公共物品提供模式的理论分析
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摘要
公共物品消费过程中所具有的非排他性和非竞争性特点，导致市场在提供公共物品时出现失灵现象，在这种情况下，政府成为公共物品的唯一提供者。然而受政府财力不足、政府运营公共资金的低效率以及人们对各种公共物品的需求不断增加等因素的影响，政府提供的公共物品严重不足，不能满足经济和社会发展的需要。
20世纪70年代出现在西方市场经济国家的公共物品市场提供模式，为我们解决这个难题提供了思路，政府可以利用市场来提供公共物品。本文详细论述了政府可以利用市场提供公共物品的原因、市场提供公共物品的理论依据以及政府与市场如何有效地配合生产社会发展所需要的公共物品。这对于我国公共物品提供体系的完善、公共财政体系的建设、以及理解市场经济条件下政府与市场之间关系，都具有非常重要的理论意义和现实意义。
公共物品的公共性会因为经济发展水平、技术条件、需求弹性、外部性等因素的变化而改变，从而使公共物品与私人物品的边界变得模糊。正是基于这一点，公共物品两个特点的成立是有条件的，即在拥挤点之间，公共物品才具有非排他性和非竞争性，所以公共物品是指设计使用者大于1的物品。公共物品在物品序列图中位置的不确定性决定了其在物品提供者序列图中的位置也具有不确定性，政府与市场都可能成为其提供者。由此提出了公共物品提供的经济发展观，应该根据经济和技术条件的变化，按照效率与公平的原则，动态地选择公共物品的最优提供者。拓宽了公共物品提供的渠道，进一步完善了公共物品提供理论。
基于公共物品提供的经济发展观，详细分析了公共物品提供的三种主要模式：政府直接生产模式、政府利用市场间接生产模式以及私人提供模式。政府提供公共物品是基于公平分配的考虑，而政府直接生产是从生产的角度来讲。当市场提供公共物品时，政府提供的涵义就体现在政府对于市场生产出来的公共物品通过一定的方式进行分配。政府利用市场提供公共物品，是公共部门与私人部门的有机结合，是效率与公平的有机结合。非政府组织及个人对公共物品的自愿提供以及实验经济学的结论证明了现实的人们并非总是“经济人”，每一个体都是一定程度的利他主义与利己主义的均衡体。
为防止市场提供公共物品时对于社会公平的偏离，政府需要对提供公共物品的市场主体进行有效地管制。本文系统分析了政府管制的客体和管制的方式，以及在信息不对称约束条件下政府管制方法的创新——激励性管制和协商性管制。
西北大学博士学位论文
最后，基于公共物品提供的经济发展观，分析了我国农村公共物品供给体制内
生的矛盾和问题，指出解决农村公共物品关键措施在于将“三提五统”的农村公共
物品融资体制纳入国家财政收支范围，在加大政府支农力度的同时，改变重工轻农、
重城市轻农村的传统观念，多渠道地为农村公共物品的生产提供资金。
Because of public goods' two characteristics, non-excludability and non-rivalry, the market cannot provide it efficiently, the government become the sole providers in the public goods market. But the government can hardly provide enough public goods for the society because the demands of public goods are increasing and the public sectors always inefficiently use public finance.
In 1970s, many governments in developed countries began to use market to provide public goods with success. This gives us a useful experiment to solve the puzzle of the public goods' provision. The dissertation detailedly analyzes why the governments can utilize the market to provide public goods, the theoretical foundation of market provision public goods and how to balance the governments and the market in order to provide necessary public goods. These studies will take on the active meaning for the improvement of the public goods provision system, the construction of the public finance system and understanding the relationship between government and market under market system.
The public goods' characteristics will be changed because of the changes of the economic development level, technical level, demand elasticity, externality, and so on. So when we talk about the public goods' characteristics, we must consider their precondition. This precondition is the public goods congestion. The public goods will have two characteristics when the number of public goods' users is less than the number of public goods' congestion point. Based on this point, the public goods is a special goods whose designed users is more than one person. Both the government and the market can provide the public goods. This is the economic development theory of the public goods provision.
Based on the economic development theory of the public goods provision, there are three main public goods provision patterns: public provision pattern; market provision pattern and private voluntary provision pattern. These are separately analyzed in this dissertation. When the governments use market to provide public goods, the public provision means that the governments evenly distribute the public goods to the society. The voluntary provision of public goods has proved that individuals are not always free rider in the public goods provision. An economic person possesses of two characteristics:
altruism and egoism.
In order to prevent the private companies from paying less attention to the public interests when they provide public goods, the governments always regulate their activities. This dissertation analyzes systematically the governments' regulation methods and their objects. But the traditional regulations are inefficiency because the governments did not take into account the asymmetric information between the regulators and the regulatees. In order to improve the efficiency of the regulation, the traditional methods should be innovated. The negotiated regulation between the governments and the regulatees may be a good method.
In the end, this dissertation presents the endogenic conflicts in the rural public goods provision system based on the economic development theory of public goods provision. In order to solve these problems, the traditional provision system must be reformed institutionally, and more funds should be collected for the provision of the rural public goods, as well as improving the fiscal investment in these fields.
20世纪70年代出现在西方市场经济国家的公共物品市场提供模式，为我们解决这个难题提供了思路，政府可以利用市场来提供公共物品。本文详细论述了政府可以利用市场提供公共物品的原因、市场提供公共物品的理论依据以及政府与市场如何有效地配合生产社会发展所需要的公共物品。这对于我国公共物品提供体系的完善、公共财政体系的建设、以及理解市场经济条件下政府与市场之间关系，都具有非常重要的理论意义和现实意义。
公共物品的公共性会因为经济发展水平、技术条件、需求弹性、外部性等因素的变化而改变，从而使公共物品与私人物品的边界变得模糊。正是基于这一点，公共物品两个特点的成立是有条件的，即在拥挤点之间，公共物品才具有非排他性和非竞争性，所以公共物品是指设计使用者大于1的物品。公共物品在物品序列图中位置的不确定性决定了其在物品提供者序列图中的位置也具有不确定性，政府与市场都可能成为其提供者。由此提出了公共物品提供的经济发展观，应该根据经济和技术条件的变化，按照效率与公平的原则，动态地选择公共物品的最优提供者。拓宽了公共物品提供的渠道，进一步完善了公共物品提供理论。
基于公共物品提供的经济发展观，详细分析了公共物品提供的三种主要模式：政府直接生产模式、政府利用市场间接生产模式以及私人提供模式。政府提供公共物品是基于公平分配的考虑，而政府直接生产是从生产的角度来讲。当市场提供公共物品时，政府提供的涵义就体现在政府对于市场生产出来的公共物品通过一定的方式进行分配。政府利用市场提供公共物品，是公共部门与私人部门的有机结合，是效率与公平的有机结合。非政府组织及个人对公共物品的自愿提供以及实验经济学的结论证明了现实的人们并非总是“经济人”，每一个体都是一定程度的利他主义与利己主义的均衡体。
为防止市场提供公共物品时对于社会公平的偏离，政府需要对提供公共物品的市场主体进行有效地管制。本文系统分析了政府管制的客体和管制的方式，以及在信息不对称约束条件下政府管制方法的创新——激励性管制和协商性管制。
西北大学博士学位论文
最后，基于公共物品提供的经济发展观，分析了我国农村公共物品供给体制内
生的矛盾和问题，指出解决农村公共物品关键措施在于将“三提五统”的农村公共
物品融资体制纳入国家财政收支范围，在加大政府支农力度的同时，改变重工轻农、
重城市轻农村的传统观念，多渠道地为农村公共物品的生产提供资金。
Because of public goods' two characteristics, non-excludability and non-rivalry, the market cannot provide it efficiently, the government become the sole providers in the public goods market. But the government can hardly provide enough public goods for the society because the demands of public goods are increasing and the public sectors always inefficiently use public finance.
In 1970s, many governments in developed countries began to use market to provide public goods with success. This gives us a useful experiment to solve the puzzle of the public goods' provision. The dissertation detailedly analyzes why the governments can utilize the market to provide public goods, the theoretical foundation of market provision public goods and how to balance the governments and the market in order to provide necessary public goods. These studies will take on the active meaning for the improvement of the public goods provision system, the construction of the public finance system and understanding the relationship between government and market under market system.
The public goods' characteristics will be changed because of the changes of the economic development level, technical level, demand elasticity, externality, and so on. So when we talk about the public goods' characteristics, we must consider their precondition. This precondition is the public goods congestion. The public goods will have two characteristics when the number of public goods' users is less than the number of public goods' congestion point. Based on this point, the public goods is a special goods whose designed users is more than one person. Both the government and the market can provide the public goods. This is the economic development theory of the public goods provision.
Based on the economic development theory of the public goods provision, there are three main public goods provision patterns: public provision pattern; market provision pattern and private voluntary provision pattern. These are separately analyzed in this dissertation. When the governments use market to provide public goods, the public provision means that the governments evenly distribute the public goods to the society. The voluntary provision of public goods has proved that individuals are not always free rider in the public goods provision. An economic person possesses of two characteristics:
altruism and egoism.
In order to prevent the private companies from paying less attention to the public interests when they provide public goods, the governments always regulate their activities. This dissertation analyzes systematically the governments' regulation methods and their objects. But the traditional regulations are inefficiency because the governments did not take into account the asymmetric information between the regulators and the regulatees. In order to improve the efficiency of the regulation, the traditional methods should be innovated. The negotiated regulation between the governments and the regulatees may be a good method.
In the end, this dissertation presents the endogenic conflicts in the rural public goods provision system based on the economic development theory of public goods provision. In order to solve these problems, the traditional provision system must be reformed institutionally, and more funds should be collected for the provision of the rural public goods, as well as improving the fiscal investment in these fields.
引文
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1．[J]：期刊
2．[M]：专著
3．[C]：论文集
4．[A]：论文集中析出的文献
5．[N]：报纸
6．[D]：学位论文
7．[WP]：工作论文
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1．[J]：期刊
2．[M]：专著
3．[C]：论文集
4．[A]：论文集中析出的文献
5．[N]：报纸
6．[D]：学位论文
7．[WP]：工作论文