个社会福利最大化来看,认证的发展应该主要依赖企业的自愿认证。实证研究表明,中国企业的认证动机突出地受到经济利益的驱动,出于环保和员工健康方面的认证动机相当低。认证的动力主要来自于加强管理、提升顾客满意度以及企业知名度。追求企业声望的企业更可能参与认证,具体而言,私营业主自评的社会地位越高,越可能参与认证。企业的存续时间越长、规模越大、改制企业和公司制企业越有可能参与认证。参加协会的企业、经过审计的企业也更可能是认证的企业。相对于农业、制造业和建筑业来说,其他行业的认证参与度要显著地低。企业领导的重视和企业文化是影响企业认证有效性最重要的因素。
(3)论文对认证市场结构和认证机构的价格行为进行了研究。发现主要三类体系认证的市场集中度在经历了一个快速下降后,基本上开始保持稳定。激烈的价格竞争导致认证收费将呈不断下降的趋势。由于在启动业务关系中存在的转换成本,在位者相对于进入者具有成本优势,为获取预期的准租金,认证机构在首期业务投标中,便采取低于成本的价格投标“低价揽客”。只要认证价格远离均衡价格的方向移动,无论是升高还是降低,都会损害认证的有效性,提高认证有效性的关键是建立有限的认证市场竞争机制。
在上述研究结论的基础上,论文提出了如下认证监管的思路:首先,隐含在一些表象(如低价恶性竞争,咨询认证一条龙服务等)背后的制度性缺陷(如消费者主体的缺位、与行政主管单位的“父子”关系等)才是导致认证有效性损害的根本原因。仅依靠干预认证收费可能会使认证市场机制进一步受到扭曲。而应该以“疏导为主”,更多地致力于建立能使微观行为主体激励相容、相互监控的制度。其次,由于认证事业是一个强烈依赖于公众信任的事业,只有真正为消费者利益服务才可能建立起长效机制。其三、机构作为整体很难形成真正的责任追究机制,但实际上认证失信行为的主导是个人,行动也是个人,因此,认证市场的监管必须是全面的监管,即要包括认证机构,更要加强对检查人员的监管,形成终身信用跟踪机制,强化个人的责任。
Certification and accreditation originates from the needs of promoting smooth transaction among traders in a commercial society. Certification contributes most in reducing information risks for traders, in reducing transaction costs by providing trust in quality and service, which helps realize the effective allocation of econimic resources. Currently, as market economy is growing more mature and globalized, certification scheme, as a third party system, is playing an important role in ensuring life safety and health, sustainable development of environment, and effective use and allocation of resources. However, while helping achieve better balance of information, certification also bears serious imbalance of informtaiton within itself. If certification fails to provide independent and impartial proof, it will make the imbalance of information among traders more serious, and thus renders certification itself invalid. And it's better to have no system than to have an invalid system.
The validity of certification is the lifeline of certification, and poor validity is the main problem facing certification. Currently, some consultancy agencies control enterprises and coerce certification bodies by providing both consultancy and certification. The enterprises do not clearly understand the purpose of certification, and apply for certification only for a certificate. Some even buy certificates. In voluntary certification, some certification bodies compete by lower prices, and as soon as they win the contract, they will use some shoddy practice to reduce the cost. Such practice sacrifices the validity of certification, the integrity and reputation of certification industry. All these call for a need for the improvement and innovation of the certification system. However the innovation and improvement of the system must be based on the behaviour of micro stakeholders as well as their philosophy, thoughts and related affecting factors.
This thesis,based on an analysis framework of information economics takes account of the background of China certification and accreditation. It focuses on the market behaviour of micro stakeholders, and has an in-depth analysis of the behaviours of three types of micro stakeholders-consumers, enterprices and certification bodies, based on an extensive survey result and in-depth interviews. The research is mainly on the consumers'attitude, paying behaviour and willness to pay, the motivation of enterprises for voluntary involvement in certification, and the price structure and price competition of certification bodies. The result will be some regulatory recommendations based on the interaction of the different stakeholders. The main contents and conclusions are as follows.
(1) When certification has come into the various fields of national economy and when a big amount of products are under certification, based on the conclusion of entensive sample data,the thesis reveals that the awareness and recognition of the public relating to certification is still very low.Besides,consumer of different social economic features and poupulation features do not generate systematic differences in awareness and recognition of certification. This means that the concept of certification needs to be spread more widely among the public. The analysis also shows that to raise such awareness and recognition will help consumers have a more positive view of certification, and the media could play a big role in such a process. Consumers who pay more attention to production process, who are exposed to media more frequently, who have higher income and who give more attention and trust to certification, have a higher willingness to pay for certification.
Such research results indicate that the government should put on its daily agenda the certification promotion and certification education to the public. It should work with the media, like TV, to raise the awareness of the consumers on certification. Through regular survey on the consumers'attitude and trust on certification, the government should review its work focus. On the other hand, the government should encourage people with advanced consumption concepts to play a pioneer role. All these efforts will contribute to the growth of certification.
(2) Based on the theoretical framwork of the stakeholders, the thesis analyses the motiviation of enterprises for certification. Although China has the largest number of certified enterprises, it is still far behind Europe in term of percentage of certified enterprises Vs total number of enterprises. Thus there is still a large room for the certification to grow in China. Theoretical analysis shows that for the social welfare maximization, the growth of certification mainly depends on the voluntary certification by enterprises. The case studies show that Chinese enterprises are mainly driven for certification by economic benefits, and seldom motivated by environmental protection and staff health. Some enterprises more easily apply for certification for the pursuit of manufacturer reputation. Specifically, those private enterprises who have a higher self-recognition more easily apply for certification. Those enterprises who have a longer history and larger scale, who are stakholding companies or corporate companies more easily apply for certification. Enterprises who are association members, or who are audited more easily go for certification. Agriculture, manufacturing and construction industries enjoy high rate of certification while other industries have a remarkably low rate of certification. Attention from the management of enterprises, as well as manufacturer culture are key factors affecting the effectiveness of certification.
(3) The thesis researches on the structure and certification market and the price behaviour of the certification bodies. It reveals that the market concentration of the main three types of system certification now stays basically stable, following a rapid decrease. Fiece price competion results in continuous decreasing of certification prices. Due to the conversion cost in starting new business, the operating practioners enjoys cost advantage over new comers. To acquire expected revenues, the certification bodies will use low price, sometimes lower than the cost, in bidding in order to win the contract. No matter the certification prices deviates either higher or lower from the benchmark price,it will damage the validty of certification. The key to raise the validity of certification is to establish limited competion mechanism in the certification market.
Based on the above research results, the thesis proposes the following supervision recommendations. Firstly, deficiencies on the system itself(such as absence of consumers, the "father and son" relationship with government authorities, etc) behind some phenomenal irregularities (such as vicious price competition, combination of consultancy and certification, etc) are the leading causes damaging validity of certification.The certification market mechanism will be further twisted by simply imposing on restrictions on certification charge. We should focus our efforts more on establishing a mechanism in which the micro stakeholder could be motivating and compatible with each other, while at the same time supervising each other. Secondly, certification is an industry heavily relying on the trust from the public, and it could set up a long-term effective mechanism only when it serves truly the interests of the consumers. Thirdly, it's hard to form real responsibility affixation mechanism on the certification body as a whole, in reality, the main player for low validity of certification is individual.Therefore, the supervision of certification should be comprehensive, including both fhe certification bodie and inspectors. A life long credit follow-up mechanism should be eventually formed and the responsibilities of individuals should be strengthened.
认证有效性是认证的生命线,认证有效性不高是目前认证面临的主要矛盾和问题。目前咨询机构控制企业,要挟认证机构,搞咨询认证一条龙。企业认证目的不明确,为认证而认证,个别花钱买证。在自愿性认证领域,一些认证机构用低价竞争,取得合同后,就弄虚作假降低成本,牺牲了认证的有效性和认证行业的整体形象和信誉度。所有这些问题都涉及到认证制度的创新和完善,而制度的创新和完善必须以微观主体的行为及其行为背后的机理和影响因素为基础。
本文基于信息经济学的分析框架,在中国的认证认可制度背景下,将微观主体的市场行为置于分析的中心,利用大样本调查数据和深度访谈案例对三类主要的微观主体——消费者、企业和认证机构的行为进行了深入分析,着重探讨了消费者的态度、支付行为和支付意愿、企业自愿参与认证的动机、认证机构的市场结构和价格竞争行为,最后在进一步探讨不同微观主体互动的基础上提出了一些监管思路和建议。论文的主要内容及结论如下:
(1)在认证涉及国民经济的方方面面,认证产品覆盖率已经较高的今天,论文基于大样本数据的研究表明:社会公众对认证的认知度仍然相当低,而且具有不同社会经济特征和人口特征的消费者对认证的认知度基本上没有表现出系统差异性,这意味着对认证的宣传还处在一个需要全民普及的阶段。研究也表明,认证认知度的提升有助于提升消费者对认证必要性的肯定,媒体在促进社会公众提升认证必要性方面发挥了重要作用。信任认证,关注商品生产过程,接触媒体多和收入高的群体具有更高的支付意愿,这些结论意味着政府有必要将对认证的宣传和对公众的认证知识教育普及列入日程,通过与电视等媒体的合作,提升消费者的认知水平:通过对消费者态度和信任程度的定期调查,检讨监管工作的着力点;提升消费者的信任度、鼓励壮大具有现代消费意识的群体,带动认证事业发展。
(2)论文基于利益相关者理论框架,分析了企业的认证动机问题。尽管目前中国企业的认证获证总量已经跃居世界第一位,但已认证企业仅占企业总数的比例远远低于欧州,中国的认证发展空间仍然很大。理论分析表明,从整个社会福利最大化来看,认证的发展应该主要依赖企业的自愿认证。实证研究表明,中国企业的认证动机突出地受到经济利益的驱动,出于环保和员工健康方面的认证动机相当低。认证的动力主要来自于加强管理、提升顾客满意度以及企业知名度。追求企业声望的企业更可能参与认证,具体而言,私营业主自评的社会地位越高,越可能参与认证。企业的存续时间越长、规模越大、改制企业和公司制企业越有可能参与认证。参加协会的企业、经过审计的企业也更可能是认证的企业。相对于农业、制造业和建筑业来说,其他行业的认证参与度要显著地低。企业领导的重视和企业文化是影响企业认证有效性最重要的因素。
(3)论文对认证市场结构和认证机构的价格行为进行了研究。发现主要三类体系认证的市场集中度在经历了一个快速下降后,基本上开始保持稳定。激烈的价格竞争导致认证收费将呈不断下降的趋势。由于在启动业务关系中存在的转换成本,在位者相对于进入者具有成本优势,为获取预期的准租金,认证机构在首期业务投标中,便采取低于成本的价格投标“低价揽客”。只要认证价格远离均衡价格的方向移动,无论是升高还是降低,都会损害认证的有效性,提高认证有效性的关键是建立有限的认证市场竞争机制。
在上述研究结论的基础上,论文提出了如下认证监管的思路:首先,隐含在一些表象(如低价恶性竞争,咨询认证一条龙服务等)背后的制度性缺陷(如消费者主体的缺位、与行政主管单位的“父子”关系等)才是导致认证有效性损害的根本原因。仅依靠干预认证收费可能会使认证市场机制进一步受到扭曲。而应该以“疏导为主”,更多地致力于建立能使微观行为主体激励相容、相互监控的制度。其次,由于认证事业是一个强烈依赖于公众信任的事业,只有真正为消费者利益服务才可能建立起长效机制。其三、机构作为整体很难形成真正的责任追究机制,但实际上认证失信行为的主导是个人,行动也是个人,因此,认证市场的监管必须是全面的监管,即要包括认证机构,更要加强对检查人员的监管,形成终身信用跟踪机制,强化个人的责任。
Certification and accreditation originates from the needs of promoting smooth transaction among traders in a commercial society. Certification contributes most in reducing information risks for traders, in reducing transaction costs by providing trust in quality and service, which helps realize the effective allocation of econimic resources. Currently, as market economy is growing more mature and globalized, certification scheme, as a third party system, is playing an important role in ensuring life safety and health, sustainable development of environment, and effective use and allocation of resources. However, while helping achieve better balance of information, certification also bears serious imbalance of informtaiton within itself. If certification fails to provide independent and impartial proof, it will make the imbalance of information among traders more serious, and thus renders certification itself invalid. And it's better to have no system than to have an invalid system.
The validity of certification is the lifeline of certification, and poor validity is the main problem facing certification. Currently, some consultancy agencies control enterprises and coerce certification bodies by providing both consultancy and certification. The enterprises do not clearly understand the purpose of certification, and apply for certification only for a certificate. Some even buy certificates. In voluntary certification, some certification bodies compete by lower prices, and as soon as they win the contract, they will use some shoddy practice to reduce the cost. Such practice sacrifices the validity of certification, the integrity and reputation of certification industry. All these call for a need for the improvement and innovation of the certification system. However the innovation and improvement of the system must be based on the behaviour of micro stakeholders as well as their philosophy, thoughts and related affecting factors.
This thesis,based on an analysis framework of information economics takes account of the background of China certification and accreditation. It focuses on the market behaviour of micro stakeholders, and has an in-depth analysis of the behaviours of three types of micro stakeholders-consumers, enterprices and certification bodies, based on an extensive survey result and in-depth interviews. The research is mainly on the consumers'attitude, paying behaviour and willness to pay, the motivation of enterprises for voluntary involvement in certification, and the price structure and price competition of certification bodies. The result will be some regulatory recommendations based on the interaction of the different stakeholders. The main contents and conclusions are as follows.
(1) When certification has come into the various fields of national economy and when a big amount of products are under certification, based on the conclusion of entensive sample data,the thesis reveals that the awareness and recognition of the public relating to certification is still very low.Besides,consumer of different social economic features and poupulation features do not generate systematic differences in awareness and recognition of certification. This means that the concept of certification needs to be spread more widely among the public. The analysis also shows that to raise such awareness and recognition will help consumers have a more positive view of certification, and the media could play a big role in such a process. Consumers who pay more attention to production process, who are exposed to media more frequently, who have higher income and who give more attention and trust to certification, have a higher willingness to pay for certification.
Such research results indicate that the government should put on its daily agenda the certification promotion and certification education to the public. It should work with the media, like TV, to raise the awareness of the consumers on certification. Through regular survey on the consumers'attitude and trust on certification, the government should review its work focus. On the other hand, the government should encourage people with advanced consumption concepts to play a pioneer role. All these efforts will contribute to the growth of certification.
(2) Based on the theoretical framwork of the stakeholders, the thesis analyses the motiviation of enterprises for certification. Although China has the largest number of certified enterprises, it is still far behind Europe in term of percentage of certified enterprises Vs total number of enterprises. Thus there is still a large room for the certification to grow in China. Theoretical analysis shows that for the social welfare maximization, the growth of certification mainly depends on the voluntary certification by enterprises. The case studies show that Chinese enterprises are mainly driven for certification by economic benefits, and seldom motivated by environmental protection and staff health. Some enterprises more easily apply for certification for the pursuit of manufacturer reputation. Specifically, those private enterprises who have a higher self-recognition more easily apply for certification. Those enterprises who have a longer history and larger scale, who are stakholding companies or corporate companies more easily apply for certification. Enterprises who are association members, or who are audited more easily go for certification. Agriculture, manufacturing and construction industries enjoy high rate of certification while other industries have a remarkably low rate of certification. Attention from the management of enterprises, as well as manufacturer culture are key factors affecting the effectiveness of certification.
(3) The thesis researches on the structure and certification market and the price behaviour of the certification bodies. It reveals that the market concentration of the main three types of system certification now stays basically stable, following a rapid decrease. Fiece price competion results in continuous decreasing of certification prices. Due to the conversion cost in starting new business, the operating practioners enjoys cost advantage over new comers. To acquire expected revenues, the certification bodies will use low price, sometimes lower than the cost, in bidding in order to win the contract. No matter the certification prices deviates either higher or lower from the benchmark price,it will damage the validty of certification. The key to raise the validity of certification is to establish limited competion mechanism in the certification market.
Based on the above research results, the thesis proposes the following supervision recommendations. Firstly, deficiencies on the system itself(such as absence of consumers, the "father and son" relationship with government authorities, etc) behind some phenomenal irregularities (such as vicious price competition, combination of consultancy and certification, etc) are the leading causes damaging validity of certification.The certification market mechanism will be further twisted by simply imposing on restrictions on certification charge. We should focus our efforts more on establishing a mechanism in which the micro stakeholder could be motivating and compatible with each other, while at the same time supervising each other. Secondly, certification is an industry heavily relying on the trust from the public, and it could set up a long-term effective mechanism only when it serves truly the interests of the consumers. Thirdly, it's hard to form real responsibility affixation mechanism on the certification body as a whole, in reality, the main player for low validity of certification is individual.Therefore, the supervision of certification should be comprehensive, including both fhe certification bodie and inspectors. A life long credit follow-up mechanism should be eventually formed and the responsibilities of individuals should be strengthened.
引文
1.鲍惠君,张其中,“日本实施优良农产品认证制度对我国蔬菜出口的影响与对策”,《中国蔬菜》,2004年第3期
2.陈善昂,“建立社会信用体系的经济学分析”,《福建金融》,2003年第3期
3.陈夕红等,“认证质量对质量认证市场的影响分析”,《内蒙古工业大学学报》,2004年第2期
4.程言清,“食品质量认证与中国食品安全”,《中国标准化》,2003年第1期
5.单吉土,“有机认证制度与有机产品贸易”,《学术交流》,2004年第9期
6.葛笑春,“对ISO认证咨询的经济学分析”,《科学学与科学技术管理》,2002年第6期
7.国家认证认可监督管理委员会编.《认证认可年鉴(2004)》,中国标准出版社,2004年。
8.国家认证认可监督管理委员会编.《认证认可年鉴(2005)》,中国标准出版社,2005年。
9.国家认证认可监督管理委员会编.《认证认可年鉴(2006)》,中国标准出版社,2006年。
10.韩沛新,“农产品质量安全认证体系的经济学意义”,《农业质量标准》,2004年第3期
11.黄涛,“中国产品认证制度的发展和现状”,《电动工具》,2003年第3期
12.李功奎,应瑞瑶,“柠檬市场与制度安排——一个关于农产品质量安全保障的分析框架”,《农业技术经济》,2004年第3期
13.李桂娥等,“质量认证的经济学思考”,《经济师》,2001年第9期
14.李新庚,“信用的经济利益价值分析”,《湖南经济管理干部学院学报》,2003年第10期
15.李勇等,“安全农产品市场信息不对称及政府干预”,《农业经济问题》,2004年第3期
16.林钧跃,《社会信用体系原理》,中国方正出版社,2004年
17.刘俊华等,“我国农产加工产品质量认知体系研究及认证体系文件的建立”,国家科技部“十五”重大科技专项“农产品深加工技术与设备研究开发”中“农产品加工标准体系与全程质量控制研究与示范”课题报告
18.刘攀等,“试论信用评级制度对信用风险的弱化作用”,《西南金融》,2003年第11期
19.刘少波,蒋海,“信誉机制、信用资源的有效供给与信用缺失治理”,《金融研究》,2004年第1期
20.刘新平等.“日本有机农业认证制度分析”,《世界农业》,2004年第12期
21.卢代富,“农产品质量法律制度探讨”,《攀枝花大学学报》,1996年
22.罗丹等,“绿色壁垒与中国农产品贸易”,《农业经济问题》,2000年第5期
23.马爱国,“农产品质量安全认证与农业产业的发展不可分割”,《农产品加工》,2004年第10期
24.秦富等,《欧美食品安全体系研究》,中国农业出版社,2003年
25.任永开,“我国目前信用缺失的经济学分析”,《财经理论与实践》,2001年第6期
26.史菁,“法国认证合格的农产品食品标签体系”,《全球科技经济了望》2004年第6期
27.汪学才,“浅议农产品质量认证制度模式”,《上海农业学报》,2004年第2期
28.王华飞,“无公害蔬菜的认证与管理”,《中国蔬菜》,2004年第3期
29.王秀清,孙云峰,“我国食品市场上的质量信号问题”,《中国农村经济》,2002年第5期
30.王志刚,“日本农产品标记和认证制度及其理念”,http://www.mdjagri.gov.cn
31.王志刚,“食品安全的认知和消费决定:关于天津市个体消费者的实证分析”,《中国农村经济》,2003年第4期
32.席兴军 刘俊华,“中国食品安全认证制度的问题与建议”,《世界标准化与质量管理》,2004年第9期
33.夏远强,韩文秀,“我国农产品质量认证问题探讨”,《西北农林科技大学学报(社会科学版)》,2002年第5期
34.徐金海,“农产品市场中的柠檬问题及其解决思路”,《当代经济研究》,2002年第8期
35.杨太康,“市场经济条件下市场中介的本质及其经济学分析”,《西安邮电学院学报》,2003年第10期
36.余师孟,“推进我国质量体系认证工作的几点思考”,《中国质量认证》,2003年第10期
37.张维迎,《博弈论与信息经济学》,上海三联书店和上海人民出版社,1996年
38.郑久坤,“浅议食用农产品质量安全市场监管的特点与对策”,《农业质量标准》,2004年第6期
39.周德翼,杨海娟,“食物质量安全管理中的信息不对称与政府监管机制”,《中国农村经济》,2002年第6期
40.周洁红、姜励卿,“影响生鲜蔬菜消费者选择政府食品安全管制方式的因素分析”,《浙江统计》,2004年第11期
41.周毅,“揭开一个严守的行业秘密,还原真实的ISO认证体系”,《都市快报》,2002年1月4日
42.周应恒等,“食品质量安全问题的经济学思考”,《南京农业大学学报》,2003年第3期
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56.Caswell,JA&Modjuzska,Using informational labeling to influence the market for quality in food products,American Journal of Agricultural,1996
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59.Cowling,K.,Cubbin,J.,1971.Price,quality,and advertising competition:An econometric investigation of the United Kingdom car market.Economica 38,378-394.
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2.陈善昂,“建立社会信用体系的经济学分析”,《福建金融》,2003年第3期
3.陈夕红等,“认证质量对质量认证市场的影响分析”,《内蒙古工业大学学报》,2004年第2期
4.程言清,“食品质量认证与中国食品安全”,《中国标准化》,2003年第1期
5.单吉土,“有机认证制度与有机产品贸易”,《学术交流》,2004年第9期
6.葛笑春,“对ISO认证咨询的经济学分析”,《科学学与科学技术管理》,2002年第6期
7.国家认证认可监督管理委员会编.《认证认可年鉴(2004)》,中国标准出版社,2004年。
8.国家认证认可监督管理委员会编.《认证认可年鉴(2005)》,中国标准出版社,2005年。
9.国家认证认可监督管理委员会编.《认证认可年鉴(2006)》,中国标准出版社,2006年。
10.韩沛新,“农产品质量安全认证体系的经济学意义”,《农业质量标准》,2004年第3期
11.黄涛,“中国产品认证制度的发展和现状”,《电动工具》,2003年第3期
12.李功奎,应瑞瑶,“柠檬市场与制度安排——一个关于农产品质量安全保障的分析框架”,《农业技术经济》,2004年第3期
13.李桂娥等,“质量认证的经济学思考”,《经济师》,2001年第9期
14.李新庚,“信用的经济利益价值分析”,《湖南经济管理干部学院学报》,2003年第10期
15.李勇等,“安全农产品市场信息不对称及政府干预”,《农业经济问题》,2004年第3期
16.林钧跃,《社会信用体系原理》,中国方正出版社,2004年
17.刘俊华等,“我国农产加工产品质量认知体系研究及认证体系文件的建立”,国家科技部“十五”重大科技专项“农产品深加工技术与设备研究开发”中“农产品加工标准体系与全程质量控制研究与示范”课题报告
18.刘攀等,“试论信用评级制度对信用风险的弱化作用”,《西南金融》,2003年第11期
19.刘少波,蒋海,“信誉机制、信用资源的有效供给与信用缺失治理”,《金融研究》,2004年第1期
20.刘新平等.“日本有机农业认证制度分析”,《世界农业》,2004年第12期
21.卢代富,“农产品质量法律制度探讨”,《攀枝花大学学报》,1996年
22.罗丹等,“绿色壁垒与中国农产品贸易”,《农业经济问题》,2000年第5期
23.马爱国,“农产品质量安全认证与农业产业的发展不可分割”,《农产品加工》,2004年第10期
24.秦富等,《欧美食品安全体系研究》,中国农业出版社,2003年
25.任永开,“我国目前信用缺失的经济学分析”,《财经理论与实践》,2001年第6期
26.史菁,“法国认证合格的农产品食品标签体系”,《全球科技经济了望》2004年第6期
27.汪学才,“浅议农产品质量认证制度模式”,《上海农业学报》,2004年第2期
28.王华飞,“无公害蔬菜的认证与管理”,《中国蔬菜》,2004年第3期
29.王秀清,孙云峰,“我国食品市场上的质量信号问题”,《中国农村经济》,2002年第5期
30.王志刚,“日本农产品标记和认证制度及其理念”,http://www.mdjagri.gov.cn
31.王志刚,“食品安全的认知和消费决定:关于天津市个体消费者的实证分析”,《中国农村经济》,2003年第4期
32.席兴军 刘俊华,“中国食品安全认证制度的问题与建议”,《世界标准化与质量管理》,2004年第9期
33.夏远强,韩文秀,“我国农产品质量认证问题探讨”,《西北农林科技大学学报(社会科学版)》,2002年第5期
34.徐金海,“农产品市场中的柠檬问题及其解决思路”,《当代经济研究》,2002年第8期
35.杨太康,“市场经济条件下市场中介的本质及其经济学分析”,《西安邮电学院学报》,2003年第10期
36.余师孟,“推进我国质量体系认证工作的几点思考”,《中国质量认证》,2003年第10期
37.张维迎,《博弈论与信息经济学》,上海三联书店和上海人民出版社,1996年
38.郑久坤,“浅议食用农产品质量安全市场监管的特点与对策”,《农业质量标准》,2004年第6期
39.周德翼,杨海娟,“食物质量安全管理中的信息不对称与政府监管机制”,《中国农村经济》,2002年第6期
40.周洁红、姜励卿,“影响生鲜蔬菜消费者选择政府食品安全管制方式的因素分析”,《浙江统计》,2004年第11期
41.周毅,“揭开一个严守的行业秘密,还原真实的ISO认证体系”,《都市快报》,2002年1月4日
42.周应恒等,“食品质量安全问题的经济学思考”,《南京农业大学学报》,2003年第3期
43.Aaker,D.A.,Jacobson,R.,1994.The financial information content of perceived quality.Journal of Marketing Research 31,191-201.
44.Akerlof,G.,1970.The market for 'lemons':Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism.Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3),488-500.
45.Anne Wilcock,Maria Pun,Joseph Khanona,May Aung,Consumer attitudes,knowledge and behavior:a review of food safety issues,Trends in Food Science& Technology,2004,15,56-66
46.Bernard,V.,1987.Cross-sectional dependence and problems in inference in marked-based accounting research.Journal of Accounting Research 25,1-48.
47.Bernhardt Dan,"Credit Rationing?",American Economics Review,2000 Vol90
48.Bharadwaj,S.G.,Menon,A.,1994.Determinants of success in services industries.Journal of Services Marketing 7,19-40.
49.Bo-Hyun cho,Neal H.Hooker,A note on three qualities:search,experience and credence attributes,The Ohio state university working paper:AEDE-WP-0027-02,2002
50.Buzzell,R.D.,Gale,B.T.,Sultan,R.G.M.,1975.Market share-a key to profitability.Harvard Business Review(January-February),97-106.
51.Buzzell,R.D.,Wiersema,F.D.,1981a.Modelling changes in market share:A cross-sectional analysis.Strategic Management Journal 2,27-42.
52.Buzzell,R.D.,Wiersema,F.D.,1981b.Successful share-building strategies.Harvard Business Review(January-February),135-144.
53.Capon,N.,Farley,J.U.,Hoenig,S.,1990.Determinants of financial performance:A meta-analysis.Management Science 36(10),1143-1159.
54.Capon,N.,Farley,J.U.,Hoenig,S.,1996.What we know(or think we know) about the causes of superior financial performance.In:Toward an Integrative Explanation of Corporate Financial Performance.Kluwer Academic Publishers,Dordrecht,pp.27-82.
55.Caruana,A.,Pitt,L.,1997.INTQUAL-an internal measure of service quality and the link between service quality and business performance.European Journal of Marketing 31(8),604-616.
56.Caswell,JA&Modjuzska,Using informational labeling to influence the market for quality in food products,American Journal of Agricultural,1996
57.Collins,D.,Dent,W.,1984.A comparison of alternative testing methodologies used in capital market research.Journal of Accounting Research 22(1),48-84.
58.Corrado,C.,1989.A nonparametric test for abnormal securityprice performance in event studies.Journal of Financial Economics 23,385-395.
59.Cowling,K.,Cubbin,J.,1971.Price,quality,and advertising competition:An econometric investigation of the United Kingdom car market.Economica 38,378-394.
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