WTO裁决的强制执行机制
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摘要
本文写作的目的在于分析和评价WTO裁决执行中的强制问题,指出WTO只有受到严格限制的执行强制措施,而没有强制执行机制;并结合国际法一般执行中“四种力量”,为构建WTO裁决的强制执行机制提出思路:向国内法院和国际协定下转化执行。
本文综合各种对国际法包括WTO法的执行/不执行的理论和实践的研究,认为是四种基本的力量主导着有关规则和裁决的执行/不执行,即国际法的正当性(拉力)、国家整体利益和国内利益集团的影响(基础力量)、国际法制的强制力(推力)、国家名誉与道德感(辅助力)。这四种力量相互作用共同影响,尤其是强制力、执行拉力和基础力量之间的相互作用,在很大程度上决定着国际法是否能够得到执行。从而在考虑对WTO裁决的强制执行机制的设计和运用时,也必须时时刻刻考虑各种力量的“和谐”运用。但在具体完善WTO的强制执行措施或机制时必须看到,在当前的WTO法制中,只有执行强制措施而没有真正强制执行机制的事实。有关强制执行机制核心要素的缺失、定位的失调,使得这种理应可以发挥更大作用的推力,非常难以产生应有的作用,并在一定程度上甚至影响了人们对WTO法制实际作用的信心。而目前的各种学界研究,以及各种关于强制执行的改进建议,存在诸多偏颇和狭隘之处,亟待廓清并予以纠正,并在此基础上构建适合当前WTO法制发展阶段又能够比较有效的解决WTO争端的强制执行机制。
截止到目前,几乎所有的学者和WTO成员,都在漠视WTO法制中根本没有所谓的“强制执行”的情况下讨论“强制”执行——在现有的语境下,执行中的一些“强制”措施被默认为了对DSB裁决和建议“强制执行”的机制。实际上,现有WTO法制中没有强制执行,只有对“引导执行”的临时强制措施,且这些临时强制措施还受到了诸多程序和实体的约束。尤其是对“补偿”形式和性质的规定,几乎将WTO中的一些敏感案件和重大案件,直接推向了不执行的边缘。在报复的水平、形式和程序规定上的诸多缺失和限制,也让进入这一阶段的案件执行的回旋余地大为缩减。有学者甚至认为,WTO虽然形式上给予授权,但是实际上不是授予权利,而是对被授予报复的权利的限制。另外,权利与义务的平衡在WTO语境下甚至出现多次的“交换”,而不是内在“平衡”。甚至有学者认为,在整个WTO法制中,被规定的其实根本就不是权利,而是义务。
实践显示,WTO强制执行机制的欠缺至少在部分上导致了严重后果:解决争端的强制措施难以操作、执行强制的实际效率低下、实现贸易自由化的效果较差、难以实现国际社会间的公平和正义价值,凸显了强烈的“实力悖论”(power paradoxes):一方面,WTO体制摒弃了GATT时代以实力为基的做法;另一方面,WTO又仰赖成员自身的经济实力来执行或强制执行裁决。但是,WTO本身其实缺乏适当的强制机制,也缺乏执行强制的权力和实力;相反,WTO体制刻意依赖其成员,特别是争端各方,动用自身实力和影响实现执行。可以认为,在WTO成员最需要WTO给予强力支持的时候,WTO组织和法制却将烫手的山芋直接塞回给了已经胜诉并渴望获得救济的受害方。迄今为止,WTO实际授予报复的几个案件,即欧共体香蕉案、欧共体荷尔蒙案、巴西飞机补贴案、美国FSC案以及加拿大飞机补贴案等,构成了研究WTO裁决执行问题的重要案例。这些案件均涉及较大的案值,具有强烈的政治敏感性,案件处理旷日持久,争端解决的效果尤其不理想。这对广大的WTO成员,特别是最不发达成员(LDCs)可能造成了更大的不利影响,它们面临实力不济有心无力的窘境,即便被授予报复也无法真正实施,甚至只好放弃(如欧共体香蕉案中的厄瓜多尔)。
本文认为,改进WTO裁决的强制执行机制,首要的任务是确定需要执行的内容和方法。根据当前WTO的规定,DSB建议和裁决的核心内容只有“建议有关成员将违规措施与WTO涵盖协定相一致”。这种对救济的规定,是受到了乌拉圭回合谈判时,WTO法制特定发展水平的限制。当前的《国家责任法》草案以及一些国际法实践,都比较明确的规定了对违反国际法行为的“补偿(reparation)”。WTO是以促进国际贸易自由化为己任的专门国际组织,经济意义远比一般的国际组织为强,理应更加重视对受害方的赔偿。这既是对国际法的正义的追求,也是对具体受害方的公平救济。在规定补偿时,必须区别不同的性质,并给予长期不执行和变相不执行时期的新增损失,予以补偿。其次,在改进WTO裁决的强制执行机制时,必须明确撤销违规措施、补偿和报复之间的关系。只要存在违规措施,补偿就应该同时进行;如果既不纠正违规措施,又不提供补偿,则应该授权报复,而且应该考虑增强在此种情形下报复的效果。
在对撤销有关措施、补偿和报复作具体规定时,WTO法制应该授权和要求发挥专家组的“建议(suggestion)”的作用。具体而言,在专家组报告中,应该首先明确建议可选的或供示范的纠正办法;并在报告发布之后,无论败诉方是否作出纠正措施,继续计算抵消或减损的水平,并以此为基础计算补偿的经济数额和可能的报复水平。
当然,在设计、改进和实践WTO裁决的强制执行机制时,必须考虑到国际法本身不同于国内法所带来的局限性,从而WTO法制中的强制执行必须有别于通常国内法上的意义。从一般意义上讲,对国际法规则和司法(含“准司法”)裁决的执行情况的衡量,实际上是对国际合作承诺得以践行,包括国际裁决得以强制执行的“程度”的考察。影响国际法执行程度的主要因素是国际法的正当性(拉力)、国家整体利益和国内利益集团的影响(基础力量)、国际法制的强制力(推力)、国家名誉与道德感(辅助力)等。国际法不执行和国际法裁决的不执行,往往是因为上述因素的否定性综合而形成的。过于强调国际法和国际法裁决的绝对执行或不执行,或过于强调其中一方的因素对执行或不执行的影响,是造成目前“国际法执行”领域各种不同甚至冲突的结论的主要原因。从而,切实促进国际法裁决的执行和应对国际法裁决,包括WTO司法裁决,的不执行,也必须从上述方面着手。
在WTO内部难以解决的强制问题,还可能通过其他的特定国际组织提供组织框架、监督和舆论压力,协助和共同解决。还可能通过转移到国内来执行以突破国际法本身的诸多不足,并发动国内私人利益集团的参与,从而将国际法与国内法的司法救济和司法执行机制相联系和转化。这就需要首先解决国际法,包括国际裁决,在国内的直接效力。当然,鉴于国际法和国际裁决在国内的直接效力事关国家的主权,并可能深刻影响到国内的宪政体系,并不可能奢望所有的国际法成员同时全部接受这样的国际法演进。但如果部分条件、要求和理念类似的成员,愿意达成类似保护国际投资的《华盛顿公约》的国际协议,创设与“国际投资争端解决中心”类似的国际组织,将为实现国际法治创造新的途径。
最后,或许极其重要的是,必须考虑到国际法规则和裁决本身的内在正当性——只有国际法本身具有公平、公正性且得到国际社会,包括败诉成员的认可,强制机制才可能实现对国际法治的促进,并在具体争端的解决和裁决的执行中起到事半功倍的效果。
本文正是基于上述认识,对WTO裁决执行中的强制机制所存在的问题及可能的改进,在新的思路下进行了全面的考虑。本文认为,对WTO裁决执行中的强制机制的建设和改进,必须与裁决本身的决策程序的改进密切结合;强制执行必须与调动败诉成员内部的政治和经济利益集团相结合。由此,有关裁决能够获得内在的正当性,提供执行裁决的“软实力”(soft power);有关裁决能够置败诉成员于国内政治和经济压力下,并改变私人利益在WTO下被隔绝的状况;当前的执行强制还应该得到国际多边体制的更大的组织上的支持。
本文为此分为了如下五个部分。
第一章WTO裁决执行的强制主要结合案例,简要分析其效率问题、正当性和公平问题。这也是几乎所有的司法执行都会遇到的难题。
第二章改进WTO裁决执行强制的建议这一部分主要分析和评价了当前主要的改进议案和建议,包括集体报复、拍卖报复权、轮候报复、缴纳强制保证金等。这些建议中,有些是长期得不到有效支持但不断被人提起的,如集体报复。集体报复的威摄力似乎很强,但是在多边合作的框架下,如果得不到大部分甚至所有成员的有效支持,则根本没有付诸实际的可能性。
第三章构建WTO裁决的强制执行机制(一)本章提出建设和改革WTO裁决的强制执行机制中必须贯彻的一些重要原则和程序。要改进WTO裁决的强制执行机制,首先应该注意保持足够的慎重,突出表现在避免给现有的体制造成伤害,但同时应该坚定的“向前看”——在规则为基的指引下,推进WTO争端解决机制的完善。在避免过度政治化或过度法制化的基础上,增强WTO裁决强制的法律正当性和可操作性,即在裁决中适当增加建议(suggestion),特别是如何执行裁决的建议,以便利WTO裁决的执行和迅速解决争端;在审理中应增加审理的透明度,利用现代便捷的各种沟通手段,通过各种形式让各利益相关方,包括有关成员和有关的利益集团,能够了解审理过程并发表意见,WTO专家组和上诉机构并应合理听取各方意见。
第四章构建WTO裁决的强制执行机制(二)本章具体提出改革建议和思路。本文提出,应对执行措施设置“预审”,由同一争端解决小组快速审议其拟执行的措施,以避免变相拖延和不执行。完善和强化补偿规定,还应补偿胜诉方在执行期间遭受的额外损失。借鉴欧盟香蕉案的“教训”,鼓励各成员签订双边和多边协议共同承认WTO在域内的直接效力,并结合私人利益集团的诉讼,充分调动域内的各利益实体的参与,并合理体现和保护其利益。
第五章结语和展望本部分结合对WTO体制的局限性和有关改革,提出中国在面对执行难题时,应降低执行预期,尽量和解,并应注重调动对方国内利益集团,特别是进出口利益集团参与裁决的执行;当面临执行的义务时,中国应积极应对执行,充分利益WTO的规则,在不违反WTO规则的前提下积极维护国内利益。当然,作为一个正在崛起并负责任的大国,中国更应该积极参与到有关的法制建设中去。
WTO体系是外交(政治)、贸易和法律要素的结合,是一种“三位一体”。在这个体系中,经济、政治外部性(political externalities)和法律框架共同作用。近年来,西方一些国际法学者越来越多的运用国际关系理论来研究国际法的运行,类似的,国际经济学家和国际政治学家也试图整合国际政治经济学(International Political Economics,IPE)。在国际贸易和经济关系中,政治常常是决策的基础,经济学是决策的依据,而法律常常同时扮演两个角色:一方面,法律提供运行框架;另一方面,法律又是重要的工具。因此,跨学科的综合经济、政治和国际法的研究方法,对研究WTO体系的实际运行几乎是必不可少的工具。本文结合具体案例,并综合运用国际法、国际关系、政治经济学等知识和理论,试图对WTO裁决的强制执行问题进行全面的思考,并在国际法有关知识和理论的基础上借鉴和融合多学科知识,提出了新的解决方案建议。如能促进对WTO裁决的执行,增进WTO体系的安全性和可预见性,而又不从根本上动摇WTO以“规则为基”的这座大厦,那也就算是本文的一点小小贡献吧。
This dissertation aims to analyze and review the enforcement of WTO DSB rulings and recommendations,and using the theory of "four forces in international law compliance",put forth some proposals for creating the enforcement mechanism for the WTO judicial decisions.
By studying the theory and practice of compliance and non-compliance of international law,including the WTO law,this dissertation finds thc underlying four forces for implementation of the international rules and judicial decisions,namely, the legitimacy as the pulling force,the national interests and domestic interest group interests as the basic force,the enforcement force as the pushing force,and the national reputation and sense of morality as the subordinate force.The above four forces interact with each other and together decide whether the international legal rules and judicial decisions could be implemented.Therefore,to design and apply the enforcement mechanism,one should always jointly consider the harmonious operation of the four forces.However,it must be understood that the current WTO legal system does not yet have an enforcement mechanism—what's there is just some scant enforcement measures.The absence of the key factors of an enforcement mechanism and the bad positioning of the enforcement measures make enforcement just a remote possibility,which in turn hurts people's confidence in the WTO legal system.The current academic research papers and various official proposals,which intend to make a difference,are mostly narrow-minded or short-sighted.
The topic of enforcement of judicial decisions has never been something novel. Various international legal scholars,government officials,enterprise practitioners and lawyers have produced a lot of rich and conflicting ideas on improving the enforcement mechanism of WTO.WTO's officials have also made proposals for improving the mechanism of enforcing DSB rulings and recommendations after the launch of Doha Round,but consensus has never been around the corner.One sheer fact is that all of them have overlooked one thing—there is simply no such enforcement mechanism in the WTO while they are talking so much on it—most of them simply talk about enforcement measures for the enforcement mechanism.
Even the scant enforcement measures that are currently available to the prevailing party who seeks retaliation authorization are strictly restricted under WTO,thanks to the historical constraints of international and domestic politics, economic development and legal evolution,and thus cannot deliver the intended result.Some scholars go so far as to claim that what are authorized by WTO are not rights but obligations.
Practice demonstrates that the deficiency of the enforcement mechanism of WTO judicial decisions has at least in part contributed to the few cases of enforcement application,the low efficacy of enforcement measures,the poor performance for liberalizing international trade,and the failure to deliver justice and equity to the world.What stands out is the power paradox:on one hand,the WTO has evolved from the power-based GATT,but on the other hand,the most forceful measures of WTO for enforcing WTO's judicial decisions fundamentally depend on power of WTO members.WTO has long been hailed as the only international legal system that most effectively solves international disputes,but the WTO in itself does not have a proper enforcement mechanism,or the authorization,power and mechanism to enforce anything.Instead,the WTO just turns the burning potatoes back to the party who has turned eagerly and hopefully to WTO.The several cases for which enforcement measures are authorized,such as the EC-banana regime case, the EC-ban on hormone case,Brazil-aircraft case,US-FSC case,and Canada-aircraft cases,are all sensitive cases involving large values but lasting a long long time yet achieving no or very limited compliance,which may be particularly damaging to the LDCs.The LDCs,say Ecuador in EC-Banana Regime case,are normally powerless even when they aspire to enforce the WTO judicial decisions,and have no way out but to abort any such aspiration.
In designing,improving and applying the enforcement mechanism of WTO, one must take into consideration the fact that international law is much different from the municipal law,and therefore the enforcement mechanism under WTO law should also be radically different from that under the municipal law.Normally, measurement of the compliance with international rules and judicial decisions(quasi judicial decisions) shows varied degrees among cases.Such degrees vary and are caused by the legitimacy of international law,the national interest and the domestic interest group interests,the enforcement of international law and national reputation and sense of morality.Over stress on the absolute compliance or noncompliance with the international rules and judicial decisions,or over stress on one of the factors that contribute to a certain degree,may be the cause for different observations.As a result,to improve the compliance wit the international judicial decision,including WTO judicial decisions,should also start from the above.
Some WTO members have raised some reform proposals on the enforcement of WTO judicial decisions,mainly focusing on enhancing the enforcement,including the collective retaliation or carousel retaliation.Some scholars,such as Steve Chamovitz,Petros Mavroidis,Robert Lawrence and Joost Pauwelyn,etc,also raised some proposals and suggestions.But both the officials who put forth the official proposals and the scholars are confined to how to directly enhance the enforcement and therefore its efficiency.The WTO DSU has been widely recognized as the teeth of WTO,with the enforcement measure as the last resort for the WTO DSU, therefore it is truly desirable to improve the enforcement measures.But any such reform should also be ground on the fact that the current development status of the international law should be respected,and the reform should aim to maintain and strengthen the WTO multilateral cooperation as well as considering international political status,the nature of international law and the development stage of the international law
The enforcement issue,which may be difficult to deal with under WTO,may be jointly or cooperatively settled by other international forums through transferring the case from WTO to other international forums.Although international organizations do not have the legislative branch just as a state has,international organizations bind states' behavior through treaty creating;although similarly international organizations do no have the administrative and judicial enforcement branches just as a state has,international organizations have something else that equally binds the international society member into abiding by international law rules,principles and systems.It is a viable option to transfer the WTO enforcement case to other international organization or third party,provided that the WTO has made clear provisions or legal decisions.
The enforcement issue,which may be difficult to deal with under the WTO, may be transferred to domestic courts and hence mobilizing the private forces.Such a transfer would require as a precondition the direct effect of the international law rules and the judicial decisions.Given the profound impact of direct effect on the sovereignty of WTO members,it should be understood that such a transfer would deeply affect the domestic constitutional system and hence not every WTO member would accept the doctrine of direct effect.Still,those members sympathetic with the doctrine of direct effect may be encouraged to sign a certain treaty enabling the direct effect of the WTO rules and judicial decisions,just as under the ICSID.
Last but not the least,one must take into consideration the inherent legitimacy of international law rules and judicial decisions—only when the international law rules as per as fair,equitable and commanding respect of the WTO members including the prevailed ones can the enforcement mechanism help promote international rule of law,and resolve international dispute and judicial enforcement issue.
It is based on the above findings that this dissertation overhauls all existing problems of the current enforcement measures under WTO and the possible improvement on them,and conducts a brand-new and all-around thinking.It is the conclusion of this dissertation that creation and improvement of the enforcement mechanism under WTO must be done hand in hand with reforming the decision-making process of the judicial decisions;by mobilizing and tuning with the domestic interest groups within the prevailed member;and by gaining more institutional support from WTO and other international organizations.Then,the enforcement mechanism may be able to acquire the inherent legitimacy and generate soft power,to put the prevailed member under domestic political and economic pressures and change over the condition where the private interests were isolated from WTO.
This dissertation consists of the following five chapters:
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the WTO enforcement by analyzing the efficiency,legitimacy and equity issues in light of the relevant cases.Sure, enforcement has been,is now and will still be an issue for all judicial decisions.
Chapter 2 deals with the existing proposals for improving the enforcement mechanism of WTO by analyzing and reviewing the various proposals such as collective retaliation,auction of retaliation right,carousel retaliation,security bond, etc.Among them,some have been raised repeatedly although not yet popularly supported,such as the collective retaliation.The deterrence of collective retaliation sounds very powerful,but within the multilateral framework,if it could not garner full support from at least most WTO members,it stands virtually no chance of success.
Chapter 3 deals with some principles and processes that must be followed in building the WTO enforcement mechanism.First among them is discretion,that is, do no harm to the WTO.At the same time,one should look forward,that is,push forward the mission of improving WTO dispute settlement process on the basis of rules.Over legalization or over politicization should both be avoided,and the legitimacy and accessibility of WTO enforcement mechanism should be enhanced by making suggestions that are also binding just as the recommendations with a view to prompt settlement of WTO disputes.Transparency in judicial decision should also be enhanced through the convenient communication vehicles so that all stake holders including the WTO member and their domestic interest groups may directly or indirectly get involved into the process.
Chapter 4 puts forth new solutions to the enforcement puzzle.This dissertation believes the pre-hearing should be conducted for the measures taken to comply so as to avoid possible default.The extra loss suffered by the prevailing party during the period of default should also be covered.Drawing from the lessons of EC-Banana Regime case,WTO should encourage members to set up a certain multilateral organization in the image of ICSID by producing clear cut provisions and judicial obligations so that domestic forces can be effectively mobilized.
Chapter 5 deals with China's viable strategies for compliance and enforcement. Drawing on the analysis of WTO's limitation,this dissertation proposes that when faced with the enforcement issue,China should be realistic and grasp all opportunities to settle the case.Also the domestic forces should all be mobilized into exerting uniform pressure to the counterparts of the prevailed member.When faced with the obligation to comply,it will be a wise strategy to respond proactively and make full use of China's due process rights and substantive rights to produce as much as benefit to the national interests while preserving the principles of WTO. But as a rising and responsible power,China should be more active in getting involved in the building of the WTO rule of law.
WTO is a unification of three in one:politics,trade and law where three factors work jointly.In recent years,western scholars tend to apply more and more international relationship theories in studying operations of international legal systems.Similarly international economists and international political scientists intend to forge a new area for studying international issues such as enforcement of international judicial decisions:international political economics,or IPE.In international trade and economic relationship,politics is always the basis for decision making,economics the rationale,and law the framework and vehicle.Thus an interdisciplinary approach would be inevitable for studying enforcement issue under WTO.This dissertation turns widely to international law,international relationship and IPE theories and knowledge and attempts to conduct brand-new and all-around thinking on the enforcement issue under WTO.If the humble analysis and proposed solution might do something good to enhance the security and predictability of WTO and enforce the judicial decisions whilst not undermining the huge rule-based edifice,I will be honored ands satisfied.
本文综合各种对国际法包括WTO法的执行/不执行的理论和实践的研究,认为是四种基本的力量主导着有关规则和裁决的执行/不执行,即国际法的正当性(拉力)、国家整体利益和国内利益集团的影响(基础力量)、国际法制的强制力(推力)、国家名誉与道德感(辅助力)。这四种力量相互作用共同影响,尤其是强制力、执行拉力和基础力量之间的相互作用,在很大程度上决定着国际法是否能够得到执行。从而在考虑对WTO裁决的强制执行机制的设计和运用时,也必须时时刻刻考虑各种力量的“和谐”运用。但在具体完善WTO的强制执行措施或机制时必须看到,在当前的WTO法制中,只有执行强制措施而没有真正强制执行机制的事实。有关强制执行机制核心要素的缺失、定位的失调,使得这种理应可以发挥更大作用的推力,非常难以产生应有的作用,并在一定程度上甚至影响了人们对WTO法制实际作用的信心。而目前的各种学界研究,以及各种关于强制执行的改进建议,存在诸多偏颇和狭隘之处,亟待廓清并予以纠正,并在此基础上构建适合当前WTO法制发展阶段又能够比较有效的解决WTO争端的强制执行机制。
截止到目前,几乎所有的学者和WTO成员,都在漠视WTO法制中根本没有所谓的“强制执行”的情况下讨论“强制”执行——在现有的语境下,执行中的一些“强制”措施被默认为了对DSB裁决和建议“强制执行”的机制。实际上,现有WTO法制中没有强制执行,只有对“引导执行”的临时强制措施,且这些临时强制措施还受到了诸多程序和实体的约束。尤其是对“补偿”形式和性质的规定,几乎将WTO中的一些敏感案件和重大案件,直接推向了不执行的边缘。在报复的水平、形式和程序规定上的诸多缺失和限制,也让进入这一阶段的案件执行的回旋余地大为缩减。有学者甚至认为,WTO虽然形式上给予授权,但是实际上不是授予权利,而是对被授予报复的权利的限制。另外,权利与义务的平衡在WTO语境下甚至出现多次的“交换”,而不是内在“平衡”。甚至有学者认为,在整个WTO法制中,被规定的其实根本就不是权利,而是义务。
实践显示,WTO强制执行机制的欠缺至少在部分上导致了严重后果:解决争端的强制措施难以操作、执行强制的实际效率低下、实现贸易自由化的效果较差、难以实现国际社会间的公平和正义价值,凸显了强烈的“实力悖论”(power paradoxes):一方面,WTO体制摒弃了GATT时代以实力为基的做法;另一方面,WTO又仰赖成员自身的经济实力来执行或强制执行裁决。但是,WTO本身其实缺乏适当的强制机制,也缺乏执行强制的权力和实力;相反,WTO体制刻意依赖其成员,特别是争端各方,动用自身实力和影响实现执行。可以认为,在WTO成员最需要WTO给予强力支持的时候,WTO组织和法制却将烫手的山芋直接塞回给了已经胜诉并渴望获得救济的受害方。迄今为止,WTO实际授予报复的几个案件,即欧共体香蕉案、欧共体荷尔蒙案、巴西飞机补贴案、美国FSC案以及加拿大飞机补贴案等,构成了研究WTO裁决执行问题的重要案例。这些案件均涉及较大的案值,具有强烈的政治敏感性,案件处理旷日持久,争端解决的效果尤其不理想。这对广大的WTO成员,特别是最不发达成员(LDCs)可能造成了更大的不利影响,它们面临实力不济有心无力的窘境,即便被授予报复也无法真正实施,甚至只好放弃(如欧共体香蕉案中的厄瓜多尔)。
本文认为,改进WTO裁决的强制执行机制,首要的任务是确定需要执行的内容和方法。根据当前WTO的规定,DSB建议和裁决的核心内容只有“建议有关成员将违规措施与WTO涵盖协定相一致”。这种对救济的规定,是受到了乌拉圭回合谈判时,WTO法制特定发展水平的限制。当前的《国家责任法》草案以及一些国际法实践,都比较明确的规定了对违反国际法行为的“补偿(reparation)”。WTO是以促进国际贸易自由化为己任的专门国际组织,经济意义远比一般的国际组织为强,理应更加重视对受害方的赔偿。这既是对国际法的正义的追求,也是对具体受害方的公平救济。在规定补偿时,必须区别不同的性质,并给予长期不执行和变相不执行时期的新增损失,予以补偿。其次,在改进WTO裁决的强制执行机制时,必须明确撤销违规措施、补偿和报复之间的关系。只要存在违规措施,补偿就应该同时进行;如果既不纠正违规措施,又不提供补偿,则应该授权报复,而且应该考虑增强在此种情形下报复的效果。
在对撤销有关措施、补偿和报复作具体规定时,WTO法制应该授权和要求发挥专家组的“建议(suggestion)”的作用。具体而言,在专家组报告中,应该首先明确建议可选的或供示范的纠正办法;并在报告发布之后,无论败诉方是否作出纠正措施,继续计算抵消或减损的水平,并以此为基础计算补偿的经济数额和可能的报复水平。
当然,在设计、改进和实践WTO裁决的强制执行机制时,必须考虑到国际法本身不同于国内法所带来的局限性,从而WTO法制中的强制执行必须有别于通常国内法上的意义。从一般意义上讲,对国际法规则和司法(含“准司法”)裁决的执行情况的衡量,实际上是对国际合作承诺得以践行,包括国际裁决得以强制执行的“程度”的考察。影响国际法执行程度的主要因素是国际法的正当性(拉力)、国家整体利益和国内利益集团的影响(基础力量)、国际法制的强制力(推力)、国家名誉与道德感(辅助力)等。国际法不执行和国际法裁决的不执行,往往是因为上述因素的否定性综合而形成的。过于强调国际法和国际法裁决的绝对执行或不执行,或过于强调其中一方的因素对执行或不执行的影响,是造成目前“国际法执行”领域各种不同甚至冲突的结论的主要原因。从而,切实促进国际法裁决的执行和应对国际法裁决,包括WTO司法裁决,的不执行,也必须从上述方面着手。
在WTO内部难以解决的强制问题,还可能通过其他的特定国际组织提供组织框架、监督和舆论压力,协助和共同解决。还可能通过转移到国内来执行以突破国际法本身的诸多不足,并发动国内私人利益集团的参与,从而将国际法与国内法的司法救济和司法执行机制相联系和转化。这就需要首先解决国际法,包括国际裁决,在国内的直接效力。当然,鉴于国际法和国际裁决在国内的直接效力事关国家的主权,并可能深刻影响到国内的宪政体系,并不可能奢望所有的国际法成员同时全部接受这样的国际法演进。但如果部分条件、要求和理念类似的成员,愿意达成类似保护国际投资的《华盛顿公约》的国际协议,创设与“国际投资争端解决中心”类似的国际组织,将为实现国际法治创造新的途径。
最后,或许极其重要的是,必须考虑到国际法规则和裁决本身的内在正当性——只有国际法本身具有公平、公正性且得到国际社会,包括败诉成员的认可,强制机制才可能实现对国际法治的促进,并在具体争端的解决和裁决的执行中起到事半功倍的效果。
本文正是基于上述认识,对WTO裁决执行中的强制机制所存在的问题及可能的改进,在新的思路下进行了全面的考虑。本文认为,对WTO裁决执行中的强制机制的建设和改进,必须与裁决本身的决策程序的改进密切结合;强制执行必须与调动败诉成员内部的政治和经济利益集团相结合。由此,有关裁决能够获得内在的正当性,提供执行裁决的“软实力”(soft power);有关裁决能够置败诉成员于国内政治和经济压力下,并改变私人利益在WTO下被隔绝的状况;当前的执行强制还应该得到国际多边体制的更大的组织上的支持。
本文为此分为了如下五个部分。
第一章WTO裁决执行的强制主要结合案例,简要分析其效率问题、正当性和公平问题。这也是几乎所有的司法执行都会遇到的难题。
第二章改进WTO裁决执行强制的建议这一部分主要分析和评价了当前主要的改进议案和建议,包括集体报复、拍卖报复权、轮候报复、缴纳强制保证金等。这些建议中,有些是长期得不到有效支持但不断被人提起的,如集体报复。集体报复的威摄力似乎很强,但是在多边合作的框架下,如果得不到大部分甚至所有成员的有效支持,则根本没有付诸实际的可能性。
第三章构建WTO裁决的强制执行机制(一)本章提出建设和改革WTO裁决的强制执行机制中必须贯彻的一些重要原则和程序。要改进WTO裁决的强制执行机制,首先应该注意保持足够的慎重,突出表现在避免给现有的体制造成伤害,但同时应该坚定的“向前看”——在规则为基的指引下,推进WTO争端解决机制的完善。在避免过度政治化或过度法制化的基础上,增强WTO裁决强制的法律正当性和可操作性,即在裁决中适当增加建议(suggestion),特别是如何执行裁决的建议,以便利WTO裁决的执行和迅速解决争端;在审理中应增加审理的透明度,利用现代便捷的各种沟通手段,通过各种形式让各利益相关方,包括有关成员和有关的利益集团,能够了解审理过程并发表意见,WTO专家组和上诉机构并应合理听取各方意见。
第四章构建WTO裁决的强制执行机制(二)本章具体提出改革建议和思路。本文提出,应对执行措施设置“预审”,由同一争端解决小组快速审议其拟执行的措施,以避免变相拖延和不执行。完善和强化补偿规定,还应补偿胜诉方在执行期间遭受的额外损失。借鉴欧盟香蕉案的“教训”,鼓励各成员签订双边和多边协议共同承认WTO在域内的直接效力,并结合私人利益集团的诉讼,充分调动域内的各利益实体的参与,并合理体现和保护其利益。
第五章结语和展望本部分结合对WTO体制的局限性和有关改革,提出中国在面对执行难题时,应降低执行预期,尽量和解,并应注重调动对方国内利益集团,特别是进出口利益集团参与裁决的执行;当面临执行的义务时,中国应积极应对执行,充分利益WTO的规则,在不违反WTO规则的前提下积极维护国内利益。当然,作为一个正在崛起并负责任的大国,中国更应该积极参与到有关的法制建设中去。
WTO体系是外交(政治)、贸易和法律要素的结合,是一种“三位一体”。在这个体系中,经济、政治外部性(political externalities)和法律框架共同作用。近年来,西方一些国际法学者越来越多的运用国际关系理论来研究国际法的运行,类似的,国际经济学家和国际政治学家也试图整合国际政治经济学(International Political Economics,IPE)。在国际贸易和经济关系中,政治常常是决策的基础,经济学是决策的依据,而法律常常同时扮演两个角色:一方面,法律提供运行框架;另一方面,法律又是重要的工具。因此,跨学科的综合经济、政治和国际法的研究方法,对研究WTO体系的实际运行几乎是必不可少的工具。本文结合具体案例,并综合运用国际法、国际关系、政治经济学等知识和理论,试图对WTO裁决的强制执行问题进行全面的思考,并在国际法有关知识和理论的基础上借鉴和融合多学科知识,提出了新的解决方案建议。如能促进对WTO裁决的执行,增进WTO体系的安全性和可预见性,而又不从根本上动摇WTO以“规则为基”的这座大厦,那也就算是本文的一点小小贡献吧。
This dissertation aims to analyze and review the enforcement of WTO DSB rulings and recommendations,and using the theory of "four forces in international law compliance",put forth some proposals for creating the enforcement mechanism for the WTO judicial decisions.
By studying the theory and practice of compliance and non-compliance of international law,including the WTO law,this dissertation finds thc underlying four forces for implementation of the international rules and judicial decisions,namely, the legitimacy as the pulling force,the national interests and domestic interest group interests as the basic force,the enforcement force as the pushing force,and the national reputation and sense of morality as the subordinate force.The above four forces interact with each other and together decide whether the international legal rules and judicial decisions could be implemented.Therefore,to design and apply the enforcement mechanism,one should always jointly consider the harmonious operation of the four forces.However,it must be understood that the current WTO legal system does not yet have an enforcement mechanism—what's there is just some scant enforcement measures.The absence of the key factors of an enforcement mechanism and the bad positioning of the enforcement measures make enforcement just a remote possibility,which in turn hurts people's confidence in the WTO legal system.The current academic research papers and various official proposals,which intend to make a difference,are mostly narrow-minded or short-sighted.
The topic of enforcement of judicial decisions has never been something novel. Various international legal scholars,government officials,enterprise practitioners and lawyers have produced a lot of rich and conflicting ideas on improving the enforcement mechanism of WTO.WTO's officials have also made proposals for improving the mechanism of enforcing DSB rulings and recommendations after the launch of Doha Round,but consensus has never been around the corner.One sheer fact is that all of them have overlooked one thing—there is simply no such enforcement mechanism in the WTO while they are talking so much on it—most of them simply talk about enforcement measures for the enforcement mechanism.
Even the scant enforcement measures that are currently available to the prevailing party who seeks retaliation authorization are strictly restricted under WTO,thanks to the historical constraints of international and domestic politics, economic development and legal evolution,and thus cannot deliver the intended result.Some scholars go so far as to claim that what are authorized by WTO are not rights but obligations.
Practice demonstrates that the deficiency of the enforcement mechanism of WTO judicial decisions has at least in part contributed to the few cases of enforcement application,the low efficacy of enforcement measures,the poor performance for liberalizing international trade,and the failure to deliver justice and equity to the world.What stands out is the power paradox:on one hand,the WTO has evolved from the power-based GATT,but on the other hand,the most forceful measures of WTO for enforcing WTO's judicial decisions fundamentally depend on power of WTO members.WTO has long been hailed as the only international legal system that most effectively solves international disputes,but the WTO in itself does not have a proper enforcement mechanism,or the authorization,power and mechanism to enforce anything.Instead,the WTO just turns the burning potatoes back to the party who has turned eagerly and hopefully to WTO.The several cases for which enforcement measures are authorized,such as the EC-banana regime case, the EC-ban on hormone case,Brazil-aircraft case,US-FSC case,and Canada-aircraft cases,are all sensitive cases involving large values but lasting a long long time yet achieving no or very limited compliance,which may be particularly damaging to the LDCs.The LDCs,say Ecuador in EC-Banana Regime case,are normally powerless even when they aspire to enforce the WTO judicial decisions,and have no way out but to abort any such aspiration.
In designing,improving and applying the enforcement mechanism of WTO, one must take into consideration the fact that international law is much different from the municipal law,and therefore the enforcement mechanism under WTO law should also be radically different from that under the municipal law.Normally, measurement of the compliance with international rules and judicial decisions(quasi judicial decisions) shows varied degrees among cases.Such degrees vary and are caused by the legitimacy of international law,the national interest and the domestic interest group interests,the enforcement of international law and national reputation and sense of morality.Over stress on the absolute compliance or noncompliance with the international rules and judicial decisions,or over stress on one of the factors that contribute to a certain degree,may be the cause for different observations.As a result,to improve the compliance wit the international judicial decision,including WTO judicial decisions,should also start from the above.
Some WTO members have raised some reform proposals on the enforcement of WTO judicial decisions,mainly focusing on enhancing the enforcement,including the collective retaliation or carousel retaliation.Some scholars,such as Steve Chamovitz,Petros Mavroidis,Robert Lawrence and Joost Pauwelyn,etc,also raised some proposals and suggestions.But both the officials who put forth the official proposals and the scholars are confined to how to directly enhance the enforcement and therefore its efficiency.The WTO DSU has been widely recognized as the teeth of WTO,with the enforcement measure as the last resort for the WTO DSU, therefore it is truly desirable to improve the enforcement measures.But any such reform should also be ground on the fact that the current development status of the international law should be respected,and the reform should aim to maintain and strengthen the WTO multilateral cooperation as well as considering international political status,the nature of international law and the development stage of the international law
The enforcement issue,which may be difficult to deal with under WTO,may be jointly or cooperatively settled by other international forums through transferring the case from WTO to other international forums.Although international organizations do not have the legislative branch just as a state has,international organizations bind states' behavior through treaty creating;although similarly international organizations do no have the administrative and judicial enforcement branches just as a state has,international organizations have something else that equally binds the international society member into abiding by international law rules,principles and systems.It is a viable option to transfer the WTO enforcement case to other international organization or third party,provided that the WTO has made clear provisions or legal decisions.
The enforcement issue,which may be difficult to deal with under the WTO, may be transferred to domestic courts and hence mobilizing the private forces.Such a transfer would require as a precondition the direct effect of the international law rules and the judicial decisions.Given the profound impact of direct effect on the sovereignty of WTO members,it should be understood that such a transfer would deeply affect the domestic constitutional system and hence not every WTO member would accept the doctrine of direct effect.Still,those members sympathetic with the doctrine of direct effect may be encouraged to sign a certain treaty enabling the direct effect of the WTO rules and judicial decisions,just as under the ICSID.
Last but not the least,one must take into consideration the inherent legitimacy of international law rules and judicial decisions—only when the international law rules as per as fair,equitable and commanding respect of the WTO members including the prevailed ones can the enforcement mechanism help promote international rule of law,and resolve international dispute and judicial enforcement issue.
It is based on the above findings that this dissertation overhauls all existing problems of the current enforcement measures under WTO and the possible improvement on them,and conducts a brand-new and all-around thinking.It is the conclusion of this dissertation that creation and improvement of the enforcement mechanism under WTO must be done hand in hand with reforming the decision-making process of the judicial decisions;by mobilizing and tuning with the domestic interest groups within the prevailed member;and by gaining more institutional support from WTO and other international organizations.Then,the enforcement mechanism may be able to acquire the inherent legitimacy and generate soft power,to put the prevailed member under domestic political and economic pressures and change over the condition where the private interests were isolated from WTO.
This dissertation consists of the following five chapters:
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the WTO enforcement by analyzing the efficiency,legitimacy and equity issues in light of the relevant cases.Sure, enforcement has been,is now and will still be an issue for all judicial decisions.
Chapter 2 deals with the existing proposals for improving the enforcement mechanism of WTO by analyzing and reviewing the various proposals such as collective retaliation,auction of retaliation right,carousel retaliation,security bond, etc.Among them,some have been raised repeatedly although not yet popularly supported,such as the collective retaliation.The deterrence of collective retaliation sounds very powerful,but within the multilateral framework,if it could not garner full support from at least most WTO members,it stands virtually no chance of success.
Chapter 3 deals with some principles and processes that must be followed in building the WTO enforcement mechanism.First among them is discretion,that is, do no harm to the WTO.At the same time,one should look forward,that is,push forward the mission of improving WTO dispute settlement process on the basis of rules.Over legalization or over politicization should both be avoided,and the legitimacy and accessibility of WTO enforcement mechanism should be enhanced by making suggestions that are also binding just as the recommendations with a view to prompt settlement of WTO disputes.Transparency in judicial decision should also be enhanced through the convenient communication vehicles so that all stake holders including the WTO member and their domestic interest groups may directly or indirectly get involved into the process.
Chapter 4 puts forth new solutions to the enforcement puzzle.This dissertation believes the pre-hearing should be conducted for the measures taken to comply so as to avoid possible default.The extra loss suffered by the prevailing party during the period of default should also be covered.Drawing from the lessons of EC-Banana Regime case,WTO should encourage members to set up a certain multilateral organization in the image of ICSID by producing clear cut provisions and judicial obligations so that domestic forces can be effectively mobilized.
Chapter 5 deals with China's viable strategies for compliance and enforcement. Drawing on the analysis of WTO's limitation,this dissertation proposes that when faced with the enforcement issue,China should be realistic and grasp all opportunities to settle the case.Also the domestic forces should all be mobilized into exerting uniform pressure to the counterparts of the prevailed member.When faced with the obligation to comply,it will be a wise strategy to respond proactively and make full use of China's due process rights and substantive rights to produce as much as benefit to the national interests while preserving the principles of WTO. But as a rising and responsible power,China should be more active in getting involved in the building of the WTO rule of law.
WTO is a unification of three in one:politics,trade and law where three factors work jointly.In recent years,western scholars tend to apply more and more international relationship theories in studying operations of international legal systems.Similarly international economists and international political scientists intend to forge a new area for studying international issues such as enforcement of international judicial decisions:international political economics,or IPE.In international trade and economic relationship,politics is always the basis for decision making,economics the rationale,and law the framework and vehicle.Thus an interdisciplinary approach would be inevitable for studying enforcement issue under WTO.This dissertation turns widely to international law,international relationship and IPE theories and knowledge and attempts to conduct brand-new and all-around thinking on the enforcement issue under WTO.If the humble analysis and proposed solution might do something good to enhance the security and predictability of WTO and enforce the judicial decisions whilst not undermining the huge rule-based edifice,I will be honored ands satisfied.
引文
1 Steve Charnovitz,Mapping the Law of WTO Accession,p.14.网络地址:http://ssrn.com/abstract=-957651,上次访问时间2008-2-5。
2 同上,第15页。
1 李以渝:《机制论:事物机制的系统科学分析》,载于《系统科学学报》第15卷第4期,2007年10月,第24-25页。
1 例如,Abram Chayes和Antonia Handler Chayes高度评价WTO的争端解决机制是所有国际机制中“最发达和最活跃的正式争端解决体系”。Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes,The New Sovereignty:Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements,Harvard,1995,p.218.
2 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules-Toward a More Collective Approach,The American Journal of International Law,Vol.94,No.2.(Apr.,2000),pp.335-347,p.338.
3 Eric Reinhardt,Adjudication without Enforcement in GATT Disputes.Journal of Conflict Resolution.Vol.45No.2,April 2001 174-195.尽管Eric Reinhardt针对的是GATT下的情况,但作者同时认为,在WTO下同样如此。见第174页注解1。
1[希]亚里士多德:《政治学》,吴寿彭译,北京:商务印书馆,1965。
2 苏榕、杨逢春编:《世界著名法典选编·民法卷》,北京:中国民主法制出版社,1998。
3 The Nature of Arguments about the Nature of Law,at http://www.oup.co.uk/pdf/0-19-924825-7.pdf,2008年4月20日星期四最后访问。
1 即现实主义,强制理论(enforcement theory),理性选择理论,自由主义理论,管理理论,名誉理论,跨国法律进程(transnational legal process),正当性理论,建构主义,组织——文化理论,和人格理论。见William Bradford,INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COMPLIANCE:SURVEYING THE FIELD,36 Geo.J.Int'l L.495,p.496.
2 "It is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time".Louis Henkin,How Nations Behave,2nd ed.,Columbia University Press,1979,p.47.
3 Ibid,p.2.
4 Ibid,pp.55-56.
1 Ibid,p.12.
2 Louis Henkin,How Nations Behave,2nd ed.,Columbia University Press,1979,p.48
3 Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes,The New Sovereignty:Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements,Harvard University Press,pp.17-23.
4 Id.p.12.
1 转引自Roger Fisher,注23。
2 Roger Fisher,p.14.
3 John J.Mearsheimer,The Tragedy of Great Power Politics(New York:W.W.Norton & Company,2001),p.18.
4 M.Byers,Custom,Power and the Power of Rules(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1999),p.22;see also H.Morgenthau,Politics Among Nations(2nd edn;New York:Knopf,1954),pp.249-286.
5 H.Morgenthau,Politics Among Nations(2nd edn;New York:Knopf,1954),pp.279-281.
6 Naboth van den Broek,Power paradoxes in enforcement and implementation of World Trade Organization dispute settlement reports:Interdisciplinary approaches and new proposals,Journal of World Trade.New York:Feb 2003.Vol.37,Iss.1,p.131.
1 H.Morgenthau,Politics Among Nations(2nd edn;New York:Knopf,1954),pp.219-221.
2 Ibid,pp.224-225.
3 Ibid,pp.255-256.
4 Ibid,pp.256-266.
5 Ibid,p.267.
6 D.Snidal,The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,International Organization 39,1985,pp.579-614.
1 同上,p.587.
2 S.D.Krasner,State Power and the Structure of International Trade,World Politics 28,April 1976,p.323.
3 John J.Mearsheimer,The Tragedy of Great Power Politics(New York:W.W.Norton & Company,2001),pp.15-17.
4 K.Waltz,Theory of International Politics(New York:McGraw-Hill,1979),pp.88-128.
5 S.krasner,"Structural Causes and Regime Consequences:Regimes as Intervening Variables",in S.Krasner (ed.),International Regimes(Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1983),p.2.
1 Ibid,p.135.
2 如 Louis Henkin,How Nations Behave:Law and Foreign Policy 46-48(1979);Abram H.Chayes & Antonia Chayes,On Compliance,47 Int'l Org.175,176(1993).
3 如George W.Downs et al.,Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?,50 Int'l Org,379(1996);Michael Byers,Custom,Power and The Power of Rules:International Relations and Customary International Law 8(1999)。
1 Andrew T.Guzman,A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law,California Law Review,Vol.90,No.6,2002,p.1827.
2 Ibid,pp.1828-1829.
3 Ibid,p.1830.
1 Ibid,pp.1830-1840。
2 Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes,The New Sovereignty:Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements,Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1995,pp.3-7.
3 Ibid,p.8.
4 Ibid,pp.135-53.
5 Ibid,pp.201-25.
6 Ibid,pp.197-201.
7 Ibid,p.25.
1 Ibid,p.25.另见:Edith Brown Weiss,at the Theme Plenary Session:Implementation,Compliance and Effectiveness,American Society of International Law Proceedings,1997,p.58.
2 Louis Henkin,How Nations Behave,2nd ed.,Columbia University Press,1979,p47.
3 Robert Staiger,International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy,in G.M.Grossman & K.Rogoff,Handbook of International Economics,Amsterdam,Elsevier,Section 3.2.
1 H.Koh,Why do Nations obey International Law?,106 Yale Law Journal,1997,pp.2602-2603.
2 详见:Naboth van den Broek,Power paradoxes in enforcement and implementation of World Trade Organization dispute settlement reports:Interdisciplinary approaches and new proposals,Journal of World Trade.New York:Feb 2003.Vol.37,Iss.1,p.137.
3 M.Byers,Custom,Power and the Power of Rules,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1999,p.179.
4 Andrew Hurrel,"International Society and the Study of Regimes",in Volker Rittberger,ed.,Regime Theory and International Relations,Oxford:Clarendon,1993,p.13.
5 L.Henkin,How Nations Behave,2nd ed;New York:Columbia University Press,1979.
6 G.W.Downs,D.M.Rocke and P.Barsoom,Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?,50 Int'l Organization,1996,p.379.
1 T.Franck,Fairness in International Law and Institutions,Oxford:Clarendon,1995,p.481.
2 A.-M.Slaughter,International Law in a World of Liberal States,E.J.I.L.6,1995,503.
3 A.Wendt,Constructing International Politics,20 International Security,Summer 1995,71,71-72.
4 N.Woods,The Uses of Theory in the Study of International Relations,in N.Woods,ed.,Explaining International Relations Since 1945,New York:Oxford University Press,1996,p.26.
1 见 T.Franck,Fairness in International Law and Institutions,Oxford:Clarendon,1995等。
2 如 Louis Henkin,How Nations Behave:Law and Foreign Policy,1979,pp.46-48和Abram H.Chayes &Antonia Chayes,On Compliance,47 International Organization,1993,pp.175-176。
3 如Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes,The New Sovereignty:Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements,1995,p.3以及 Andrew T.Guzman,A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law,California Law Review,Vol.90,No.6,2002,pp.1823-1887.
4 Andrew T.Guzman,A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law,California Law Review,Vol.90,No.6,2002,pp.1826-1827.
1 参见 G.Clark & U Sohn,World Peace through World Law,2~(nd) ed.,1960.转引自 Roger Fisher,Improving Compliance with International Law,Charlottesville:University Press of Virginia,1981,pp 14-15.
2 Roger Fisher,Improving Compliance with International Law,Charlottesville:University Press of Virginia,1981,pp 14-16.
3 lbid,pp 8-9.
4 Ibid,pp 22-23.
5 Ibid,p.25,p28.
1 Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes,The New Sovereignty:Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements,1995,p.31.
2 Ibid.,p.31.
3 Ibid.,p.32.
4 H.Kelsen,Principles of International Law,pp.18-20(2nd rev.ed.R.Tucker,1966);M.McDougal & F.Feliciano,Law and Minimum World Public Order,p.266.转引自 Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes,The New Sovereignty:Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements,1995,p.31.
5 Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes,The New Sovereignty:Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements,1995,p.30.
1 Roger Fisher,Improving Compliance with International Law,Charlottesville:University Press of Virginia,1981,p.29.
2 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,The American Journal of International Law,Vol.94,2000,p.336.
3 WTO Secretariat,Trading into the Future,p.38.
1 J.G.Starke:《国际法导论》,赵维田译,法律出版社,1984年,第417页。
2 Steve Chamovitz,Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions,American Journal of International Law,No.95,p.793(2001).
3 参见《联合国宪章》第2条第3款和第4款的规定。
4 J.G.Starke:《国际法导论》,赵维田译,法律出版社,1984年,第417页。
5 沃尔夫刚.格拉夫.魏智通:《国际法》,2001年第2版,吴越,毛晓飞译,法律出版社,2002年,第777页。
1 劳特派特修订:《奥本海国际法》第8版,下卷第一分册,王铁崖,陈体强译,商务印书馆,第96页。
2 左海聪:《关贸总协定争端解决条款的起源拟定和内容评析》,载于《法学评论》,1995年第3期,第22页。
1 Francis Maupain,The Settlement of Disputes within the International Labour Office,Journal of International Economic Law,Vol.2,1999,pp.273-283.
1 联合国和平与安全简介http://www.un.org/chinese/peace/issue/enforcement.htm。最近一次登录时间为2008年3月9日星期日。
2 马克斯.普朗克比较公法及国际法研究所主编:《国际公法百科全书》第一专辑“争端的解决”,陈致中,李斐南译,广州:中山大学出版社,1988年,第1-9页。
1 See UN Doc EPCT/A/PV/6(1947),p.4,转引自赵维田:《世界贸易组织(WTO)的法律制度》,吉林人民出版社,2000年1月,第447页。
2 时为工作组,即现在的专家组。
3 转引自Robert E.Hudec,The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy,1975,p.180.
1 约翰.H.杰克逊:《重建关贸总协定的体制》,1990,第60页。
2 但实际上,在起草GATT的哈瓦纳会议上,加拿大等提出报告,要求将“中止减让”作为一项惩罚性制裁措施,但是遭到了一些国家如阿拉伯联盟的强烈反对。
3 卡斯尔:《乌拉圭回合与总协定争端解决规则与程序的改进》,第848—849页,转引自余敏友:《关贸总协定争议解决活动的主要成就与问题》,载于《中国国际法年刊》,1996,法律出版社,第269。
4 Ibid,p.341.
5 United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,WT/DS2/AB/R,pp.16-17.
6 赵维田:《WTO司法机制的主要特征》,载于《北大国际法与比较法评论》第一卷,北京大学出版社,2002年第一版,第123-128页。
1 ILC Draft,supra note 20,Arts.41-46.
2 Christine Gray,Judicial Remedies in International Law,p.12(1987).
3 草案第49条第1款和第2款。
4 DSU第22条第1款
5 WT/DS46/ARB.para.3.42.
1 当然,二者的“补偿”含义是不相同的。
2 Oscar Schachter,Dispute Settlement and Countermeasures in the International Law Commission,The Journal of International Law,Vol.88 p.474.
3 Article 51:Countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered,taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question.
4 Petros C.Mavroidis,Remedies in the WTO Legal Sysem:Between a Rock and a Hard Place,European Journal of International Law,Vol.11,2000,p.11.
5 DSU Article 22.6.
1 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,Para.1,Article 8.
2 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,94 AM.J.INT'L L.335,340(2000)
3 如专家组在美国——版权法第110(5)条案的裁定。
4 如澳大利亚——汽车皮革案的裁定。
5 关于美国当时的政策和提案,可参见Clair Wilcox,A Charter for World Trade,New York:The MacMillan Company,1949,pp.14-24.
1 Jared R.Silverman,Multilateral Resolution Over Unilateral Retaliation:Adjudicating the Use of Section 301Before the WTO,U.Pa.J.Int'l Econ.,L,Vol.17,1996,p.240.
1 NAFTA Article 2004 at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?DetailID=175,2008年3月8日星期六最后登录。
1 Ibid,Article 2019.
2 R.Hudec,Enforcing International Trade Law,Salem,NH:Butterworth,1991,p.305.
3 这9个案件为WT/DS50、WT/DS56、WT/DS54,55,59,64、T/DS79/1、WT/DS75,84、WT/DS126/1、WT/DS90/1、110/1、WT/DS189。
1 Louis Henkin,How Nations Behave,2nd ed.,Columbia University Press,1979,p.48.
2 R.Hudec,Enforcing International Trade Law,Salem,NH:Butterworth,1991,pp.192-196.
3 R.Hudec,Enforcing International Trade Law,Salem,NH:Butterworth,1991,p.198.
1 State of Play:US-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,WT/DS2 and WT/DS4.
2 在United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia,15 June 2001,WT/DS58/RW中,第21.5条仲裁程序认可了美国的执行措施。
3 US-Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors(DRAMS) of One Megabit and Above from Korea,WT/DS99.
4 如A.Chayes and A.Chayes,The New Sovereignty:Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements,Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1995,p.25和H.Koh,Why do Nations obey International Law?,106 Yale L.J.,1997,pp.2599-2658.
5 Trade Bill Includes Temporary Fix for EU-US Copyright Dispute,Inside US Trade,2 August 2002,p.17.
1 Naboth van den Brock,Power paradoxes in enforcement and implementation of World Trade Organization dispute settlement reports:Interdisciplinary approaches and new proposals,Journal of World Trade.New York:Feb 2003.Vol.37,Iss.1,p.147.
2 关于香蕉案Ⅰ、Ⅱ和Ⅲ的详细说明,可参见张玉卿主编:《WTO法律大辞典》,北京:法律出版社,2006年11月第一版,第697-698页。
1 US White House release,To Provide for the Termination of Action Taken with Regard to Imports of Certain Steel Products by the President of the United States of America a Proclamation,http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031204-7.html。最后访问日期为2008-3-14。
1 Chuck Lambert,Jan.-November 2001 Beef Exports Decrease.8%in Volume and 6%in Value,Jan./Feb.2002,http://www.beef.org/newsjanuaryfebruary20022764.aspx转引自 Darrell Chichester,Battle of the Beef,the Rematch,21 Am.U.Int'l L.Rev.221,note 3.
2 WT/L/616,I August 2005,para.94以及 WT/L/625,27 October 2005,para.127.
3 WT/DS364/1 G/L/822,27 June 2007.
4 WT/DS361/1 G/L/818,26 March 2007.
5 C.B.Gleason and R.D.Walther,The WTO Dispute Settlement Implementation Procedures:A System in Need of Reform,31 Law & Policy in International Business 3,2000,p.712,p.729.
1 O.Schachter,International Law in Theory and Practice,1985,rev.ed.1991,pp.536,537.
2 Naboth van den Broek,Power paradoxes in enforcement and implementation of World Trade Organization dispute settlement reports:Interdisciplinary approaches and new proposals,Journal of World Trade.New York:Feb 2003.Vol.37,Iss.1,p.152.
3 Lott tries to force USTR hand on Settling Bananas,Beef Disputes,Inside US Trade,20 October 2000.
1 R.H,Bates and W.T.Bianco,Co-operation by Design:Leadership,Structure and Collective Dilemmas,84 Am.Pol.Science Rev.1,March 1990,133-147.
2 M.Byers,Custom,Power and the Power of Rules,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1999,p.216.
3 Robert E.Hudec,Enforcing International Trade Law,Salem,NH:Butterworth,1991,p.303;table 11.21,p.311;p.317.
1 Robert E.Hudec,Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement,in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES,p.388(Friedl Weiss ed.,2000).
2 Robert E.Hudec,Enforcing International Trade Law,Salem,NH:Butterworth,1991,pp.199-200.
3 Robert E.Hudec,Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement,in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES,p.388(Friedl Weiss ed.,2000).
4 如Robert E.Hudcc,Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement,in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES,pp.389-390(Friedl Weiss ed.,2000);John O.McGinnis & Mark L.Movsesian,The World Trade Constitution,114 HARV.L.REV.511,521-25(2000)等。
1 例如:David Palmeter & Petros C.Mavroidis,Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization:Practice and Procedure(1999),pp.473-74;Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,94 AM.J.INT'L L.335,338(2000);Michael K.Young,Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round:Lawyers Triumph Over Diplomats,29 INT'L LAW.389,408(1995)等;另见:Arvind Subramanian & Jayashree Watal,Can TRIPS Serve as an Enforcement Device for Developing Countries in the WTO?,3 J.INT'L ECON.L.403,403-04(2000)(讨论发展中国家的申诉),John H.Jackson,Emerging Problems of the WTO Constitution:Dispute Settlement and Decision Making in the Jurisprudence of the WTO,in LIBERALISATION AND PROTECTIONISM IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 25,31(Philip Ruttley et al.eds.,1999)(认为弱势成员缺乏诉讼应对经验,与美国和欧共体等强势成员相比处于实质性不利地位)等。
2 WTO报复制度要求报复的水平与遭受的抵消或减损相当,又由于不能追溯计算报复的水平,这可能导致报复救济的威慑力不足,并客观上有利于维护违规成员的利益,包括在裁决作出前一直在获得的违规利益。参见:Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,94 AM.J.INT'L L.335,344(2000).
3 例如Monika B(u|¨)tler & Heinz Hauser,The WTO Dispute Settlement System:A First Assessment from an Economic Perspective,16 J.L.ECON.& ORG.503,528(2000);Carolyn B.Gleason & Pamela D.Walther,The WTO Dispute Settlement Implementation Procedures:A System in Need of Reform,31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS.709,712-13,729(2000);Philippe Ruttley,WTO Dispute Settlement and Private Sector Interests:A Slow,But Gradual Improvement?,in DUE PROCESS IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 167,173,180-81(Philippe Ruttley et al.eds.,2001)
4 EC-Bananas,arbitration report,supra note 46,para.2.13.
1 WT/L/625,27 October 2005,para.127.
2 WT/DS364/1 G/L/822,27 June 2007.
3 WT/DS361/1 G/L/818,26 March 2007.
4 有较多的文章涉及第21条和第22条的顺序之争,有代表性的有:Cherise M.Valles and Brendan McGivern,"The Right to Retaliate under the WTO Agreement:The "Sequencing Problem",34 Journal of World Trade 2,pp.63-84(2000) 以及S.A.Rhodes,"The Article 21.5/22 Problem:Clarification through Bilateral Agreements?," 3 JIEL 3,pp.553-558(2000).
1 Decision by the Arbitrators,WT/DS26/ARB.
2 Decision by the Arbitrators,WT/DS48/ARB.
3 EU complies with WTO ruling on Hormone beef and calls on USA and Canada to lift trade sanctions-Brussels,15 October 2003,at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/april/tradoc_113909.pdf(2008年3月1日星期六最后访问).
4 Communication from the Chairman of the Panel,UNITED STATES-CONTINUED SUSPENSION OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE EC-HORMONES DISPUTE,WT/DS320/11,26 June 2007,at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/september/tradoc_135751.pdf.
1 Jas Kaminski,Irish Exporters Manage So Far to Avoid Impact of US Trade Tariffs,IRISH TIMES,July 31,1999,at Bus.& Fin.p.17.
2 WTO Appellate Body Report on EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products(Hormones),WT/DS26/AB/R para.245(Jan.16,1998)
3 WT/DS/18/12,July 15,1999.
4 WT/DS108/13,Nov.,17,2000.
1 WT/DS108/ARB,30 August 2002.
2 COUNCIL REGULATION(EC) No 728/2006 of 15 May 2006,suspending and conditionally repealing Regulation(EC) No 2193/2003 establishing additional customs duties on imports of certain products originating in the United States of America at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_131589.pdf(最后一次访问时间为2008年3月1日星期六)
1 WT/DS222/ARB,para.3.107.
2 Ibid,para.3.121.
3 WT/DS27/ARB,para.6.3.
4 WT/DS/103/17,Feb.19,2001.
5 WT/DS/113/17,Feb.19,2001.
6 WT/DS/103/RW,WT/DS/113/RW,July 11,2001.
7 WT/DS/103/AB/RW,WT/DS/113/AB/RW,Dec.,3,2001.
8 见WTO网站的案件介绍:http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds103_e.htm。(最后一次访问时间为2008年3月1日星期六)
1 美国《1916年反倾销法》的前身是美国《1916年税收法》第800—801节。《1916年反倾销法》规定,对以“实质性低于”某外国生产的产品在国外相关市场上的价格“一般的和系统性的”进口至美国或在美国销售的进口商,可以其他民事和刑事程序,条件是此类行为的目的是“破坏或损害美国的产业,或阻止某产业在美国的确立,或约束或垄断该产品在美国的贸易和商业的任何部分”。见The Revenue Act of 1916,ch.463,Sections 800-801,39 Stat.798,codified as 15 U.S.C.§.72。该法是美国为解决所谓的“倾销”问题而制定的,是美国在“一战”后对欧洲,特别是德国,公司通过掠夺性销售获取美国市场,进而威胁美国产业刚建立的领先地位的做法的应对之法。
2 Unfair Competition Act(Anti-dumping Act of 1916),15 U.S.C.Section 71-76.
3 WT/DS136/AB/R,WT/DS162/AB/R,Aug.28,2000.
4 WT/DS136/15,WT/DS162/18,Jan.7,2002.
5 日本的报复请求表明:“用金钱价值来计算抵消和减损的水平是不现实的”。见WT/DS162/18,2002年1月7日。
1 WT/DS136/ARB,para.6.14.
2 WT/DS136/ARB,p.36.
3 US-Anti-dumping:Pascal Lamy welcomes US Congress' vote to repeal the US 1916 Anti-Dumping Act,IP/04/1387,Brussels,20 November 2004,p.2.
1 WT/DS136/ARB,paras.5.69-72.
2 Copyright Act,17 U.S.C.,Section 101 et seq,2001.
3 WT/DS160/R,June 15,2000.
4 WT/DS160/ARB25/1,Nov.,9,2001.
5 Press release,European Communities,EU and U.S.Agree on Temporary Compensation in Copyright Dispute,Dec.19,2001.Also,WT/DS160/23,p.2.
6 WT/DS160/19,Jan.7,2002.
7 WT/DS160/24/Add.38,8 February 2008.
1 例如,吕成功:《美国对世界的博弈——伯德修正案之争》,载于《WTO经济导刊》,2004年第12期,等。
1 Robert Z.Lawrence,Crimes and Punishments? An Analysis of Retaliation under the WTO,at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/～RLawrence/Crimes%20and%20Punishments%20Final%20June%2025.pdf第2—3页。2008年3月10日星期一最后访问。
2 Hufubauer,Gary C.and Fred Newman,2002,Trade and Investment:An Amercian Perspoctive,Cambrdge:Harvard University,转引自Robert Z.Lawrence,Crimes and Punishments? An Analysis of Retaliation under the WTO,at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/～RLawrence/Crimes%20and%20Punishments%20Final%20June%2025.pdf第3页。2008年3月10日星期一最后访问。
3 Robert Z.Lawrence,Crimes and Punishments? An Analysis of Retaliation under the WTO,p.4.
1 WT/DS267/RW,18 December 2007,conclusion.
2 WT/DS285/ARB,21 December 2007.
1 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System:International Law,International Organizations and Dispute Settlement 82,Kluwer Law International 1997.
2 Ibid.
1 在GATT时代,缔约方全体仅批准过一次报复请求,但作为胜诉方的荷兰,却因为种种顾忌,最终没有真正实施报复。见Netherlands—Measures of suspension of Obligations to the United States,Nov.8,1952,GATT B.I.S.D.(1~(st) Supp.),p.32.
2 John H.Jackson et al.,Legal Problems of International Economic Relations,pp.7-14(4th ed.2002).
3 这类分析和观察比较多,有代表性的有:Judith Goldstein,International Institutions and Domestic Politics:GATT,WTO,and the Liberalization of International Trade,in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 133,144-45(Anne O.Krueger ed.,1998);Robert E.Hudec,Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement,in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES 369,389(Friedl Weiss ed.,2000)。
1 Robert E.Hudec,Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement,in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES,p.388(Friedl Weiss ed.,2000).
2 Ibid.
3 Trade and Development Act of 2000,Pub.L.No.106-200,§407,114 Stat.293;另见:Raj Bhala,The Bananas War,31 MCGEORGE L.REV.839,950-51(2000):Helene Cooper,Food Fight With Europe May Worsen,WALL ST.J.,Sept.6,2000,at A2;Robert O'Neill,Making a List,Checking It Twice,32 NAT'L J.2505(2000)。
4 Peter Sutherland,et al.,Future of the WTO,p.50.
5 Ibid.,p.49.
1 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,The American Journal of International Law,Vol.94,2000,p.343.
2 王传丽:《析世界贸易组织争端解决机制——兼评贸易报复》,载于《政法论坛》,1996年第4期,第80页。
3 当然,也有少部分学者是认可当前的报复措施的,因为,虽然国际贸易中的地位差异导致报复的实施效果大相径庭,但是这种由于实力或者地位的差异形成的事实的不平等充斥国际关系,乃至社会社会的各个方面。我们不能以利用报复机制的机会或效果的不平等而否认报复作为争端解决程序存在的合法性。见马呈元,试论世界贸易组织的争端解决制度,载于马呈元等主编:《国际法律问题研究》,中国政法大学出版社,1999年,第25页。
4 Allan Rosas,Implementation and Enforcement of WTO Dispute Settlement Finding:An EU Perspective,Journal of International Economic Law,Vol.4,2001,p.143.
5 Eric Reinhardt,Adjudication without Enforcement in GATT Disputes,Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.45No.2,April 2001 174-195,p.174 note 1.
1 European Communities—Regime for the Importation,Sale and Distribution of Bananas—Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU:Decision by the Arbitrators, WT/DS27/ARB(April 9,1999),at para.6.3.
1 WT/DS27/ARB(April 9,1999),para.6.3.
2 WT/DS136/ARB,paras 5.5,5.7.
3 见加拿大Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU:Decision of the Arbitrators,WT/DS48/ARB(July 12,1999)第40页第39段,和美国Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU:Decision of the Arbitrators,WT/DS26/ARB(July 12,1999)第10页第40段。
4 Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft:Recourse to Arbitration by Brazil under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement:Decision by the Arbitrators,WT/DS46/ARB(Aug.28,2000),para.3.44,pp.14-15.
5 另外:Naboth van den Broek,Power paradoxes in enforcement and implementation of World Trade Organization dispute settlement reports:Interdisciplinary approaches and new proposals,Journal of World Trade.New York:Feb 2003.Vol.37,Iss.1,p.139,以及J.H.Jackson,The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstanding on the Nature of Legal Obligation,91 A.J.I.L.,1997,p.60;N.van den Broek,Legal Persuasion,Political Realism and Legitimacy:The European Court's Recent Treatment of the Effect of WTO Agreements in the EC Legal Order,4 J.I.E.L.2,2001,pp.411-440;A.O.Sykes,The Remedy for Breach of Obligations under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:Damages or Specific Performance?,in M.C.E.J.Bronckers and R.Quick,eds,New Directions in International Economic Law:Essays in Honour of John H.Jackson,The Hague:Kluwer,2000,pp.347-357.
1 目前国内普遍将“induce compliance”翻译成“促进执行”,但很明显,无论是文本(text)还是从WTO 规则的目的和实践来看,现有的WTO争端解决机制并不是正面促进执行,而只是对裁决执行的引导。
2 初步证据案件,表面证据案件,或称表面证据确凿案件,(prima facie case)是指申诉方提供的证据可以证明其提出的事实存在,其提出的诉请合理的案件。除非应诉方能够提出充分的反驳证据,否则审理纠纷的机构就会作出对胜诉方有利的裁决。见张玉卿主编:《WTO法律大词典》,法律出版社,2006年11月,第76页条目。另据《牛津法律指南》(1980年版)解释,“表面证据确凿案件”系一个足以要求作出答复的案件。
3 William J.Davey,Dispute Settlement in GATT,11 Fordham Int'l L.J.,p.51(1987).或可见:John H.Jackson,et al.,Legal Problems of International Economic Relations:Cases,Materials and Text on the National and International Regulation of Transnationai Economic Relations,p.371.
4 R.Hudec,Enforcing International Trade Law,Salem,NH:Butterworth,1991,pp.192-196.
5 R.Hudec,Enforcing International Trade Law,Salem,NH:Butterworth,1991,p.198.
6 但有一些学者,如Joost Pauwelyn,还是坚定的认为WTO体制规定的还是私法领域内纯粹的合同关系,而不是植根于公法的体制,因为这里不考虑公共利益(public goods)。详见Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,American Journal of International Law 2(April):335-47,p.340.
1 根据Robert Z.Lawrence的计算,关税的社会成本的增长水平为关税率增长的平方。即2%的税率造成的损害是1%的税率的4倍;3%的则是1%的9倍。参见:Robert Z.Lawrence,Crimes and Punishments?An Analysis of Retaliation under the WTO,at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/～RLawrence/Crimes%20and%20Punishments%20Final%20June%2025.pdf第3页。2008年3月10日星期一最后访问。
1 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,American Journal of International Law 2(April):335-47,p.336.
2 EC-Bananas arbitration report WT/DS27/ARB,,para.6.3,EC-Hormones arbitration report WT/DS26/ARB,para.39以及WT/DS48/ARB,para.40.
3 Article 41,ILC draft of Law of State Responsibility.
4 见前文对“possibility”的注解。
1 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,American Journal of International Law 2(April):335-47,p.341.
2 参见Niall P.Meagher,Representing Developing Countries in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings in Mavroidis & Berman(eds)(Cambridge University Press),以及Rene Guilherme S.Medrado,Renegotiating Remedies in the WTO:A Multilateral Approach,22 Wisconsin International Law Journal 323(2004)等。
3 Naboth van den Broek,Power paradoxes in enforcement and implementation of World Trade Organization dispute settlement reports:Interdisciplinary approaches and new proposals,Journal of World Trade,New York:Feb 2003.Vol.37,No.1;pp.127-162.
4 Ibid,p.134.
1 Fatoumata Jawara & Aileen Kwa,Behind the Scenes at the WTO:the real world of international trade negotiations,London:Zed Books,p.6.
2 South Center,Issues Regarding the Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism,T.R.A.D.E.working paper NO.1,1999,Executive Summary.
3 Fatoumata Jawara & Aileen Kwa,Behind the Scenes at the WTO:the real world of international trade negotiations,London:Zed Books,p.7.
1 "Transcending the Ostensible":Some Reflections on the Nature of Litigation Between Governments,72Minnesota Law Review 211(1987) reprinted in Robert E.Hudec,Essays on the Nature of International Trade Law 117,118(Cameron May 1999).218.
2 Robert E.Hudec,Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement,in Friedl Weiss(ed)Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures:Issues & Lessons from the Practice of Other International Courts and Tribunals 370(Cameron May,2000).
3 "The United States maintains that it has the right not to comply with WTO rulings," UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,Report to the Chairman,Committee on Ways and Means,House of Representatives,WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:ISSUES IN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT at 16(August 2000).The European Court of Justice has taken a similar view:Portuguese Republic v.Council of the European Union,C-149/96,23 November 1999.
4 WTO文本中并没有出现“报复(retaliation)”一词,但“报复”一词在指代WTO下的“中止减让和其他义务”概念时广为流传,并得到了学界的认可。应注意的是:WTO下的“报复”并不如其本意那样含有惩罚性的成分,也不是带有惩罚规定和措施的“制裁(sanction)”。关于概念的区分,可以参见Robert Z.Lawrence,Crimes and Punishments? An Analysis of Retaliation under the WTO,at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/～RLawrence/Crimes%20and%20Punishments%20Final%20June%2025. pdf第二页注释2。2008年3月10日星期一最后访问。
1 David Palmeter,The WTO Dispute Settlement System in the Next Ten Years,April 7,2006,pp.7-8(working paper),available at http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/wto/pdfs/PalmeterWorkingPaper.pdf.最后访问时间为2008年3月18日。
2 Reflections on the Nature of Litigation Between Governments,72 Minnesota Law Review 211(1987)reprinted in Robert E.Hudec,ESSAYS ON THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 117,118(Cameron May 1999).218.
3 Ibid,p.8.
4 Robert E.Hudec,Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement,in Friedl Weiss(ed)IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES:ISSUES & LESSONS FROM THE PRACTICE OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 370(Cameron May,2000).
5 美国认为它有权力不执行DSB裁决:UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,Report to the Chairman,Committee on Ways and Means,House of Representatives,WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:ISSUES IN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT at 16(August 2000).欧共体也持有类似的观点,见:Portuguese Republic v.Council of the European Union,C-149/96,23 November 1999.
6 关于金钱赔偿,可参见Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek,Financial Compensation in the WTO:Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement,8 Journal of International Economic Law(101)(2005);World Trade Organization,THE FUTURE OF THE WTO:ADDRESSING INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM,Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi,para.243(WTO 2004)等。
1 如Marc L.Busch & Eric Reinhardt,Testing International Trade Law:Empirical Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement,in Kennedy & Southwick(eds.) THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E.HUDEC 457,478(Cambridge 2002)以及Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,94 AM.J.INT'L L.335,338(2000)等。
2 David Palmeter,The WTO Dispute Settlement System in the Next Ten Years,April 7,2006,pp.8-9(working paper),available at http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/wto/pdfs/PalmeterWorkingPaper.pdf.最后访问时间为2008年3月18日。
3 William J.Davey,The WTO Dispute Settlement System:The First Ten Years,8 J.Int'l Econ.L.17,p.29.
1 A.Subramanian and J.Watal,Can TRIPs serve as an enforcement mechanism for Developing Countries in the WTO?,3 J.I.E.L.(2000),403-416.
2 B Hoekman and P C Mavroidis,Enforcing Multilateral Commitments:Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries,The WTO/World Bank Conference on Developing Countries in a New Millennium(WTO Secretariat,1999),p.10.
3 Marco C.E.J.Bronckers,More Power to the WTO,4 J.I.E.L.1(2001),61-63;以及Fritz Breuss,WTO Dispute Settlement from an Economic Perspective-More Failure than Success? REI Working Paper(October 2001).
4 Petros C.Mavroidis,Remedies in the WTO Legal System:Between a Rock and a Hard Place,11 E.J.I.L.4(2000),763-814.
5 Fritz Breuss,WTO Dispute Settlement from an Economic Perspective-More Failure than Success? REI Working Paper(October 2001),pp 45-48.
6 Naboth van den Broek,Power paradoxes in enforcement and implementation of World Trade Organization dispute settlement reports:Interdisciplinary approaches and new proposals,Journal of World Trade,New York:Feb 2003.Vol.37,No.1;pp.127-162.
7 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,94 AM.J.INT'L L.335,338(2000)
1 Giovanni Maggi,The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation,in Petros C.Mawoidis,Alan O.Sykes eds.,:The WTO and International Trade Law/Dispute Settlement,2005,p.356
2 Maggi,p.358
3 Maggi,p.359
4 Maggi,p.366
1 Maggi,P.367
2 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,The American Journal of International Law,Vol.94,2000,p.342.
1 WT/DS27/R/USA,para.7.47.
2 Ibid,para.7.49.
3 Ibid,para.7.50.
4 WT/DS27/AB/R,para.136,Sept.9,1997.
5 WT/DS27/ARB,para.8.1.
6 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,The American Journal of International Law,Vol.94,2000,p.335.
1 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,The American Journal of International Law,Vol.94,2000,p.344.
2 《UN宪章》的第七章正是这样设计的。
3 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,The American Journal of International Law,Vol.94,2000,pp.345-346..
1 铃木草案(WTO争端解决机制和下一轮谈判的主要问题及我们的对策)网址:http://www.com-law.net/wenku/dsm.htm最后访问日期为2008年3月20日。
1 如T.Cottier,Intellecutal Property in International Trade Law and Policy:The GATT Connection 79-105,1992,Aussenwirtschaft,pp.103-105,T.Cottier,"The Prospects for Intellecutal Property in GATT",28Common Market Law Rewiew(1991),pp.383-392,B.Hoekman and M.Kostecki,The Political Economy of the World Trading System,Oxford University Press,1995,p.157和Arvind Subramanian and Jayashree Watal,Can TRIPS Serve as an Enforcement Device for Developing Countries in the WTO? Journal of International Economic Law(2000) 403-416.
2 Arvind Subramanian and Jayashree Watal,Can TRIPS Serve as an Enforcement Device for Developing Countries in the WTO? Journal of International Economic Law(2000),p.405.
1 吴汉东:《关于知识产权私权属性的再认识——兼评“知识产权公权化”理论》,载于《社会科学》,2005年第10期,第58页。
2 这方面的评论较多,如孔祥俊:《WTO知识产权协定及其国内适用》,法律出版社2002年版,第72页。
3 伯纳德.霍克曼和迈克尔.考斯泰基:《世界贸易体制的政治经济学》(中译本),法律出版社,第144-145页。
4 J.Watal,Pharmaceutical Patents,Prices and Welfare Losses:Policy Options for India under the WTO TRIPS Agreement,The World Economy 23(5) May 733-752(2000). 权、强制权等)和公民公权(生存权、自由权、参政权、请求权等)。公权与私权的划分标准,尽管众说纷纭,但有两点必须把握:一是权利的内容,即公权一般是政治性的,私权一般是民事性的;二是权利的产生,即公权源于公法关系,私权源于私法关系。参见吴汉东,关于知识产权私权属性的再认识——兼评“知识产权公权化”理论,社会科学,2005年第10期,第62页。
1 孔祥俊:(WTO知识产权协定及其国内适用》,法律出版社2002年版,第72页。
2 吴汉东:《关于知识产权私权属性的再认识——兼评“知识产权公权化”理论》,载于《社会科学》,2005年第10期,第58页。
3 胡锦光、韩大元:《当代人权保障制度》,中国政法大学出版社,1993年,第1-2页。
4 何盛明主编:《财经大辞典》,中国财政经济出版社1990年版,第255页。
5 L.Ray Patterson Stanley & W.Lindberg,The Nature of Copyright:A Law of Users' Right,The University of Georgia Press,1991,p.45.
1 WT/DS27/ARB/ECU,paras.148-150.
2 Lenore Sek,Trade Retaliation:The "Carousel" Approach,CRS Report for Congress,order code RS20715,at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/23368.pdf.最后访问时间为2008-3-8.
1 Steve Charnovitz,Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions,The American Journal of International Law,Vol.95,2001,p.823.
2 Rosemary A.Ford,The Beef Hormone Dispute and Carousel Sanctions:A Roundabout Way of Forcing Compliance with World Trade Organization Decisions,27 BROOKLYN J.INTERNATIONAL L.543-573(2002),p.543.
1 Congressional Record,Sept.22,1999,p.S11260.
2 Daniel Pruzin,EU Warns US Against Africa-CBI Provision Adopting "Carousel" Approach to Retaliation,Daily Report for Executives,May 4,2000.
3 P.L.106-200,Trade and Development Act of 2000.
1 Section 407,P.L.106-200,Trade and Development Act of 2000.
2 USTR,USTR Announces Procedures for Modifying Measures in EC Beef and Banana Cases,Press Release 00-41,May 26,2000.
1 U.S Faces EU on "Carousel" and Bananas,Trade Reports International Group,Washington Trade Daily,July 28,2000.
2 "Carousel" List Still Held Up,Trade Reports International Group,Washington Trade Daily,August 2,2000.
3 2001年7月,WTO裁定美国修改后的政策仍然与WTO规定不符。随后美国提出上诉,但2002年1月14日,WTO基本维持了原判。
4 Gary G.Yerkey,U.S.Will Use "Carousel" Law as "Leverage" to Open Foreign Markets,International Trader Reporter,May 31,2001.
1 参见ILC的草案第42-46条。
2 Allan H.Meltzer,Report of the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission,http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/meltzer.pdf,March 2000,p.107.
3 Ibid.,p.108.
4 Ibid.
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 比较典型的论述见John H.Jackson,The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:Misunderstandings 0n the Nature of Legal Obligation,91 AJIL 60(1997)第62-63页;John H.Jackson,International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports:Obligations to Comply or Option to "Buy Out"?,98 AJIL 109(2004)第115-117页;Robert E.Hudec,Broadening the Scope of Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement,in Friedl Weisss(ed.),Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures:Issues & Lessons from the Practice of Other International Courts and Tribunals 369,London:Cameron May 2000,第377页等。
1 比较典型的论述见Judith Hippler Bello,The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:Less is More,90 AJIL 416:Timothy M.Reif and Mariorie Florestal,Revenge ofthe Push-Me,Pull-You:The Implementation Process of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding.32 International Law 755(1998)第763页。
2 不可否认的是,“有效违约”与“合同必须执行”的原则向背,有违“公平”、“正义”之价值。
3 如三人的合作文章Henrik Hom,Giovanni Maggi and Robert W.Staiger,The GATT/WTO as an Incomplete Contract,May 2006,at http://www.fundacionareces.es/PDF/glob_maggi.pdf.最后访问时间为2007年3月19日星期一。
4 经济学理论认为,所谓“完伞合约”是指缔约双方能够完全遇见合约期内可能发生的所有情况,并自觉执行双方签订的合约条款;当缔约双方对合约条款产生争议时,第三方能够强制执行。不完全合约则指由于个人的有限理性、外在环境的复杂性和不确定性等不完美因素的存在,合约方法不可能详尽准确的将与交易有关的所有未来可能发生的情况及相应情况下的职责和权利写明的合约。签订完全合同只是一种理想的状况。真实世界的合约在绝对意义上都是不完全合约。正由于当事人的有限理性和环境的不确定性,所以事前不可能签订面面俱到的合约,才使得事后的治理结构和制度安排变得非常重要。参见科斯:《论生产的制度结构》,上海:上海三联书店,1994年6月;奥利弗.E.威廉姆森:《资本主义经济制度:论企业签约与市场签约》,北京:商务印书馆,2002年,第16-50页。
5 比较典型的论述见Alan O.Sykes,The Remedy for Breach of Obligations Under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:Damages or Specific Performance?,in New Directions in International Economic Law:Essays in Honour of John H.Jackson,p.347,349-351;Jeffrey L.Dunoff and Joel P.Trachtman,Economic Analysis of International Law,24 Yale Journal of International Law 1(1999),pp.31-33.
6 对此,John H.Jackson从DSU的文本解释、谈判历史和政策制定等角度,反驳了将“有效违约”理论引入以解释WTO违规做法的观点。John H.Jackson,The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation,91 AJIL 60(1997)第62-63页。
1 US White House release,To Provide for the Termination of Action Taken with Regard to Imports of Certain Steel Products by the President of the United States of America a Proclamation,http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031204-7.html.最后访问日期为 2008-3-14。
2 Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek,Financial Compensation in the WTO:Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement,8 Journal of International Economic Law(101)(2005);World Trade Organization,THE FUTURE OF THE WTO:ADDRESSING INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM,Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi,para.243.
3 Susan Esserman and Robert Howse,The WTO on Trial,in Petros C.Mavroidis,Alan O.Sykes eds.,:The WTO and International Trade Law/Dispute Settlement,p.296
1 Naboth van den Broek,Power paradoxes in enforcement and implementation of World Trade Organization dispute settlement reports:Interdisciplinary approaches and new proposals,Journal of World Trade.New York:Feb 2003.Vol.37,Iss.1,p.139.
2 这方面的论述甚多,如 J.H.Jackson,The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstanding on the Nature of Legal Obligation,91 A.J.I.L.,1997,p.60;N.van den Broek,Legal Persuasion,Political Realism and Legitimacy:The European Court's Recent Treatment of the Effect of WTO Agreements in the EC Legal Order,4J.I.E.L.2,2001,pp.411-440;A.O.Sykes,The Remedy for Breach of Obligations under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:Damages or Specific Performance?,in M.C.E.J.Bronckers and R.Quick,eds,New Directions in International Economic Law:Essays in Honour of John H.Jackson,The Hague:Kluwer,2000,pp.347-357.
1 William J.Davey,WTO Dispute Settlement:Segregating the Useful Political Aspects and Avoiding "Over-Legalization",in M.Bronckers & R.Quick(eds.) New Directions in International Economic Law,p.299.
2 Ibid,p.299.
3 Ibid,p.292.
4 如 Steve Chamovitz,Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions,95 AM.J.INT'L L.792,792,832(2001);Edward Alden,Bad Losers Cast Gloom Over WTO's Disputes Procedure,FIN.IMES,Dec.6,2000,p.8(批评者的一个重要观点是执行机制常常逼迫政府作出不必要的对立)。
5 如 Reinhard Quick,TABD Still Supports Trade Dispute Settlement,FIN.TIMES,Dec.11,000,p.14; TRANSATLANTIC BUSINESS DIALOGUE,CINCINNATI RECOMMENDATIONS 37-38(2000);Steve Charnovitz,Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions,95 AM.J.INT'L L.792,792,832(2001),p.810-11.
1 如Meltzer委员会报告第114页。
2 Steve Charnovitz,Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions,95 AM.J.INT'L L.792,p.792&832(2001).
3 转引自劳特派特修订:《奥本海国际法》,上卷第一分册,中译本,商务印书馆,1981年,第4页。
4 参见J.G.Starke:《国际法导论》,中译本,法律出版社,1984年,第19页。另参见《国际法讲义》,1832年,1954年版,第6页,转引自王铁崖主编:《国际法》,法律出版社,1995年,第6页。
5 劳特派特修订:《奥本海国际法》,上卷第一分册,中译本,商务印书馆,1981年,第5页。
6 王铁崖主编:《国际法》,法律出版社,1995年,第6-7页。
1 王铁崖主编:《国际法》,法律出版社,1995年,第7页。
2 如 Louis Hcnkin,How Nations Behave:Law and Foreign Policy 46-48(1979);Abram H.Chayes & Antonia Chayes,On Compliance,47 Int'1 Org.175,176(1993).
3 如Joost Pauwelyn认为:“WTO规则是通过WTO特有的争端解决体系执行的。”参见:Joost Pauwdyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules and Rules -Toward a More Collective Approach,American Journal of International Law 2(April):335-47,p.336.
1 Judith Hippler Bello,The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:Less Is More,in The American Journal of International Law,Vol.90,No.3,P.417.
2 John H.Jackson,The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding—Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation,in The American Journal of International Law,Vol.91,No.1,pp.60-64.
3 WTO Appellate Body Report,Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,WT/DS8/AB/R,WT/DS10/AB/R,and WT/DS11/AB/R,adopted 1 November 1996,p.32.
4 仅有香港对执行专家组的报告进行了明确的支持。
1 Gavin Goh & Andreas R.Ziegler,Retrospective Remedies in the WTO After Automative Leather,Journal of International Economic Law,Sept 2003,p.561.
2 WT/DS152/R,pant.7.24.
3 Petros Mavroidis,Remedies in the WTO Legal System:Between a Rock and a Hard Place,11 European Journal of International law 763(2000),p.780.
4 WT/DS126/RW,para.6.35.
1 讨论国际法的边界和限制,可参见:Jack L.Goldsmith and Eric A.Posner,The Limits of International Law,Oxford University Press,2005.
2 如在EC禽肉案、美国影响印度针织衫和罩衫的措施案中,上诉机构即应用了司法节制原则,对一些问题不予讨论。
3 依国际公法“遇有疑义从轻解释(in dubio mitius)”原则,条约解释时如遇用词含糊不清之情形,应采取使负担义务之一方较少负担的解释。
4 Richard H.Steinberg,Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO:Discursive,Constitutional,and Political Constraints,American Journal of International Law,Vol.98:247,2004,p.269.
5 European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products,WTO Doc.WT/DS135/AB/R(adopted Apr.5,2001).
1 Richard H.Steinberg,Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO:Discursive,Constitutional,and Political Constraints,American Journal of International Law,Vol.98:247,2004,p.273.
2 Richard H.Steinberg,Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO:Discursive,Constitutional,and Political Constraints,American Journal of International Law,Voi.98:247,2004,p.272.
1 但在法学家耶林那里,法律的强制性特征却被放在了十分突出的地位:“没有强制力的法律是一把不燃烧的火,一缕不发亮的光”。
2 关于国际体系中的正当性,详见Thomas M.Franck,Legitimacy in the International System,American Journal of International Law,82 Am.J.Int'1 L.,pp.705-760
1 Thomas M.Franck,The Power of Legit/macy and the Legitimacy of Power:International Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium,in The American Journal of International Law,Vol.100 No.1,p.94.
2 Ibid,p.93.
3 关于规则本身如何获得正当性,可参见:Hurd 1999;Kohler-Koch 2000。
4 参见Franek 1990,Finnemore & Sikkink 1998.
1 有关程序的正当性,可参见Dworkin 1986,Hurrell 1995,Franck 1995等。
2 Susan Esserman and Robert Howse,The WTO on Trial,in Petros C.Mavroidis,Alan O.Sykes eds.,:The WTO and International Trade Law/Dispute Settlement,p.289
3 Louis Henkin认为,“在几乎所有的时候,几乎所有国家都遵守国际法的几乎所有原则,并遵守它们几乎所有的义务。(It is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.)”(斜体为原作者所加),见Louis Henkin,How Nations Behave,2rid ed.,Columbia University Press,1979,p47.
4 Thomas M.Franck,The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power:International Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium,in The American Journal of International Law,Vol.100 No.1,p.93.
5 Ibid,p.93.
1 Ibid,p.93,originally from Thomas M.Franck & Edward Weisband,Word Politics:Verbal Strategy among the Superpowers 120-48(1971).
1 Kenneth W.Dam,1970,The GATT:Law and International Economic Organization,Chicago:University of Chicago Press,p.352.
2 John H.Jackson,1969,World Trade and the Law of GATT,Indianapolis,Bobbs-Merrill,p.170.
3 DSU第22.5条只是规定:“DSB授权的中止减让或其他义务的水平应与利益抵消或减损的水平相当。”
4 WT/DS217/ARB/EEC,para.6.4.
1 WT/DS217/ARB/EEC,paras.6.2 & 6.3.
2 Ibid,note 130.
3 如 S.A.Rhodes,The Article 21.5/22 Problem:Clarification through Bilateral Agreements?,3 J.I.E.L.(2000),553-558:Jason E.Keams and Steve Chamovitz,Adjudicating Compliance in the WTO:A Review of DSU Article 21.5,5 J.I.E.L.2(2002),331-352.
1 David Palmeter,The WTO Dispute Settlement System in the Next Ten Years,April 7,2006,p.5(working paper),available at http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/wto/pdfs/PalmeterWorkingPaper.pdf.最后访问时间为 2008年3月18日.
2 Naboth van den Broek,Power Paradoxes in Enforcement and Implementation of World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Reports:Interdisciplinary Approaches and New Proposals,Journal of World Trade.New York:Feb 2003.Vol.37,Iss.1,p.141.
1 John H.Jackson,The World Trade Organization,the Royal Institute of International Affairs,1998,p.86,
2 John H.Jackson,Dispute Settlement and the WTO,Journal of International Economic Law,Vol.1,p.335.
1 Steve Charnovitz,Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions,95 AM.J.INT'L L.792,pp.815-816.
2 Robert E.Hudec,Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement,in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES,pp.390-391.
3 Ibid,p.391.
4 Mark L.Movsesian,Enforcement of WTO Rulings:An Interest Group Analysis,in Hofstra Law Review Vol.32 No.1,Fall 2003,p.13.
1 DSU只规定过“贸易效果”,但是仲裁员在美国——版权法第110(5)节程序中,因为美国的有关版权法规定不导致贸易损失,但是会导致版费的损失,因此,仲裁员“能动性的”使用了“经济效果(economic effectt)”一词来计算报复的水平。参见WT/DS160/ARB25/1,9 November 2001,para.3.18.
2 WT/DS136/ARB,para.5.32.
3 Ibid,para.5.40.
4 Thomas Jurgensen,Crime and Punishment:Retaliation under the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System,Journal of World Trade 39(2):327-340,2005,p.4.
1 WT/DSI36/ARB,pare.5.58.
2 WT/DS217/ARB/EEC,para.4.17.
3 Ibid,para 4.18.
4 WT/DS217/ARB/EEC,pare.4.19.
1 WT/DS217/ARB/BRA,note 90.
2 Ibid,para.4.20.
3 WT/DS217/ARB,para.3.74.
1 Report of the Working Party on Netherlands Action under Article ⅩⅩⅢ:2,L/61,7 November 1952.
2 WT/DS136/ARB,para.5.72.
1 E.g.:Bronckers & van den Broek,Financial Compensation in the WTO:Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement,Journal of International Economic Law,Vol.8,Issue 1,pp.101-126,2005;William J.Davey,The WTO:Looking Forwards,9J.Int'1 Econ.L.3,22-23(2006);et al.
2 Suzanne,p.163.
3 见 Draft Articles on Responsibilty of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,adopted by the International Law Commission at its 53~(rd) session,Sept 2001.
4 1929 PCIJ Series A,No 8,4,p 21.
5 Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek,Financial Compensation in the WTO:Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement,8 J.Int'1 Econ.L.101,103(2005).
1 Alexander Keck,WTO Dispute Settlement:What Role for Economic Analysis? A Commentary on Fritz Breuss,4 J.Indus.Competition & Trade 365,368(2004).
2 当然,如果货币补偿确实只是暂时的措施,且货币补偿后原有非法措施被最终取消了或与WTO协定相符,则还是可行的。
1 Trade Bill Includes Temporary Fix for EU-US Copyright Dispute,Inside US Trade,2 August 2002,p.17.
2 指有关的执行措施。
3 R.Hudec,Enforcing International Trade Law,Salem,NH:Butterworth,1991,pp.199-200.
4 Ecuador-Contribution of Ecuador to the Improvements of the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO,8 July 2002,TN/DS/W/9.
5 WT/DSS/AB/R,pp.14-15.
1 H.Horn and P.Mavroidis,Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement System and Developing Countries Interests,1999,p.8.
2 Australia-Subsidies provided to producers and exporters of automotive leather,Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States,at para.6.39
3 WT/DSi26/RW,adopted 11 February 2000.
4 另一个原因是专家组在作出这一审理时,超出了专家组的授权范围(tersm of reference),审理了双方均没有要求的问题。见WT/DS126/RW,para.6.19.
5 WT/DS27/RW/ECU,para.6.105.
1 WT/DS 165/R,para.6.106.
2 WT/DS70/RW,para.5.48.
3 WT/DS46/RW,footnote 17.
4 WT/DS108/RW,para.3.1.
5 GATT panel report,GPR/DS2/R,adopted 13 May 1992.
6 1929 PCIJ Series A,No 8,4,p.21.
7 WT/DS2/AB/R,adopted 20 May 1996,p.17.
8 WT/DS58/AB/R.
9 Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek,Financial Compensation in the WTO:Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement,8 Journal of International Economic Law(101)(2005),p.103.
1 Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek,Financial Compensation in the WTO:Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement,8 Journal of International Economic Law(101)(2005),p.105.
2 Ibid,pp.110-111.
3 Report of the Ad Hoc Group on Legal Amendments to the General Agreement,COM.TD/F/4,(4 March 1966).
1 Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Brock,Financial Compensation in the WTO:Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement,8 Journal of International Economic Law(101)(2005),pp.,112-121.
2 见前文关于“WTO已授权的报复统计”。
1 如Sungjoon Cho,The Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law,65 U.Pitt.L.Rev.763,787-88(20O4)。
2 关于贸易损失的计算方法,可以参见本文前一节。
3 Bronckers和van den Broek并认为,政府对其被裁定应负责的损害的弥补,这是国际公法传统的一部分,而不是什么新鲜观念。参见Rene Guilherme S.Medrado,Renegotiating Remedies in the WTO:A Multilateral Approach,22 Wis.Int'l L.J.323,369(2004).
1 DSU Article 19.1.
2 DSU Article 26.1(c).
3 如US—Stainless Steel(Mexico) Panel Report,EC—Salmon(Panel) Report,Japan—DRAMS CVDs Panel Report,US—Byrd Amendment Panel Report,etc.
1 Horn & Mavroidis,Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement System and Developing Countries Interests,1999,p.14.
2 有关风注1。
3 WT/DS344/R,para.8.4-5.
4 WT/DS328/R,para.8.6-9.
1 WT/DS336/R,para.8.7-8.
2 WT/DS268/R,paras.A-75,A-76,85-87.
3 WT/DS268/AB/RW/,para.184.
4 WT/DS331/R,para.8.7-12.
5 WT/DS283/R,paras.8.6-8.
6 WT/DS241/R,para.8.3-7.
7 WT/DS217/R,para.8.6.
1 WT/DS27/RW/ECU 第6.8段。
2 WT/DS70/AB/RW,paras.33-38.
3 WT/DS18/RW 第7.10段。
4 WT/DS257/RW 第66-69段。
5 WT/DS141/AB/RW,para.79.
6 WT/DS267/RW,paras.9.9-27.
1 Ibid,para.9.22.
2 WT/DS257/AB/RW,paras,49-94.
3 WT/DS126/RW 第6.5段。
4 WT/DS18/RW 第7.10段。
1 所有数据均截止于2008年3月20日星期四。
2 见TN/DS/W/35(2003年1月22日)提案。
3 参见第一章的统计表格。
4 DSU Article 21.6.
1 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,American Journal of International Law 2(April):335-47,p.336.
1 Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek,Financial Compensation in the WTO:Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement,8 Journal of International Economic Law(101)(2005);World Trade Organization,THE FUTURE OF THE WTO:ADDRESSING INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM,Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi,para.243.
2而且,当前的《国家责任法》草案以及一些国际法实践,都比较明确的规定了对违反国际法行为的“补偿(reparation)”。
1 同上,第96页。
2 Roger Fisher,Improving Compliance with International Law,Charlottesville:University Press of Virginia,1981,p.199.
3 Ibid.,p.199.
4 Ibid.,p.200.
1 Pauling v.McElroy,278 F.2d 252(D.C.Cir.1960).
2 United States—1974 Trade Act Article 301,WT/DS 152/R,para.7.72.
3 Ibid.,note 661.
4 Ibid.,para.7.72.
5 DSU Article 3.2.
1 United States—1974 Trade Act Article 301,WT/DSI52/R,para.7.78.
2 John H.Jackson,The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding—Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation,in The American Journal of International Law,Vol.91,No.1,pp.60-64.
3 Case C-149/96,Portuguese Republic v.Council,1999 E.C.R.I-8395 第38段。
4 John H.Jackson,The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding—Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation,in The American Journal of International Law,Vol.91,No.1,p,62.
5 有关WTO关于执行义务的规定,John H.Jackson教授列出了DSU的至少11处规定。详见J.H.Jackson,The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstanding on the Nature of Legal Obligation,91 A.J.I.L.,1997,p.63.
1关于国际法规则是否能够在欧盟内产生直接效力,欧盟法院判例确定的标准是:应首先确定该规则的内容是否足够清楚、准确和无条件;二是应根据该国际法的目的和上下文,判定来规则是否符合该国际法的明确目的。详见Case 270/80,Polydor Ltd.V.Harlequin Record Shops Ltd.,1982 E.C.R.329第14段及以下;Case C-432/92,The Queen v.Minister of Agric.,Fisheries and Food,1994 E.C.R.I-3087等。
2 Case C-149/96,Portuguese Republic v.Council,1999 E.C.R.I-8395,p.40.
3 Ibid,p.46.
4 19 U.S.C.§ 3512(a)(2)(2002).
5 James McCall Smith,The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design:Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts,54 INT'L ORG.137,p.142(2000).
6 R.Hudec,Enforcing International Trade Law,Salem,NH:Butterworth,1991,p.172.
1 Julian G.Ku,The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations:New Problems With Old Solutions,85 MINN.L.REV.71,77(2000).
2 United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,WT/DSI52/R,paras.7.72-7.92(Dec.22,1999).
3 Case C-149/96,Portuguese Republic v.Council,1999 E.C.R.1-8395,p.40.
4 Ibid,p.46.
1 Fisher,p.207.
2 Fisher,p.209.
1 叶兴平:《国际争端解决机制的最新发展》,法律出版社,2006年第1版,第3页。
2 同上,第4页。
1 Damedin Tsogtbaatar,Mongolia's WTO Accession:Expectations and Realities of WTO Membership,Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation:CASE STUDY 29,p.2.网络地址:http://www.wto.org/English/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case29_e.htm,最后访问2008-3-20。
1 DSU第3.7条。
2 Susan Esserman and Robert Howse,The WTO on Trial,in Petros C.Mavroidis,Alan O.Sykes eds.,:The WTO and International Trade Law/Dispute Settlement,p.298
3 Turab Hussain,Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation:Case Study 34 "Victory in Principle:Pakistan's Dispute Settlement Case on Combed Cotton Yarn Exports to the United States".
4 但泰国则认为无论如何都应该大胆诉讼,即便失败了也能表达自己的观点,而这对在其他领域的谈判是有利的;如果胜诉,则更可以获得几倍的回报。另外,即便没有完整的司法程序,也可能达成有约束力的结果。参见Nilaratna Xuto,Thailand:Conciliating a Dispute on Tuna Exports to the EC,MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF WTO PARTICIPATION:CASE STUDY 40.
5 如前文统计过的,不上诉争端审理,耗时平均为465.03天;上诉争端审理,平均耗时为550.53天;不上诉情况下的执行专家组程序,耗时平均为244.63天;上诉情况下的执行专家纽程序,耗时平均为373.36天;另外DSU第22.6条仲裁程序也耗时不等,都极大的延长了对WTO案件的审理和执行期限。
1贺小勇:《国际贸易争端解决与中国对策研究——以WTO为视角》,法律出版社,2006年3月出版,第254-255页。
2贺小勇:《国际贸易争端解决与中国对策研究——以WTO为视角》,法律出版社,2006年3月出版,第251页。
3同上,第254页。
1同上,第271页。
2周汉民主编:《中国外贸救济与外贸调查制度》,上海交通大学出版社,2005年4月出版,第200-204页。
1商务部,WTO争端解决专家组听证会首次向公众开放,http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/dwmyxs/200607/20060702585614.html,2008-3-22最后登录。
2 参见TN/DS/W/29(23 January 2003).
3 TN/DS/W/40,TN/DS/W/47.
4 TN/DS/W/40.
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1、周汉民主编:《与WTO规则的融合》,上海人民出版社2003年第1版。
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14、《最高人民法院司法解释小文库》编选组编:《WTO司法解释及相 关法律规范》,人民法院出版社2003年第1版。
1、赵维田:《WTO司法机制的主要特征》,载于《北大国际法与比较法评论》第一卷,北京大学出版社,2002年第一版。
2、赵维田:《WTO与国际法》,载于《法律适用》2000年第8期特稿。
3、吴汉东:《关于知识产权私权属性的再认识——兼评“知识产权公权化”理论》,载于《社会科学》,2005年第10期,第58页。
4、李以渝:《机制论:事物机制的系统科学分析》,载于《系统科学学报》第15卷第4期,2007年10月。
5、余敏友:《关贸总协定争议解决活动的主要成就与问题》,载于《中国国际法年刊》,法律出版社1996年出版。
6、余敏友,陈卫东:《欧共体围绕WTO协定直接效力问题的争论及其对我国的启示(一)》,载于《法学评论》,2001年第3期,第97页。
7、吕成功:《美国对世界的博弈——伯德修正案之争》,载于《WTO经济导刊》,2004年第12期。
8、秦建荣,唐荣安:《DSU报复制度的显著改进及我国的应对策略》,载于《桂林师范高等专科学校学报》,2005年12月第19卷第4期。
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20. Carlos Di Ponio, Competition, Cooperation and Conflict, An Assessment of the Extraterritorial Application and Enforcement of theCompetition Laws in Cnanda and the United States, Michigan State Journal of International Law
21. Gary N. HORLIC, The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, Compliance with WTO Rulings and other Procedural Problems, THE JOURNAL OF WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
22. Andreas Lowenfeld, Remedis along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the New GATT, American Journal of International law, July 1994, N3,Vol88.
23. Alan O. Sykes, "Mandatory" Retaliaiton for Breach of Trade Agreeements: Some Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section 301, 8 B.U.Int'l L.J.302 1990
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27. Naboth van den Broek, Powerparadoxes in Enforcement and Implementation of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: Interdisciplinary Approaches and new Proposals, Journal of World Trade, P127-162,Vol.37, No. 1, February 2003.
28. William J, Davey, The WTO: Looking Forwards, Journal of International Economics Law, 2006 9 (1):3-29.
29. Naboth van den Broek, Legal Persuasion, Political Realism and Legitimacy: the European Counts Recent Threatment of the effect of WTO Agreement in the EC Legal Order, Journal of International Economic Law 2001 4 (2): 411-440, V.4, November 2.
30. M. Rafiqul Islam, Recent EU Trade Sanctions on the US to Induce Compliance with the WTO Rulling in the Foreign Sales Corporations Case: Its Policy Contradiction Revisited, Journal of World Trade 38 (3),4710489,2004.
31. Mitsuo Matsushtita and Aya lino, The Blocking Legislation as a Countermeasure to the US Anti-Dumping Act of 1916: A Comparative Analysis of the EC and Japanese Damage Recovery Legislation, Journal of World Trade (40) (4), 753-776, 2006.
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33. William J, Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, Journal of International Economic Law 8 (1), 17-50, doi:10,1093/jielaw/jgi003.
34. William J. Davey, Mini-Symposium on the Consultative Board's Report on the Future of the WTO, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 8 No. 3,2005
35. Joel P. Trachtman, The Missing Link: Coherence and Poverty at the WTO, Journal of International Economic Law Vol. 8 No. 3,2005
36. Lorand Bartels, The Legality of the EC Mutual Recognition Clause Under WTO Law, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 8 No. 3, 2005.
37. Robert Wolfe, Decision-Making and Transparency in the "Medieval" WTO: Does the Sutherland Report have the Right Prescription? Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 8 No. 3,2005.
38. Peter Van den Bossche and Iveta Alexovicova, Effective Global Economics Governance by the World Trade Organization, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 8 No. 3,2005.
39. Kara Leitner and Simon Lester, WTO Dispute Settlement 1995-2004: A Statistical Analysis, Journal of International Economic Law 8 (1),231-244, doi: 10.1093/jielaw/jgi010.
40. Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive,constitutional, and Political Constraints, The American Journal of International Law, Vol.98: 247,2004.
41. Yuka Fukunaga, Securing Compliance through the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Implementation of DSB Recommendations, Journal of International Economic 9(2), 383-426, doi:1093/jiel/jgi007.2006.
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43. Armin von Bogdandy, Legal Effects of World Trade Organization Decisions Within European Union Law: A Contribution to the Theory of the Legal Acts of International Organization and the Action for Damages Under Article 288 (2) EC, Journal of World Trade 39 (1): 45-66, 2005.
44. Mitsuo Matsushita, Governance of International Trade Under World Trade Organization Agreements-Relationships Between World Trade Organization Agreements and Other Trade Agreements, Journal of World Trade 38(2), 185-210,2004.
45. Americo Bevigilia Zampetti, Democratic Legitimacy in the World Trade Organization: The Justice Dimension, Journal of World Trade 38 (2), 105-126,2003.
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1.www.wto.org
2.http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/
3.http://www.ustr.gov/
4.http://www.commerce.gov/
5.http://www.whitehouse.gov/
6.http://europa.eu/
7.http://www.worldtradelaw.net/
8.http://www.worldtradelaw.net/community/
9.http://www.un.org/
10.http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/index.html
11.http://www.icj-cij.org/
12.http://www.jstor.org/
13.http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx
14.http://www.economist.corn/
15.http://www.cnn.corn/
16.http://www.worldbank.org/
17.http://www.imf.org/extemal/index.htm
2 同上,第15页。
1 李以渝:《机制论:事物机制的系统科学分析》,载于《系统科学学报》第15卷第4期,2007年10月,第24-25页。
1 例如,Abram Chayes和Antonia Handler Chayes高度评价WTO的争端解决机制是所有国际机制中“最发达和最活跃的正式争端解决体系”。Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes,The New Sovereignty:Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements,Harvard,1995,p.218.
2 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules-Toward a More Collective Approach,The American Journal of International Law,Vol.94,No.2.(Apr.,2000),pp.335-347,p.338.
3 Eric Reinhardt,Adjudication without Enforcement in GATT Disputes.Journal of Conflict Resolution.Vol.45No.2,April 2001 174-195.尽管Eric Reinhardt针对的是GATT下的情况,但作者同时认为,在WTO下同样如此。见第174页注解1。
1[希]亚里士多德:《政治学》,吴寿彭译,北京:商务印书馆,1965。
2 苏榕、杨逢春编:《世界著名法典选编·民法卷》,北京:中国民主法制出版社,1998。
3 The Nature of Arguments about the Nature of Law,at http://www.oup.co.uk/pdf/0-19-924825-7.pdf,2008年4月20日星期四最后访问。
1 即现实主义,强制理论(enforcement theory),理性选择理论,自由主义理论,管理理论,名誉理论,跨国法律进程(transnational legal process),正当性理论,建构主义,组织——文化理论,和人格理论。见William Bradford,INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COMPLIANCE:SURVEYING THE FIELD,36 Geo.J.Int'l L.495,p.496.
2 "It is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time".Louis Henkin,How Nations Behave,2nd ed.,Columbia University Press,1979,p.47.
3 Ibid,p.2.
4 Ibid,pp.55-56.
1 Ibid,p.12.
2 Louis Henkin,How Nations Behave,2nd ed.,Columbia University Press,1979,p.48
3 Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes,The New Sovereignty:Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements,Harvard University Press,pp.17-23.
4 Id.p.12.
1 转引自Roger Fisher,注23。
2 Roger Fisher,p.14.
3 John J.Mearsheimer,The Tragedy of Great Power Politics(New York:W.W.Norton & Company,2001),p.18.
4 M.Byers,Custom,Power and the Power of Rules(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1999),p.22;see also H.Morgenthau,Politics Among Nations(2nd edn;New York:Knopf,1954),pp.249-286.
5 H.Morgenthau,Politics Among Nations(2nd edn;New York:Knopf,1954),pp.279-281.
6 Naboth van den Broek,Power paradoxes in enforcement and implementation of World Trade Organization dispute settlement reports:Interdisciplinary approaches and new proposals,Journal of World Trade.New York:Feb 2003.Vol.37,Iss.1,p.131.
1 H.Morgenthau,Politics Among Nations(2nd edn;New York:Knopf,1954),pp.219-221.
2 Ibid,pp.224-225.
3 Ibid,pp.255-256.
4 Ibid,pp.256-266.
5 Ibid,p.267.
6 D.Snidal,The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,International Organization 39,1985,pp.579-614.
1 同上,p.587.
2 S.D.Krasner,State Power and the Structure of International Trade,World Politics 28,April 1976,p.323.
3 John J.Mearsheimer,The Tragedy of Great Power Politics(New York:W.W.Norton & Company,2001),pp.15-17.
4 K.Waltz,Theory of International Politics(New York:McGraw-Hill,1979),pp.88-128.
5 S.krasner,"Structural Causes and Regime Consequences:Regimes as Intervening Variables",in S.Krasner (ed.),International Regimes(Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1983),p.2.
1 Ibid,p.135.
2 如 Louis Henkin,How Nations Behave:Law and Foreign Policy 46-48(1979);Abram H.Chayes & Antonia Chayes,On Compliance,47 Int'l Org.175,176(1993).
3 如George W.Downs et al.,Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?,50 Int'l Org,379(1996);Michael Byers,Custom,Power and The Power of Rules:International Relations and Customary International Law 8(1999)。
1 Andrew T.Guzman,A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law,California Law Review,Vol.90,No.6,2002,p.1827.
2 Ibid,pp.1828-1829.
3 Ibid,p.1830.
1 Ibid,pp.1830-1840。
2 Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes,The New Sovereignty:Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements,Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1995,pp.3-7.
3 Ibid,p.8.
4 Ibid,pp.135-53.
5 Ibid,pp.201-25.
6 Ibid,pp.197-201.
7 Ibid,p.25.
1 Ibid,p.25.另见:Edith Brown Weiss,at the Theme Plenary Session:Implementation,Compliance and Effectiveness,American Society of International Law Proceedings,1997,p.58.
2 Louis Henkin,How Nations Behave,2nd ed.,Columbia University Press,1979,p47.
3 Robert Staiger,International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy,in G.M.Grossman & K.Rogoff,Handbook of International Economics,Amsterdam,Elsevier,Section 3.2.
1 H.Koh,Why do Nations obey International Law?,106 Yale Law Journal,1997,pp.2602-2603.
2 详见:Naboth van den Broek,Power paradoxes in enforcement and implementation of World Trade Organization dispute settlement reports:Interdisciplinary approaches and new proposals,Journal of World Trade.New York:Feb 2003.Vol.37,Iss.1,p.137.
3 M.Byers,Custom,Power and the Power of Rules,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1999,p.179.
4 Andrew Hurrel,"International Society and the Study of Regimes",in Volker Rittberger,ed.,Regime Theory and International Relations,Oxford:Clarendon,1993,p.13.
5 L.Henkin,How Nations Behave,2nd ed;New York:Columbia University Press,1979.
6 G.W.Downs,D.M.Rocke and P.Barsoom,Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?,50 Int'l Organization,1996,p.379.
1 T.Franck,Fairness in International Law and Institutions,Oxford:Clarendon,1995,p.481.
2 A.-M.Slaughter,International Law in a World of Liberal States,E.J.I.L.6,1995,503.
3 A.Wendt,Constructing International Politics,20 International Security,Summer 1995,71,71-72.
4 N.Woods,The Uses of Theory in the Study of International Relations,in N.Woods,ed.,Explaining International Relations Since 1945,New York:Oxford University Press,1996,p.26.
1 见 T.Franck,Fairness in International Law and Institutions,Oxford:Clarendon,1995等。
2 如 Louis Henkin,How Nations Behave:Law and Foreign Policy,1979,pp.46-48和Abram H.Chayes &Antonia Chayes,On Compliance,47 International Organization,1993,pp.175-176。
3 如Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes,The New Sovereignty:Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements,1995,p.3以及 Andrew T.Guzman,A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law,California Law Review,Vol.90,No.6,2002,pp.1823-1887.
4 Andrew T.Guzman,A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law,California Law Review,Vol.90,No.6,2002,pp.1826-1827.
1 参见 G.Clark & U Sohn,World Peace through World Law,2~(nd) ed.,1960.转引自 Roger Fisher,Improving Compliance with International Law,Charlottesville:University Press of Virginia,1981,pp 14-15.
2 Roger Fisher,Improving Compliance with International Law,Charlottesville:University Press of Virginia,1981,pp 14-16.
3 lbid,pp 8-9.
4 Ibid,pp 22-23.
5 Ibid,p.25,p28.
1 Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes,The New Sovereignty:Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements,1995,p.31.
2 Ibid.,p.31.
3 Ibid.,p.32.
4 H.Kelsen,Principles of International Law,pp.18-20(2nd rev.ed.R.Tucker,1966);M.McDougal & F.Feliciano,Law and Minimum World Public Order,p.266.转引自 Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes,The New Sovereignty:Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements,1995,p.31.
5 Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes,The New Sovereignty:Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements,1995,p.30.
1 Roger Fisher,Improving Compliance with International Law,Charlottesville:University Press of Virginia,1981,p.29.
2 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,The American Journal of International Law,Vol.94,2000,p.336.
3 WTO Secretariat,Trading into the Future,p.38.
1 J.G.Starke:《国际法导论》,赵维田译,法律出版社,1984年,第417页。
2 Steve Chamovitz,Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions,American Journal of International Law,No.95,p.793(2001).
3 参见《联合国宪章》第2条第3款和第4款的规定。
4 J.G.Starke:《国际法导论》,赵维田译,法律出版社,1984年,第417页。
5 沃尔夫刚.格拉夫.魏智通:《国际法》,2001年第2版,吴越,毛晓飞译,法律出版社,2002年,第777页。
1 劳特派特修订:《奥本海国际法》第8版,下卷第一分册,王铁崖,陈体强译,商务印书馆,第96页。
2 左海聪:《关贸总协定争端解决条款的起源拟定和内容评析》,载于《法学评论》,1995年第3期,第22页。
1 Francis Maupain,The Settlement of Disputes within the International Labour Office,Journal of International Economic Law,Vol.2,1999,pp.273-283.
1 联合国和平与安全简介http://www.un.org/chinese/peace/issue/enforcement.htm。最近一次登录时间为2008年3月9日星期日。
2 马克斯.普朗克比较公法及国际法研究所主编:《国际公法百科全书》第一专辑“争端的解决”,陈致中,李斐南译,广州:中山大学出版社,1988年,第1-9页。
1 See UN Doc EPCT/A/PV/6(1947),p.4,转引自赵维田:《世界贸易组织(WTO)的法律制度》,吉林人民出版社,2000年1月,第447页。
2 时为工作组,即现在的专家组。
3 转引自Robert E.Hudec,The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy,1975,p.180.
1 约翰.H.杰克逊:《重建关贸总协定的体制》,1990,第60页。
2 但实际上,在起草GATT的哈瓦纳会议上,加拿大等提出报告,要求将“中止减让”作为一项惩罚性制裁措施,但是遭到了一些国家如阿拉伯联盟的强烈反对。
3 卡斯尔:《乌拉圭回合与总协定争端解决规则与程序的改进》,第848—849页,转引自余敏友:《关贸总协定争议解决活动的主要成就与问题》,载于《中国国际法年刊》,1996,法律出版社,第269。
4 Ibid,p.341.
5 United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,WT/DS2/AB/R,pp.16-17.
6 赵维田:《WTO司法机制的主要特征》,载于《北大国际法与比较法评论》第一卷,北京大学出版社,2002年第一版,第123-128页。
1 ILC Draft,supra note 20,Arts.41-46.
2 Christine Gray,Judicial Remedies in International Law,p.12(1987).
3 草案第49条第1款和第2款。
4 DSU第22条第1款
5 WT/DS46/ARB.para.3.42.
1 当然,二者的“补偿”含义是不相同的。
2 Oscar Schachter,Dispute Settlement and Countermeasures in the International Law Commission,The Journal of International Law,Vol.88 p.474.
3 Article 51:Countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered,taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question.
4 Petros C.Mavroidis,Remedies in the WTO Legal Sysem:Between a Rock and a Hard Place,European Journal of International Law,Vol.11,2000,p.11.
5 DSU Article 22.6.
1 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,Para.1,Article 8.
2 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,94 AM.J.INT'L L.335,340(2000)
3 如专家组在美国——版权法第110(5)条案的裁定。
4 如澳大利亚——汽车皮革案的裁定。
5 关于美国当时的政策和提案,可参见Clair Wilcox,A Charter for World Trade,New York:The MacMillan Company,1949,pp.14-24.
1 Jared R.Silverman,Multilateral Resolution Over Unilateral Retaliation:Adjudicating the Use of Section 301Before the WTO,U.Pa.J.Int'l Econ.,L,Vol.17,1996,p.240.
1 NAFTA Article 2004 at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?DetailID=175,2008年3月8日星期六最后登录。
1 Ibid,Article 2019.
2 R.Hudec,Enforcing International Trade Law,Salem,NH:Butterworth,1991,p.305.
3 这9个案件为WT/DS50、WT/DS56、WT/DS54,55,59,64、T/DS79/1、WT/DS75,84、WT/DS126/1、WT/DS90/1、110/1、WT/DS189。
1 Louis Henkin,How Nations Behave,2nd ed.,Columbia University Press,1979,p.48.
2 R.Hudec,Enforcing International Trade Law,Salem,NH:Butterworth,1991,pp.192-196.
3 R.Hudec,Enforcing International Trade Law,Salem,NH:Butterworth,1991,p.198.
1 State of Play:US-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,WT/DS2 and WT/DS4.
2 在United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia,15 June 2001,WT/DS58/RW中,第21.5条仲裁程序认可了美国的执行措施。
3 US-Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors(DRAMS) of One Megabit and Above from Korea,WT/DS99.
4 如A.Chayes and A.Chayes,The New Sovereignty:Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements,Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1995,p.25和H.Koh,Why do Nations obey International Law?,106 Yale L.J.,1997,pp.2599-2658.
5 Trade Bill Includes Temporary Fix for EU-US Copyright Dispute,Inside US Trade,2 August 2002,p.17.
1 Naboth van den Brock,Power paradoxes in enforcement and implementation of World Trade Organization dispute settlement reports:Interdisciplinary approaches and new proposals,Journal of World Trade.New York:Feb 2003.Vol.37,Iss.1,p.147.
2 关于香蕉案Ⅰ、Ⅱ和Ⅲ的详细说明,可参见张玉卿主编:《WTO法律大辞典》,北京:法律出版社,2006年11月第一版,第697-698页。
1 US White House release,To Provide for the Termination of Action Taken with Regard to Imports of Certain Steel Products by the President of the United States of America a Proclamation,http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031204-7.html。最后访问日期为2008-3-14。
1 Chuck Lambert,Jan.-November 2001 Beef Exports Decrease.8%in Volume and 6%in Value,Jan./Feb.2002,http://www.beef.org/newsjanuaryfebruary20022764.aspx转引自 Darrell Chichester,Battle of the Beef,the Rematch,21 Am.U.Int'l L.Rev.221,note 3.
2 WT/L/616,I August 2005,para.94以及 WT/L/625,27 October 2005,para.127.
3 WT/DS364/1 G/L/822,27 June 2007.
4 WT/DS361/1 G/L/818,26 March 2007.
5 C.B.Gleason and R.D.Walther,The WTO Dispute Settlement Implementation Procedures:A System in Need of Reform,31 Law & Policy in International Business 3,2000,p.712,p.729.
1 O.Schachter,International Law in Theory and Practice,1985,rev.ed.1991,pp.536,537.
2 Naboth van den Broek,Power paradoxes in enforcement and implementation of World Trade Organization dispute settlement reports:Interdisciplinary approaches and new proposals,Journal of World Trade.New York:Feb 2003.Vol.37,Iss.1,p.152.
3 Lott tries to force USTR hand on Settling Bananas,Beef Disputes,Inside US Trade,20 October 2000.
1 R.H,Bates and W.T.Bianco,Co-operation by Design:Leadership,Structure and Collective Dilemmas,84 Am.Pol.Science Rev.1,March 1990,133-147.
2 M.Byers,Custom,Power and the Power of Rules,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1999,p.216.
3 Robert E.Hudec,Enforcing International Trade Law,Salem,NH:Butterworth,1991,p.303;table 11.21,p.311;p.317.
1 Robert E.Hudec,Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement,in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES,p.388(Friedl Weiss ed.,2000).
2 Robert E.Hudec,Enforcing International Trade Law,Salem,NH:Butterworth,1991,pp.199-200.
3 Robert E.Hudec,Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement,in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES,p.388(Friedl Weiss ed.,2000).
4 如Robert E.Hudcc,Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement,in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES,pp.389-390(Friedl Weiss ed.,2000);John O.McGinnis & Mark L.Movsesian,The World Trade Constitution,114 HARV.L.REV.511,521-25(2000)等。
1 例如:David Palmeter & Petros C.Mavroidis,Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization:Practice and Procedure(1999),pp.473-74;Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,94 AM.J.INT'L L.335,338(2000);Michael K.Young,Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round:Lawyers Triumph Over Diplomats,29 INT'L LAW.389,408(1995)等;另见:Arvind Subramanian & Jayashree Watal,Can TRIPS Serve as an Enforcement Device for Developing Countries in the WTO?,3 J.INT'L ECON.L.403,403-04(2000)(讨论发展中国家的申诉),John H.Jackson,Emerging Problems of the WTO Constitution:Dispute Settlement and Decision Making in the Jurisprudence of the WTO,in LIBERALISATION AND PROTECTIONISM IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 25,31(Philip Ruttley et al.eds.,1999)(认为弱势成员缺乏诉讼应对经验,与美国和欧共体等强势成员相比处于实质性不利地位)等。
2 WTO报复制度要求报复的水平与遭受的抵消或减损相当,又由于不能追溯计算报复的水平,这可能导致报复救济的威慑力不足,并客观上有利于维护违规成员的利益,包括在裁决作出前一直在获得的违规利益。参见:Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,94 AM.J.INT'L L.335,344(2000).
3 例如Monika B(u|¨)tler & Heinz Hauser,The WTO Dispute Settlement System:A First Assessment from an Economic Perspective,16 J.L.ECON.& ORG.503,528(2000);Carolyn B.Gleason & Pamela D.Walther,The WTO Dispute Settlement Implementation Procedures:A System in Need of Reform,31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS.709,712-13,729(2000);Philippe Ruttley,WTO Dispute Settlement and Private Sector Interests:A Slow,But Gradual Improvement?,in DUE PROCESS IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 167,173,180-81(Philippe Ruttley et al.eds.,2001)
4 EC-Bananas,arbitration report,supra note 46,para.2.13.
1 WT/L/625,27 October 2005,para.127.
2 WT/DS364/1 G/L/822,27 June 2007.
3 WT/DS361/1 G/L/818,26 March 2007.
4 有较多的文章涉及第21条和第22条的顺序之争,有代表性的有:Cherise M.Valles and Brendan McGivern,"The Right to Retaliate under the WTO Agreement:The "Sequencing Problem",34 Journal of World Trade 2,pp.63-84(2000) 以及S.A.Rhodes,"The Article 21.5/22 Problem:Clarification through Bilateral Agreements?," 3 JIEL 3,pp.553-558(2000).
1 Decision by the Arbitrators,WT/DS26/ARB.
2 Decision by the Arbitrators,WT/DS48/ARB.
3 EU complies with WTO ruling on Hormone beef and calls on USA and Canada to lift trade sanctions-Brussels,15 October 2003,at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/april/tradoc_113909.pdf(2008年3月1日星期六最后访问).
4 Communication from the Chairman of the Panel,UNITED STATES-CONTINUED SUSPENSION OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE EC-HORMONES DISPUTE,WT/DS320/11,26 June 2007,at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/september/tradoc_135751.pdf.
1 Jas Kaminski,Irish Exporters Manage So Far to Avoid Impact of US Trade Tariffs,IRISH TIMES,July 31,1999,at Bus.& Fin.p.17.
2 WTO Appellate Body Report on EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products(Hormones),WT/DS26/AB/R para.245(Jan.16,1998)
3 WT/DS/18/12,July 15,1999.
4 WT/DS108/13,Nov.,17,2000.
1 WT/DS108/ARB,30 August 2002.
2 COUNCIL REGULATION(EC) No 728/2006 of 15 May 2006,suspending and conditionally repealing Regulation(EC) No 2193/2003 establishing additional customs duties on imports of certain products originating in the United States of America at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_131589.pdf(最后一次访问时间为2008年3月1日星期六)
1 WT/DS222/ARB,para.3.107.
2 Ibid,para.3.121.
3 WT/DS27/ARB,para.6.3.
4 WT/DS/103/17,Feb.19,2001.
5 WT/DS/113/17,Feb.19,2001.
6 WT/DS/103/RW,WT/DS/113/RW,July 11,2001.
7 WT/DS/103/AB/RW,WT/DS/113/AB/RW,Dec.,3,2001.
8 见WTO网站的案件介绍:http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds103_e.htm。(最后一次访问时间为2008年3月1日星期六)
1 美国《1916年反倾销法》的前身是美国《1916年税收法》第800—801节。《1916年反倾销法》规定,对以“实质性低于”某外国生产的产品在国外相关市场上的价格“一般的和系统性的”进口至美国或在美国销售的进口商,可以其他民事和刑事程序,条件是此类行为的目的是“破坏或损害美国的产业,或阻止某产业在美国的确立,或约束或垄断该产品在美国的贸易和商业的任何部分”。见The Revenue Act of 1916,ch.463,Sections 800-801,39 Stat.798,codified as 15 U.S.C.§.72。该法是美国为解决所谓的“倾销”问题而制定的,是美国在“一战”后对欧洲,特别是德国,公司通过掠夺性销售获取美国市场,进而威胁美国产业刚建立的领先地位的做法的应对之法。
2 Unfair Competition Act(Anti-dumping Act of 1916),15 U.S.C.Section 71-76.
3 WT/DS136/AB/R,WT/DS162/AB/R,Aug.28,2000.
4 WT/DS136/15,WT/DS162/18,Jan.7,2002.
5 日本的报复请求表明:“用金钱价值来计算抵消和减损的水平是不现实的”。见WT/DS162/18,2002年1月7日。
1 WT/DS136/ARB,para.6.14.
2 WT/DS136/ARB,p.36.
3 US-Anti-dumping:Pascal Lamy welcomes US Congress' vote to repeal the US 1916 Anti-Dumping Act,IP/04/1387,Brussels,20 November 2004,p.2.
1 WT/DS136/ARB,paras.5.69-72.
2 Copyright Act,17 U.S.C.,Section 101 et seq,2001.
3 WT/DS160/R,June 15,2000.
4 WT/DS160/ARB25/1,Nov.,9,2001.
5 Press release,European Communities,EU and U.S.Agree on Temporary Compensation in Copyright Dispute,Dec.19,2001.Also,WT/DS160/23,p.2.
6 WT/DS160/19,Jan.7,2002.
7 WT/DS160/24/Add.38,8 February 2008.
1 例如,吕成功:《美国对世界的博弈——伯德修正案之争》,载于《WTO经济导刊》,2004年第12期,等。
1 Robert Z.Lawrence,Crimes and Punishments? An Analysis of Retaliation under the WTO,at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/～RLawrence/Crimes%20and%20Punishments%20Final%20June%2025.pdf第2—3页。2008年3月10日星期一最后访问。
2 Hufubauer,Gary C.and Fred Newman,2002,Trade and Investment:An Amercian Perspoctive,Cambrdge:Harvard University,转引自Robert Z.Lawrence,Crimes and Punishments? An Analysis of Retaliation under the WTO,at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/～RLawrence/Crimes%20and%20Punishments%20Final%20June%2025.pdf第3页。2008年3月10日星期一最后访问。
3 Robert Z.Lawrence,Crimes and Punishments? An Analysis of Retaliation under the WTO,p.4.
1 WT/DS267/RW,18 December 2007,conclusion.
2 WT/DS285/ARB,21 December 2007.
1 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System:International Law,International Organizations and Dispute Settlement 82,Kluwer Law International 1997.
2 Ibid.
1 在GATT时代,缔约方全体仅批准过一次报复请求,但作为胜诉方的荷兰,却因为种种顾忌,最终没有真正实施报复。见Netherlands—Measures of suspension of Obligations to the United States,Nov.8,1952,GATT B.I.S.D.(1~(st) Supp.),p.32.
2 John H.Jackson et al.,Legal Problems of International Economic Relations,pp.7-14(4th ed.2002).
3 这类分析和观察比较多,有代表性的有:Judith Goldstein,International Institutions and Domestic Politics:GATT,WTO,and the Liberalization of International Trade,in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 133,144-45(Anne O.Krueger ed.,1998);Robert E.Hudec,Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement,in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES 369,389(Friedl Weiss ed.,2000)。
1 Robert E.Hudec,Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement,in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES,p.388(Friedl Weiss ed.,2000).
2 Ibid.
3 Trade and Development Act of 2000,Pub.L.No.106-200,§407,114 Stat.293;另见:Raj Bhala,The Bananas War,31 MCGEORGE L.REV.839,950-51(2000):Helene Cooper,Food Fight With Europe May Worsen,WALL ST.J.,Sept.6,2000,at A2;Robert O'Neill,Making a List,Checking It Twice,32 NAT'L J.2505(2000)。
4 Peter Sutherland,et al.,Future of the WTO,p.50.
5 Ibid.,p.49.
1 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,The American Journal of International Law,Vol.94,2000,p.343.
2 王传丽:《析世界贸易组织争端解决机制——兼评贸易报复》,载于《政法论坛》,1996年第4期,第80页。
3 当然,也有少部分学者是认可当前的报复措施的,因为,虽然国际贸易中的地位差异导致报复的实施效果大相径庭,但是这种由于实力或者地位的差异形成的事实的不平等充斥国际关系,乃至社会社会的各个方面。我们不能以利用报复机制的机会或效果的不平等而否认报复作为争端解决程序存在的合法性。见马呈元,试论世界贸易组织的争端解决制度,载于马呈元等主编:《国际法律问题研究》,中国政法大学出版社,1999年,第25页。
4 Allan Rosas,Implementation and Enforcement of WTO Dispute Settlement Finding:An EU Perspective,Journal of International Economic Law,Vol.4,2001,p.143.
5 Eric Reinhardt,Adjudication without Enforcement in GATT Disputes,Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.45No.2,April 2001 174-195,p.174 note 1.
1 European Communities—Regime for the Importation,Sale and Distribution of Bananas—Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU:Decision by the Arbitrators, WT/DS27/ARB(April 9,1999),at para.6.3.
1 WT/DS27/ARB(April 9,1999),para.6.3.
2 WT/DS136/ARB,paras 5.5,5.7.
3 见加拿大Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU:Decision of the Arbitrators,WT/DS48/ARB(July 12,1999)第40页第39段,和美国Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU:Decision of the Arbitrators,WT/DS26/ARB(July 12,1999)第10页第40段。
4 Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft:Recourse to Arbitration by Brazil under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement:Decision by the Arbitrators,WT/DS46/ARB(Aug.28,2000),para.3.44,pp.14-15.
5 另外:Naboth van den Broek,Power paradoxes in enforcement and implementation of World Trade Organization dispute settlement reports:Interdisciplinary approaches and new proposals,Journal of World Trade.New York:Feb 2003.Vol.37,Iss.1,p.139,以及J.H.Jackson,The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstanding on the Nature of Legal Obligation,91 A.J.I.L.,1997,p.60;N.van den Broek,Legal Persuasion,Political Realism and Legitimacy:The European Court's Recent Treatment of the Effect of WTO Agreements in the EC Legal Order,4 J.I.E.L.2,2001,pp.411-440;A.O.Sykes,The Remedy for Breach of Obligations under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:Damages or Specific Performance?,in M.C.E.J.Bronckers and R.Quick,eds,New Directions in International Economic Law:Essays in Honour of John H.Jackson,The Hague:Kluwer,2000,pp.347-357.
1 目前国内普遍将“induce compliance”翻译成“促进执行”,但很明显,无论是文本(text)还是从WTO 规则的目的和实践来看,现有的WTO争端解决机制并不是正面促进执行,而只是对裁决执行的引导。
2 初步证据案件,表面证据案件,或称表面证据确凿案件,(prima facie case)是指申诉方提供的证据可以证明其提出的事实存在,其提出的诉请合理的案件。除非应诉方能够提出充分的反驳证据,否则审理纠纷的机构就会作出对胜诉方有利的裁决。见张玉卿主编:《WTO法律大词典》,法律出版社,2006年11月,第76页条目。另据《牛津法律指南》(1980年版)解释,“表面证据确凿案件”系一个足以要求作出答复的案件。
3 William J.Davey,Dispute Settlement in GATT,11 Fordham Int'l L.J.,p.51(1987).或可见:John H.Jackson,et al.,Legal Problems of International Economic Relations:Cases,Materials and Text on the National and International Regulation of Transnationai Economic Relations,p.371.
4 R.Hudec,Enforcing International Trade Law,Salem,NH:Butterworth,1991,pp.192-196.
5 R.Hudec,Enforcing International Trade Law,Salem,NH:Butterworth,1991,p.198.
6 但有一些学者,如Joost Pauwelyn,还是坚定的认为WTO体制规定的还是私法领域内纯粹的合同关系,而不是植根于公法的体制,因为这里不考虑公共利益(public goods)。详见Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,American Journal of International Law 2(April):335-47,p.340.
1 根据Robert Z.Lawrence的计算,关税的社会成本的增长水平为关税率增长的平方。即2%的税率造成的损害是1%的税率的4倍;3%的则是1%的9倍。参见:Robert Z.Lawrence,Crimes and Punishments?An Analysis of Retaliation under the WTO,at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/～RLawrence/Crimes%20and%20Punishments%20Final%20June%2025.pdf第3页。2008年3月10日星期一最后访问。
1 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,American Journal of International Law 2(April):335-47,p.336.
2 EC-Bananas arbitration report WT/DS27/ARB,,para.6.3,EC-Hormones arbitration report WT/DS26/ARB,para.39以及WT/DS48/ARB,para.40.
3 Article 41,ILC draft of Law of State Responsibility.
4 见前文对“possibility”的注解。
1 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,American Journal of International Law 2(April):335-47,p.341.
2 参见Niall P.Meagher,Representing Developing Countries in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings in Mavroidis & Berman(eds)(Cambridge University Press),以及Rene Guilherme S.Medrado,Renegotiating Remedies in the WTO:A Multilateral Approach,22 Wisconsin International Law Journal 323(2004)等。
3 Naboth van den Broek,Power paradoxes in enforcement and implementation of World Trade Organization dispute settlement reports:Interdisciplinary approaches and new proposals,Journal of World Trade,New York:Feb 2003.Vol.37,No.1;pp.127-162.
4 Ibid,p.134.
1 Fatoumata Jawara & Aileen Kwa,Behind the Scenes at the WTO:the real world of international trade negotiations,London:Zed Books,p.6.
2 South Center,Issues Regarding the Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism,T.R.A.D.E.working paper NO.1,1999,Executive Summary.
3 Fatoumata Jawara & Aileen Kwa,Behind the Scenes at the WTO:the real world of international trade negotiations,London:Zed Books,p.7.
1 "Transcending the Ostensible":Some Reflections on the Nature of Litigation Between Governments,72Minnesota Law Review 211(1987) reprinted in Robert E.Hudec,Essays on the Nature of International Trade Law 117,118(Cameron May 1999).218.
2 Robert E.Hudec,Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement,in Friedl Weiss(ed)Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures:Issues & Lessons from the Practice of Other International Courts and Tribunals 370(Cameron May,2000).
3 "The United States maintains that it has the right not to comply with WTO rulings," UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,Report to the Chairman,Committee on Ways and Means,House of Representatives,WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:ISSUES IN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT at 16(August 2000).The European Court of Justice has taken a similar view:Portuguese Republic v.Council of the European Union,C-149/96,23 November 1999.
4 WTO文本中并没有出现“报复(retaliation)”一词,但“报复”一词在指代WTO下的“中止减让和其他义务”概念时广为流传,并得到了学界的认可。应注意的是:WTO下的“报复”并不如其本意那样含有惩罚性的成分,也不是带有惩罚规定和措施的“制裁(sanction)”。关于概念的区分,可以参见Robert Z.Lawrence,Crimes and Punishments? An Analysis of Retaliation under the WTO,at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/～RLawrence/Crimes%20and%20Punishments%20Final%20June%2025. pdf第二页注释2。2008年3月10日星期一最后访问。
1 David Palmeter,The WTO Dispute Settlement System in the Next Ten Years,April 7,2006,pp.7-8(working paper),available at http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/wto/pdfs/PalmeterWorkingPaper.pdf.最后访问时间为2008年3月18日。
2 Reflections on the Nature of Litigation Between Governments,72 Minnesota Law Review 211(1987)reprinted in Robert E.Hudec,ESSAYS ON THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 117,118(Cameron May 1999).218.
3 Ibid,p.8.
4 Robert E.Hudec,Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement,in Friedl Weiss(ed)IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES:ISSUES & LESSONS FROM THE PRACTICE OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 370(Cameron May,2000).
5 美国认为它有权力不执行DSB裁决:UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,Report to the Chairman,Committee on Ways and Means,House of Representatives,WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:ISSUES IN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT at 16(August 2000).欧共体也持有类似的观点,见:Portuguese Republic v.Council of the European Union,C-149/96,23 November 1999.
6 关于金钱赔偿,可参见Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek,Financial Compensation in the WTO:Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement,8 Journal of International Economic Law(101)(2005);World Trade Organization,THE FUTURE OF THE WTO:ADDRESSING INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM,Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi,para.243(WTO 2004)等。
1 如Marc L.Busch & Eric Reinhardt,Testing International Trade Law:Empirical Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement,in Kennedy & Southwick(eds.) THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E.HUDEC 457,478(Cambridge 2002)以及Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,94 AM.J.INT'L L.335,338(2000)等。
2 David Palmeter,The WTO Dispute Settlement System in the Next Ten Years,April 7,2006,pp.8-9(working paper),available at http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/wto/pdfs/PalmeterWorkingPaper.pdf.最后访问时间为2008年3月18日。
3 William J.Davey,The WTO Dispute Settlement System:The First Ten Years,8 J.Int'l Econ.L.17,p.29.
1 A.Subramanian and J.Watal,Can TRIPs serve as an enforcement mechanism for Developing Countries in the WTO?,3 J.I.E.L.(2000),403-416.
2 B Hoekman and P C Mavroidis,Enforcing Multilateral Commitments:Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries,The WTO/World Bank Conference on Developing Countries in a New Millennium(WTO Secretariat,1999),p.10.
3 Marco C.E.J.Bronckers,More Power to the WTO,4 J.I.E.L.1(2001),61-63;以及Fritz Breuss,WTO Dispute Settlement from an Economic Perspective-More Failure than Success? REI Working Paper(October 2001).
4 Petros C.Mavroidis,Remedies in the WTO Legal System:Between a Rock and a Hard Place,11 E.J.I.L.4(2000),763-814.
5 Fritz Breuss,WTO Dispute Settlement from an Economic Perspective-More Failure than Success? REI Working Paper(October 2001),pp 45-48.
6 Naboth van den Broek,Power paradoxes in enforcement and implementation of World Trade Organization dispute settlement reports:Interdisciplinary approaches and new proposals,Journal of World Trade,New York:Feb 2003.Vol.37,No.1;pp.127-162.
7 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,94 AM.J.INT'L L.335,338(2000)
1 Giovanni Maggi,The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation,in Petros C.Mawoidis,Alan O.Sykes eds.,:The WTO and International Trade Law/Dispute Settlement,2005,p.356
2 Maggi,p.358
3 Maggi,p.359
4 Maggi,p.366
1 Maggi,P.367
2 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,The American Journal of International Law,Vol.94,2000,p.342.
1 WT/DS27/R/USA,para.7.47.
2 Ibid,para.7.49.
3 Ibid,para.7.50.
4 WT/DS27/AB/R,para.136,Sept.9,1997.
5 WT/DS27/ARB,para.8.1.
6 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,The American Journal of International Law,Vol.94,2000,p.335.
1 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,The American Journal of International Law,Vol.94,2000,p.344.
2 《UN宪章》的第七章正是这样设计的。
3 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,The American Journal of International Law,Vol.94,2000,pp.345-346..
1 铃木草案(WTO争端解决机制和下一轮谈判的主要问题及我们的对策)网址:http://www.com-law.net/wenku/dsm.htm最后访问日期为2008年3月20日。
1 如T.Cottier,Intellecutal Property in International Trade Law and Policy:The GATT Connection 79-105,1992,Aussenwirtschaft,pp.103-105,T.Cottier,"The Prospects for Intellecutal Property in GATT",28Common Market Law Rewiew(1991),pp.383-392,B.Hoekman and M.Kostecki,The Political Economy of the World Trading System,Oxford University Press,1995,p.157和Arvind Subramanian and Jayashree Watal,Can TRIPS Serve as an Enforcement Device for Developing Countries in the WTO? Journal of International Economic Law(2000) 403-416.
2 Arvind Subramanian and Jayashree Watal,Can TRIPS Serve as an Enforcement Device for Developing Countries in the WTO? Journal of International Economic Law(2000),p.405.
1 吴汉东:《关于知识产权私权属性的再认识——兼评“知识产权公权化”理论》,载于《社会科学》,2005年第10期,第58页。
2 这方面的评论较多,如孔祥俊:《WTO知识产权协定及其国内适用》,法律出版社2002年版,第72页。
3 伯纳德.霍克曼和迈克尔.考斯泰基:《世界贸易体制的政治经济学》(中译本),法律出版社,第144-145页。
4 J.Watal,Pharmaceutical Patents,Prices and Welfare Losses:Policy Options for India under the WTO TRIPS Agreement,The World Economy 23(5) May 733-752(2000). 权、强制权等)和公民公权(生存权、自由权、参政权、请求权等)。公权与私权的划分标准,尽管众说纷纭,但有两点必须把握:一是权利的内容,即公权一般是政治性的,私权一般是民事性的;二是权利的产生,即公权源于公法关系,私权源于私法关系。参见吴汉东,关于知识产权私权属性的再认识——兼评“知识产权公权化”理论,社会科学,2005年第10期,第62页。
1 孔祥俊:(WTO知识产权协定及其国内适用》,法律出版社2002年版,第72页。
2 吴汉东:《关于知识产权私权属性的再认识——兼评“知识产权公权化”理论》,载于《社会科学》,2005年第10期,第58页。
3 胡锦光、韩大元:《当代人权保障制度》,中国政法大学出版社,1993年,第1-2页。
4 何盛明主编:《财经大辞典》,中国财政经济出版社1990年版,第255页。
5 L.Ray Patterson Stanley & W.Lindberg,The Nature of Copyright:A Law of Users' Right,The University of Georgia Press,1991,p.45.
1 WT/DS27/ARB/ECU,paras.148-150.
2 Lenore Sek,Trade Retaliation:The "Carousel" Approach,CRS Report for Congress,order code RS20715,at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/23368.pdf.最后访问时间为2008-3-8.
1 Steve Charnovitz,Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions,The American Journal of International Law,Vol.95,2001,p.823.
2 Rosemary A.Ford,The Beef Hormone Dispute and Carousel Sanctions:A Roundabout Way of Forcing Compliance with World Trade Organization Decisions,27 BROOKLYN J.INTERNATIONAL L.543-573(2002),p.543.
1 Congressional Record,Sept.22,1999,p.S11260.
2 Daniel Pruzin,EU Warns US Against Africa-CBI Provision Adopting "Carousel" Approach to Retaliation,Daily Report for Executives,May 4,2000.
3 P.L.106-200,Trade and Development Act of 2000.
1 Section 407,P.L.106-200,Trade and Development Act of 2000.
2 USTR,USTR Announces Procedures for Modifying Measures in EC Beef and Banana Cases,Press Release 00-41,May 26,2000.
1 U.S Faces EU on "Carousel" and Bananas,Trade Reports International Group,Washington Trade Daily,July 28,2000.
2 "Carousel" List Still Held Up,Trade Reports International Group,Washington Trade Daily,August 2,2000.
3 2001年7月,WTO裁定美国修改后的政策仍然与WTO规定不符。随后美国提出上诉,但2002年1月14日,WTO基本维持了原判。
4 Gary G.Yerkey,U.S.Will Use "Carousel" Law as "Leverage" to Open Foreign Markets,International Trader Reporter,May 31,2001.
1 参见ILC的草案第42-46条。
2 Allan H.Meltzer,Report of the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission,http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/meltzer.pdf,March 2000,p.107.
3 Ibid.,p.108.
4 Ibid.
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 比较典型的论述见John H.Jackson,The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:Misunderstandings 0n the Nature of Legal Obligation,91 AJIL 60(1997)第62-63页;John H.Jackson,International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports:Obligations to Comply or Option to "Buy Out"?,98 AJIL 109(2004)第115-117页;Robert E.Hudec,Broadening the Scope of Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement,in Friedl Weisss(ed.),Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures:Issues & Lessons from the Practice of Other International Courts and Tribunals 369,London:Cameron May 2000,第377页等。
1 比较典型的论述见Judith Hippler Bello,The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:Less is More,90 AJIL 416:Timothy M.Reif and Mariorie Florestal,Revenge ofthe Push-Me,Pull-You:The Implementation Process of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding.32 International Law 755(1998)第763页。
2 不可否认的是,“有效违约”与“合同必须执行”的原则向背,有违“公平”、“正义”之价值。
3 如三人的合作文章Henrik Hom,Giovanni Maggi and Robert W.Staiger,The GATT/WTO as an Incomplete Contract,May 2006,at http://www.fundacionareces.es/PDF/glob_maggi.pdf.最后访问时间为2007年3月19日星期一。
4 经济学理论认为,所谓“完伞合约”是指缔约双方能够完全遇见合约期内可能发生的所有情况,并自觉执行双方签订的合约条款;当缔约双方对合约条款产生争议时,第三方能够强制执行。不完全合约则指由于个人的有限理性、外在环境的复杂性和不确定性等不完美因素的存在,合约方法不可能详尽准确的将与交易有关的所有未来可能发生的情况及相应情况下的职责和权利写明的合约。签订完全合同只是一种理想的状况。真实世界的合约在绝对意义上都是不完全合约。正由于当事人的有限理性和环境的不确定性,所以事前不可能签订面面俱到的合约,才使得事后的治理结构和制度安排变得非常重要。参见科斯:《论生产的制度结构》,上海:上海三联书店,1994年6月;奥利弗.E.威廉姆森:《资本主义经济制度:论企业签约与市场签约》,北京:商务印书馆,2002年,第16-50页。
5 比较典型的论述见Alan O.Sykes,The Remedy for Breach of Obligations Under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:Damages or Specific Performance?,in New Directions in International Economic Law:Essays in Honour of John H.Jackson,p.347,349-351;Jeffrey L.Dunoff and Joel P.Trachtman,Economic Analysis of International Law,24 Yale Journal of International Law 1(1999),pp.31-33.
6 对此,John H.Jackson从DSU的文本解释、谈判历史和政策制定等角度,反驳了将“有效违约”理论引入以解释WTO违规做法的观点。John H.Jackson,The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation,91 AJIL 60(1997)第62-63页。
1 US White House release,To Provide for the Termination of Action Taken with Regard to Imports of Certain Steel Products by the President of the United States of America a Proclamation,http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031204-7.html.最后访问日期为 2008-3-14。
2 Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek,Financial Compensation in the WTO:Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement,8 Journal of International Economic Law(101)(2005);World Trade Organization,THE FUTURE OF THE WTO:ADDRESSING INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM,Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi,para.243.
3 Susan Esserman and Robert Howse,The WTO on Trial,in Petros C.Mavroidis,Alan O.Sykes eds.,:The WTO and International Trade Law/Dispute Settlement,p.296
1 Naboth van den Broek,Power paradoxes in enforcement and implementation of World Trade Organization dispute settlement reports:Interdisciplinary approaches and new proposals,Journal of World Trade.New York:Feb 2003.Vol.37,Iss.1,p.139.
2 这方面的论述甚多,如 J.H.Jackson,The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstanding on the Nature of Legal Obligation,91 A.J.I.L.,1997,p.60;N.van den Broek,Legal Persuasion,Political Realism and Legitimacy:The European Court's Recent Treatment of the Effect of WTO Agreements in the EC Legal Order,4J.I.E.L.2,2001,pp.411-440;A.O.Sykes,The Remedy for Breach of Obligations under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:Damages or Specific Performance?,in M.C.E.J.Bronckers and R.Quick,eds,New Directions in International Economic Law:Essays in Honour of John H.Jackson,The Hague:Kluwer,2000,pp.347-357.
1 William J.Davey,WTO Dispute Settlement:Segregating the Useful Political Aspects and Avoiding "Over-Legalization",in M.Bronckers & R.Quick(eds.) New Directions in International Economic Law,p.299.
2 Ibid,p.299.
3 Ibid,p.292.
4 如 Steve Chamovitz,Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions,95 AM.J.INT'L L.792,792,832(2001);Edward Alden,Bad Losers Cast Gloom Over WTO's Disputes Procedure,FIN.IMES,Dec.6,2000,p.8(批评者的一个重要观点是执行机制常常逼迫政府作出不必要的对立)。
5 如 Reinhard Quick,TABD Still Supports Trade Dispute Settlement,FIN.TIMES,Dec.11,000,p.14; TRANSATLANTIC BUSINESS DIALOGUE,CINCINNATI RECOMMENDATIONS 37-38(2000);Steve Charnovitz,Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions,95 AM.J.INT'L L.792,792,832(2001),p.810-11.
1 如Meltzer委员会报告第114页。
2 Steve Charnovitz,Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions,95 AM.J.INT'L L.792,p.792&832(2001).
3 转引自劳特派特修订:《奥本海国际法》,上卷第一分册,中译本,商务印书馆,1981年,第4页。
4 参见J.G.Starke:《国际法导论》,中译本,法律出版社,1984年,第19页。另参见《国际法讲义》,1832年,1954年版,第6页,转引自王铁崖主编:《国际法》,法律出版社,1995年,第6页。
5 劳特派特修订:《奥本海国际法》,上卷第一分册,中译本,商务印书馆,1981年,第5页。
6 王铁崖主编:《国际法》,法律出版社,1995年,第6-7页。
1 王铁崖主编:《国际法》,法律出版社,1995年,第7页。
2 如 Louis Hcnkin,How Nations Behave:Law and Foreign Policy 46-48(1979);Abram H.Chayes & Antonia Chayes,On Compliance,47 Int'1 Org.175,176(1993).
3 如Joost Pauwelyn认为:“WTO规则是通过WTO特有的争端解决体系执行的。”参见:Joost Pauwdyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules and Rules -Toward a More Collective Approach,American Journal of International Law 2(April):335-47,p.336.
1 Judith Hippler Bello,The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:Less Is More,in The American Journal of International Law,Vol.90,No.3,P.417.
2 John H.Jackson,The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding—Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation,in The American Journal of International Law,Vol.91,No.1,pp.60-64.
3 WTO Appellate Body Report,Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,WT/DS8/AB/R,WT/DS10/AB/R,and WT/DS11/AB/R,adopted 1 November 1996,p.32.
4 仅有香港对执行专家组的报告进行了明确的支持。
1 Gavin Goh & Andreas R.Ziegler,Retrospective Remedies in the WTO After Automative Leather,Journal of International Economic Law,Sept 2003,p.561.
2 WT/DS152/R,pant.7.24.
3 Petros Mavroidis,Remedies in the WTO Legal System:Between a Rock and a Hard Place,11 European Journal of International law 763(2000),p.780.
4 WT/DS126/RW,para.6.35.
1 讨论国际法的边界和限制,可参见:Jack L.Goldsmith and Eric A.Posner,The Limits of International Law,Oxford University Press,2005.
2 如在EC禽肉案、美国影响印度针织衫和罩衫的措施案中,上诉机构即应用了司法节制原则,对一些问题不予讨论。
3 依国际公法“遇有疑义从轻解释(in dubio mitius)”原则,条约解释时如遇用词含糊不清之情形,应采取使负担义务之一方较少负担的解释。
4 Richard H.Steinberg,Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO:Discursive,Constitutional,and Political Constraints,American Journal of International Law,Vol.98:247,2004,p.269.
5 European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products,WTO Doc.WT/DS135/AB/R(adopted Apr.5,2001).
1 Richard H.Steinberg,Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO:Discursive,Constitutional,and Political Constraints,American Journal of International Law,Vol.98:247,2004,p.273.
2 Richard H.Steinberg,Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO:Discursive,Constitutional,and Political Constraints,American Journal of International Law,Voi.98:247,2004,p.272.
1 但在法学家耶林那里,法律的强制性特征却被放在了十分突出的地位:“没有强制力的法律是一把不燃烧的火,一缕不发亮的光”。
2 关于国际体系中的正当性,详见Thomas M.Franck,Legitimacy in the International System,American Journal of International Law,82 Am.J.Int'1 L.,pp.705-760
1 Thomas M.Franck,The Power of Legit/macy and the Legitimacy of Power:International Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium,in The American Journal of International Law,Vol.100 No.1,p.94.
2 Ibid,p.93.
3 关于规则本身如何获得正当性,可参见:Hurd 1999;Kohler-Koch 2000。
4 参见Franek 1990,Finnemore & Sikkink 1998.
1 有关程序的正当性,可参见Dworkin 1986,Hurrell 1995,Franck 1995等。
2 Susan Esserman and Robert Howse,The WTO on Trial,in Petros C.Mavroidis,Alan O.Sykes eds.,:The WTO and International Trade Law/Dispute Settlement,p.289
3 Louis Henkin认为,“在几乎所有的时候,几乎所有国家都遵守国际法的几乎所有原则,并遵守它们几乎所有的义务。(It is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.)”(斜体为原作者所加),见Louis Henkin,How Nations Behave,2rid ed.,Columbia University Press,1979,p47.
4 Thomas M.Franck,The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power:International Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium,in The American Journal of International Law,Vol.100 No.1,p.93.
5 Ibid,p.93.
1 Ibid,p.93,originally from Thomas M.Franck & Edward Weisband,Word Politics:Verbal Strategy among the Superpowers 120-48(1971).
1 Kenneth W.Dam,1970,The GATT:Law and International Economic Organization,Chicago:University of Chicago Press,p.352.
2 John H.Jackson,1969,World Trade and the Law of GATT,Indianapolis,Bobbs-Merrill,p.170.
3 DSU第22.5条只是规定:“DSB授权的中止减让或其他义务的水平应与利益抵消或减损的水平相当。”
4 WT/DS217/ARB/EEC,para.6.4.
1 WT/DS217/ARB/EEC,paras.6.2 & 6.3.
2 Ibid,note 130.
3 如 S.A.Rhodes,The Article 21.5/22 Problem:Clarification through Bilateral Agreements?,3 J.I.E.L.(2000),553-558:Jason E.Keams and Steve Chamovitz,Adjudicating Compliance in the WTO:A Review of DSU Article 21.5,5 J.I.E.L.2(2002),331-352.
1 David Palmeter,The WTO Dispute Settlement System in the Next Ten Years,April 7,2006,p.5(working paper),available at http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/wto/pdfs/PalmeterWorkingPaper.pdf.最后访问时间为 2008年3月18日.
2 Naboth van den Broek,Power Paradoxes in Enforcement and Implementation of World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Reports:Interdisciplinary Approaches and New Proposals,Journal of World Trade.New York:Feb 2003.Vol.37,Iss.1,p.141.
1 John H.Jackson,The World Trade Organization,the Royal Institute of International Affairs,1998,p.86,
2 John H.Jackson,Dispute Settlement and the WTO,Journal of International Economic Law,Vol.1,p.335.
1 Steve Charnovitz,Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions,95 AM.J.INT'L L.792,pp.815-816.
2 Robert E.Hudec,Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement,in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES,pp.390-391.
3 Ibid,p.391.
4 Mark L.Movsesian,Enforcement of WTO Rulings:An Interest Group Analysis,in Hofstra Law Review Vol.32 No.1,Fall 2003,p.13.
1 DSU只规定过“贸易效果”,但是仲裁员在美国——版权法第110(5)节程序中,因为美国的有关版权法规定不导致贸易损失,但是会导致版费的损失,因此,仲裁员“能动性的”使用了“经济效果(economic effectt)”一词来计算报复的水平。参见WT/DS160/ARB25/1,9 November 2001,para.3.18.
2 WT/DS136/ARB,para.5.32.
3 Ibid,para.5.40.
4 Thomas Jurgensen,Crime and Punishment:Retaliation under the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System,Journal of World Trade 39(2):327-340,2005,p.4.
1 WT/DSI36/ARB,pare.5.58.
2 WT/DS217/ARB/EEC,para.4.17.
3 Ibid,para 4.18.
4 WT/DS217/ARB/EEC,pare.4.19.
1 WT/DS217/ARB/BRA,note 90.
2 Ibid,para.4.20.
3 WT/DS217/ARB,para.3.74.
1 Report of the Working Party on Netherlands Action under Article ⅩⅩⅢ:2,L/61,7 November 1952.
2 WT/DS136/ARB,para.5.72.
1 E.g.:Bronckers & van den Broek,Financial Compensation in the WTO:Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement,Journal of International Economic Law,Vol.8,Issue 1,pp.101-126,2005;William J.Davey,The WTO:Looking Forwards,9J.Int'1 Econ.L.3,22-23(2006);et al.
2 Suzanne,p.163.
3 见 Draft Articles on Responsibilty of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,adopted by the International Law Commission at its 53~(rd) session,Sept 2001.
4 1929 PCIJ Series A,No 8,4,p 21.
5 Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek,Financial Compensation in the WTO:Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement,8 J.Int'1 Econ.L.101,103(2005).
1 Alexander Keck,WTO Dispute Settlement:What Role for Economic Analysis? A Commentary on Fritz Breuss,4 J.Indus.Competition & Trade 365,368(2004).
2 当然,如果货币补偿确实只是暂时的措施,且货币补偿后原有非法措施被最终取消了或与WTO协定相符,则还是可行的。
1 Trade Bill Includes Temporary Fix for EU-US Copyright Dispute,Inside US Trade,2 August 2002,p.17.
2 指有关的执行措施。
3 R.Hudec,Enforcing International Trade Law,Salem,NH:Butterworth,1991,pp.199-200.
4 Ecuador-Contribution of Ecuador to the Improvements of the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO,8 July 2002,TN/DS/W/9.
5 WT/DSS/AB/R,pp.14-15.
1 H.Horn and P.Mavroidis,Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement System and Developing Countries Interests,1999,p.8.
2 Australia-Subsidies provided to producers and exporters of automotive leather,Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States,at para.6.39
3 WT/DSi26/RW,adopted 11 February 2000.
4 另一个原因是专家组在作出这一审理时,超出了专家组的授权范围(tersm of reference),审理了双方均没有要求的问题。见WT/DS126/RW,para.6.19.
5 WT/DS27/RW/ECU,para.6.105.
1 WT/DS 165/R,para.6.106.
2 WT/DS70/RW,para.5.48.
3 WT/DS46/RW,footnote 17.
4 WT/DS108/RW,para.3.1.
5 GATT panel report,GPR/DS2/R,adopted 13 May 1992.
6 1929 PCIJ Series A,No 8,4,p.21.
7 WT/DS2/AB/R,adopted 20 May 1996,p.17.
8 WT/DS58/AB/R.
9 Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek,Financial Compensation in the WTO:Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement,8 Journal of International Economic Law(101)(2005),p.103.
1 Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek,Financial Compensation in the WTO:Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement,8 Journal of International Economic Law(101)(2005),p.105.
2 Ibid,pp.110-111.
3 Report of the Ad Hoc Group on Legal Amendments to the General Agreement,COM.TD/F/4,(4 March 1966).
1 Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Brock,Financial Compensation in the WTO:Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement,8 Journal of International Economic Law(101)(2005),pp.,112-121.
2 见前文关于“WTO已授权的报复统计”。
1 如Sungjoon Cho,The Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law,65 U.Pitt.L.Rev.763,787-88(20O4)。
2 关于贸易损失的计算方法,可以参见本文前一节。
3 Bronckers和van den Broek并认为,政府对其被裁定应负责的损害的弥补,这是国际公法传统的一部分,而不是什么新鲜观念。参见Rene Guilherme S.Medrado,Renegotiating Remedies in the WTO:A Multilateral Approach,22 Wis.Int'l L.J.323,369(2004).
1 DSU Article 19.1.
2 DSU Article 26.1(c).
3 如US—Stainless Steel(Mexico) Panel Report,EC—Salmon(Panel) Report,Japan—DRAMS CVDs Panel Report,US—Byrd Amendment Panel Report,etc.
1 Horn & Mavroidis,Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement System and Developing Countries Interests,1999,p.14.
2 有关风注1。
3 WT/DS344/R,para.8.4-5.
4 WT/DS328/R,para.8.6-9.
1 WT/DS336/R,para.8.7-8.
2 WT/DS268/R,paras.A-75,A-76,85-87.
3 WT/DS268/AB/RW/,para.184.
4 WT/DS331/R,para.8.7-12.
5 WT/DS283/R,paras.8.6-8.
6 WT/DS241/R,para.8.3-7.
7 WT/DS217/R,para.8.6.
1 WT/DS27/RW/ECU 第6.8段。
2 WT/DS70/AB/RW,paras.33-38.
3 WT/DS18/RW 第7.10段。
4 WT/DS257/RW 第66-69段。
5 WT/DS141/AB/RW,para.79.
6 WT/DS267/RW,paras.9.9-27.
1 Ibid,para.9.22.
2 WT/DS257/AB/RW,paras,49-94.
3 WT/DS126/RW 第6.5段。
4 WT/DS18/RW 第7.10段。
1 所有数据均截止于2008年3月20日星期四。
2 见TN/DS/W/35(2003年1月22日)提案。
3 参见第一章的统计表格。
4 DSU Article 21.6.
1 Joost Pauwelyn,Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach,American Journal of International Law 2(April):335-47,p.336.
1 Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek,Financial Compensation in the WTO:Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement,8 Journal of International Economic Law(101)(2005);World Trade Organization,THE FUTURE OF THE WTO:ADDRESSING INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM,Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi,para.243.
2而且,当前的《国家责任法》草案以及一些国际法实践,都比较明确的规定了对违反国际法行为的“补偿(reparation)”。
1 同上,第96页。
2 Roger Fisher,Improving Compliance with International Law,Charlottesville:University Press of Virginia,1981,p.199.
3 Ibid.,p.199.
4 Ibid.,p.200.
1 Pauling v.McElroy,278 F.2d 252(D.C.Cir.1960).
2 United States—1974 Trade Act Article 301,WT/DS 152/R,para.7.72.
3 Ibid.,note 661.
4 Ibid.,para.7.72.
5 DSU Article 3.2.
1 United States—1974 Trade Act Article 301,WT/DSI52/R,para.7.78.
2 John H.Jackson,The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding—Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation,in The American Journal of International Law,Vol.91,No.1,pp.60-64.
3 Case C-149/96,Portuguese Republic v.Council,1999 E.C.R.I-8395 第38段。
4 John H.Jackson,The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding—Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation,in The American Journal of International Law,Vol.91,No.1,p,62.
5 有关WTO关于执行义务的规定,John H.Jackson教授列出了DSU的至少11处规定。详见J.H.Jackson,The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstanding on the Nature of Legal Obligation,91 A.J.I.L.,1997,p.63.
1关于国际法规则是否能够在欧盟内产生直接效力,欧盟法院判例确定的标准是:应首先确定该规则的内容是否足够清楚、准确和无条件;二是应根据该国际法的目的和上下文,判定来规则是否符合该国际法的明确目的。详见Case 270/80,Polydor Ltd.V.Harlequin Record Shops Ltd.,1982 E.C.R.329第14段及以下;Case C-432/92,The Queen v.Minister of Agric.,Fisheries and Food,1994 E.C.R.I-3087等。
2 Case C-149/96,Portuguese Republic v.Council,1999 E.C.R.I-8395,p.40.
3 Ibid,p.46.
4 19 U.S.C.§ 3512(a)(2)(2002).
5 James McCall Smith,The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design:Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts,54 INT'L ORG.137,p.142(2000).
6 R.Hudec,Enforcing International Trade Law,Salem,NH:Butterworth,1991,p.172.
1 Julian G.Ku,The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations:New Problems With Old Solutions,85 MINN.L.REV.71,77(2000).
2 United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,WT/DSI52/R,paras.7.72-7.92(Dec.22,1999).
3 Case C-149/96,Portuguese Republic v.Council,1999 E.C.R.1-8395,p.40.
4 Ibid,p.46.
1 Fisher,p.207.
2 Fisher,p.209.
1 叶兴平:《国际争端解决机制的最新发展》,法律出版社,2006年第1版,第3页。
2 同上,第4页。
1 Damedin Tsogtbaatar,Mongolia's WTO Accession:Expectations and Realities of WTO Membership,Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation:CASE STUDY 29,p.2.网络地址:http://www.wto.org/English/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case29_e.htm,最后访问2008-3-20。
1 DSU第3.7条。
2 Susan Esserman and Robert Howse,The WTO on Trial,in Petros C.Mavroidis,Alan O.Sykes eds.,:The WTO and International Trade Law/Dispute Settlement,p.298
3 Turab Hussain,Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation:Case Study 34 "Victory in Principle:Pakistan's Dispute Settlement Case on Combed Cotton Yarn Exports to the United States".
4 但泰国则认为无论如何都应该大胆诉讼,即便失败了也能表达自己的观点,而这对在其他领域的谈判是有利的;如果胜诉,则更可以获得几倍的回报。另外,即便没有完整的司法程序,也可能达成有约束力的结果。参见Nilaratna Xuto,Thailand:Conciliating a Dispute on Tuna Exports to the EC,MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF WTO PARTICIPATION:CASE STUDY 40.
5 如前文统计过的,不上诉争端审理,耗时平均为465.03天;上诉争端审理,平均耗时为550.53天;不上诉情况下的执行专家组程序,耗时平均为244.63天;上诉情况下的执行专家纽程序,耗时平均为373.36天;另外DSU第22.6条仲裁程序也耗时不等,都极大的延长了对WTO案件的审理和执行期限。
1贺小勇:《国际贸易争端解决与中国对策研究——以WTO为视角》,法律出版社,2006年3月出版,第254-255页。
2贺小勇:《国际贸易争端解决与中国对策研究——以WTO为视角》,法律出版社,2006年3月出版,第251页。
3同上,第254页。
1同上,第271页。
2周汉民主编:《中国外贸救济与外贸调查制度》,上海交通大学出版社,2005年4月出版,第200-204页。
1商务部,WTO争端解决专家组听证会首次向公众开放,http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/dwmyxs/200607/20060702585614.html,2008-3-22最后登录。
2 参见TN/DS/W/29(23 January 2003).
3 TN/DS/W/40,TN/DS/W/47.
4 TN/DS/W/40.
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28、[比]约斯特·鲍威林著:《国际公法规则之冲突》,周忠海、周丽瑛、马静、黄建中等译,法律出版社2005年第1版。
1、周汉民主编:《与WTO规则的融合》,上海人民出版社2003年第1版。
2、周汉民主编:《中国外贸救济与外贸调查制度》,上海交通大学出版社2005年第1版。
3、汪尧田、周汉民主编:《世界贸易组织总论》,上海远东出版社1995年第1版。
4、张玉卿主编:《WTO新回合法律问题研究》,中国商务出版社2004年第1版。
5、王铁崖主编:《国际法》,法律出版社1995年第1版。
6、陈安主编:《国际经济法学刊》第10卷(2004),北京大学出版社。
7、陈安主编《国际经济法学刊》第11卷(2004),北京大学出版社。
8、陈安主编:《国际经济法学刊》第12卷第1期(2005),北京大学出版社。
9、陈安主编:《国际经济法学刊》第13卷第2期(2006),北京大学出版社。
10、陈安主编:《国际经济法学刊》第14卷第1期(2007),北京大学出版社。
11、[美]安妮·O·克鲁格编:《作为国际组织的WTO》,黄理平、彭利平、刘军等译,上海人民出版社2002年第1版。
12、世界贸易组织秘书处编:《乌拉圭回合协议导读》,索必成、胡盈之译,法律出版社2000年第1版。
13、世界贸易组织秘书处编:《贸易走向未来》,张江波,索必成译,法律出版社1999年第1版。
14、《最高人民法院司法解释小文库》编选组编:《WTO司法解释及相 关法律规范》,人民法院出版社2003年第1版。
1、赵维田:《WTO司法机制的主要特征》,载于《北大国际法与比较法评论》第一卷,北京大学出版社,2002年第一版。
2、赵维田:《WTO与国际法》,载于《法律适用》2000年第8期特稿。
3、吴汉东:《关于知识产权私权属性的再认识——兼评“知识产权公权化”理论》,载于《社会科学》,2005年第10期,第58页。
4、李以渝:《机制论:事物机制的系统科学分析》,载于《系统科学学报》第15卷第4期,2007年10月。
5、余敏友:《关贸总协定争议解决活动的主要成就与问题》,载于《中国国际法年刊》,法律出版社1996年出版。
6、余敏友,陈卫东:《欧共体围绕WTO协定直接效力问题的争论及其对我国的启示(一)》,载于《法学评论》,2001年第3期,第97页。
7、吕成功:《美国对世界的博弈——伯德修正案之争》,载于《WTO经济导刊》,2004年第12期。
8、秦建荣,唐荣安:《DSU报复制度的显著改进及我国的应对策略》,载于《桂林师范高等专科学校学报》,2005年12月第19卷第4期。
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6.http://europa.eu/
7.http://www.worldtradelaw.net/
8.http://www.worldtradelaw.net/community/
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