项目融资风险分担、控制模型及其实证分析
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摘要
项目融资作为国际金融市场的一个创新,为吸引私人和国际资本提供了更加灵活和多样的渠道,并为各国的基础设施的建设以及经济社会的发展提供了强有力的支持。随着国际上各种项目融资方式,如BOT、PFI、ABS等,在道路、桥梁修建、能源开发、水资源开发等各个领域的广泛应用。项目融资被视为国际金融的一个独立分支,开始受到人们的广泛重视。在国内,随着我国经济的持续快速发展,基础设施、石油、电力、水资源等的供需矛盾日益突出,加大投资力度已经是唯一选择,但是,如何提高投资的效率和效益、如何吸引更多的民间资本以及国际资本,则成为我们要考虑的首要问题。应该说,项目融资,这一国际上通用及流行的方式,为我们解决这一难题打开了一扇大门。
     采取项目融资的方式进行建设,其复杂的过程使项目受到诸多因素的影响。国内外环境因素的变化,各参与方之间的关系处理,投融资的结构及模式的安排,资金的来源等都会影响到项目的建设进程,影响到项目的运行成本以及项目建成后的经济强度,而这些问题只有建立在对项目的风险有了正确的识别、评价、分析以及由此而采取合理的风险分担及动态控制的基础上才可以得到解决。
     本文以项目融资风险分析及控制的全过程为主线,首先对项目融资的概念、性质、特点以及组织和实施步骤都作了系统全面的阐述,并分析了目前国际、国内通用并流行的项目融资方式。接下来,在对项目融资的各种方式进行了详细的风险分析的基础上,建立了项目融资风险分担的博弈模型,从而为分析项目融资风险、优化项目融资结构以及建立科学合理的风险分配机制奠定了理论基础。然后,针对项目融资实施过程的风险控制,本文建立了项目融资风险动态评价和控制模型,分别以模糊数学及动态模糊层次分析法进行风险量化控制。最后,结合TEDA(天津经济技术开发区)的海水淡化项目进行项目融资实证分析,从项目博弈分析建立融资合同,一直到项目实施过程的动态风险评价与控制,进行了全过程及相关数据分析,进一步证明了该模型及理论的有效性。
As an innovation tool of the international financial market, Project Financing has developed into an efficient widely used financing method for private and international resource and can provide more vivid with diverse outlet and a powerful support for the development of the construction and economy society. The various modes of project financing, such as BOT、PFI、ABS etc., have been applied in many international projects, which included infrastructure's construction, power plants, water resources development projects etc. The Project financing is seen as an independence branch of the international finance, which has been accepted extensively by people.
     In China, along with the continuously and quickly development of the economy, the gap have been enlarged between supply and demand in the projects of public infrastructures, petroleum, power, water resources etc. Increasing investment is unique choice already, however, how to improve the efficiency and performance of the investment and how to attract more private and international capitals have become the initial problem that we should consider. The Project Financing, which is the more and more popular way to solve it, opened the door for us.
     The variety of the international environment factor, the relationship between the partners, the structures and the modes of the financing, the source of the funds etc. will have influence on the construction progress and the operation cost of the project. It could be solved by building up the right system for the project risk management, including risk identification and evaluation, and establishing reasonable model for the risk sharing and the dynamically controlling. In this paper, the whole process for project financing analysis and risk controlling were discussed in detail. Firstly, the elaborate completely introduction for the project financing concept, features, organizations and the implement steps were reviewed, then international currently modes of project financing were analyzed, especially for detailed risk analysis for the modes. After that, the model of project financing risk sharing was set up with the game theory, which is useful for analyzing project financing risk, optimizing project financing‘s structure and establishing reasonable allocation of the risks. For the risk control of project financing, the project financing risk dynamic evaluation and the control model was established, which used fuzzy mathematics, AHP and some indexes.
     In the paper, the cases of TEDA (Tianjin Economic Technological Development Area) were studied. Also one of the biggest scale seawater desalination projects was given as the empirical analysis evidence for the models. In this project, the financing contract was discussed through the model of risk sharing and the dynamic risk evaluation and control models were applied, which illustrated the models were practicable and applicable.
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